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( 1 of a) of 2) DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT] DOCUMENT DOCUMENT NUMBER TYPE SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS DATE RESTRICTION 1 Teleon HAK and Peter Ramsbotham (3 (T) DECLASSIFIED per Hr. 9/29/2014 7/22/74 b IA Telcon HAK and James Callaghan (5pp) 7/22/74 B per Hr. 9/29/2014 & Telcon DECLASSIFIED HAK and James Callaghan p.) 7/22/74 M DECLASSIFIED per Hr. 9/29/2014 2A Telcon HAK and Prime Minister Ecevit (2p DECLASSIFIED 7/22/74 B ob 3 Telcon HAR nd william Colby C2 pp.) per Hr. 9/29/2014 7/22/74 B SANITIZED per Hr. 9/29/2014 3.3(b)(1)(6) 4 Telcon HAK and Peter Ransbitham (2 pp.) 7/23/74 B SANITIZED per Hr. 9/29/2014 3.3(b)(6) h Tclcon HAK Peter Ransbothan 1p.) 7/23/74 M DECLASSIFIED per Hr. 9/29/2014 6 Telcon HAR and Peter Romsbothem Ca pp) 7/23/74 B DECLASSIFIED per Hr. 9/29/2014 17 Takan HAR and Peter Rumsbotham pp.) 7/23/74 DD DECLASSIFIED per Hr. 9/29/2014 8 Tckon HAK and William Colby (1p) 7/23/74 m DECLASSIFIED per Hr. 4/30/2013 FILE GROUP TITLE BOX NUMBER kissinger Transcripts - Telephone Conversations 26 FOLDER TITLE 1974 22-24 July RESTRICTION CODES A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy. E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or B. National security classified information. financial information. C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law rights. enforcement purposes. D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material. or a libel of a living person. H., Withdrawn and returned non-historical material. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NA FORM 1421 (4-85) This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. (2of) 2) DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT] DOCUMENT DOCUMENT NUMBER TYPE SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS DATE RESTRICTION 9 Tckon HAK SANITIZED and James Schlesinger C2 pp.) 7/24/74 13 per Hr. 9/29/2014 3.3(b)(1)(6) 10 Telcon HAK ml James Callaghan (3 PP.) 7/24/79 B DECLASSIFIED per Hr. 9/29/2014 11 Telcon HAR ml Poter Ransbirtham p.) 7/24/79 M DECLASSIFIED Hr. 9/29/2014 FILE GROUP TITLE BOX NUMBER Kissinger Transcripts - Telephone Conversations 26 FOLDER TITLE 1974 22-24 July S RESTRICTION CODES A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy. E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or B. National security classified information. financial information. C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law rights. enforcement purposes. D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted inval Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidentian Libraryand return private and personal material. or a libel of. a living person. DECLASSIFIED H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material. This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. of 2) DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT] DOCUMENT DOCUMENT NUMBER TYPE SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS DATE RESTRICTION 1 Tekon HAK and Peter Ramsbotham (3 pp.) 7/22/74 B 1A Telcon HAR and James Callaghan (Spp) 7/22/74 B 2 Tclcon HAR and James Callaghan (1p.) 7/22/74 B SANITIZED 2A Telcon HAK and Prime minister Eccuit (2pp.) 7/22/74 B SANITIZED 3 Telcon HAR and William Colby C2 pp.) 7/22/74 B 4 Telcon HAR and Peter Ransbotham (2 pp.) 7/23/74 B 5 Tclcon HAK and Peter Ransbothan (1p.) 7/23/74 B L Telcon HAR and Peter Ransbotham C2 pp) 7/23/74 B 7 Telcan HAR and Peter Ramsbotham (3pp.) 7/23/74 B a Tckon HAR and William Colby (lp) 7/23/74 B FILE GROUP TITLE BOX NUMBER kissinger Transcripts Telephone Conversations 26 FOLDER TITLE 1974 22-24 July 9 RESTRICTION CODES A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy. E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or B. National security classified information. financial information. C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law rights. enforcement purposes. D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material. or a libel of a living person. H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION DECLASSIFIED NA FORM 1421 (4-85) This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. of 2) DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT] DOCUMENT DOCUMENT NUMBER TYPE SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS DATE RESTRICTION 9 Tckon HAR SANITIZED and James Schlesinger C2 pp.) 7/24/74 13 10 Tclcon SANITIZED HAK and Junes Callayhan (3 3 pp.) 7/24/74 B 11 Telcon HAR and Peter Ramsbootham 'p.) 7/24/74 B FILE GROUP TITLE BOX NUMBER kissinger Transcripts - Telephone Conversations 26 FOLDER TITLE 1974 22-24 July 9 RESTRICTION CODES A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy. E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or B. National security classified information. financial information. C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law rights. enforcement purposes. D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material. or a libel of a living person. H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION DECLASSIFIED NA FORM 1421 (4-85) This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELECON Ambassador Ramsbotham/Secretary Kissinger July 22 British K: You're too friendly to me. I read in the/newspapers that you are to R: That was the Economist. K: Well, your story leaked in fact you're not even talking to me. R: Well, you've been XX away. I am very sorry about tax that. I have had some reports from our missions and you have been talking to London today. I haven't had a report on that, but I do have some cables I want to tell you about. As you know, Makarios is arriving in New York tomorrow at 1:30. He has asked us to have the meeting delayed until Friday morning to allow him to rest and he He expects to be challanged. We have heard from Waldheim that he sent a message to Makarios that he will support his address to the committee. We have prepared an outline of a draft resolution since the need to take a strong stance from the non-aligned. Then, we saw Makarios this evening. We didn't discuss the fraft but he made clear his objectives. There are three of then First, to deny recognition. Secondly, get international support to return to the status quo and third, secure withdrawal of the Box Greek officer from the National Guard. K: I think it is dangerous to start me mucking around in a civil war. I am sending Sisco over there and I would like to see if we can work out a compromise R: You are sending Sisco to New York? K: No, to London. R: To what? K: To London, to see if we can work out a X Greek/Turkish negotiation. If you make Mazxxx Makarios the xhiev chief spokesman and loga legal ruler, you will leave it up to him as to which forces he will bring to the Island and they will be Soviet forces. R: Well, he is a Commonwealth head and it would be difficult for us not to support him at that stage. He has an astonishing power of survival. What do you have in mind? K: I would at least make it more difficult to make sure he isn't going to start moving. If the Greek officers are removed from the Island, the only IXEX result will be that the balance of power will shift to the Communist party to the extent that the Greek officers were restrained and secondly, Greece cannot in the balance off the Turks and then the Eastern Bloc will have to provide support. DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526, Section 3.5 624009-64/14020 Per Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Hr. 9/29/2014 DECLASSIFIED By RIWIH NARA, Date 11/9/2016 This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Ramsbotham -page 2 R: The national guard -- are they very strong? K: I think they are a strong element. R: Twice they tried to assassinate him. K: Who. R: The Boxexx Gree k officer of the National Guard. I am not so sure Makarios will run to the Communists. It is not in his nature. K: Maybe not, but it may be a political reality. R: The difficulty about not doing anything is you are getting a strong resolution in the Security Council and we have to counter it with something. . K: Well, let it go. R: That wouldn't worry you? K: It worries me to meet one day's headline and get into a trap. I don't want the present government to be replaced by Communist governemnt or a Quadaff type government. So, I want a * slow gxx game. We wouldn't accept a Xxx Sampson government. There is no question about accepting Sampson R: Dimitri (?) told me that if Clerides was put forward, he would serve under h im and be loyal to him which I think is interesting. K: That is what we would like. I would like to get rid of both. R: I find it XXXX difficult to believe Sampson will last long. K: But that is not the point. I would prefer we try this Clerides in and then go all out for Makarios. We don't mind falling back to him, but not in such an exuberant fastin fashion. R: How far did you get with Callaghan? K: My impression is that Jim is more susceptible to txx his Foreign Office advice than I am to my State Department. R: I see that point very clear. K: My concern is, if we dtotaly endorse Makarion, we're doing his work for him. The reality of the situation is going back on the Turks. Since he ********** certainly will not make sixux himself a . I don't think we should. Xxxx All of this is going to If we had some idea X what Clerides had . Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Ramsbotham -page 3 R: Have they made these points? K: He can be XXXXX under no doubt about that whole idea. I did mention K to him and he wants two things R: The only difficulty about it, H Henry, is the . He's not the right man to attend such it's a small point. K: I have no idea, but I know Makexinex Makarios us to hand everything to him for nothing. R: the outline of a possible agreement. K: Why don't we decide this tomorrow W evening. R: OK. END Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. EYES ONLY Send to Larry Brenner for information. This must be returned to B. Scowcroft within twenty-four hours. No reproduction permitted. hate: Buffum to London - wed. a.m. Comperence Wed. ofternoon HAR to send Callagben a sporting Cable. File Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON Sec. Gen Waldheim/ Sec. Kissinger July 22, 9:40 a.m. [1974] W: I wish to tell you how happy I am about the acceptance of the ceasefire and wish to thank you for all your efforts. K: We have worked together on many things Mr. Sec. Gen. W: I wanted to tell you I had a call from the For. Min. of Turkey who bitterly complained about the K: I had a call from the PM and I was going to call you. We would support an increase of the United Nations Forces and any strengthening of the mandate. W: Yes. I think this is what I want. K: I am told it does not need to be changed. W: I discussed this with some members of the Council -- the British Amb. here and I think thatoof course we have two possibilities -- either to get a new mandate from the Council which would create a debate in the Council and the other approach which I think is better -- is that I tell the Council that in this situation where we have a new role to play to separate the forces, we need strengthening of our forces and to ask that existing forces have of Government who are contributing to (increase) their contingent. You will go along with this K: We would strongly support it. We think it a better way of doing it and a faster way. W: Yes. Otherwise I am afraid we will have a long debate. K: We will strongly support it and I will instruct Scali to work with you on it. W: I am grateful for this. I think it is the only possibility to establish order in the Island again and I think the British are quite ready to give us the necessary reinforcements. R: My only problem Mr. Secretary is when you command the largest army in the non-communist world are you going to be too difficult to deal with. You are going to have a large army in Syria, Egypt, and now in Cyprus. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. 2. W: (Silence) I think in this respect I don't really feel that it is impossible to handle. K: I was just joking. W: (Laughter). K: Of course, we S will strongly support it and I will tell Scali to work with your people immediately. W: Fine. I appreciate this. I think it is very important also. It is said that if they don't stop massacring our people we have to continue bombarding those villages. K: We will strongly support it. W: With these 2-3000 men it is impossible. We need to be stronger. The British would be best to ask. K: We will strongly support it and I will tell Scali to get in touch with you immediately. W: Fine. Thank you for your information. K: You will be coming down this week. W: Yes. It is confirmed for 3:00. END Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Telcon Secretary Kissinger Minister Vorontsov 7/22/74; 11:00 a.m. V: Henry, you are at it again. K: It is getting revolting. V: We've had good chances before and we will do it again. I have a cable to you from Gromyko. It is a short one. It concerns our decision to evacuate part of our personnel from Cyprus from the Embassy and other missions. In toto # there will be 150 persons evacuated. K: Can we help you? V: Yes, Gromyko asked your cooperation but mainly we asked the British to help us. The main point is they are going to be evacuated by Soviet ships now in the port of Lanarka --- 150 persons. don't K: I/know where Lanarka is. V: To the south away from the invasion point. We appealed to the British and UN. K: We will do our utmost to cooperate with you. We are meeting now with our military and others persons. We will give maximum cooperation. If we can help with transportation, we will do it. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Telcon Secretary Kissinger/Foreign Min. Callaghan 7/22/74; 11:25 a. m. K: You wouldn't take my call. I rang you this morning, and you wouldn't take my call. C: [laughs] Well, now, what's the situation? K: Well, our understanding is that there is a coup in Greece. C: ] Yes. K: And Sisco thinks they won't be ready to meet tomorrow. C: Yes, I am told that this man Davos (?) is taking over. Is that right? K: That's right, and our reading is that he isn't so bad. C: Our what? K: Our reading is that he may be more moderate. C: Yeah, you know you've got a broken voice. I don't think it's just the accent of yours. It's that bloody machine you've got there. K: Do you want me to call you back? C: I think I can just make it out, Henry, if you go pretty slowly. Did you say that -- uh, what did you say last? K: I said that my impression - our impression - is that this fellow may not be so bad to work with. C: Ah, right, I agree, but I am told he's pretty anti-Turkish. K: Umm. C: However, I'll put if off, and what do you suggest? Wednesday? K: I would put it til Thursday. C: Well, is that letting it go a bit long? K: Well, then do it Wednesday if you want. DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526, Section 3.5 NLN09-64/14021 Per 9/29/2014 By R Wilt NARA, Date 11/9/2016 Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. -2- C: I think we/d better try for Wednesday, and we may have to settle for Thursday. K: Good. C: Because the situation is such that you've got this man Sampson still there. K: I agree. C: And Echevit was ringing me up and saying that genocide is going on and there's no authority to deal with. K: Now we are talking to Waldheim, C: Yes. K: to increase the UN force. C: Yes. K: And we will strongly support it if you will. C: Yes, we will certainly strongly support that, although we shall probably have to supply some people. K: That's what I would think. C: Yes, well all right. Well I would try and get that through, and we would have to add some people to the UN force and let them operate under UN auspices. K: Good. Box C: But I think in those circumstances it is all the more important we try and make it Wednesday if we can. K: Good. And I will bring Sisco home, and I will send Bill Buffum. C: Bill who? K: Buffum. C: All right. Yes. K: He's a very stable and solid and unexcitable fellow. C: Very good. K: And he will have my thinking in very great detail. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. -3- C: Would he come to Geneva? K: If you want him. C: Well, I think we'd better have him in London first. K: OK. C: And then he can come on from London to Geneva when we start the conference. K: He will be in London on Wednesday. C: On Wednesday. K: Unless it slips. C: Unless it slips, yes. All right. We'll see him here first thing Wednesday morning then, Henry. K: He'll be there first thing Wednesday. C: And then he can consult with us before we go. And we will try and make the conference Wednesday afternoon. K: Wonderful. C: See if you can make that stick with the Greeks and with the Turks, will you? K: I'll do my best. C: Right, old man. Good. K: And I've really enjoyed working with you on this. C: I really have. I think we've managed this not too badly, don't you? K: I think it's come out as a net asset. C: Yes, I think it's good too. We've got to get rid of this fellow Sampson quickly, you know? K: Well, I told you, we'd support that. C: Yes. That's right. OK. Well, when we get your man over here, we'll talk, and we'll try and coordinate again. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. -4- K: Now, look, I'm seeing Makarios this afternoon. C: Yes. K: And I'm going to play it rather cool. C: Don't be too cool. K: No, I'll play it loose. C: You must recognize, he's the legitimate President untill any other arrangements are made. K: That's right. No, no, I'll be very friendly, but I will be noncommittal. C: Yes, that's all right. I tell you, we will have to move very delicately on that one, Henry. K: I agree with you. C: Yeah, because we've got this big well, I've got a lot of information I'll tell your chap on that. And I know all the difficulties, but I take it you want to appear to be isolated on this one, you know. If we move, we've got to move together. K: No, no, we are not going to make a commitment, but we don't want a final decision made. C: No, no, all right. Well, we are going to inform him through our UN ambassador there. Righto, we are going to inform him of what is taking place, and we will notify Denktash, the Turkish leader, too, and Claridies. K: Right. And we will stay loose on it and very friendly. C: Yes, that's right. K: And we will send you a reporting cable. C: Yes, you keep it going for a bit, Henry. You take your uncle's advice. K: Oh, no, you can count on that. You can absolutely count on that. C: And you must be absolutely filthy to Sampson. K: You can count on that too. [laughter] C: Very good. I can always count on you being filthy, can I? Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. - -5- - K: We really have turned nasty on this. C: [laughs] All right. K: Good. Nice to have talked to you. C: Goodbye now. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON Callaghan/ Sec. Kissinger July 22, 1974 1:15 p.m. C: Sorry to trouble you. I don't seem to be blable to reach Ecevit. Are you r communications better than ours. K: I will try to reach him. What would you like me to discuss with him? C: In response to this hysterical telegram about the genocide that is going on and our communications with ourHigh Commissioner in Nicosia, I am ready to offer two companies of guards and two squadrons of armored cars to the UN forces. That would be about another 500 min. K: Wonderful. C: The other thing if you could carry him along on that would be great. The other thing is that his Ambassador in Cyprus seems to be dominated by the military commanders. He is in a hysterical mood and threatening to call in Turkish fighters to bomb the UN forces. Will you gtell him with as much caution as you can, if they do that we will stop them. K: All right. C: We can't do it very well. We have some Lightnings there. We cannot have them bombing UN Forces in my view. 750 of them are our own men apart from everything else. K: I agree. C: If you could get the positive side across to him and tell him to restrain his people in Nicosia It would be a great help. K: His ambassador is a pain in the neck. I will do it immediately. C: I have been trying for an hour and with no success. K: I will do my best. C: We have sent a message to our Ambassador to get to him.. If you put the threat to stop him in general terms I would be grateful. K: I will do it. END DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526, Section 3.5 NLN09-64/140227 Hr. 9/29/2014 By RJ WIH NARA, Date 11/9/2016 Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON Taska/ Greek Officials Sec. Kissinger July 22, 1974, 5:00 p.m. T: I am in the office of the Gizikis, the President of Greece. All of the Chiefs of the Greek military services are here as well as the new leadership of Greece, Kanaloplis. They are very anxious to have a word with you. I have told them the efforts we have made and how much importance we attach to maintenance of peace in the area. They are very, very concerned about what is going on in Cyprus and it has created an impossible problem for them politically to face as the first democratic government of Greece since 1967. They would like to have you speak to them and Kanaloplis so they can explain this problem. Kanaloplis: Mr. K. speaking. K: How nice to hear from you. Kan: We are all here very concered and we are in a dil emma. It is impossible for us to accept this continuation of such activities in Cyprus. The situation has become very critical. I would be very glad if you would be kind enough to have a talk with Mr. Napolis. K: I have heard you very well. Kan: I have to tell you I am very glad to have this talk with you for the first time in my life. K: I would like to tell you that our friendship for Greece is firm and you can count on our friendship and our alliance. I will get immediately in touch with the Turkish Prime Minister and urge him to show the greatest restraint. Kard: Thank you very much indeed. Please be so kind to have a talk with Mr. Napolis. N: Hello Mr. Secretary. K: How are you. N: Fine. Thank you very much. I just talked to Cleredis. Re the military operations to happen to Nicosia tomorrow morning. It would be impossible for us to survive as a Government just as we take over. What is come back to the ceasefire line. Otherwise we do not know how to stay in power. They are violating the ceasefire :agreement. We would like you to intervene as soon as possible and ask them to come back to the cease- fire line. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. 2. K: I understand and I will call the Turkish PM immediately. N: Thank you Mr. Secretary. The situation becomes very critical there and tomorrow morning in Nicosia the Greek forces will resist and there will be a massacre in the town and it will make it impossible the survival of the two communities in the Island. K: I understand. I will call the Turkish Govt immediately. N: In case you have something to tell us we are in the office of the President of the Republic here in Athens. K: I will call back within the hour. END Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON MelLair Sec. Kissinger July 22, 1974 5:00 L: Congratulations. K: How are you? L: You seem to be busy in another area in the Mediterannean. K: There is no nation of maniacs that I don't get involved in. L: It certainly seems to be some improvement. Very good. K: You are a mind reader. I have been wanted to get together with you. L: I would like to Henry. One thing I wanted to ask you and it sort of a personal thing. Dave Packard and I each September -- had about 65 Presidential appointees-- we take them to Airlie for two days. They were part of our team at Defense and we have continued this even though we left Defense. We go out for two days in September. You were at our first meeting in 1969. K: I remember. L: You answered question and had supper with us. This would include people -- members of the Joint Chiefs -- very few military the rest will be civilians. K: What day. L: Either the 20th or 21st of September. K: The only trouble is that I will be at the General Assembly but I could conceivably fly down -- what is the nearest town. L: You could land at Warrenton. K: With an airplane. I will look at my calendar and if humanly possible I will do it. L: It will be a kind of old time -- K: It is the sort of thing I like to do. L: Almost everyone of those people are out of Government now. As a matter of fact most of them wre let out after Dave and I left. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. 2. K: I am at the stage I have to meet people who might give me jobs. May I insult you. I look back at your tenure with nostalgia. L: I was not such a bad son-of-a-bitch. K: You were terrific. I said in a crisis we never had to worry about Mel Laird. L : I would be good to see you and let's get together. K: Let's have breakfast next week some morning. L: Fine, I would like too. K: Can we call you. L: At my office here. K: Let's say tentively Tuesday or Wedn esday, 30th or 31st. L: Wednesday would be best for me. K: Let's do it Wednesday. L: Come to your office. K: To the State Department office. Wed., 31st, 8:00. L: I will be there, Henry. It will be great to see you. K: I will give you my answer then. L: You certainly can and I no the problem. Dave and I were talking about it and what a great thing it would be. K: If I can get away from the GA and if not booked for one of those two nights, I will leave for down there and return to NY that night. L: It is informal. K: I remember. I did it on a Saturday later afternoon. The Chiefs went off duck hunting except for Zumwalt. L: That won't happen. K: Good-bye. END Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELECON Pm Ecevit/Sec. Kissinger July 22, 1974 5:30 pm K: Our relationship is more intense than at Harvard. E: What, I am not hearing ?? K: I said our relationship is more intense and more frequent than it was at Harvard. E: Yes, indeed. K: We have had urgent reports that your forces are actively violating the cease-fire and I was wondering if when dawn breaks they could be brought under control? E: I shall be concerned immediately. K: It is considered a bad. and makes it difficult to do what we all want to do. E: I shall do my best. K: Good. Also, it is my understanding that your Ambassador in Cyprus is under great stress. If he could be calmed down a bit. E: I see. K: If you could do your utmost to ****X ensure the cease-fire and we shall use our maximum influence with Greece. E: Alright, I will do that. K: Thank you, and You'll let me know about that other thing? E: We have discussed it. It is impossible for me to leave the country. Couldn't you do something about coming here ? K: Let me look at my situation. E: I have to be here. DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526, Section 3.5 NLIN09-64/14023 Per Hr. 9/29/2014 By R) /MIH NARA, Date 11/9/2016 Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. -2- K: I understand. Nr. Prime Minister, I am sendinf you some personal reflections -- on a personal and friendly basis. E: Thank you. K: Thank you. END Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELECON Chairman Brown/Secretary Kissinger July 22, 1974 5:55 PM K: I wonder if you could make an analysis of the performance of the Turkish army based on what you saw in Cyprus. Do it in my capacity as Assistant to the President what this means for NATO. B: Right. K:K The President is insistent on that. I just talked to him. B: We'll get right on it. K: I would appreciate it. He's worried they didn't perform very well and whether that means anything. B: I think they made a bad on the they made the mistake you mentioned this morning. Sent it with too little power. I'll do the analysis and get it back to you. K: OK. Thank you. END Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. C05953575 CU0090183 SANITIZED COPYCONFIDENTIAL EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs° 24 EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)>25Yrs SANITIZED TELECON William Colby/Secretary Kissinger July 22, 1974 6:23 PM K: How is the thing going in Cyprus? C: There's still a little shooting going on. It's no major problem. They're still shooting at us. The National Guard is cooperating to a certain extent. K: Can you make an xxxxx analysis for us as far as the performance of the Turkish army and what it tells us, what we want to know, and does it worry us about the southern flanks. C: They couldn't turn the ships axxxxharound fast enough to build up their forces. The problem is, we Americans are spoiled. Our forces are equipped to do these things. K: They must have figured it out before they went in the there. C: I know it. K: It's one of the few things VX you can figure on. C: It's a matter of doing your homework. S has broadcast an appeal to respect the ceasefire. K: How is that Greek government doing? Is there or is there not a coup? You better make sure there is tomorrow. I've announced it. You can't make me look bad. there was a coup today. C: No, in that I can find . K: It's the first time the U.S. has announced a coup in a friendly country. I gave a press briefing today. C: We had reports that there was something going on. C: They're talking about the movement of the Turks K: The movement of the Turks . C: I'm not worried about it. DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526, Section 3.5 CONFIDENTIAL 9/29/2014 By RIMIH NARA, Date 11/9/2016 Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. C05953575 000090183 CONF IDENTIAL Colby - page 2 K: Don't worry. Ithink we did well last week. C: I think it's XXXX coming out very well. K: We'll come out better if this sticks together. C: is out ? K: Is that . C: I think it would be hard to get him back in there at this point. I think you may have some press problems with Sampson and the Greeks. K: been seeing hiM? C: No. Just generally. In effect, their plan worked. K: Not yet. We can't be blex blamed for the imcompetence of the Turks. C: It wasn't our problem. It was a Greek/Turkish Elxegthing. We are not conducting a political sixen science CODEX course. K: I'm still hoping to get Clerides in. C: There may be some chance of that. I was trying to figure out the pressure points for you. K: We'll have to see. C: It's one of the over there, it's not our problem K: We have come out in that respect very well. We are certainly not going to lend any support for Sampson. C: I think there will be some chatter in the left place. K: OK. Many thanks. END CONFIDENTIAL Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Date 1/23 EYES ONLY FOR: Please return to Jackie Hill by Close of Business today. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. L TELECON Mr. Andropolous/Secretary Kissinger July 23 A. This is the Prime Minister. K: How are you Mr. Prime Minister ? A: Fine, how are you? K: Fine. A: I am sorry I have to bother you again. I am in a difficult position to bring to your attention the cease-fire. Therefore, fighting took place on various parts of the Island. War materials were unloaded and military men have landed on the Island at the port of Kyrenia. K: Yes. A: And something must be done to stop all of this because there is a clear understanding and Greece has (inaudible) K: I will do my best immediately and I am glad you are calling it to my attention. A: What is going to happen tomorrow morning? Because in Cyprus now it is about 10:15 and during the night things may be somehow started and then it is morning and we may start all over again. K: We will do our best to get it stopped. Can I ask you a question? A: Yes. K: I was wondering if you wouldn't be coming to the United States at any point so we could exchange ideas. A: I don't think I could make it right now. K: You could not? A: It's something to be considered. K: I think as we begin these negotiations A: The negotiations will begin our Minister of Foreign Affairs will carry out the negotiations and I think. cool off a little bit. (inaudible) K: We understand this Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. -2- A: And then we will sit down and discuss.. K: I thought it might be helpful to discuss general strategy and intentions. The Turkish Prime Minister thought he might want to come over for a day. A: I think now it might make it more difficult to have meetings together. K: No, no. It would be separate; it WD uldn't be joint. A: Well, K: Let me think about it. I will be in touch with you. A: Thank you. END Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON Amb. Ramsbotham/Sec. Kissinger July 23, 1974, 3:23 p.m. R: Henry, I have received a telegram which I forgot about this morning. Calaghan spoke to Cxyxpx Kiprious and was told then that the Greeks could not come to the meeting. He tried to put a lot of p ressure on him -- before the coup or anything else. He said he intended to be in a meeting for 3:00. Turkey would be there, the UN and US representatives and the world press would be present. If the Greeks did not arrive the world would draw its own conclusion. It was all meant to put on pressure. K: What is the hurry now? Larry has just talked in the last 10 minutes to Alexander and apparently he told him you were having a meeting. Discussed when the conference might take place and the Turks might become difficult without a conference. I did not have the impression that the Turks were dying to get to a conference. R: Nor did I. K: First of all I hope you will not act without talking to us. We did not make a move without talking to you. Even though we grant you the brains and us the muscle. It would still be nice. Secondly, I don't see what the compulsion is to have this meeting. R: I suppose unless you can get the people around the table soon the Island situation might change. I don't know their thinking. I will get in touch. What I read to you was this morning work and that was just pressure. K: Make clear to your people on that morning -- don't bother to protest that morning thing just make clear to them in general. Obviously, all parties have to be there before we can do anything. Whatevery happens in Greece should be given 48 hours to settle down. As far as I can tell they have no PM now. Third, we will be happy to try to handle it. the Turks with you. I don't have the impression that exactx Ecevit will die of a heart attack if there is no conference. R: I agree. Certainly we are not going to take any decisions without consulting. K: If the junta were still there, I would think it desirable to have a rapid conference. In its absence I don't see the advantage of Thursday or Friday. DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526, Section 3.5 NLIN09-64/14027Pe 9/29/2014 By RJ IMIH NARA, Date 11/9/2016 Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. 2. R: Yes. Unless there is something happening on the Island which is relevant and I don't know about. . K: Thank you. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELECON General Haig/Secretary Kissinger July 23, 1974 2:40 pm K: I had a very good session thbs morning and if you follow the same route we're home free. Almost everyone agreed to clear us. Starting out on Kraft they asked about that. I said that is all nonsense. Haig never did anything that he was not ordered to do and Haig never did anything I was not aware of. So the, that reduced it to Saffire. H: They said what about Saffire? K: I sal d I didn't know about it and I assumed Haig didn't know about the tap. They said how does Hiag's name appear on that request. I said, I don't know. I don't know how they kept on this. That is the only area you have a problem. All the rest of the stuff On the Young thing, I said I have no reason to believe Hiag knew Young was requesting an investigation. H: An investigation of wha t ? K: I knew Young was doing that one interview. I'm just talking about the Kraft article. H: I don't know what t Kraft is saying. K: At any rate, the major problem is at the hearing this morning, it was so embarassingly white-washy. I don't see how they can publish the transcript. A number of them made speeches saying it was a lousy method. It was amazing. It was embarrassing. H: That's good. That Kraft piece came out of Saffire. I'm so damn mad. K: In my view, you should stay quiet. If you stick with me on this you can't hav e any problems because we accounted for all of them. I have not created an independent role for you. It's filthy. He's going to write his own before the week is up. I would not get into an independent defense or they'll come after you. You see what I mean? H: Yes. K: You should only function as an appendage to me. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. -2- H: That's right. Ok. You think everythin. &: The record this morning is embarrassing. It's a total clearing. They cleared the whole process. They started out trying to go the Xcenficix Kraft line and then gave it up. H: Who's the tough guy on that? K: Who was he.. Well, Symington isn't after you. He's after Haldeman and Ehrlichman. He says these guys always found some legal body to cover up what they did semi-illegally, like the CIA or NSC. That you know is true. Church was sort of semi-nigigling. They subsided almost immediately. They said is it possible Haig did things on his own, I said no. They said is it possible he did it on the President's orders. I said I can't think of a single case How do you account for the Saffire tap. I said that the Brandon tap, I know Haig didn't have anything to do with it. I said take the first four, they never pursued it after the first three minutes. Javits was the guy who raised you. But, after the first three minutes your name was never raised again. H: Ok, when are you coming out? K: Cn Thursday night. H: When do you plan to leave? K: Saturday afternoon, why? H: What time do you arrive Thursday? K: About 9 or 9:30. H: I just wanted to be sure we have that for the press. K: I'm bringing Genscher with me. You'll see when you read this thing, if you stick to what I said, it leaves you out totally. In wha t I said, you're just a transmittal agent. I just wanted you to know. H: That is virtually true. I don't know how to handle these cut-offs. I don't know who did it. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. -3- K: That is what you should say. I don't either. On the cut-offs, say I just don't know how they were cut off and that's exactly what you should say. Just say you don't know. I don't know either. I think the major problem is this is going to be an embarrassment. It was so easy. H: I don't worry about that. K: Unless things change course during the week. H: That' can't happen. not the K: I doubt it. They're/looking for thex/culprit, that's one thing -- their line is that nothing wrong was done. H: Did they get into those other two guys. Idon't know anything about this. K: They didn't even mention you. Theysaid, in orther words, you gave names that were tapped it was all me they may come to you. Just read what Isaid. First, it's the truth and you see nothing was done. It isn't that they are looking for a villian and thereby clearming me of something. They're claiming nothing wrong was done. H: You think I should make an opening statement? K: No. Just go up there without a paper before you and answer questions. H: That's what I planned to do. K: I wouldn't try to be clever. It's better to say you have no recollection. They are convinced these records are a mess. Dean Rusk is testifying this afternoon. --saying it is rédiculous to think that youxworkk and that you would only act on a directive from the President. H: Alright, good. Everything going alright in Cyprus? K: Yes. There is a coup in Greece and has been brought back. You see, all the guys w 11 come out perfectly. We've got to get Tasca out of there. That I have totalk to you about later. That guy is no good. I don't care what line he used with the President. H: We'll talk about that when you come out. K: Ck, there's no hurry. END Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. SANITIZED COPY TELECON Ambassador Ramsbotham/Secretary Kissinger July 23, 1974 3:04 PM Ks How are you? R Very well. K: I called you about these talles to start in Geneva tomorrow. I am assuming they won't start now. R We have had a measage from our man in Athens. Whatever happens, it won't be possible for the ID Chrecks to attend tomorrow or for many days. K I don't think we should push them until they get crystallized. Rs Yes. We are also trying to get crystallized as to what's at happening in Cyprus, in which Clerides claims to be seting. K is he acting President or President ? R We don't know. Ki We are going to hold off recognizing him until later and we would appreciate if you don't do anything. R We don't go either way until we communicate with each other. K: We & won't do anything either. Ra I talked to Sisco today about that. because we have sent instructions to our man to avoid any matter that would but to deal with him on practical matters. K: I dont think we have even done that. R I think you should. K: $ do too. What is your personal assessment ? Rs You was I my personal view? K: Yes. R: of Clarides. I don't think there is anyone else capable of taking over. Kr Unless. DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526, Section 3.5 NLW09-64/14025 3.3(6)(6) Hr.9/29/2014 By R WIH NARA, Date 11/9/2016 Reproduced SANITIZED OOPY at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. SANITIZED COPY Ramsbotham $ NW page 8 Bill Unless Makarine goes back, K And what do you think of that? B: You want my personal view? Ell Yes. R and think a will be very difficult for him to go back. E: Who will oppose him? R: I don't think there is a very strong pro-Makarios element outside the Island. at will all depend on what the new Greek regime wants. I just heard there was some sort of matteage Indicating he's standing by to go back. K You heard be has been called back? B No, that he's standing by to go back. K We have heard he has gone back. R: And the King too, if the King wants to back him with that offering some pressure for Makarios, Makaries is close to the King as a spiritual adviser. SANITIZED 3.3(b)(6) & 1 never thought much of the King to begin with. PH take Makarios as a political advisor but not as a spicitual adviser. R We'll be in touch as - soon as we have some view about the Constitutional stinte situation. in Good. Then will you tell the Foreign Becretary that we will keep Buffum here until It's clarified. R Yes, hold up Buffum until it to clarified. K: There won't be a meeting now. a will tell him that and we'll tell each other before either does anything about Clorides. $ Yes, B Good. END Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Pr esidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELECON Ambassador Ramsbotham/Secretary Kissinger July 23, 1974 3:16 PM K: AI got a call from our Ambassador in Athens, who sometimes gets a little excited, that your Ambassador has told the Greeks that you are prepared to start the conference in Geneva even without them and that this US support. There is no support for a conference without the Greeks and we are not in support of a conference in Cyprus without the Greeks. We will not have anybody there. R: I dont' understand. When we talked just a moment ago I read from a telegram XX which said whatexx whatever happens, there will be no Greek representative. K: We cannot under any cxixx circumstances support a conference on Cyprus excluding Greece. We strongly support a X conference with Greece. You cannot set up a condecexxxxxxx conference Xxxx excluding Greece. R: Your man could be wrong. I "11 check it out. K: Secondly, it is our judgment that the day after a coup is not the day to start a conference. Sisco is sitting here and says if he box had stayed he might have been made Prime Minister. R: We all have out ambitions. I'll check on it right away. I 11 get in to that and clear it up rather quickly. K: Can you clear it up? R: Yes. END DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526, Section 3.5 NLN09-64/14026 Per Hr. 9/29/2014 By 25/MIH NARA, Date 11/9/2016 Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELECON Prime Minister Ecevit/Secretary Kissinger July 23, 1974 3:30 PM E: How are you? K: Fine. E: Things are moving. K: You're causing a lot of xxixx trouble. I just want to find out how you see the situation. E: I just called your Ambassador. I want to give you my comments on Clerides. K: Don't tell me that on the phone. E: What? K: I think you should give me that view if I may suggest, if you could give that XXX view to X my Ambassador. Did you get my cable this morning? E: I did. I got your oral message. K: If you could call him and tell him. E: I just did. He should come in 10 minutes. K: Good. Give him my regards. Now, may I ask when should the talks between you and the Greeks start? E: I have talked to Callaghan and he was wondering if bx the Greeks could attend the conference in Geneva. I said I don't know, they don't seem to have a government but I said unless we hear from the Greeks to the contrary, Callaghan and Gunes will be in Geneva, K: I think that is a mistake. E: They may be able to appoint a Foreign Minister and send him but they have decided not to hold a private talk session but offered to open the nxxxx meeting and wait for the Greek Foreign Minister to come. If he comes, alright, if he doesn't . Wait, I just received a note I mean they will attempt to open the conference and wait for the Greek Foreign Minister to arrive. If he doesn't they will postpone it. Noone from Athens has said they will not be able to abxx attend. If we bxextxex hear they want to put it off, then we will. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Ecevit - page 2 K: I think it is XI unfair to bring pressure ona government to attend a conference when they don't have a Foreign Minister. I think we should give them the courtesy of xpprixxxx appointing a government first. This is my personal view. This was done without asking our view. I will not have an American representative there before Thursday. E: Excuse me? K: I will not send Buffum there until Thursday in any event. E: One moment please. We have just received a message from Mr. Callaghan and he suggests that although uncertain that Greece can attend, they should still meet and discuss what to do. In the meantime, there are sumors that a delegation headed by the ex-Foreign Minister might go to the Geneva meeting. This is a messåge I just received from Geneva. K: We will not send anyone until we know that the Greek Government is sending a representative. E: They may send -- it doesn't have to be a Foreign Minister. x We have heard nothing to the contrary. Of course the conference will not be officially started unless the Greeks attend. K: Whatever you want to do, you should proceed doing. If you have agreed to send somebody to Geneva with Callaghan then you should do it. I have no right to get in the way. E: I didn't understand. K: We cannot get in the way of an agreement you have already made with the British. But, I would prefer to know that all parties are coming. E: Certainly. If word reaches us that Greece cannot attend the meeting tomorrow, then we will cancel it, but we have heard nothing so far. K: But they don't have a government. E: But their's is a different system and there is still a President and they can send a representative. According to a note I received, the Greece delegation headed by Gunes may come. If we postpone Callaghan and Gunes going, it would be worse. Gunes will ask our Embassy in Athens to approach whatever authority they axix can find and ask if they will be represented. K: That is a very good suggestion. We will approa ch them too. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Ecevit - page 3 R: We can ask them whether they will be represented. If the answer is no, we won't go. K: OK. This is a very good idea. OK. Thank you. END Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. 7/23/74, 3:45 p.m. TELCON/Mr. Eagleburger/Mr. Michael Alexander, UK Foreign Office E. The Secretary has asked me to call you again with a message. He has just talked with Ecevit and Ecevit has told him that he and the Foreign Secretary have agreed to meet in Geneva tomorrow regardless of whether the Greeks are there. A. That is not true actually, but go on. E. Here are the points he would like to make. He thinks it is very unwise to meet in the absence of the Greeks. It will first of all undermine the new government. Secondly it will look like a rape of the Greeks or a gang-up by the UK, US and Turks. He wants you people to know that we will not send anyone to Geneva until we have official word from the Greeks that they are coming. Next point, he wants you to know that we have made no unilateral moves and he hopes very much that you will not make unilateral moves without consultations with us first. A. In what context? E. In the sense that we have in this crisis let you know what we were going to do before we did it. He asks that you not take any unilateral steps without letting us know first. His final question was, "What's the hurry ?" A. I don't know what impression he got from Ecevit. The danger is that the people on the ground are likely to muck up this ceasefire when you get right down to it. The Turks are concerned with the modalities of this ceasefire. Important to the Foreign Secretary that we keep them in play. No intention on our part to make unilateral move. It is moving so fast. I think the origin of your last call was because you had seen one of our own telegrams, wasn't it ? Where did you get it from? There is no intention on our part to keep it from you. E. This contact is useful only if we are frank with one another. My first call triggered by what? A. By your having seen a telegram that we are going ahead whether Greeks turned up or not. E. I guess it may have been. A. What is your answer on what we do with the Turks. E. Henry's view after talking with Ecevit is that they are not all that anxious. One more point, matter of information, Ecevit told Kissinger Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. - 2 - that he would have their Ambassador in Athens -- I didn't know they still had an Ambassador in Athent -- check with the Greeks before they make any decision on sending Gunes to Geneva. A. That comes back to what I was saying about what Secretary of Stat e and Ecevit agreed. If learned tonight definitively that Greeks would not be in Geneva tomorrow, we would not go. We went to some trouble to establish what time Gunes' departure was E. You agreed that if you learned tonight that the Greeks, in fact, were not going, you would put off for 24 hours, would not go tomorrow ? A. Absolute chaos on this side deciding when absolute moment was when we could decide. Ecevit and Foreign Secretary agreed that if established definitively that Greeks could not be represented in Geneva tomorrow, we would not go and would get in touch with Gunes in time to stop him. This was 5:00 a. m. I think we probably have established ekixix definitively that there won't be any Greeks in Geneva tomorrow. Question really now is whether go ahead with the meeting on Thursday or not. E. I just wanted to reinforce Kissinger's view that even day after tomorrow if there is no Greek there we think it is a mistake to have a meeting. A: What would he think about a straightforward bilatemal meeting, Anglo-Turk meeting, in London. E. I don't know what Henry's view on that would be. My guess is it puts you in awkward position with Greeks. It seems to be of some concern to Henry now that we take a balanced position with both disputant parties. This is my own view, not Henry's. We obviously fall behind here, not knowing exactly what facts are. A. I think we may have to talk again. My principal is rather tired and I am not quite sure he is going to take a great deal more interest this evening. E. What is your report on the Greek situation right now? A. Athens is in an uproar. Our Ambassador there described it as like Greece that won the world cup. Karamanlis has not yet arrived but is on his way and our information is that he is on his way to head a government. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. - 3 - Actually it is clear to us it is going to take more than a couple of hours. It is not a thing they can do just like that after the last 7 years. We are very well seized with the Greek angle on all this. E. We are not terribly confident of what we are getting from our sources. A. I got a flavor of that last time we spoke. We think it looks rather good in Athens from what we can judge at this early stage. E. You have no feeling Greece is going to take on Turkey in a military way ? A. Absolutely not at the moment. A Karamanlis government would be to the right. It would not be soft on the Turks. We also get feeling that they consider Turkish violation of ceasefire and could cause some very anxious to keep the Turks in play. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELECON Senator Percy/Secretary Kissinger July 23, 1974 4:07 pm K: Chuck, how are you? P: Fine, how are you? Dean Rusk testified this afternoon. I had met with him in London and we had about six hours alone and it was a good talk. His testimony was impressive. I think if anyone was doubtful before they cannot be any longer He said dealing with Hoover was like dealing with deGalle who didn't tell him anything. I read to him sections of your own report and what you understood to be the truth He everything down the line. After Haig's testimony I think we will get this cleared up. I also asked him, isn't it wise to clear this up? He agreed. I think blosxx his testimony was extremely good and very helpful. K: You'ave been a good friend and I appreciate the questions you asked this morning. P: We are doing our duty here. We'll make it very clear that the investigation was initiated at your request and what what followed That we have not been mislead. I can't believe but that Haig's testimony won't be very helpful. K: Haig will support everything I said. P: Ok. K: Thank you. END Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELECON Ambassador Ramsbotham/Secretary Kissinger July 23, 1974 5:30 PM K: I want you to know I'm getting restless with London. R: I haven't had an answer. They were talking about it. K: I have talked to Ecevit. I had a frantic call from the Greek Government, or boxx what passes for the Greek Government. R: Who is that? K: Mr. Canellopoulos, they said if there was a Turkish attack tomorrow, then the Greek democracy would collapse. So I called Ecevit to tell him not to do it. He said he wouldn't. R: Attack on waht? K: Nicosia. R: What was it to be on. I had't heard. K: The airport, they were afraid of a general attack. In the course of my conversation with Ecevit, he tells me that he has an agreement with Callaghan that he would be in Geneva tomorrow evening. Unless he hears to the contrary from the Greeks. But the Breeks are no more able to say they will come then to say they are not. And there is no way you can settle this thing without us and if you try a solo, we will drag our X feet. R: I'll tell you what I said, that you said there is that all peace K: I thinkit's inconceivable that the Greek democratic governemtn be confronted by a British/Turkish gangup. You better make it clear to London that I think communications have totally broken down and remind them VX that I didn't make a move wikx without clearing it with Caklagalx Callaghan. R: I'm still waiting to hear. I think in London they are concerned about what might happen if we leave the situation in @yxpxXxxxx Cyprus without a conference. K: I'm not concerned about that. I don't want a conference without the Greeks. By R) MIH NARA, Date 11/9/2016 NLIN09-64/14028 Per Hr. 9/29/2014 We will not be there and will not associate ourse ves with a British/Turkish . E.O. 13526, Section 3.5 DECLASSIFIED R: We shall try to get them there and with a new government, we can probably do it. K: It's indecent to ask a new government that hasn't been formed to go there to negokiation negotiate. That is out concern. Since the outcome is not one that will be glorios for Greece it certainly should not look like maximum wexx weakness Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Ramsbotham - page 2 of a democratic government. R: I'm almost certainthat we probably agree with you. In the hope we can still get the Greeks there. I'm sure we wouldn't go ahead without them. You say you are restless, but I haven't a definite answer. K: I am, and there has been no communication with Ecevit about your intentions. R: I will clear this up and should get an answer quickly and let you know. K: We are in agreement with you on substance and if there has been a Greek government we should have supported the we would not go as far as a have a conference without them, but it doesn't seem wise to have negotiations going the first day of a new government. Any concessions they make willk look like blackmail. If they want to come, we would be delighted. We have k nothing against the conference. R: But they must not be pressued. K: Ecevit is still perating in the same theory as three hours ago. R: The other *** thing, we are hearing from the UN that the Russians and the non- aligned are thinking they should support Makarios and resist recognition of Clerides. K: He hasn't claimed. I understand he's being sworn in as acting President. We will not go along with that. R: If the Russians try to their recognition of Clerides. K: We will not be pressured by either party to recognize Clerides. If we suspect any pressure we will go ahead with recognition. We are not gaing to be maneuvered into a holding off in deference to you. We will not be pressured into doing more. R: If he is acting as President, that's not so bad. K: No. R: It XX depends on which article of the Constitution he is under. K: Are there two articles? R: Yes, there is one with the President in a temporary absnece and then there is one if it is a permanent absence. He is authorized to assume the office. K: I didn't know about that. Will you let me know. Dont' try any maneuvers without textex letting us IX know. R: No. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Ramsbotham - page 3 K: We are not against Makarios We are not going to pay the price for other XXXX people's rational moves we gave the same instructions. R: The Russians are by now alerted on this sometime tonight and C will . K: From our point of view, Clerides emerges too rapidly. R: What is unfortunate, is he will alienate himself from with Makarios if he keeps Sampson on. K: Is he keeping Sampson? R: I don't know. There's some indication he may be. K: We are not pushing Clerides. We are also not going to be pressured into Makarios. R: Alright. K: So if everybody understands this, we can go along. R: Like yesterday. K: It's exactly what it was yesterday as far as we're concerned. R: And so it will be when I come back to you. K: Good. END Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELECON Mr. Flakos/Secretary Kissinger July 23, 1974 5:40 pm K: I have already tal ked to Ecevit and I've talked to . I WO uld like to talke to Mr. Connelopoulos to give him the answer of the Prime Minister of Turky. Mr. Connelopoulos called me from the President's office of Greece. As soon as you get him on the line I will talk to him. F: Certainly, Mr. Secretary. I just wanted to tell you what I showed to Mr. Brown. If there's no ceasefire and the Turks do not go back to the lines of 4:00 yesterday, the situation will be most da ngerous. K: I understand. there will be a ceasefire. F: The ceasefire hasmot been respected by the Turks. K: I understand all of this. I would like to get Connelopoulos back on the line. F: I will try to get him on the line. K: Can you tell me -- are you planning on going to the Geneva Conference tomorrow? F: Not tomorrow. It is impossible. K: We are not sending anybody until the Greeks have sent someone. F: We have an understanding with the Turks and I think they agree that we will start either Thursday or Friday. This is a matter which has been settled. insist on starting tomorrow. I have the assurance of the Ambassador of Turkey that he will convey our message to the Turkish Government. But tomorrow, it is a materiel impossibility. K I understand that. I appreciate it F: The problem is helping K: Will you get Mr. Connelopoulos to call be back? F: He might find himself in a very difficult position and he might not be able to return. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. -2- K: I have been assured by the Turkish Prime Minister that there will be no military offensive tomorrow. F: I wouldn't want you to be lured by that fact. that During the night there won't be any fighting. Usually the Turks don't fight during the night hours. They might start tomorrow at dawn. K: I have been told they will not fight during the day. I have to get a call from Mr. Connelopoulos. F: I will do whatever I can SO you can have your call immediat ely. K: Ok, Thank you. END Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELECON Mr. Connollopoulos/Secretary Kissinger July 23, 1974 6:25 PM K: I have talked to the Prime Minister of Turkey and he has promised me there will be no military offensive tomorrow. C: Thank you very much. (ixxxxix)x (inaudible) K: I have great XXXXX trouble hereingx hearing you. C: Thank you very much. K: You're welcome. Goodbye. END Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELECON William Colby/Secretary Kissinger July 1974 7:45 PM K: I'm just returning your call. C: That was just to tell you about the thing. That was a long time ago. You were up on the Hill. K: Perhaps we ought to have a WSAG sometime soon. C: Anytime. It sounds like it's going very well. K: The trouble with you Colby . I decided I want (Clerides). You don't have to produce it in 45 hours. C: I wish I could see it was done like that. K: I told . C: I'm only worried about the Turks as to how will it come out. That's not very clear. K: They're God-damn inconsistent. They should have played for the to stay in. They're going to get squeezed off Cyprus. C: The other thing -- I think the problem now for the Greeks themselves, is how far they go. K: I think they will go the way of the Portuguese. C: The Portuguese went very far . K: I doubt it. OK. C: Thank you. END DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526, Section 3.5 NLN09-64/14029 Per Hr. 4/30/2013 By RJ NARA, Date 11/9/2016 Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELECON Mr. Sisco/Secretary Kissinger July 23, 1974 8:06 PM K: I wanted you to know what I've done. The British have recognized Clerides to act as President. I thought you should know. S: I was going to say I felt that XXXX line was a good interim line. We're perfectly statex safe in recognizing him . K: I've told Stabler to call the newspapers tonight or then the other question would be why are we holding back. The Turks said they will never recognize Makarios as President of Cyprus nor will they recognize Clerides as head of Cyprus. S: I understand the first party. K: They want, . S: That won't wash on the Turk side. But I agree with you. I'm very pleased to hear you say this. K: You know, I think WXX you did a superb job. I didn't get a chance to say it to you txixx this afternoon. You and I make a good team. You know that final solution WXSX was your idea. I just wanted you to know I know it. I'm having lunch tomorrow X with Max Frankle and I'm going to tell him. S: I'm very pleased that you are pleased. K: Good, Joe. END Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. SANITIZED COPY SANITIZED 14030 C05953576 NLN-TELCONS-26-9-346-2 EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs 30 3.3(b)(6) TELECON Secretary Schlesinger/Secretary Kissinger July 24, 1974 2:24 pm K: Jim, how are you? S: You brought itx off a coup. K: I announced it to the press yesterday. S: The subject was reached. I had a long talk with Bob Ellsworth. I don't know whether you ha d a full read-out from Sisco. K: No, I testified all morning. I'm meeting with Sisco right now. S: He says he and Sisco agree. The subject he should brief you on. some of the weaknesses that were perceived in the Embassy in Athens on this thing. Somehow Tasca just couldn't resist doing it. in the case of the overthrow and Tasca couldn't respond to it. K: The overthmow in Cyprus? S: they may have thought they had American acquiescence. K: We have got a problem with that fellow. SKX S: You may want to take a hard look at it . K: Between you and me, he's not necessarily the State Department candidate. S: Yes, I can see that. K: If this is true, ru have to talk to Sisco about it. Then, I have a bbasis for doing something. S: K: Yes. S: I talked to Ingersoll a bit ago. -- about letting those two F-4's go. DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526, Section 3.5 SANITIZED COPY By WIMIH NARA, Date 11/9/2016 Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. C05953576 NLN-TELCONS-26-9-346-2 -2- K: Yes, I think we should. S: We will let them go immediately. K: Jim, you and I ought to get together on the next stages of SALT sometime soon. X: Yes. K: Ok END Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified TELECON PM Ecevit/Secretary Kissinger July 24, 1974 3:05 K: Can you hear me ? Mr. Prime Minister ? E: This is Ecevit. K: Can you hear me ? E: Yes, I can hear you, how are you? K: Fine. And since a day isn't complete without my talking to my students I have been calling all over the world. Your Ambassador in Cyprus who tends to get a little excited. E: We have sent a liaision officer in good spirits with excellent english. He should be there sometime tomorrow. K: He told the British and Cypriots that you are going to take the airport in two hours. E: This is not true. I have talked with Waldheim, Macomber and Callaghan about it. There are confusing reports. It seems that because the Greeks were using the airport for transporting armaments and military men, our military units took over the airport and offered it to the UN forces. They did not arrive for a long time, SO they had no alternative hello? Hello? K: I can hea r you. E: They had no alternative but to take hold of it, the airport. The British forces arrived there and claimed they had certain legal rights at the Nicosia Airport based on the agreements. Cur people accepted that the British had these rights based on the international agreements and we said we will agree to respect the British rights at the airport and we are doing that. According to the UN, it is not in control of the UN force but surrounded by the Turkish forces. What ever the position may be under Turkish control or UN control, Turkish forces have strict orders not to get into conflict with the UN forces but we are not clear about who really controls the airport but whatever the situation our people will respect it and maintain it. We may have a disagreement with the UN but Gunes will discuss with in Geneva. UN claims they have right to control airport. We say why didn't you exert that when airport was in control of the Greeks. We ask for the protection of the helpless Turkish units so this is the point. We are not going to cause any confrontation with British forces. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. -2- K: I will send Ambassador Buffum to Geneva tomorrow and I think he should have a talk with your Foreign Minister about our thinking. E: Yes, certainly. K: We want to stay in close touch. E: I appreciate that. K: We want to continue these negotiations in a spirit of alliance and friendship. E: The talks will be tripartite.? Won't they ? K: Yes. He will be available to give our view. His instructions are to be very cooperative with you. E: Have you heard about the Canneloupoulos appointment? K: We think it is positive. E: We sent a warm message to him and we meant it. He is a wise statesman. And I hope this will be a contribution to better relations. KL That is our view and itx we made a strong statement of support. E: Good, So did I. I hope it doesn't work against him. K: I hope so. It was a pleasure to talk to you and we really have to talk again soon. END Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELECON Callaghan/Secretary Kissinger July 24, 1974 3:30 PM K: You didn't talk to me yesterday. C: I'm sorry. I hope you can hear me. K: I can. C: We'ave had a message from the Turkish Ambassador in Nicosia. K: He's crazy. C: He's what? K: Crazy. C: Crazy? Well, I know that. He says they are going to attach the airport. K: I got that message and I called Ecevit. C: And does he say no? K: He says no. There is some dispute as to who holds the airport, the Turks or the UN. C: We have a bad connection. K: Can you call me back? C; As we have it from here this xxxxxxx madness in Nicosia that Turkish troops are going to attack the Nicosia airport tonight. We have a note read over the telephone from Ambassador office. That they fully understand the British troops bawex at the airport have some rights, and I say this in brackets, we back have no rights except as members of the xxx UN forces, therefore, they intend to leave the troops alone. in a position to leave the airport, it will be taken and reports if we do, how the hell can they distinguish between British and Turkish troops. K: Your troops are there as part of the UN forces. Let me tell you what Ecevit told me. C: I have less and less time for that man. DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526, Section 3.5 NLN09-64/14031 Per 9/29/2014 By RS /WIH NARA, Date 11/9/2016 Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Ecevit - page 2 K: What Ecevit told me was one of his wild stories of what was going on. Basically he said he didn't know who held the airport right now. There were no conflicting stories in whatever the situation was and it would not be changed. I've talked to the Secretary General and he has just had a report from Nicosia that they still hold the airport. If Ecevit is to be believed, the UN will continue to hold the airport will not permit an attack on UN forces. This is the state of play as I understand it. C: it is not possible to leave the airport outside British facilities. My own view is the Turks have not achieved their objectives, which included capture of the airport. What we have done is to tell them we are flying up 600 men from the base to reinforce the airport and we're flying out from here in a helicopter. We can't stand by and see the I don't know, I don't see myself going to Geneva tomorrow. K: I understand your position on this. We, of course, are opposed to it. C: Can you get hold of the Turkish general staff? K: All they do is take the ICK message and par refuse to pass any messages back. I tried to get through both through military as well as through NATO channe C: I think these people are going to get this airport. I don't know what impact it will baxex have on the Greek Government. K: I don't see there's anything we can do. C: after a couple of hours the Turkish will then attack the UN forces. K: I can't believe they'll do it. C: I can't either. K: Above all, in the view of the promise of the Prime Minster who has only broken 3 promises a day for C: I don't see how they are going to take the airport. K: I think in the final analysis they won't attack. That's a rational calculation. a I don't know, let me go back to them again. C: Give them an indication they that we're reinforcing UN forces. Tell them we understand they are going to fight. See what you can do. K: Let me do this. C: I'm leaving at 10:00 in the mo rning. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Ecevit - page 3 K: I'll send Buffum to Geneva. He's leaving tonight. C: Good. Alright. K: Should Buffum get in touch with you in Geneva? C: Yes, straight away. I 11 be there about mid-day tomorrow. K: He will be there about that time. C: If he gets in tough with our Embassy, he'll know where to find me. If you can do anything, please do. K: OK. END Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON Hauser/Kissinger July 24, 1974, 4:35 p.m. H: How did it go for you. K: I think very well. H: No problem. K: Not at all. H: What happens next. When they finish Haig then what? K: They they will vote to clear me. H: Very good and I think you will get washed out on the other thing. I think he is going to be finished. I have been on the phone with them. I don't understand their mentality about how to respond to this Supreme Court decision. K: What are they saying? H: Some don't want him to say anything; others want a terse comment. I have talked to three of them (Congressmen?). One more note of defiance and they will go to the other side. K: This request is going to be the beginning of more and more. H: What's his choice? If he turns them over and they come out as terrible stuff; he can't burn them. The tipover is 60 votes in the House. Really something. K: I have not read the decision but it seems to be much too sweeping. H: I only saw the ticker. Any lawyer could have told them this would be the case. They got made at me. They don't want to believe what is happening. They refuse to accept it. They don't know where it is to go. If I bet, I think it would be out. If I were you I would just hide out -- keep busy with Cyprus. You will get washed out in this. K: That is what I am going to do. H: Any breakthrough with Jackson. K: I think so. H: I talked to Lobell and I told him I thought there would be a compromise. K: That was mv strong impression. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. 2. H: I'm glad all is all right for you. K: All your points were included in my statement. H: Fine. Will it be published. K: Eventually. H: O.K. I'm glad it is coming out right for you and we will see how this game plays out. K: When you come down XIX come in and we will talk about where we go from here. H: I've talked to your buddy Mel Lair who is running around the country for Ford. He will be important if Ford becomes President. It is a terrible thing -- on how to handle this. If Laird is the real power in the White House, I think it will pose problems for you. You just mind your own business at the moment and be a good Secretary. Wait until the dust settles and we will see where we want to go. END Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELECON Amb Ramsbotham/Sec. Kissinger July 24, 1974 4:45 R: I wondered if you had heard that our Prime Minister talked to Ecevit. K: Yes, I talked to your Foriegn Minister and Ecevit told the same probable lie to him that he told me. R: And you got the message that Gunes sent. K: Yes. The only way to make rational sense out of this is that the Turks intended to attack and that your Prime Minister's phone call, mine and the Secretary-General's prevented it and the other rational explanation is that Ecevit is not in control of his forces. R: I think that is probably CO rrect. K: And they are going to attack anyway. R: They were saying all along the airport could not be left in the hands of the UN. the cover story is, it has been in the hands of the Turks all the time and we Well, we have some phantoms on the way. Knowing the Turks well, I don't think they will attack before dawn, which is about 5 hours off. They have 40 tanks, which will prove more than you or we can cope with. K: Let me call you back in half an hour. I have to get Buffum off. R: Alright. END DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526, Section 3.5 NLN09-64/14032 Per 9/29/2014 By RS limit NARA, Date 11/9/2016 Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELECON French FM Sauvagnargues/Secretary Kissinger July 24, 1974 4:45 K: I want to welcome you to the United States. S: Thank you. It is a short stopover. K: You are undermining our position in the now. S: I don't think so. we haven't agreed on the EC position. Our British friends were rather obstinate on sugar. K: Well, if you have any position, you are way ahead of me. S: How are things. I have heard disquieting things about the Turks. K: We are trying to dissuade them from taking the airport. S: It is defended by the UN force. K: That is right and the Turkish Prime Minister has promised me that he had no plans to take the airport, but. S: (inaudible) K: That is a good question, I don't know. S: That is disquieting. I don't think Ioannidis should do anything now but perhaps the French government could. K: I think it is too late. If you want to send a demarch, fine. S: It is probably too late. Was there definitely a danger of an attack. K: Our impression is there was a definite plan for an attack and calls from the Secretary General, the British and me have have delayed it, if Ecevit is in charge of his forces. S: What about the conference in Geneva? K: It is starting tomorrow. S: Both governments have agreed. K: Yes. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. S: Why are they doing it ? Probably they will through the military K: They filed and they are now in a precarious position. If their supplies have to come by sea and there is only one open road to Nicosia they are in a precarious position. S: And you are in touch with Ankara? K: Yes. S: I hope you succeed in stopping it. It could start the whole thing again. K: I agree. S: I wish you luck. K Thank you. S: Thank you for your kind message. I am looking forward to my next stay in September and I hope to see you. I'll try to come for at least one day to Washington. K We count on that. S: Thank you, good bye. END Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELECON Governor Rockefeller/Secretary Kissinger July 23, 1974 K: How are ;you? R: Wanted you to know we are thinking about you. How are you doing ? K: What are you thinking about? R: I was thinking about your friends in Cyprus. K: This thing is coming out fine. It is coming out as you overheard me on the phone the other day. R: I remember, but I was a little worried. K: It has come out the way we want. Sampson is out and they have a guy in there who is really our first choice. R: As long as you say it is alright. K: But we are keeping open the option of the other. R: That is number one. So it has come out according to plan. K: Yes, and we kept the Russians out of it totally. R: Well, you can mark down another one. I talked to John Dunlop yesterday. K: He is outstanding. R: Yes. He talked to me about what you asked him to do and I had asked him to go into a panel on International trade K: I think he is excellent. R: I also thought because the people are crazy about him and David is crazy about him that we might get him to do some writing for us. But, from what he told me, his work is very parallel to this, Now, I wouldn't want to interfere in anything he has promised to do for you, but as I said, I think the work is very parallel and this shouldn't interfere. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. -2- K: I have no objection to him doing any writing. R: You don't K: No, that is fine. R: That's marvelous. And I'll be seeing him on Friday. Now, one other thing. On September 10 we are having a full commission meeting in Washington. We want to develop a new Panel., which would be in the public and private institutional. we are meeting on what is happening to the private system and we want to know if you might be able to come to this. It is the tenth of September and if you did you might want to say a word about the changing world of international institutions. We were going to ask Mike Mansfield to say a word on the restructuring of Congress and perhaps George Meany on Labor's role. K: If possible, if I am in town, I will do it. R: You're marvelous. This would be in the morning. Do you think we ought to ask the Vice President to speak at any time during the meeting. X He is still ex-officio. K: It is a Presidential . I have no objection. I like Jerry Ford. R: So do I. K: Why don't you do it. R: Good. Well, that is it. I do want to chat with you K: You're nice and on Cyprus, it has come out perfectly. R: I don't know how you do it. K: They didn't know the strategy. R: Well, I am thrilled and give my love to Nancy. K: Ok. END Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELECON Dean Rusk/Secretary Kissinger July 23, 1974 7:20 pm R: I just wanted to give you. 60 seconds of what went on with the Committee this afternoon. The impact was good. I started to make a hard in terms of the method and actions of the FBI. I wanted to mention to you one point, and that is, I did tell them about our assessment during your work in the and your work on Viet- Nam and I said that if you said something to me, I would believe it. There seemed to be general agreement around the table. I understan d Haig will be coming on later. As far as you know, nothing Haig will say will undermine my veracity. I said if you were to say something to me on this subject, I would believe it. K: It is not inconceivable to me that in one or two cases, Haig may have received orders from Haldeman or the President, as orders of the President. It's inconceivable to me that Haig did it on his own. There is no possibility that Haig would say I gave him orders to do things beyond what I have testified. I don't know whether you saw my statement. R: No. They read two or three. K: The backup material helps my case because it is now clear that the first four cases were done under Hoover's recommendation. It is clear that 3 of these people I had put on mysaff against Hoover's recommendations SO I WO uldn't have tried to prove him right. which proves Hiag was right all along. R: that Hoover would make no He never interfered with my ability to make a judgment on. or security matters. K: In my case, he has, of the names given, 3 to me and the 4th turned out to be an espionage agent. R: And the 4th was Henry Brandon. That was ridiculous. K: I know. That was Hoover's view. There were four cases where the XXX FBI. signed a statement saying I just had a call from Haig who said that he had just been called by the President that the following four names should be put on the list. K: My guess is that unless Haig's testimony sets them off balance, they are likely to say that after the most careful and meticulous re -examining they have no basis for changing their original judgment and will reaffirm the point that this wh ole business of wiretapping needs to be looked into by the Muskie Subcommittee. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. -2- K: That doesn't bother me As a practical matter, there is no possibility for Haig to deviate from my testimony. R: There were a lot of Senators there today -- many more than when I was ever Secretary of State but there was no hostile questioning in terms of you K: My impression is, in fact, they were a littletoo easy on me this morning. R: I will be criticised a little for some phrases. I said talking to J. Edgar Hoover was like talking to De Galle. Well, I am going back to Atlanta tomorrow but I wanted to express to you what I said about my confidence in your veracity and make sure that Hiag will not undercut me. K: No possibility of that. You know I appreciate this. R: Well, good luck and God bless. K: Thank you and I think we'll come out alright. R: Good luck my fellow. END Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

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Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.\nE. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or\nB. National security classified information.\nfinancial information.\nC. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's\nF. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law\nrights.\nenforcement purposes.\nD. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy\nG. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.\nor a libel of a living person.\nH., Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nNA FORM 1421 (4-85)\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n(2of) 2)\nDOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]\nDOCUMENT\nDOCUMENT\nNUMBER\nTYPE\nSUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS\nDATE\nRESTRICTION\n9\nTckon\nHAK SANITIZED and James Schlesinger C2 pp.)\n7/24/74\n13\nper Hr. 9/29/2014\n3.3(b)(1)(6)\n10\nTelcon\nHAK ml James Callaghan (3 PP.)\n7/24/79\nB\nDECLASSIFIED per Hr. 9/29/2014\n11\nTelcon\nHAR ml Poter Ransbirtham p.)\n7/24/79\nM\nDECLASSIFIED Hr. 9/29/2014\nFILE GROUP TITLE\nBOX NUMBER\nKissinger Transcripts - Telephone Conversations\n26\nFOLDER TITLE\n1974 22-24 July S\nRESTRICTION CODES\nA. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.\nE. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or\nB. National security classified information.\nfinancial information.\nC. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's\nF. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law\nrights.\nenforcement purposes.\nD. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted inval Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidentian Libraryand return private and personal material.\nor a libel of. a living person.\nDECLASSIFIED\nH. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nof 2)\nDOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]\nDOCUMENT\nDOCUMENT\nNUMBER\nTYPE\nSUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS\nDATE\nRESTRICTION\n1\nTekon\nHAK and Peter Ramsbotham (3 pp.)\n7/22/74\nB\n1A\nTelcon\nHAR and James Callaghan (Spp)\n7/22/74\nB\n2\nTclcon\nHAR and James Callaghan (1p.)\n7/22/74\nB\nSANITIZED\n2A\nTelcon\nHAK and Prime minister Eccuit (2pp.)\n7/22/74\nB\nSANITIZED\n3\nTelcon\nHAR and William Colby C2 pp.)\n7/22/74\nB\n4\nTelcon\nHAR and Peter Ransbotham (2 pp.)\n7/23/74\nB\n5\nTclcon\nHAK and Peter Ransbothan (1p.)\n7/23/74\nB\nL\nTelcon\nHAR and Peter Ransbotham C2 pp)\n7/23/74\nB\n7\nTelcan\nHAR and Peter Ramsbotham (3pp.)\n7/23/74\nB\na\nTckon\nHAR and William Colby (lp)\n7/23/74\nB\nFILE GROUP TITLE\nBOX NUMBER\nkissinger Transcripts Telephone Conversations\n26\nFOLDER TITLE\n1974 22-24 July 9\nRESTRICTION CODES\nA. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.\nE. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or\nB. National security classified information.\nfinancial information.\nC. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's\nF. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law\nrights.\nenforcement purposes.\nD. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy\nG. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.\nor a libel of a living person.\nH. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nDECLASSIFIED\nNA FORM 1421 (4-85)\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nof 2)\nDOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]\nDOCUMENT\nDOCUMENT\nNUMBER\nTYPE\nSUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS\nDATE\nRESTRICTION\n9\nTckon\nHAR SANITIZED and James Schlesinger C2 pp.)\n7/24/74\n13\n10\nTclcon\nSANITIZED HAK and Junes Callayhan (3 3 pp.)\n7/24/74\nB\n11\nTelcon\nHAR and Peter Ramsbootham 'p.)\n7/24/74\nB\nFILE GROUP TITLE\nBOX NUMBER\nkissinger Transcripts - Telephone Conversations\n26\nFOLDER TITLE\n1974 22-24 July 9\nRESTRICTION CODES\nA. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.\nE. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or\nB. National security classified information.\nfinancial information.\nC. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's\nF. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law\nrights.\nenforcement purposes.\nD. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy\nG. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.\nor a libel of a living person.\nH. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nDECLASSIFIED\nNA FORM 1421 (4-85)\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nAmbassador Ramsbotham/Secretary Kissinger\nJuly 22\nBritish\nK: You're too friendly to me. I read in the/newspapers that you are to\nR: That was the Economist.\nK: Well, your story leaked\nin fact you're not even talking to me.\nR: Well, you've been XX away. I am very sorry about tax that. I have had\nsome reports from our missions and you have been talking to London today. I\nhaven't had a report on that, but I do have some cables I want to tell you about.\nAs you know, Makarios is arriving in New York tomorrow at 1:30. He has\nasked us to have the meeting delayed until Friday morning to allow him to rest\nand he\nHe expects to be challanged. We have heard from Waldheim that\nhe sent a message to Makarios that he will support his address to the committee.\nWe have prepared an outline of a draft resolution since the need to take a\nstrong stance from the non-aligned. Then, we saw Makarios this evening. We\ndidn't discuss the fraft but he made clear his objectives. There are three of then\nFirst, to deny recognition. Secondly, get international support to return to\nthe status quo and third, secure withdrawal of the Box Greek officer from the\nNational Guard.\nK: I think it is dangerous to start me mucking around in a civil war. I am\nsending Sisco over there and I would like to see if we can work out a compromise\nR: You are sending Sisco to New York?\nK: No, to London.\nR: To what?\nK: To London, to see if we can work out a X Greek/Turkish negotiation. If you\nmake Mazxxx Makarios the xhiev chief spokesman and loga legal ruler, you will\nleave it up to him as to which forces he will bring to the Island and they will be\nSoviet forces.\nR: Well, he is a Commonwealth head and it would be difficult for us not to\nsupport him at that stage. He has an astonishing power of survival. What\ndo you have in mind?\nK: I would at least make it more difficult to make sure he isn't going to\nstart moving. If the Greek officers are removed from the Island, the only\nIXEX result will be that the balance of power will shift to the Communist party\nto the extent that the Greek officers were restrained and secondly, Greece cannot\nin the balance off the Turks and then the Eastern Bloc will have to provide\nsupport.\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 13526, Section 3.5\n624009-64/14020\nPer\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential\nHr.\n9/29/2014\nDECLASSIFIED\nBy RIWIH NARA, Date 11/9/2016\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nRamsbotham -page 2\nR: The national guard -- are they very strong?\nK: I think they are a strong element.\nR: Twice they tried to assassinate him.\nK: Who.\nR: The Boxexx Gree k officer of the National Guard. I am not so sure Makarios\nwill run to the Communists. It is not in his nature.\nK: Maybe not, but it may be a political reality.\nR: The difficulty about not doing anything is you are getting a strong resolution\nin the Security Council and we have to counter it with something.\n.\nK: Well, let it go.\nR: That wouldn't worry you?\nK: It worries me to meet one day's headline and get into a trap. I don't want the\npresent government to be replaced by Communist governemnt or a Quadaff type\ngovernment. So, I want a * slow gxx game. We wouldn't accept a Xxx Sampson\ngovernment. There is no question about accepting Sampson\nR: Dimitri (?) told me that if Clerides was put forward, he would serve under\nh im and be loyal to him which I think is interesting.\nK: That is what we would like. I would like to get rid of both.\nR: I find it XXXX difficult to believe Sampson will last long.\nK: But that is not the point. I would prefer we try this Clerides in and then\ngo all out for Makarios. We don't mind falling back to him, but not in such an\nexuberant fastin fashion.\nR: How far did you get with Callaghan?\nK: My impression is that Jim is more susceptible to txx his Foreign Office\nadvice than I am to my State Department.\nR: I see that point very clear.\nK: My concern is, if we dtotaly endorse Makarion, we're doing his work for\nhim.\nThe reality of the situation is going back on the Turks. Since he\n********** certainly will not make sixux himself a\n.\nI don't think we should.\nXxxx All of this is going to\nIf we had some idea X what Clerides had\n.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nRamsbotham -page 3\nR: Have they made these points?\nK: He can be XXXXX under no doubt about that whole idea. I did mention\nK to him and he wants two things\nR: The only difficulty about it, H Henry, is the\n.\nHe's not the right man\nto attend such it's a small point.\nK: I have no idea, but I know Makexinex Makarios\nus to hand everything to him for nothing.\nR:\nthe outline of a possible agreement.\nK: Why don't we decide this tomorrow W evening.\nR: OK.\nEND\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nEYES ONLY\nSend to Larry Brenner\nfor information. This must be returned to B. Scowcroft within\ntwenty-four hours.\nNo reproduction permitted.\nhate: Buffum to London - wed. a.m.\nComperence Wed. ofternoon\nHAR to send Callagben a sporting Cable.\nFile\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nSec. Gen Waldheim/ Sec. Kissinger\nJuly 22, 9:40 a.m.\n[1974]\nW: I wish to tell you how happy I am about the acceptance of the ceasefire\nand wish to thank you for all your efforts.\nK: We have worked together on many things Mr. Sec. Gen.\nW: I wanted to tell you I had a call from the For. Min. of Turkey who\nbitterly complained about the\nK: I had a call from the PM and I was going to call you. We would\nsupport an increase of the United Nations Forces and any strengthening\nof the mandate.\nW: Yes. I think this is what I want.\nK: I am told it does not need to be changed.\nW: I discussed this with some members of the Council -- the British\nAmb. here and I think thatoof course we have two possibilities -- either\nto get a new mandate from the Council which would create a debate\nin the Council and the other approach which I think is better -- is that\nI tell the Council that in this situation where we have a new role to play\nto separate the forces, we need strengthening of our forces and to ask\nthat existing forces have of Government who are contributing to\n(increase) their contingent. You will go along with this\nK: We would strongly support it. We think it a better way of doing it\nand a faster way.\nW: Yes. Otherwise I am afraid we will have a long debate.\nK: We will strongly support it and I will instruct Scali to work with you\non it.\nW: I am grateful for this. I think it is the only possibility to establish\norder in the Island again and I think the British are quite ready to\ngive us the necessary reinforcements.\nR: My only problem Mr. Secretary is when you command the largest\narmy in the non-communist world are you going to be too difficult to\ndeal with. You are going to have a large army in Syria, Egypt, and now\nin Cyprus.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n2.\nW: (Silence)\nI think in this respect I don't really feel that it is\nimpossible to handle.\nK: I was just joking.\nW: (Laughter).\nK: Of course, we S will strongly support it and I will tell Scali to\nwork with your people immediately.\nW: Fine. I appreciate this. I think it is very important also. It is\nsaid that if they don't stop massacring our people we have to continue\nbombarding those villages.\nK: We will strongly support it.\nW: With these 2-3000 men it is impossible. We need to be stronger.\nThe British would be best to ask.\nK: We will strongly support it and I will tell Scali to get in touch\nwith you immediately.\nW: Fine. Thank you for your information.\nK: You will be coming down this week.\nW: Yes. It is confirmed for 3:00.\nEND\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelcon\nSecretary Kissinger\nMinister Vorontsov\n7/22/74; 11:00 a.m.\nV: Henry, you are at it again.\nK: It is getting revolting.\nV: We've had good chances before and we will do it again. I have a\ncable to you from Gromyko. It is a short one. It concerns our decision\nto evacuate part of our personnel from Cyprus from the Embassy and\nother missions. In toto # there will be 150 persons evacuated.\nK: Can we help you?\nV: Yes, Gromyko asked your cooperation but mainly we asked the\nBritish to help us.\nThe\nmain\npoint is they are going to be evacuated by Soviet ships now in the port\nof Lanarka --- 150 persons.\ndon't\nK: I/know where Lanarka is.\nV: To the south away from the invasion point. We appealed to the\nBritish and UN.\nK: We will do our utmost to cooperate with you. We are meeting now\nwith our military and others persons. We will give maximum cooperation.\nIf we can help with transportation, we will do it.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelcon\nSecretary Kissinger/Foreign Min. Callaghan\n7/22/74; 11:25 a. m.\nK:\nYou wouldn't take my call. I rang you this morning, and you wouldn't\ntake my call.\nC:\n[laughs] Well, now, what's the situation?\nK:\nWell, our understanding is that there is a coup in Greece.\nC: ] Yes.\nK:\nAnd Sisco thinks they won't be ready to meet tomorrow.\nC:\nYes, I am told that this man Davos (?) is taking over. Is that right?\nK:\nThat's right, and our reading is that he isn't so bad.\nC:\nOur what?\nK:\nOur reading is that he may be more moderate.\nC:\nYeah, you know you've got a broken voice. I don't think it's just the\naccent of yours. It's that bloody machine you've got there.\nK:\nDo you want me to call you back?\nC:\nI think I can just make it out, Henry, if you go pretty slowly. Did you\nsay that -- uh, what did you say last?\nK:\nI said that my impression - our impression - is that this fellow may\nnot be so bad to work with.\nC:\nAh, right, I agree, but I am told he's pretty anti-Turkish.\nK:\nUmm.\nC:\nHowever, I'll put if off, and what do you suggest? Wednesday?\nK:\nI would put it til Thursday.\nC:\nWell, is that letting it go a bit long?\nK:\nWell, then do it Wednesday if you want.\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 13526, Section 3.5\nNLN09-64/14021 Per 9/29/2014\nBy R Wilt NARA, Date 11/9/2016\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-2-\nC:\nI think we/d better try for Wednesday, and we may have to settle\nfor Thursday.\nK:\nGood.\nC:\nBecause the situation is such that you've got this man Sampson\nstill there.\nK:\nI agree.\nC:\nAnd Echevit was ringing me up and saying that genocide is going\non and there's no authority to deal with.\nK:\nNow we are talking to Waldheim,\nC:\nYes.\nK:\nto increase the UN force.\nC:\nYes.\nK:\nAnd we will strongly support it if you will.\nC:\nYes, we will certainly strongly support that, although we shall\nprobably have to supply some people.\nK:\nThat's what I would think.\nC:\nYes, well all right. Well I would try and get that through, and we\nwould have to add some people to the UN force and let them operate\nunder UN auspices.\nK:\nGood. Box\nC:\nBut I think in those circumstances it is all the more important we\ntry and make it Wednesday if we can.\nK:\nGood. And I will bring Sisco home, and I will send Bill Buffum.\nC:\nBill who?\nK:\nBuffum.\nC:\nAll right. Yes.\nK:\nHe's a very stable and solid and unexcitable fellow.\nC:\nVery good.\nK:\nAnd he will have my thinking in very great detail.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-3-\nC:\nWould he come to Geneva?\nK:\nIf you want him.\nC:\nWell, I think we'd better have him in London first.\nK:\nOK.\nC:\nAnd then he can come on from London to Geneva when we start\nthe conference.\nK:\nHe will be in London on Wednesday.\nC:\nOn Wednesday.\nK:\nUnless it slips.\nC:\nUnless it slips, yes. All right. We'll see him here first thing\nWednesday morning then, Henry.\nK:\nHe'll be there first thing Wednesday.\nC:\nAnd then he can consult with us before we go. And we will try and\nmake the conference Wednesday afternoon.\nK:\nWonderful.\nC:\nSee if you can make that stick with the Greeks and with the Turks,\nwill you?\nK:\nI'll do my best.\nC:\nRight, old man. Good.\nK:\nAnd I've really enjoyed working with you on this.\nC:\nI really have. I think we've managed this not too badly, don't you?\nK:\nI think it's come out as a net asset.\nC:\nYes, I think it's good too. We've got to get rid of this fellow Sampson\nquickly, you know?\nK:\nWell, I told you, we'd support that.\nC:\nYes. That's right. OK. Well, when we get your man over here, we'll\ntalk, and we'll try and coordinate again.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-4-\nK:\nNow, look, I'm seeing Makarios this afternoon.\nC:\nYes.\nK:\nAnd I'm going to play it rather cool.\nC:\nDon't be too cool.\nK:\nNo, I'll play it loose.\nC:\nYou must recognize, he's the legitimate President untill any other\narrangements are made.\nK:\nThat's right. No, no, I'll be very friendly, but I will be noncommittal.\nC:\nYes, that's all right. I tell you, we will have to move very delicately\non that one, Henry.\nK:\nI agree with you.\nC:\nYeah, because we've got this big well, I've got a lot of information\nI'll tell your chap\non that. And I know all the difficulties,\nbut I take it you want to appear to be isolated on this one, you know.\nIf we move, we've got to move together.\nK:\nNo, no, we are not going to make a commitment, but we don't want a\nfinal decision made.\nC:\nNo, no, all right. Well, we are going to inform him through our UN\nambassador there. Righto, we are going to inform him of what is\ntaking place, and we will notify Denktash, the Turkish leader, too,\nand Claridies.\nK:\nRight. And we will stay loose on it and very friendly.\nC:\nYes, that's right.\nK:\nAnd we will send you a reporting cable.\nC:\nYes, you keep it going for a bit, Henry. You take your uncle's advice.\nK:\nOh, no, you can count on that. You can absolutely count on that.\nC:\nAnd you must be absolutely filthy to Sampson.\nK:\nYou can count on that too. [laughter]\nC:\nVery good. I can always count on you being filthy, can I?\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n- -5- -\nK:\nWe really have turned nasty on this.\nC:\n[laughs] All right.\nK:\nGood. Nice to have talked to you.\nC:\nGoodbye now.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nCallaghan/ Sec. Kissinger\nJuly 22, 1974\n1:15 p.m.\nC: Sorry to trouble you. I don't seem to be blable to reach Ecevit. Are\nyou r communications better than ours.\nK: I will try to reach him. What would you like me to discuss with him?\nC: In response to this hysterical telegram about the genocide that is\ngoing on and our communications with ourHigh Commissioner in Nicosia,\nI am ready to offer two companies of guards and two squadrons of armored\ncars to the UN forces. That would be about another 500 min.\nK: Wonderful.\nC: The other thing if you could carry him along on that would be great.\nThe other thing is that his Ambassador in Cyprus seems to be dominated\nby the military commanders. He is in a hysterical mood and threatening\nto call in Turkish fighters to bomb the UN forces. Will you gtell him with\nas much caution as you can, if they do that we will stop them.\nK: All right.\nC: We can't do it very well. We have some Lightnings there. We cannot\nhave them bombing UN Forces in my view. 750 of them are our own men\napart from everything else.\nK: I agree.\nC: If you could get the positive side across to him and tell him to\nrestrain his people in Nicosia It would be a great help.\nK: His ambassador is a pain in the neck. I will do it immediately.\nC: I have been trying for an hour and with no success.\nK: I will do my best.\nC: We have sent a message to our Ambassador to get to him.. If\nyou put the threat to stop him in general terms I would be grateful.\nK: I will do it.\nEND\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 13526, Section 3.5\nNLN09-64/140227 Hr. 9/29/2014\nBy RJ WIH NARA, Date 11/9/2016\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nTaska/ Greek Officials Sec. Kissinger\nJuly 22, 1974, 5:00 p.m.\nT: I am in the office of the Gizikis, the President of Greece. All of\nthe Chiefs of the Greek military services are here as well as the new\nleadership of Greece, Kanaloplis. They are very anxious to have a\nword with you. I have told them the efforts we have made and how\nmuch importance we attach to maintenance of peace in the area.\nThey are very, very concerned about what is going on in Cyprus\nand it has created an impossible problem for them politically to\nface as the first democratic government of Greece since 1967.\nThey would like to have you speak to them and Kanaloplis so they can\nexplain this problem.\nKanaloplis: Mr. K. speaking.\nK: How nice to hear from you.\nKan: We are all here very concered and we are in a dil emma. It is\nimpossible for us to accept this continuation of such activities in Cyprus.\nThe situation has become very critical. I would be very glad if you\nwould be kind enough to have a talk with Mr. Napolis.\nK: I have heard you very well.\nKan: I have to tell you I am very glad to have this talk with you for\nthe first time in my life.\nK: I would like to tell you that our friendship for Greece is firm and you\ncan count on our friendship and our alliance. I will get immediately in\ntouch with the Turkish Prime Minister and urge him to show the\ngreatest restraint.\nKard: Thank you very much indeed. Please be so kind to have a talk with\nMr. Napolis.\nN: Hello Mr. Secretary.\nK: How are you.\nN: Fine. Thank you very much. I just talked to Cleredis. Re the military\noperations to happen to Nicosia tomorrow morning. It would be impossible\nfor us to survive as a Government just as we take over. What is\ncome back to the ceasefire line. Otherwise we do not know how to stay in\npower. They are violating the ceasefire :agreement. We would like you\nto intervene as soon as possible and ask them to come back to the cease-\nfire line.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n2.\nK: I understand and I will call the Turkish PM immediately.\nN: Thank you Mr. Secretary. The situation becomes very critical\nthere and tomorrow morning in Nicosia the Greek forces will resist\nand there will be a massacre in the town and it will make it impossible\nthe survival of the two communities in the Island.\nK: I understand. I will call the Turkish Govt immediately.\nN: In case you have something to tell us we are in the office of the\nPresident of the Republic here in Athens.\nK: I will call back within the hour.\nEND\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nMelLair Sec. Kissinger\nJuly 22, 1974\n5:00\nL: Congratulations.\nK:\nHow are you?\nL: You seem to be busy in another area in the Mediterannean.\nK: There is no nation of maniacs that I don't get involved in.\nL: It certainly seems to be some improvement. Very good.\nK: You are a mind reader. I have been wanted to get\ntogether with you.\nL: I would like to Henry. One thing I wanted to ask you\nand it sort of a personal thing. Dave Packard and I each\nSeptember -- had about 65 Presidential appointees-- we take\nthem to Airlie for two days. They were part of our team at\nDefense and we have continued this even though we left Defense.\nWe go out for two days in September. You were at\nour first meeting in 1969.\nK: I remember.\nL: You answered question and had supper with us. This would\ninclude people -- members of the Joint Chiefs -- very few\nmilitary the rest will be civilians.\nK: What day.\nL: Either the 20th or 21st of September.\nK: The only trouble is that I will be at the General Assembly\nbut I could conceivably fly down -- what is the nearest town.\nL: You could land at Warrenton.\nK: With an airplane.\nI will look at my calendar and if humanly possible I will do it.\nL: It will be a kind of old time --\nK: It is the sort of thing I like to do.\nL: Almost everyone of those people are out of Government now.\nAs a matter of fact most of them wre let out after Dave and I\nleft.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n2.\nK: I am at the stage I have to meet people who might give me jobs.\nMay I insult you. I look back at your tenure with nostalgia.\nL: I was not such a bad son-of-a-bitch.\nK: You were terrific. I said in a crisis we never had to\nworry about Mel Laird.\nL : I would be good to see you and let's get together.\nK: Let's have breakfast next week some morning.\nL: Fine, I would like too.\nK: Can we call you.\nL: At my office here.\nK: Let's say tentively Tuesday or Wedn esday, 30th or 31st.\nL: Wednesday would be best for me.\nK: Let's do it Wednesday.\nL: Come to your office.\nK: To the State Department office. Wed., 31st, 8:00.\nL: I will be there, Henry. It will be great to see you.\nK: I will give you my answer then.\nL: You certainly can and I no the problem. Dave and I were\ntalking about it and what a great thing it would be.\nK: If I can get away from the GA and if not booked for one of\nthose two nights, I will leave for down there and return to\nNY that night.\nL: It is informal.\nK: I remember. I did it on a Saturday later afternoon. The\nChiefs went off duck hunting except for Zumwalt.\nL: That won't happen.\nK: Good-bye.\nEND\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nPm Ecevit/Sec. Kissinger\nJuly 22, 1974\n5:30 pm\nK: Our relationship is more intense than at Harvard.\nE: What, I am not hearing ??\nK: I said our relationship is more intense and more frequent than\nit was at Harvard.\nE: Yes, indeed.\nK: We have had urgent reports that your forces are actively\nviolating the cease-fire and I was wondering if when dawn breaks\nthey could be brought under control?\nE: I shall be concerned immediately.\nK: It is considered a bad. and makes it difficult to do what we all\nwant to do.\nE: I shall do my best.\nK: Good. Also, it is my understanding that your Ambassador in\nCyprus is under great stress. If he could be calmed down a bit.\nE: I see.\nK: If you could do your utmost to ****X ensure the cease-fire and\nwe shall use our maximum influence with Greece.\nE: Alright, I will do that.\nK: Thank you, and You'll let me know about that other thing?\nE: We have discussed it. It is impossible for me to leave the\ncountry. Couldn't you do something about coming here ?\nK: Let me look at my situation.\nE: I have to be here.\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 13526, Section 3.5\nNLIN09-64/14023 Per Hr. 9/29/2014\nBy R) /MIH NARA, Date 11/9/2016\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-2-\nK: I understand. Nr. Prime Minister, I am sendinf you some\npersonal reflections -- on a personal and friendly basis.\nE: Thank you.\nK: Thank you.\nEND\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nChairman Brown/Secretary Kissinger\nJuly 22, 1974\n5:55 PM\nK: I wonder if you could make an analysis of the performance of the Turkish\narmy based on what you saw in Cyprus. Do it in my capacity as Assistant\nto the President\nwhat this means for NATO.\nB: Right.\nK:K The President is insistent on that. I just talked to him.\nB: We'll get right on it.\nK: I would appreciate it. He's worried they didn't perform very well and\nwhether that means anything.\nB: I think they made a bad on the they made the mistake you mentioned this\nmorning. Sent it with too little power. I'll do the analysis and get it back to\nyou.\nK: OK. Thank you.\nEND\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nC05953575\nCU0090183\nSANITIZED\nCOPYCONFIDENTIAL\nEO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs° 24\nEO 13526 3.3(b)(6)>25Yrs\nSANITIZED\nTELECON\nWilliam Colby/Secretary Kissinger\nJuly 22, 1974\n6:23 PM\nK: How is the thing going in Cyprus?\nC: There's still a little shooting going on. It's no major problem. They're\nstill shooting at us. The National Guard is cooperating to a certain extent.\nK: Can you make an xxxxx analysis for us as far as the performance of the\nTurkish army and what it tells us, what we want to know, and does it worry us\nabout the southern flanks.\nC: They couldn't turn the ships axxxxharound fast enough to build up their forces.\nThe problem is, we Americans are spoiled. Our forces are equipped to do these\nthings.\nK: They must have figured it out before they went in the there.\nC: I know it.\nK: It's one of the few things VX you can figure on.\nC: It's a matter of doing your homework. S has broadcast an appeal to\nrespect the ceasefire.\nK: How is that Greek government doing? Is there or is there not a coup?\nYou better make sure there is tomorrow. I've announced it. You can't make\nme look bad.\nthere was a coup today.\nC: No, in that I can find\n.\nK: It's the first time the U.S. has announced a coup in a friendly country. I\ngave a press briefing today.\nC: We had reports that there was something going on.\nC: They're talking about the movement of the Turks\nK: The movement of the Turks\n.\nC: I'm not worried about it.\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 13526, Section 3.5\nCONFIDENTIAL\n9/29/2014\nBy RIMIH NARA, Date 11/9/2016\nNixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nC05953575\n000090183\nCONF IDENTIAL\nColby - page 2\nK: Don't worry. Ithink we did well last week.\nC: I think it's XXXX coming out very well.\nK: We'll come out better if this sticks together.\nC:\nis out ?\nK: Is that\n.\nC: I think it would be hard to get him back in there at this point. I think you\nmay have some press problems with Sampson and the Greeks.\nK:\nbeen seeing hiM?\nC: No. Just generally. In effect, their plan worked.\nK: Not yet. We can't be blex blamed for the imcompetence of the Turks.\nC: It wasn't our problem. It was a Greek/Turkish Elxegthing. We are not\nconducting a political sixen science CODEX course.\nK: I'm still hoping to get Clerides in.\nC: There may be some chance of that. I was trying to figure out the pressure\npoints for you.\nK: We'll have to see.\nC: It's one of the over there, it's not our problem\nK: We have come out in that respect very well. We are certainly not going\nto lend any support for Sampson.\nC: I think there will be some chatter in the left place.\nK: OK. Many thanks.\nEND\nCONFIDENTIAL\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDate 1/23\nEYES ONLY\nFOR:\nPlease return to Jackie Hill\nby Close of Business today.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nL\nTELECON\nMr. Andropolous/Secretary Kissinger\nJuly 23\nA. This is the Prime Minister.\nK: How are you Mr. Prime Minister ?\nA: Fine, how are you?\nK: Fine.\nA: I am sorry I have to bother you again. I am in a difficult position to\nbring to your attention the cease-fire. Therefore, fighting took place\non various parts of the Island. War materials were unloaded and\nmilitary men have landed on the Island at the port of Kyrenia.\nK: Yes.\nA: And something must be done to stop all of this because there is a\nclear understanding and Greece has\n(inaudible)\nK: I will do my best immediately and I am glad you are calling it to my\nattention.\nA: What is going to happen tomorrow morning? Because in Cyprus now\nit is about 10:15 and during the night things may be somehow started\nand then it is morning and we may start all over again.\nK: We will do our best to get it stopped.\nCan I ask you a question?\nA: Yes.\nK: I was wondering if you wouldn't be coming to the United States at any\npoint so we could exchange ideas.\nA: I don't think I could make it right now.\nK: You could not?\nA: It's something to be considered.\nK: I think as we begin these negotiations\nA: The negotiations will begin\nour Minister of Foreign Affairs will\ncarry out the negotiations and I think. cool off a little bit. (inaudible)\nK: We understand this\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-2-\nA: And then we will sit down and discuss..\nK: I thought it might be helpful to discuss general strategy and intentions.\nThe Turkish Prime Minister thought he might want to come over for\na day.\nA: I think now it might make it more difficult to have meetings\ntogether.\nK: No, no. It would be separate; it WD uldn't be joint.\nA: Well,\nK: Let me think about it. I will be in touch with you.\nA: Thank you.\nEND\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nAmb. Ramsbotham/Sec. Kissinger\nJuly 23, 1974, 3:23 p.m.\nR: Henry, I have received a telegram which I forgot about this\nmorning. Calaghan spoke to Cxyxpx Kiprious and was told then that\nthe Greeks could not come to the meeting. He tried to put a lot of\np ressure on him -- before the coup or anything else. He said he\nintended to be in a meeting for 3:00. Turkey would be there, the UN\nand US representatives and the world press would be present. If the\nGreeks did not arrive the world would draw its own conclusion. It\nwas all meant to put on pressure.\nK: What is the hurry now? Larry has just talked in the last 10 minutes\nto Alexander and apparently he told him you were having a meeting.\nDiscussed when the conference might take place and the Turks might become\ndifficult without a conference. I did not have the impression that the\nTurks were dying to get to a conference.\nR: Nor did I.\nK: First of all I hope you will not act without talking to us. We did not\nmake a move without talking to you. Even though we grant you the\nbrains and us the muscle. It would still be nice. Secondly, I don't\nsee what the compulsion is to have this meeting.\nR: I suppose unless you can get the people around the table soon the\nIsland situation might change. I don't know their thinking. I will get\nin touch. What I read to you was this morning work and that was just\npressure.\nK: Make clear to your people on that morning -- don't bother to protest\nthat morning thing just make clear to them in general. Obviously, all\nparties have to be there before we can do anything. Whatevery happens\nin Greece should be given 48 hours to settle down. As far as I can\ntell they have no PM now. Third, we will be happy to try to handle it.\nthe Turks with you. I don't have the impression that exactx Ecevit will\ndie of a heart attack if there is no conference.\nR: I agree. Certainly we are not going to take any decisions without\nconsulting.\nK: If the junta were still there, I would think it desirable to have a\nrapid conference. In its absence I don't see the advantage of Thursday\nor Friday.\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 13526, Section 3.5\nNLIN09-64/14027Pe 9/29/2014\nBy RJ IMIH NARA, Date 11/9/2016\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n2.\nR:\nYes. Unless there is something happening on the Island which\nis relevant and I don't know about.\n.\nK: Thank you.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nGeneral Haig/Secretary Kissinger\nJuly 23, 1974\n2:40 pm\nK: I had a very good session thbs morning and if you follow the same\nroute we're home free. Almost everyone agreed to clear us. Starting\nout on Kraft\nthey asked about that. I said that is all nonsense.\nHaig never did anything that he was not ordered to do and Haig never\ndid anything I was not aware of. So the, that reduced it to Saffire.\nH: They said what about Saffire?\nK: I sal d I didn't know about it and I assumed Haig didn't know about\nthe tap. They said how does Hiag's name appear on that request. I said,\nI don't know. I don't know how they kept\non this. That is the only\narea you have a problem. All the rest of the stuff\nOn the Young\nthing, I said I have no reason to believe Hiag knew Young was\nrequesting an investigation.\nH: An investigation of wha t ?\nK: I knew Young was doing that one interview. I'm just talking about the\nKraft article.\nH: I don't know what t Kraft is saying.\nK: At any rate, the major problem is at the hearing this morning, it\nwas so embarassingly white-washy. I don't see how they can\npublish the transcript. A number of them made speeches saying\nit was a lousy method. It was amazing. It was embarrassing.\nH: That's good. That Kraft piece came out of Saffire. I'm so damn mad.\nK: In my view, you should stay quiet. If you stick with me on this you\ncan't hav e any problems because we accounted for all of them. I\nhave not created an independent role for you. It's filthy. He's going to\nwrite his own before the week is up. I would not get into an independent\ndefense or they'll come after you. You see what I mean?\nH: Yes.\nK: You should only function as an appendage to me.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-2-\nH: That's right. Ok. You think everythin.\n&: The record this morning is embarrassing. It's a total clearing.\nThey cleared the whole process. They started out trying to go the\nXcenficix Kraft line and then gave it up.\nH: Who's the tough guy on that?\nK: Who was he.. Well, Symington isn't after you. He's after\nHaldeman and Ehrlichman. He says these guys always found some\nlegal body to cover up what they did semi-illegally, like the CIA\nor NSC. That you know is true. Church was sort of semi-nigigling.\nThey subsided almost immediately. They said is it possible Haig did\nthings on his own, I said no. They said is it possible he did it on the\nPresident's orders. I said I can't think of a single case\nHow do you account\nfor the Saffire tap. I said that the Brandon tap, I know Haig didn't\nhave anything to do with it. I said take the first four, they never\npursued it after the first three minutes. Javits was the guy who\nraised you. But, after the first three minutes your name was never raised\nagain.\nH: Ok, when are you coming out?\nK: Cn Thursday night.\nH: When do you plan to leave?\nK: Saturday afternoon, why?\nH: What time do you arrive Thursday?\nK: About 9 or 9:30.\nH: I just wanted to be sure we have that for the press.\nK: I'm bringing Genscher with me. You'll see when you read this thing,\nif you stick to what I said, it leaves you out totally. In wha t I said,\nyou're just a transmittal agent. I just wanted you to know.\nH: That is virtually true. I don't know how to handle these cut-offs.\nI don't know who did it.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-3-\nK: That is what you should say. I don't either. On the cut-offs,\nsay I just don't know how they were cut off and that's exactly what you\nshould say. Just say you don't know. I don't know either. I think\nthe major problem is this is going to be an embarrassment. It was\nso easy.\nH: I don't worry about that.\nK: Unless things change course during the week.\nH: That' can't happen.\nnot\nthe\nK: I doubt it. They're/looking for thex/culprit, that's one thing -- their\nline is that nothing wrong was done.\nH: Did they get into those other two guys. Idon't know anything about\nthis.\nK: They didn't even mention you. Theysaid, in orther words, you\ngave names that were tapped it was all me they may come to you.\nJust read what Isaid. First, it's the truth and you see\nnothing\nwas done. It isn't that they are looking for a villian and thereby\nclearming me of something. They're claiming nothing wrong was done.\nH: You think I should make an opening statement?\nK: No. Just go up there without a paper before you and answer questions.\nH: That's what I planned to do.\nK: I wouldn't try to be clever. It's better to say you have no recollection.\nThey are convinced these records are a mess. Dean Rusk is testifying\nthis afternoon. --saying it is rédiculous to think that youxworkk and that\nyou would only act on a directive from the President.\nH: Alright, good. Everything going alright in Cyprus?\nK: Yes. There is a coup in Greece and\nhas been brought back. You\nsee, all the\nguys w 11 come out perfectly. We've got to get Tasca\nout of there. That I have totalk to you about later. That guy is no good.\nI don't care what line he used with the President.\nH: We'll talk about that when you come out.\nK: Ck, there's no hurry.\nEND\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSANITIZED COPY\nTELECON\nAmbassador Ramsbotham/Secretary Kissinger\nJuly 23, 1974\n3:04 PM\nKs How are you?\nR Very well.\nK: I called you about these talles to start in Geneva tomorrow. I am assuming\nthey won't start now.\nR We have had a measage from our man in Athens. Whatever happens, it\nwon't be possible for the ID Chrecks to attend tomorrow or for many days.\nK I don't think we should push them until they get crystallized.\nRs Yes. We are also trying to get crystallized as to what's at happening in\nCyprus, in which Clerides claims to be seting.\nK is he acting President or President ?\nR We don't know.\nKi We are going to hold off recognizing him until later and we would appreciate\nif you don't do anything.\nR We don't go either way until we communicate with each other.\nK: We & won't do anything either.\nRa I talked to Sisco today about that. because we have sent instructions to\nour man to avoid any matter that would\nbut to deal with him on\npractical matters.\nK: I dont think we have even done that.\nR I think you should.\nK: $ do too. What is your personal assessment ?\nRs You was I my personal view?\nK: Yes.\nR: of Clarides. I don't think there is anyone else capable of taking over.\nKr Unless.\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 13526, Section 3.5\nNLW09-64/14025 3.3(6)(6) Hr.9/29/2014\nBy R WIH NARA, Date 11/9/2016\nReproduced SANITIZED OOPY at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSANITIZED COPY\nRamsbotham $ NW page 8\nBill Unless Makarine goes back,\nK And what do you think of that?\nB: You want my personal view?\nEll Yes.\nR and think a will be very difficult for him to go back.\nE: Who will oppose him?\nR: I don't think there is a very strong pro-Makarios element outside the\nIsland. at will all depend on what the new Greek regime wants. I just heard\nthere was some sort of matteage Indicating he's standing by to go back.\nK You heard be has been called back?\nB No, that he's standing by to go back.\nK We have heard he has gone back.\nR: And the King too, if the King wants to back him with that offering some\npressure for Makarios, Makaries is close to the King as a spiritual adviser.\nSANITIZED\n3.3(b)(6)\n& 1 never thought much of the King to begin with. PH take Makarios as a\npolitical advisor but not as a spicitual adviser.\nR We'll be in touch as - soon as we have some view about the\nConstitutional stinte situation.\nin Good. Then will you tell the Foreign Becretary that we will keep Buffum\nhere until It's clarified.\nR Yes, hold up Buffum until it to clarified.\nK: There won't be a meeting now.\na will tell him that and we'll tell each other before either does anything\nabout Clorides.\n$ Yes,\nB Good.\nEND\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Pr esidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nAmbassador Ramsbotham/Secretary Kissinger\nJuly 23, 1974\n3:16 PM\nK: AI got a call from our Ambassador in Athens, who sometimes gets a little\nexcited, that your Ambassador has told the Greeks that you are prepared to\nstart the conference in Geneva even without them and that this\nUS support.\nThere is no support for a conference without the Greeks and we are not in\nsupport of a conference in Cyprus without the Greeks. We will not have\nanybody there.\nR: I dont' understand. When we talked just a moment ago\nI read from\na telegram XX which said whatexx whatever happens, there will be no Greek\nrepresentative.\nK: We cannot under any cxixx circumstances support a conference on Cyprus\nexcluding Greece. We strongly support a X conference with Greece. You\ncannot set up a condecexxxxxxx conference Xxxx excluding Greece.\nR: Your man could be wrong. I \"11 check it out.\nK: Secondly, it is our judgment that the day after a coup is not the day to\nstart a conference. Sisco is sitting here and says if he box had stayed he\nmight have been made Prime Minister.\nR: We all have out ambitions. I'll check on it right away. I 11 get in to that\nand clear it up rather quickly.\nK: Can you clear it up?\nR: Yes.\nEND\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 13526, Section 3.5\nNLN09-64/14026 Per Hr. 9/29/2014\nBy 25/MIH NARA, Date 11/9/2016\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nPrime Minister Ecevit/Secretary Kissinger\nJuly 23, 1974\n3:30 PM\nE: How are you?\nK: Fine.\nE: Things are moving.\nK: You're causing a lot of xxixx trouble. I just want to find out how you see the\nsituation.\nE: I just called your Ambassador. I want to give you my comments on Clerides.\nK: Don't tell me that on the phone.\nE: What?\nK: I think you should give me that view if I may suggest, if you could give\nthat XXX view to X my Ambassador. Did you get my cable this morning?\nE: I did. I got your oral message.\nK: If you could call him and tell him.\nE: I just did. He should come in 10 minutes.\nK: Good. Give him my regards. Now, may I ask when should the talks between\nyou and the Greeks start?\nE: I have talked to Callaghan and he was wondering if bx the Greeks could attend\nthe conference in Geneva. I said I don't know, they don't seem to have a\ngovernment but I said unless we hear from the Greeks to the contrary,\nCallaghan and Gunes will be in Geneva,\nK: I think that is a mistake.\nE: They may be able to appoint a Foreign Minister and send him but they have\ndecided not to hold a private talk session but offered to open the nxxxx meeting\nand wait for the Greek Foreign Minister to come. If he comes, alright, if\nhe doesn't\n.\nWait, I just received a note\nI mean they will attempt to\nopen the conference and wait for the Greek Foreign Minister to arrive. If he\ndoesn't they will postpone it. Noone from Athens has said they will not be able\nto abxx attend. If we bxextxex hear they want to put it off, then we will.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nEcevit - page 2\nK: I think it is XI unfair to bring pressure ona government to attend a\nconference when they don't have a Foreign Minister. I think we should give\nthem the courtesy of xpprixxxx appointing a government first. This is my\npersonal view. This was done without asking our view. I will not have an\nAmerican representative there before Thursday.\nE: Excuse me?\nK: I will not send Buffum there until Thursday in any event.\nE: One moment please. We have just received a message from Mr. Callaghan\nand he suggests that although uncertain that Greece can attend, they should\nstill meet and discuss what to do. In the meantime, there are sumors that a\ndelegation headed by the ex-Foreign Minister might go to the Geneva meeting.\nThis is a messåge I just received from Geneva.\nK: We will not send anyone until we know that the Greek Government is sending\na representative.\nE: They may send -- it doesn't have to be a Foreign Minister. x We have heard\nnothing to the contrary. Of course the conference will not be officially started\nunless the Greeks attend.\nK: Whatever you want to do, you should proceed doing. If you have agreed to\nsend somebody to Geneva with Callaghan then you should do it. I have no right\nto get in the way.\nE: I didn't understand.\nK: We cannot get in the way of an agreement you have already made with the\nBritish. But, I would prefer to know that all parties are coming.\nE: Certainly. If word reaches us that Greece cannot attend the meeting\ntomorrow, then we will cancel it, but we have heard nothing so far.\nK: But they don't have a government.\nE: But their's is a different system and there is still a President and they can\nsend a representative. According to a note I received, the Greece delegation\nheaded by Gunes may come. If we postpone Callaghan and Gunes going, it\nwould be worse. Gunes will ask our Embassy in Athens to approach whatever\nauthority they axix can find and ask if they will be represented.\nK: That is a very good suggestion. We will approa ch them too.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nEcevit - page 3\nR: We can ask them whether they will be represented. If the answer is no,\nwe won't go.\nK: OK. This is a very good idea.\nOK. Thank you.\nEND\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n7/23/74, 3:45 p.m.\nTELCON/Mr. Eagleburger/Mr. Michael Alexander, UK Foreign Office\nE. The Secretary has asked me to call you again with a message. He\nhas just talked with Ecevit and Ecevit has told him that he and the\nForeign Secretary have agreed to meet in Geneva tomorrow regardless\nof whether the Greeks are there.\nA. That is not true actually, but go on.\nE. Here are the points he would like to make. He thinks it is very\nunwise to meet in the absence of the Greeks. It will first of all\nundermine the new government. Secondly it will look like a rape\nof the Greeks or a gang-up by the UK, US and Turks. He wants you\npeople to know that we will not send anyone to Geneva until we have\nofficial word from the Greeks that they are coming. Next point, he\nwants you to know that we have made no unilateral moves and he\nhopes very much that you will not make unilateral moves without\nconsultations with us first.\nA. In what context?\nE. In the sense that we have in this crisis let you know what we\nwere going to do before we did it. He asks that you not take any\nunilateral steps without letting us know first. His final question\nwas, \"What's the hurry ?\"\nA. I don't know what impression he got from Ecevit. The danger\nis that the people on the ground are likely to muck up this ceasefire\nwhen you get right down to it. The Turks are concerned with the\nmodalities of this ceasefire. Important to the Foreign Secretary\nthat we keep them in play. No intention on our part to make\nunilateral move. It is moving so fast. I think the origin of your\nlast call was because you had seen one of our own telegrams,\nwasn't it ? Where did you get it from? There is no intention on\nour part to keep it from you.\nE. This contact is useful only if we are frank with one another.\nMy first call triggered by what?\nA. By your having seen a telegram that we are going ahead whether\nGreeks turned up or not.\nE. I guess it may have been.\nA. What is your answer on what we do with the Turks.\nE. Henry's view after talking with Ecevit is that they are not all that\nanxious. One more point, matter of information, Ecevit told Kissinger\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n- 2 -\nthat he would have their Ambassador in Athens -- I didn't know\nthey still had an Ambassador in Athent -- check with the Greeks\nbefore they make any decision on sending Gunes\nto Geneva.\nA. That comes back to what I was saying about what Secretary\nof Stat e and Ecevit agreed. If learned tonight definitively that\nGreeks would not be in Geneva tomorrow, we would not go. We\nwent to some trouble to establish what time Gunes' departure was\nE. You agreed that if you learned tonight that the Greeks, in fact,\nwere not going, you would put off for 24 hours, would not go tomorrow ?\nA. Absolute chaos on this side deciding when absolute moment was\nwhen we could decide. Ecevit and Foreign Secretary agreed that\nif established definitively that Greeks could not be represented in\nGeneva tomorrow, we would not go and would get in touch with Gunes\nin time to stop him. This was 5:00 a. m. I think we probably have\nestablished ekixix definitively that there won't be any Greeks in Geneva\ntomorrow. Question really now is whether go ahead with the meeting\non Thursday or not.\nE. I just wanted to reinforce Kissinger's view that even day after\ntomorrow if there is no Greek there we think it is a mistake to have\na meeting.\nA: What would he think about a straightforward bilatemal meeting,\nAnglo-Turk meeting, in London.\nE. I don't know what Henry's view on that would be. My guess is\nit puts you in awkward position with Greeks. It seems to be of some\nconcern to Henry now that we take a balanced position with both\ndisputant parties. This is my own view, not Henry's. We obviously\nfall behind here, not knowing exactly what facts are.\nA. I think we may have to talk again. My principal is rather tired and\nI am not quite sure he is going to take a great deal more interest this\nevening.\nE. What is your report on the Greek situation right now?\nA. Athens is in an uproar. Our Ambassador there described it as like\nGreece that won the world cup. Karamanlis has not yet arrived but is on\nhis way and our information is that he is on his way to head a government.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n- 3 -\nActually it is clear to us it is going to take more than a couple\nof hours. It is not a thing they can do just like that after the\nlast 7 years. We are very well seized with the Greek angle on\nall this.\nE. We are not terribly confident of what we are getting from our\nsources.\nA. I got a flavor of that last time we spoke. We think it looks rather\ngood in Athens from what we can judge at this early stage.\nE. You have no feeling Greece is going to take on Turkey in a\nmilitary way ?\nA. Absolutely not at the moment. A Karamanlis government\nwould be to the right. It would not be soft on the Turks. We\nalso get feeling that they consider Turkish violation of ceasefire\nand could cause some\nvery anxious to keep the Turks in play.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nSenator Percy/Secretary Kissinger\nJuly 23, 1974\n4:07 pm\nK: Chuck, how are you?\nP: Fine, how are you? Dean Rusk testified this afternoon. I had met\nwith him in London and we had about six hours alone and it was a good\ntalk. His testimony was impressive. I think if anyone was doubtful\nbefore they cannot be any longer\nHe said dealing with Hoover was\nlike dealing with deGalle who didn't tell him anything. I read to him\nsections of your own report and what you understood to be\nthe truth\nHe\neverything down the line. After Haig's\ntestimony I think we will get this cleared up. I also asked him,\nisn't it wise to clear this up? He agreed. I\nthink blosxx his testimony was extremely good and very helpful.\nK: You'ave been a good friend and I appreciate the questions you\nasked this morning.\nP: We are doing our duty here. We'll make it very clear that the\ninvestigation was initiated at your request and what\nwhat followed\nThat we have not been mislead. I can't believe but that Haig's\ntestimony won't be very helpful.\nK: Haig will support everything I said.\nP: Ok.\nK: Thank you.\nEND\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nAmbassador Ramsbotham/Secretary Kissinger\nJuly 23, 1974\n5:30 PM\nK: I want you to know I'm getting restless with London.\nR: I haven't had an answer. They were talking about it.\nK: I have talked to Ecevit. I had a frantic call from the Greek Government,\nor\nboxx what passes for the Greek Government.\nR: Who is that?\nK: Mr. Canellopoulos, they said if there was a Turkish attack tomorrow, then\nthe Greek democracy would collapse. So I called Ecevit to tell him not to do it.\nHe said he wouldn't.\nR: Attack on waht?\nK: Nicosia.\nR: What was it to be on. I had't heard.\nK: The airport, they were afraid of a general attack. In the course of my\nconversation with Ecevit, he tells me that he has an agreement with Callaghan\nthat he would be in Geneva tomorrow evening. Unless he hears to the contrary from\nthe Greeks. But the Breeks are no more able to say they will come then to say\nthey are not. And there is no way you can settle this thing without us and if you\ntry a solo, we will drag our X feet.\nR: I'll tell you what I said, that you said there is that all peace\nK: I thinkit's inconceivable that the Greek democratic governemtn be confronted\nby a British/Turkish gangup. You better make it clear to London that I think\ncommunications have totally broken down and remind them VX that I didn't make\na move wikx without clearing it with Caklagalx Callaghan.\nR: I'm still waiting to hear. I think in London they are concerned about what might\nhappen if we leave the situation in @yxpxXxxxx Cyprus without a conference.\nK: I'm not concerned about that. I don't want a conference without the Greeks.\nBy R) MIH NARA, Date 11/9/2016\nNLIN09-64/14028 Per Hr. 9/29/2014\nWe will not be there and will not associate ourse ves with a British/Turkish\n.\nE.O. 13526, Section 3.5\nDECLASSIFIED\nR: We shall try to get them there and with a new government, we can probably\ndo it.\nK: It's indecent to ask a new government that hasn't been formed to go there to\nnegokiation negotiate. That is out concern. Since the outcome is not one that will\nbe glorios for Greece it certainly should not look like maximum wexx weakness\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nRamsbotham - page 2\nof a democratic government.\nR: I'm almost certainthat we probably agree with you. In the hope we can still\nget the Greeks there. I'm sure we wouldn't go ahead without them. You say\nyou are restless, but I haven't a definite answer.\nK: I am, and there has been no communication with Ecevit about your intentions.\nR: I will clear this up and should get an answer quickly and let you know.\nK: We are in agreement with you on substance and if there has been a Greek\ngovernment we should have supported the\nwe would not go as far as a have\na conference without them, but it doesn't seem wise to have negotiations going\nthe first day of a new government. Any concessions they make willk look like\nblackmail. If they want to come, we would be delighted. We have k nothing against\nthe conference.\nR: But they must not be pressued.\nK: Ecevit is still perating in the same theory as three hours ago.\nR: The other *** thing, we are hearing from the UN that the Russians and the non-\naligned are thinking they should support Makarios and resist recognition of\nClerides.\nK: He hasn't claimed. I understand he's being sworn in as acting President. We\nwill not go along with that.\nR: If the Russians try to\ntheir recognition of Clerides.\nK: We will not be pressured by either party to recognize Clerides. If we\nsuspect any pressure we will go ahead with recognition. We are not gaing to be\nmaneuvered into a holding off in deference to you. We will not be pressured into\ndoing more.\nR: If he is acting as President, that's not so bad.\nK: No.\nR: It XX depends on which article of the Constitution he is under.\nK: Are there two articles?\nR: Yes, there is one with the President in a temporary absnece and then there is\none if it is a permanent absence. He is authorized to assume the office.\nK: I didn't know about that. Will you let me know. Dont' try any maneuvers\nwithout textex letting us IX know.\nR: No.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nRamsbotham - page 3\nK: We are not against Makarios We are not going to pay the price for other XXXX\npeople's rational moves\nwe gave the same instructions.\nR: The Russians are by now alerted on this sometime tonight and C will .\nK: From our point of view, Clerides emerges too rapidly.\nR: What is unfortunate, is he will alienate himself from with Makarios if he\nkeeps Sampson on.\nK: Is he keeping Sampson?\nR: I don't know. There's some indication he may be.\nK: We are not pushing Clerides. We are also not going to be pressured into\nMakarios.\nR: Alright.\nK: So if everybody understands this, we can go along.\nR: Like yesterday.\nK: It's exactly what it was yesterday as far as we're concerned.\nR: And so it will be when I come back to you.\nK: Good.\nEND\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nMr. Flakos/Secretary Kissinger\nJuly 23, 1974\n5:40 pm\nK: I have already tal ked to Ecevit and I've talked to\n. I WO uld\nlike to talke to Mr. Connelopoulos to give him the answer of the Prime\nMinister of Turky. Mr. Connelopoulos called me from the President's\noffice of Greece. As soon as you get him on the line I will talk\nto him.\nF: Certainly, Mr. Secretary. I just wanted to tell you what I showed\nto Mr. Brown. If there's no ceasefire and the Turks do not go back to\nthe lines of 4:00 yesterday, the situation will be most da ngerous.\nK: I understand. there will be a ceasefire.\nF: The ceasefire hasmot been respected by the Turks.\nK: I understand all of this. I would like to get Connelopoulos back on the\nline.\nF: I will try to get him on the line.\nK: Can you tell me -- are you planning on going to the Geneva\nConference tomorrow?\nF: Not tomorrow. It is impossible.\nK: We are not sending anybody until the Greeks have sent someone.\nF: We have an understanding with the Turks and I think they agree that\nwe will start either Thursday or Friday. This is a matter which has\nbeen settled. insist on starting tomorrow. I have the assurance\nof the Ambassador of Turkey that he will convey our message to the\nTurkish Government. But tomorrow, it is a materiel impossibility.\nK I understand that. I appreciate it\nF: The problem is helping\nK: Will you get Mr. Connelopoulos to call be back?\nF: He might find himself in a very difficult position and he might not be\nable to return.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-2-\nK: I have been assured by the Turkish Prime Minister that there will\nbe no military offensive tomorrow.\nF: I wouldn't want you to be lured by that fact. that During the\nnight there won't be any fighting. Usually the Turks don't fight during\nthe night hours. They might start tomorrow at dawn.\nK: I have been told they will not fight during the day. I have to\nget a call from Mr. Connelopoulos.\nF: I will do whatever I can SO you can have your call immediat ely.\nK: Ok, Thank you.\nEND\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nMr. Connollopoulos/Secretary Kissinger\nJuly 23, 1974\n6:25 PM\nK: I have talked to the Prime Minister of Turkey and he has promised me there\nwill be no military offensive tomorrow.\nC: Thank you very much. (ixxxxix)x (inaudible)\nK: I have great XXXXX trouble hereingx hearing you.\nC: Thank you very much.\nK: You're welcome. Goodbye.\nEND\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nWilliam Colby/Secretary Kissinger\nJuly\n1974\n7:45 PM\nK: I'm just returning your call.\nC: That was just to tell you about the thing. That was a long time ago.\nYou were up on the Hill.\nK: Perhaps we ought to have a WSAG sometime soon.\nC: Anytime. It sounds like it's going very well.\nK: The trouble with you Colby\n.\nI decided I want (Clerides). You don't\nhave to produce it in 45 hours.\nC: I wish I could see it was done like that.\nK: I told\n.\nC: I'm only worried about the Turks as to how will it come out. That's not\nvery clear.\nK: They're God-damn inconsistent. They should have played for the\nto stay in. They're going to get squeezed off Cyprus.\nC: The other thing -- I think the problem now for the Greeks themselves, is how\nfar they go.\nK: I think they will go the way of the Portuguese.\nC: The Portuguese went very far\n.\nK: I doubt it. OK.\nC: Thank you.\nEND\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 13526, Section 3.5\nNLN09-64/14029 Per Hr. 4/30/2013\nBy RJ NARA, Date 11/9/2016\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nMr. Sisco/Secretary Kissinger\nJuly 23, 1974\n8:06 PM\nK: I wanted you to know what I've done. The British have recognized\nClerides to act as President. I thought you should know.\nS: I was going to say I felt that XXXX line was a good interim line. We're\nperfectly statex safe in recognizing him .\nK: I've told Stabler to call the newspapers tonight or then the other question\nwould be why are we holding back. The Turks said they will never recognize\nMakarios as President of Cyprus nor will they recognize Clerides as head of\nCyprus.\nS: I understand the first party.\nK: They want,\n.\nS: That won't wash on the Turk side. But I agree with you. I'm very pleased\nto hear you say this.\nK: You know, I think WXX you did a superb job. I didn't get a chance to say\nit to you txixx this afternoon. You and I make a good team. You know that\nfinal solution WXSX was your idea. I just wanted you to know I know it.\nI'm having lunch tomorrow X with Max Frankle and I'm going to tell him.\nS: I'm very pleased that you are pleased.\nK: Good, Joe.\nEND\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSANITIZED COPY\nSANITIZED\n14030\nC05953576\nNLN-TELCONS-26-9-346-2\nEO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs 30\n3.3(b)(6)\nTELECON\nSecretary Schlesinger/Secretary Kissinger\nJuly 24, 1974\n2:24 pm\nK: Jim, how are you?\nS: You brought itx off a coup.\nK: I announced it to the press yesterday.\nS: The subject was reached. I had a long talk with Bob Ellsworth. I\ndon't know whether you ha d a full read-out from Sisco.\nK: No, I testified all morning. I'm meeting with Sisco right now.\nS: He says he and Sisco agree. The subject he should brief you on.\nsome of the weaknesses that were perceived in the Embassy in Athens\non this thing. Somehow Tasca just couldn't resist doing it.\nin the\ncase of the overthrow and Tasca couldn't respond to it.\nK: The overthmow in Cyprus?\nS:\nthey may have thought they had American acquiescence.\nK: We have got a problem with that fellow.\nSKX S: You may want to take a hard look at it .\nK: Between you and me, he's not necessarily the State Department\ncandidate.\nS: Yes, I can see that.\nK: If this is true, ru have to talk to Sisco about it. Then, I have a\nbbasis for doing something.\nS:\nK: Yes.\nS: I talked to Ingersoll a bit ago. -- about letting those two F-4's go.\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 13526, Section 3.5\nSANITIZED COPY\nBy WIMIH NARA, Date 11/9/2016\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nC05953576\nNLN-TELCONS-26-9-346-2\n-2-\nK:\nYes, I think we should.\nS: We will let them go immediately.\nK: Jim, you and I ought to get together on the next stages of SALT\nsometime soon.\nX: Yes.\nK: Ok\nEND\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nTELECON\nPM Ecevit/Secretary Kissinger\nJuly 24, 1974\n3:05\nK: Can you hear me ? Mr. Prime Minister ?\nE: This is Ecevit.\nK: Can you hear me ?\nE: Yes, I can hear you, how are you?\nK: Fine. And since a day isn't complete without my talking to my students\nI have been calling all over the world.\nYour Ambassador in Cyprus\nwho tends to get a little excited.\nE: We have sent a liaision officer in good spirits with excellent english. He\nshould be there sometime tomorrow.\nK: He told the British and Cypriots that you are going to take the airport\nin two hours.\nE: This is not true. I have talked with Waldheim, Macomber and Callaghan\nabout it. There are confusing reports. It seems that because the\nGreeks were using the airport for transporting armaments and military\nmen, our military units took over the airport and offered it to the UN\nforces. They did not arrive for a long time, SO they had no alternative\nhello? Hello?\nK: I can hea r you.\nE: They had no alternative but to take hold of it, the airport. The British\nforces arrived there and claimed they had certain legal rights at the\nNicosia Airport based on the agreements. Cur people accepted that the\nBritish had these rights based on the international agreements and we said\nwe will agree to respect the British rights at the airport and we are doing\nthat. According to the UN, it is not in control of the UN force but\nsurrounded by the Turkish forces. What ever the position may be\nunder Turkish control or UN control, Turkish forces have strict orders not to\nget into conflict with the UN forces but we are not clear about who really\ncontrols the airport but whatever the situation our people will respect it and\nmaintain it. We may have a disagreement with the UN but Gunes will discuss\nwith\nin Geneva. UN claims they have right to control airport. We\nsay why didn't you exert that when airport was in control of the Greeks.\nWe ask for the protection of the helpless Turkish units so this is\nthe\npoint.\nWe are not going to cause any confrontation with British forces.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-2-\nK: I will send Ambassador Buffum to Geneva tomorrow and I think he\nshould have a talk with your Foreign Minister about our thinking.\nE: Yes, certainly.\nK: We want to stay in close touch.\nE: I appreciate that.\nK: We want to continue these negotiations in a spirit of alliance and\nfriendship.\nE: The talks will be tripartite.? Won't they ?\nK: Yes. He will be available to give our view. His instructions are to be\nvery cooperative with you.\nE: Have you heard about the Canneloupoulos appointment?\nK: We think it is positive.\nE: We sent a warm message to him and we meant it. He is a wise statesman.\nAnd I hope this will be a contribution to better relations.\nKL That is our view and itx we made a strong statement of support.\nE: Good, So did I. I hope it doesn't work against him.\nK: I hope so. It was a pleasure to talk to you and we really have to talk\nagain soon.\nEND\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nCallaghan/Secretary Kissinger\nJuly 24, 1974\n3:30 PM\nK: You didn't talk to me yesterday.\nC: I'm sorry. I hope you can hear me.\nK: I can.\nC: We'ave had a message from the Turkish Ambassador in Nicosia.\nK: He's crazy.\nC: He's what?\nK: Crazy.\nC: Crazy? Well, I know that. He says they are going to attach the airport.\nK: I got that message and I called Ecevit.\nC: And does he say no?\nK: He says no. There is some dispute as to who holds the airport, the Turks\nor the UN.\nC: We have a bad connection.\nK: Can you call me back?\nC; As we have it from here this xxxxxxx madness in Nicosia that Turkish\ntroops are going to attack the Nicosia airport tonight. We have\na note read over the telephone from Ambassador office. That they fully\nunderstand the British troops bawex at the airport have some rights, and I say\nthis in brackets, we back have no rights except as members of the xxx UN\nforces, therefore, they intend to leave the troops alone.\nin a position to\nleave the airport, it will be taken and reports if we do, how the hell can\nthey distinguish between British and Turkish troops.\nK: Your troops are there as part of the UN forces. Let me tell you what\nEcevit told me.\nC: I have less and less time for that man.\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 13526, Section 3.5\nNLN09-64/14031 Per 9/29/2014\nBy RS /WIH NARA, Date 11/9/2016\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nEcevit - page 2\nK: What Ecevit told me was one of his wild stories of what was going on.\nBasically he said he didn't know who held the airport right now. There were\nno conflicting stories in whatever the situation was and it would not be\nchanged. I've talked to the Secretary General and he has just had a report\nfrom Nicosia that they still hold the airport. If Ecevit is to be believed,\nthe UN will continue to hold the airport will not permit an attack on UN\nforces. This is the state of play as I understand it.\nC:\nit is not possible to leave the airport outside British facilities.\nMy own view is the Turks have not achieved their objectives, which included\ncapture of the airport. What we have done is to tell them we are flying up\n600 men from the base to reinforce the airport and we're flying out from\nhere in a helicopter. We can't stand by and see the\nI don't know, I don't see myself going to Geneva tomorrow.\nK: I understand your position on this. We, of course, are opposed to it.\nC: Can you get hold of the Turkish general staff?\nK: All they do is take the ICK message and par refuse to pass any messages\nback. I tried to get through both through military as well as through NATO channe\nC: I think these people are going to get this airport. I don't know what impact\nit will baxex have on the Greek Government.\nK: I don't see there's anything we can do.\nC:\nafter a couple of hours the Turkish will then attack the UN forces.\nK: I can't believe they'll do it.\nC: I can't either.\nK: Above all, in the view of the promise of the Prime Minster who has only\nbroken 3 promises a day for\nC: I don't see how they are going to take the airport.\nK: I think in the final analysis they won't attack. That's a rational calculation.\na I don't know, let me go back to them again.\nC: Give them an indication they that we're reinforcing UN forces. Tell them\nwe understand they are going to fight. See what you can do.\nK: Let me do this.\nC: I'm leaving at 10:00 in the mo rning.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nEcevit - page 3\nK: I'll send Buffum to Geneva. He's leaving tonight.\nC: Good. Alright.\nK: Should Buffum get in touch with you in Geneva?\nC: Yes, straight away. I 11 be there about mid-day tomorrow.\nK: He will be there about that time.\nC: If he gets in tough with our Embassy, he'll know where to find me.\nIf you can do anything, please do.\nK: OK.\nEND\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nHauser/Kissinger\nJuly 24, 1974, 4:35 p.m.\nH: How did it go for you.\nK: I think very well.\nH: No problem.\nK: Not at all.\nH: What happens next. When they finish Haig then what?\nK: They they will vote to clear me.\nH: Very good and I think you will get washed out on the other thing. I\nthink he is going to be finished. I have been on the phone with them. I\ndon't understand their mentality about how to respond to this Supreme\nCourt decision.\nK: What are they saying?\nH: Some don't want him to say anything; others want a terse comment.\nI have talked to three of them (Congressmen?). One more note of\ndefiance and they will go to the other side.\nK: This request is going to be the beginning of more and more.\nH: What's his choice? If he turns them over and they come out as\nterrible stuff; he can't burn them. The tipover is 60 votes in the House.\nReally something.\nK: I have not read the decision but it seems to be much too sweeping.\nH: I only saw the ticker. Any lawyer could have told them this would be\nthe case. They got made at me. They don't want to believe what is\nhappening. They refuse to accept it. They don't know where it is to\ngo. If I bet, I think it would be out. If I were you I would just hide\nout -- keep busy with Cyprus. You will get washed out in this.\nK: That is what I am going to do.\nH: Any breakthrough with Jackson.\nK: I think so.\nH: I talked to Lobell and I told him I thought there would be a compromise.\nK: That was mv strong impression.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n2.\nH: I'm glad all is all right for you.\nK: All your points were included in my statement.\nH: Fine. Will it be published.\nK: Eventually.\nH: O.K. I'm glad it is coming out right for you and we will see how\nthis game plays out.\nK: When you come down XIX come in and we will talk about where we go\nfrom here.\nH: I've talked to your buddy Mel Lair who is running around the\ncountry for Ford. He will be important if Ford becomes President.\nIt is a terrible thing -- on how to handle this. If Laird is the real\npower in the White House, I think it will pose problems for you.\nYou just mind your own business at the moment and be a good Secretary.\nWait until the dust settles and we will see where we want to go.\nEND\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nAmb Ramsbotham/Sec. Kissinger\nJuly 24, 1974\n4:45\nR: I wondered if you had heard that our Prime Minister talked to Ecevit.\nK: Yes, I talked to your Foriegn Minister and Ecevit told the same probable\nlie to him that he told me.\nR: And you got the message that Gunes sent.\nK: Yes. The only way to make rational sense out of this is that the\nTurks intended to attack and that your Prime Minister's phone call,\nmine and the Secretary-General's prevented it and the other rational\nexplanation is that Ecevit is not in control of his forces.\nR: I think that is probably CO rrect.\nK: And they are going to attack anyway.\nR: They were saying all along\nthe airport could not be left in the hands\nof the UN. the cover story is, it has been in the hands of the Turks all\nthe time and we\nWell, we have some phantoms on the way. Knowing\nthe Turks well, I don't think they will attack before dawn, which is about\n5 hours off. They have 40 tanks, which will prove more than you or we\ncan cope with.\nK: Let me call you back in half an hour. I have to get Buffum off.\nR: Alright.\nEND\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 13526, Section 3.5\nNLN09-64/14032 Per 9/29/2014\nBy RS limit NARA, Date 11/9/2016\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nFrench FM Sauvagnargues/Secretary Kissinger\nJuly 24, 1974\n4:45\nK: I want to welcome you to the United States.\nS: Thank you. It is a short stopover.\nK: You are undermining our position in the\nnow.\nS: I don't think so.\nwe haven't agreed on the EC position. Our British\nfriends were rather obstinate on sugar.\nK: Well, if you have any position, you are way ahead of me.\nS: How are things. I have heard disquieting things about the Turks.\nK: We are trying to dissuade them from taking the airport.\nS: It is defended by the UN force.\nK: That is right and the Turkish Prime Minister has promised me that\nhe had no plans to take the airport, but.\nS: (inaudible)\nK: That is a good question, I don't know.\nS: That is disquieting. I don't think Ioannidis should do anything now but\nperhaps the French government could.\nK: I think it is too late. If you want to send a demarch, fine.\nS: It is probably too late. Was there definitely a danger of an attack.\nK: Our impression is there was a definite plan for an attack and calls from\nthe Secretary General, the British and me have have delayed it, if Ecevit\nis in charge of his forces.\nS: What about the conference in Geneva?\nK: It is starting tomorrow.\nS: Both governments have agreed.\nK: Yes.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nS: Why are they doing it ? Probably they will through the military\nK: They filed and they are now in a precarious position. If their\nsupplies have to come by sea and there is only one open road to Nicosia\nthey are in a precarious position.\nS: And you are in touch with Ankara?\nK: Yes.\nS: I hope you succeed in stopping it. It could start the whole thing again.\nK: I agree.\nS: I wish you luck.\nK Thank you.\nS: Thank you for your kind message. I am looking forward to my next stay in\nSeptember and I hope to see you. I'll try to come for at least one\nday to Washington.\nK We count on that.\nS: Thank you, good bye.\nEND\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nGovernor Rockefeller/Secretary Kissinger\nJuly 23, 1974\nK: How are ;you?\nR: Wanted you to know we are thinking about you. How are you doing ?\nK: What are you thinking about?\nR: I was thinking about your friends in Cyprus.\nK: This thing is coming out fine. It is coming out as you\noverheard me on the phone the other day.\nR: I remember, but I was a little worried.\nK: It has come out the way we want. Sampson is out and they have\na guy in there who is really our first choice.\nR: As long as you say it is alright.\nK: But we are keeping open the option of the other.\nR: That is number one. So it has come out according to plan.\nK: Yes, and we kept the Russians out of it totally.\nR: Well, you can mark down another one. I talked to John Dunlop yesterday.\nK: He is outstanding.\nR: Yes. He talked to me about what you asked him to do and I had asked\nhim to go into a panel on International trade\nK: I think he is excellent.\nR: I also thought because the\npeople are crazy about him and David\nis crazy about him that we might get him to do some writing for us.\nBut, from what he told me, his work is very parallel to this, Now, I\nwouldn't want to interfere in anything he has promised to do for you, but\nas I said, I think the work is very parallel and this shouldn't interfere.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-2-\nK: I have no objection to him doing any writing.\nR: You don't\nK: No, that is fine.\nR: That's marvelous. And I'll be seeing him on Friday. Now, one\nother thing. On September 10 we are having a full commission\nmeeting in Washington. We want to develop a new Panel., which would\nbe in the public and private institutional.\nwe are meeting on what is\nhappening to the private\nsystem and we want to know if you\nmight be able to come to this. It is the tenth of September and if\nyou did you might want to say a word about the changing world\nof international institutions. We were going to ask Mike Mansfield\nto say a word on the restructuring of Congress and perhaps George\nMeany on Labor's role.\nK: If possible, if I am in town, I will do it.\nR: You're marvelous. This would be in the morning. Do you think\nwe ought to ask the Vice President to speak at any time during the\nmeeting. X He is still ex-officio.\nK: It is a Presidential\n.\nI have no objection. I like Jerry Ford.\nR: So do I.\nK: Why don't you do it.\nR: Good. Well, that is it. I do want to chat with you\nK: You're nice and on Cyprus, it has come out perfectly.\nR: I don't know how you do it.\nK: They didn't know the strategy.\nR: Well, I am thrilled and give my love to Nancy.\nK: Ok.\nEND\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nDean Rusk/Secretary Kissinger\nJuly 23, 1974\n7:20 pm\nR: I just wanted to give you.\n60 seconds of what went on with the\nCommittee this afternoon. The impact was good. I started to make a\nhard\nin terms of the method and actions of the FBI. I wanted to\nmention to you one point, and that is, I did tell them about our\nassessment during your work in the\nand your work on Viet-\nNam and I said that if you said something to me, I would believe it. There\nseemed to be general agreement around the table. I understan d Haig\nwill be coming on later. As far as you know, nothing Haig will say will\nundermine my veracity. I said if you were to say something to me on\nthis subject, I would believe it.\nK: It is not inconceivable to me that in one or two cases, Haig may have\nreceived orders from Haldeman or the President, as orders of the\nPresident. It's inconceivable to me that Haig did it on his own. There\nis no possibility that Haig would say I gave him orders to do things\nbeyond what I have testified. I don't know whether you saw my statement.\nR: No. They read two or three.\nK: The backup material helps my case because it is now clear that\nthe first four cases were done under Hoover's recommendation.\nIt is clear that 3 of these people I had put on mysaff against Hoover's\nrecommendations SO I WO uldn't have tried to prove him right. which proves\nHiag was right all along.\nR:\nthat Hoover would make no\nHe never interfered with my ability to\nmake a judgment on.\nor security matters.\nK: In my case, he has, of the names given, 3\nto me and the 4th turned\nout to be an espionage agent.\nR: And the 4th was Henry Brandon. That was ridiculous.\nK: I know. That was Hoover's view. There were four cases where the\nXXX FBI.\nsigned a statement saying I just had a call from Haig who\nsaid that he had just been called by the President that the following four names\nshould be put on the list.\nK: My guess is that unless Haig's testimony sets them off balance, they are\nlikely to say that after the most careful and meticulous re -examining they\nhave no basis for changing their original judgment and will reaffirm the\npoint that this wh ole business of wiretapping needs to be looked into by the\nMuskie Subcommittee.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-2-\nK: That doesn't bother me As a practical matter, there is no possibility\nfor Haig to deviate from my testimony.\nR: There were a lot of Senators there today -- many more than when I\nwas ever Secretary of State but there was no hostile questioning in terms\nof you\nK: My impression is, in fact, they were a littletoo easy on me this morning.\nR: I will be criticised a little for some phrases. I said talking to J. Edgar\nHoover was like talking to De Galle. Well, I am going back to Atlanta\ntomorrow but I wanted to express to you what I said about my confidence\nin your veracity and make sure that Hiag will not undercut me.\nK: No possibility of that. You know I appreciate this.\nR: Well, good luck and God bless.\nK: Thank you and I think we'll come out alright.\nR: Good luck my fellow.\nEND\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified."
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