Ask the Scholar

{
    "localId": "498694063",
    "label": "October 1973",
    "core": "doc",
    "dtoType": "document",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/498694063"
}

{
    "id": "498694063",
    "sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/498694063",
    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "October 1973",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/498694063",
    "collections": [
        "National Security Files (Nixon Administration)",
        "Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Telcons)"
    ],
    "iiifBase": "https://s3.dualstack.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/nixon/rn-nsf/579113/Batch0002/37-natsec-kissinger_telcons-579113-28-03/37-natsec-kissinger_telcons-579113-28-03-001.jpg",
    "thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.dualstack.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/nixon/rn-nsf/579113/Batch0002/37-natsec-kissinger_telcons-579113-28-03/37-natsec-kissinger_telcons-579113-28-03-001.jpg",
    "largeImageUrl": "https://s3.dualstack.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/nixon/rn-nsf/579113/Batch0002/37-natsec-kissinger_telcons-579113-28-03/37-natsec-kissinger_telcons-579113-28-03-001.jpg",
    "imageCount": 107,
    "hasImages": true,
    "source": "import",
    "hasTranscription": false
}

{
    "url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/498694063",
    "naId": 498694063,
    "levelOfDescription": "fileUnit",
    "recordType": "description",
    "ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}

{
    "seq": 98,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
    "url": "https://s3.dualstack.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/nixon/rn-nsf/579113/Batch0002/37-natsec-kissinger_telcons-579113-28-03/37-natsec-kissinger_telcons-579113-28-03-098.jpg",
    "mediaId": "7f5ebf9cf76d7cd1",
    "ocrText": "-2-\nK. Whether you ever believe it or not it is not important now. I\nam telling you it was not\nwe were convinced you were planning\nsomething unilateral. We were as outrated. We thought the tone\nin that letter\nD. You were pretty sure we would do it. If you were so sure, you\ncould have waited one hour to get some additional information from\nBrezhnev. But you didn't want to have it.\nK. That isn't true. I was very tough. Don't pressure us. I sent\nyou two or three messages to please don't do anything unilateral.\nD. Exactly.\nK. You could have said what makes you think we will do anything\nunilateral. We have no intention of taking action.\nD. What you said was to wait for a reply. I sent four telegrams\nto Moscow--this was a unique situation--to wait for a reply from the\nPresident. What did they receive ? This is not\nSomeday in\nMoscow\nmuch more easy to discuss.\nK. We very truly thought you were threatening us out of the\nD. Exactly, you have it with us. Wait for the reply. By the way\nnothing was said. Then you are trying to make it look like it was\na Cuban or Hanoi crisis.\nK. Don't remind me of that. It was not well done.\nD. It was done badly. It was unbelievable. He won't believe he\ncompared it\nMore things are involved for both sides. There is\nno need to discuss this. What was done was done. We will now\nhave to look forward. This message is oral to the President and\nto you in connection with Soviet/American observers. was\ninstructed to tell you in a written message\nthat the Secretary General\nwould like to say that we\nsubstance of yesterday's message from\nabout Soviet/American observers.\nK. I know of one. You sent me on discussions.\nD. We also\nfrom the promise that the Soviet and American observers\nwill ask as a contingent of the observer force of the UN. We want to\nstress that we consider it very important that the American observers\nwill start the dispatch of their forces, having in mind that it should\ngive the USJR and US the possibility of getting authentic information."
}