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Mr. Kissinger/General Haig/Secretary Rogers
- 3 -
[The Signal operator interrupted to say Assistant
Secretary Sisco wanted to speak with General Haig]
K:
No, just leave him on here now. No, leave this conversation
uninterrupted except for the President.
K:
(Cont'd)
and said that he had made the following decisions:
First, that we should communicate to the Israelis: (1) the action must
succeed; (2) it has to succeed diplomatically as well as militarily -- for
this purpose, our preference is for air in the first instance, but that if
they believe ground forces are essential, we would support that also.
Ground forces, however, should be used inside Jordan; this was in reference
to when Joe was in the office and he came in and Joe said he thought the
best thing for the Israelis would be to start attacking from the Golon Heights
into Syria. The President says that is militarily good, but politically not
good. Those were the five points he wanted me to communicate. I told
him maybe we should have a meeting of everybody. He said no, that's
what he wants to do, but of course, anyone who wants to protest can do SO
to him. Now, he added, when he interrupted before, a sixth point which
is that they should be told that if they go in on the ground, they should
announce that they will withdraw when the Syrians withdraw or if the
Syrians withdraw. I said, 'what if the situation gets completely unstuck
in Jordan?' He said, "That's a different problem, but the correct diplomatic
posture is to go in and say they'11 withdraw as soon as the Syrians withdraw.
11
So, this is where we stand. I haven't done anything else.
R:
Have you told them?
K:
No, no, no. I wouldn't do that without talking to you. But I got the call
from Sisco that I had placed earlier. I just told him and told him I was going
to call you immediately, and Sisco said he was coming in to the office. Those
are the only people who have been contacted.
R:
There are two things: (1) I gather from Al that he felt that the Israelis
would not do anything until tomorrow. Is that right? Did they pass?
K:
I would guess by tonight our time uh, tomorrow night our time (Monday
night our time) is our instinct. They didn't say.
R:
Yeah, but in any event, we'd have
it's 1:00 in Amman.
K:
I would think Tuesday morning Amman time.
R:
Did you say that they wanted an answer right away.
K:
Within two hours or so.
R:
I wonder what the
[NLN 05-03/7:P. 3.7.6]
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"ocrText": "Mr. Kissinger/General Haig/Secretary Rogers\n- 3 -\n[The Signal operator interrupted to say Assistant\nSecretary Sisco wanted to speak with General Haig]\nK:\nNo, just leave him on here now. No, leave this conversation\nuninterrupted except for the President.\nK:\n(Cont'd)\nand said that he had made the following decisions:\nFirst, that we should communicate to the Israelis: (1) the action must\nsucceed; (2) it has to succeed diplomatically as well as militarily -- for\nthis purpose, our preference is for air in the first instance, but that if\nthey believe ground forces are essential, we would support that also.\nGround forces, however, should be used inside Jordan; this was in reference\nto when Joe was in the office and he came in and Joe said he thought the\nbest thing for the Israelis would be to start attacking from the Golon Heights\ninto Syria. The President says that is militarily good, but politically not\ngood. Those were the five points he wanted me to communicate. I told\nhim maybe we should have a meeting of everybody. He said no, that's\nwhat he wants to do, but of course, anyone who wants to protest can do SO\nto him. Now, he added, when he interrupted before, a sixth point which\nis that they should be told that if they go in on the ground, they should\nannounce that they will withdraw when the Syrians withdraw or if the\nSyrians withdraw. I said, 'what if the situation gets completely unstuck\nin Jordan?' He said, \"That's a different problem, but the correct diplomatic\nposture is to go in and say they'11 withdraw as soon as the Syrians withdraw.\n11\nSo, this is where we stand. I haven't done anything else.\nR:\nHave you told them?\nK:\nNo, no, no. I wouldn't do that without talking to you. But I got the call\nfrom Sisco that I had placed earlier. I just told him and told him I was going\nto call you immediately, and Sisco said he was coming in to the office. Those\nare the only people who have been contacted.\nR:\nThere are two things: (1) I gather from Al that he felt that the Israelis\nwould not do anything until tomorrow. Is that right? Did they pass?\nK:\nI would guess by tonight our time uh, tomorrow night our time (Monday\nnight our time) is our instinct. They didn't say.\nR:\nYeah, but in any event, we'd have\nit's 1:00 in Amman.\nK:\nI would think Tuesday morning Amman time.\nR:\nDid you say that they wanted an answer right away.\nK:\nWithin two hours or so.\nR:\nI wonder what the\n[NLN 05-03/7:P. 3.7.6]"
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