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77026
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
May 19, 1977
TO:
The Recipients of NSDM #144
SUBJECT:
Declassification of NSDM #144
National Security Decision Memorandum #144 of December 22,
1971 titled "United States Arctic Policy and Arctic Policy
Group" was declassified on May 18, 1977. Please mark
your document accordingly.
net
Michael Hornblow
Acting Staff Secretary
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
UNCLASSIFIED
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
|SECRET
December 22, 1971
National Security Decision Memorandum 144
TO:
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Interior
The Secretary of Commerce
The Secretary of Transportation
The Director, National Science Foundation
The Chairman, Council on Environmental Quality
SUBJECT:
United States Arctic Policy and Arctic Policy Group
The President has reviewed the NSC Under Secretaries Committee's
recommendations, conclusions and report regarding United States Arctic
policy and organizational arrangements for its implementation, as for-
warded by Under Secretary Irwin on August 9, 1971.
The President has decided that the United States will support the sound
and rational development of the Arctic, guided by the principle of mini-
mizing any adverse effects to the environment; will promote mutually
beneficial international cooperation in the Arctic; and will at the same
time provide for the protection of essential security interests in the
Arctic, including preservation of the principle of freedom of the seas and
superjacent airspace.
In furtherance of this policy, the President has:
--
Directed that the NSC Under Secretaries Committee review and
forward detailed action programs, including plans and specific
projects (with budgetary implications as appropriate), for increas-
ing mutually beneficial cooperation with Arctic and other countries
in areas such as exploration, scientific research, resource develop-
ment and the exchange of scientific and technical data; for improving
the US capability to inhabit and operate in the Arctic and the under-
standing of the Arctic environment: and for developing a framework
for international cooperation with particular attention given the
Northlands Compact approach. (These action programs should be
forwarded for the President's consideration not later than March 1,
1972.)
DECLASSIFIED
Auth. EO 11652
SECRET
DE to: 18 May 1977
Pv: Michael Hornston
Reprod
Richard ixon Presidential Library this document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13 ON PT. terminedto be-doclassified.
JUN
UNCLASSIFIED
2
Directed that an Interagency Arctic Policy Group be established,
chaired by the Department of State and including the Departments
of Defense, Interior, Commerce and Transportation, the National
Science Foundation, the Council on Environmental Quality and
representatives of other agencies as appropriate. (The Depart-
ment of State is responsible for providing the administrative
support, including staff, necessary to enable the Arctic Policy Group
to carry out its responsibilities.)
The Interagency Arctic Policy Group will be responsible for over-
seeing the implementation of U.S. Arctic policy and reviewing and
coordinating U.S. activities and programs in the Arctic, with the
exception of purely domestic Arctic-related matters internal to
Alaska. In discharging these responsibilities, the Arctic Policy
Group will report to and coordinate with the NSC Under Secretaries
Committee. Any substantive policy issues requiring the President's
decision will be referred to the NSC Senior Review Group for
consideration.
Approved the development of a coordinated plan for scientific research
in and on the Arctic, including possible cooperative projects with
Arctic and other countries, and the investigation of the feasibility of
developing a comprehensive transportation system capable of meeting
U.S. requirements in the Arctic, with appropriate recommendations
to be made to the Arctic Policy Group.
There should be no public statements concerning U.S. Arctic policy and the
other decisions set forth herein pending the President's review of the action
programs requested above.
A.
Henry A. Kissinger
cc:
Secretary, Health Education and Welfare
Director of Central Intelligence
Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director, Office of Management and Budget
President's Science Advisor
ISECRET
Reproduced
UNCI ASSIFIED sidentiall
This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
department OF STATE
S/S 7204569
Washington, D.C. 20520
2187
SECRET
March 10, 1972
Memorandum for: NSC Secretariat
The White House
Subject: CSCE Working Group Meeting on Security
Monday, March 13, 1972 at 10:00 a.m.,
Room 7519 NS
There is attached, for Mr. Hyland and Mr. Powers
of your staff, a copy of a paper "CSCE: Relationship
with MBFR" which will be discussed at the meeting.
Micholes NaS
Secretariat Staff
Attachment:
As stated.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
m Powers 3/9/72
SECRET
CSCE: Relationship with MBFR
Index
Page
I. Introduction
1
II. The Security Question in CSCE
2
Allied Views
2
Pact Views
4
III. Procedural Relationship of CSCE and MBFR
5
1. Maintain total separation of CSCE and MBFR, as
in current US policy
5
2. Maintain present procedural separation between
MBFR and CSCE, with concurrent emphasis on movement
toward MBFR explorations and negotiations, con-
ditioning progress in preparations for CSCE on
progress toward MBFR
7
3. Advocate in Allied CSCE preparations and in
initial multilateral East-West talks the establish-
ment by a Ministerial CSCE of machinery for sub
sequent MBFR negotiations
9
4. Link MBFR to CSCE via a special sub-group to deal
with MBFR in tandem with CSCE
9
IV. Dealing with Elements of MBFR in CSCE
13
1. Attempting to reach at least broad agreement
in CSCE on stabilizing measures
15
2. As a variant of (1) above, initial discussions of
stabilizing measures would be conducted in CSCE
preparatory talks, and the issues thereafter would
be remanded to the MBFR subgroup
for the purpose of drawing up a separate
agreement on stabilizing measures, which would be
open to accession by other states as well as the
MBFR participants
17
3. Negotiation in CSCE of MBFR principles, but not
reductions
17
V. A Force Limitation Agreement
19
Annexes: A - Stabilizing Measures
B - NATO telegram "MBFR: FRG draft of joint declaration"
C - Possible Post-CSCE Permanent Machinery
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
CSCE Security Issues:
The Relationship with MBFR
I.
Introduction
The current US position, stated in NSDM 142, is to move
slowly and carefully on both MBFR and CSCE, to develop NATO
consensus on positions on both which maintain undiminished
security, and to keep the two fully separate.
We have urged upon the Allies the need for separation
the basis that East-West MBFR discussions should not be
delayed, and that linking MBFR to CSCE would attach to MBFR
the Allied CSCE precondition of a Berlin agreement. The Allies
thus far have been prepared to accept separation; mainly be-
cause they recognize MBFR has played a major role in dealing
with Congressional sentiment favoring unilateral US force
reductions. However, as the prospect increases that CSCE
may precede MBFR negotiations, the argument for CSCE separation
from MBFR has less validity in the eyes of our Allies.
At this time, general Allied sentiment favors the inclusion
of questions related to security on a CSCE agenda, and a
majority, but not including the US, UK and France, would.
prefer to deal with MBFR and related issues under the CSCE
security rubric. Thus, the US confronts the following issues
addressed in this paper:
- - the procedural relationship between CSCE and MBFR
negotiations;
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
2.
SECRET
-- the related question of dealing with the desire of
some Allies for CSCE discussion at least of stabili-
zing measures, and perhaps of other MBFR elements,
such as MBFR principles and proposals for force
limitations or reductions.
II. The Security Question in CSCE
The Pact proposed in 1969 that CSCE adopt a declaration
on renunciation of the use of force. Subsequently, NATO,
to rebut the Brezhnev doctrine, proposed that CSCE address
principles governing relations between states. However,
partly in response to US desire that CSCE also address concrete
issues of security, and partly from the concern of some over
the results if CSCE were to avoid addressing issues of military
security, NATO Ministers agreed in December 1971 to continue
the study of "questions of security, including
certain
military aspects of security", looking toward discussion of
these issues at a Conference on European Security (CSCE).
Their decision reflected the view of a strong majority of
Ministers that, in addition to discussion, under the security
heading, of principles governing relations between states,
CSCE should address concrete issues related to the military
confrontation in Europe.
Allied Views. Subsequent Allied efforts to identify
appropriate issues of security for discussion at CSCE have
resulted in
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
3.
-- a general Allied desire to address general strategic
issues related to the Rueopean military balance;
-- a majority, but not including the UK and France, favoring,
at minimum, CSCE discussion and possible agreement on stabi-
lizing measures, such as advance notification of military
movements and maneuvers, heretofore associated with MBFR as
"collateral constraints" complementing an agreement on force
reductions. This represents a departure from the position
taken by the Allies in the December 1969 declaration. NATO
Ministers at that time directed further studies of measures
which could accompany or follow agreement on MBFR. As examples
of these ancillary measures, Ministers cited advance notifica-
tion of military movements and maneuvers. exchange of observers
at military maneuvers, and possibly establishment of obser-
vation posts. Two of these - advance notification and
observation posts - have subsequently been considered in
NATO studies as collateral measures associated with MBFR.
Observation posts also could be one of the MBFR verification
and inspection modalities, which NATO has agreed will depend
on the size and nature of the reduction agreement. Only
exchange of observers has not yet been considered in the MBFR
context.
--- some also viewing favorably CSCE discussion of principles
governing MBFR, along the lines of the Allied statements on
guidelines for MBFR in recent Ministerial communiques;
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
4.
SECRET
--- all but the US favoring
general discussion
of MBFR at CSCE, though there is broad Allied recognition that
actual negotiation of force reductions should take place in a
more restricted forum.
In Allied and US studies to date, no other issues of
security have been identified as suitable for possible dis-
cussion at CSCE.
Pact Views. The Warsaw Pact clearly prefers to address
MBFR and related issues in a body to be established by CSCE.
While acknowledging that reference may be made to disarmament
at CSCE, but apparently seeking to avoid dealing with security
issues at CSCE, the Soviets have indicated that complicated
matters of military security should be dealt with in a limited
forum, preferably established by CSCE, and comprising states
directly involved, as well as some neutral and non-aligned
states.
In sum, at this point, CSCE is the center of Allied and
Soviet attention Barring FRG parliamentary failure to ratify
the Moscow treaty, multilateral preparations for CSCE could
begin in Helsinki by autumn. Movement toward MBFR explorations
and negotiations, on the other hand, has been stalled by Soviet
refusal to receive Brosio, and apparent preference for dealing
with MBFR only after convening a CSCE. Meanwhile, many Allies
are seeking to inject MBFR elements into the CSCE context.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
5.
III. Procedural Relationship of CSCE and MBFR
The linkage, or lack of it, between CSCE and MBFR discussions
and negotiations on substantive issues depends importantly on the
procedural relationship between the fora to be established to
address these questions. The considerations addressed below would
obtain whether there were a long or short preparatory phase, or
whether there were one or two Ministerial CSCE meetings. Broadly,
there are four alternatives:
1. maintain total separation of CSCE and MBFR, as in
current US policy.
2. maintain procedural separation between CSCE and MBFR,
with concurrent emphasis on movement toward MBFR, conditioning
progress in preparations for CSCE on progress toward MBFR.
3. Advocate in Allied CSCE preparations and in initial
multilateral East-West talks the establishment by a Minis-
terial CSCE of machinery for subsequent MBFR negotiations.
4. Link MBFR to CSCE via a special subgroup to deal with
MBFR in tandem with CSCE.
1. Maintain total separation of CSCE and MBFR, as in current
US policy. The Allies would seek to limit CSCE consideration of
security issues at most to a general discussion of MBFR, possibly
followed by a CSCE declaration supporting MBFR negotiations among
the states directly concerned. CSCE would not consider stabilizing
measures, MBFR principles, or reductions. Progress toward CSCE
would not be conditioned on parallel progress toward MBFR.
Advantages
-- would underline the long-standing US position that MBFR
is so complex and sensitive that only the states directly
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
6.
involved should participate in negotiations.
-- would likely be acceptable to the Soviets, who prefer
that CSCE address non-security issues.
-- would avoid risk of scuttling MBFR in the event CSCE
did not take place.
-- would give the US and the Allies maximum freedom to
pursue MBFR studies, explorations and negotiations at a pace
corresponding to military and political needs.
--- would avoid separating elements of MBFR, and permit them
to be pursued comprehensively in a single forum.
-- would avoid offering the Soviets a possible tactical
opportunity to allege that, since stabilization measures were
being addressed at CSCE, they were inappropriate for discussion
in association with force reduction negotiations.
Disadvantages
-- could result in no progress toward MBFR, at least until
after convening of CSCE.
--- since no change in the current US approach to MBFR
would be involved, Congressional proponents of unilateral US
forces reductions could claim lack of US and Allied interest
in MBFR.
--- there would bè only the most general CSCE discussion of
security issues, and desires for progress in dealing at CSCE
with real issues of security would not be met.
- could precipitate sharp criticism and possibily
isolation from our Allies, since a fairly broad consensus has
existed for several months that MBFR elements constitute the
only real security issues CSCE could address.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
7.
SECRET
-- would make the US appear opposed to possible movement
toward resolution of East-West security issues.
-- would forego opportunities for US leadership in shaping
Allied goals at CSCE which might otherwise result in declara-
tory undertakings, peripheral to central security concerns,
while giving the appearance of enhancing detente to the
detriment of Allied defense efforts.
-- would forego an opportunity to bring CSCE participants
face-to-face with the strategic realities of European security.
2. Maintain present procedural separation between MBFR
and CSCE, with concurrent emphasis on movement toward MBFR
explorations and negotiations, conditioning progress in
preparations for CSCE on progress toward MBFR. Under this
approach, the US would continue to argue against dealing with
MBFR in the CSCE context. This approach also would build upon
Soviet interest in an early CSCE to obtain agreement to steps
toward MBFR talks, conditioning Allied movement in CSCE multi-
lateral preparatory talks to Soviet movement toward MBFR.
Depending on the Soviet response and Allied cohesion, this
approach also could result in MBFR explorations and negotiations
beginning at about the same time as CSCE.
Advantages
-- would keep substantive MBFR elements separate from CSCE.
- if the Soviets refused to move forward on MBFR, for
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
8.
SECRET
example by not receiving Western MBFR exploratory mission, the
Allies would have a logical basis for arguing that Pact failure
to deal with a real security issue ruled out further prepara-
tions for a CSCE.
Disadvantages
-- by making movement toward MBFR negotiations a pre-
condition of CSCE, contrary to the present Allied position on
CSCE, it would encounter strong resistance from the majority
of Allies favoring an eariy CSCE.
-- could be exploited publicly by the Soviets as a belated
new obstacle, analogous to the Berlin precondition, to CSCE.
-- to be fully effective, this approach would require
that CSCE preparations and MBFR explorations advance in tandem,
which could prove complicated, particularly in view of the
complexity of MBFR.
-- could preclude CSCE discussion of real security
issues.
even if the USSR were to agree to early MBFR nego-
tiations, the Allies might not be adequately prepared.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
9.
SECRET
3. Advocate in Allied CSCE preparations and in initial
multilateral East-West talks the establishment by a Ministerial
CSCE of machinery for subsequent MBFR negotiations.
Advantages
-- Would be acceptable to most Allies and to the Pact.
-- Would provide a vehicle for preliminary discussion of
security issues, without necessarily circumscribing actual MBFR
negotiations to follow in a more restricted forum.
Disadvantages
Would suggest to many that MBFR deliberately were being
deferred and played down.
-- By postponing MBFR discussions until after CSCE, might not
meet Allied desires for discussion and negotiation in CSCE of
elements of MBFR.
4. Link MBFR to CSCE via a special sub-group to deal with
MBFR in tandem with preparation for a CSCE, possibly followed
by establishment by the Ministerial CSCE of a continuing MBFR
group. This approach offers a way to move ahead on MBFR by
linking MBFR and CSCE procedurally, but in a way designed to
limit the problems of mixing the two. In the initial CSCE
multilateral preparatory stage, the Allies could press for the
creation of an MBFR sub-group along with other CSCE working
groups. Thereafter, in subsequent multilateral preparatory
talks the MBFR sub-group would be formally established.
It would be confined to states directly concerned, and
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
10.
would report to Ministers of those states, who would
undertake to report to CSCE the results of the sub-group's
work. Thus, while the full CSCE could hold general dis-
cussions on MBFR, substantive explorations or negotiations
on principles, constraints, or reductions would be conducted
by the sub-group, while the CSCE would only note its findings.
The MBFR sub-group could:
-- Continue exploration of substantive issues, along
the lines envisaged for the Brosio mission; or
-- If agreed by the Allies, negotiate agreements on
MBFR principles and/or stabilization measures, along the
lines envisaged in the first two steps of the FRG proposal
for a phased approach; or
--- After appropriate explorations, undertake to move
directly to negotiation of an MBFR agreement,
including actual reductions, as well as principles and
constraints.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
11.
The following illustrative sequence suggests a possible way of ad-
vancing this approach with our Allies and with the Soviets and their allies:
--- US and NATO studies would continue on security issues to be
addressed at CSCE.
---- Until the
May 30-31 Ministerial meeting, bi-
lateral probes would continue by the US and Allies of the USSR views towards
MBFR and CSCE.
-- The US could discuss bilaterally with Soviet representatives in
Moscow a comprehensive and coordinated procedural approach to CSCE and MFBR
negotiations
.
-- If the Soviets agree, preparatory talks on MBFR or its elements
-- as outlined above -- would be held among national repre-
sentatives concurrent with CSCE preparatory talks.
There follow the advantages and disadvantages of this
approach:
Advantages
-- Could use CSCE preparatory stages as a springboard to
MBFR preparations, by providing in the near term an organiza-
tion linked to CSCE and spècifically charged with exploring
MBFR and establishing the framework for negotiations.
Would be consistent with Pact indications that it.
wuld be prepared to envisage MBFR talks parallel to CSCE
preparations.
--- Would represent a step forward on MBFR highly visible
to Allied publics and parliaments.
--- Would provide a measure of control over the pace of
MBFR explorations.
Would leave open the possibility of linking progress in the
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
13.
SECRET
IV. Dealing with Elements of MBFR in CSCE
Depending upon the procedural approach selected from those in
Part III, above, there follow possible alternative approaches to dealing
with elements of MBFR at CSCE, on the assumptions that a) general dis-
cussion, at least, of MBFR is unavoidable; b) negotiations on actual
force reductions are too complex and sensitive to be handled in CSCE,
which will comprise some thirty states, and should be dealt with in
a smaller body; and c) some Allies will maintain pressures to deal with
elements of MBFR in CSCE:
(1) Attempting to reach at least broad agreement on stabilizing
measures in the CSCE context.
(2) A variant of (1), whereby discussion of stabilizing measures
of European-wide application would be discussed initially in a CSCE, ne-
gotiated in an MBFR forum established by CSCE, but open to accession by
all European states.
(3) Negotiation of MBFR principles in the CSCE context.
All have the following disadvantages:
- MBFR, if introduced into CSCE, with so many participants, might
slip from the control of the states most directly involved;
- The separation of MBFR elements into different fora working
on different schedules would render difficult, if not impossible, a
comprehensive sequential approach; and
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
14.
SECRET
--- Could be seen by Allied publics and parliaments as postponing
actual negotiation of reductions.
On the other hand, all have the following general advantages:
-- Allied movement to negotiations on actual reductions could
proceed at a more deliberate pace;
--- NATO and other countries not directly involved
would participate to some degree in discussions related to MBFR;
-- French involvement in discussion of European security issues,
regional arms control measures and force reductions might be encouraged;
and
-- Stabilizing measures, if agreed, might be advantageously
extended to a broader geographic area than the eventual zone of actual
Sorce reductions.
The following discussion outlines pros and cons of eacn of the
approaches outlined above.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
15.
(1) Attempting to Reach at Least Broad Agreement in
CSCE on Stabilizing Measures. As envisaged by a majority
of Allies, and now under NATO study, though the US, the UK
and France have reserved their positions, agreement could be
sought at CSCE on stabilizing measures, which previously
had been considered as collateral constraints in the MBFR
context. A balance would be needed between stabilizing
measures that might be discussed at CSCE and those that are
better suited for MBFR. At the same time, however, very
demanding --- even patently unnegotiable -- measures might be
explored in CSCE for propaganda purposes; for example, measures
designed to challenge the Brezhnev Doctrine.
General advantages and disadvantages follow; some illus-
trative stabilizing measures are provided at Annex A:
Advantages
-- could lead to a better understanding of the utility
of such measures. in arms control arrangements by focusing
general attention on specific measures to enhance stability;
could provide a test of Soviet interest in specific
arms control measures, and their willingness to deal at CSCE
with initial steps to enhance stability;
- - could permit application of some stabilizing measures
to a broader area than the eventual reduction zone, encom-
passing, say, the flanks and Romania;
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
16.
-- would give Allies and others not directly involved
in eventual MBFR negotiations a role in dealing with
issues associated with MBFR;
-- more stringent stabilizing measures than are likely
to be agreed at CSCE would not necessarily be precluded
from later negotiation in a more restricted MBFR forum; and
-- by addressing concrete issues of security, would offset
Pact proposals for CSCE agreement on a purely hortatory
declaration on renunciation of the use of force.
Disadvantages
- - the Pact could react acrimoniously to Allied efforts
to introduce into CSCE elements of MBFR that could inhibit
Soviet flexibility.
:
- could prejudice later discussion of collateral con-
straints in MBFR negotiations and, specifically, tactically
complicate efforts to tie specific constraints to proposed
reductions in an MBFR negotiating package.
- measures agreed in the CSCE context might reflect little
net advance, yet be touted by the Pact as a significant
achievement in the security sphere, and viewed by Allied
public opinion as steps toward detente warranting reduced
defense efforts.
--- if this occurred, it might be easier for the Soviets
to avoid substantive MBFR explorations and negotiations,
thus allowing MBFR, a major Allied initiative, to be postponed
and slip into the background.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
17.
(2) As a variant of (1) above, initial discussions
of stabilizing measures would be conducted in CSCE prepara-
tory talks, and the issues thereafter would be remanded to
the MBFR subgroup (see Part III. 4, above) for the purpose
of drawing up a separate agreement on stabilizing measures,
which would be open to accession by other states as well as
the MBFR participants.
Advantages
-- most of the advantages given for (1) above would apply;
-- additionally, it would have the advantage of linking
discussion of stabilizing measure more closely to discussion
of troop reductions. Europe-wide association could be encouraged
by opening the agreement to accession by all states partici-
pating in the CSCE;
-- would set, in train talks on MBFR in parallel with CSCE.
Disadvantages
would be äkin to those under (1) above, but less
compelling.
(3) Negotiation in CSCE of MBFR Principles, but not
Reductions. Strongly supported by the FRG, and favored by
others as well, including Belgium and Denmark, negotiation at
CSCE of principles related to MBFR could involve seeking
agreement on a declaration containing guidelines for MBFR
along the lines proposed by the Allies in Ministerial communiques
of June 1968, December 1969, May 1970, and June 1971, and
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
reflected in the mandate of the Allied MBFR explorer
(CM (71) 49) , agreed in October 1971. The FRG foresees the
possibility of accession to a declaration by all at CSCE, or
only by interested states or those participating in MBFR
negotiations.
MBFR principles proposed by the FRG for CSCE discussion
are at Annex B. There follow general advantages and dis-
advantages of including MBFR principles on a CSCE agenda:
Advantages
--- the advantages largely parallel those of dealing with
stabilizing measures in CSCE. Additionally, however, by
attracting broad support, efforts to agree on principle could
provide additional pressure on the USSR and its allies to move
toward MBFR negotiations, particularly if agreement were
sought on the principle that early MBFR negotiations should
be held, perhaps referring to a specific date.
Disadvantages
--- above all, might lead the Pact to accept anodyne
principles, which they later could tout as a significant
achievement in the security sphere.
- if the foregoing occurred, it might be easier for the
Soviets to avoid substantive MBFR explorations or negotiations,
thus allowing MBFR, a major Allied initiative, to slip into
the background.
-- the thrust of MBFR principles would likely be vitiated
by separation from the more concrete context of force
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
19.
SECRET
reductions, rendering more difficult subsequent discussion
looking toward agreement on more stringent principles in
MBFR negotiations.
-- involvement of states not directly concerned could
pose problems.
V. A Force Limitation Agreement
To include a force limitation agreement in CSCE dis-
cussion, looking toward agreement, in line with tentative
FRG thinking, would give the CSCE a focus toward a central
security issue, and render discussion of force limitations the
core agenda item.
However, the overriding disadvantage would be the likely
pressures on the West, as much as on the East, to reach an
agreement that, by setting a ceiling on forces, deprive the
US and the Allies of flexibility and might prejudice force
improvements. Moreover, it would engage some thirty states
in sensitive issues best dealt with by states directly
involved. Accordingly, it would appear clearly inappropriate
for CSCE consideration.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Annex A
SECRET
Stabilizing Measures
Stabilizing measures would involve agreements to notify
the other side in advance of significant military movements
and to limit or refrain altogether from certain movements.
They would not serve to prevent or slow down a Warsaw Pact
buildup, if the Soviets chose to violate an agreement.
Nor would they speed the flow in intelligence on Pact
activities. They could, however, enhance early warning of
a buildup by helping to remove ambiguity from Soviet military
activity and making unannounced or otherwise illicit acti-
vities immediately suspect. Treating the agreement as an
interpretive yardstick, NATO could reach judgments sooner
about Pact intentions, and thus gain more time to decide on
its reaction to Pact moves. Such additional time could help
compensate NATO for the relative enhancement in the Soviet
reinforcement advantage in Central Europe which reductions
would bring about.
illustrative
The/stabilizing measures below pertain to movement into
and out of Europe, movement within Europe, and reserve
them
call-ups. It would be preferable to negotiate/as a package.
Most have been studied by the US in the MBFR context; a
paper on MBFR constraints in response to a Verification Panel
Working Group request is in production, and NATO's MBFR
Working Group has initiated a study to which the US will be
expected to contribute.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
Illustrative Measures
-- exchange of calendar year schedules of all
force movements into and out of Europe, with a 90-day
notification of any changes.
-- limitation on the size and duration of stay of
forces introduced into Europe. 1/A limitation of 30 days
and 20,000 men would seem reasonable. This would
permit Reforger exercises, and allow the Pact to conduct
its multilateral Front level exercises.
-- advance notification and exchanges of observers
at exercises and maneuvers:
--- limitation on the size and duration of maneuvers.
Illustrative figures are 30,000 men and 30 days:
-- advance notice of reserve call-ups. Call-ups of
more than 1,000 (the figure is illustrative only) could
be made subject to advance notification.
A constraints agreement would require some implementing
machinery. An East-West commission could serve as a vehicle
for exchange of notifications required by an agreement, for
complaints and explanations of apparent violations, and for
discussion of potentially destabilizing moves by either side
not specially provided for in the agreement itself. A further
discussion of permanent machinery that might be established
by CSCE is at Annex C.
1/ While the duration provision may be of largely symbolic value
until reductions or a force timitation agreement are negotiated,
this provision would have a political value in both Eastern and
Western Europe and would make the constraints, if negotiated
also valid for a post-reduction setting
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined
to
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ANNEX B
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF Statements
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL 612
PAGE 01 NATO 90875 241832Z
45
ACTION EUR-20
INFO OCT-01 SS-14 NSC-19 ACDA-19 E-11 TRSE-00 SA-03
CIAE-08 PM-36 INR-36 L-03 NEA-09 NSAE-00 P-03 RSC-01
!
PRS- 01 GAC-01 USIA-12 SAL-02 RSR-01 /123 N
367675
P R 241748Z FEB 72
FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5261
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 1574
USCINCEUR
USDOCOSOUTH
USLOSACLANT
USNMR SHAPE
CONFIDENTIALUSNATO 875
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
$ 25 AM 7 23
OVERNI
SUBJ: MBFR: FRG DRAFT OF JOINT DECLARATION
REF: USNATO 797
1. FRG DEL HAS CIRCULATED BY LETTER OF 23 FEBRUARY REVISED
DRAFT OF JOINT DECLARATION ON OBJECTIVES AND GENERALI PRINCIPLES
OF FUTURE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. LETTER STATES DRAFT HAS BEEN
FORMULATED IN SUCH A WAY THAT IT COULD 3E USED IN CONTEXT OF
CSCE, AND THAT DOCUMENT C*1(711491FINAL AND RESULTS OF
DISCUSSION IN SENIOR POLITICAL COMMITTEE HAVE BEEN TAKEN INTO
ACCOUNT. TEXT FOLLOWS:
2. BEGIN TEXT:
"A-
THE SIGNATORIES
CONSCIOUS OF THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES IN SECURING PEACE,
EMPHASIZING THE NEED TO CONTINUE THE POLICY OF DETENTE
ON WHICH THEY HAVE EMBARKED,
INTENDING TO LOOK FOR POSSIRILITIES OF COOPERATION IN THE
INTEREST OF GREATER SECURITY,
HOPING THEREBY TO CONTRIBUTE TO STABILITY IN EUROPE AND
CONFIDENTIAL
So
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 NATO 00875 241832Z
THROUGHOUT THE WORLD,
WELCOME THE DECISION OF INTERESTED PARTIES TO ENTER INTO
NEGOTIATIONS ON MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS IN EUROPE
AND AGREE TO PARTICIPATE IV NEGOTIATIONS ON OTHER STABILIZING
MEASURES.
-B-
THE SIGNATORIES
AGREE THAT IT SHOULD RE THE AIM OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS
(A) TO REDUCE THE DANGERS OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN
EUROPE THROUGH STABILIZING AGREEMENTS,
(B) TO SET IN MOTION A PROCESS TOWARDS AV AGREED, REDUCED
LEVEL OF FORCES IN EUROPE,
(C) TO PLAN THIS PROCESS IN SUCH is MANNER THAT THE REDUCED
LEVEL OF FORCES IS REACHED BY PHASES FORMING PART OF AV
INTEGRAL PROGRAM
(D) TO ENSURE THAT STABILITY IS MAINTAINED AT EACH STAGE
AND TO THIS END CONSIDER IT NECESSARY THAT TRANSITION
TO A SUBSEQUENT STAGE DOES NOT TAKE PLACE UNLESS THE
MEASURES PERTAINING TO THE PRECEDING STAGE HAVE BEEN
IMPLEMENTED AND UNLESS THE COLLATERAL MEASURES HAVE
PROVED EFFECTIVE.
-C-
THE SIGNATORIES
AGREE THAT THE FORTHCOMING NEGOTIATIONS AND THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF FUTURE AGREEMENTS SHOULD BE BASED ON THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES:
(A) ALL REDUCTION MEASURES SHOULD BE SO BALANCED THAT THEY
DO NOT OPERATE AT ANY STAGE TO THE MILITARY DISADVANTAGE
OF ANY ONE STATE OR GROUP OF STATES AND THAT UNDIMINISHED
SECURITY IS ENSURED EQUALLY FOR ALL PARTIES,
(B) AGREEMENTS ON FORCE REDUCTIONS SHOULD MAKE ALLOWANCE
FOR THE DIFFERENCES ARISING FROM GEOGRAPHICAL AND
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS/
(C) FORCE REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT SIMULTANEDUSLY
BY ALL STATES WHOSE FORCES ARE AFFECTED BY AGREEMENTS
ON MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS,
(D) FORCE REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE PHASED IN THEIR SCOPE
AND TIMING,
(E) AN INTEGRAL PROGRAM ON FORCE REDUCTIONS SHOULD INCLUDE
STATIONED AND INDIGENOUS FORCES,
(F) FORCE REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE PRECEDED OR ACCOMPAINIED
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF STATEMENTS
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 NATO 00875 241832Z
BY OTHER STABILIZING MEASURES
OR:
COLLATERAL MEASURES SHOULD ENSURE THAT THE RISK OF
MISCALCULATION AND SURPRISE ATTACKS IS REDUCED,
(G) FORCE REDUCTIONS SHOULD NTO BE ALLOWED TO RESULT IN
AN INCREASED THREAT TO OTHER REGIONS REPRESENTED BY
SIGNATORIES OF THIS DECLARATION,
(H) THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AND THE COMPLIANCE WITH ANY
MBFR AGREE "ENT SHOULD BE APPROPRIATELY VERIFIED AT
EACH STAGE, THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF SUCH VERIFICATIONS
DEPENDING ON THE NATURE AND SCORE OF THE AGREED MBFR
MEASURES.
-0-
THE SIGNATORIES
EXPRESS THEIR FIRM CONVICTION THAT AGREEMENTS IMPLEMENTING
THESE OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES WOULD STRENGTHEN CONFIDENCE AND
PEACE IN EUROPE AND STATE THEIR INTEREST IN AV EARLY START OF
NEGOTIATIONS ON MEASURES REDUCING THE DANGERS OF MILITARY
CONFRONTATION. END TEXT
GP-4 VEST
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
ANNEX C
CONFIDENTIAL
POSSIBLE POST-CSCE
PERMANENT MACHINERY
I. RECOMMENDED US POSITION
We remain ready to study this issue further
when the Allies wish to do so. Consideration will
have to be given internally to what kind of prior
congressional consultation would be required or
appropriate, should the US decide to participate
in post-conference permanent machinery.
II. DISCUSSION
We tabled in NATO In September 1971 a study
giving illustrative US views on permanent machinery,
which has not yet been discussed by the Allies.
The following paragraphs are based essentially upon
that study.
Introduction
The Warsaw Pact countries proposed, at their
June 1970 Budapest meeting, the establishment, by a
CSCE, of a permanent "organ" for questions of security
and cooperation in Europe. In part, this may have
been in response to the NATO proposal, in paragraph 15
of the May 1970 Rome Ministerial Communique, that
a permanent body might be established prior to such
a conference. However, apart from mention of the
possibility of discussion of MBFR in the "organ, 11 the
Warsaw Pact countries have never explained their views
clearly, although it has been raised in the course
of various bilateral contacts with the NATO countries
and was briefly mentioned in the January, 1972 Prague
Communique.
For the foreseeable future, the security of
the Allies will rest upon the NATO deterrent, and
the existence of a permanent procedural device for
East-West discussion could not restore the security
which would be lost if the Allied deterrent posture
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
X/2.
should weaken. Indeed, in such circumstances, the
existence of a body of this kind might have the
opposite effect of making it easier for the Soviets
to manipulate developments to their advantage. Thus,
while a permanent body could not, in any meaningful
sense, assume responsibility for the maintenance
of European security, it might nevertheless provide
a useful forum in which to address East-West problems,
although the mere fact of its existence would not,
of course, ensure that serious discussion or nego-
tiations would actually take place.
Objectives
A. Allied Objectives
The utility of a permanent East-West organization
should be decided in light of the following general
Allied objectives:
to further serious negotiations and
discussions of concrete problems of
European security and cooperation;
to inhibit, to the extent possible,
Moscow's use of force or threatening
behavior to impose its will upon the
Eastern European states;
to give the smaller Warsaw Pact members
additional latitude to develop their
relations with the West without Soviet
interference;
to avoid providing the Soviets with
additional opportunities to divide
the Allies or to impede the growth of
Western European unity.
If Allied Governments eventually agree to
the establishment of a permanent organization after
a CSCE, they would undoubtedly wish to make clear
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
X/3.
to parliamentary and public opinion in their
respective countries the rather modest results
that could realistically be expected from it, at
least in the near and medium term, in order to
avoid unwarranted optimism and a consequent decline
in support for the Alliance and for the necessary
Allied defensive efforts.
B.
Warsaw Pact Objectives
The Soviets undoubtedly see a permanent, post-
CSCE body as a small step toward their long-held
and ultimate goal of a European security system
politically and militarily advantageous to them,
which would supersede the in two military blocs" and
involve the withdrawal of North American forces
from the continent. It is interesting to recall
that the Soviets first proposed the creation of a
permanent body for European political consultations
as early as the 1955 Geneva Foreign Ministers'
Conference.
To further this ultimate goal, the Soviets
would almost certainly hope to use a permanent body
as a platform from which to exert influence over
Western European policies and developments, particularly
to hinder further political and military cooperation.
The Soviet Union would also seek to promote the view
in Western public opinion that political problems
could best be worked out in Europe among European
countries themselves, without the participation of
the United States and Canada.
Some of the smaller Warsaw Pact members, however,
likely believe that the existence of some kind of
on-going East-West machinery would give them additional
freedom of maneuver and make it somewhat more embar-
rassing for the Soviets to use coercive methods in
Eastern Europe.
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
X/4.
The Nature Of A Permanent Body
A. General Considerations
Experience shows that multilateral groupings
empowered to take decisions binding on member
states function best when the members share a con-
siderable measure of common purpose--something
which could not be said of the some thirty states
likely to attend a CSCE. Thus this suggests that
the permanent body should be given a more modest
role.
Conceivably one might also envision that
the body could serve as a forum for largely public
discussion and be empowered to vote resolutions-
a kind of East-West general assembly. In an
uncertain political climate, its debates, however,
might sharpen opposing positions rather than create
a climate conducive to negotiations. Moreover, it
is unlikely that the Warsaw Pact states would agree
to join a body in which they would constitute a
small minority (seven) of the likely total membership
of some 30 states.
The Soviets will very probably attempt publicly
to portray any permanent body as the first step in
the creation of a new European security system which
would progressively render obsolete existing alliances.
They would also emphasize the "European" nature of
the new body, conveying thereby the implication that
they are members by right, while Canada and the US
are present on sufferance.
Thus it would be desirable, in selecting the
official title of any post-CSCE organization and
drafting its terms of reference, to avoid terminology
that might be consonant with these Soviet propaganda
themes. Hence, permanent secretariat or permanent
commission for East-West relations might, for example,
be an appropriate designation. By the same token,
the permanent body should not be constituted as a
regional organization under Chapter VIII of the UN
Charter.
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
X/5.
B.
Possible Alternative Structures
1.
A Permanent East-West Secretariat
The Allies might wish initially to propose
the establishment of a small secretariat in a neutral
capital limited to purely administrative functions.
It could serve as a link between the first and any
subsequent conferences and could also organize
ad hoc meetings of all or some of the participant
states to discuss specific problems.
Modest machinery of this kind would be
capable of expansion into a more ambitious organiza-
tion if this should at some later period seem useful
to all concerned.
2. A Permanent East-West Commission
The Allies might also wish to consider the
possibility of a permanent organization structured
somewhat along the lines of the Conference of the
Committee on Disarmanent (CCD) and designed to
promote businesslike and largely private discussions
leading to the negotiation of concrete problems.
a. The Business of a Permanent Commission
Like the CCD, a post-CSCE organization might
adopt a broadly defined and essentially permanent
agenda, which illustratively could include the
following headings:
problems of security;
problems of cooperation;
problems of regional disarmament.
(1)
Problems of security. If CSCE adopts a
declaration or agreement on principles that should
govern relations between states, the text could pro-
vide that any state which had reason to believe that
another state had violated those principles, or
was preparing to violate them, could raise the problem
for discussion in the permanent body with a view to
its resolution there.
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
X/6.
In addition, a permanent commission, even
though without enforcement powers, might neverthe-
less provide a framework for quiet diplomacy that
could be helpful in resolving disputes endangering
the security of Europe. While such problems could
well come before the UN in some manner, concurrent
discussions, out of the public limelight and in a
body where most of the participants would have a
substantial interest in a peaceful settlement,
might usefully supplement the UN discussions.
(2) Problems of cooperation. A CSCE and
its preliminaries will probably canvass a number of
problems relating in expanded economic and technical
exchanges, environmental matters, and the NATO pro-
posal for freer movement of people, ideas and infor-
mation. But few specific agreements may emerge.
If the discussions indicate a promise of future
progress in these fields, negotiations could continue
in the permanent body. Care should be taken to avoid
organizational arrangements that would conflict and
overlap with ECE and GATT.
Although the Soviets will resist it, the agenda
of any post-CSCE body should nevertheless be arranged
to permit further discussion of freer movement. This
might be accomplished by subsuming the freer movement
issue under the broader rubric of "cooperation. =
If further discusssion of economic and technological
exchanges, after a CSCE, were reserved exclusively
to the ECE, it would then become very difficult if
not impossible to get Warsaw Pact agreement to
inclusion of freer movement, as a separate item,
on the agenda. of a permanent commission.
(3)
Problems of regional disarmament. Were
it agreed by the US and subsequently among the Allies,
a permanent organization could, for example, provide
a framework, after an initial MBFR agreement, for
multilateral soundings on further regional dis-
armament negotiations. Subject to the terms of an
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
X/7.
MBFR agreement, the organization could also be
given the authority to discuss complaints of non-
compliance. Finally, it could receive and dissemi-
nate reports produced by the multilateral system
of verification and collateral constraints that might
accompany such an agreement.
b. Methods of Work
These could also be similar to those of the
CCD. It might be agreed that, in their formal
statements, delegations could address themselves to
any or all of the agenda items and make specific
proposals if they desired. Work sessions would be
closed to the press but perhaps open to the public
on a restricted basis. While delegations would often
brief the press on positions they had adopted, thus
giving the proceedings a semi-public character, they
nevertheless would not take place in the full glare
of publicity. It could be hoped, then, that state-
ments of delegations would be businesslike in character
and not designed primarily for propaganda effect.
During the course of formal discussions and
informal exchange, a consensus might develop on
specific problems, permitting the tabling of draft
agreements by one or several delegations which would
reflect the general views of an even broader number
and could thus serve as a realistic basis for nego-
tiations. These could be conducted in plenary
sessions or be assigned initially to restricted
committees or working groups.
It might be useful to designate, as
secretary general of the commission, a highly
respected and experienced statesman from a neutral
or non-aligned member state, in the expectation
that he would chair plenary and other meetings and,
particularly in informal discussion, actively
encourage the convergence of viewpoints necessary
to the initiation of negotiations. Although the
chairmanship might be shared jointly by an Eastern
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
X/8.
and Western state, or rotated between East and West,
this could create difficulties with the non-aligned
participants.
Illustratively, there might be two plenary
sessions annually of about two months each, with
meetings perhaps twice weekly during the sessions.
There could be provision for calling special meetings
between plenaries on short notice whenever, for
example, three member governments so request the
secretary general. States would usually be repre-
sented at ambassadorial level.
C. Administrative Questions
The Allies could propose Berlin as a desirable
site for the organization. Other possible sites
would be Vienna, Helsinki, Geneva, or another Swiss
city.
Given the probable importance of the secretary
general's role, he should be assisted by a personal
staff of appropriate number and rank selected by him.
The secretary general might also be assisted by two
or three assistant secretaries general. The remainder
of the secretariat should be apportioned roughly
equally between nationals of NATO, the Warsaw Pact and
neutral states. Moreover, just as in the case of the
CCD negotiations, the UN might agree to render assistance
and provide services. If the organization were located
at Geneva, it could then draw upon the resources of
the UN secretariat there. National delegations could
also draw upon the expertise available in missions
dealing with problems before the ECE, GATT and other
bodies.
Conclusions
It is difficult now to judge whether a permanent
organization could usefully supplement existing
bilateral and multilateral channels for East-West
negotiation. However, the prospects in this regard
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
X/9.
should become clearer during the multilateral explo-
ratory and preparatory conversations prior to a CSCE
and during the course of the conference itself.
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DOC
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Backgrounder for the Mar 13 CSCE working Group mtg on MBFR
SUBJECT:
REFERENCE: S/S 7204569
OTHER
NOT XEROXED
APP'TS: PRES
hak
TALKER
MEMCON
DATE REQ.
INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION
ACTION REQUIRED
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(
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MEMO
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(
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RECOMMENDATIONS
(
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EUROPE/CANADA
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for your handling
/
JOINT MEMO
(
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LATIN AMERICA
REFER TO STATE
(
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UNITED NATIONS
ANY ACTION NECESSARY
(
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(
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SCIENTIFIC
SUCRETARIAT
DUE DATE:
LR PLANNING
COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)
PROGRAM ANALYSIS
NSC PLANNING
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ACTION REQUIRED
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NOTIFY
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SUBF XX
* GPO: 1971-412-41
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7200401 thru 7200413
00250
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
NSC UNDER SECRETARIES COMMITTEE
SECRET
NSC-U/DM 72A
January 7, 1972
TO:
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Under Secretary, Department of Commerce
The Under Secretary, Department of Interior
The Under Secretary, Department of Health,
Education and Welfare
The Under Secretary, Department of
Transportation
The Director, Office of Science and Technology
The Director, National Science Foundation
The Assistant Director, Office of Management
and Budget
The Chairman, Council on Environmental Quality
The Administrator, Environmental Protection
Agency
SUBJECT:
United States Arctic Policy and Arctic
Policy Group
A study of United States Arctic policy and organizational
arrangements for its implementation undertaken by the Under
Secretaries Committee was completed and forwarded to the
President on August 9, 1971. The Président has completed his
review of our recommendations, conclusions and report.
National Security Decision Memorandum 144, copy attached,
reflects his decisions.
The President has directed that an Interagency Arctic
Policy Group (APG) be established, chaired by the Department
of State and including the Departments of Defense, Interior,
Commerce and Transportation, the National Science Foundation,
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
2
and the Council on Environmental Quality. I should like
these departments and agencies, at this time, to designate
to the APG their representatives at the Assistant Secretary
level. The APG should coordinate its actions with the
Under Secretaries Committee and refer to the Under
Secretaries Committee unresolved issues. I have asked
Herman Pollack, Director, Bureau of International Scientific
and Technological Affairs, to act as the State Department
representative on, and chairman of the APG.
The President has also directed that the NSC Under
Secretaries Committee review and forward detailed action
programs for the Arctic. Details are set forth in
NSDM 144. The APG should initiate the necessary action in
furtherance of this and other directives and policy
contained in NSDM 144.
June John N. Irwin II
2
Durri
Attachment:
NSDM 144
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
SECRET
December 22, 1971
National Security Decision Memorandum 144
TO:
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Interior
The Secretary of Commerce
The Secretary of Transportation
The Director, National Science Foundation
The Chairman, Council on Environmental Quality
SUBJECT:
United States Arctic Policy and Arctic Policy Group
The President has reviewed the NSC Under Secretaries Committee's
recommendations, conclusions and report regarding United States Arctic
policy and organizational arrangements for its implementation, as for-
warded by Under Secretary Irwin on August 9, 1971.
The President has decided that the United States will support the sound
and rational development of the Arctic, guided by the principle of mini-
mizing any adverse effects to the environment; will promote mutually
beneficial international cooperation in the Arctic; and will at the same
time provide for the protection of essential security interests in the
Arctic, including preservation of the principle of freedom of the seas and
superjacent airspace.
In furtherance of this policy, the President has:
Directed that the NSC Under Secretaries Committee review and
forward detailed action programs, including plans and specific
projects (with budgetary implications as appropriate), for increas-
ing mutually beneficial cooperation with Arctic and other countries
in areas such as exploration, scientific research, resource develop-
ment and the exchange of scientific and technical data; for improving
the US capability to inhabit and operate in the Arctic and the under-
standing of the Arctic environment: and for developing a framework
for international cooperation with particular attention given the
Northlands Compact approach. (These action programs should be
forwarded for the President's consideration not later than March 1,
1972.)
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
2
Directed that an Interagency Arctic Policy Group be established,
chaired by the Department of State and including the Departments
of Defense, Interior, Commerce and Transportation, the National
Science Foundation, the Council on Environmental Quality and
representatives of other agencies as appropriate. (The Depart-
ment of State is responsible for providing the administrative
support, including staff, necessary to enable the Arctic Policy Group
to carry out its responsibilities. )
The Interagency Arctic Policy Group will be responsible for over-
seeing the implementation of U.S. Arctic policy and reviewing and
coordinating U.S. activities and programs in the Arctic, with the
exception of purely domestic Arctic-related matters internal to
Alaska. In discharging these responsibilities, the Arctic Policy
Group will report to and coordinate with the NSC Under Secretaries
Committee. Any substantive policy issues requiring the President's
decision will be referred to the NSC Senior Review Group for
consideration.
Approved the development of a coordinated plan for scientific research
in and on the Arctic, including possible cooperative projects with
Arctic and other countries, and the investigation of the feasibility of
developing a comprehensive transportation system capable of meeting
U.S. requirements in the Arctic, with appropriate recommendations
to bé made to the Arctic Policy Group.
There should be no public statements concerning U.S. Arctic policy and the
other decisions set forth herein pending the President's review of the action
programs requested above.
A.
Henry A. Kissinger
cc:
Secretary, Health Education and Welfare
Director of Central Intelligence
Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director, Office of Management and Budget
President's Science Advisor
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
31425
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
SECRET
December 22, 1971
National Security Decision Memorandum 144
TO:
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Interior
The Secretary of Commerce
The Secretary of Transportation
The Director, National Science Foundation
The Chairman, Council on Environmental Quality
SUBJECT:
United States Arctic Policy and Arctic Policy Group
The President has reviewed the NSC Under Secretaries Committee's
recommendations, conclusions and report regarding United States Arctic
policy and organizational arrangements for its implementation, as for-
warded by Under Secretary Irwin on August 9, 1971.
The President has decided that the United States will support the sound
and rational development of the Arctic, guided by the principle of mini-
mizing any adverse effects to the environment; will promote mutually
beneficial international cooperation in the Arctic; and will at the same
time provide for the protection of essential security interests in the
Arctic, including preservation of the principle of freedom of the seas and
superjacent airspace.
In furtherance of this policy, the President has:
Directed that the NSC Under Secretaries Committee review and
forward detailed action programs, including plans and specific
projects (with budgetary implications as appropriate), for increas-
ing mutually beneficial cooperation with Arctic and other countries
in areas such as exploration, scientific research, resource develop-
ment and the exchange of scientific and technical data; for improving
the US capability to inhabit and operate in the Arctic and the under-
standing of the Arctic environment: and for developing a framework
for international cooperation with particular attention given the
Northlands Compact approach. (These action programs should be
forwarded for the President's consideration not later than March 1,
1972.)
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
2
Directed that an Interagency Arctic Policy Group be established,
chaired by the Department of State and including the Departments
of Defense, Interior, Commerce and Transportation, the National
Science Foundation, the Council on Environmental Quality and
representatives of other agencies as appropriate. (The Depart-
ment of State is responsible for providing the administrative
support, including staff, necessary to enable the Arctic Policy Group
to carry out its responsibilities.)
The Interagency Arctic Policy Group will be responsible for over-
seeing the implementation of U.S. Arctic policy and reviewing and
coordinating U.S. activities and programs in the Arctic, with the
exception of purely domestic Arctic-related matters internal to
Alaska. In discharging these responsibilities, the Arctic Policy
Group will report to and coordinate with the NSC Under Secretaries
Committee. Any substantive policy issues requiring the President's
decision will be referred to the NSC Senior Review Group for
consideration.
Approved the development of a coordinated plan for scientific research
in and on the Arctic, including possible cooperative projects with
Arctic and other countries, and the investigation of the feasibility of
developing a comprehensive transportation system capable of meeting
U.S. requirements in the Arctic, with appropriate recommendations
to bé made to the Arctic Policy Group.
There should be no public statements concerning U.S. Arctic policy and the
other decisions set forth herein pending the President's review of the action
programs requested above.
A.
Henry A. Kissinger
cc:
Secretary, Health Education and Welfare
Director of Central Intelligence
Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director, Office of Management and Budget
President's Science Advisor
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TYPE OF DOCUMENT:
NSDM 144
DISPATCHED
N.S.C.
2. SUBJECT:
United States Arctic Policy and ADecti22
3. DATE:
December 22, 1971
4. CLASSIFICATION:
SECRET
NO. OF
ADDRESSEE
COPIES
RECIPIENT
TIME
DATE
R
Vice President (Gen. Dunn)
1
State - Executive Secretariat
1
Defense - Sec. Laird
2
JCS - Adm. Moorer
B.Wadi,go.
1325
23Dec 7/ 23 Dec
OEP - Director
1
CIA - Richard Helms
1
Interior - Sec. Morton
1
Commerce - Sec. Stans
1
Transportation - Sec. Volpe
1
Nat. Science Found. - Dr. Owens 1
CEQ. - Chairman
1
HEW - Sec. Richardson
1
OST - Dr. David
1
OMB - Director
1
EPA - Administrator
1
OMB - J. Frey
1
Gen. Haig
1
Mr. Odeen
1
Col. Kennedy
1
Mr. Walsh
1
JSC - Adm. Welander
1
Justice - Attorney General
1
Just:
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
SECRET
December 22, 1971
National Security Decision Memorandum 144
TO:
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Interior
The Secretary of Commerce
The Secretary of Transportation
The Director, National Science Foundation
The Chairman, Council on Environmental Quality
SUBJECT:
United States Arctic Policy and Arctic Policy Group
The President has reviewed the NSC Under Secretaries Committee's
recommendations, conclusions and report regarding United States Arctic
policy and organizational arrangements for its implementation, as for-
warded by Under Secretary Irwin on August 9, 1971.
The President has decided that the United States will support the sound
and rational development of the Arctic, guided by the principle of mini-
mizing any adverse effects to the environment; will promote mutually
beneficial international cooperation in the Arctic; and will at the same
time provide for the protection of essential security interests in the
Arctic, including preservation of the principle of freedom of the seas and
superjacent airspace.
In furtherance of this policy, the President has:
Directed that the NSC Under Secretaries Committee review and
forward detailed action programs, including plans and specific
projects (with budgetary implications as appropriate), for increas-
ing mutually beneficial cooperation with Arctic and other countries
in areas such as exploration, scientific research, resource develop-
ment and the exchange of scientific and technical data; for improving
the US capability to inhabit and operate in the Arctic and the under-
standing of the Arctic environment: and for developing a framework
for international cooperation with particular attention given the
Northlands Compact approach. (These action programs should be
forwarded for the President's consideration not later than March 1,
1972.)
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
2
Directed that an Interagency Arctic Policy Group be established,
chaired by the Department of State and including the Departments
of Defense, Interior, Commerce and Transportation, the National
Science Foundation, the Council on Environmental Quality and
representatives of other agencies as appropriate. (The Depart-
ment of State is responsible for providing the administrative
support, including staff, necessary to enable the Arctic Policy Group
to carry out its responsibilities.)
The Interagency Arctic Policy Group will be responsible for over-
seeing the implementation of U.S. Arctic policy and reviewing and
coordinating U.S. activities and programs in the Arctic, with the
exception of purely domestic Arctic-related matters internal to
Alaska. In discharging these responsibilities, the Arctic Policy
Group will report to and coordinate with the NSC Under Secretaries
Committee. Any substantive policy issues requiring the President's
decision will be referred to the NSC Senior Review Group for
consideration.
Approved the development of a coordinated plan for scientific research
in and on the Arctic, including possible cooperative projects with
Arctic and other countries, and the investigation of the feasibility of
developing a comprehensive transportation system capable of meeting
U.S. requirements in the Arctic, with appropriate recommendations
to bé made to the Arctic Policy Group.
There should be no public statements concerning U.S. Arctic policy and the
other decisions set forth herein pending the President's review of the action
programs requested above.
A.
Henry A. Kissinger
cc:
Secretary, Health Education and Welfare
Director of Central Intelligence
Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director, Office of Management and Budget
President's Science Advisor
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NSOM 144
MEMORANDUM
@
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL REF/ACTION 31425
CONFIDENTIAL
November 24, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
GENERAL HAIG
FROM:
MICHAEL GUHIN
THRU:
JOHN WALSH
SUBJECT:
US Arctic Policy and Arctic Policy Group
On September 25, I forwarded for decision a package on the NSC Under Secre-
taries Committee's report on US Arctic policy and the establishment of an
Arctic Policy Group (Action #31425).
At a recent meeting of the Economic Commission for Europe gas committee,
the USSR chief delegate (Osipov) informed the US delegate that the Soviets would
be interested in holding joint US-Canadian-USSR discussions and possibly
organizing study tours on Arctic gas technology problems (Tab A). There have
been some other indications over the past few months regarding Soviet interests
in cooperation in specific Arctic projects.
As you know, the Canadians and Soviets have also been exploring cooperative
bilateral Arctic projects. I think we can expect both countries to be raising
Arctic issues with the US.
A decision on the Arctic policy package will facilitate consideration of possible
Arctic issues which might be raised during the President's visits to Canada and
the Soviet Union next year. If it is decided to pursue any of these issues, the
bureaucracy will need time to prepare specific proposals. (As you know, Dr.
Kissinger has just asked Russell Train to begin work on a bilateral environmental
package that has Arctic policy implications.)
As I noted in the Arctic package memorandum, there is agreement between our-
selves and the Domestic Council that there should be no public statement on this
matter before an announcement of and any court action regarding a decision to
proceed with the Alaskan oil pipeline. Nonetheless, in my view we.should not
hold up all action and refrain from proceeding with the tasks defined in the
package.
RECOMMENDATION:
Therefore, I recommend priority attention be given to the request for decision
submitted with my memorandum of September 25.
Al- ) rigned the many
CONFIDENTIAL
his really best
to give Atta USC or should
me unit though the SRG onethine H
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
EMPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL 046
PAGE 01 GENEVA 05096 231859Z
44
ACTION IO-13
INFO OCT-01 EUR-14 RSR-01 OIC-04 E-11 COM-08 INT-06 TRSE-00
CIAE-00 INR-06 NSAE-00 RSC-01 P-03 PRS-01 USIA-12
SCI-05 SS-14 NSC-10 /110 W
033016
R 231830Z NOV 71
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2174
ANDERSON
INFO USMISSION NATO
BEAR
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
BERGSTEN
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
CHAPIN
HOLDRIDGE
CONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 5096
KENNEDY
LEHMAN
SUBJECT: ECE: GAS COMMITTEE: SOVIETS PROPOSE ARCTIC GAS
NACHMANOFF
TECHNOLOGY CONTACTS
ROBINSON
RONDON
MOSCOW PASS TO SIMPSON OF COMMERCE
SAUNDERS
SMITH
1. AT RECENT ECE GAS COMMITTEE MEETING, USSR CHIEF DEL
SMYSER
OSIPOV (MIN. GAS IND) INFORMED US DEL GAGNE THAT SOVIETS
CONNENFELDT
WRIGHT
WOULD BE INTERESTED IN HOLDING JOINT US-CANADIAN-USSR
DISCUSSIONS AND POSSIBLY ORGANIZING STUDY TOURS ON ARCTIC
GAS TECHNOLOGY PROBLEMS, EITHER UNDER AUSPICES OF ECE GAS
COMMITTEE OR ON TRILATERAL BASIS. MAJOR TOPICS OF INTEREST TO
USSR ARE TO LEARN ABOUT US RESERACH IN THIS FIELD, AND IN
PARTICULAR, ABOUT SPECIFIC TECHNOLOGIES IN ARCTIC LONG-
DISTANCE PIPE LINING WHICH HAPPENS TO BE AREA OF SOME INTEREST
TO US DEL GAGNE, NORTHERN NATURAL GAS, OMAHA, NEBRASKA.
2. US DEL AWARE OF RECENT BILATERAL SOVIET-CANADIAN CONTACTS
AND EXCHANGES ON GAS TECHNOLOGY. US DEL GAGNE HIMSELF
VISITED USSR ARCTIC FIELDS IN 1969.
3. SINCE SOVIET REQUEST LIKELY TO BE REPEATED AT SUITABLE FUTURE
OCCASION, MISSION WOULD APPREICATE GUIDANCE. GP = 3. BASSIN
CONFIDENTIAL
is
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION/31425
SECRET
September 25, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
DR. KISSINGER
FROM:
MICHAEL A. GUHIN
SUBJECT:
US Arctic Policy and Arctic Policy Group
The Problem. The US has never defined any general policy guidance spe-
cifically relating to the Arctic and no interagency mechanism exists to
focus the overall national effort. We are operating mostly on an ad hoc
basis, internationally and internally, at a time when:
Technology is opening the Arctic to increased resource exploitation
and transportation possibilities, and there is a more serious danger
to the Arctic environment, which inter alia influences the world's
weather patterns.
Canada and the USSR are recognizing a mutuality of special interests
in the Arctic (result of PM Trudeau's visit to the USSR in May), and
Canada has acted on its growing concern with jurisdictional preroga-
tives by setting up a pollution control zone extending into Arctic waters.
A continued trend of unilateral extensions of jurisdiction would cause
more serious problems relating to our manifold military (strategic
mobility), economic, environmental and oceans policy interests in
access to the Arctic.
Issues. There are two fundamental issues: How to define our general
Arctic policy and proceed from here and how to harness the bureaucracy
to implement this policy effectively?
Last year the President directed the Under Secretaries Committee (USC)
to review these questions (Tab E). Though plagued in the beginning by some
interagency disagreement (e. g., Interior's problem with State on how ade-
quately to exclude internal Alaskan matters), the study has taken over a
year primarily because of State's apathy and the concomitant lack of priority
and resources given the project.
The USC has forwarded its report and recommendations (Chairman Irwin's
Memorandum, Tab B/Arctic Study, Tab D). I have prepared an analytical
summary (Tab C).
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
2
The USC recommends (1) adoption of proposed statement of Arctic policy
and objectives; (2) formation of an interagency Arctic Policy Group chaired
by State; (3) development of possible frameworks for international Arctic
cooperation; (4) development of a coordinated scientific research program;
and (5) a feasibility study of a comprehensive Arctic transportation system.
Mr. Irwin notes that all USC members plus CEQ, Interior, HEW, Commerce,
Transportation, and NSF concur in the report and recommendations.
The memorandum for the President at Tab 1 (1) outlines the problem and
issues, the USC's recommendations and the proposed NSDM at Tab A; and
(2) recommends that he approve the NSDM.
The NSDM at Tab A:
Sets forth general Arctic policy guidelines consistent with those
recommended by the USC, but eliminates the proposed objective
of Alaska's economic development (since this is essentially a
domestic matter) and states policy in a less platitudinous and
repetitive manner than the bureaucracy's proposal.
Directs the USC to submit an action program, for the President's
consideration by November 30, including plans for attaining our
objectives in (1) increasing mutually beneficial international
cooperation, (2) enhancing the U.S. capability to inhabit and
operate in the Arctic, and (3) developing a framework of interna-
tional cooperation in the Arctic, with particular attention given
the Northlands Compact approach.
[ The USC recommends further study of two options: a Northlands
V
Compact aimed toward a loose framework for increasing coopera-
tion in specific areas of common concern, and a specialized Arctic
Regime aimed toward a more comprehensive, legally binding
treaty for the Arctic. While a regime may be a worthy long-range
goal, it is probably not attainable today (because of the Canadian
and Soviet positions on preserving jurisdictional prerogatives) and
present bureaucratic energies should not be absorbed in it to the
possible detriment of getting a pragmatic proposal.
Directs the establishment of an Interagency Arctic Policy Group,
chaired by State and including other interested agencies, reporting
to the USC.
Approves the recommendations regarding development of a coordi-
nated scientific research program and a feasibility study of an
Arctic transportation system.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
3
Since State's resources are today grossly inadequate, the NSDM also
reinforces the point made in Mr. Irwin's report that State will provide
adequate administrative resources and staff for the Arctic Policy Group.
Mr. Ehrlichman, Dr. David, Mr. Dam (OMB), Hal Sonnenfeldt, and
Dick Kennedy concur. Mr. Ehrlichman and OMB concur on the under-
standing that there will be no public statement before Secretary Morton
announces the decision to proceed with the Alaskan oil pipeline (probably
in mid-December) and, in the event the government is taken to court,
before the case is decided.
Once the pipeline decision is absorbed by the nation and we have an action
program combined with the decisions in the NSDM at Tab A, a Presiden-
tial policy statement on the Arctic could put these matters in broad per-
spective were this desired.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1.
That you forward the memorandum for the President (Tab 1)
recommending he approve the NSDM at Tab A on US Arctic policy
and Arctic Policy Group; and
2.
That, if he approves, you sign the NSDM at Tab A.
Attachments
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CONFIDENTIAL
December 21, 1971
MEMO FOR GENERAL HAIG
onfolmath
SUBJECT: US Arctic Policy and Arctic Policy Group
AL:
I agree with your thought that we ought to keep this
exercise in the Under Secretaries Committee to the
extent possible. However, there may be some
substantive policy issues arise which should be
considered by the SRG during the course of the
exercise (or at least in that framework for the
President's decision). There is no need to put
the issue through the SRG unless such issues do
arise.
Accordingly, I have very slightly revised the NSDM
to make this point (see page 2 of revised NSDM at
paper clip). In view of the time lapse, we have
also changed the due date.
If you agree, please just return the whole file to
me and I will have the revision of the NSDM
machine signed and issued (HAK had already signed
the original version).
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and ok has been determined to be declassified.
RTKennedy
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Dule Kimedg
Give me on plane
Roment you view.
on HAR'S 's quitim
believe
We should key as
is given pros 8
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
evend more urient
19000
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ACTION/31425
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
HENRY A. KISSINGER
K
SUBJECT:
US Arctic Policy and Arctic Policy Group
Problem. The US has no policy guidance specifically relating to the Arctic and
no coordinating mechanism to focus the national effort at a time when:
Technology is opening the Arctic to more resource exploitation (e. g.,
oil), and there are more serious dangers to the Arctic environment.
Canada and the USSR are recognizing a mutuality of special Arctic
interests, and Canada has set up a pollution control zone extending into
Arctic waters.
Continued unilateral extensions of jurisdiction would cause more serious
problems relating to our military, economic, environmental and oceans
policy interests in access to the Arctic.
Two Issues. How to define our general Arctic policy and how to harness the
bureaucracy to implement this policy. At your direction, the NSC Under Sec-
retaries Committee (USC) reviewed these questions, and has forwarded recom-
mendations with the concurrence of the eleven interested agencies (Tab B/
Analytical Summary, Tab C).
Policy. The USC recommends you approve a general policy statement including
(1) support for orderly and sound Arctic development, (2) protection of our
national security interests (e. g., freedom of the seas), and (3) development of
a framework for international cooperation in the Arctic. The USC also recom-
mends you approve: (1) related policy objectives including environmental protec-
tion, increased international cooperation, improved operational capability, and
Alaska's economic development; (2) the development of a coordinated scientific
research program; and (3) a feasibility study of an Arctic transportation system.
With increasing Arctic interests, I believe we need to establish explicit, though
necessarily general, policy guidelines. Except for the reference to Alaskan
development (which is basically a domestic matter), I agree with the above
recommendations. They cover our economic, environmental, military, and
political interests and recognize our interest in furthering international coopera-
tion to achieve our objectives. Follow-on action programs will add substance
to these generalities.
Of particular significance, the USC recommends that we now study two optional
frameworks for international cooperation: (1) a Northlands Compact option
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
2
aimed toward a loose framework for increasing cooperation in specific areas of
common concern; and (2) a Specialized Arctic Regime option aimed toward a
legally binding treaty similar to that in the Antarctic. (I think that further study
should give particular attention to the first option for now since it appears the
more practicable. While we have an interest in increasing cooperation, we can
expect the USSR and Canada generally to favor the status quo: the USSR because
of its more advanced Arctic programs, strategic and resource interests and
security sensitivities; and Canada because of its sensitivities to jurisdictional
and resource exploitation questions.)
Harnessing the Bureaucracy. The USC recommends that you approve the forma-
tion of an independent Interagency Arctic Policy Group- chaired by State and
including interested agencies- to oversee policy implementation and coordinate
our Arctic activities, except purely domestic programs.
I agree that such an interagency committee is required to implement policy and
coordinate activities effectively. Initially, however, this group should be tied
into the NSC system during consideration of foreign policy and security questions.
The NSDM at Tab A (1) sets forth US Arctic policy guidelines consistent with the
USC's recommendations; (2) directs that action programs for increasing coopera-
tion, for enhancing our capability to operate in the Arctic, and for developing a
framework of international cooperation be submitted for your consideration; (3)
establishes an Arctic Policy Group, and (4) approves the development of a coor-
dinated scientific research program and a feasibility study of an Arctic transpor-
tation system.
John Ehrlichman, Ed David and Kenneth Dam concur in the decision memorandum.
We agree that there should be no public statement on this before the announcement
of and any court action regarding a decision to proceed with the Alaskan oil pipe-
line. Once the pipeline decision is absorbed by the nation and we have action
programs plus these decisions, you could, if you wished, review US Arctic pro-
grams and policy in a Presidential statement.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you approve the decision memorandum at Tab A setting forth US Arctic policy,
requesting action programs, and establishing an Arctic Policy Group.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
Attachments
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
SECRET
National Security Decision Memorandum
TO:
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Interior
The Secretary of Commerce
The Secretary of Transportation
The Director, National Science Foundation
The Chairman, Council on Environmental Quality
SUBJECT:
United States Arctic Policy and Arctic Policy Group
The President has reviewed the NSC Under Secretaries Committee's
recommendations, conclusions and report regarding United States Arctic
policy and organizational arrangements for its implementation, as for-
warded by Under Secretary Irwin on August 9, 1971.
The President has decided that the United States will support the sound
and rational development of the Arctic, guided by the principle of mini-
mizing any adverse effects to the environment; will promote mutually
beneficial international cooperation in the Arctic; and will at the same
time provide for the protection of essential security interests in the
Arctic, including preservation of the principle of freedom of the seas and
superjacent airspace.
In furtherance of this policy, the President has:
Directed that the NSC Under Secretaries Committee review and
forward detailed action programs, including plans and specific
projects (with budgetary implications asappropriate), for increas-
ing mutually beneficial cooperation with Arctic and other countries
in areas such as exploration, scientific research, resource develop-
ment and the exchange of scientific and technical data; for improving
the US capability to inhabit and operate in the Arctic and the under-
standing of the Arctic environment: and for developing a framework
for international cooperation with particular attention given the
Northlands Compact approach. (These action programs should be
forwarded for the President's consideration not later than November
30, 1971.) March 1972.)
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
2
Directed that an Interagency Arctic Policy Group be established,
chaired by the Department of State and including the Departments
of Defense, Interior, Commerce and Transportation, the National
Science Foundation, the Council on Environmental Quality and
representatives of other agencies as appropriate. (The Depart-
ment of State is responsible for providing the administrative
support, including staff necessary to enable the Arctic Policy Group
to carry out its responsibilities.)
The Interagency Arctic Policy Group will be responsible for over-
seeing the implementation of U.S. Arctic policy and reviewing and
coordinating U.S. activities and programs in the Arctic, with the
exception of purely domestic Arctic related matters internal to
Alaska. Any substantive policy matters requiring Presidential
decision will be reviewed by the NSC Under Secretaries Committee
and forwarded for the President's consideration. The Arctic Policy
Group will report to and coordinate with the NSC Under Secretaries
Committee all foreign policy and national security matters.
Approved the development of a coordinated plan for scientific research
in and on the Arctic, including possible cooperative projects with
Arctic and other countries, and the investigation of the feasibility of
developing a comprehensive transportation system capable of meeting
U.S. requirements in the Arctic, with appropriate recommendations
to be made to the Arctic Policy Group.
There should be no public statements concerning U.S. Arctic policy and the
other decisions set forth herein pending the President's review of the action
programs requested above.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
7112122
31425
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
NSC UNDER SECRETARIES COMMITTEE
SECRET
August 9, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Subject: United States Arctic Policy and
Organizational Arrangements for
Implementation
The review which you have directed of U.S. Arctic
policy by the NSC Under Secretaries Committee has been
completed. This report is attached.
The report finds that there is not now nor has
there ever been a coordinated U.S. policy on the Arctic.
Additionally, no single agency or interagency mechanism
or body has been charged with the task of focusing a
national effort, particularly where the international
and national security implications of domestic policy
and programs must be considered. The report recommends
that the Arctic Policy of the U.S. be:
to insure that Arctic development is orderly and
consistent with U.S. policy on conservation and
protection of the environment; to maintain a
posture sufficient to protect our national
security interests and preserve the principle of
freedom of the seas and superjacent airspace;
to develop and implement programs and activities
within a framework of international cooperation
wherever appropriate and feasible.
To that end the report defines and recommends U.S.
policy objectives in the Arctic and recommends four
additional actions:
(1) The development of a mechanism for international
cooperation in the Arctic.
SECRET
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2
(2) The formation of an interagency Arctic Policy
Group to review, develop and coordinate Arctic
Policy.
(3) The development of a coordinated program of
scientific research focusing especially on
"baseline research" and including projects
suitable for international cooperation.
(4) The investigation of the feasibility of
developing a comprehensive transportation
system to meet the requirements of the Arctic.
The recommendations of the Under Secretaries
Committee are detailed in the first section of the
attached report entitled "Conclusions and Recommendations
on the Review of U.S. Arctic Policy".
Background discussion relating to the recommendations
on U.S. Arctic Policy is attached to this memorandum.
Recommendation
That the conclusions and recommendations of the
report on United States Arctic Policy be adopted.
Approve
Disapprove
John John Chairman N. 2 Irwin II II
Attachments:
Background Discussion
Report of USC Ad Hoc Study
Group on U.S. Arctic Policy
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BACKGROUND DISCUSSION
The Ad Hoc Interagency Study Group of the Under
Secretaries Committee which prepared the report notes
that while the strategic importance of the Arctic has
been recognized since World War II, subsequent events
have enormously increased its economic potential.
Simultaneously, concern for the preservation of the
environment has grown.
The Study Group has concluded that the lack of
a coordinated U.S. policy on the Arctic, or single
policy coordinating mechanism probably will not be
detrimental to U.S. interests in the short run. In
some areas adequate formal or informal interagency
coordination already exists; for example, in scientific
research and defense. However, the value of a
coordinated policy defining national interests and goals
within the international context of the entire Arctic
region becomes evident as our Arctic interests and
activities expand into areas where responsibilities
are less clearly defined and operational interdependence
is a necessity, e.g., regional environmental protection,
economic development and transportation.
Two of the recommendations are key to the
implementation of a coordinated U.S. Arctic Policy:
(1) The development of mechanism for international
cooperation in the Arctic.
(2) The formation of an Arctic Policy Group to
review, develop and coordinate Arctic Policy.
International Cooperation
The Arctic region for the purpose of the review is
defined as the land and water areas surrounding the North
Pole, including the Arctic Ocean and adjacent water,
and extending on land to the southern limit of continuous
permafrost. This region includes parts of Canada,
Denmark, Norway, the United States and the USSR. Although
by this definition Finland, Iceland, and Sweden are not
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2
technically Arctic, their interests in the region are
significant and they are considered a part of the
"Arctic community". Other nations, e.g., United Kingdom,
France, and Japan have longstanding Arctic interests in
one or more specific areas; for example, scientific
research, exploration, trade and maritime affairs.
Several of the areas of general concern and
interest relating to the Arctic can be usefully
approached through international cooperation; e.g.,
scientific research, environmental studies and pollution
control. One thread which particularly links the
Arctic interests of the U.S. and other Arctic nations
is the need to preserve the ecological and environmental
balance of the Arctic region, and to insure that Arctic
development is rational. Pollution control is one
problem which can best be approached through multinational
cooperation. Another is the conduct of basic Arctic
research needed to allow more accurate prediction of the
effects of man-made and natural changes within the region.
Other important areas in which there is a commonality
of interest among Arctic nations include resource
exploration, transportation, and cold weather construction
techniques.
At present international cooperation in the Arctic
is effected largely on an ad hoc basis. As technology
opens the region to further resource exploitation and
new transportation possibilities, interest in the region
for commercial, scientific and possibly military uses
will increase, creating strains on the ability of a purely
ad hoc approach to function effectively. The review states
the necessity for developing a framework for international
cooperation in the Arctic and recommends that the develop-
ment of this framework be undertaken.
The Arctic Policy Group
The Arctic Policy Group (APG) would provide leadership
in implementing the policy and a coordinative mechanism
for U.S. Arctic planning. This group would be primarily
concerned with international and national security aspects
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3
of Arctic affairs. It would also be concerned with
otherwise "domestic" activities having significant
international or national security components or effects.
This body would not delimit or replace existing agencies
or committees with Arctic responsibilities, nor would it
exercise responsibility in purely domestic Arctic related
matters.
The APG would be an independent body somewhat
analogous to the existing Antarctic Policy Group (State,
Defense, National Science Foundation). It would include
State (Chairman), Defense, Interior, Commerce, Transportation
and the National Science Foundation (NSF) and representatives
of such other agencies as might be invited by the Chairman
to participate on an ad hoc basis. The respective members
of the APG will be designated at the Assistant Secretary
level by the appropriate agency Secretaries and the
Director, NSF. The APG would coordinate its actions with
the Under Secretaries Committee in matters falling within
the cognizance of that body and would refer to the Under
Secretaries Committee unresolved issues.
The APG will give immediate attention to the
development of the recommended framework for international
cooperation and the budgetary implications of U.S. Arctic
Policy. This body will also be responsible for further
reviewing, developing and coordinating U.S. Arctic Policy
and for reviewing plans for U.S. activities and promulgating
guidelines for coordinated action in the Arctic within
the scope of U.S. Arctic Policy as stated in this report.
The Department of State will be responsible for providing
the administrative support including staff necessary
to enable the APG to carry out its responsibilities.
Discussion of Agency Views
For the purposes of this review the Under Secretaries
Committee has included, in addition to its regular
membership, representatives of the Council on Environmental
Quality, the Departments of Interior, Commerce, Health,
Education and Welfare, Transportation, the Office of
Science and Technology, and the National Science Foundation.
All agencies of the Under Secretaries Committee, as so
constituted, concur in the review and its conclusions
and recommendations.
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Conclusions and Recommendations
on the
Review of US Arctic Policy
and
Organizational Arrangements for Implementation
Report
NSC Ad Hoc Interagency Study Group
July 1971
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CONCLUSIONS
The Committee, having reviewed the history and
status of U.S. Arctic Policy has concluded that there
has never been, nor does there now exist a coordinated
U.S. policy on the Arctic. Additionally, no single
agency or interagency mechanism or body has been charged
with the task of focusing a national effort, particularly
where the international and national security implications
of domestic policy and programs must be considered.
To continue as at present would probably not be
detrimental to U.S. interests in the short run. In some
areas, for example, e.g., scientific research and defense,
the U.S. currently has significant programs and interests
which fall under defined agency responsibilities. In
these areas, adequate formal or informal interagency
coordination already exists. However, the value of a co-
ordinated policy defining national interests and goals
within the international context of the entire Arctic
region becomes evident as our Arctic interests and
activities expand into areas where responsibilities are
less clearly defined and operational interdependence is a
necessity, e.g., regional environmental protection, economic
development and transportation.
STATEMENT OF POLICY
U.S. Arctic interests including developmental and
environmental concerns, research, and national security
interests cannot any longer be pursued separately without
real coordination. They must now be addressed within the
framework of a single coherent national policy. To this end,
the Ad Hoc Committee on U.S. Arctic Policy has developed
the following statement of U.S. Arctic policy:
It is declared to be the policy of the United
States to insure that Arctic development is orderly
and consistent with U.S. policy on conservation and
protection of the environment; to maintain a posture
sufficient to protect our national security interests
and preserve the principle of freedom of the seas and
superjacent airspace; to develop and implement programs
and'activities, within a framework of international
cooperation wherever appropriate and feasible.
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2.
STATEMENT. OF OBJECTIVES
If this statement of U.S. Arctic policy is to be
effectively implemented our activities relating to the
region must be organized and coordinated so as to contribute
to the realization with a minimum adverse effect on the
environment of the following objectives:
1. Mutually beneficial cooperation with Arctic
and other countries in exploration, scientific
research, resource development and exchange of
scientific and technical data.
2. An improved capability to inhabit and
operate in the Arctic based on a fuller
understanding of the marine, terrestrial
atmospheric components of the Arctic
environment.
3. The economic development of Alaska including
its continental shelf.
4.
Adequate freedom of action to conduct those
military and intelligence operations essential
to the security of the U.S. and the capability
to carry out aerospace, surface and undersurface
military operations in the Arctic.
5. The settlement of jurisdictional questions and
disputes among nations through peaceful
international means.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The President directed that a review of United States
policy for the Arctic be made in view of the critical need
for an overall policy framework to preserve the environment
of the North, to provide guidelines for decision-making
on several issues of international concern, and to focus
United States activities, longer-range interests and
objectives in the Arctic. In light of these needs the
Committee makes the following recommendations regarding U.S.
Arctic policy and its implementation.
RECOMMENDATION 1
That the statement of U.S. Policy and related objectives
set out above be adopted by the United States Government.
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3.
RECOMMENDATION 2
That we seek the establishment of a general framework
for international cooperation in the Arctic. This framework
would provide a mechanism for international cooperation in
scientific and other activities.
RECOMMENDATION 3
That there be established an Arctic Policy Group for
the purposes of: (1) further reviewing, developing and
coordinating U.S. Arctic Policy; (2) reviewing plans
for U.S. activities and promulgating guidelines for
coordinated action in the Arctic within the scope of this
policy statement, and (3) developing the recommended
framework for international cooperation. The Arctic Policy
Group should give priority attention to the development
of the budgetary implications of U.S. Arctic policy.
The Arctic Policy Group should consist of the
Departments of State (Chairman), Defense, Interior, Commerce,
Transportation and the National Science Foundation, and
representatives of such other agencies as may be invited by
the Chairman to participate on an ad hoc basis. The respective
members of the Arctic Policy Group will be designated at the
Assistant Secretary level by the appropriate agency Secretary
and the Director, National Science Foundation.
RECOMMENDATION 4
That urgent attention be given by the Interagency
Arctic Research Coordinating Committee to developing a
coordinated plan of scientific research in and on the Arctic,
including projects for international cooperation. Priority
should be given to that research necessary to predict potential
changes in the global environment as related to changes in
the physical characteristics of the Arctic.
RECOMMENDATION 5
That the Departments of Transportation, Defense and
Commerce in cooperation with other interested agencies
give early attention to the investigation of the feasibility
of developing a comprehensive transportation system capable
of meeting logistic and support requirements in the Arctic, and
make appropriate recommendations to the Arctic Policy Group.
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ANALYTICAL SUMMARY OF US ARCTIC POLICY REVIEW
The Arctic. The review defines the term "Arctic region" broadly as the
land and water surrounding the North Pole, including the Arctic Ocean
and adjacent seas, extending on land to the southern limit of continuous
permafrost. The region comprises about 8. 3 million square miles (50%
larger than the US), with the Arctic Ocean- much of which is perenially
covered by a floating ice cap- accounting for over 5 million square
miles.
This broad region includes both national and non-national territories.
Canada, Denmark, Norway, the US and the USSR (which has the most
active and largest Arctic region program) have permanently inhabited
Arctic national territories. Finland, Iceland and Sweden also have signi-
ficant Arctic interests and are considered "Arctic community" countries.
Other nations (e. the UK, France and Japan) have long-standing Arctic
interests in scientific research, exploration, trade and maritime affairs.
For foreign policy purposes, Arctic policy relates to the non-national
area of the North Pole, the Arctic Ocean and adjacent seas. The US
position is that the extent and nature of sovereignty or jurisdiction
exercised by coastal states over water beyond certain limits should be
determined by international agreement. However, some other Arctic
countries do not necessarily agree with the application of the US position
in the Arctic region.
The Problem. The US has never defined any general policy guidance
specifically relating to the Arctic, though several existing US policies are
directly applicable to the Arctic (e. g., law of the sea policy). Also,
though we have special interagency committees on economic, resource
and oil development in Alaska and scientific research in the Arctic (includ-
ing Alaska), we have no interagency mechanism to focus the overall
national effort, particularly from a foreign policy and national security
standpoint.
The US is operating mostly on an ad hoc basis, internationally and
internally, at a time when:
Technology is opening the Arctic region to increased resource
exploitation, particularly oil and mineral development, and new
transportation possibilities (e. g., the 1968 discovery of oil in
Alaska and the 1969 and 1970 Arctic voyages of the tanker
MANHATTAN.)
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With the interest in resource and transportation development there
is a more serious danger of degrading the fragile Arctic environ-
ment, which is not self-renewing like more temperate climates
and which heavily influences the world's weather patterns.
The economic potential and environmental problems of the Arctic
have heightened the USSR's and Canada's concern with preserving
jurisdictional prerogatives. Canada and the USSR are recognizing
a mutuality of special interest in the Arctic and "special responsi-
bilities and corresponding rights" with respect to ensuring the
safety of navigation and preserving the Arctic environment (Joint
Communique on PM Trudeau Visit to USSR, May 18, 1971).
Canada has set up a pollution control zone extending 100 miles from
its coast in areas north of 60° latitude, defining it in terms of
extending jurisdiction rather than territorial sovereignty. (The US
protested this unilateral action.)
There are potentially more serious problems regarding US military,
economic, environmental and oceans policy interests in access to
the Arctic. (Since 1926 the USSR's organic law has included the
"sector theory", under which a country claims as its territory that
pie-shaped wedge extending along its borders to the North Pole.
This "theory" finds some support in the fact that the Arctic Ocean's
ice cap is comparable to land in some respects and, therefore,
subject to territorial claims. The US does not recognize the validity
of this "theory" though Seward's Treaty by which we acquired Alaska
defines the territory as extending along delineating longitudinal
lines to the Frozen Ocean.)
Areas of common concern (e.g., scientific research, environmental
studies and pollution control) are becoming more important and can
best be approached on a multinational basis.
U.S. Interests in the Arctic. Historically, US interests in the Arctic have
been focused on Alaska. Our interests in the broader Arctic region have
been, until recently, limited primarily to continental defense, exploration
and scientific research.
Since the discovery of oil resources in Alaska, our interests have grown to
include the feasibility of extracting and transporting oil and mineral resources
to markets and the concurrent need for environmental protection. Broadly
speaking, US interests in the Arctic are:
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National security and military interest in freedom of access,
freedom of the seas and the superjacent airspace.
Economic and commercial interest in resource development and
transportation (which subsumes a better capability to inhabit and
operate in the Arctic).
Environmental interest in minimizing any adverse effects on the
environment, particularly since degradation of the environment
could have serious, widespread consequences (which subsumes a
better understanding of the Arctic environment and its global
effects).
Political interests in having jurisdictional questions and disputes
settled through international agreement.
Policy Guidelines and Options
There is no question that general US policy guidelines should recognize
the above mentioned US Arctic interests which are, for the most part,
not unique to that region.
But there remains the question of how one proceeds to protect and further
those interests in an era of increasing activity and interests and growing
concerns with jurisdictional and sovereignty prerogatives. The report
concludes that advancing international cooperation generally and, more
specifically, developing a framework for cooperation in the Arctic is in
the US interest and should be pursued not merely because many areas of
common concern can best be approached on a multinational basis, but
because cooperation may be the only alternative to increasing restrictive
national claims (jurisdictional and perhaps even sovereignty) which would
run counter to US military, economic, environmental and oceans policy
interests.
The "sector theory" approach, whereby the US could claim jurisdiction or
sovereignty over the pie-shaped territory from the borders of Alaska to
the North Pole, is not considered a realistic policy option precisely
because it would appear contrary to US interests. A US "sector theory"
policy would likely lead to a division of the Arctic "pie" with the US having
less than 15%, the USSR over 50% and Canada over 30%. More importantly,
by accepting national claims through our action, there would be no guarantee
of freedom to act in the Arctic Ocean or adjacent seas either in the interests
of national security, military intelligence, commercial development or for
environmental monitoring and protection activity.
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The Existing System. There are already some established beginnings in
cooperation. A large number of informal exchanges occur among scien-
tists, universities and private institutions, often including their Soviet
counterparts. Cooperation among the western Arctic nations, particularly
in North America, is more highly developed (e. the US and Canada built
and maintain the DEW line and operate weather stations; Japanese, British
and Canadians have worked together on ice flow stations; and the NSF
sponsors Arctic research projects with Canada, Denmark and other
countries).
However, the existing system deals with international relations and coopera-
tion in the Arctic on an ad hoc basis. As technology opens the Arctic,
national interests and activities for gaining access to the area for commer-
cial, scientific and even military uses will increase. The interaction of
these growing interests and activities cannot be dealt with effectively on a
piecemeal national approach to the Arctic. The report concludes that new
means are required to meet the potential problems.
Optional Frameworks for International Cooperation. The report analyzes
three options for developing a framework for international cooperation in
the Arctic. Though there appears ample room for increasing exchange in
many fields, there are also substantial problems in any US approach to
increasing international cooperation and particularly to promoting a frame-
work for such:
Nations with Arctic territory (particularly the USSR and Canada)
will be increasingly concerned with preserving jurisdiction pre-
rogatives, while other states will be seeking to preserve maximum
access to the area (e. the US or Japan).
We can expect the USSR and Canada generally to favor the status quo:
the USSR because of its advanced Arctic programs (making it difficult
for the Soviets to believe they stand to receive equal gain in a more
cooperative framework), strategic and resource interests and security
sensitivities; Canada because of its sensitivities to jurisdictional
questions and matters of resource exploitation and environmental
problems.
Option 1. The Northlands Compact for International Cooperation
This proposal would establish a loose framework for enhancing cooperation
among Arctic and other interested states. The agreement would provide an
umbrella under which participating states could, as they wished, share
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experience and data affecting (1) regional development (transportation,
construction, communications, et cetera), (2) environmental protection,
(3) conservation of resources and (4) basic scientific research in fields
of mutual interest.
Cooperation would be facilitated by (1) exchanging information, data, and
experts, (2) holding conferences, (3) coordinating research by interested
parties, (4) facilitating expeditions through logistic support and rescue
missions, (5) designating national points of contact, and (6) consulting on
significant projects and meeting regularly.
The main advantage of this option is its potential for acceptance by nations
interested in the Arctic. The loose and flexible arrangement could be
adjusted to the needs and desires of participating states, and could sidestep
the jurisdiction issues which may retard international cooperative efforts.
The US could also gain in Arctic science and technology from cooperation
with other countries.
The disadvantage of this option would be its inability to bind states to
common action. It would probably not have much immediate and substantial
impact on the larger problems created by increasing international interest
and activity in the Arctic (e.g., economic development versus environmental
protection, unilateral claims versus international agreement, extension of
jurisdiction or sovereignty versus freedom of the seas).
Option 2. The Specialized Arctic Regime
This proposal would be a more comprehensive and binding arrangement than
the Northlands Compact. The regime would establish an agreed code of
conduct for states in various Arctic activities and an agreed mechanism for
continued consultation among the parties. It could be limited to discreet
fields of mutual interest or encompass a broad range of concerns. It would
approximate, though with significant differences, an Antarctic Treaty for
the Arctic.
The regime could encompass matters which lend themselves to joint objec-
tives and joint or self regulation, stipulating certain agreed "freedoms" and
"obligations", such as (1) environmental protection with the obligation for
national regulation under agreed guidelines, (2) promotion of scientific
research with the obligation to exchange plans and data; (3) facilitation of
international cooperation; (4) preservation and conservation of living and
non-living resources; (5) protection of indigenous peoples; (6) mutual opera-
tion aids, assistance and services. The regime might specifically exclude
subjects more suitable for national action such as defense and jurisdictional
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6
considerations. It might also circumvent sovereignty claims by applying
different codes of conduct to land and water areas.
The main advantages of this option are that it (1) would establish interna-
tional agreed codes of conduct and consultative machinery; (2) could
supplement the earlier and related U.S. initiatives of the seabed regime
for mineral resources; (3) could provide an unobtrusive mechanism through
which the interested nations of the international community could deal with
Arctic issues; and (4) if successful, could fashion Arctic cooperation before
mounting national interests in Arctic resources harden and jurisdictional
claims proliferate.
The disadvantages of this option, as reflected in our current discussions
with Canada and the USSR about an Arctic regime for pollution and navigation,
revolve around national jurisdictional and defense considerations. To
negotiate a regime today would be more difficult than to establish a compact,
and the consequences of its failure could reduce chances for cooperation in
specific areas. Also, a special regime for the Arctic runs the risk of de-
rogating from existing Law of the Sea Conventions and setting a precedent
for other nations to apply special circumstances and considerations to other
areas of the world ocean.
A third option, a condominium type regime, is also discussed in the USC
report. It would be an extension and further formalization of the Specialized
Arctic Regime. It would provide for some form of governing Council with
stipulated membership and authority over specific aspects of Arctic activity.
This approach would have even less chance of acceptance than an Arctic
regime, and is probably not needed at this time to accomplish U.S. objec-
tives. Moreover, it is not clear that such a formal regulatory arrangement
would be in the US interests.
The report recommends further study and development of the Northlands
Compact option and the specialized Arctic Regime option.
Harnessing the Bureaucracy Options
There does not now exist any agency or interagency mechanism to focus the
overall national effort and give guidance to agencies responsible for imple-
menting Arctic programs. There are Federal interagency mechanisms to
plan and coordinate activities in resource, economic and oil development in
Alaska and scientific research in the Arctic (including Alaska), but these
are relatively limited in scope and basically domestically oriented.
With active US interest growing to encompass the Arctic as a region, and
with the increasing interrelations between domestic, international and
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national security aspects of Arctic plans, programs and activities, some
interagency mechanism should be established to focus on the overall
national effort, to coordinate agency activities and to evaluate and relate
international aspects of domestic programs with regional policy aims.
This mechanism should also be the focal point for the pursuit of interna-
tional cooperation and aims in the Arctic. Such a mechanism would not
infringe upon purely domestic Arctic-related matters in Alaska and already
established mechanisms for dealing with them.
The report reviewed the following options for harnessing the bureaucracy:
Option 1.
Designation of an Executive non-operating agency without
Arctic programs (e.g., OST, NSC or State) as the central
policy coordinating agency.
Option 2.
Designation of an independent, Presidentially-appointed board
or coordinating committee of individuals.
Both options 1 and 2 have the advantage of giving coordinating responsibility
to an agency without vested interests in particular programs, missions and
operations and thereby avoid agency parochialism while expressing executive
interest at a high level. However, both options have the disadvantages of
lacking authority to define programs or develop budgetary support.
Option 3.
Designation of an appropriate executive operating agency
(e. Interior, DOD, Transportation or Commerce) as the
lead agency.
This option has the advantage of placing central coordinating authority with
an agency which has responsibility for program development and budgetary
allocations and an existing support staff familiar with Arctic programs; but
it has the disadvantages of lacking authority over the areas of other agency
responsibility and of tending toward agency parochialism.
Option 4.
An NSC Under Secretaries Committee including agencies with
Arctic interests.
Option 5.
An independent, interagency committee or "Arctic Policy
Group" consisting of agencies with the most significant
Arctic interests.
Both options 4 and 5 have the advantage of allowing for collective leadership
in developing programs and guidance, giving consideration to all interests,
operating and non-operating. Information on programs and budgets could be
effectively assembled because of the level of agency representation. The
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designation of an independent interagency committee (Option 5) would have
the additional advantages of (1) not involving the USC in such areas as
coordinated scientific research programs and studies of transportation
systems, and (2) facilitating coordination of related activities with the
existing Antarctic Policy Group (chaired by State). There appear to be
no real disadvantages to these two options other than bureaucratic con-
cerns that nothing can be accomplished by either group without Presiden-
tial authorization.
The report recommends the establishment of an independent interagency
Arctic Policy Group (Option 5), but charged with reporting to and coor-
dinating with the Under Secretaries Committee all matters pertaining to
national security, matters significantly affecting our international posture
or policy questions, and matters which the Arctic Policy Group is unable
to resolve.
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REVIEW OF US ARCTIC POLICY
AND
ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR IMPLEMENTATION
Report
NSC Ad Hoc Interagency Study Group
July 1971
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction.
i.
II. The Arctic - Definition & Description
i.
III. US Interests in the Arctic
3.
a) National Security Interests
4.
b) Resource and Transportation Development
5.
c) Protection of the Arctic Environment
5.
IV. US Activities in the Arctic
6.
V. Interests and Activities of Other Countries
7.
VI. Policy Options
8.
a) Option 1. The Existing System
12.
b) Option 2. The Northlands Compact for
International Cooperation
.13.
c) Option 3. The Specialized Arctic Regime
14.
d) Option 4. The Condominium Type Regime
15.
VII. Interagency Coordinating Mechanism
17.
VIII. Budgetary Implications
23.
IX. Conclusions
24.
X. Map of the Arctic Region
XI. Appendix - Background Paper
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i
I.
Introduction
The President directed the NSC Under Secretaries
Committee to undertake a review of the U.S. policy on
the Arctic. Dr. Henry Kissinger in a memorandum to the
Chairman of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee of
April 15, 1970 stated that this review should consider
the political implications of U.S. policy and explore all
opportunities for international cooperation on Arctic
matters. It should also include consideration of the
necessary Interagency coordinating mechanisms and
budgetary implications. This report prepared by an NSC
Under Secretaries Committee Ad Hoc Interagency Study Group
is in response to that request.
In the interests of coherence and brevity, a
considerable amount of background material necessary to
an understanding of U.S. interests and involvement in the
Arctic as well as the interests and involvement of other
countries has been incorporated in a single background
paper as an appendix to this paper.
U.S. Arctic Policy Study
II. The Arctic - Definition & Description
The term "Arctic" has two meanings in the context
of this paper. First, the term refers to a specific geo-
graphical region whose limits may be variously defined.
The term broadly refers to the circumpolar cold region
around the North Pole. However, for specific purposes,
the Arctic may be defined by:
- High latitude or the area within the Arctic
Circle (660 33' N).
- Polar basin or the area of the Arctic Ocean,
often including the drainage basin of rivers
flowing into it.
- Continuous permafrost or the high latitude
areas where the ground is perenially frozen.
- Tree line or the poleward limit of tree growth.
- Temperature or areas where the average tempera-
ture of the warmest month is blow 50°F and the
coldest month is below 32° F.
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All of these definitions include land and sea,
national and "non-national" territories. The region
generally comprises about 8.3 million square miles, a
region about 50% larger than the United States, of which
the Arctic Ocean is over 5 million square miles. It is
unique among the seas of the world in that much of it is
perennially covered by a floating ice cap,
For the purposes of this review, the term "Arctic
region" will be defined as the land and water areas
surrounding the North Pole including the Arctic Ocean
and adjacent water and extending on land to the southern
limit of continuous permafrost. What we mean by the
Arctic for the purpose of national policy, however, must
take into consideration geopolitical realities in the
region.
The second meaning of the term "Arctic" refers to
the community of nations having territory which is "arctic"
by some conventional definition and to the interests of
those nations focusing on their Arctic territory and the
region generally. The second meaning can be extended to
encompass nations having no Arctic territory, but having
substantial present or potential interests in the region.
In geopolitical terms, the Arctic region includes the
territory of five nations - - Canada, Denmark, Norway, U.S.
and USSR. Finland, Iceland and Sweden are not characterized
by permafrost nor do they directly abut the Arctic Ocean.
However, because of their northern geographic location and
concern for Arctic exploration and development, they are
considered a part of the general "Arctic community". The
Arctic is clearly a region delineated by common environmental
characteristics wherein the constituent regional countries
share interests: for example, the possibilities for resource
development, preservation of the environment and scientific
research.
Additionally, the United Kingdom and France have
long traditions of Arctic interest, expressed mostly in
exploration and research. Japan is showing increasing
interest in the region. It can be expected that maritime
nations in general will take greater note of the region
should the Northwest Passage and/or the Northern Sea Route
adjacent to the USSR open to regular commercial traffic.
A national policy for the Arctic must be workable
in the context of the political realities relating to the
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
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2.
region. Some nations, particularly the USSR and Canada,
consider their sovereignty and jurisdiction to extend
into areas of, the seas generally considered to be "non-
national". Because of the permanent nature of the Arctic
Ocean's ice cap, the view is held by some that it is
comparable to land in some respects, and, therefore, it
has been suggested that the "frozen Arctic Ocean" might
be subject to territorial claims. The view is embodied
in the "Sector Theory" under which a country claims as
its own territory ice found in a wedge extending along
the limiting lines of longitude of land territory to the
North Pole.
The USSR has included the "Sector Theory" as part of
its organic law since 1926. Though individual members of
various Canadian governments have also referred to this
theory as a means for delineating Canadian territory, it
has never been adopted as policy by any Canadian government.
The recent Canadian legislation (establishing inter alia
pollution control zones extending 100 miles seaward of the
Canadian coast in all areas north of 60° latitude) speaks
of extension of jurisdiction rather than territorial
sovereignty and does not mention the "Sector Theory".
The U.S. position is that the extent and nature of
sovereignty orjurisdiction exercised by coastal states
over waters beyond three miles should be determined by
international agreement. The U.S. has never recognized
the validity of the "Sector Theory" or claims under it
although Seward's Treaty, through which we acquired Alaska,
defines the territory as extending along delineating lines
of longitude to the Frozen Ocean.
Another important factor in considering a U.S. Arctic
policy is the fact that the Arctic, unlike the Antarctic,
is permanently inhabited. Most Arctic nations, therefore,
have a natural interest in Arctic development.
Thus, in the political context, the Arctic region
is not uniform and may be characterized in three ways:
- The national territory of Arctic states other
than the U.S.;
- The U.S. Arctic (for example, Alaska); and
- The non-national area of the Arctic Ocean
and adjacent seas.
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The policy interests of the U.S. may differ significantly
in many ways regarding each of these three categories. For
example, with regard to the Arctic territories of other
states, a U.S. policy can of course have no direct "extra
territorial effect". However, this does not preclude
reaching agreements with other Arctic states on matters
of mutual interest which will require the initiation or
modification of domestic actions (for example, trade or
wildlife preservation).
In the case of the U.S. Arctic (Alaska), the develop-
ment, coordination and implementation of policy on
domestic matters is the responsibility of those agencies
and authorities of the Federal Government with programs,
activities and interests within the state and of the state
authorities themselves. This study does not contemplate
the establishment of a new national policy for Alaska or
the establishment of new bureaucratic entities for
coordinating or overseeing domestic Alaskan development
or programs as such.
While the impact of a general U.S. Arctic policy on
domestic planning for Alaska would not be direct, the
development of such a policy would afford an opportunity
to identify and integrate useful elements of domestic
activities into the development of a multinational approach
to the solution of Arctic problems. Moreover, otherwise
"domestic" plans or programs in Alaska may have significant
implications with regard to the national security and our
relations with other countries (for example, the ecological
implications of transporting oil from northern Alaska by
sea routes). Where domestic programs have such implications,
they may be best considered within the framework of the
broader U.S. international and national security policy
goals. Any U.S. policy would require a mechanism for
evaluating the international implications of significant
domestic plans and coordinating, where appropriate, such
plans with related international activities.
It is in approaching questions related to the non-
national area of the Arctic Ocean and adjacent seas that the
formulation of a coordinated U.S. Arctic Policy would prove
most useful and assist U.S. agencies in planning and
implementing Arctic programs.
III. U.S. Interests in the Arctic
Historically, the U.S. interest in the Arctic has
been focused on Alaska, its past exploitation (for
example, the "gold rush"), and future development. Our
interests in the broader Arctic region have in the past
been limited primarily to continental defense, exploration
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4.
and scientific research. Since the discovery of the oil
resources in Alaska, in 1968, our interests have grown to
include the feasibility of extracting and transporting oil
and mineral resources to markets and the concurrent need
for environmental protection. The voyages of the MANHATTAN
have brought the commercial utilization of the Northwest
Passage into the realm of possibility for the first time.
U.S. interests can thus be considered in three broad
categories: (1) national security and military interests;
(2) the development of Arctic resources which subsumes a
capability to operate and transport in the Arctic; and (3)
the ensuring of the maximum environmental protection
consistent with the growth of human activity.
These interests are in fact interrelated to a degree
which makes any final ordering of priorities arbitrary.
While the need for military preparedness in the Arctic has
not diminished, there has been a rise in importance and
the immediacy of the national interest in resource and
transportation development and environmental protection.
Both the development of the oil and mineral resources in
the Arctic and Alaska and the need for environmental pro-
tection have increased importance today because of the
potential importance of these interests to the total welfare
of the people of the U.S. and the world. Also, because
none of these interests can be realized without developing
an adequate data base and the application of technology,
the need for increased scientific and technological research
is obvious. Such research is inherent to the realization
of the interests and is considered as a necessary element
in each case.
a) National Security Interests - The
assurance of the freedom to act as necessary
to ensure the national security has been, at
least since World War II, our primary interest
in the Arctic. With the advances in technology,
the nature of the primary initial military
threat to the North American Continent has
shifted from direct invasion to aerospace
incursions, primarily missile attacks, and
underwater operations. Our own technology has
been applied to counter these threats. There
is, of course, a continuing strategic importance
of the Arctic region in that it is the shortest
distance between the Eurasian and North American
continents, and because of its position directly
between the U.S. and the USSR.
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The impediments to the freedom of military actions
are at the moment almost as much political and environmental
as technological. Such issues as the ensuring of freedom
of the seas and superadjacent aerospace are of significance
in the Arctic to both commercial traffic and national
defense. The direct military interest is then to a greater
degree than in the past related to the interests of other
segments of our national interest. The establishment of
the principles of freedom of the seas in the context of
opening new sea routes will also benefit the military
defense interest.
b) Resource and Transportation Development -
The discovery of large oil reserves in the Prudhoe
Bay region of Alaska has particularly emphasized
the resources potential of the Arctic. The trans-
portation of oil and minerals; particularly to the
east coast of the U.S. by sea has significant
economic implications, as it could be marketed in
the U.S. at a price less than that of Venezuelan
or Mid-East oil, and possibly less than the present
cost of oil now derived from domestic sources.
With the development of efficient and safe trans-
portation systems the more rapid development of
the extractable resources of the Arctic is likely.
c) Protection of the Arctic Environment -
The interest in development and transportation of
oil and mineral resources is itself largely the
source of the need to focus greater emphasis on
environmental protection. The preservation of
the Arctic environment may be cons dered extremely
important because of its influence on the world's
weather and environmental patterns. Several con-
siderations come into play in defining this
interest:
(1) The Arctic environment is itself
fragile - It does not have the self-renewing
ability of more temperate environments. For
example, the degrading effects of an oil
spill in the Arctic may persist for an
indefinite period. In any event, the seriousness
of the fragility of the Arctic environment is
compounded by the difficulty of working in the
frigid temperature.
(2) Relatively small chances in the
environmental characteristics of the Arctic may
have serious implications for lower latitudes -
For example, it is possible that with regular
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surface shipping made possible through
the use of huge icebreakers the ice may
be prevented from refreezing thereby
allowing interchange of eastern and
western waters which might significantly
affect the ecological balance and the
heat exchange equation of the region.
This would alter aquatic life distri-
bution and temperature elsewhere.
(3) Arctic conditions heavily influence
the world's weather - Should there be major
changes in the amount of ice cover in the
Arctic, the forces creating basic weather
patterns elswhere in the world conceivably
will be altered. Also, the appearance of
pollutants in the Arctic could create a
chain of circumstances which could culminate
in serious alterations of the Earth's
climate. Although we can develop conceptual
pictures of what gross changes in the Arctic
environment can do, we do not yet have the
knowledge to accurately predict the effects
of incremental degradation or to determine
levels of "acceptability" in ecological and
environmental change as balanced against the
degradation accompanying development. It is,
therefore, necessary to consider the environ-
mental effects of all developmental acts.
IV. U.S. Activities in the Arctic
Increased interest in the Arctic's potential for
economic development coupled with its importance. to the
defense of the continent and the necessity for preserving
the regional environment means that U.S. involvement in
activities such as shipping and research on the high seas
and other areas beyond national jurisdiction will grow in
size and importance. Some indications of the growth of
U.S. Arctic interest is given by a comparison of the
approximate gross figures for U.S. Federal Agency expendi-
tures for FY 70 and FY 71. In FY 70, the total Federal
expenditures in and on the Arctic (including Alaska
programs) was approximately $91 million; for FY 71, the
estimate is $152 million. About $40 million of the
increase is accounted for by the cost of a new icebreaker
for the Department of Transportation. However, significant
projected increases in funding for Arctic programs are
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planned by several agencies, notably NSF which is increasing
its budget requests by a factor of two over FY-70 levels in
each of FY 71 and 72, to a level of $5,500,000 in FY 72.
The Departments of Commerce and Defense have also increased
their FY 71 budget requests for Arctic activities over
FY 70 levels. Over twenty Federal agencies are involved
in Arctic programs in science, resource development, health
and welfare and research development. Research and
science activities encompass a broad range of atmospheric,
earth and marine sciences.
Moreover, the growing interest of government and
private sectors in our own Arctic (Alaska) will increas-
ingly have international and national security implications.
V.
Interests and Activities of Other Countries
A number of other countries have active interests
in the Arctic. The USSR, Canada, Norway, Denmark, Finland,
Iceland, and Sweden either possess Arctic territory or
have "northern" interests with resulting strategic,
political, economic, social and environmental interests.
Each of them has special policies and programs for Arctic
development, a few more advanced than our own.
The USSR is developing and using the Arctic region
more than any other nation. The Arctic constitutes one-
third of Soviet territory and harbors two million people.
The area is being woven systematically in the country's
fabric. Extensive military facilities and missile units
are there along with the world's largest fleet of ice
breakers to keep open the Northern Sea Route for ocean
vessels and the world's most extensive Arctic scientific
research program.
While less active than the USSR, other countries conduct
Arctic activities. Canada, with the major western icebreaker
fleet (U.S. and Finnish fleets are smaller) has begun a
major commercial exploration and environmental protection
effort.
The new interest in Arctic resources and the possi-
bility of environmental damage have awakened interest in
territorial soveriegnty and jurisdiction control in the
Arctic, issues which have not been seriously disputed in
the Arctic in the past. The potential of Alaskan and
Canadian oil resources and the possibility for commercial
shipping in the Northwest Passage precipitated Canadian
proposals for new and stringent legislation for control in
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8.
the Canadian north and its high seas areas.
In June of 1970, Canada enacted legislation estab-
lishing pollution zones for controlling shipping routes
and standards in Arctic waters extending 100 miles seaward
from the coast in all areas north of 60° N latitude. (We
protested Canada's unilateral action in the absence of
international agreement in areas recognized by international
law as the high seas, and we proposed early convening of an
international conference to seek international agreement on
pollution andnavigation standards for the Arctic beyond
national limits).
The Nordic countries are beginning to consider the
need for coordinated, continuous Arctic programs and
planning. Norway (Spitsbergen and Jan Mayen) and Denmark
(Greenland) have limited but growing economic interests
in the Arctic, and they conduct important maritime and
scientific programs there. Finland, Sweden and Iceland
share interest in the area's exploration, development and
exploitation. The Sea Ice Conference scheduled in Iceland
this season has stimulated considerable interest.
VI. Policy Options
There has never been, nor does there now exist, a
coordinated U.S. policy on the Arctic. Each of the twenty
Federal agencies and activities with Arctic programs is,
of course, responsive to Federal policy or policies in
planning and carrying out its mission. However, there is
no general overall policy guidance, specifically relating
to the Arctic, to which all Federal agencies with Arctic
interests can relate. Additionally, no single agency or
interagency mechanism or body exists which is able to focus
a national effort, particularly where the international
and national security implications of domestic policy and
programs must be considered.
In considering a coordinated U.S. Arctic policy, two
factors must be kept in mind:
- There are a number of existing U.S. policies
affecting the issues which apply to or have
implications for the Arctic (for example,
seabeds and continental shelf, fisheries, law
of the sea and sovereignty). These issues all
have manifestations in the Arctic. A U.S.
Arctic policy would not supersede or subsume
existing developed policies which affect the
Arctic, Rather, a U.S. Arctic policy is con-
ceived of as a statement of goals and
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recommendations which will delimit the con-
tinuing U.S. interest in the Arctic as a
region and provide a framework for the orderly
establishment of Arctic program priorities
as well as facilitating the rationalization
of U.S. Arctic objectives with our international
commitments.
Because of the non-uniform nature in the geo-
political context of the Arctic region, any
framework developed for accommodating policy
implementation must be flexible enough to allow
the development and implementation of programs
relating to U.S. bilateral relations with
Arctic and non-Arctic countries as well as
those relating to a more general international
context.
The possibilities of developing a suitable "compact"
or treaty framework for international cooperation in various
areas of concern should be evaluated with this in mind.
At the present time, we are taking this approach with
respect to the prevention of sea pollution and establishing
navigation standards in the Arctic. Broader areas, including
environmental protection generally, basic and applied
research, commercial development and transportation, might
also be amenable to this approach.
The four basic policy options considered below each
concern advancing international cooperation in the Arctic.
While it might be contended that the U.S. could itself
adopt a type of "Sector Theory" policy, thereby claiming
jurisdiction or sovereignty over the pie-shaped territory
from the borders of Alaska to the North Pole, this approach
would lead to a division of the Arctic "pie" with the U.S.
having less than 15%, the USSR over 50%, and Canada over
30%. More importantly, by accepting national claims
through our action, there would be no guarantee or freedom
to act either in the interests of national security or in
commercial development. Moreover, protection of the
environment and control of pollution can best be approached
on a coordinated international and multinational basis.
Thus, because the "Sector Theory" approach would be contrary
to U.S. political, economic, environmental and military
interests, it is not considered a realistic policy option.
It can also be argued that the U.S. could continue
to handle issues individually on an ad hoc basis with no
coordinated, definitive U.S. Arctic policy relating all
elements of national interest and relatively little con-
tinuing coordination of Federal agency programs except
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in scientific research and defense. The U.S. currently
has significant programs and interests which fall under
defined agency responsibilities. In these areas, adequate
formal or informal interagency coordination already
exists. Thus, this approach would probably not be detri-
mental to U.S. interests in the short run.
However, as our Arctic interests and activities
expand into areas where responsihilities are less clearly
defined an operational interdependence is a necessity (for
example, regional environmental protection, economic
development and transportation), the value of a coordinated
policy defining national interests and goals within the
international context of the entire Arctic region becomes
evident. Moreover, technology is opening the Arctic region
to resource exploitation and new transportation possibilities,
and interests of states in gaining access to the area for
commercial, scientific and even military uses is growing.
and the danger of environmental degradation is more serious.
Many resource, environmental, and security issues cannot be
resolved through unilateral action.
Thus, the increasing international activity in the
Arctic points to handling Arctic issues, by broadening and
strengthening international collaborative machinery and
programs. One thread particularly links the Arctic interests
of the U.S. with those of other Arctic nations and, in fact,
with the broader interests of all nations. This is the need
to preserve the ecological and environmental balance of the
Arctic region. The protection of the Arctic environment
from pollution is of international concern since environmental
degradation here has implications for all nations, including
"territorial Arctic states" and commercial "users" of the
region.
Control of pollution is a problem which can best be
approached through coordinated international and multi-
national action. The conduct of the basic research needed
to raise our understanding of the Arctic environment to
allow more accurate prediction of the effects of man-made
and natural changes within the region and elsewhere in the
world can best be performed through the collaborative
efforts of interested nations. Problems of pollution con-
trol and environmental protection in the Arctic which lend
themselves to a multinational approach include: air pollution,
water pollution (including ocean dumping), preservation of
ecology (for example, safeguarding habitats of unique or
endangered species, and navigation assistance. Other
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important areas, which would benefit from international
cooperation though not to a single approach for all
nations, include disposal of solid waste and community planning.
Besides environmental protection and pollution con-
trol, there are broad areas of common interest among the
nations in such fields as resource exploration and
exploitation, transportation, construction, communications,
science, conservation, and weather observation. Each of
these areas requires new scientific and engineering
knowledge and capability.
There is already some established beginnings in
cooperation. A large number of informal exchanges occur
among scientists, universities and private institutions,
often including their Soviet counterparts. Arctic nations
exchange world weather information under the World
Meteorological Organization. In October of 1969, the
President announced our intention to increase Arctic
environmental research and support oceanic research
generally in the International Decade of Ocean Explora-
tion. On November 7, 1969, the Vice President confirmed
designation of the National Science Foundation as lead
agency for the International Decade of Ocean Exploration
and for the extension of Arctic research with the advice
of the Interagency Arctic Research Coordinating Committee.
Cooperation among the western Arctic nations,
particularly in North America, is more highly developed.
The U.S. and Canada built and maintain the DEW line and
operate weather stations. Japanese, British and Canadians
have worked together on ice flow stations. The National
Science Foundation under its Arctic Research Program
sponsors and encourages International Arctic research in
projects with Canada, Denmark and other countries.
But, while there is ample room for exchange in these
fields, there are also problems which must be recognized
in any U.S. approach to increasing international cooperation.
As national activities and interests in resources grow in
the North, nations with Arctic territory (particularly, the
USSR and Canada) will be concerned increasingly with pre-
serving jurisdictional prerogatives, while other states
will be seeking to gain maximum access to the area (for
example, the U.S. or Japan). These divergent interests
may hamper attempts at cooperation and may lead to extensions
of jurisdictional claims (for example, the recent Canadian
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legislation extending its jurisdiction into what we con-
sider "non-national" territories). Soviet security
sensitivities in the Arctic further strengthen their
restrictive policies and militate against cooperative
arrangements in research and data exchange.
Also, nations with substantial existing capabilities
for scientific research in and access to the Arctic,
particularly the Soviet Union and to a much less extent
Canada, will wish to cooperate largely in areas where they
believe they stand to receive equal gain. This factor,
plus the vast extent of Soviet territory rimming the Arctic
Basin and their correspondingly large "sector claim", are
likely to limit Soviet interest in collaborative efforts.
The success of efforts to promote international
collaboration in the Arctic now will rest upon shaping a
cooperative arrangement with programs and machinery which
will build upon the existing foundation of common national
interests in the Arctic and at the same time allay the
sensitivities and issues of difference.
Four alternative frameworks to foster expanded
international cooperation in the Arctic have been proposed
within the United States Government: (1) a continuation
of the existing system, (2) the so-called Northlands Compact,
(3) a Specialized Arctic Regime, and (4) a Condominium
Type Regime.
Option 1. The Existing System
The existing system deals with international relations
in the Arctic on an ad hoc basis. The strong pressures
being exerted on the arrangements are discussed above.
As technology opens the Arctic, as it has the seabed, to
resource exploitation and new transportation possibilities,
national interests and activities for gaining access to the
area for commercial, scientific and even military uses will
increase. The interaction of these interests and activities
place overbearing strains on the current piecemeal national
approach to the Arctic, hampering our ability to deal with
international Arctic issues. New means are required.
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Option 2. The Northlands Compact for International
Cooperation
This proposal would establish a loose framework for
enhancing cooperation among Arctic and other interested
states, particularly those with Arctic territories and
economic and scientific research interests. The agreement
would provide an umbrella under which participating states
could, as they wished, share experience and data affecting
(1) regional development (transportation, construction,
communications and the like), (2) environmental protection,
(3) conservation of resources and (4) basic scientific
research in fields of mutual interest.
The cooperation would be facilitated by exchanging
information and data, exchanging visits of experts, holding
conferences, joint planning and coordination of research
by interested parties and facilitating expeditions through
logistic support and rescue missions. Nations would support
the compact by permitting and encouraging international
cooperative projects by their nationals, designating
national points of contact for cooperation and coordination,
seeking to reduce impediments to research, consulting on
specific, significant projects and meeting on a regular
basis to review experience and decide upon ways to further
the goals of the compact.
The possible advantages of a compact approach lie in
its potential for acceptance by nations interested in the
Arctic. Loose and flexible, the arrangement could be
adjusted to the needs and desires of participating states,
and it could sidestep the jurisdiction issues which may
retard international cooperative endeavors. In a general
way. it could shape the basic structure, direction and
atmosphere of Arctic cooperation.
Among its disadvantages would be its inability to
bind states to common action. Its success would hinge upon
the interests of the States, which are likely to change,
and the resulting effort could be one-sided. It would
probably not have much immediate and substantial impact
on the larger problems created by increasing international
interest and activity in the Arctic.
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14.
Option 3. The Specialized Arctic Regime
The specialized Arctic regime approach would be a
more comprehensive and binding arrangement than the compact
proposal, though in a sense it would be an extension of the
compact arrangement. While it might comprise the same
interested states, the regime would establish an agreed
code of conduct for states in various Arctic activities
and an agreed mechanism for continued consultation among the
parties. It could be limited to discreet fields of mutual
interest or encompass a broad range of concerns, and be
comprised of a single or a series of agreements with narrow
or broad guidelines. It would approximate although with
significant differences, an Antarctic Treaty for the Arctic.
Like the Antarctic Treaty, which revolves around
international interest in scientific research, it is likely
that a successful regime would focus upon a common theme,
such as scientific research and environmental maintenance
and protection, and a limited number of specific fields of
cooperation where there is a known community of interest.
The regime could encompass matters which lend themselves
to joint objectives and joint or self regulation, stipulating
certain agreed "freedoms" and "obligations", such as (1)
environmental protection with the obligation for national
regulation under agreed guidelines, (2) promotion of
scientific research with the obligation to exchange plans
and data; (3) facilitation of international cooperation;
(4) preservation and conservation of living and non-living
resources; (5) protection of indigenous peoples; (6) mutual
operation aids, assistance and services. The regime might
specifically exclude subjects more suitable for national action
such as defense and jurisdictional considerations. It might
incorporate a limitation of future claims to sovereignty. It
*
While the Arctic and Antarctic have similarities, the
differences are significant, notably: unlike the Antarctic,
the Arctic is an area of known economic potential,
recognized claims of territorial sovereignty and first order
environmental and security interest near major world
population centers. In the Antarctic, neither the U.S.
nor the USSR hold or recognize any national territorial
claims, favoring maximum access to the area.
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might circumvent sovereignty claims by applying different
codes of conduct to land and water areas.
The possible advantages of the specialized regime
approach are that it would establish international agreed
codes of conduct and consultative machinery which could shape
the international community's approach to the Arctic for
years to come. The specialized regime would supplement
the earlier and related U.S. initiatives of the seabed
regime for mineral resources, which are designed to foster
order and cooperation in other parts of the ocean. It could
provide an inexpensive, unobtrusive mechanism through which
the interested nations of the international community
could deal with Arctic issues and the U.S. could seek to
further appropriate priorities. A flexible arrangement,
it would permit the determination of the subject areas of
the regime by international negotiation. A binding
instrument, it could fashion Arctic cooperation before
mounting national interests in Arctic resources harden
and jurisdictional claims proliferate.
Disadvantages of the specialized regime approach, as
we have recently observed in our current discussions with
Canada and the USSR about an Arctic regime for pollution and
navigation, will revolve around national jurisdictional and
defense considerations. As technology enables all nations
to increase Arctic activities, these concerns are likely
to heighten. Thus to negotiate a regime today would be
more difficult than to establish a compact, and the
consequences of its failure would be greater, in that failure
in establishing a specialized regime could reduce chances
for formal cooperative mechanisms in specific areas, which
might have been subsumed therein. Also, depending upon the
substance of the regime, a special regime for the Arctic
runs the risk of derogating from existing Law of the Sea
Conventions and setting a precedent for other nations to
apply special circumstances and considerations to other
areas of the world ocean.
Option 4. The Condominium Type Regime
This type of regime would be an extension and further
formalization of the Specialized Arctic Regime. It would
go beyond consultative machinery and provide for some form
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16.
of governing Council with stipulated membership and authority
to govern specific aspects of Arctic activity. These
aspects might well include those cited in the discussion
of the Specialized Arctic Regime. The regime's operation
might resemble in some respects that proposed in the U.S.
draft for a United Nations Convention on the International
Seabed Area.
The advantages of the condominium regime are that it would
extend and solidify the objectives and machinery of the
specialized regime and bind nations to a cooperative mechanism.
The disadvantages are that the structure probably
is not needed at this time to accomplish U.S. objectives,
and, in view of Canadian and Soviet and perhaps other
sensitivities about jurisdictional aspects of the Arctic,
may not be acceptable to some major Arctic powers. Moreover,
evidence is not clear that the vital interests of other
Arctic nations will reinforce our own. Under these
uncertainties a formal regulatory arrangement may not now be
in the U.S. interest.
While consultations will be needed to determine the
attitudes of other countries toward an international Arctic
framework, it is likely that options 2 and 3 would be accepted
by most nations. The smaller Arctic and other involved countries
would probably be attracted to options 3 and 2 in that order
because they would foster broad international cooperation while
maintaining the parity of the smaller Arctic nations. The USSR
and Canada would probably only depart reluctantly from the
status quo, the former because of its concern for strategic
and resource interests, limiting access to the area and its
dislike for new international arrangements, and the latter
because of its sensitivity over jurisdictional and resource
exploitation considerations. But options 2 and 3 in that order
might be attractive to Canada, because they offer a means to
regularize international activities in the Arctic while providing
valuable cooperation and information exchange. The Soviets
are not likely to consider initially that the concrete benefits
of international cooperation will override their other Arctic
interests. Their reaction today to an international Arctic
framework proposal is expected to be negative. Nevertheless,
we believe the overall benefits of the proposal warrant
our exploring their attitudes and seeking their support for it.
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17.
Recommended Option: The Committee believes that
Option 2, the Northlands Compact for International Cooperation
and Option 3, the Specialized Arctic Regime both provide
general contexts within which U.S. needs and objectives
in the Arctic region might reasonably be attained. However,
the selection of one of these, or the melding of desirable
elements from each, as a recommended framework for
international cooperation in the Arctic will require a
detailed consideration of many factors which it has not
been possible to treat thoroughly within this Review. These
factors include the acceptability and probable reaction of
other countries with Arctic territory and interests; the
specific areas in which international cooperation is most
useful; the identification of the resources within the U.S.
to support international cooperation in these areas; and
the interrelation between the framework for general
international cooperation in the Arctic and such efforts as
our desire to formulate within the "Law of the Sea" context
international agreement on maritime environmental and
navigation standards and regulations in the Arctic.
In view of the need to give more attention to the
development of a framework for international cooperation in
the Arctic, the Committee recommends the adoption in principle
of the establishment of a framework for international
cooperation in the Arctic and that the Arctic Policy Group
as the mechanism for effecting overall Federal coordination
and policy guidance given immediate attention to the develop-
ment of a. single recommended framework for international
cooperation in the Arctic.
VII. Interagency Coordinating Mechanism
As indicated earlier, there does not now exist any agency,
or interagency mechanism able to give guidance consonant with
overall national policy interests and objectives to agencies
having the responsibility for implementing Arctic programs.
Federal interagency mechanisms which plan and coordinate
activities in several relatively limited and essentially
domestically oriented areas do, however, exist. Of particular
interest are three interagency bodies focusing on the Arctic:
The Federal Field Committee for Development and Planning
in Alaska; the "Task Force on Alaskan Oil Development"; and
the Interagency Arctic Research Coordinating Committee.
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18.
The Federal Field Committee was established to serve
as the principal instrumentality for developing coordinate
plans for Federal programs which contribute to economic
and resource development in Alaska and for recommending
appropriate action by the Federal Government to carry out
such plans. The Committee has produced a series of studies,
long-range plans, program developments and policy recommenda-
tions concerning the actions the government should take to
improve Alaskan economic and resource development. The
Chairman of the Field Committee is. appointed by the President.
The members of the Field Committee are senior Federal officials
in Alaska representing the Departments of Defense, Interior,
Agriculture, Commerce, Labor, HEW, Transportation, Housing
and Urban Development, Small Business Administration and the
Federal Power Commission.
The Federal Task Force on Alaskan Oil Development
was established in May 1969 by the President under the
Department of the Interior. Membership includes, DOD, DOT,
Commerce, HEW, HUD, OST, CEQ, NSF and OMB. This Task
Force conducted a number of biological and geological
investigations during the summer of 1969, which resulted
in the development of environmental stipulations to condition
the permit of the Trans Alaska Pipeline.
The focus of the Task Force has recently broadened
to include: (1) the initiation of studies on the effective-
ness of land use regulations and procedures for Federal
lands in the Arctic; (2) an evaluation of the management
of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge; and (3) the estab-
lishment of a Master Land Use Plan to determine the best
use and protection of all Federal lands north of the
Procupine-Yukon- Kuskowim line in Alaska.
The Interagency Arctic Research Coordinating Committee
(IARCC) was established in 1967. It is chaired by the
National Science Foundation. Membership on this Committee
includes the Departments of Agriculture, Defense, State,
Commerce, Health, Education and Welfare, Interior, and
Transportation, the Atomic Energy Commission and the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration. The Office of Manage-
ment and Budget and the National Academy of Sciences are
observers. The IARCC is limited in its coordinative
abilities because its expertise is confined to general
scientific and logistic matters.
This Committee collects and collates agency research
budgets, coordinates scientific research programs and
coordinates Arctic research with Antarctic research.
Classified military research and research in the economic
sciences are beyond the IARCC's scope of interest. The
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19.
IARCC has been actively concerned with international as
well as domestic scientific research activities relating
to the Arctic.
These three interagency groups have been and continue
to be active and effective in their areas of interest.
However, with the exception of the IARCC, these bodies have
not been directly concerned with planning and coordination
for international programs or for the international and
national security components and implications of largely
domestic programs.
The principle limitations of each of these committees
and similar bodies are lack of breadth and/or lack of
agency representation at a "policy level. Both the Federal
Field Committee and the Federal Task Force on Alaskan Oil
Development focus on matters relating in essence to Alaskan
development. The IARCC, which is increasingly involved in
international activities, does not have direct interests
beyond research.
With active interests of the U.S. growing to encompass
the Arctic as a region, and with the increasing interrelation
between domestic, international and national security aspects
of Arctic plans, programs and activities, some mechanism
focusing on regional policy development, and serving to
evaluate and relate international aspects of domestic pro-
grams with regional policy aims is desirable. It should
be concerned with investigating the possibilities for
international cooperation in the Arctic and the available
alternatives in our approach to Arctic regional problems
and opportunities generally.
The "policy coordinating mechanism" should also
specifically address itself to gathering budgetary and
other data necessary to the formulation of a coherent
integrated regional Arctic policy. This mechanism should
be the primary policy level entity for the expression of
U.S. international and national security interests in the
Arctic. In this capacity it should advise other constituted
bodies whose responsibilities might from time to time
require a consideration of Arctic interests. It will not,
however, replace presently constituted and "chartered"
bodies with Arctic responsibilities. Also, the "mechanism
for policy guidance" is not intended to infringe upon defined
agency responsibilities or adequate formal or informal
interagency coordination where these exist with regard to
domestic Arctic policy and programs; specifically, all
matters of concern to the Interagency Task Force on Law
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20.
of the Sea arising in an Arctic context shall continue to
be the responsibility of that body.
The "mechanics for policy guidance" might take any of
several forms. Options available to effect overall Federal
coordination and pòlicy guidance include:
Option 1. Designating an Executive non-operating
agency which does not operate Arctic
programs like the Office of Science and
Technology, the National Security Council,
or the Department of State as a central
policy coordinating agency.
Option 2. An independent, Presidentially named
board or coordinating body consisting of
designated individuals.
Option 3. Designation of an appropriate Executive
operating agency; e.g., Interior, DOD,
Transportation or Commerce as a "lead
agency".
Option 4. An NSC Under Secretaries Committee includ-
ing agencies with Arctic interests.
Option 5. An independent, interagency committee
or "Arctic Policy group" consisting of
agencies with the most significant Arctic
interests.
Option 1.
The designation of a non-operating Executive agency
has the advantage of having no vested interests in its own
programs or conflicts in mission with operating agencies.
The primary disadvantages. are a lack of authority to
define programs or develop budgetary support.
Option 2.
The designation of an independent Presidentially
named board or coordinating body has the advantage of
avoiding agency parochialism, and an ability to exercise
judgments out of the context of an agency mission and
expressing Executive interest at the highest level.
Its disadvantages are essentially the same as apply
to Option 1, that is lack of authority to define programs
or develop budgetary support.
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21.
In addition, such a body could only advise and not
direct Federal agencies or programs.
Option 3.
The designation of an operating Executive agency
has the advantage of placing central coordinating authority
with an agency which has responsibility and authority for
program development and budgetary allocations and an existing
support staff familiar with Arctic programs.
The principal disadvantages are a lack of authority
in developing and guiding programs which are the normal
parochialism. responsibility of other agencies and the possibility of
Option 4.
The designation of an Under Secretaries Committee
has the advantage of allowing for collective leadership
in developing programs and policy guidance giving con-
sideration to all interests, operating and non-operating.
Also because of the level of agency representation,
assembled. information on programs and budgets could be effectively
The principle disadvantage is that in the absence of
a specific authority, from the President or Congress, the
Committee cannot specifically control or plan the programs
of its constituent agencies. This problem may be accentuated
because of the fact that within agencies Arctic expertise
frequently is directly associated with operating programs
which might overly color the positions of agencies as
represented within the Committee. Additionally, the focus
of the Under Secretaries Committee on National Security
and Foreign Policy affairs might impede the development of
broader Arctic programs in that forum.
Option 5.
The designation of an independent interagency committee
or Arctic Policy Group has the advantages of option 4 and also
such a group could more easily develop whatever new guidelines
that may be necessary to carry out the actions arising from
this study and its recommendations; since it would not be
limited to the terms of reference and specific interests of
the Under Secretaries Committee. For example actions relating
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22.
to the implementation of the recommendations calling for the
development of a comprehensive transportation system and
a coordinated program of scientific research would fall
largely outside of the specific general boundary of interests
of the Under Secretaries Committee. The involvement of the
Under Secretaries Committee in such activities would be
an anomaly. The establishment of such a group also could
assist in the coordination of related activities in the
Arctic and Antarctic, e.g., certain aspects of scientific
research, by creating a body analogous to the Antarctic
Policy Group.
Its principal disadvantages include those listed for
option 4 and in addition, its independent status could leave
its relation to established interagency bodies unclear,
particularly its relation to the Under Secretaries Committee,
and the NSC system with regard to National Security and
international affairs.
Recommended Option:
The Committee believes that Option 5, the establishment
of an independent, interagency committee designated the
Arctic Policy group best meets U.S. needs and interests at
this time. The Arctic Policy Group should consist of the
Departments of State (Chairman), Defense, Interior, Commerce,
Transportation and the National Science Foundation. The
group should consult with other agencies as appropriate
in carrying out its responsibilities, and should utilize
fully the facilities and advice of existing interagency
groups in carrying out its responsibilities. The Arctic
Policy Group should also insure that its decisions relating
to matters affecting the National Security or significantly
affecting our international posture are coordinated with the
Under Secretaries Committee. The Policy Group should also
refer to the Under Secretaries Committee questions in these
areas which it is unable to resolve. The Arctic Policy Group
will not oversee or coordinate primarily domestic or
Alaskan development or programs as such.
A principal recommendation of the Committee is the creation
of a framework providing for the establishment of international
agreement in several specific areas of Arctic activity and interests.
Agreements under this framework might in many instances include
monitoring and regulating mechanisms. To give guidance and
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23.
continuity to the development and implementation of such
agreements and to coordinate USA activities under its
aegis, a defined mechanism is needed. Placing the responsibility
for giving guidance to US activities in the Arctic with an
"Arctic Policy Group." is reasonable since its membership
includes those agencies primarily responsible for their
developments. The independent status of the Arctic Policy
Group will allow broad flexibility in developing and
coordinating policy actions. By defining a relational link
with the Under Secretaries Committee, adequate coordination
of National Security and foreign policy interests - can be
insured.
VIII. Budgetary Implications
It has not been possible to develop the budgetary
implications of a U.S. policy on the Arctic, particularly those
inherent in achieving the U.S. Interests and Objectives we
have listed. Since there has heretofore been no coordinated
policy on the Arctic, many agencies have had no incentive or
requirement to specifically identify Árctic budgetary data or
programs and program components. In many agencies such
data can be acquired only by separately identifying and
extracting Arctic components of functional or broader
geographic programs.
Additionally, the lack of a consistently applied
definition of the Arctic makes the extraction of program
data difficult. An accurate breakdown of Arctic program
costs is available only in the area of scientific research
at the present time. This breakdown is annexed in the Appendix
Table II. The President's FY 71 budget request emphasizes
the expansion of Arctic research; the message transmitting
the annual report, Marine Science Affairs, to the Congress
in particular takes note of this need. The approximate total
figures for gross Federal expenditures including research
as well as all other expenditures (NSF) in and on the Arctic
are: FY 70 - $91,024,936.; FY 71 - $151,682,730.
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24.
IX. Conclusions
The Committee, having reviewed the history and
status of U.S. Arctic Policy has concluded that there
has never been, nor does there now exist a coordinated
U.S. policy on the Arctic. Additionally, no single
agency or interagency mechanism or body has been charged
with the task of focusing a national effort, particularly
where the international and national security implications
of domestic policy and programs must be considered.
To continue as at present would probably not be
detrimental to U.S. interests in the short run. In some
areas, for example, e.g., scientific research and defense,
the U.S. currently has significant programs and interests
which fall under defined agency responsibilities. In these
areas, adequate formal or informal interagency coordination
already exists. However, the value of a coordinated policy
defining national interests and goals within the international
context of the entire Arctic region becomes evident as our
Arctic interests and activities expand into areas where
responsibilities are less clearly defined and operational
interdependence is a necessity, e.g., regional environmental
protection, economic development and transportation.
STATEMENT OF POLICY
The Arctic region a polar ice-covered ocean bounded
by adjacent seas and territories of several nations - -
including the United States, Canada, and the Soviet Union --
presents the United States with multifold, often-disparate
opportunities and challenges.
The time has come when U.S. Arctic interests -- which
range from economic development consistent with U.S. polciy
regarding preservation of environmental quality and
cooperative, international research to issues of strategic
importance to the Nation's security - - may no longer be
pursued separately but must, instead, be addressed within
the framework of a single, coherent national policy. To this
end, the Ad Hoc Committee on U.S. Arctic Policy has developed
the following statement of U.S. Arctic Policy.
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25.
It is declared to be the policy of the United States
to insure that Arctic development is orderly and consistent
with U.S. policy on conservation and protection of the
environment; to maintain a posture sufficient to protect our
national security interests and preserve the principle of
freedom of the seas and superjacent airspace; to develop and
implement programs and activities within a framework of
international cooperation wherever appropriate and feasible.
In order to effectively implement U.S. policy in
the Arctic, our activities relating to the region must be
organized and coordinated to contribute to the following
objectives:
U.S. Objectives
U.S. objectives in the Arctic may be defined as the
achievement, with a minimum adverse effect on the environment,
of:
1. Mutually beneficial cooperation with Arctic
and other countries in exploration,
scientific research, resource development
and exchange of. scientific and technical
data,
The U.S. should promote international coopera-
tion in exploration, research, safety, health
and welfare and other activities which will be
beneficial to all participating countries. We
should establish criteria for identifying infor-
mation suitable for exchange. The development
of a general framework within which multinational
cooperation can take place is specifically
recommended. Such a framework might focus over
a broad spectrum of activities including, but
not limited to scientific and technical research
and regional economic development assistance.
It would not be pre-emptive, nor prohibit the
establishment of specialized agreements in par-
ticular areas e.g., an agreement between nations
on anti-pollution and environmental standards for
Arctic waters and on standards and. regulations
for navigation assistance.
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26
2.
An improved capability to inhabit and operate
in the Arctic based on a fuller understanding
of the marine, terrestrial and atmospheric
components of the Arctic environment.
The U.S. should facilitate and improve the
education and training of technical and pro-
fessional personnel for Arctic work and develop
a comprehensive understanding of the technical,
economic and social problems presented by the
Arctic environment. We should encourage, support
and conduct broad fundamental research programs
to develop a fuller understanding of the Arctic
environment and ecology.
3.
The economic development of Alaska including
its continental shelf
The U.S. should, through governmental and
private sector resources, encourage the conduct
of the research and engineering necessary for
the development of Alaska, giving attention to
both environmental quality and economic goals.
4. Adequate freedom of action to conduct those
military and intelligence operations essential
to the security of the U.S. and the capability
to carry out aerospace, surface and under-
surface military operations in the Arctic.
This would encompass, but not be limited to:
a. Operational freedom and exercises, as
deemed appropriaté and with due regard
for economic, social and political
objectives as well as the preservation
of the ecology and environment in the
Arctic region on U.S. territory and in
areas of the region beyond the limit
of national jurisdiction recognized by
the U.S.;
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27.
b. Facilities, equipment and logistic
support systems required to implement
the air defense of the North American
Continent and the maintenance of an
assured retaliatory capability;
C. Protection of U.S. military facilities
against surveillance, espionage, and
compromise;
d. Scientific and engineering research in
support of those military and intelli-
gence activities essential to the
security of the U.S.
5. The settlement of jurisdictional questions and
disputes among nations through peaceful
international means.
The U.S. should continue to encourage the
resolution of international problems by agreement among
nations reached through existing international mechanisms
and means, or through the development, if necessary,
of new approaches to the solution of such problems by
agreement among nations.
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THE ARCTIC REGION
CHINA
DAMA
Shange
MONGOLIA
Servipainsk
THE
KUREAT
Herbin
litulik
Srediovsk
Versonal
/
S
S.
GRIEN
R.
Moscom
Noril'sk
TAUTA
Helsinki
AVE AND
KUNIL
ISLANUS
THISI
ZEMLTA
BARENTS
Riansk
NOVAYA
SWEDEN
Stockwing
F.R.G.
SEA
R
W.A
Oslo
FRANCE
UNITED
London
ARCTIC
Anadyr
OCEAN
ICELAND
NORTH
Barrow
SONY7SI
DEALFORT
SEA
$
IALASK
Resolute
Thele BAFFIN GREENLAND
Reykjavik
Valuers
Faucanks
Godthab
PACIFIC
C
A
N
D
A
NEW
4
Ottawa
BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION IS
UNITED STATES
NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE
Washington
Polar Azimuthal Equidistant Projection
Scale is true along the mendisn
Southern boundary of continuous permafrost
0
500
1000
1500
Routes of Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Route
100
78635 7-70
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North Polar Region
180
JAPAN
roasi
KURIL ISLANDS
ALEUTIAN ISCANDS
NORTH
Petropavlovsk-
8EA OF
Kamchatskiy
Sakhalin
BERING
JAPAN
РАСИҒІС
SĘA
Kamchatka
Peninsula
SEA OF
OCEAN
OKHOTSK
Khabarovsk
Magadan
Nome
Anadyr'
Valdez
Juneau,
ALASKA
Arctic Circle
CHINA
Fairbanks
(USA)
SCHUKCHI
SEA
Pevek
Barrow
SIBERSTAN
Yakutsk
Inuvik
BEAUFORT
MOSI-
Lena
Tiksi
Lena
Yellowknife
NEW
Mirnyy
SIBERIAN
ISLANDS
LAPTEV
SEA
Victoria
Island
ARCTICOCEAN
120E
U.S. S. R.
CANADA
QUEEN
Taymyr
ELIZABETH
Peninsula
Churchill
ISLANDS
SEVERNAYA
Resolute
ZEMLYA
did
NORTH
90W
90E
POLE
Noril'sk,
XasinaX
HUDSON
Ellesmere Island
Igarka
BAY
Thule
KARA &
Baffin Island
FRANZ
SEA
JOSEPH
BAFFIN
LAND
BAY60W-
NOVAYA
60E
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Salekhard
80
GREENLAND
SVALBARD
BARENTS
Ob
(Denmark)
30W
there
SEA
GREENLAND
Godthaab,
Sverdlovsk
SEA
Goose Bay
Murmansk
LABRADOR
Tromso
Arkhangel'sk
SEA
70
Kiruna
Newfoundland
NORWEGIAN
Island
Volga
Reykjavik
SEA
FINLAND
ICELAND
Helsinki
Leningrad
Moscow
NORWAY
NORTH ATLANTIC OCEAN
Stockholm
Oslo
60-
SWEDEN
Volgograd
NORTH
SEA
DENMARK Copenhagen
Scale 1:45,700,000
0
250
500
750
1000
UNITED
EAST
POLAND
Nautical Miles
IRELAND
KINGDOM
GERMANY
0
250
500
750
1000
NETH.
London
FED.
Statute Miles
REP.
BELG.
0
250 500 750 1000
50
OF
CZECH.
GERMANY
Kilometers
HUNGARY
ROMANIA
TURKEY
AUST.
FRANCE
BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION IS
Polar Azimuthal Equidistant Projection
0
sw.
IT.
YUGO.
NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE
78711 2-71
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Appendix
REVIEW OF U.S. ARCTIC POLICY
AND
ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENT FOR IMPLEMENTATION
BACKGROUND PAPER
Purpose
Increasing awareness in the United States and other
countries bordering the Arctic of the great economic
potential and strategic importance of the region makes
reappraisal of U.S. policy for the Arctic necessary at this
time. The Arctic region, especially the land area, has been
reconnoitered sufficiently to identify its importance,
but further development without causing irreparable dis-
ruption of its fragile ecological fabric depends on a
concerted and strong U.S. policy decision to devote
sufficient priority attention and resources to U.S. Arctic
programs.
Definition of Arctic Region
The term "Arctic" has different real meanings in
different contexts. Generally it is used to refer to the
broad cold region which surrounds the North Pole. For the
purposes of specific studies and problems, however, it has
been defined by several more definitive criteria, the most
common being as follows:
a. High latitude -- usually that area within
the Arctic Circle (660 33' N)
b. Polar Basin -- the area of the Arctic Ocean,
sometimes also including the drainage basins
of rivers flowing into it.
C. Continuous permafrost -- the high latitude
areas where the ground is perennially frozen,
d. Temperature - - areas where the average
temperature of the warmest month is below
50° F and the coldest month is below 32° F.
e, Tree line -- the poleward limit of tree growth.
For the purposes of this paper the term is most often
used in its general sense. Where a specific boundary is
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2.
required the Arctic Region is defined as: the land and water
areas surrounding the North Pole including the Arctic Ocean
and adjacent waters, extending on the land to the southern
limit of continuous permafrost.
Description of Arctic Region
The Arctic region, some 8.3 million square miles,
centers on the Arctic Ocean and includes almost 3 million
square miles of continuous permafrost land. The Arctic
Ocean itself covers 5.4 million square miles, and area
50% larger than the U.S., and connects the Atlantic and
Pacific Oceans. A perennial, floating icepack extends
outward from the North Pole to distances of 500 to 1200
miles. The mean monthly temperatures for this region,
ranging from minus 40° F. to plus 50° F., make it a most
hostile environment for human activity.
The Arctic Environment
The Arctic regions exercise a major influence on
weather and climate of the Northern Hemisphere and indeed
of the whole planet. Small changes in the ice cover and
snow cover significantly affect the atmospheric heat
balance. Perturbations in the heat balance can alter
weather and climate over large regions, can influence the
extent of glaciation and produce changes in mean sea level.
These influences make it imperative that prior to the
initiation of large-scale operations sufficient research
and evaluation be carried out to determine the effect on
global conditions. For example, the diversion of rivers
currently flowing into the Arctic could bring about profound
changes. At present relatively fresh waters lie near the
surface. French water freezes more rapidly than saline
water to form sea ice, the extent of which plays an important
role in determining the thermal balance within the atmosphere.
The Arctic is now one of the world's least polluted
areas. By proper planning in the development of this area,
we can prevent many of the environmental problems which
now plague most of the populated sectors of the world. The
following features of pollution control should be considered:
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3.
a.
Control of Air Pollution.
Again because of the sensitivity of world-wide
climate, perturbations in conditions
existing at the Arctic could have not only
local and regional but also world-wide effects.
b.
Disposal of Solid Wastes.
This presents a special problem due to the
difficulties in the Arctic of excavating
sanitary landfills. Special care should be
taken in handling of solid waste.
C.
Water Pollution Including Ocean Dumping.
Particular care must be taken in monitoring
the activities of the offshore oil industries
and the related sea transports. Research is
urgently needed on the property of oil in
the Arctic Ocean environment. The specific
gravity of the oil is intermediate between
that of the water and ice and this fact
could complicate to a very large extent any
cleanup operations.
d.
Proper Land Use Planning.
The Arctic regions present a unique opportunity
to plan ahead so as to make optimum uses of the
varied resources.
e.
Planning of Communities, Defense and Industry
Cantonments.
Past history reveals that in frontier areas
these usually have grown in a helter-skelter
manner. In the Arctic these should be planned
and take into account the following factors:
1. functional purpose and utility
2, recreational activities
3. disposal of sewage and solid waste
and the provision of other sanitary
measures
4, esthetic values, both natural and man-
made
5. prevention of air and noise pollution
6.
provision of adequate transportation/
communications facilities without
endangering environmental values
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This cumenkhas been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
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4.
f.
Extraction of Minerals and Other Natural Resources
In many wilderness areas these activities have
proceeded without regard to the esthetic or
wilderness of the lands affected. Adequate con-
trols must be instituted so that development of
one sort does not destroy resources of another
sort.
bis
Arctic Ecology Should be Preserved.
Research and evaluation is urgently needed to
define further this ecology. Areas of natural
habitat of unique species must be identified
and safeguarded. Particular attention should
be devoted to those animals, fish and birds that
could on a short time scale become endangered
species.
The prevention of many of these environmental problems
is particularly critical in the Arctic because of its unique
characteristics. These include the effect of the icepack
and other physical features on the world's weather, and the
nature of permafrost, as it relates to the ability to
excavate, construct and drain. In the Arctic, land use
planning and community development must be accomplished in
a context of environmental preservation. Without careful
planning the Arctic ecological balance cannot be preserved.
Importance of Arctic
The Arctic is the "last frontier" in the northern
hemisphere in terms of the world's limited natural resources
and space for an expanding world population. In spite of
the extremely adverse conditions, modern technology--clothing,
shelter, transportation systems, and operational techniques--
makes possible year-round human occupancy and work in this
region.
The Arctic is strategically important because if
affords the shortest distance between the continents of
Eurasia and North America. The Arctic encompasses the most
direct attack routes from the USSR to the U.S. The region
also contains the avenues of attack and operation required
to maintain the effectiveness of the U.S. retaliatory
capability and, thereby, the integrity of deterrence against
attack on the U.S. The Arctic Region, as defined herein,
consists largely of areas that the U.S. considers to be
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5.
international, subject to the high seas regime affording
freedom of transition, over and under the high seas,
including areas of superincumbent ice mass. Although the
dimensions of the strategic threat to the U.S. may change
somewhat as that threat becomes more omnidirectional, the
Arctic Region will continue to be of primary strategic
concern because of its position contiguous to and directly
between the U.S. and the USSR. The military significance
of the Region may increase as the technologies of operations
(military and civilian) are more fully developed and as
the economic potential of the Arctic littorals is realized.
The U.S. Arctic Region is important to the economy
of our Nation because of its unexploited natural resources
and favorable trade-route location. Oil and gas, in
Alaska partially relieve our concern over supply of these energy
reserves from foreign sources in times of emergency.
Hardly of less importance is the existence of an alternate
supply of petroleum which could ease the essentially total
dependence of our major allies on Mideast and Africal oil.
The supply of strategic and precious metals in
the Arctic are not immediately important, but will be in the
long term as the world's population expands and other sources
are depleted. Natural resources of the Arctic can be useful
to restore a healthy balance of foreign trade and possibly
enhance our gold reserves. Arctic Alaska is geographically
well-suited to trade with Asia and Europe via the northern
and northwestern sea routes should commercial transiting
of these routes become feasible, Its sparse, underprivileged
population needs economic help. The development of Arctic
resources can assist in relieving the immediate social and
economic problems of the indigenous Alaskan population by
providing an opportunity for jobs and community development.
Science in the Arctic is important to the Nation
because the keys to an understanding of the physical,
chemical and biological cycles are provided through studies
on such subjects as global weather patterns and ocean
circulation, marine and terrestrial ecosystems, permafrost
and sea-ice properties, upper atmospheric phenomena, and
archaeological, social and anthropolitical investigations
of native populations.
Internationally, the Arctic Ocean makes us neighbors
to four other nations USSR, Norway, Denmark and Canada,
Although Finland, Sweden and Iceland do not abut the Arctic
Ocean, they too share our concern for exploration, development,
settlement and exploitation of the Arctic region. The United
Kingdom and France, too, have a long tradition of exploration
and research in and on the Arctic. Japan, a natural resource-
starved nation, has shown increased interest in Arctic
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6.
resources as manifested by investment and commerce,
primarily with Alaska and Canada in oil and timber resources.
Through international cooperation in science the knowledge
essential to effect optimum development of the Arctic's
resources balanced against the need for environmental
preservation can be most effectively accumulated.
Summary of Activities of Arctic Ocean Nations
Table I compares interests of the five Arctic Ocean
nations in terms of territory, continental shelves, popu-
lation, natural resources, relative investments in
transportation facilities, and commercial and scientific
activities.
USSR
A rigid application of the permafrost definition
of the Arctic Region would exclude the Kola Peninsula of
the USSR, the highly developed logistical center for
Soviet military, scientific, and economic activities in
the Arctic Basin. To present a more comprehensive and
realistic picture of Soviet activities and operational
capabilities in the Arctic Region this discussion of the
Soviet Arctic includes the area to the southern limit of
permafrost or the Arctic Circle, whichever lies further
south.
The USSR is developing and using the Arctic Region
more extensively than any other country. The Arctic part
of the USSR, which constitutes one-third of its territory,
is being systematically interwoven into the Soviet political,
social, economic and military fabric. Approximately two
million citizens live in the Soviet Arctic, and are engaged
in mining, forestry, fishing, and limited agriculture. The
region furnishes virtually all of the natural industrial
diamonds used in the national economy, as well as 95% of
the platinum-group metals, nearly 50% of the gold (219 million
in 1969), 40% of the tin, 85% of the nickel, 15% of the
tungsten and 15% of the copper. There has been extensive
military and economic development on the Kola Peninsula in
the last-15-20 years, SO that today this region is a
strategic bastion in the north and makes a sizable contri-
bution to the country's economy. A key factor in the
development and operation of the Arctic economy is the
coordinated water transportation system of ocean-going
vessels on the Northern Sea Route (NSR) and river fleets
on the northward flowing rivers. The NSR stretches some
3,400 nautical miles from Murmansk (on the Kola Peninsula)
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7.
to the Bering Sea and links twenty or more ports (10 of
which are deep water) on the Arctic coast with the outside
world during a three- to four-month summer navigation
season. Operation of the NSR requires a huge investment
in ancillary services including a fleet of fiftenn large
ice-breakers to convoy vessels through the ice-choked
waters. In 1967 the Soviets "offered" use of the NSF to
foreign commercial vessels as a short route from Northern
Europe to Japan and eastern Asia, but no foreign ship-
owners accepted the offer. The offer was withdrawn in 1968.
A number of naval units are annually transferred over the
NSR to the Pacific Ocean.
Soviet military use of the Arctic is extensive and
includes elements of ground, naval, air, and missile test
units.
On the Kola Peninsula the Soviets maintain extensive
military facilities including the Northern Fleet surface
and air units, Army elements of the Leningrad Military
District, Air Defense units including fighters surface-to-
air missiles and radar, naval missile test ranges and
nuclear weapons storage facilities.
The Plesetsk Missile Test Center is just south of
the Arctic Circle near the White Sea.
The entire Arctic littoral is dotted with operational
airfields used by heavy and medium bombers of Long Range
Aviation (LRA) during their Arctic exercises. In addition,
airfields on the Arctic Islands (Novaya Zemlya, Franz
Josef Land, Severnaya Zemlya and Wrangel) are also used
by LRA bombers. Long Range Aviation units routinely fly
missions throughout the Arctic as do some units of Soviet
Air Defense Command (PVO), while Arctic Military Transport
units are permanently based at Vorkuta and Tiksi.
Anadyr, on the Chukhotsk Peninsula, ranks second to
the Kola Peninsula in military use. It supports air defense
units and reconnaissance operations by LRA Badgers against
our Alaskan ADIZ. A nucler storage site and some Army
units of the Far East Military District are also based there.
Overall, the Soviet military has obtained experience
in Arctic operations for all its major force components.
The Soviet Union has long claimed broad jurisdiction
over the part of the Arctic basin north of the USSR. A
1926 Soviet decree claimed all land an immovable ice
formations within the triangular area bounded by the Arctic
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
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8.
coast on the south and the meredians 320 04' 34" E and
168° 49' 30" W, excluding Svalbard in the west and Little
Diomede Island in the east. Later, Soviet jurists
broadened this claim to include open polar seas and drift
ice. The Soviet government continues to delimit the sector
on all current maps with a symbol defined as "Polar Domain
(Vladeniya) of the USSR", but it has not excluded foreign
vessels, aircraft or drift ice stations from this broad
sector. In marginal seas and adjacent straits, however,
Soviet claims of exclusive jurisdiction are most rigorously
enforced. These claims have not been recognized by other
nations.
Transit of the Norther Sea Route is not feasible
without Soviet technical assistance. When U.S. icebreakers
attempted in the summers of 1963-67 to test freedom of
these areas, the Soviets harassed the vessels in the open
sea and later effectively blocked their passage through
the key straits by a series of legal technicalities,
threats and diplomatic notes. Although recent diplomatic
talks still give the impression of Soviet determination
to keep the northern straits closed to international traffic,
Soviet attitudes toward the marginal seas may be changing.
A 1969 book by a Soviet legal expert omits listing the
marginal seas (except the White Sea) in the Arctic as
internal waters for historic reasons.
Although the Soviets have not led in the development
and exploitation of offshore mineral resources in the Arctic,
the shelf adjacent to the USSR's Arctic coast is long
(4,500 nautical miles), broad (up to 500 nautical miles)
and reportedly rich in hydrocarbons. They must soon begin
to look to development of this area if they are to maintain
hydrocarbon self-sufficiency in this century. The Soviets
probably recognize, however, that it may take their tech-
nology as long as 20 to 30 years to get large-scale
production of oil and gas from Arctic offshore areas.
Soviet future "projects" for the "transformation of
nature" appear to have some potentially adverse implications
for the Arctic Basin. The Soviets continue to discuss two
grandiose projects which would dam and divert waters of
several large northward flowing rivers to augment scarce
water resources in the southern USSR. The implementation
of such projects could have drastic effects on the environ-
ment of the Arctic and possibly the entire earth. Scientists
believe that the water from these Siberian rivers keeps the
top layer of the Arctic Ocean comparatively fresh so that
it freezes more easily. Any significant reduction in the
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9.
supply of fresh water would precipitate large-scale
melting of the icepack and result in a disastrous shift
in climatic zones throughout the Northern Hemisphere.
The Soviets have recently decided to initiate the first
stage of a diversion of the upper reaches of the Pechora
River into the southward flowing Kama and Volga Rivers.
While this may not be enough to seriously disturb the
ecological balance in the Arctic, it may be a forerunner
to other such projects and consequently the ramifications
of such projects must be considered.
Soviet Arctic scientific research in the last half
century has sought to improve environmental knowledge and
the prediction of associated dynamic phenomena. This has
provided the base for the development of the Northern Sea
Route and the economic resources of the region. More than
100 polar research stations are strung along the coast and
on some of the islands. The Soviets have maintained year-
round research camps on two drifting ice floes--the latest
established in October 1968 on an ice island 300 miles off
Point Barrow, Alaska. Extensive meteorological data
collections are made by aircraft, rockets and telemetering
drifting buoys as well as by their research camps.
Oceanographic observations are made by the Hydrographical
Patrol, naval submarines, special cruises of icebreakers,
large freight ships and aircraft which land on the icepack.
Aircraft are regularly used to reconnoiter ice conditions
for navigational forecasts.
As leaders in Arctic research the Soviets hold a
vast store of data. Although they publish extensively on
many topics, they often exclude the basic data from which
their findings are derived. In the absence of an inter-
national program or arrangements for data exchange, much
of the vast store of primary data is not available to us.
Moreover, in the absence of a U.S. scientific effort of
commensurate size and quality to theirs, and for other
reasons, the Soviets to date have been generally unreceptive
to U.S. moves to begin scientific cooperation in the Arctic.
They have discouraged efforts to collect oceanographic data
from the Soviet side of the pack ice, although they sometimes
operate in the western sector of the Arctic Ocean.
Canada
The Canadians have for several decades claimed
sovereignty over land areas in the Arctic North. Her
declared interest in the area was evident as early as 1897.
when the Arctic Archipelago was included as part of the
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10.
new District of Franklin. A 1904 map showed Canada ex-
tending clear to the North Pole, via sector lines along the
60th and 141st meredians. By the 1920's territorial out-
posts were established and regulatory practices put into
force, many of which were complied with by foreign interests
doing business in the area.
Sovereignty over the non-land areas has been less
clear. Conflicting interpretations by various Prime
Ministers and other officials have reflected the complexi-
ties of determining policies on waterways which, for most
of the year, are solid ice and unnavigable; the Northwest
Passage is iceblocked for 8-10 months every year. In any
case, the determination of Canadian territorial waters
according to her traditional 3- mile limit would put much
of the non-land area of the Archipelago under Canadian
sovereignty, and according to a newly declared 12-mile
limit nearly all of it under her sovereignty, unless clear
exception is made for freedom of navigation through and
over international straits.
The transit of the Northwest Passage by the Humble
Oil Company's tanker, Manhattan, in late 1969
examined the feasibility of this route for commercial
traffic on an international scale. The implications were
far-reaching, especially for the Canadians who traditionally
have had the only western icebreaker fleet available to
providedassistance in the ice-bound Arctic waters a
status that gave them nominal control. The possibility of
foreign vessels plying these waters independently in the
future precipitated proposals for new and stringent legis-
lation for environmental protection of the Canadian North.
Contending that the dangers of pollution are immediate,
while the formulation and enactment of international laws
to guard against pollution would require considerable time,
Canada chose to extend her claims to jurisdiction unilaterally.
in order, in her view, to prevent irreversible damage in
the Arctic. On April 8, 1970, legislation was introduced
in the Canadian Parliament establishing pollution zones in
Arctic waters extending 100 miles seaward from every point in
Canadian territory above the 60th parallel. In these zones
the Canadian government would exert control over shipping,
including the establishment of required ship construction
standards, and also control the navigation of vessels
through the areas included in the zones. The Canadian
government has stated that she stands ready to participate
in multilateral discussions on navigation safety and
environmental protection, which should in her view "transcend
traditional concepts of sovereignty and national jurisdiction".
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11.
The Canadian Arctic (north of 60°) consists of two
sectors, the Yukon and the Northwest Territories. Both
have limited self-government, but the Federal Government
in Ottawa exercises primary control. The Canadian
Department of National Defense is responsible for all
aspects of maritime, land and air defense of the Canadian
Arctic. In some areas these tasks are done in cooperation,
or shared, with the U.S. under joint agreement. The
Canadian armed forces also share mapping responsibilities
with the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources. They
provide search and rescue facilities and additional
assistance to other government activities where commercial
services are not available. In the area of science, the
Defense, Research Board supports and conducts research
relevant to military problems, especially in communications
techniques and equipment.
Their Department of Transport coordinates and carries
out delivery to the Arctic of cargo and passengers for
government and commercial concerns. Aided by Navy clearance
diving teams they resupply the Arctic weather stations
which were until recently jointly operated with the U.S.
The Canadians will staff them entirely in the future. The
Department of Transport also assists commercial carriers
in supplying the DEW Line. The Canadian DOT operates ten
icebreakers. Approximately 108,000 short tons of dry cargo
and bulk oil were transported to the Arctic in 1967. The
Canadian government is advised on operations in the Arctic
by the Deputy Minister level Advisory Committee on Northern
Development, whose responsibilities are:
"To advise the government on questions of policy
relating to civilian and military undertakings in
northern Canada and to provide for the effective
coordination of all government activities."
Eighteen agencies concerned with northern affairs are
represented on this Committee.
The largest single Canadian Arctic program is the
Polar Continental Shelf Project, a comprehensive research
and mapping venture of the Department of Energy, Mines
and Resources. It will eventually cover all parts of the
Canadian Arctic Archipelago. Permanent observatories for
geomagnetism, gravity and seismology have been established
at the eight major Arctic stations and settlements.
The Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Develop-
ment operates a research station at Inuvik on the Mackenzie
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12.
delta and assists in funding the McGill University at
Schefferville, Quebec. This Ministry is in general quite
influential in Arctic matters and its Minister often
speaks for the Government on Northern questions. Among
other Canadian agencies with major Arctic programs are
the Defense Research Board, the Department of Agriculture,
the Department of Forestry and Rural Development, the
Fisheries Research Board, the National Museum of Canada
and the National Research Council of Canada.
These activities have involved on the order of 9000
employees and a budget of $96.8 million.
Denmark
As a country that builds and also operates a large
fleet of ice-strengthened merchant ships, Denmark has a
strong interest in the maximum commercial development of
polar regions. The popular ice-strengthened Dan-class
vessels are used not only in Greenland waters by the Danes,
but are also chartered by several other nations for use
in the Arctic and Antarctic.
Danish views on national jurisdiction of the seabed
in Arctic regions is likely to be influenced by the size
of the continental margin around Greenland. When measured
to the 2,500 meter isobath, this seabed area is huge and
includes vast sedimentary basins that are considered locally
favorable for petroleum.
Greenland, which is an integral part of Denmark, has
been a significant element in the defense structure of
North American and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO). During World War II the U.S. established three
air bases in Greenland--Narssarsuak Sonderstrom and
Thule. Narssarsuak was turned over to Denmark after the
war as was part of Sonderstrom Air Base. Defense early
warning sites (DEW Line) and ballistic missile early warning
sites (BMEWS) are still in operation.
Economic activity in Greenland is in three main
categories, most important being the fishing, hunting and
sheep raising pursued by the Greenlanders themeselves
without direct government regulation. The second comprises
government-operated trading transport, building and public
installations. The third is mining, mostly carried out
by Danes for export. Valuable minerals are not very
abundant--cryolite mined near Ivigtut and lead near
Mestersvig are the most notable.
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13.
Denmark has sponsored scientific investigations in
Greenland for more than two centuries, mainly geological
and biological surveys. Many expeditions for the study
of meteorology, ionospheric physics and glaciology have
centered on Greenland. The U.S., Canada and France have
participated in cooperative scientific activities in
Greenland. Meteorological, ionospheric and radio propaga-
tion studies are the major effort at established stations,
which include Nord, Thule, Qanaq, Narssarsuak and Godhavn.
Denmark has encouraged international cooperation in
scientific research in Greenland, involving whenever
possible the participation of Danish scientists.
Norway
Norway, a maritime state, has a keen interest in
maintaining maximum freedom of the seas, particularly in
Arctic waters. Each summer a number of Norwegian timber
vessels travel the Northern Sea Route under Soviet control
and surveillance to Soviet ports on the Yenisey River.
In 1957, Norwegian shipowners showed strong interest in
the possibility of using the North Sea Route to trade with
the Orient.
The Norwegians are very sensitive to Russian submarine
activity which has occurred in various fiords along their
cost in the last several years.
Norwegian views on seabed jurisdiction are likely to
be favorable to any proposal which would give them exclusive
rights to exploit the mineral resources that may be found
in offshore sedimentary basins at depths below 200 meters
on eith side of the northern end of the Norwegian Trough,
as well as in the northern region around Jan Mayen Island
and Svalbard and beyond towards the Pole.
Norway has a special situation among Arctic nations
since nearly half the country is north of the Arctic circle.
Yet from a climatic, vegetation, or permafrost sense this
country would not be considered "Arctic". The Norwegian
islands: Spitzbergen (Svalbard), Bear Island and Jan Mayen
are true Arctic -- glaciated and desolate. As a member of
NATO, Norway contributes to the defense of the North Atlantic
especially through its strategic location and through the
provision of specialists in Arctic mountain and Arctic maritime
operations.
Spitzbergen was until 1920 officially unclaimed.
Because of proximity to the islands anc the long-standing
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14.
Norwegian interest in marine science exploration activities
including seal and walrus hunting, they took the lead in
intensive scientific exploration of the islands in 1906.
By 1920 enough world-wide interest had developed so that
nine* interested countries signed a treaty which assigned
sovereignty to Norway, prohibits the use of the archipelago
for warlike purposes and provides that all parties have
equal liberty of access and entry for any peaceful reason
or object. The USSR later acceded to this treaty.
Most of the efforts on Spitzbergen are carried on
by Norway and the USSR. Both countries are mining coal
there with Norway producing about 480,000 tons annually
and the Soviet Union producing some 300,000 tons annually.
Both countries have explored for oil with little success
to date but a renewal of efforts can be expected as a result
of the Prudhoe Bay discovery. A satellite tracking station
has been built there. The Norwegians, long prominent in
polar science, have worked to the limit of their means and
are seeking cooperative efforts with friendly countries.
United States
Arctic Alaska, an area of approximately 150,000
square miles north of the Yukon River basin, has but
13,500 inhabitants scattered along the seaboard in villages
and a few defense and communication centers.
The economic development potential of the region is
now being identified and characterized. Recent discoveries
and geological studies by government and commercial interests
indicate that the area and its adjacent continental shelf
have what may be one of the world's richest petroleum
provinces, and possibly important deposits of copper, gold,
tin and other strategic materials needed for our modern
economy.
More than twenty federal agencies with a total budget
of more than $20 million** involving some 600-700 people
including scientists and technicians are engaged in programs
of science, resource development, health and welfare, and
military R&D. (Military operations are not included in the
* United Kingdom, United States, France, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden and Norway.
** Senate Document No. 71 on Federal Arctic Research lists
a total expenditure of $40 million, but this includes
activity in the whole state of Alaska for some agencies.
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15.
budget estimate). Some limited work is carried out on the
Arctic Ocean and in cooperation with Canada and with Denmark
in Greenland. U.S. research programs represent a broad
spectrum of disciplines including oceanography, glaciology,
earth sciences, meteorological and ionospheric sciences and
the biological sciences. Technical research activities
include surveying and mapping, natural resource inventories,
weather observations, ice patrol, reclamation, transport,
construction and various military projects. Some 11 Federal
facilities and Federally supported facilities serve as
centers for most of this work. Two groups currently exist
that are serving to coordinate Federal plans and activities
with respect to the Arctic: the Interagency Arctic Research
Coordination Committee, chaired by the National Science
Foundation, and the Task Force on the Alaska Pipeline,
chaired by the Department of the Interior. Cooperation in
research among agencies and institutions is carried out through
informal person-to-person contacts and through the Inter-
agency Arctic Research Coordinating Committee. In addition
to general research activities, Federal development activities
in the State of Alaska are coordinated through the Federal
Field Committee for Development and Planning in Alaska, but
there is no mechanism for overall coordination and planning
for the Arctic per se. In fact, many agencies find it
difficult to separate the cost of Arctic activities from
the rest of their Alaskan programs or from general global
problems. There is a need for broader interagency coordina-
tion; however, there is no one agency that has clear
responsibility and scope of interest to assume a lead agency
role.
Economic and social problems of the U.S. Arctic have
to do with development of natural resources and with the
betterment of the indigenous population. It is one set of
problems to search for, identify and map the resources and
another set to recover them. Geological, geophysical and
geochemical maps necessary to mineral exploration and
prospecting have yet to be made; the continental shelf area
is almost entirely unexplored. Arctic equipment and
techniques for mineral extraction need to be developed.
Mineral refineries need to be established. Bulk transport
systems which can cope with the Arctic environment are needed
to carry the products to market. At present there is no
deep water port facility in Arctic Alaska. Overland transport
by truck and rail is feasible. However, such facilities
have not yet been expanded nor has the full impact of such
construction on the environment been evaluated. Tracked
vehicles and sleds which are now used over snow, ice, and
frozen ground are being considered for future transport
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16.
systems although other systems, possibly more economical,
are being instigated and may prove feasible. Aircraft are
now the principal mode for moving personnel and light
freight. The larger helicopters, air cushion vehicles and
the new C-5 Galaxy may play a major role in future trans-
portation systems. Pipelines to southerly open water ports,
and tankers via the Northwest Passage are other possible
modes of transport to be considered. Submarines may be
especially appealing for transit to the east coast and
Europe. Barge transportation on the rivers may also be
possible.
More than 11,000. of the 13,500 citizen residents of
Arctic Alaska are natives; 43 percent live in the settlements
of Nome, Kotzebue and Barrow; most live on a bare sub-
sistence economy of hunting and fishing; unemployment,
poverty, education and health problems are among the worst
in the Nation. Yet, the Eskimo is intelligent and skillful,
quick to learn to operate and maintain machines and equip-
ment. However, opportunities for economic employment have
been scarce.
Inflation is a serious problem in Alaska which
attenuates economic growth and development; it results in
capital-intensive rather than labor-intensive operations.
This is partially caused by the practice of paying inflated
wages to attract skilled, technical and professional workers
from the U.S. labor market. (The USSR and Canada have
similar problems). Development of natural resources will
not be a panacea to the economic development problems. New
job opportunities in this area will in large proportion
require highly skilled, professional and sub-professional
workers. Because of Alaska's relatively small population
it is expected that a large part of these jobs will be filled
from outside the state, at least for the immediate future,
although major efforts should be made by the government and
private employers to train and employ natives in the work
force. General economic and regional development in Alaska
is coordinated by the Federal Field Committee for Development
and Planning in Alaska, established under Executive Order
11182 on October 6, 1964. The mission of the Federal Field
Committee importantly includes the submission of a comprehensive
overall plan for economic development in that State. This
plan will be reviewed by the Federal Advisory Council on
Regional Economic Development, established by Executive Order
11386 on December 28, 1967.
The Federal Field Committee is almost entirely con-
cerned with economic and resource development of the State
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
17.
alone and is not concerned with national, scientific,
military or international strategies and policies except
in the economic sense. Likewise, the Federal Field
Committee is little concerned with the Arctic Ocean and
continental shelf development except by way of developing
the fishing and mineral industries, and other economic
as well as social potential.
Over-twenty Federal agencies and bureaus currently
conduct activities in the Arctic region, including Alaska
and other parts of the Arctic. Until the establishment in
1967 of the Interagency Arctic Research Coordinating Committee,
these agencies conducted their research programs more or
less independently. Coordination previously on an informal
basis, is now more formal. However, programs are still
planned and executed by each agency in accordance with its
individual mission.
There is some need to reexamine the adequacy of
organizational arrangements of the U.S. Government with
regard to:
(a) coordination of plans and projects. The Inter-
agency Arctic Research Coordinating Committee collects and
collates agency budgets, promotes cooperation in logistics
and international projects, identifies scientific problems,
promotes international meetings and coordinates the research
of the Arctic with that of the Antarctic. Research pertain-
ing to the classified military, social and economic sciences
is not included in the Interagency Committee's present scope
of interest.
(b) balanced consideration of budgets and financial
considerations. The largest part of existing budgets goes
for logistical support, this likely will be true also for
future budgets.
(c) provision of a focal point for information on
Arctic activities.
The scientific problems of the Arctic region center
on five unique natural phenomena: (1) the polar icepack and
its role in the earth-atmosphere heat-engine; (2) polar
magnetic field and its effects on communications and space
electromagnetic phenomena; (3) geologic structure which
links North America with Eurasia and involves a component
of the global mid-ocean ridge system; (4) a simple but
delicately balanced ecological system; and (5) the presence
of permafrost.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
18.
Although some laboratory and theoretical analysis
based on satellite observations or data from past expedi-
tions can be accomplished at home laboratories, most Arctic
problems require observatories and field investigation in
the Arctic itself. Many of the phenomena which vary in
both time and place require international cooperation in
the collection and exchange of information.
The growing feasibility of resource development will
inevitably expand the interface between nations in the
Arctic and affect their national and international policies
regarding the Arctic region. The U.S. oil find at Prudhoe
Bay has caused a significant spurt in Canadian oil explora-
tion in the North. The Soviets, likewise are exploring
their Arctic for petroleum deposits. Japan, a non-Arctic
nation, has shown increased interest through investments
in the resources of Arctic U.S., Canada and USSR.
The USSR and Canada have in the past made "sector
claims". * By a 1926 decree the USSR claimed all lands in
the Arctic Ocean lying within its longitude boundaries
extended to the North Pole. For the first half of this
century Canada periodically reiterated the sector claim
for the lands and frozen seas to their north; since 1955
the Canadian position on sovereignty in the North has not
been entirely clear. However, as stated earlier, the
Canadian have recently introduced legislation establishing
jurisdiction over a 100 mile pollution zone north of 60
and also a 12 mile territorial sea. Although the USSR has
not excluded foreign vessels from their claimed sector and
has not pushed the concept in recent years, it has con-
sistently demonstrated a strong proprietary interest in the
area. They are especially resolute in maintaining their
authority over coastal waters, 12 miles, which causes
difficulty in transiting several strait areas. The U.S.
has not recognized either USSR or Canadian sector claims
and considers the Arctic Ocean to be free high seas.
* The "sector principle" states that all lands, dis-
covered or undiscovered, within a spherical triangle formed by
the North Pole and the easterly and westerly limits of the
country's Arctic coast, belong to that country or that it
should have at least a preferential right to their acquisition.
Canada first set forth such a sector claim in the early
1900's. Were all countries to agree to such an arrangement,
the approximate percentage of the Arctic Ocean area which
would be held by each of the countries would be USSR 57%;
U.S. 12%; Canada 17%; Norway 9%; and Denmark 3%.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET
19.
Military operations and facilities essential to the
security of the U.S. are located in the Arctic areas of
Alaska, Greenland, Norway and Canada and the international
portions of the Arctic Region. Intimately related and support-
ing facilities are located in areas in close proximity to
the Arctic Region in Alaska, Canada, and elsewhere. These
facilities include BMEWS sites, DEW Line stations, air
bases and a variety of related facilities. Also carried
out in various of these areas are air, surface and under-
surface military operations.
The capability for U.S. forces to operate in the Arctic
region needs improvement, particularly in communications,
weapons, sonics, navigation, construction, environmental
services, and search and rescue. Scientific research pro-
grams, complemented by appropriate military operations,
should be designed to improve our military capability in
the region. Accordingly, in developing a U.S. policy con-
cerning the Arctic Region the following military considera-
tions apply:
(a) The necessity for freedom of action to conduct
those military operations or scientific support of possible
military operations essential to the security of the U.S.
(b) The capability to establish facilities on snow,
ice, icecaps, land, or permafrost which can be used to
support land, sea, or air operations.
(c) The capability of equipment and logistic support
systems to permit sustained operations in the Arctic.
(d) The capability to carry out air, surface, and
undersurface military operations in the Arctic.
Logistics is the basis on which military, scientific
and commercial developments must build. Yet, transportation
and supply depots for Arctic Alaska and the Arctic Ocean are
largely ad hoc, makeshift and prohibitively expensive. There
are no overland roads nor railroads in Arctic Alaska; distances
are vast and construction techniques require extensive
improvement. The airfields are most commonly improved only
with steel landing strips and are limited in capacity. There
are no developed deep water ports. Most logistical support
now is by aircraft or ship; some is by tractor train over
the frozen terrain in wintertime, although off-road truck
and other wheeled vehicle operations are carried out
occasionally. Ship supply routes need icebreaker support--
which now is severely limited in terms of icebreaking ability
and available time. The voyages of the SS Manhattan, a
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
20.
prototype icebreaking tanker may however indicate a solution
to the problem of sea transportation in Arctic waters.
Ships anchor offshore and their cargos are brought ashore
by lighters up to a distance of 14 miles. Scientific study
of the deep Arctic Ocean is limited to that which can be
carried out from ice floes serviced by aircraft and this
restricts the kind of studies that can be conducted. All
but one of the U.S. fleet of eight polar icebreakers are under
5,000 tons. Seven of these are WIND class built in World
War II and have been used continuously since then. Two of
them usually are assigned to Arctic Alaska and the remainder
are employed as needed elsewhere. Some ocean research has
been conducted from submarines, a practical way to circumvent
ice pace problems. There are no civilian submarines capable
of under ice studies.
Trained manpower for work in the Arctic, is a scarce
resource. To date, job opportunities, except for scientific
research, have been scarce. When opportunities do appear,
such as the oil exploration and development, trained manpower
is recruited from the U.S. labor pool with substantial
financial inducements. However, many of these workers are
not accustomed to nor experienced with the Arctic environment.
Living conditions are somewhat primitive and difficult.
Consequently, turnover rates have been high. A greater
effort to train and employ natives needs to be made. Signi-
ficantly, greater employment of natives should assist in
reducing personnel turnover. In the case of scientists, there
have been no centers of learning for combined Arctic sciences;
however, the University of Alaska is developing in this
direction. Arctic marine science, even today, has no center
of expertise for training or information, outside of the USSR.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
TABLE 1 - COMPARATIVE ARCTIC REGION STATISTICS
(1967)
DENMARK
USSR*
USA
CANADA
GREENLAND
NORWAY
stline (miles)
islands
8,166
1,066
5,725
25,000
1,500
islands
21,785
tinental Shelf
2,000,000
120,000
1,500,000
200,000 (est)
(sq. mi)
(est)
mafrost area
1,400,000
150,000
1,100,000
840,000
oulation
2,000,000
13,500
38,000
44,000
2,000
(deep water)
10
0
4
20
5
breakers
40
8
10
5
0
Service
15
2
2
0
0
Supply Vessels
200
2
9
6
3
fields
rward area
90
6
5
-
-
weather
20
0
1
3
]
itime freight (tons)
3,000,000
10,000
110,000
10,000
600,000
(est)
(est)
erals
(mined, tons)
25,000,000
-
-
-
450,000
(reserves, bb1)
exploring
5 billion exploring
-
-
(reserves, cu,ft)
exploring
900
"
-
-
-
tinum-group metals
oz)
1,900,000
-
-
-
-
(mined, oz)
3,000,000
-
380,000
-
-
lver (mined, oz)
-
- 1,400,000
-
-
ckel (mined, metric
110,000
-
-
-
-
tons)
pper (mined, metric
150,000
-
3,900
-
I
tons)
(mined, tons)
-
-
140,000
-
-
(mined, tons)
-
- 2,000,000
-
-
balt (mined coproduct)
2,500
-
-
-
I
(mined)
7,500
-
-
-
-
rcury
it
development stages -
-
-
-
ngsten (mined)
2,000
-
-
-
I
.
earch Effort
(est)
20,000
600-700
ca 3,000
I
-
llars
-
22,000,000 97,000,000
-
I
statistical purposes the USSR's arctic region is defined as the southern
of continuous permafrost or the Arctic Circle, whichever lies further
This includes the Kola Peninsula, a highly developed Soviet logistical
for military, scientific and economic activities in the Arctic Basin.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
FEDERAL BUDGET FOR ARCTIC RESEARCH, FY 1968 & FY 1969
PLANNED EXPENDITURES, FY 1970 and FY 1971
artment of the Army
919,000
476,000
476,000
1,201,000
artment of Navy
4,041,000
5,133,500
5,133,500
4,745,000
artment of Air Force
1,574,000
918,000
757,500
913,000
artment of Transportation
1
6,300,000
451,000
907,900
600,000
rtment of Commerce²
1,900,000
221,300
267,200
215,000
rtment of Agriculture
380,000
364,300
364,300
364,300
rtment of HEW
1,895,800
1,474,000
1,474,000
1,500,200
rtment of the Interior
1,171,000
729,550
729,550
3,700,600
onal Science Foundation
2,215,600
2,157,650
2,200,000
4,250,000
1,467,000
912,000
1,467,000
1,467,000
201,100
3,617,000
3,397,000
3,271,500
$22,064,500 $16,454,300 $17,173,950 $22,227,600
Does not include logistic costs.
Does not include logistic costs of joint U,S.-Canadian Weather Stations.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
April 15, 1970
MEMORANDUM I OR
CHAIRMAN, NSC UNDER SECRETARIES COMMITTEE
SUBJECT: United States Arctic Policy and Organizational
Arrangements for Implementation
The President has expressed concern that there exists no coordinated
United States policy on the Arctic and Arctic affairs.
In view of the critical need for an overall policy framework to pre-
serve the environment of the North, to provide guidelines for decision-
making on several issues of international concern, and to focus United
States activities, longer-range interests and ot jectives in the Arctic,
the President has directed that the NSC Under Secretaries Committee
undertake a review of United policy on the Arctic. This review
should consider the political implications of United States policy, and
explore all opportunities for international cooperation on Arctic matters.
It should also include consideration of the necessary interagency co-
ordinating mechanisms and budgetary implications.
For the purposes of this review, the Under Secretaries Committee should
include the Chairman of the Council on Environ mental Quality and rep-
resentatives of the Departments of Interior, Commerce, Health Education
and Welfare, Trai sportation, the Office of Science and Technology, the
National Science Foundation, the Bureau of the Budget.
The Committee's recommendations regarding United States Arctic policy
and organizational arrangements for implementation should be forwarded
to the President by or before May 18, 1970.
Henry A. Kissinger
Reproduce Sathe Ridhard Nixon:PresidentlaM.ibiary This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DOC
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Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. 12