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Finland Vol. I [May 1969-February 1974]
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Finland Vol. I [May 1969-February 1974]
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DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]
DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT
SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS
DATE
RESTRICTION
NUMBER
TYPE
4
letter
Lodge to HAK
1/10/72
B
10
note
Saunders to HAK
n.d.
B
SANITIZED
PER RAC REVIEW
5/2008
11
memo
3/30/71
B
CIA to HAK
18
memo
Eliot to HAK
9/27/69
B
25 A
Biography
March '69
B
report
DECLASSIFIED
PER CAC REVIEW 4/5/2008
28
telegram
Amemb Helsinki to Sec State
7/7/73
B
63
telegram
SecState to Amemb Helsinki
2/2/72
B
Intelligence Information Cable
7/21/70
B
65
report
66
report
Intelligence Information Cable
3/5/70
B
FILE GROUP TITLE
BOX NUMBER
NSC
673
FOLDER TITLE
2
RESTRICTION CODES
A Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
B.
National security classified information.
financial information.
C.
Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's
F. Release would disclose Investigatory information compiled for law
rights.
enforcement purposes.
D.
Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted Invasion of privacy
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
or a libel of a living person.
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
GPO:1989-235-084/00024
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NA 14021 (4-85)
DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]
DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT
SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS
DATE
RESTRICTION
NUMBER
TYPE
4
letter
Lodge to HAK
1/10/72
B
10
note
Saunders to HAK
n.d.
B
11
memo
CIA to HAK
3/30/71
B
18
memo
Eliot to HAK
9/27/69
B
25 A
Biography
March '69
B
report
28
telegram
Amemb Helsinki to SecState
7/7/73
B
63
telegram
SecState to Amemb Helsinki
2/2/72
B
Intelligence Information Cable
7/21/70
B
65
report
66
report
Intelligence Information Cable
3/5/70
B
FILE GROUP TITLE
BOX NUMBER
NSC
673
FOLDER TITLE
2
RESTRICTION CODES
A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
B. National security classified information.
financial information.
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's
F. Release would disclose investigatory Information compiled for law
rights.
enforcement purposes.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
or a libel of a living person.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidental'Library and returned non-historical material.
DECLASSIFIED
NATIONAL ARC This document has been Executive Order 13526 989-235-084/00024 and has been determined to be declassified.
NA 14021 (4-85)
5700
7212349
department OF state
Washington, D.C. 20520
CONFIDENTIAL
July 22, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE
Subject: Additional Comments on Resignation
of Finnish Government
Although the actual reason for the sudden resigna-
tion of the minority Finnish Government July 19 may
have been its reluctance to take sole responsibility
for signing the free trade agreement with the EEC, as
stated by Prime Minister Paasio, the possibility that
the Soviet Union may have played some role in the move
cannot be discounted. In the past the Soviets have on
occasion moved to block planned courses of action by
the Government of Finland; the most recent case was in
December 1969, when the Finns abandoned plans to form
a Nordic Economic Community (NORDEC) at the last moment,
due to Soviet objections. In this connection, the
visit to Helsinki of Soviet Ambassador to Paris Valerian
Zorin on July 17-18 could be connected to the surprise
resignation. The Soviets have been persistently cool
to any Finnish tie to the Common Market, although
Finnish Government officials have moved ahead with the
negotiations on the assumption that Moscow would go along
with a free trade agreement which had no political
strings. If, indeed, Soviet reserve towards a Finnish
tie to the EEC is involved in the Government's resigna-
tion, the matter will undoubtedly be a major topic of
discussion when President Kekkonen visits Prime
Minister Kosygin in the Soviet Union next month.
Phy: Thing. Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DOC
RECD
LOG NBR
INITIAL ACTION OFF
MO DA
MO DA HR
NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE
7
22
7
24
D9
5700
FROM: ELIOT x
LOG IN/OUT ONLY I'feldt
TO: PRES
U
NO FORN
NODIS
X
KISSINGER
ROGERS, W
LOU
BUO
EXDIS
&
DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION
HAIG
LAIRD, M
C
EYES ONLY
LIMDIS
'S
CODE WORD
RES DATA
SUBJECT: Addl Comments on Resignation TS of Finnil sensitive Government
72/2349
REFERENCE: S/S
OTHER
NOT XEROXED
APP'TS: PRES
HAK
TALKER
MEMCON
DATE REQ.
INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION
ACTION REQUIRED
ACTION
INFO
REC
MEMO FOR HAK
(
)
CY
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG
FOR
MEMO FOR PRES.
(
)
STAFF SECRETARY
REPLY FOR
SIGNATURE
-
)
FAR EAST
FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH
(
-
SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
MEMO
TO
(
)
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA
RECOMMENDATIONS
(
)
EUROPE/CANADA
x
JOINT MEMO
-
)
LATIN AMERICA
REFER TO STATE
(
)
UNITED NATIONS
X
ANY ACTION NECESSARY
(
)
ECONOMIC
)
SCIENTIFIC
LR PLANNING
CONCURRENCE DUE DATE: 7/28
(
COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)
PROGRAM ANALYSIS
NSC PLANNING
CONGRESSIONAL
NAR CY
9/7/24 TO
DATE
FROM
TO
S
ACTION REQUIRED
7/26
REL
NSC/S
no action required
INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING
MICROFILM DATA
CROSS REF WITH
NOTIFY
DATE
DO
SEE LOG
DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO
INIT
DISPOSITION
JOINED BY LOG
COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE)
JUL
DATE
SPECIAL FILE RQMT:
SA,
HP,
HM
28/1972
ORIG)
NSC
&
TO )
PAF
SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS:
WHC
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED:
YES
NO
SUBF
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
GPO: 1972-455-927
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
Action concluded. All people
notified.
Col J. Merritt
Closs
our
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to
5695
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION
SECRET
July 22, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
FROM:
Phil Odeen
SUBJECT:
Finns Propose Date for CSCE
The Finns have proposed November 22 as the date to start CSCE
preparatory talks (see Tab A). State wants to go to our allies saying
we could agree to this date.
Agreeing at this time to a specific date for CSCE would seriously
undermine the concept of parallel MBFR Explorations and CSCE prepa-
rations, and the arrangements worked out in Moscow (which the Soviets
appear to be edging away from).
We are only in the initial stages of getting an allied consensus on the
procedural aspects of MBFR Explorations (place, participants, etc.).
More time is needed to bring preparations for MBFR Explorations
abreast of CSCE.
We have already agreed to a tentative date for CSCE preparatory talks
of around the 20th of November. I do not believe we should go beyond
this until our efforts to get Warsaw Pact agreement to convening MBFR
explorations are more advanced, or we will give up any leverage we
might have. We may get some help from the FRG on this. They are
growing increasingly concerned that CSCE preparatory talks not begin
before the FRG elections in early December, and they are talking
privately about early next year for CSCE preparations.
State has prepared a cable which could instruct US NATO to tell the allies
that we could accept November 22. They are holding it for clearance by
Secretary Rogers who returns to Washington Monday. They also plan
to get White House clearance.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
2
I believe we should tell State to take a different approach. We should
tell the Allies and the Finns that we are not in a position to settle on
a firm date for CSCE preparations. We should be frank with out Allies
and explain that we do not want to set a date until we are further along
in making arrangements for MBFR explorations so the two can go forward
in parallel. This will have the added benefit of encouraging the Allies
and our own bureaucracy to move more expeditiously in getting MBFR
underway.
RECOMMENDATION
That you approve instructing State along the above lines. Bill Hyland
agrees.
Approve
H
Disapprove
See me
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CSCE
*
*
Department of State
AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
STATES OF
CONFIDENTIAL 628
PAGE 01 HELSIN 01126 192048Z
65
ACTION EUR-20
INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 NEA CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-06 H-02 INR-06 L-03
NSAE-00 NSC-10 P-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-14 USIA-12 T-03
OMB-01 IO-12 01C-04 ACDA-19 RSR-01 /129 W
105735
PRR 191450Z JUL 72
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4729
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY OSLO
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
USMISSION NATO
CONFIDENTIAL HELSINKI 1126
SUBJECT: FINNISH GOVERNMENT PROPOSES CSCE PREPARATORY
TALKS BE OPENED NOVEMBER 22, 1972
REF: HELSINKI 1066
1. SUMMARY. FOREIGN OFFICE HAS ASKED FOR US VIEWS ON
FINNISH PROPOSAL TO INVITE AMBASSADORS OF PARTICIPATING
COUNTRIES TO CSCE PREPARATORY MEETING BEGINNING
NOVEMBER 22, 1972. FINNS HAVE CONTACTED SOVIETS
AND BRITISH EMBASSIES AND PLAN ALSO TO DISCUSS
SUGGESTED DATE WITH FRENCH.
CONFIDENTIAL
v
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
FORM
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DS-1652
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
STATES OF
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 HELSIN 01126 192048Z
2. FOREIGN OFFICE (CHIEF OF POLITICAL DIVISION MATTI
TUOVINEN) CALLED EMBASSY TO SOLICIT US VIEWS ON
FINNISH PROPOSAL TO INVITE AMBASSADORS OF PARTICIPATING
COUNTRIES TO CSCE PREPARATORY MEETING IN HELSINKI
BEGINNING NOVEMBER 22, 1972. HE SAID FOREIGN OFFICE
HAD ALREADY DISCUSSED DATE WITH SOVIET AND BRITISH
EMBASSIES AND IT WOULD BE IN TOUCH ALSO WITH FRENCH
EMBASSY. FINNS WOULD DISCUSS PROPOSED DATE WITH
OTHER PARTICIPTING COUNTRIES, AS NECESSARY, DEPENDING
ON RESPONSE FROM MOST IMPORTANT COUNTRIES INCLUDING US,
BUT SUCH DISCUSSION WOULD NOT BE ACTIVELY PURSUED.
3. ACTION REQUESTED. DEPARTMENT GUIDANCE ON ACCEPTABILITY
OF DATE. PETERSON
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
FORM
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DS-1652
DOC
RECD
LO
BR
INITIAL ACTION OFF
MO DA
MO DA HR
NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE
7
22
7
12
5615
L4
LOG IN/OUT ONLY
TO: PRES
FROM: ELIOT
U
NO FORN
NODIS
KISSINGER X
ROGERS, W
LOU
BUO
EXDIS
DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION
HAIG
laird, M
C
EYES ONLY
LIMDIS
ODEEN
'S x
CODE WORD
RES DATA
SUBJECT: CSCE Coordination L Eminish timing TS on proposed SENSITIVE Date for
REFERENCE: S/S
OTHER
NOT XEROXED
APP'TS: PRES
HAK
TALKER
MEMCON
DATE REQ.
INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION
ACTION REQUIRED
ACTION
INFO
REC
MEMO FOR HAK
(
)
CY
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG
FOR
MEMO FOR PRES.
(
-
STAFF SECRETARY
REPLY FOR
SIGNATURE
(
)
FAR EAST
FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH
(
)
SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
MEMO
TO
(
)
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA
RECOMMENDATIONS
(
)
EUROPE/CANADA
JOINT MEMO
(
)
LATIN AMERICA
REFER TO STATE
(
)
UNITED NATIONS
ANY ACTION NECESSARY
(
)
ECONOMIC
CONCURRENCE
(
)
SCIENTIFIC
DUE DATE:
LR PLANNING
COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)
PROGRAM ANALYSIS
NSC PLANNING
CONGRESSIONAL
Bill Lyand
+
DATE
FROM
TO
S
ACTION
CY TO
7/24
ODEEN
HAN
X
Decision REQUIRED (7/28)
Sorm
INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING
7/25
carru
Drive
5
No motify State (xirp)
DOEN
7/24
Srue notified by 14y land
MBFR R working 6 samp by Meritt
nothing further
MICROFILM DATA
CROSS REF WITH
NOTIFY
DATE
DO
SEE LOG
DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO
INIT
DISPOSITION
JOINED BY LOG
COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE)
SPECIAL file RQMT:
SA,
HP,
HM
ORIG) DATE
x
TO )
OAF
SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS:
WHC
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED:
YES
NO
SUBF
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
GPO: 1972-455-927
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
5660
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
CONFIDENTIAL
INFORMATION
July 21, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER
rql
FROM:
Robert Gerald Livingston
SUBJECT:
Fall of Finnish Government
The State Department has sent you a short memorandum (Tab A) on the
resignation of the Finnish government. The memorandum calls attention
to the fact that it fell July 19 on the issue of Finland's industrial free
trade agreement with the European Community (EC). The Paasio govern-
ment, which is a minority Social Democratic administration, declared
that it could not take sole responsibility for signing the agreement.
Signature had been scheduled for July 22 but now will be postponed until
a new government is formed -- which is likely to take some time.
Besides the information in State's memorandum, the following points bear
on the situation:
-- Regardless of what government now emerges, Kekkonen will remain
the key maker of Finland's main foreign policies -- EC affiliation, diplomatic
recognition of the two Germanies (which the Finns have recently offered),
and the hosting of the European Security Conference (CSCE).
-- The EC agreement carries so much potential for adverse domestic
and Soviet reaction that, faced with the July 22 deadline, the minority
government recoiled.
-- A key question is how Moscow will react to the agreement. So far
the Soviets have exercised no known pressure on Finland's trade negotiations
with the Community but in 1970, Finnish politicians recall, they made a
last-minute volte-face on NORDEC (Nordic Economic Union). Kekkonen
may have been so unsure about Moscow's final attitude that the government
preferred to clarify it before proceeding to signature of the EC agreement.
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
A
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This has been ed -- i ..
5660
7212268
department OF state
Washington, D.C. 20520
July 20, 1972
UNCLASSIFIED
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE
Subject: Finnish Government Resigns
In a surprise move, the minority Social
Democratic Government of Finland submitted its
resignation to President Kekkonen July 19. The
Government's action came only three days before
Finland was expected to sign an industrial free
trade agreement with the European Economic
Community. In submitting the resignation, out-
going Prime Minister Rafael Paasio declared that
the Social Democratic Party could not take sole
responsibility for signing the agreement with
the Common Market. Another factor in the Govern-
ment's resignation has been its opposition to the
expanded pension scheme voted by Parliament for
which no adequate funding is available. After
accepting the resignation, President Kekkonen
asked the Paasio Government, which had been in
office only five months, to continue in a caretaker
status until a new Government is named. Negotia-
tions will start next week for the formation of a
cabinet based on a Parliament majority. As a
result of the Government's resignation, the
planned signing of the agreement with the EEC
will be postponed until a new Government is formed.
for
Theodore hang Schulre L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary
UNCLASSIFIED
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
3714
7207762
department OF state
Washington, D.C. 20520
April 28, 1972
CONFIDENTIAL
Memorandum for: NSC Secretariat
The White House
Subject: Private Visit to Alaska by Finnish President
Kekkonen
For your information, President Urho Kekkonen
of Finland plans to make a private visit to Alaska
from June 22 to June 29. His primary purpose is to
go fishing. He will be flown to and from Alaska
on an aircraft belonging to the Lummus Company of
White Plains, New York, a subsidiary of Combustion
Engineering. Lummus has close ties to Finland because
it has designed two petroleum refining facilities for
Neste Oy, the Finnish government-owned petroleum
refining company. The visit has not yet been announced
in Finland, and we want to keep it confidential until
the Finnish Government makes it public.
they Secretariat Staff
CONFIDENTIAroduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DOC
RECD
G NBR
INITIAL ACTION OFF
MO DA
MO DA HR
NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE
4
28
4
29
10
3714
LOG IN/OUT ONLY somefeldt
TO: PRES
FROM: ELIOT a
U
NO FORN
NODIS
KISSINGER x
ROGERS, W
LOU
BUO
EXDIS
laird, M
C &
DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION
HAIG
EYES ONLY
LIMDIS
'S
CODE WORD
RES DATA
TS
SENSITIVE
SUBJECT: Info mino on Pervate visit of Funnish Pres Un ho Kekkoven
to us in June
7287762
REFERENCE: S/S
OTHER
NOT XEROXED
APP'TS: PRES
HAK
TALKER
MEMCON
DATE REQ.
INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION
ACTION REQUIRED
ACTION
INFO
REC
MEMO FOR HAK
(
)
CY
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG
FOR
MEMO FOR PRES.
(
)
STAFF SECRETARY
X
REPLY FOR
SIGNATURE
(
)
FAR EAST
for DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH
(
)
SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
MEMO
TO
(
)
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA
RECOMMENDATIONS
(
)
EUROPE/CANADA
X
JOINT MEMO
(
)
LATIN AMERICA
REFER TO STATE
(
)
UNITED NATIONS
X
ANY ACTION NECESSARY
-
)
ECONOMIC
CONCURRENCE
(
)
SCIENTIFIC
LR PLANNING
DUE DATE: 5/3
COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)
PROGRAM ANALYSIS
NSC PLANNING
CONGRESSIONAL
DATE
FROM
TO
S
ACTION REQUIRED
CY TO
#
INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING
5/2
HS
Nscls
no further action- was included in
briefing item
MICROFILM DATA
CROSS REF WITH
NOTIFY
DATE
DO
SEE LOG
DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO
DISPOSITION
JOINED BY LOG
COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE)
SPECIAL FILE RQMT:
SA,
HP,
HM
MAY 041972 DATE INIT
ORIG)
NSC
TO )
PAF
SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS:
WHC
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED:
YES
NO
SUBF
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
GPO: 1972-455-927
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 4 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION.
NLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
;
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
SENT
WWE213
1972 FEB 8 20 44
00 RUESHL
DE RUEADWW 0353 0392030
ZNR UUUUU
0 082094Z FEB 72 ZFF-1
FM THE WHITE HOUSE
TO AMEMB HELSINKI
BT
UNCLAS LIMITED OFFICIAL USE WH20127
SITUATION ROOM SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
72 FEB 8 PM 4:05
FEBRUARY 8, 1972
FOR:
RISTON HYVARINEN, FINNISH FOREIGN MINISTRY
FROM:
HENRY A. KISSINGER
I HEARD WITH GREAT CONCERN OF YOUR ILLNESS, BUT AM ENCOURAGED BY
REPORT THAT YOUR CONDITION IS IMPROVING. YOU HAVE MY SINCERE WISHES
FOR A SPEEDY RECOVERY.
WARM REGARDS.
BT
0353
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
NNNN
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Ed Roberts your pleases. meh
February 8, 1972
TO:
AM® EMBASSY - HELSINKI
FOR:
RISTO HYVARINEN, FINNISH FOREIGN MINISTRY
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER K
I heard with great concern of your illness, but am encouraged by
report that your condition is improving. You have my sincere wishes
for a speedy recovery.
Warm regards.
LIMITED OFFICIA Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
08
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
Coleman Hicks
Please call
to HAK'S
attention
Ets.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
as been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
121
PAGE 01 HELSIN 00147 0312432
45
FILE COPY
ACTION EUR- 2a
INFO OCT-01 SS-14 INR-06 NSC-10 CIAE-00 IO-12 RSR-01 RSC-01
/065 W
023215
R 0310352 FEB 72
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4225
INFO USUN NEW YORK 126
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE HELSINKI 0147
SUBJECT: HYVARINEN ILLNESS
FINNISH FOREIGN MINISTRY'S CHIEF OF POLITICAL SECTION
RISTO HYVARINEN WAS ADMITTED TO MEILAHTI HOSPITAL, helsinki,
EARLIER THIS WEEK AFTER SUFFERING HEART ATTACK WHILE PLAYING
TENNIS. THE ILLNESS HAS NOT BEEN PUBLICIZED. ACCORDING
TO HIS DEPUTY, HYVARINEN NOT IN CRITICAL CONDITION, BUT HAS
EXPERIENCED SOME DIFFICULTIES OF MOVEMENT. AT THIS JUNCTURE
THE MINISTRY HOPES HE WILL BE ABLE TO RETURN TO WORK AFTER
A CONVALESCENCE OF SEVERAL WEEKS.
PETERSON
ANDERSON
HOLDRIDGE
HORMATS
JESSUP
KENNEDY
LEHMAN
T
NACHMANOFF
NEGROPONTE
ODEEN
RONDON
SAUNDERS
SONNENFELDT
WALSH
WELANDER
WRIGHT
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
USE
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
34511
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
CONFIDENTIAL
INFORMATION
November 9, 1971
NOT
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
34511
SUBJECT:
Conversation Between Dr. Kissinger and
Risto Hyvarinen, Wednesday, November 3
Hyvarinen began by saying that he could not understand our China policy.
The trend in the UN had been an inevitable one but not because of Dr.
Kissinger's most recent trip to Peking. US arm twisting had created bad
reactions but even without it, the vote would have been the same although
perhaps made up of a different set of countries.
Hyvarinen then conveyed regards from Max Jakobsen. Dr. Kissinger
said he would like to see him when he is in Washington. Hyvarinen said
that Secretary Rogers felt Jakobsen should not come here before the vote
on the Secretary General. Dr. Kissinger agreed. Hyvarinen went on to
say that Jakobsen's chances were pretty good. The Soviets have no serious
candidate of their own but have not yet made up their minds. The French
cannot very well use their veto. The Finns have the impression that Peking
is not against Jakobsen and might support him. The Arabs were not using
their old arguments against Jakobsen any more. Hyvarinen thought that the
role of the Secretary General was an important one, especially now that
the Chinese were coming into the United Nations. Dr. Kissinger agreed
and added that we were supporting Jakobsen and would use our best influence
to get him elected.
Hyvarinen then asked whether anything had come up in Peking on Sino-Soviet
relations. Dr. Kissinger said he would not comment on his talks in Peking
but this particular subject had not been a major one. Hyvarinen said the
Soviets see the Chinese as their major enemy and are worried about their
coming to the UN but the Chinese would probably be quite moderate. Dr.
Kissinger agreed that they probably would not do much in the first year.
Hyvarinen commented that the Chinese arrival would diminish Soviet influence
in the third world and further split the "anti-imperialist front. 11
Dr. Kissinger asked whether Hyvarinen thought that some UN delegations
had behaved badly after the Chinese vote. Hyvarinen thought some had,
for example, the Cubans. (Hyvarinen added that the Cubans supported
Jakobsen and this may be an indication of the Chinese attitude.)
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CONFIDENTIAL
-2-
Dr. Kissinger asked why the Soviets were SO eager to have a European
Security Conference. Hyvarinen thought the reason was psychological.
The Soviets liked congresses and ceremonial occasions. They want the
status quo ratified. Perhaps they also want the conference as an end in
itself, to mark a triumph of a long-standing policy. To Dr. Kissinger's
inquiry as to the more concrete Soviet objective in a conference, Hyvarinen
responded he thought the Soviets were looking for a declaration on relations
between states.
Dr. Kissinger asked Hyvarinen why he thought the Soviets wanted to meet
with President Nixon. Hyvarinen said it must be related to SALT and the
European Security Conference.
Dr. Kissinger asked about the Finnish assessment of Brezhnev. Hyvarinen
said the Finns had had little to do with him. They had found Kosygin a
most intellectual person. Brezhnev appeared to have had heart trouble
but Hyvarinen could not really give an assessment. Podgorny always seemed
to be on a single track party line. Kosygin told Kekkonen two years ago
that he wanted to retire. At present the top leaders seem to have a division
of labor for travel. Dr. Kissinger said that Brezhnev seemed to get the
more important trips.
In conclusion, Dr. Kissinger noted that there did not seem to be many real
issues at the UN. He asked Hyvarinen whether he thought the China vote
was a good thing, whether it was better to have had it this year than next.
Hyvarinen said it would make the organization more realistic. After agreeing
with Hyvarinen that U Thant was not very intellectual, Dr. Kissinger reiterated
that we supported Jakobsen. Hyvarinen expressed his appreciation.
Helmut Sonnenfeldt
Original - Dr. Kissinger
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Fradand
34306
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
CONFIDENTIAL
ACTION
@
November 2, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER
FROM:
Helmut Sonnenfeldt
SUBJECT:
Your Meeting with Risto Hyvarinen, Wednesday,
November 3, at 5:30
You will presumably wish to touch on the Kekkonen visit to Moscow, the
Jakobson candidacy, the Finnish Government collapse, the Finnish-
German initiative, and CES.
*
*
Kekkonen's Moscow Visit. His 15th unofficial visit to the USSR since
taking office in 1956 was on October 17-18 en route from Iran to Helsinki.
Kekkonen met with Podgorny and Gromyko, and discussed Jakobson and
CES. The Finns were heartened by the fact that the Russians made no
negative comment about Jakobson. The Finns believe that the Soviets
would not make up their minds finally until after a full discussion at the
politiburo meeting after Brezhnev returns from France. Kekkonen, at
least at that time, was fairly sanguine about eventual Soviet support for
Jakobson. On CES, Kekkonen had the feeling that the Soviets wanted it
badly, but have come to the conclusion that some delay is now likely.
New Finnish Government. On October 30 Kekkonen appointed a non-
political Cabinet of experts to replace the Karjalainen Government which
resigned the day before after failing to resolve a dispute between labor
and agrarian interests over agricultural income policy. The new Cabinet
is politically balanced, and half of the 15 Ministers were members of the
"experts" Cabinet which sat in 1970 before the Karjalainen government was
formed. The change in government eases former Foreign Minister Leskinen
out of office with minimal embarassment (beyond the inconvenience of being
on an official visit to Czechoslovakia and Hungary when deprived of office).
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CONFIDENTIAL
-2-
New elections will be around January 2. Indeed, the reason for the
hectic activity last week was because any further delay would have con-
stitutionally postponed the elections by a month -- and then placed them
in the middle of the politically-charged collective bargaining period and
negotiation regarding the entire economic stabilization program. There
is a general supposition that the elections will not appreciably change
the political coloration of the Parliament. The elections may serve to
clear the air before the stabilization negotiations, and might also clarify
Finland's position vis a vis the Common Market, which will be a major
campaign issue.
The Common Market. Finnish industry gave its support to the former
Government's position of negotiating an industrial free-trade arrangement
with the EC. Since the Social Democrats have also climbed on board, the
Soviets presumably will have greater difficulty in opposing the Finnish EEC
talks. Hyvarinen may have some information on the EC issue, since the
potential effects of EC enlargement was the main subject at the one day
Nordic Prime Ministers meeting on October 28. (The Danish surcharge
problem was also discussed; the Communist press in Finland has been
urging the Government to take similar trade blocking measures.)
The Germanies. The GDR rather promptly informed the Finns that they
were ready to start negotiations on the Finnish initiative. So far the Finns
are sticking to their position that no "definitive" reply has been received
from the FRG, and so no date can be set for the talks. The general speculation
has been that the Finns took this initiative as a gesture to the Soviets in part
designed to head off pressure from Moscow on the Common Market issue.
Visit by President. As I mentioned in an earlier memorandum, Hyvarinen
asked me last month "on a personal basis" whether the President could not
stop in Helsinki on his way back from Moscow. I said that details as to his
itinerary etc. had not yet been worked out. Until more is known about possible
stops in Allied countries, I assume the question of a Helsinki stop -- in itself
desirable -- should be held in abeyance.
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DOC
RECD
OG NBR
INITIAL ACTION OFF
MO DA
MO DA HR
NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE
11
2
11
3+306
2
20
LOG IN/OUT ONLY
TO: PRES
FROM: ELIOT
U
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ROGERS, W
LOU
BUO
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Sonmeyeldt LAIRD, M
S
CODE WORD
RES DATA
subject:
Toeners for Hin mig with Risto TS Hyvounew SENSITIVE on
REFERENCE: S/S
OTHER
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APP'TS: PRES
HAK
TALKER
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DATE REQ.
INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION
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ACTION
INFO
REC
MEMO FOR HAK
(
)
CY
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG
FOR
MEMO FOR PRES.
(
)
STAFF SECRETARY
REPLY FOR
SIGNATURE
(
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FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH
(
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MEMO
TO
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RECOMMENDATIONS
(
)
EUROPE/CANADA
JOINT MEMO
(
)
LATIN AMERICA
REFER TO STATE
(
)
UNITED NATIONS
ANY ACTION NECESSARY
(
)
ECONOMIC
CONCURRENCE
(
)
SCIENTIFIC
DUE DATE:
LR PLANNING
COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)
PROGRAM ANALYSIS
NSC PLANNING
CONGRESSIONAL
DATE
FROM
TO
S
ACTION REQUIRED
CY TO
11/2
Sam
HAK
x
Talkers (1/3)
INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING
11/4
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MICROFILM DATA
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JOINED BY LOG
COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE)
SPECIAL FILE RQMT:
SA,
HP,
HM
081971 DATE INIT
ORIG)
NSC
x
SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS:
TO )
PAF
WHC
R
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: YES
NO
SUBF
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
* GP01 1971-412-412
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
,30 pm Wed 3Noo
158
MEMORANDUM
HA16
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
10
34143
CONFIDENTIAL Attachment
ACTION
October 29, 1971
Finlend
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER
FROM:
Helmut Sonnenfeldt Hs.
SUBJECT:
Hyvarinen
He called from New York today after having been in Finland for ten days.
He will be in Washington Tuesday about noon and has an appointment with
Hillenbrand. He wants of course again to try to see you and says he can
stay through Wednesday night or even Thursday morning, November 4.
At Tab A (Log #33685) is the message he asked me to give you when I saw
him two weeks ago. As it turned out, Kekkonen only saw Porgorny.
RECOMMENDATION
That you indicate whether you want to see Hyvarinen.
Yes HK
Day
Time
No
Hicks notify
Sonnenfeldt notify
CONFIDENTIAL Attachment
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
33685
CONFIDENTIAL
URGENT INFORMATION
October 14, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER
FROM:
Helmut Sonnenfeldt
SUBJECT:
Message From Hyvarinen
At lunch with the Finnish Ambassador today, Hyvarinen asked me to tell
you the following:
-- He is going home for about a week; when he returns week after
next he will be able to report on Kekkonen's talks with Brezhnev et al in
Moscow next week enroute to Tehran.
-- The Chinese have indicated that Jakobsen would be acceptable to
them as the next UN Secretary General;
-- Saying he spoke without instructions, Hyvarinen wondered whether
the President could stop in Helsinki on the way back from Moscow for a
brief talk, perhaps luncheon, with Kekkonen. I said no detailed plans had
yet been made but I certainly would pass the idea on.
HS:hc
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DOC
RECD
LOG NBR
INITIAL ACTION OFF
MO DA
MO DA HR
NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE
10
29
10
2914
24143
LOG IN/OUT ONLY
TO: PRES
FROM: ELIOT
U
NO FORN
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KISSINGER
ROGERS, W
LOU
BUO
EXDIS
DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION
HAIG
C
X
EYES ONLY
LIMDIS
Bornenfelat LAIRD, M
S
CODE WORD
RES DATA
TS
sensitive
SUBJECT: Renewed request from Riisto Hyvarinen of
feiland for appt firth AAR
REFERENCE: S/S
OTHER
NOT XEROXED
APP'TS: PRES
HAK
Request MEMCON
DATE REQ.
INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION
ACTION REQUIRED
ACTION
INFO
REC
MEMO FOR HAK
(
)
CY
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG
FOR
MEMO FOR PRES.
-
)
STAFF SECRETARY
REPLY FOR
SIGNATURE
-
)
FAR EAST
FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH
(
)
SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION
AFRICA
MEMO
TO
(
)
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA
RECOMMENDATIONS
(
)
EUROPE/CANADA
JOINT MEMO
(
)
LATIN AMERICA
REFER TO STATE
(
)
UNITED NATIONS
ANY ACTION NECESSARY
(
)
ECONOMIC
CONCURRENCE
(
)
SCIENTIFIC
DUE DATE:
LR PLANNING
COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)
PROGRAM ANALYSIS
NSC PLANNING
CONGRESSIONAL
DATE
FROM
TO
S
ACTION REQUIRED
CY TO
10/29
HAK
X
Decision (10/30)
INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING
11/2
Hak Approved Recar
L
MICROFILM DATA
CROSS REF WITH
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JOINED BY LOG
COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE)
NOV 041971 INIT DATE
SPECIAL FILE RQMT:
SA,
HP,
HM
ORIG)
NSC
SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS:
TO )
PAF
WHC
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED:
YES
NO
SUBF
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
* GPO: 19 '1-412-412
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
7117654
34352
department OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520
CONFIDENTIAL
November 3, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE
Subject: Resignation of Finnish Government
The attached memorandum was prepared for the
Secretary and is forwarded for the information of
the National Security Council.
Theodore L. Elist pe. fre.
Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary
Attachment:
Memorandum on Resignation
of Finnish Government
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CONFIDENTIAL
Resignation of the Finnish Government
The Cabinet of Prime Minister Ahti Karjalainen
resigned on October 29 after a bitter dispute between
the two major coalition partners, the Social Democrats
and the Center Party, over agricultural price supports.
An interim cabinet headed by Helsinki Mayor Teuvo Aura
took office October 29. The new cabinet, acting with
the President, dissolved parliament and called for new
elections on January 2-3, 1972. Prime Minister Aura
declared that his government would not change the
course of Finland's foreign policy.
The Social Democrats apparently felt they could
not allow themselves to appear negligent in protecting
the interest of the blue collar worker by accepting
the demands of the agriculturally oriented Center Party
for increased farm subsidies. This is particularly
important at this time because the Social Democrats
are engaged in a fight with the Communists for control
of the largest industrial trade union, the Metalworkers
Union.
The resignation of the Karjalainen government,
the appointment of the Aura government, and the call
for new elections do not have any implications for U.S.
interests in Finland at this time.
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DOC
RECD
OG NBR
INITIAL ACTION OFF
MO DA
MO DA HR
NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE
34352
LOG in/out ONLY
TO: PRES
FROM: ELIOT x
U
NO FORN
NODIS
KISSINGER X
ROGERS, W
LOU
BUO
EXDIS
DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION
HAIG
laird, M
C
X
EYES ONLY
LIMDIS
S
CODE WORD
RES DATA
SUBJECT:
Resignation of the Finnish sensitive Government
REFERENCE: S/S 7117654 OTHER
NOT XEROXED
APP'TS: PRES
HAK X
TALKER
MEMCON
DATE REQ.
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ACTION REQUIRED
ACTION
INFO
REC
MEMO FOR HAK
(
)
CY
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG
FOR
MEMO FOR PRES.
(
)
STAFF SECRETARY
REPLY FOR
SIGNATURE
(
)
FAR EAST
FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH
(
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SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
MEMO
TO
(
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NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA
X
RECOMMENDATIONS
(
-
EUROPE/CANADA
JOINT MEMO
(
)
LATIN AMERICA
REFER TO STATE
(
UNITED NATIONS
ANY ACTION NECESSARY 1
(
)
ECONOMIC
CONCURRENCE
(
)
SCIENTIFIC
DUE DATE:
1110
LR PLANNING
COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)
PROGRAM ANALYSIS
NSC PLANNING
CONGRESSIONAL
DATE
FROM
TO
S
ACTION REQUIRED
CY TO
As
FYF
11/4
INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING
Downey
fact
no action necemary
MICROFILM DATA
CROSS REF WITH
NOTIFY
DATE
SEE LOG
DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO
DO
INIT
DISPOSITION
JOINED BY LOG
COPIES: (AS MARKED above)
SA,
HM
NOV081971
DATE
SPECIAL FILE RQMT:
HP,
ORIG)
NSC
X
SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS:
TO )
PAF
WHC
R
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED:
YES
NO
SUBF
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
* GPO: 1971-412-412
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
33685
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
Kinland
CONFIDENTIAL
URGENT INFORMATION
October 14, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER
FROM:
Helmut Sonnenfeldt
by
SUBJECT:
Message From Hyvarinen
At lunch with the Finnish Ambassador today, Hyvarinen asked me to tell
you the following:
-- He is going home for about a week; when he returns week after
next he will be able to report on Kekkonen's talks with Brezhnev et al in
Moscow next week enroute to Tehran.
-- The Chinese have indicated that Jakobsen would be acceptable to
them as the next UN Secretary General,
-- Saying he spoke without instructions, Hyvarinen wondered whether
the President could stop in Helsinki on the way back from Moscow for a
brief talk, perhaps luncheon, with Kekkonen. I said no detailed plans had
yet been made but I certainly would pass the idea on.
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DOC
RECD
LOG NBR
INITIAL ACTION OFF
MO
DA
MO DA HR
NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE
10
14
10
33685
14
18
LOG IN/OUT ONLY
TO: PRES
FROM: ELIOT
U
NO FORN
NODIS
X
KISSINGER
ROGERS, W
LOU
BUO
EXDIS
HAIG
X
DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION
laird, M
C
EYES ONLY
LIMDIS
Sonminfeldt
S
CODE WORD
RES DATA
TS
sensitive
subject:
Funnish Anb Conveys Msg to Sonnerfeldt re his between to
Moscow, UN SEC General 2 Phes trys to PRC
REFERENCE: S/S
OTHER
NOT XEROXED
APP'TS: PRES
HAK
TALKER
MEMCON
DATE REQ.
INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION
ACTION REQUIRED
ACTION
INFO
REC
MEMO for HAK
(
)
CY
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG
for
MEMO FOR pres.
(
)
STAFF SECRETARY
REPLY FOR
SIGNATURE
(
-
FAR EAST
FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH
(
)
SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION
sub-saharan AFRICA
MEMO
TO
(
)
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA
RECOMMENDATIONS
)
)
EUROPE/CANADA
JOINT MEMO
(
)
LATIN AMERICA
REFER TO STATE
(
)
UNITED NATIONS
ANY ACTION NECESSARY
(
)
ECONOMIC
CONCURRENCE
-
)
SCIENTIFIC
due DATE:
LR PLANNING
COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)
PROGRAM ANALYSIS
NSC PLANNING
CONGRESSIONAL
DATE
FROM
TO
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ACTION REQUIRED
CY TO
10/14
Sonn
HAK
City
Info
INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING
11-03
noted by york
Y
MICROFILM DATA
CROSS REF WITH
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DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO
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DISPOSITION
JOINED BY LOG
NOV
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COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE)
HP,
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051971
DATE
.
SPECIAL file RQMT:
SA,
ORIG)
NSC
TO )
PAF X
SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS:
WHC
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED:
YES
NO
SUBF
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
* GPO: 1971-412-412
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
No Objection To Declassification 2008/09/05 : NLN-NSC-673-2-1-5
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
A
HAK:
The attached telegram refers to a Fatah
terrorist who, by his account, was assigned the
task of assassinating King Hussein in London.
He decided not to and says that Fatah is now
out to kill him.
The State judgment not to consider him
eligible was made on general grounds that he
is an undesirable alien-i.e. an ibinerant
terrorist. He is not in danger from any
government--either his own in Lebanon or the
Finnish where he is now. He does not seem
the kind of upstanding individual in danger
from a repressive government that usually is
the asylum case.
Hal Saunders
State Dept. review completed
+5
HAK
you asked about
this @
No Objection To Declassification 2008/09/05 : NLN-NSC-673-2-1-5
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
No Objection To Declassification 2008/09/05 : NLN-NSC-673-2-1-5
DEPARTMENT
STATE
UNITED STATES OF
DISPARCHED Department of State
RSC
TELEGRAMA
SECRET 207
Sawan
PAGE 01 STATE 002330
82
ORIGIN SS-45
24
INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 1046 R
66635
DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN:AIKILLGORE
APPROVED BY: NEA-ATHERTON
S/R.ORM-TEMPLECOLE
EUR/SCAN-BODDE
INR/OIL-BUFORD
NEA/ARN-T.W.SEELYE
S/S-O:BRIMS
070233
0 R 070049Z JAN 71 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY HELSINKI IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
SE C R E T STATE 002330
25X1
EXDIS
SUBJECT: ABDUL RAHIM HASSANEIN HUSAYNI
REF#
10 DEPT TENDS TO DISCOUNT BULK OF HUSAYNI'S STORY ALTHOUGH
APPEARS THAT PORTIONS OF IT MAY NOT HAVE BEEN FABRICATED.
FOR INSTANCE, HIS CLAIM THAT HE WOULD FACE PRISON SEN
TENCE IN LEBANON FOR AL-FATAH ACTIVITY DOES NOT CONFORM
TO REALITIES OF SITUATION IN LEBANON
2. ON BASIS INFORMATION AVAILABLE SUBJECT APPEARS TO BE
IN NO DANGER IN FINLAND OR LEBANON AND, THEREFORE, HIS
ELIGIBILITY FOR POLITICAL ASYLUM STRONGLY IN DOUBT. FURTHER-
MORE, WE WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO PERMIT ENTRY INTO THIS COUN-
TRY OF HIRED ASSASIN.
SECRET
30
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE
No Objection To Declassification 2008/09/05 NLN-NSC-673-2-1-5
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
No Objection To Declassification 2008/09/05 : NLN-NSC-673-2-1-5
are
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 STATE 002332
3. DEPT RECOMMENDS THAT HELSINKI POLITELY DISABUSE HUSAYNI
OF ANY NOTION THAT HE MAY 35 ABLE TO ENTER UNITED STATES
AS A DEFECTOR
4. DEPT SUGGESTS THAT AT ITS DISCRETION, MAY
WISH TO INFORM APPROPRIATE FINNISH AUTHORITIES IN CONFI-
DENCE CONCERNING HDS INIS INWIN
NOT TO % REPRODUCED HITHOUT THE AUTHOR CASTOP OF THE
No Objection To Declassification 2008/09/05 : NLN-NSC-673-2-1-5
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
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DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER
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ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION.
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Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
26911
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
S/S 7104005
March 19, 1971
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Subject: Finnish Government Resigns over
Communist Intransigence
The eight-month old coalition government headed
by Prime Minister Ahti Karjalainen has resigned over
the opposition of the Communist-front Finnish Peoples
Democratic League to an essential government measure.
Its members in parliament voted against the price
control program supported by the other four coalition
parties. The Finnish Communists first joined non-
Communist parties in a coalition in 1966 after an
18 year absence from government.
In December 1970 the Finnish Peoples Democratic
League almost wrecked the five party coalition over
a minor issue, a gasoline price increase, but backed
down at the last moment. Until the onset of this
latest political crisis, the Soviet Union and the
majority of the Finnish Communist leaders evidently
agreed that the advantages of political respectability
and power outweighed the disadvantage of association
with government measures which were not in line with
Marxist doctrine. However, participation in govern-
ment exacerbated the rift between the hard-line
Stalinists and the so-called liberals within the
Finnish Communist Party. Recently the Communists have,
to an increasing extent, played the double game of
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CONFIDENTIAL
2.
attacking the government for actions which are eco-
nomically necessary though unpopular with the left,
while remaining in the Cabinet. Although the price
control program was adopted by the Parliament, Prime
Minister Karjalainen called the Communists' hand by
resigning.
Our Embassy reports it is generally believed
that President Kekkonen will ask Prime Minister
Karjalainen to attempt to form a four party coalition
without Communist participation. Such a government
would have a slim majority in Parliament.
The resignation of the Finnish Government has
no worrisome implications for US-Finnish relations,
which remained healthy during the period of Communist
participation in the governing coalition. Whatever
the character of the government that is next formed,
President Kekkonen will remain in absolute control
of Finnish foreign policy. If the Communists do not
make their peace with him and are excluded, Kekkonen
may face certain difficulties with Moscow but should
be able to master them as he has in the past.
Should the next government not include the
Communists, then our relations with Finland will be
on even more secure ground. Also, the "European show-
case" of Communist participation in the exercise of
government power will be shattered.
William P. Rogers
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
APR 27 1971
NSC # 26911
Sccretariat
MR Sammanfillt
,
The attached has been referred to you for action on March 19TH.
At this time:
- Do you recommend "No Action Required"?
YES
- Is this item "OBE"?
- Do you intend to reply?
Can you specify an approximate date?
Please return this sheet to the NSC Secretariat as soon
as possible.
Thank you.
MICROFILM DATA
DO
MAY031971
MAY
INIT
DATE
ORIG)
NSC
TO
)
PAF
WHC
SUBF
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DOC
RECD
LOG NBR
INITIAL ACTION OFF
MO DA
MO DA HR
NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE
3
19
3
19
19
n6911
TO: PRES X
LOG IN/OUT ONLY
FROM: ELIOT
U
NO FORN
NODIS
KISSINGER
ROGERS,
W
x
LOU
BUO
EXDIS
DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION
HAIG
LAIRD, M
X
EYES ONLY
LIMDIS
S
CODE WORD
RES DATA
TS
SENSITIVE
SUBJECT:
longation of Finnial Good due to Communist Intransyince
REFERENCE: S/S 7104005
OTHER
NOT XEROXED
APP'TS: PRES
HAK
TALKER
MEMCON
DATE REQ.
INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION
ACTION REQUIRED
ACTION
INFO
REC
MEMO FOR HAK
(
)
CY
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG
FOR
MEMO FOR PRES.
(
x
)
STAFF SECRETARY
REPLY FOR
SIGNATURE
(
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FAR EAST
FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH
(
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SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION
SUB-SAHARaN AFRICA
MEMO
TO
(
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NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA
x
RECOMMENDATIONS
(
)
EUROPE/CANADA
JOINT MEMO
(
)
LATIN AMERICA
REFER TO STATE
(
)
UNITED NATIONS
ANY ACTION necessary
(
)
ECONOMIC
CONCURRENCE
(
)
SCIENTIFIC
LR PLANNING
DUE DATE: 3/23
COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)
PROGRAM ANALYSIS
NSC PLANNING
CONGRESSIONAL
DATE
FROM
TO
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ACTION required
CY TO
3/20
H3
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INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING
428
Hyland
NSC/S
OBE
MICROFILM DATA
CROSS REF WITH
NOTIFY
DATE
SEE LOG
DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO
DO
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JOINED BY LOG
COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE)
DATE
SPECIAL FILE RQMT:
SA,
HP,
HM
ORIG)
NSC
\
SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS:
TO )
PAF
WHC
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED:
YES
NO
SUBF
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
* GPO: 1971-412-412
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
23642
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
CONFIDENTIAL
INFORMATION
November 18, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER
FROM:
Helmut Sonnenfeldt to
SUBJECT:
Meeting with Finnish Roving Ambassador Ralph Enckell
on European Security
As you may know, Ambassador Enckell has been touring Europe for about
a year talking soundings on a European Security Conference. Ambassador
Munkki hosted a small luncheon for him on Wednesday, and since I could
not make it I saw Enckell briefly before lunch. Bill Hyland attended the
luncheon. He explained the latest Finnish idea, which is to hold a "gathering"
of Ambassadors in Helsinki to talk about a conference. The theory is that
this might serve as a catalyst, and only in this way could one really know if
there was any prospect for a more formal meeting that might have a chance
of success. He reports growing enthusiasm, except for British coolness,
and, he implied, American skepticism. He stressed that his effort was
not at Soviet behest, and in fact, reported that the Finns during Kekkonen's
visit to Moscow had to warn the Soviets off of embracing the Finnish idea lest
Soviets endorsement turn it into a Warsaw Pact proposal. He said the Finns
would soon send formal notes with their proposal to all interested states.
I asked whether he had talked all this over with State. (He said he had.)
I said that I assumed that once a Finnish note was officially received by our
Government it would be given full consideration and a response would then
be forthcoming. I asked whether the note would be sent out before the
December NATO meeting; he said it would but stressed that it would be
made clear that no NATO response would be expected soon. (Comment:
As a practical matter I assume that a new Finnish initiative will in fact
stimulate further pressures in NATO to be forthcoming on a conference,
even though the Rome Communique last spring already went some way
toward endorsing preparations through multilateral contacts.)
In response to Enckell's question as to whether our attitude had changed I
said we still did not oppose a conference as a matter of principle but were
concerned that it deals with real issues and showed promise of success.
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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CONFIDENTIAL
- 2 -
Enckell asked about the relationship of the Berlin talks to preparations for a
conference. I said there had been some assertions that we had raised a new
"pre-condition" by making a Berlin settlement a pre-requisite to a con-
ference. Enckell said it was wrong to think of pre-conditions. All aspects
of East-West relations in Europe were interrelated. I said this made sense;
it was hard to envisage real security in Europe if Berlin remained a source
of constant tension or crises. At the same time, the Berlin talks pointed up
the fact that the real issues that might currently be ripe for negotiation and
settlement were hardly suited for Conference-style diplomacy. Enckell
reiterated that the Finnish idea was to test the water by having Ambassadors
informally talk about whether and how to hold a conference at some unspecified
time. He concluded that the chief Finnish criterion in all their activities in
this field was "acceptability"; i.e. there could be a conference only if all
concerned wanted it. (Comment: Enckell, whom I have known for some
years, is in fact a quite hard-headed man who has few illusions about the
Soviets or the prospects for fundamental changes in East-West relations.
He is doing a job for his government and is trying to do it in such a way as
to minimize the propagandistic effects of Soviet-Warsaw Pact tactics. Even
so, as noted above, his activities will to some extent contribute to pressures
for a conference which already exist in the West. Cf. for example, the long
way the Italians just went with Gromyko in endorsing a conference and the
FRG's similar posture. Even Pompidou, while in Moscow, found it expedient
to agree to communique language favoring a conference.)
In reporting this talk, I note that Senator Percy has sent you a special message
reporting on this same subject in his talks with Finnish Prime Minister
Karjalainen. Percy promised to bring the Finnish proposal to the President's
attention when he returned. (Cable at Tab A).
Enckell
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
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A
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
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the
CONFIDENTIAL
1891
to
PAGE 02 HELSIN 01425 171627Z
CONFIDENTIALHELSINKI 1425
CODEL PERCY
PASS WHITE HOUSE FOR DR. KISSINGER
PASS SENATOR'S OFFICE FOR HHPLJ
4L SF
ICD JZWEHEN ( )
SUBJ: SENATOR PERCY DISCUSSION OF CES WITH PR IME
MINISTER KARJALAINEN
1. DURING CALL BY SENATOR PERCY ON PRIME MINISTER KARJALAINEN
TO DISCUSS VIETNAM (SUBJECT OF SEPARATE MESSAGE), PRIMIN
RAISED QUESTION OF CONFERENCE ON EUROPEAN SECURITY (CES).
NOT ING THAT NUMBER OF CRITICS ABROAD HAD SUGGESTED THAT
FINLAND WAS ACTING AS STALKING HOR SE FOR MOSCOW IN PROPOSING
CES IN HELSINKI, KARJALAINEN SAID FINLAND WAS ACTING
STR ICTLY IN TIS ON INTERESTS IN MAKING PROPOSAL.
2. SENATOR PERCY POINTED OUT THAT USG WELL AWARE FINLAND'S
SINCER ITY - AND THAT OF PRIMIN HIMSELF--IN PROPOSING CES
FURTHER, SENATOR SAID U.S. DID NOT IN PRINCIPLE OPPOSE CES
BUT THAT us AND ITS NATO ALLIES BELIEVED THAT PROGRESS SHOULD
BE MADE ON CONCRETE ISSUES, SUCH AS BERLIN, SALT, ETC --
BEFORE POWERS COULD TAKE STEPS TOWARDS REALIZATION OF CES.
IF BY THEIR ACTIONS, SOVIETS SHOWED THEY WOULD BE PREPARED
TO DEAL WITH CES IN BUSINESSLIKE MANNER, THEN GROUNDWORK
WOULD BE LAID FOR EVENTUAL CONFERENCE. SENATOR NOTED THAT
HE HAD RECENTLY ATTENDED NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY, AT WHICH
POSITIVE RESOLUTION ON CES HAD BEEN VOTED. BUT US AND
NATO ALLIES WOULD NOT BE WILLING TO ATTEND CONFERENCE WHICH
WOULD BE SIMPLY PROPAGANDA FOR UM FOR MOSCOW.
3. PRIMIN THEN REFERRED TO HIS PROPOSAL FOR "GATHERING"
OF AMBASSADORS IN HELSINKI WHICH COULD SERVE AS A KIND OF
PRELIMINARY CES. HE POINTED OUT THAT SUCH A MEET ING WOULD
SER VE AS EXCELLENT TEST OF SOVIET INTENTIONS; WEST COULD
AT THIS GATHERING DETERMINE WHETHER SOVIETS REALLY READY
FOR SER IOUS CES NEGOTIATIONS. BY ATTENDANCE AT SUCH A
MEETING, HE CONCLUDED, WESTERN NAT IONS WOULD LOSE NOTHING
4. SENATOR PERCY DECL INED TO COMMENT ON SUBSTANCE OF
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
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CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 HELSIN 01425 171627Z
PROPOSAL, BUT PROMISED TO TRANSMIT PRIMIN'S VIEWS TO
PRESIDENT NIXON WHEN SENATOR RETURNS TO U.S.
GP3.
PETERSON
NOTE BY OC/T: HELSINKI 1425 ( ) AS RECEIVED. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.
CONFIDENTIALT
CONF IDENT IAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Hang
THE CHIEF OF PROTOCOL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
SECRET
Finland
May 6, 1970
HR
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE
Bill Codus from this office informed me upon
his return from the trip with the Apollo 12 Astro-
nauts that, in spite of the fact that President
Kekkonen had returned from Moscow especially to
be on hand to greet the Astronauts, our Ambassador
to Finland was off on vacation. This was the
cause of a certain amount of embarrassment.
Emil Mosbacher, Qurp. Jr.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
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3812
MEMORANDUM
Sover
has
1969
THE WHITE HOUSE
HAK
25
WASHINGTON
CONFIDENTIAL
INFORMATION
OCT
October 22, 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER
FROM:
Helmut Sonnenfeldt
SUBJECT: Your Meeting Friday, October 24 at 2p.m. with Risto
Hyvarinen
You have agreed to meet with Risto Hyvarinen, Director of Political
Affairs in the Finnish Foreign Ministry. He was a student of yours
while a Fellow at the Harvard Center for International Affairs during
1963-64. A confidant of President Kekkonen, he was hand-picked for
his extremely influential position in the Foreign Ministry, and has
traveled with Kekkonen on most of his foreign trips. Hyvarinen is an
honest and careful talker, and has been most cooperative with our
Embassy.
Hyvarinen may raise the following points:
-- the desire of President Kekkonen to visit the US, preferably in
the second quarter of 1970; (NOTE: Ambassador Val Peterson
recently strongly urged such a visit; State, however, has not
included it on the visit list for the first half of 1970.)
-- continued interest in the "Finnish initiative" for a European
Security Conference;
-- Helsinki as a site for the SALT talks (the Finns have indicated
they would be delighted to be hosts, but they do not want to be
in competition with Geneva and Vienna).
There are no bilateral Finnish-US problems. You may wish to ask his
assessment of the Kekkonen visit in September to Romania, Hungary
and Czechoslovakia (heavily criticized by the Finnish left) and the visit
to Helsinki last week of Soviet President Podgorny. You should give him
a succinct rundown on Vietnam because this will get back to the Soviets.
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
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3394
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ACTION
October 11, 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER
FROM:
Helmut Sonnenfeldt
of
SUBJECT: Appointment with You for Risto Hyvarinen, Director of
Political Affairs, Foreign Ministry of Finland (Tab A)
A former student of yours Risto Hyvarinen, now Director of Political
Affairs in the Foreign Ministry of Finland, has asked to call on you when
he is here from October 23 to 25. Alternatively, the Finnish Ambassador,
Mr. Munkki, suggests a private luncheon for the two of you at his residence.
State and Ambassador Val Peterson in Helsinki strongly support the request.
Apart from any personal interest you may have, I think it would be useful
for you to see a prominent Finn for a change. If you like, I can take him
off your hands after 15 minutes or so,
RECOMMENDATION
That you agree to see Risto Hyvarinen for 15 minutes.
Approve
October 23
October 24
-Tetatinely
(prisments)
October 25
Disapprove
new
Chd w/ andrea Long, s/s
0930 10/17 RB
to
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
3394
department OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520
October 10, 1969
15487
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE
Subject: Appointment with you for Risto Hyvarinen,
Director of Political Affairs, Foreign
Ministry of Finland.
The Finnish Ambassador, Olavi Munkki, has spoken to
us concerning the wish of Risto Hyvarinen, Director of
Political Affairs, Foreign Ministry of Finland, to pay a
call on you. Mr. Hyvarinen was a student of yours while
a Fellow at the Harvard Center for International Affairs
during the school year 1963-64. The request for an
appointment is supported by Ambassador Val Peterson.
Mr. Hyvarinen is a man of most substantial influence
in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland. He is a
confidant of President Kekkonen, and has traveled with
the President on most of his recent trips abroad. He has
been cooperative and forthcoming with our Embassy in
Helsinki on all occasions.
Hyvarinen will be in Washington from October 23 to 25.
Ambassador Munkki has suggested that, while you might
prefer that Mr. Hyvarinen call on you at your office, as
an alternative he would be happy to offer a private lunch
for the two of you at his Residence.
Recommendation
I very much hope that it will be possible for you to
see Mr. Hyvarinen. His meeting with you would be decidedly
in the interest of our relations with Finland.
Rebrematic
Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Exempted from
Automatic Decontrol.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
PRANTMENT OF
Days
Stall to mahe
STATE
recommendation
*
*
Department of State
OF STATE AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL 663
PAGE 01 HELSIN 01042 081420Z
ok
50
ACTION EUR 08
HK
INFO OCT 01,10 03,CIAE 00:INR 07, NSAE 00 RSC 01,SS 20,NSC 100PM 04,
RSR 01/055 W
033160
R 081250Z OCT 69
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1914
C. ONF IDENTIA L HELSINKI 1042
1. DURING COURSE OF LUNCHEON CONVERSATION TODAY, RISTO
HYVARINEN, DIRECTOR OF FONMIN OFFICE OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS,
ASKED ME TO ARRANGE MEETING FOR HIM WITH DR. HENRY KISSINGER,
WHO WAS HYVARINEN'S PROFESSOR WHEN HE WAS FELLOW AT HARVARD
CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1963-64 HYVARINEN SAID
HE WOULD BE IN NEW YORK OCT. 20-25 TO ATTEND UNGA AND WOULD
COME TO WASHINGTON IF HE COULD MEET FOR APPROXIMATELY HALF-
HOUR WITH DR. KISSINGER AT LATTER'S CONVENIENCE.
2° ASIDE FROM HOLDING DOWN KEY FONMINISTRY POST OF POLITICAL
OFFICE DIRECTOR's HYVARINEN IS CONFIDANT OF PRESIDENT KEKKONEN
AND HAS TRAVELED WITH PRESIDENT KEKKONEN ON MOST OF KEKKONEN'S
RECENT TRIPS ABROAD. HE HAS IMPORTANCE IN GOF CONSIDERABLY
BEYOND HIS OFFICIAL POST, AND KEKKONEN IS KNOWN TO HAVE HIGH
RESPECT FOR HIS JUDGEMENT.
30 IN VIEW OF HYVARINEN'S POSITION HERE, AND FACT HE ALWAYS
COOPERATIVE IN DEALING WITH ME AND MY STAFF ON BILATERAL
MATTERS, I RECOMMEND THAT DR o KISSINGER AGREE TO RECEIVE
HYVARINEN FOR BRIEF MEETING, PROVIDED DR. KISSINGER'S SCHEDULE
PERMITS. I CONSIDER MEETING WOULD BE BENEFICIAL TO U.S.=
FINNISH RELATIONS, AND WOULD BE GREATLY APPRECIATED BY HYVARINEN
GP-3
PETERSON
CONFIDENTIAL
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THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER
18
ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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DECLASSIFIED
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929
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
CONFIDENTIAL
ACTION
May 15, 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER
FROM:
Helmut Sonnenfeldt HS (WEH)
SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with Ambassador Peterson
The President will receive Val Peterson, Ambassador-designate to
Finland, Friday at 3:45. Attached (Tab A) is a brief background
and talking point memorandum for the President, drawing on
State's memo (Tab B). Peterson is an old acquaintance of the
President's.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you sign and forward the attached memorandum (Tab A).
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
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A
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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929
department OF state
Washington, D.C. 20520
7698
May 15, 1969
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE
Subject: The President's Meeting with Ambassador-
designate to Finland, Val Peterson, Friday,
May 16, 1969 at 3:45 P.M.
Ambassador Peterson has been in Washington since May 5
for a series of briefings attendant on his assignment as
Ambassador to Finland. He plans to return to Hastings,
Nebraska on May 17 to conclude his personal affairs, and then
to embark for Europe on June 24. The Ambassador, who served
as President Eisenhower's Administrative Assistant, as
Federal Civil Defense Administrator and as Ambassador to
Denmark, is well acquainted with the President. A biographic
sketch of Ambassador Peterson is enclosed.
Relations between Finland and the United States remain
exceptionally good. There are no important bilateral issues
pending between the two countries. The Finnish political
situation is stable. President Kekkonen last year began his
third six year term. The present five party coalition govern-
ment, which took office in March 1968, is given a good chance
of remaining in office until early 1970.
Finnish foreign policy is one of neutrality, non-involve-
ment in conflicts between the Great Powers and friendly
relations with all nations and particularly the Soviet Union.
Finland, the only European democracy to share an extensive
frontier with the USSR, considers it necessary to its survival
to avoid any move that the USSR could legitimately regard as
a threat to its security. While Finland has a 1948 Treaty of
Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet
CONFIDENTIAL
Group 3
Downgraded at 12 year intervals,
not automatically declassified.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CONFIDENTIAL
-2-
Union, it is of limited applicability as the Finns are obliged
to fight only in the event of an attack, by West Germany or
its allies, on Finland or on the USSR through Finland.
Finland, despite its policy of non-involvement in major
East-West issues, plays an active and responsible role on the
international scene. During 1969, Finland is occupying a seat
on the UN Security Council.
The most significant of Finland's recent foreign policy
undertakings has been its initiative on a European Security
Conference. On the sixth of this month, the Finnish Govern-
ment approached the Governments of the United States and
Canada as well as all European Governments, including both
Germanies, with an offer of Helsinki as the site of a European
Security Conference. The Finnish proposal calls for prelimi-
nary consultations among the Governments concerned and, if it
is ascertained that conditions are ripe, a subsequent prepara-
tory meeting prior to the conference itself. The Finns have
told us privately that they expect that the entire process
would require a considerable period of time. In response to
the Finnish proposal, we have made reference to the April NATO
decision that the Allies, while remaining in close consul-
tation, would explore with the USSR and other Eastern European
countries the concrete issues which best lend themselves to
fruitful negotiation and early resolution. We have told the
Finnish Government that we believe it best to approach first
the specific problems, such as Berlin access, that do not
require a general conference. We believe that the NATO Allies
should, of course, examine this proposal (as is being done in
NATO), but continue with the real task of sorting out the
issues. In this way we hope to maintain progress and to
avoid the generation of euphoric hopes that, by promising
quick and enduring solutions to complex problems, would prove
detrimental to the achievement of real solutions.
John P. Walsh
for
Acting Executive Secretary
Enclosure:
Biographic Sketch
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
VAL RETERSON
Position for which considered: Ambassador to Finland
Present Position:
Chairman of the Board, Investors Growth
Industries, Incorporated
Office Address:
First Security Building, Suite 201,
601 West Second Street, Hastings, Nebraska
Born:
July 18, 1903, Oakland, Nebraska
Legal Residence:
Nebraska.
Marital Status:
Married June 6, 1929
Family:
Wife: Elizabeth Pleak
Home Address:
1124 Oswego Street, Hastings, Nebraska
Education:
A.B. 1927, Wayne State Teachers College;
A.M. 1931, University of Nebraska; 1931-33,
graduate student, University of Nebraska
Language Ability:
Not stated
Experience:
Non-Government
1925-30
Teacher public school, athletic coach,
Nebraska
1930-33
Instructor, University of Nebraska
1933-39
Superintendent, Elgin, Nebraska
1936-46
Publisher Elgin Review, Elgin, Nebraska
1939-40
Campaign Manager for U.S. Senator from
Nebraska, August 1939-November 1940
Government
1941- 42
Secretary to Governor Dwight Griswold
of Nebraska
Military
1942-46
United States Army, served to Lieutenant
Colonel; China, Burma, India Theatre
Government
1947-53
Governor of Nebraska
1947-53
Member, Missouri Basin Inter-Agency
Committee
1948-53
Chairman, Missouri River States Commission
1953
Administrative Assistant to the President
1953-55
Member, Commission Intergovernmental
Relations
1953-57
Federal Civil Defense Administrator
1957-60
Ambassador to Denmark
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
- 2 -
Non-Government
1961-64
Vice-President, Administrator, J. M.
McDonald Foundation, Inc.
1961-66
Vice Chairman of the Board, J. M. McDonald
Company, Hastings, Nebraska
1961-69
Director and Chairman of the Board, Life
Investors of Nebraska, Incorporated and
Director, Investors Life Insurance
Company of Nebraska
January/1969
to present
Chairman of the Board, Investors Growth
Industries, Incorporated
Memberships and Clubs:
Director: Public Relations, Mary Łanning
Memorial Hospital (Hastings, Nebraska) ;
Member, National Council of Boy Scouts;
Regent, University of Nebraska (1963-65) ;
President, University of Nebraska (1965) ;
Executive Council, Nebraska Association
of 4-H Development;
President, Wayne State Foundation;
Nebraska Delegate at Large, Republican
National Convention (1960 and 1964) ;
Member: American Legion, Veterans of
Foreign Wars, Air Force Association.
Clubs: Lochland Country Club, Omaha Club,
International Club; National Press Club.
Decorations and Awards: Bronze Star; Grand Cross of Dannebrog
(Denmark).
Honorary degrees: LL.D.: Midland College,
Fairleigh Dickinson University Stetson
University, Texas Lutherin, Muhlenberg
College.
March 1969
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
To
From
Classif.
Doc. Date
Recd.
Log No.
Kissinger
K.Cole
U
5/14
5/14
850
Subject
Comments
Memo re President's Meeting with XMMXX
also II 929
Ambassador Delegate Val Peterson, Friday, May 16,
3:45 P.M.
Index Terms
Action
Info.
Action Required
Micro.
Date Out
Sonnenfeldt
Briefing Memo for HAK
DUE 5/15
To.
Date
To
Date
To
Date
To
Date
To
Date
Agency
Date
Reproduced a the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
LOG CARD
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
850
MEMORANDUM
Date: May 14, 1969
Time: 9:30 A.M.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
FOR: H. Kissinger
CC (for information):
FROM THE STAFF SECRETARY
-Designate
SUBJECT (see attached): President's Meeting with Ambassador Delegate
Val Peterson, Friday, May 16, 3:45 P.M.
ACTION AND REMARKS:
For Necessary Action
Draft Reply
X Prepare Agenda and Brief
Draft Remarks
For Your Comments
For Your Information
For Your Recommendations
Other:
DUE: Date:
IV
May 15, 1969
Time: 2:00 P.M.
Please attach this copy to material submitted.
If you have any questions or if you anticipate a delay in
Co
submitting the required material, please telephone the
K. R. COLE, JR.
Staff Secretary immediately.
For the President
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STAT
MAY 9, 1969
FOR THE PRESS
NO. 111
VAL PETERSON SWORN IN AS
UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR
TO FINLAND
Val Peterson, of Nebraska, was sworn in today as United States
Ambassador to the Republic of Finland. Mr. Peterson had been Chairman
of the Board, Investors Growth Industries, Incorporated, since January
1969. In Helsinki, he will succeed Ambassador Tyler Thompson, who had
served there since August 1964.
Born on July 18, 1903, at Oakland, Nebraska, Mr. Peterson was
educated at Wayne State Teachers College (A.B., 1927); the University
of Nebraska (A.M., 1931); and was a graduate student at the University
in 1931-33. During 1942-46, he served in the U.S. Army in the China,
Burma, India Theatre, rising to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel.
Mr. Peterson taught in the Nebraska public school system from 1925
to 1930, and at the University of Nebraska from 1930 to 1933. In 1933,
he became Superintendent of the Elgin, Nebraska school system. He was
appointed Assistant to Governor Dwight Griswold in 1941. In 1947, he
was elected Governor of Nebraska, serving until 1953. At the same time,
he was Chairman of the Missouri River States Commission and a member of
the Missouri Basin Inter-Agency Committee. In 1953, Mr. Peterson was
named Administrative Assistant to President Eisenhower, and a member of
the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations in addition to his position
as Federal Civil Defense Administrator. During 1957-60, he served as
United States Ambassador to Denmark.
Upon leaving Government service, Mr. Peterson became Vice-President,
Administrator, J.M. McDonald Foundation, Inc. (1961-64); Vice Chairman
of the Board, J.M. McDonald Company, Hastings, Nebraska (1961-66); and
during 1961-69, Director and Chairman of the Board, Life Investors of
Nebraska, Incorporated, and Director, Investors Life Insurance Company of
Nebraska.
Ambassador Peterson is married to the former Elizabeth Howells
Pleak.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
THE WHITE Ho
WASHINGTON
3-28
NOTE - Mr. Malinen advised
unable to see before March 29
but would call after April 20
to set something up
Joan McCarthy
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 5, 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR MRS. JOAN McCARTHY
FROM:
Don Lesh have
SUBJECT:
Finnish Counselor's Request to See Dr. Kissinger
Remember our great and good friend, Mr. Malinen, of the Finnish
Embassy, who wants to pay his respects to Dr. Kissinger? The
Scandinavian Desk at State telephoned today to tell me that Malinen
still wants to come in, and has asked them to check once more on
the possibilities.
Any chance of finding him ten minutes in the near future? I gather
you had called once before when Malinen was setting off on holiday,
and he couldn't make it.
Strike a blow for US-Finnish friendship. Maybe he'll invite you
to a sauna.
Recently named
Omb to UAR
RECEIVED OELICE
RED MVA 1200 2 ЫМ + S3
HAR at saw 350 pm, 6/16,69
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM
NC DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ON
Intelligence
U.S. DEPARTMENT C. STATE
Note
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
- 374
April 15, 1969
To
: The Acting Secretary
Through: S/S
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes the
Subject: USSR/Finland: President Kekkonen and Premier Kosygin
to Meet May 19 for Unofficial Talks
The just-released announcement that Finnish President Kekkonen
and Soviet Premier Kosygin will meet in Leningrad on May 19 raises
questions about the connection between that meeting and Finland's
recent energetic diplomatic activity in favor of a European
security conference. Although the recent Finnish offer to host a
European security conference will doubtless be among the subjects
discussed, we do not believe that the meeting was arranged specifically
for this purpose. Kekkonen and Kosygin, each for his own reasons,
have found frequent personal contact with each other to be valuable,
they have a number of bilateral matters to discuss, and the timing
of the forthcoming meeting may well have been dictated largely by
Kosygin's busy schedule. Kekkonen and Kosygin last met in Finland
in October, and Kekkonen had planned to make a visit to the Soviet
Union this past winter.
Kekkonen Sensitive on European Security Conference Issue. Kekkonen
has shown himself to be sensitive to the possibility that the
Finnish initiative would be interpreted as having been undertaken in
collusion with the USSR or at Soviet behest, Consequently, the Finns
have gone out of their way to emphasize that their proposal is
entirely a unilateral one.
This report was produced by the Bureau
of Intelligence and Research. Aside
7
from normal substantive exchange with
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM
other agencies at the working level,
it has not been coordinated elsewhere.
NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
ECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROI D DISSEM
NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY
- 2 -
There are also indications that Soviet leaders are willing to
respect these Finnish sensitivities. A planned visit to Finland by
Soviet Defense Minister Grechko scheduled for later this month
(but never made public) has reportedly been postponed until later
in the year or next year. Moscow has apparently agreed with Kekkonen's
reported contention that such a visit at this time would be harmful
to Finnish efforts on behalf of a security conference. On the
basis of these developments we believe that the security conference
itself and the Finnish initiative in this regard are not the major
reason for the upcoming meeting. Subsequently, in any public
reports that he may make about the conversations, Kekkonen can be
expected to play down the security conference as a subject of
discussion.
No Major Outstanding Bilateral Issues. The two leaders have
not conferred since the heads of the Scandinavian governments met
in Stockholm and Helsinki in early 1969 to plan for a Nordic Economic
Community (NORDEC), and they are likely to exchange views on this subject.
The Soviets have yet to formulate their own position on this issue;
therefore, Kosygin may seek Kekkonen's views before Moscow
takes a stand. For his part, Kekkonen will want to reassert the
Finns' contention that Finland's membership in NORDEC would not
impair the development of Finnish-Soviet trade, nor would it result
in Finland's being drawn politically closer to NATO members Norway
and Denmark, as some Soviet leaders are reported to believe.
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM
NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLIE DISSEM
NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND U ONLY
- 3 -
Trade issues, focussing on the USSR's desire to increase its
share of the Finnish market, have from time to time provided minor
irritants in the otherwise trouble-free Finnish-Soviet relationship.
Within this context, the two leaders will no doubt discuss such
matters as the USSR's longstanding offer to build Finland's first
nuclear power plant; its desire to provide electric locomotives
for Finland's railways; and its proposal to build a natural gas
pipeline into Finland. There are strong indications that the
Finns have decided to give the power plant and locomotive contracts
to the USSR. The pipeline proposal is still in a state of con-
jecture. We think it is highly unlikely that any substantive
decisions will be taken on these issues at the Leningrad meeting.
Meetings Valuable to Both Sides. In addition to the reportedly
close and cordial relationship that has developed between them, both
Kekkonen and Kosygin have longstanding and valid reasons for wanting
to maintain contact through frequent, informal ænsultations. Kekkonen
ascribes a high priority to the Finnish need to keep its fences
with the USSR mended, and believes personal contacts are important
in this context. Of perhaps subsidiary, but nonetheless real, value
to Kekkonen is the domestic political advantage that he derives
from periodically refurbishing his image as the Finnish leader best
able to represent Finland's interests in dealing with Soviet leaders.
For Kosygin, the value of a close relationship with Kekkonen
is probably twofold: Kekkonen is a Western leader whom the Soviets
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM
NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLIED DISSEM
NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND [
ONLY
- 4 -
feel they know well enough to trust and to seek out for a frank
insight into events in the Western world. On the other hand,
Kosygin also probably finds Kekkonen useful as a channel for in-
formally transmitting to non-Communist countries Moscow's views on
delicate international issues. In addition, informal meetings,
such as the one planned for Leningrad, serve to enhance the image
of Finnish-Soviet relations as an ideal example of the desirable
relationship between a great Communist power and its small non-
Communist neighbor. Moscow probably considers the promotion of
that image even more desirable now in view of its own European
security initiatives.
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM
NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
6/17
SECRETARIAT
I don't have a file on this one....
guess
I returned it earlier as an OBE or something,
huh? ?
dene
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
ocument has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declas
MEMORANDUM
HAR
771
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ACTION
March 10, 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER
FROM:
Helmut Sonnenfeldt 8
april
SUBJECT: Request for Appointment by Finnish Embassy Counselor
Mr. Pekka Malinen -- a former student of yours at Harvard in 1956 and
now Counselor of the Finnish Embassy here in Washington -- has twice
called the Finnish Desk at State to express his wish to make a courtesy
call on you at your convenience. He would merely like to renew your
acquaintance and pay his respects.
Mr. Malinen understands that you have been extremely busy. However,
if you feel that you would like to see him, he will be available at any
time between now and March 29, when he will leave on vacation. He
also would be available after his return on April 20. A biographical
sketch of Mr. Malinen has been prepared by the State Department to
refresh your memory (Tab A).
Since Mr. Malinen's interest in seeing you is strictly personal, the decision
is entirely up to you. However, while you certainly cannot begin to receive
all your former students, you may wish to make a slight concession for
Mr. Malinen in view of his status in the Finnish Embassy.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you see Mr. Malinen very briefly after April 20.
Approve
Disapprove
See Lim before Maid 29 bright
H
2:30
3/26
HAK 16/6/69
Im
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
ACTION
March 10, 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER
FROM:
Helmut Sonnenfeldt
SUBJECT: Request for Appointment by Finnish Embassy Counselor
Mr. Pekka Malinen -- a former student of yours at Harvard in 1956 and
now Counselor of the Finnish Embassy here in Washington -- has twice
called the Finnish Desk at State to express his wish to make a courtesy
call on you at your convenience. He would merely like to renew your
acquaintance and pay his respects.
Mr. Malinen understands that you have been extremely busy. However,
if you feel that you would like to see him, he will be available at any
time between now and March 29, when he will leave on vacation. He
also would be available after his return on April 20. A biographical
sketch of Mr. Malinen has been prepared by the State Department to
refresh your memory (Tab A).
Since Mr. Malinen's interest in seeing you is strictly personal, the decision
is entirely up to you. However, while you certainly cannot begin to receive
all your former students, you may wish to make a slight concession for
Mr. Malinen in view of his status in the Finnish Embassy.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you see Mr. Malinen very briefly after April 20.
Approve
Disapprove
DRLesh:mm
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
A
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
771
CONFIDENTIAL
FINLAND
NAME: Pekka Kullervo MALINEN (Pronounced MA'-1ee-nen)
PRESENT POSITION: Counselor, Finnish Embassy, Washington
BORN: June 11, 1921, in Viipuri, Finland (now Vyborg, USSR)
FAMILY: Married Hilkka Helena Tiaien, two daughters (born
1946 and 1951) and one son (born 1962)
EDUCATION: M.A., (political science) 1948; Graduate School,
Harvard University, 1956
LANGUAGES: English (good)
CAREER:
1939-44
-
Military service, decorated
1945
I
Economic Research Institute
1948-49
-
Secretary, Chamber of Commerce, Employers
Organization
1949-50
-
Principal, Adult Education Institute
1951-52
-
Editor, Kaleva magazine
1952-60
--
Secretary, Liberal Party
1957
-
Minister of Defense (for six months)
1960
-
Entered Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Helsinki
1960-61
-
Finnish Consul, Gdynia, Poland
1961-65
-
Finnish Commercial Counselor, Beirut,
Lebanon (also Charge d'Affaires
for Cyprus)
1965-67
-
Chief of Bureau, Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Helsinki (promoted to
rank of Counselor, 1966)
1967
-
Counselor of Finnish Embassy, Washington
(July 1)
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
PER RAC REVIEW 9/5/2008
By J43 NARA, Date 4/2/2012
March 1969
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Ipp. 1 of 23
CONF IDENTIAL
-2-
Pekka Malinen is a large, pleasant man, naturally somewhat
reserved. His apparent stolidity and strong sense of pro-
priety are probably useful, however, in his present position
as deputy to a dominant Ambassador noted for his mercurial
temper. Malinen is an intelligent man, competent, and agree-
able to do business with.
From the time he joined the Foreign Minister in 1960 until
his assignment to Washington in 1967, Mr. Malinen dealt
largely with economic and commercial matters. His earlier
experience, however, included eight years (1952-60) as
Secretary of the Liberal Party. It was during that period
that he held his most imposing appointments, those of Minister
of Defense and Associate Minister of Finance in the Suskelainen
Cabinet which held office from May to November 1957. Malinen
appears to regard his appointment to such high office at
35 years of age as an amusing accident, reflecting less on
his ability than on the transitory nature of Finnish Cabinets
in the mid 1950's.
Malinen's Liberal Party service suggests a conservative politi-
cal outlook, but he is restrained in discussing Finnish domes-
tic politics. He appears to enjoy living in the United States,
and is generally pro-American.
CONF IDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
2
771
1.Semenfeldy Ref.
department OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520
3026
March 7, 1969
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE
Subject: Request for Appointment by Finnish
Embassy Counselor
Pekka Malinen, the Counselor of the Finnish Embassy
in Washington, wishes to make a courtesy call on you.
Mr. Malinen says that he has no substantive matters to
raise but that, as a former student of yours at Harvard
(1956), he would like merely to renew the acquaintance
and pay his respects.
This is the second time that Mr. Malinen has asked
about such a call. In late January the Finnish country
officer, after discussing the matter with a member of
your staff, suggested to Mr. Malinen that it might be
advisable to postpone his request until you had had
time to assemble your staff and organize your office.
Mr. Malinen said that he thoroughly understood the
difficulty of scheduling such a call and has waited
until now to renew his request.
Mr. Malinen has said that, if you are able to
receive him, he would be available any time between now
and March 29, when he leaves on vacation. He would also
be available on any day after his return to Washington
on April 20.
A biographic sketch of Mr. Malinen is enclosed.
OurDans John P. Walsh
Acting Executive Secretary
Enclosure:
Biographic Sketch
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Enclasure)
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
EXPIS
DEPARTMENT PERA OF STATE
STATE AMERICA UNITED some
Department of State
TELEGRAM
OF
CONFIDENTIAL 187
PAGE 01 HELSIN 00313 131610Z
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INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION GNEVA
CONF IDENTIAL HELSINKI 0313
EXDIS
'74 FEB 13 PM 2:55
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, CSCE, FI, UR, ME, US
EXPIS
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT KEKKONEN'S VIEWS ON CSCE, MIDDLE
EAST AND ENERGY CRISTS.
references: HELSINKI 0241, STATE 025365, 026197, 027048.
1. DURING FORTY- FORTY-MINUTE MINUTE VISIT WITH PRESIDENT KEKKONEN
TODAY, HE GAVE ME FOLLOWING VIEWS ON SUBJECTS I RAISED
IN ACCORDANCE INSTRUCTIONS RECEIVED FROM DEPARTMENT
IN REFTELS.
2. US-FINNISH RELATIONS: KEKKONEN SAID HE APPRECIATED
VERY MUCH MY REFERENCE TO THE USGIS CONTINUED UNDERSTAN-
DING OF FINNISH NEUTRALITY. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THIS
UNDERSTANDING WAS VERY IMPORTANT TO HIM.
EXPIS
3. CSCE: KEKKONEN SAID IT WAS USEFUL TO RECEIVE THE
US POSITION ON CSCE AT THIS TIME. AS HOST FOR PHASE
III HE WAS FOLLOWING developments IN GENEVA CLOSELY.
HE SAID FINLAND HAD ADOPTED A ROLE AS MODERATER BUT
WOULD ALSO MAKE INITIATIVES ON ITS OWN. HE HOPES
THAT BY JUNE PHASE II WILL REACH A POINT THAT
DEFINITE PLANS CAN BE MADE TO MOVE ON TO PHASE III.
TIME. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT BASKET III WAS DIFFICULT AT THIS
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
FORM
DS-1652
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
befees
PEPARTMENT
OF
DEP
STATE
EXPIS
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 HELSIN 00313 131610Z
4. MIDDLE EAST: KEKKONEN SAID HE HAD THE GREATEST
RESPECT FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER, PARTICULARLY THE
RESULTS HE HAD ACHIEVED IN THE MIDDLE EAST. HE KNEW
EXPIC
FROM HIS SOVIET FRIENDS THAT SECRETARY KISSINGER WAS
KEEPING THE SOVIETS INFORMED AND THAT THE SOVIETS
ALSO WERE TAKING HELPFUL STEPS BEHIND THE SCENES,
BUT NOT IN THE OPEN.
5. ENERGY: KEKKONEN SAID FINLAND WAS IN A BETTER
POSITION THAN OTHER NORDIC COUNTRIES IN VIEW OF ITS
BILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. (FIN-
LAND RECEIVES ROUGHLY SEVENTY PERCENT OF ITS CRUDE
FROM THE SOVIET UNION PLUS NATURAL GAS.) THE CURRENT
PRICE IS HIGH BUT HE THINKS IT WILL COME DOWN,
ALTHOUGH IT WILL NEVER RETURN TO THE PRICE LEVEL PRIOR
TO LAST FALL. THE ARAB OIL EMBARGO PROVED SUCCESSFUL
AND THEREFORE THE USE OF OIL AS A POLITICAL
WEAPON WILL MOST LIKELY CONTINUE.
EXPIS
6. COMMENT: PRESIDENT KEKKONEN AT SEVENTY-TWO
APPEARED IN EXCELLENT PHYSICAL CONDITION. HE WAS
FRIENDLY AND RELAXED IN EXPRESSING HIS VIEWS.
ALTHOUGH THE PRESIDENT USUALLY DISCOURAGES VISITS
BY LOCAL AMBASSADORS UNLESS A STATE VISIT IS IM-
MINENT, HIS CORDIALITY THIS AFTERNOON REFLECTS HIS
14 EEB 13 bM 5:22
APPARENT INTEREST IN KEEPING IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH
US ON SUBJECTS OF MUTUAL INTEREST.
KREHBIEL
EXPIS
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED THOUT THE THORIZATION o- THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
920/20/8L90
FORM
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT BE OF STATE
*
*
Department of State
STATE AMERICA UNITED Name
TELEGRAM
OF
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PAGE 01 HELSIN 01902 0808352
2
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ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 FILE-01 01027
R 0807562 JUL 73
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6506
INFO AMEMBASSY LISBON
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE 2825421 HOUSE
73 9 AM 8:19
CONFIDENTIALHELSINKI1902
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SECTO 52
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR
SUBJECT: B-26 AIRPLANES IN PORTUGUESE AFRICA
1. IN SEPARATE CONVERSATION WITH PORTUGUESE FOREIGN
EXPIC EXPIR
MINISTER JULY 7 FOLLOWING BILATERAL WITH SECRETARY
(SEPTEL), STOESSEL TOOK UP WITH HIM QUESTION OF B=26
AIRPLANES IN PORTUGUESE AFRICA.
2. STOESSEL RECALLED NUMEROUS CONVERSATIONS WITH
PORTUGUESE AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON AND REPRESENTATIONS
IN LISBON ON THIS SUBJECT, WHICH WAS ONE WITH A POTENTIAL
FOR ATTRACTING CONGRESSIONAL INTEREST AND WHICH COULD BE
UTI B PERSONS WHO DID NOT WISH TO SEE GOOD RELATIONS
BETWEE PORTUGAL AND US. WE STRONGLY HOPED THAT
B-265 COULD BE RETURNED TO PORTUGAL.
3. PATRICIO WAS WELL BRIEFED ON THIS QUESTION AND
WENT OVER MANNER IN WHICH PLANES HAD FIRST BEEN ACQUIRED
NUMBER OF YEARS AGO IN GOOD FAITH BY PORTUGUESE THROUGH
us PRIVATE FIRM. HE INDICATED TWO PLANES WERE NOT
SERVICEABLE AND OTHER TWO WERE MARGINAL. HE DOUBTED.
IN FACT, IF THEY COULD BE FLOWN BACK TO EUROPE. IN ANY
CASE, PATRICIO STATED SOMEWHAT EMOTIONALLY, OUR MOST
RECENT APPROACHES ABOUT PLANES HAD COINCIDED WITH MISSILE
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUCON DENTHRIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
*
*
Department of State
SEATES UNITED AMERICA
TELEGRAM
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EXE™S EXCES
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 HELSIN 01902 080835Z
ATTACKS ON OTHER PORTUGUESE AIRCRAFT IN AFRICAN TERRITORIES.
FOR US TO BRING PRESSURE ABOUT THESE B=26 PLANES WHEN
PORTUGUESE FORCES WERE TARGETS OF HOSTILE ELEMENTS
PLENTIFULLY SUPPLIED WITH ARMS BY COMMUNISTS WAS SOMETHING
HE FOUND DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND.
4. PATRICIO STATED HE TOOK NOTE OF STOESSEL'S PRESENTATION
AND OF COURSE WOULD REVIEW MATTER ON RETURN TO LISBON,
HOWEVER, IT SEEMED EVIDENT FROM HIS MANNER THAT HIS
ATTITUDE TOWARD OUR REQUEST WAS DECIDEDLY NEGATIVE.
ROGERS
BOOW
HOME
43 VW 8:18
LETECKVW
CONFIDENTIAL
NOT TO BE REPRODUCE
VITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
FORM
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
70/20/8L90
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DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 28 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECRED ed at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
NLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)
DECLASSIFIED
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BEPARTMENT OF STATE
*
*
EXCES
Department of State
AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
STATES OF
SECRET 769
PAGE 01 HELSIN 01897 0720467
2
60
ACTION SS=25
INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 ADP-00 FILE-01 1027 W
023939
R 0718437 JUL 73
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6501
INFO SECDEF WASHDC
USMISSION NATO
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
SECRE T HELSINKI 1897
EXDIS
SITUATION ROOM ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
73 JUL 8 AM 10: 12
SECTO 47
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S BILATERAL MEETING WITH TURKISH
FOREIGN MINISTER BAYULKEN, JULY 7.
BEGIN SUMMARY: BAYULKEN SUGGESTED NOVEMBER WOULD BE
BEST TIME FOR POSSIBLE VISIT TO TURKEY BY PRESIDENT
NIXON. HE EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT DURABILITY OF US
MILITARY PRESENCE IN EUROPE, AND SECRETARY REASSURED
HIM THAT ADMINISTRATION IS DETERMINED TO MAINTAIN
PRESENT US FORCE LEVELS IN ABSENCE OF AN MBFR AGREE-
MENT. END SUMMARY.
1. PRESIDENTIAL VISIT. BAYULKEN SAID THAT BEST DATE
FOR POSSIBLE VISIT BY THE PRESIDENT TO TURKEY WOULD
BE DURING NOVEMBER, FOLLOWING TURKISH ELECTIONS AND
PRIOR TO DECEMBER NATO MINISTERIAL.
2. us MILITARY PRESENCE IN EUROPE. BAYULKEN SAID
THAT COMBINATION OF US PROPOSAL FOR NEW ATLANTIC
CHARTER, FORTHCOMING MBFR NEGOTIATIONS AND CSCE
PROCESS CAUSED MANY IN TURKEY TO QUESTION
DURABILITY OF US MILITARY PRESENCE IN EUROPE.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
FORM
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
PARANTMENT
OF
STATE
*
EXBLU
UNITED
Department of State
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 HELSIN 01897 072046Z
TURKISH GOVERNMENT OF COURSE, REGARDED STRONG US
MILITARY CONTRIBUTION TO ALLIANCE AS ESSENTIAL TO
TURKISH SECURITY.
3. SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT OUR SUGGESTION ON DECLARA-
TION OF PRINCIPLES OF US=EUROPEAN RELATIONS SHOULD
NOT REPEAT NOT BE TAKEN TO MEAN THAT WE
INTEND TO CHANGE WHOLE STRUCTURE OF ALLIANCE. MAJOR
US INITIATIVES, IT SEEMS, OFTEN AROUSE A CERTAIN
NUMBER OF DOUBTS AND SUSPICIONS IN THE MINDS OF OUR
FRIENDS. WITH RESPECT TO DECLARATION -- AS IN OTHER
SUCH CASES -- OUR INTENTIONS ARE EXACTLY AS WE HAVE
STATED THEM. WE THINK IT IS IMPORTANT TO SET OUT
CLEARLY COMMON US-EUROPEAN INTERESTS TO PROVIDE A
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK WITHIN WHICH WE CAN ADDRESS THE
SPECIFIC PROBLEMS BEFORE us. THERE IS NOTHING IN THIS
INITIATIVE WHICH SHOULD WORRY TURKEY. SECRETARY ADDED
THAT us IS DETERMINED TO RESIST CONGRESSIONAL PRESSURES,
WHICH MIGHT BECOME ACUTE IN SEPTEMBER OR OCTOBER, TO
FORCE UNILATERAL REDUCTIONS OF US FORCES IN
EUROPE. THERE IS THUS NO CHANGE IN ADMINISTRATION'S
BASIC COMMITMENT TO ALLIANCE.
4, BAYULKEN ASKED WHETHER SOMETHING COULD NOT BE DONE
BETWEEN NOW AND DECEMBER NATO MINISTERIAL THAT WOULD
HELP ADMINISTRATION WITH ITS CONGRESSIONAL PROBLEM
AND ALSO REASSURE PUBLIC OPINION IN TURKEY AND OTHER
ALLIED COUNTRIES. HE SUGGESTED ALLIED COMMITMENT TO
MAINTAIN NATO FORCES AT SPECIFIED LEVEL FOR, SAY, FIVE
YEARS. HE LATER REFERRED TO THIS AS SOMETHING THAT
COULD BE USEFUL IMMEDIATELY AFTER INITIAL MBFR REDUC-
TIONS, APPARENTLY UNDER THE ASSUMPTION THAT SOVIETS
WILL BE WILLING TO STRIKE A QUICK DEAL FOR SMALL CUTS
ON BOTH SIDES. BAYULKEN EMPHASIZED THAT HE DID NOT
HAVE IN MIND A UNILATERAL US COMMITMENT BUT AN
ALLIANCE-WIDE UNDERTAKING.
5. THE SECRETARY OBSERVED THAT EVEN so, IT MIGHT
BE DIFFICULT FOR THE US TO JOIN IN UNDERTAKING OF
THIS KIND SINCE THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH COULD NOT
COMMIT THE CONGRESS, IN ADVANCE, TO APPROPRIATE FUNDS
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED /ITHOUT THE SECRET AUTHORIZATION THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
HIVIS of a
CAUHONZ
Department of State
OF AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 03 HELSIN 01897 072046Z
EXPIS EXCESS EXPIS
NECESSARY TO IMPLEMENT IT. HOWEVER, IN NOTING
BAYULKEN'S SUGGESTION HE SAID TWO GOVERNMENTS SHOULD
KEEP IN TOUCH.
ROGERS
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
*******UNCLASSIFIED*******S.COPY
ROUTINE
ESA013HLA025
DE RUESHLQ #1892 1881750
R 071650Z JUL 73
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6496
INFO USINT ALGIERS 0024
AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0106
AMEMBASSY ATHENS 0123
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA 0009
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0043
AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0022
USUN NEWYORK 0197
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR
USLOCOSOUTH
USLOSACLANT
UNCLAS HELSINKI 1892
SECTO 42
DEPT PLEASE PASS ALL EUROPEAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR
SUBJECT: CSCE MINISTERIAL: FINAL COMMUNIQUE TEXT
1. THERE FOLLOWS TEXT OF FINAL COMMUNIQUE ADOPTED FOR CSCE FIRST
STAGE MINISTERIAL JULY 7. QUOTE:
COMMUNIQUE
ON THE FIRST STAGE OF THE
CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE
1. THE FIRST STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN
EUROPE TOOK PLACE IN HELSINKI FROM 3 TO 7 JULY 1973. IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE AGREEMENT REACHED EARLIER, THIS STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE
WAS HELD AT FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL.
2. THE FOLLOWING STATES ARE PARTICIPATING IN THE CONFERENCE: AUSTRIA,
BELGIUM, BULGARIA, CANADA, CYPRUS, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, DENMARK,
FINLAND, FRANCE, GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
GERMANY, GREECE, HOLY SEE, HUNGARY, ICELAND, IRELAND, ITALY,
LIECHTENSTEIN, LUXEMBOURG, MALTA, MONACO, NETHERLANDS, NORWAY,
WHSR COMMENT
*
KENNEDY,LL
RECALLED
PSN:031199
PAGE 01
TOR:189/06:13Z
DTG:071650Z JUL 73
*******U N CLASSIFIE D*******S COPY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
*******UNCLASSIFIED*******SCOPY
POLAND, PORTUGAL, ROMANIA, SAN MARINO, SPAIN, SWEDEN, SWITZERLAND
TURKEY, UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, UNITED KINGDOM,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, YUGOSLAVIA.
3. AT THE INAUGURAL SESSION OF THE CONFERENCE DR. URHO KEKKONEN,
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF FINLAND MADE A SPEECH OF WELCOME.
DR. KURT WALDHEIM, SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS ALSO
ADDRESSED THE CONFERENCE.
4. THE MINISTERS ADOPTED THE FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE HELSINKI
CONSULTATIONS WHICH COMPRISE THE AGENDA AND INSTRUCTIONS OF THE
WORKING BODIES OF THE CONFERENCE TOGETHER WITH THE RULES OF
PROCEDURE AND THE OTHER ARRANGEMENTS RELATING TO THE CONDUCT OF
THE CONFERENCE. THE TEXT OF THESE FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS IS
AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC.
5. THE MINISTERS STATED THE VIEWS OF THEIR GOVERNMENTS ON
ESSENTIAL PROBLEMS RELATING TO SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE,
AND ON THE FURTHER WORK OF THE CONFERENCE.
6. THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF SEVERAL STATES SUBMITTED PROPOSALS ON
VARIOUS QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE AGENDA. OTHERS ANNOUNCED THE
INTENTION TO SUBMIT PROPOSALS DURING THE SECOND STAGE OF THE
CONFERENCE.
7. THE MINISTERS EXAMINED THE MANNER IN WHICH THE CONFERENCE WOULD
ACQUAINT ITSELF WITH POINTS OF VIEW EXPRESSED BY NON-PARTICIPATING
STATES ON THE SUBJECT OF VARIOUS AGENDA ITEMS. THIS MATTER WAS IN
PARTICULAR CONSIDERED IN CONNECTION WITH THE REQUEST OF MALTA AND
SPAIN IN FAVOUR OF ALGERIA AND TUNISIA. THIS MATTER WAS ALSO
CONSIDERED IN RELATION TO OTHER NON-PARTICIPATING STATES
BORDERING THE MEDITERRANEAN. NO CONSENSUS WAS REACHED FOR
THE TIME BEING.
8. THE MINISTERS DECIDED THAT THE SECOND STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE
WILL MEET IN GENEVA ON 18 SEPTEMBER 1973 IN ORDER TO PURSUE THE
STUDY OF THE QUESTIONS ON THE AGENDA AND IN ORDER TO PREPARE DRAFTS
OF DECLARATIONS, RECOMMEDNATIONS, RESOLUTIONS OR ANY OTHER FINAL
DOCUMENTS ON THE BASIS OF THE PROPOSALS SUBMITTED DURING THE FIRST
STAGE AS WELL AS THOSE TO BE SUBMITTED.
9. THE CO-ORDINATING COMMITTEE MADE UP OF REPRESENTATIVES OF
PARTICIPATING STATES WILL ASSEMBLE FOR ITS FIRST MEETING IN
GENEVA ON 29 AUGUST 1973 IN ORDER TO PREPARE THE ORGANIZATION
OF THE SECOND STAGE.
10. THE MINISTERS EXPRESSED THE DETERMINATION OF THEIR GOVERNMENTS
TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE SUCCESS OF THE FURTHER WORK OF THE CONFERENCE.
11. THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONFERENCE EXPRESSED THEIR PROFOUND
RECALLED
PSN: 031199
PAGE 02
TOR:189/06:13Z
DTG:071650Z JUL 73
*******UNCLASSIFIED*******SCOPY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
*******UNCLASSIFIED*******SCOPY
GRATITUDE TO THE GOVERNMENT OF FINLAND FOR ITS HOSPITALITY AND
FOR THE IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION MADE BY FINLAND TO THE PREPARATION
OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE AND TO THE
CONDUCT OF THE FIRST STAGE.
UNQUOTE. ROGERS
BT
RECALLED
PSN: 031199
PAGE 03
OF 03
TOR:189/06:137
DTG:071650Z JUL 73
*******U N CLASSIFIE D*******S COPY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
DEP
STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
OF
'73 JUL 5 AM 8:30
CONFIDENTIAL 641
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
PAGE 01 HELSIN 01809 041504Z
46
2
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 CCO-00 SSO-00 FILE-01 ADP-00 NSCE-00 /027 W
125374
0 R 041430Z JUL 73
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6427
INFO AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
CONFIDENTIAL HELSINKI 1809
SECTO 6
EXDIS
E.O. 116521 GDS
TAGS: PFOR
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S POSSIBLE VISIT TO PRAGUE; US-CZECH
CLAIMS SETTLEMENT
REF: PRAGUE 1495
1. DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER RUZEK SOUGHT OUT STOESSEL
JULY 3 DURING CSCE TO DISCUSS SECRETARY'S POSSIBLE VISIT
TO PRAGUE. HE EXPRESSED STRONG HOPE SECRETARY COULD
COME AND MENTIONED OUTLINE OF SCHEDULE FOR VISIT
CONSISTENT WITH REFTEL. IN SEPARATE TALK WITH SECRETARY,
CHNOUPEK ALSO STATED HOPE SECRETARY COULD STOP IN PRAGUE.
2, RUZEK SAID CONSULAR TREATY WOULD BE READY FOR SIGNING
AS OF JULY 7. IF SECRETARY COULD NOT COME FOR SIGNING
EXPES
THEN RUZEK PROBABLY WOULD BE SENT TO WASHINGTON
FOR SIGNING. HOWEVER, CZECHS WOULD MUCH PREFER HAVING
SECRETARY VISIT PRAGUE.
3. IN ADDITION SIGNING CONSULAR TREATY, RUZEK SAID
HE HOPED SECRETARY ALSO WOULD BE WILLING TO INITIATE
DISCUSSIONS ON CLAIMS. HE DESCRIBED THIS AS LONG-STANDING
PROBLEM WHICH IT WAS IMPORTANT TO GET BEHIND US AS
QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHONFIT DE TAUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
EXPIS
Department of State
UNITED
AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 HELSIN 01809 041504Z
4. WE HAVE TOLD CZECHS THAT, WHILE SECRETARY WOULD LIKE
TO VISIT PRAGUE, HIS PLANS ARE STILL UNCERTAIN AND ARE
DEPENDENT TO SOME EXTENT ON SCHEDULE OF CSCE, WE HOPE
TO INFORM CZECHS ONE WAY OR OTHER BY END OF WEEK, IF
SECRETARY IS ABLE TO COME, STOESSEL SAID HE WOULD LOOK
FORWARD TO TALKS WITH CZECH OFFICIALS AND TO SIGNING
CONSULAR CONVENTION, WHILE HE WOULD BE PREPARED INDICATE
OUR DESIRE REACH MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY SOLUTION OF CLAIMS
PROBLEM, SECRETARY WOULD NOT PLAN TO ENTER INTO ANY
DETAILED DISCUSSIONS OF THIS MATTER,
5, AS OF INTEREST TO DEPARTMENT AND PRAGUE, RUZEK
OUTLINED CZECH VIEWS ON POSSIBLE CLAIMS SETTLEMENT.
BASED ON us CLAIMS OF APPROXIMATELY $72 MILLION, CZECHS
WOULD EXPECT TO PAY APPROXIMATELY 40 PER CENT, OR ABOUT
$28 MILLION, SUBTRACTING CZECH CLAIMS OF $16 MILLION
FOR STEEL MILL PLUS $1 MILLION FOR "OTHER ITEMS",
THIS WOULD LEAVE $11 MILLION FOR CZECHS TO PAY, WHILE
NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR, RUZEK SEEMED TO INDICATE THAT CZECHS
WOULD WORK OUT THIS AMOUNT THROUGH PURCHASES OF
INDUSTRIAL MACHINERY IN US WHICH WOULD BE OVER AND ABOVE
PURCHASES NORMALLY PLANNED.
6. RUZEK MENTIONED INCREASE IN VALUE OF GOLD AND SAID
CZECHS WOULD NOT PLACE VALUE ON THIS EQUAL TO CURRENT
MARKET RATES BUT WOULD REGARD GOLD AS HAVING DOUBLED
IN VALUE FOR PURPOSES OF settlement. RUZEK ADDED THAT
"OF COURSE" SOME FORM OF COMMITMENT FOR MFN FOR
CZECHOSLOVAKIA, PROBABLY ALONG LINES OF US-HUNGARIAN
CLAIMS settlement, WOULD BE ESSENTIAL PART OF SETTLEMENT.
7. RUZEK FELT THAT MUCH OF GROUND WORK FOR CLAIMS
SETTLEMENT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED THROUGH PREVIOUS
NEGOTIATIONS, HE HOPED THAT SECRETARY'S VISIT TO PRAGUE
COULD RESULT IN AGREEMENT TO SET UP MIXED US-CZECH
COMMISSION TO NEGOTIATE NEW SETTLEMENT AND THAT THIS 02E
COMMISSION SHOULD WORK AGAINST DEADLINE OF, SAY, THREE
MONTHS. ROGERS
13 70Γ 2 VW 8:30
CONFIDENTIAL
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED Reproduced ITHOUT THE at the Richard UTHORIZATION Nixon Presidential Library ( THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
180/30/8190
of
STATE
CAUHONI
C.I.E
EXECUTIVE
WH
*
*
Department of State
OF / AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
EXAMS EXETS
SECRET 771
PAGE 01 HELSIN 01598 130505Z
2
13
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
073685
R 121445Z JUN 73
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6302
INFO AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
S E C R E T HELSINKI 1598
'73 JUN 13 PM 04
EXDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, PFOR
SUBJECT: CSCE/MBFR LINKAGE: DATE FOR MBFR
COPENHAGEN FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY, MCQUIRE, AND VEST
VIENNA FOR USDEL MBFR
REF: HELSINKI 1589
1. IN RESPONSE TO BRITISH AMBASSADOR ELLIOTT'S INQUIRY
CONCERNING MY CALL ON MENDELEVITCH YESTERDAY (REFTEL),
DCM LIMITED REPLY TO SOLE POINT THAT WE ARE INTERESTED
IN RESOLVING THE ONLY OUTSTANDING QUESTION AT VIENNA
MBFR PREPARATORY TALKS, I.E. THE OPENING DATE, AND
BROUGHT OUR INTEREST TO MENDELEVITCH'S ATTENTION
SINCE HE WAS RETURNING TO MOSCOW TODAY.
2. ELLIOTT THOUGHT THIS WAS GOOD MOVE AND HOPED IT
WOULD BRING THE DESIRED RESULTS. HE ADDED THAT
HE KNEW THAT THE CANADIAN RESERVATION ON DATE FOR CSCE
MINISTERIAL WAS NOT WASTED ON mendelevitch AND HOPED
THIS TOO WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO SOVIETS COMING UP WITH
MBFR DATE.
KREHBIEL
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
FORM
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DS-1652
PEPARTMENT
OF
DEPA
STATE
'73 JUN 11 PM
*
*
Department of State
OF STATES AMERICA UNITED
SITUATION ROUSE ROOM
TELEGRAM
SECRET 506
PAGE 01 HELSIN 01589 111553Z
50
2
ACTION SS=25
INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO=00 NSCE-00 /026 W
058152
0 111530Z JUN 73
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6296
INFO AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE
SECRE T HELSINKI 1589
EXDIS
TOSEC TEHRAN ONLY
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, PFOR
SUBJECT: CSCE/MBFR LINKAGE: DATE FOR MBFR
COPENHAGEN HOLD FOR MCGUIRE
TEHRAN FOR THE SECRETARY'S PARTY
VIENNA FOR USDEL MBFR
REF: A. STATE 112110 8. 112060
1. IN COMPLIANCE WITH REQUEST IN REFTEL B, I CALLED
ON MENDELEVITCH THIS AFTERNOON AND SET FORTH POINTS AS
INDICATED. MENDELEVITCH EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION FOR
MY BRINGING THESE POINTS TO HIS ATTENTION AND SAID HE
WOULD PASS THEM TO MOSCOW. HE ADDED THAT SINCE THE
SUBJECT MATTER WAS PRIMARILY ADDRESSED TO THE SOVIET
REPRESENTATIVE TO THE MBFR TALKS IN VIENNA, HE WOULD
ACCEPT THE POINTS ON AN INFORMATION BASIS AND WITHOUT
COMMENT.
2. MENDELEVITCH SAID THAT HE HAD ENJOYED WORKING
WITH GEORGE VEST AND THOUGHT THAT THE COOPERATION THAT
EXISTED BETWEEN THE SOVIET AND AMERICAN DELEGATIONS, EVEN
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF
DEP
STATE
*
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 HELSIN 01589 111553Z
WHEN THEY WERE NOT IN AGREEMENT, CONTRIBUTED TO THE
FAVORABLE RESULTS THAT WERE REALISED. MENDELEVITCH
LEAVES FOR MOSCOW TOMORROW.
EXELS
KREHBIEL
Freebym
22
VITHOUT THE
"
bw
NOT TO BE REPRODUCE
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
EEO/CO/EL90
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 1 3526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SUPARTMENT OF
STATE
EXPIN
Department of State
UNITED STATES
TELEGRAM
OF
WH
SECRET 070
PAGE 01 HELSIN 01220 0911037
02
10
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
013117
P R 0910317 MAY 73
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6083
INFO USMISSION NATO
SECRE T HELSINKI 1220
EXDIS
E.O. 11652: GPS
TAGS: PFOR
SUBJECT: CSCE: CBM: POLICY ON MILITARY MOVEMENTS
REF: A) STATE 83486 B) STATE 85682
1. AFTER PREPARING GROUND IN SERIES OF WEEKEND
BILATERALS, VEST INFORMED NATO CAUCUS MORNING OF
MAY 8 OF EXCHANGE WITH MENDELEVICH AND PROPOSED
ALTERNATIVE APPROACH OUTLINED IN REF (A). CAUCUS
DISCUSSIONS PRODUCED: A) AGREEMENT THAT THIS PROBLEM
SHOULD BE HANDLED IN HELSINKI, NOT RPT NOT IN NATO:
B) CLEAR INDICATION THAT NO RPT NO ALLIED DELEGATION
WOULD WISH TO DELAY CONVENING OF CONFERENCE BECAUSE OF
DIFFERENCES WITH SOVIETS OVER MILITARY MOVEMENTS
ISSUE; C) STRONG MAJORITY PREFERENCE NEVERTHELESS TO
HOLD TO CURRENT NATO POSITION IN IMMEDIATE FUTURE,
BASED ON EXPECTATION OF MANY NATO DELS THAT THERE
IS SOME GIVE IN THE SOVIET POSITION.
2. SITUATION AT MAY 8 NATO CAUCUS WAS MUDDIED
BY FACT THAT SOME OTHER ALLIES HAD REPORTS FROM
SKOWRONSKI (POLAND), A SENIOR SOVIET STAFF MEMBER,
AND AMBASSADOR BOCK (GDR), WHO HAS OFTEN BEEN
WARSAW PACT SPOKESMAN ON THIS SUBJECT, THAT AFTER
HARD FIGHT SOVIETS, WOULD GIVE IN AND ACCEPT "MAJOR
MILITARY MOVEMENTS." PORTUGAL REPORTED THAT FRENCH
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE SECRET IHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATE STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 HELSIN 01220 091103Z
(WHO WERE NOT REPRESENTED AT CAUCUS) HAD REPORT
TO THE SAME EFFECT. THUS, LED BY UK, FRG, ITALY
AND NORWAY, MAJORITY OF ALLIES HELD FIRMLY TO VIEW
THAT, AT NEXT MINI-GROUP DISCUSSION, LATER THIS WEEK,
THEY SHOULD STICK TO CURRENT NATO POSITION, WHICH
HAD THE SUPPORT OF A NUMBER OF OTHERS LIKE YUGOSLAVIA
AND ROMANIA -- THIS DESPITE FACT THAT EST-MENDELEVICH
CONVERSATIONS WERE CLEAR AND THAT MENDELEVICH RE-
ITERATED TO VEST AFTERNOON MAY 8 THAT HE HAS NO RPT NO LEE-
WAY EVEN TO CONSIDER AN ALTERNATIVE FORMULA FOR PRIOR
NOTIFICATION OF LARGE-SCALE TROOP MOVEMENTS.
3, AFTER NEXT MINI-GROUP DISCUSSION WE WILL PRESS
AGAIN FOR ALTERNATIVE FORMULA CONSONANT WITH
REF (A)
AND WILL WORK WITH MENDELEVICH IN THAT PROCESS.
WHITE
EXPIR
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE SECRET AUTHORIZATION or THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
FORM
450/20/2690
DS-165his document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF STATE
OHONI
*
Department of State
UNITED OF
TELEGRAM
EXPIS EXPIS
I
SECRET 785
PAGE 01 HELSIN 01157 040716Z
16
2
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W
103015
0 0315287 MAY 73
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6051
SECRE T HELSINKI 1157
EXDIS
CORRECTED COPY (TEXT)
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR
SUBJECT: CSCE: CBM: POLICY ON MILITARY "MOVEMENTS"
REF: STATE 083486
1. VEST SAW MENDELEVICH ON MAY 3 AND DREW FULLY ON PARAGRAPH
3 OF REFTEL TO PRESENT CASE FOR "MAJOR MILITARY MOVEMENTS."
2. MENDELEVICH WAS PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN ARGUMENT IN
PARAGRAPH 3F ON AN ILLUSTRATIVE LIST WHICH HE SAID WAS A NEW
PROPOSAL FOR HIM. HE WAS REASSURED AT THE DEGREE OF NATIONAL
CONTROL AND THE EXTENT OF MUTUAL EXAMPLE WHICH WAS EMBODIED IN
SUCH AN IDEA. HOWEVER, IN SPITE OF VEST'S STRESS ON THE
COOPERATION WHICH WOULD NECESSARILY FLOW FROM THE EXCHANGE OF
SUCH LISTS, MENDELEVICH WAS WORRIED BY THE POSSIBILITY THAT
THE SOVIET LIST WOULD VERY LIKELY BE MUCH SHORTER THAN THAT OF
THE US AND THUS THAT THE USSR WOULD BE PRESSURED BY
THE SITUATION.
3. HE EXPLAINED THAT HE HAD HAD FOR A TIME, HOPES FOR SOME
FLEXIBILITY IN THIS AREA. HOWEVER, DURING THE EASTER break, THE
MOSCOW AUTHORITIES HAD EXAMINED THE SUJBECT IN DETAIL,
INCLUDING HIS PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS ON THE SUBJECT, AND HE NOW
HAD INSTRUCTIONS THAT--AS HE HAD VOLUNTEERED IN US-SOVIET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE SECRET AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
FORM
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
1652
or
STATE
*
Department of State
OF / AMERICA UNITED same
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 HELSIN 01157 040716Z
BILATERAL CONVERSATION OF MAY 2--REQUIRED HIM "CATEGORICALLY"
TO REJECT THE ALLIED PROPOSAL FOR PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR
TROOP MOVEMENTS.
4. FURTHER HE HAD NO RPT NO AUTHORITY TO OFFER SUGGESTIONS
FOR ANY COMPROMISE FOMULAE. HE HAD THE IMPRESSION, HE SAID,
THAT THE FRG DID NOT ATTACH MUCH IMPORTANCE TO THIS PROPOSAL
AND HE HOPED THE US WOULD NOT EITHER. HE THOUGHT THAT A SIMPLE
REFERENCE TO"MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS" WOULD IN PRACTICE MAKE
LITTLE REAL DIFFERENCEDURING THE CONFERENCE. IN PHASE II
WE WOULD PROBABLY END UP WITH MUCH THE SAME RESULTS.
5. THUS MENDELEVICH, AS ANTICIPATED, WAS RESOLUTELY NEGATIVE
AND HAD NO ALTERNATIVE FORMULA. MIN-GROUP WILL DISCUSS CBM
PARAGRAPH NEXT WEEK.
6. RECOMMEND THAT VEST BE AUTHORIZED TO INFORM ALLIED DELS
HERE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE OF SOVIET ATTITUDE. WE EXPECT NUMBER
OF ALLIES WILL INSIST THAT DECISION ON "MOVEMENTS" BE DECIDED
IN NATO RATHER THAN BY MPT NEGOTTATORS. IF SO, WE SHOULD
ARRANGE TOPURSUE QUESTION IN NATO, OBTAIN APPROVAL THERE FOR
ALLIED REPS HERE TO LOOK FOR COMPROMISE OR TO DROP MOVEMENTS,
IN LINE WITH THINKING OF PARA 2, REFTEL.
7. DEPT REQUEST REPEAT TO USNATO.
WHITE
EXCES
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED THOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
580/20/2290
ORM
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TRANTMENT
OF
STATE
*
*
Department of State
STATES AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
OF
SECRET 119
PAGE 01 HELSIN 00649 1312067
16
ACT ON SS-25
2
INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 1026 W
039034
R 131113Z MAR 73
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5754
SECRET HELSINKI 0649
EXDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, UR
SUBJECT: CSCE: SOVIET DRAFT FINAL DOCUMENT
1. MENDELEVICH IN CONVERSATIONS WITH VEST HAS SEVERAL
'73 MAR 13 AM 8:28 28
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
TIMES MADE PASSING REFERENCES TO SOVIET DRAFT OF "FINAL
CSCE DOCUMENT,' LEAVING THE IMPRESSION THAT HE ASSUMED
VEST HAD SEEN TEXT OF DRAFT. US DELOFF THEREFORE
ASKED SOVIET DELOFF SHIKALOV, WHO ACCORDING TO MENDELEVICH
IS WORKING ON DRAFT, AT WHAT STAGE SOVIETS ENVISAGE SUCH
A DOCUMENT BEING ADOPTED. SHIKALOV RESPONDED THAT THEY
ENVISAGE IT AS A DOCUMENT FOR ADUPTION AT THE THIRD,
SUMMIT PHASE, ALTHOUGH IT WOULD PRESUMABLY BE CONSIDERED
BY THE MINISTERS IN PRELIMINARY WAY. SHIKALOV THEN
ASKED WHAT THE US DELOFF THOUGHT OF THE SOVIET DRAFT.
USDELOFF REPLIED THAT HE HAD NOT SEEN IT.
2. INTERESTINGLY, ROMANIAN DELOFF AT BEGINNING OF THIS
ROUND ALSO ASKED us DEL WHAT HE THOUGHT OF THE SOVIET
DRAFT FINAL DOCUMENT AND EXPRESSED DISBELIEF WHEN TOLD
THAT WE HAD NOT SEEN IT.
3. I WOULD APPRECIATE ANY INFORMATION AVAILABLE ON
SOVIET DRAFT.
PETERSON
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
FORM DS-1This2 document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
7
DEPA
STATE
*
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL 272
EXPIS EXCES EXPIS
PAGE 01 HELSIN 00842 021444Z
47
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 /026 W
013657
0 021423Z JUN 72
72 SITUAT JUN 2 2 PM 42
HOUSE WHITE
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4585
CONFIDENTIAL HELSINKI 0842
EXDIS
PERSONAL FOR SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR
REF STATE 96887
1 - WITHOUT EXCEPTION, ALL FINNS I HAVE TALKED TO SINCE
THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO THE SOVIET UNION HAVE BEEN
ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT THE POSITIVE RESULTS ATTAINED
AND THEY APPLAUD HIS INITIATIVE. TRUE, SOME WITH
LONG MEMORIES OF THEIR BIG NEIGHBOR EXPRESSED THE
HOPE WE BE ALERT AND STRONG.
2° MEDIA COVERAGE, PRESS, RADIO AND TELEVISION, OF
THE PRESIDSNT'S TRIP TO USSR HAS BEEN HEAVY, REASONABLY
ACCURATE, GROWING IN INTEREST, INTENSITY AND VOLUME
AND OVERWHELMINGLY FAVORABLE UP TO AND INCLUDING THIS
DATE. MY OBSERVATION IS THAT THIS ACCURATELY REFLECTS
VAST MAJORITY PUBLIC OPINION.
3. OVERALL, VISIT BEST PLUS IN MANY YEARS FOR US
IN FINLAND. FOREIGN NEWS EDITOR MAIN FINNISH PAPER
(HELSINGIN SANOMAT) TOLD PUBLIC AFFAIRS. OFFICER "THIS
TRIP REALLY HELPED US HERE. ALL OF US FINNS FEEL
GOOD ABOUT THIS."
40 THERE HAS BEEN SOME ANCILLARY STATIC FROM HOPELESS
DISSIDENTS, VIETNAM DIEHARDS, MADISTS, YOUTH BELLIGERENTS
AND THE LIKE.
5 ° SOME FINNS WHO HAD FEARED THAT CHINESE-US
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES AMERICANT
TELEGRAM
OF
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 HELSIN 00842 021444Z
RAPPROCHMENT WOULD ADVERSELY AFFECT THE USSR AND
THUS FINLAND ARE RELIEVED BY THE SUCCESS OF THE MOSCOW
MEETINGS.
6. THE FINNS LIKE BOLD AND DARING ACTIONS BASED ON
CAREFUL PREPARATION AND PRESIDENT NIXON°S STOCK
WAS NEVER HIGHER IN FINLAND.
PETERSON
EXCLUS EXCELS
NOT TO BE REPRODUCE WITHOUT C PINEF UTNORIZATION
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
THE
2ECKELVNA
*
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
FEB
CONFIDENTIAL 090
PAGE 01 HELSIN 00143 0214262
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
WH
42
2 PM ? 49
2
ACTION SS-25
3
INFO OCT-01 /026 W
014811
EXET
R 021330Z FEB 72
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4224
CONFIDENTIAL HELSINKI 0143
EXDIS
JOINT EMBASSY/DATT MESSAGE
SUBJECT: TEN PERCENT DEPOSIT OF VALUE OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE
REF: STATE 14505
1. THE EMBASSY (INCLUDING THE DATT) CANNOT ASCERTAINI WHY
IT WAS AN ACTION ADDRESSEE OF THE MESSAGE UNDER REFERENCE.
THERE IS NO MAP IN FINLAND. THE ONLY ACTIVITY IN THIS
AREA IS TRAINING, I.E. THE ATTENDANCE OF ONE TO THREE
FINNISH OFFICERS PER YEAR AT COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGES
OR SQUADRON OFFICER SCHOOLS OF THE THREE US SERVICES. THE
FINNS PAY INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL WHILE THE US SERVICE
CONCERMED PAYS PERTINENT CONNECTED EXPENSES. THUS,
EVEN IF THE PROVISION OF THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AUTHORI-
ZATION BILL FOR FY 1972 WERE TO APPLY TO FINLAND, IT WOULD
ALPEAR THAT THE TRAINING ASSISTANCE NOW RENDERED, OR
LIKELY TO BE RENDERED IN THE FUTURE WOULD, AS SERVICE-
FUNDED, BE COVERED BY THE EXCLUSION IN PARAGRAPH THREE
OF THE REFTEL.
2. PLEASE CLARIFY.
PETERSONO
CONFIDENTIAL
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CONFIDENT IAL CONFIDENTIALS
RECEIVED
HAK
PAGE 01 HELSIN 00271 171830Z
WHCA
53
ACTION EUR-25
1971 MAR 17 18 48
INFO OCT-01 CCO-00 SS0-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00
PM-05 H202 INR-08 L-04 NSAE-00 NSC-10 P-03 RSC-01
PRS-01 SS-20 NIC-01 MC-02 0-03 OPR-02 SY-03 OC-08
RSR-01 /100 W
069511
0 R 171745Z MAR 71
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3511
INFO AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY OSLO
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
USMISSION NATO
CONFIDENTIAL HELSINKI 271
SUBJ: FALL OF FINNISH GOVERNMENT IMMINENT
REF: HELSINKI 265
1. FINNISH GOVERNMENT OF PRIME MINISTER AHTI KARJALAINEN IS
EXPECTED TO RESIGN WITHIN THE NEXT 24 HOURS, FOLLOWING COMMUNIST
REJECTION OF THE GOVT.'S PRICE CONTROL BILL. IN A DRAMATIC
SESSION OF PARLIAMENT, THE COMMUNIST-FRONT SKDL PARTY THIS
EVENING VOTED UNANIMOUSLY AGAINST THE MEASURE, WHICH HAD BEEN
SUPPORTED BY THE OTHER FOUR CABINET PARTIES. SINCE PRIMIN KAR-
JALAINEN HAD DECLARED BEFORE THE VOTING THAT THE GOVT. WOULD
FALL IF THE COMMUNISTS VOTED AGAINST THE BILL, IT IS EXPECTED
THAT THE PRIMIN WILL CALL ON PRESIDENT KEKKONEN TO SUBMIT HIS
GOVERNMENT'S RESIGNATION PERHAPS AS EARLY AS THIS EVENING.
IN ALL PROBABILITY THE PRESIDENT WILL ACCEPT, THE RESIGNATION
BUT ASK KARJALAINEN TO REMAIN ON UNTIL A NEW GOVT. IS FORMED.
2. AS LATE AS LAST NIGHT, IT HAD BEEN WIDELY BELIEVED IN LOCAL
POLITICAL CIRCLES THAT PRESIDENT KEKKONEN, WHO RETURNED FROM
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 HELSIN 00271 171830Z
SWEDEN LAST NIGHT, WOULD TAKE MATTERS INTO HAND AND BRING ABOUT
A COMPROMISE IN THE IMPASSE. INDEED, KEKKONEN DID MEET THIS
MORNING WITH MAJOR POLITICAL FIGURES, INCLUDING THE COMMUNIST
LEADERS. HOWEVER, NEITHER SIDE WAS WILLING TO BACK DOWN FROM
ITS PREVIOUSLY DECLARED POSITION AND THUS THE CRISIS PROGRESSED
TO ITS INEVITABLE DENOUEMENT THIS EVENING.
3. IT IS GENERALLY BELIEVED THAT PRESIDENT KEKKONEN WILL ASK
PRIMIN KARJALAINEN TO FORM A NEW GOVT., BASED ON THE PRESENT
CABINET COALITION MINUS THE COMMUNISTS. SUCH A COALITION,
MADE UP OF THE SOCIAL DEMOCRAT, CENTER, SWEDISH AND LIBERAL
PARTIES, WOULD HAVE 2 06 PARLIAMENTARY SEATS, SINCE TWO
SWEDISH PARTY MEMBERS RECENTLY DECLARED THAT THEY WERE JOINING
THE OPPOSITON.
4. HOWEVER, THE KEY TO FORMING SUCH A CENTER-LEFT GOVT. WILL
BE THE ATTITUDE OF THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS, WHO HOLD 52 SEATS
IN THE 200 MEMBER PARLIAMENT. THERE IS GREAT RELUCTANCE WITHIN
THE PARTY TO CONTINUE IN GOVT. IF THE COMMUNISTS ARE IN THE
OPPOSITION, SINCE THE COMMUNISTS COULD ATTACK THE SOCIAL
DEMOCRATS FOR THEIR SUPPORT OF ECONOMICALLY NECESSARY BUT
POLITICALLY DIFFICULT MEASURES. THE SOCDEM PARTY COUNCIL IS
SCHEDULED TO MEET ON MARCH 24 AND IT IS PROBABLE THAT A DECI-
SION ON FUTURE GOVT. PARTICIPATION WILL BE MADE AT THAT TIME.
5. IF THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS DO NOT ACCEPT A ROLE IN A NEW
POLITICAL GOVT., THE MOST LIKELY ALTERNATIVE IS THE FORMATION
OF A CARETAKER "GOVERNMENT OF EXPERTS" WHICH WOULD GOVERN
UNTIL NEW ELECTIONS ARE HELD, POSSIBLY AS EARLY AS NEXT FALL.
HOWEVER, SINCE NONE OF THE PARTIES, INCLUDING THE SOCIAL
DEMOCRATS, WANT SUCH EARLY ELECTIONS, THERE WILL BE CONSIDER-
ABLE PRESSURE ON THE PARTY TO PARTICIPATE IN A POLITICAL
GOVERNMENT WHICH COULD HOLD POWER AT LEAST THROUGH THE
CURRENT YEAR.
6. A SEPARATE EMBASSY MESSAGE WILL COMMENT ON THE IMPLICATIONS
OF COMMUNIST WITHDRAWAL FROM THE FINNISH GOVERNMENT. GP-3.
PETERSON
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
HCE346
SECRET_LIMUIS
PAGE 01 HELSIN 00247 101736Z
RECEIVED
42-S
WHCA
S/Feldt
ACTION EUR-12
HAR'D
INFO OCT-01 SS-20 NSC-10 NSCE-00 INR-07 CIAE-00 NSAE-00
EA-18 NEA-08 PM-03 ACDA-10 E-04 RSR-01 RSC-01 /095 W
014374
PR 101604Z MAR 71
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3497
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION NATO
SECRE T HELSINKI 247
LIMDIS
SUBJ: DISCUSSION WITH PRESIDENT KEKKONEN
POLICY
1. I CALLED ON FINNISH PRESIDENT UR HO KEKKONEN THIS
AFTERNOON TO DISCUSS HIS RECENT TWO-DAY TRIP TO THE SOVIET
UNION WHERE HE HAD SPENT TWO FULL DAYS HUNTING WITH PODGORNY,
BREZHNEV, AND KOSYGIN. I FOUND THE PRESIDENT RELAXED, AND
THE DISCUSSION, WHICH LASTED 45 MINUTES WAS CONDUCTED IN A
FRANK AND AMICABLE MANNER. THE ONLY OTHER PERSON PRESENT
WAS A FINNISH INTERPRETER.
2. I TOLD THE PRESIDENT THAT I WAS CALLING ON HIM TO DISCUSS
IN A GENERAL WAY HIS RECENT VISIT TO MOSCOW. I SAID I DID
NOT INTEND TO QUESTION HIM ON SPECIFIC ISSUES, BUT RATHER
WISHED TO KNOW HIS GENERAL IMPRESSION OF CURRENT SOVIET
THINKING ON MAJOR EAST-WEST ISSUES. I POINTED OUT THAT HE HAD
HAD A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY TO GAUGE THE ATTITUDE OF THE TOP
LEADERSHIP, HAVING BEEN IN CLOSE CONTACT FOR TWO DAYS WITH
THE SOVIET "TROIKA."
3. OBSERVING THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT QUESTIONS IN THE WORLD
TODAY HINGE ON US-SOVIET RELATIONS, I ASKED THE PRESIDENT,
IN VIEW OF HIS 15 YEARS AS CHIEF OF STATE AND HIS INTIMATE
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
PAGE 02 HELSIN 00247 101736Z
ASSOCIATION DURING THESE YEARS WITH THE SOVIET LEADERS,
WHETHER HE MIGHT HAVE ANY SUGGESTIONS FOR EASING TENSIONS
BETWEEN THE TWO POWERS. I SAID I RECOGNIZED THAT HE
WOULD NOT PRESUME TO GIVE UNSOLICITED ADVICE TO THE LEADERS
OF EITHER SUPER POWER, BUT IN VIEW OF THE TREMENDOUS
IMPORTANCE OF THIS QUESTION TO ALL NATIONS IN THE WORLD,
INCLUDING THE NEUTRALS, HIS THOUGHTS WOULD BE HELPFUL. I
CONCLUDED WITH THE SPECIFICE QUESTION: "WHAT WOULD YOU DO
IF YOU WERE IN PRESIDENT NIXON'S POSTION TODAY, FACED WITH
THE GREAT BURDEN OF SEEKING PEACE?"
4. KEKKONEN REPLIED THAT HIS ADVICE WOULD BE FOR PRESIDENT
NIXON TO SEND A MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT PODGORNY OFFERING TO
VISIT THE SOVIET UNION TO MEET WITH HIM AND THE OTHER SOVIET
LEADERS TO DISCUSS PROBLEMS OF MUTUAL INTEREST. SUCH A
PROPOSED MEETING, HE ADDED, SHOULD TAKE PLACE AFTER THE
FORTHCOMING SOVIET PARTY CONGRESS. CONTINUING, THE
PRESIDENT SAID THAT THE SOVIET LEADERS SEEM TO "LACK TRUST"
IN PRESIDENT NIXON; WHEN I ASKED HIM WHY, HE SAID HE DID
NOT KNOW. HOWEVER, HE SAID IN HIS VIEW, TRUST IS SOMETHING
THAT COULD BE BUILT. KEKKONEN SAID THAT FROM HIS ASSOCIATIO
WITH THEM, HE HAD FOUND THE SOVIET LEADERS TO BE "REASONABLE
MEN" AND A "SUMMIT MEETING" WOULD CERTAINLY NOT WORSEN THE
SITUATION AND MIGHT VERY WELL IMPROVE IT. THE SOVIET LEADERS,
HE ADDED, KNOW THE NECESSITY FOR SOME KIND OF ACCOMODATION
WITH THE U.S. AND SEEM FULLY AWARE OF THE CONSEQUENCES IF
THERE IS NOT.
5. KOSYGIN AND BREZHNEV
I ASKED THE PRESIDENT HIS EVALUATION OF THE CURRENT
SOVIET LEADERS. HE REPLIED THAT HE FOUND KOSYGIN IN
A MUCH BETTER "PHYSICAL CONDITION AND MENTAL OUTLOOK" THAN
ON HIS LAST VISIT TO THE USSR "JULY 2970). KOSYGIN SEEMED
MUCH MORE VIVACIOUS THAN ON THE PREVIOUS OCCASION. KEKKONEN
SAID HE PERSONALLY BELIEVES THAT KOSYGIN HAS A MUCH BETTER
COMPREHENSION OF WORLD PROBLEMS THAN THE OTHER SOVIET LEADERS.
ON THE OTHER HAND, HE ADMITTED THAT BREZHNEV CLEARLY SEEMS
TO BE THE DOMINANT FIGURE AMONG THE SOVIET LEADERS. HE SAID
IT "IS DIFFICULT TO SAY WHY," BUT HE HAS SOME CHARACTERISTICS
THAT DIFFERENTIATES HIM FROM THE OTHER TWO MEN. PERHAPS,
THE PRESIDENT SUGGESTED, HIS STRENGTH IS DUE TO HIS SECURE
PARTY BASE. KEKKONEN DID NOT DISCUSS PODGORNY.
6. VIETNAM
WHAT, I ASKED, ARE THE PROBLEMS MOST PREOCCUPYING THE SOVIET
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
PAGE 03 HELSIN 00247 101736Z
LEADERS WITH REGARD TO THE WEST. THE PRESIDENT REPLIED THAT
THE TWO CHIEF CONCERNS ARE VIETNAM AND THE MID-EAST. ON
VIETNAM, THE SOVIETS CHARGED THAT PRESIDENT NIXON HAD
"EXPANDED" THE WAR IN INDOCHINA BY THE ENTRANCE INTO
LAOS; I CHALLENGED THIS, NOTING THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE
HAD YEARS AGO "EXPANDED" THE WAR TO LAOS.
7. THE MID-EAST
CONCERNING THE MID-EAST, KEKKONEN SAID THE SOVIETS BELIEVED
THAT THE US AND USSR HAVE A MUTUAL INTEREST IN SEEING THAT
PROBLEM SETTLED PEACEFULLY. HE SAID THE SOVIETS EXPRESSED
CONCERN LEST SOME "HOTHEAD" EGYPTIAN ARMY OFFICERS GET OUT
SADAT'S CONTROL AND IGNITE A CONFLICT IN THE AREA.
8. SOVIET JEWS
THE PRESIDENT SIAD THE SOVIET LEADERS SHOWED CONSIDERABLE
SENSIVITITY OVER THE CRITICISM DIRECTED AT THEM FOR SOVIET
HANDLING OF JEWS IN THE USSR. HE SAID THEY WENT TO CONSI-
DERABLE LENGTHS TO EXPLAIN THAT THERE NO POGROMS" AGAINST JEWS IN
THE USSR, AND SEEMED QUITE UPSET AT AGITIATION IN THE U.S.
AGAINST THEIR HANDLING OF THE JEWS.
9. EXPANSIONISM
I POINTED OUT THAT ONE OF OUR CONCERNS WAS THE
GROWING SOVIET EXPANSIONISM THROUGHTOUT THE WORLD, AS
REFLECTED BY MOVING OF THE SOVIET FLEET INTO EVERY MAJOR
SEA. KEKKONEN LAUGHED AT THIS COMMENT, AND SAID THAT HE
HAD ONCE DISCUSSED THIS QUESTION WITH GENERAL DEGAULLE, WHEN
THE LATTER WAS STILL PRESIDENT. DEGAULLE, HE CONTINUED,
HAD OBSERVED THAT HE WAS NOT WORRIED BY SOVIET NAVAL
PRESENCE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN; "GREAT POWERS," DEGAULLE
COMMENTED, "BY THEIR NATURE MUST MAKE THEIR PRESENCE FELT
EVERYWHERE." KEKKONEN ADDED THAT WHILE THE SOVIETS HAD
BECOME MORE EXPANSIONIST IN RECENT YEARS, THE U.S. TOO HAD
DEMONSTRATED "EXPANSIONIST" TENEDENCIES IN THE PAST.
10. SALT AND CES
REGARDING SALT, THE PRESIDENT DID NOT ENLARGE ON HIS PUBLIC
COMMENTS THAT THE SOVIETS ARE SOMEWHAT OPTIMISTIC ABOUT A
SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME OF THE TALKS. CONCERNING CES, I COMPLI-
MENTED HIM ON THE LOW-KEY, CAUTIOUS APPROACH RECENTLY
ASSUMED BY THE GOF ON THIS QUESTION, AND HE OBERVED THAT
THERE WAS ONLY LIMITED DISCUSSION OF THIS QUESTION IN MOSCOW.
11. FINNISH SOVIET TRADE
THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT THERE WAS A LONG DISCUSSION OF
FINNISH SOVIET TRADE IN MOSCOW, BUT THE BASIC PROBLEM,
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
PAGE 04 HELSIN 00247 101736Z
KEKKONEN OBSERVED, IS THE LIMITED NUMBER OF ITEMS THE
FINNS CAN FIND TO BUY FROM THE USSR. THIS PROBLEM, HE
ADDED, HAS BEEN FACING THE GOF FOR SOME 20 YEARS, AND WILL
PROBABLY BE AROUND LONG AFTER HE (KEKKONEN) LEAVES OFFICE.
THE PRESIDENT ADDED THAT THERE WERE NO MAJOR BILATERAL
PROBLEMS THAT HAD TO BE DISCUSSED DURING HIS VISIT.
12. BERLIN
ALTHOUGH THE PRESIDENT DID NOT REFER TO THE GERMAN QUESTION,
HE SAID THE SOVIETS DID MENTION BERLIN, NOTING THAT THEY
HAD MADE A PROPOSAL TO THE WESTERN POWERS ON BERLIN BUT HAD
NOT YET RECEIVED A RESPONSE.
13. COMMENT: INSASMUCH AS KEKKOEN IS PROBABLY ON CLOSER
TERMS WITH THE TOP SOVIET LEADERSHIP THAN ANY OTHER NON-
CMMUNIST LEADER, HIS COMMENTS ARE WORTHY OF CAREFUL
STUDY. HE IS A SHREWD JUDGE OF CHARACTER, AND PROBABLY
KNOWS THE SOVET LEADERS AS WELL AS ANY OUTSIDER CAN.
PARTICULAR INTERESTING IS HIS SUGGESTION THAT PRESIDENT
NIXON VISIT THE SOVIET UNION; IT OBVIOUSLY REFLECTS
THE PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL BELIEF IN "SUMMIT" DIPLOMACY
AS A WAY OF DEALING WITH SOVIET LEADERS.
GP 4
PETERSON
SECRET
SECRET LIMOIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET 224
PAGE 01 HELSIN 00012 071531Z
51
ACTION SS-45
INFO OCT-01 CCO-00 SSO-00 a NSCE- 00 1046 W
075266
0 071450Z JAN 71
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3345
'71 JAN 7 PM 8:00 00
SITUATION WHITE HOUSE ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
SECR ET HELSINKI 012
EXDIS:
DEPT PASS INFO AMMAN, BEIRUT, COPENHAGEN, LONDON, STOCKHOLM
SUBJECT: ABDUL RAHIM HASSANEIN HUSAYNI
REF: STATE 002330 (NOT SENT STOCKHOLM)
EXSIS
EMBASSY AGREES WITH DEPARTMENT'S REASONING AND HAS
INFORMED HUSAYNI THAT HE CANNOT QUALIFY FOR POLITICAL
ASYLUM. HUSAYNI ACCEPTED NEWS AND STATED HE WILL ASK
SWEDES FOR ASYLUM HE PLANS TO TRAVEL TO STOCKHOLM
TONIGHT AND IS SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE THERE AT 0730
JANUARY 8 ON MoVo BOTNIA
PETERSON
NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED ABOVE ADDRESSEES.
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CRET LIMDIS
RECEIVED
WHCA
1970 NOV 18 21 57
VV EHA601
RR RUEHEX
DE RUEHC 188730/1 3222141
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 182102Z NOV 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO THE WHITE HOUSE
BT
SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 STATE 188730/1
LIMDIS
FOR KISSINGER
FOL SENT ACTION SECSTATE INFO ADDIS ABABA LAGOS LONDON
USDEL FRANCE USDEL SALT III NOV 17TH
QUOTE
HELSINKI 1426
LIMDIS
CODEL PERCY
SUBJ: SENATOR PERCY'S CALL ON PRIMIN KARJALAINEN: VIETNAM
PASS WHITE HOUSE FOR DR. KISSINGER
PASS SENATOR'S OFFICE FOR MESSRS FARRELLIAND COHEN
1. BEGIN SUMMARY. ON NOVEMBER 16, SENATOR PERCY CALLED
ON FINNISH PRIME MINISTER AHTI KARJALAINEN TO ASK FINNISH
GOVERNMENT TO USE ITS INFLUENCE
TO PERSUADE HANOI TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY ON BASIS PRESIDENT
NIXON'S FIVE POINT PROGRAM TO OBTAIN PEACE IN VIETNAM.
PRIMIN PROMISED TO DISCUSS MATTER WITH PRESIDENT KEKKONEN AND
CABINET TO DETERMINE WHAT HELPFUL STEPS FINNS COULD TAK. HE
SAID HE WOULD ADVISE EMBASSY OF GOVERNMENT'S DECISION WITHIN
A FEW DAYS. END SUMMARY
2. SENATOR PERCY, IN CALL ON PRIMIN KARJALA INEN NOVEMBER 16,
POINTED OUT THAT SITUATION IN UNITED STATES REGARDING VIETNAM
HAD CHANGED RADICALLY SINCE PRESIDENT NIXON HAD MADE HIS
DTAMATIC FIVE-POINT PROGRAM FOR PEACE IN VIETNAM OCTOBER 7.
WHILE IN PAST AMERICAN PEOPLE--AND U.S. SENATE-HAD BEEN DEEPLY
DIVIDED OVER VIETNAM, NOW COUNTRY IS UNITED BEHIND PRESIDENT'S
INITIATIVE FOR PEACE. THE SENATE ITSELF HAD CONFIRMED THIS
BY PASSING RESOLUTION EXPRESSING UNANIMOUS SUPPORT FOR
PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS. SENATOR HAD TRAVELED IN 12 STATES
DURING LAST CAMPAIGN, SPEAKING BEFORE UNIVERSITIES, YOUTH
GROUPS, SENIOR CITIZENS, ETC., AND NOT ONCE HAD ANYONE EXPRESSED
CRITICISM OF CURRENT U.S. VIETNAM POLICY. IT IS CLEAR U.S.
PUBLIC IS CONVIENCED THAT PRESIDENT'S APPROACH TO ENDING
KILLING IN VIETNAM IS THE RIGHT ONE. THIS IS BITTERLY
DISAPPOINTING TO HANOI, WHICH HAS BEEN COUNTING ON DIVISION
WITHIN AMERICA TO MAKE U.S. ACCEDE TO ITS DEMANDS.
3. UNFORTUNATELY, SENATOR CONTINUED, AT PARIS PEACE TALKS
NORTH VIETNAMESE AND VIET CONG ARE NOT NEGOTIATING SERIOUSLY
AND INSTEAD USE TALKS AS FORUM FOR PROPAGANDA DIATRIBES. THEY
HAVE DEMANDED, AS CONDITIONS FOR NEGOTIATIONS, TIMETABLE FOR
U.S. TROOP WITHDRAWAL AND OUSTER OF PRESENT SAIGON GOVERNMENT
LEADERSHIP. U.S. BELIEVES THAT DATE FOR WITHDRAWAL OF U.S.
TROOPS--QUITE POSSIBLY Reproduced WITHIN at the YEAR- Richard Nixon IS Presidential SUBJECT Library TO NEGOTIATION,
BUT CANNOT BE PRECONDITION FOR DECLASSIFIED. U.S. IS DEFINITELY
COMM This documenthas been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined be declassified.
WILL BE THROUGH NEGOTIATION WITH OTHER SIDE, WHICH COULD SPEED
WITHDRAWAL, OR THROUGH UNILATERAL ACTION FOLLOWING VEITNAMIZA-
TION, WHICH WOULD OF COURSE TAKE LONGER. CONCERNING HANOI'S
DEMANDS FOR OUSTER OF PRESIDENT THIEU, VICE PRESIDENT KY,
AND PRIMIN KHIEM, NORTH VIETNAMESE ARE TRYING TO GET U.S. TO
DO WHAT THEY THEMSELVES HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO DO AFTER NINE
YEARS OF FIGHTING, I.E., OVERTHROW THE SAIGON GOVERNMENT.
U.S. WILL NEVER AGREE TO THIS. THE SOONER THE OTHER SIDE
RECOGNIZES THIS FACT, THE BETTER FOR ALL CONCERNED, SINCE
TIME IS NOT WORKING IN HANOI'S FAVOR.
4. IT IS ESSENTIAL, SENATOR PERCY CONTINUED, THAT HANOI
GIVE UP ITS HOPES THAT A DIVISION WITHIN THE UNITED STATES
WILL BRING ABOUT PEACE ON ITS OWN TERMS, AND GET DOWN TO
SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE. IN THIS CONTEXT, A
COUNTRY SUCH AS FINLAND, WITH IT INTERNATIONAL REPUTATION FOR
NEUTRALITY, AND WHICH PLAYS A ROLE IN WORLD AFFAIRS FAR
GREATER THAN ITS SIZE WOULD INDICATE, COULD HELP THE CAUSE
OF PEACE BY ENCOURAGING HANOI, EITHER DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY,
TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY ON THE BAISS OF THE PRESIDENT'S .POINT
PROGRAM. SENATOR ADDED THAT KARJALAINEN HIMSELF, AS ARCHITECT
OF FINNISH INITIATIVE FOR CES IN HELSINKI, HAD ESTABLISHED
REPUTATION AS STATESMAN WORKING FOR PEACE AND RELAXATION OF
INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS. FURTHERMORE, FINLAND, BECAUSE OF ITS
CLOSE CONTACTS WITH STATES REPRESENTING DIFFERENT SOCIAL
SYSTEMS--HERE SENATOR REFERRED TO SOVIETS AND OTHER COMMUNIST
COUNTRIES--MIGHT WELL BE IN A POSITION TO MAKE SIGNIFICANT
CONTRIBUTION TO PEACE. SENATOR ALSO TOOK OCCASION TO REMIND
PRIMIN OF FONMIN LESKINEN' PROMISE IN WASHINGTON
TO CONSIDER "VERY SERIOUSLY" U.S. REQUEST TO APPROACH
HANOI REGARDING U.S. POW'S. FINALLY, SENATOR NOTED THAT
SUCCESSFUL ENLARGED CONFERENCE ON VIETNAM COULD HAVE FAVORABLE
REPERCUSSIONS FOR EVENTUAL CES.
5. FOLLOWING SENATOR'S PRESENTATION, PRIMIN SAT IN REFLECTIVE
SILENCE FOR SOME MOMENTS. HE THEN ASKED IF SENATOR HAD YET
SEEN PRESIDENT AND, UPON BEING INFORMED THAT SENATOR WOrLD
NEXT CALL ON PRESIDENT, SAID THAT ONCE SENATOR HAD SEEN
PRESIDENT KEKKONEN HE (KARJALAINEN) WOULD CONSULT WITH PRESIDENT
AS WELL AS WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF CABINET TO DETERMINE WHAT
STEPS FINLAND MIGHT TAKE TO HELP IN THE CAUSE OF PEACE IN
VIETNAM. KARJALAINEN SAID THAT WHILE FINLAND DOES NOT HAVE
RELATIONS WITH HANOI, IT NEVERTHELESS DOES HAVE CONTACT WITH
THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW, WHO OCCASIONALLY
VISITS FINLAND. THE PRIMIN ADDED THAT IN PAST HE HAD TALKED
WITH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR AND THAT
FURTHER SUCH CONTACTS WERE POSSIBLE. ALSO, FINNISH EMBASSY
IN MOSCOW HAD CONTACT WITH THE AMBASSADOR CHE DISMISSED CONTACTS
BETWEEN FINNISH AND NORTH VIETNAMESE AMBASSADORS
IN PEKING AS NOT BEING VERY SIGNIFICANT). HOWEVER, BEFORE
COMMENTING FURTHER, HE WOULD WISH TO CONSULT WITH PRESIDENT
AND CABINET AND PROMISED TO INFORM EMBASSY HELSINKI "WITHIN
SEVERAL DAYS" OF DECISION TAKEN BY GOVERNMENT REGARDING
SENATOR'S REQUEST.
6. ON CONCLUSION OF CONVERSATION, PRIMIN ASKED SENATOR
PERCY TO REMEMBER HIM TO SECRETARY OF STATE ROGERS, WHOM
THE SENATOR SAID HE HAD GOTTEN TO KNOW WELL IN WASHINGTON.
SECRET
LIMDIS
SENATOR PERCY PROMISED TO DO SO AND, AFTER THANKING PRIMIN
WARMLY, DEPARTED FOR APPOINTMENT WITH PRESIDENT.
7. EMBASSY COMMENT: IT WAS CLEAR THAT PRIMIN KARJALAINEN
WAS IMMENSELY PLEASED BY COMMENDATORY REFERENCES TO HIS
BT
4010
to
SHCV
RECEIAED
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NNNNVV EHA596
RR. RUEHEX
HAIS
DE RUEHC 188684 32220
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
CORRECTED COPY.
R 181948Z NOV 70
RECEIVED
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
CONADENTIAL
TO THE WHITE HOUSE
BT
CONFIDENTIAL STATE 188684
1970 NOV 18 20 49
FOR KISSINGER
FOLLOWING SENT ACTION SECSTATE, INFO ADDIS ABABA, AND BY POUCH
TO ANKARA, ATHENS, BELGRADE, BERN, BERLIN, BONN, BRUSSELS,
BUCHAREST, BUDAPEST, COPENHAGEN, DUBLIN, LISBON, LONDON,
LUXEMBOURG, MADRID, MOSCOW, OSLO, OTTAWA, PRAGUE, PARIS,
REYKJAVIK, SOFIA, STOCKHOLM, THE HAGUE, VALLETTA, VIENNA,
WARSAW, NATO, USNMR SHAPE, USLO SACLANT, AND SALT III ON 17 NOV
FROM HELSINKI. QUOTE:
Q
HELSINKI 1425
CORRECTEDCOPY
CODEL PERCY
PASS WHITE HOUSE FOR DR. KISSINGER
PASS SENATOR'S OFFICE FOR MESSRS FARRELL AND COHEN
SUBJ: SENATOR PERCY DISCUSSION OF CES WITH PRIME
MINISTER KARJALAINEN
1. DURING CALL BY SENATOR PERCY ON PRIME MINISTER KARJALAINEN
TO DISCUSS VIETNAM (SUBJECT OF SEPARATE MESSAGE), PRIMIN
RAISED QUESTION OF CONFERENCE ON EUROPEAN SECURITY (CES).
NOTING THAT NUMBER OF CRITICS ABROAD HAD SUGGESTED THAT
FINLAND WAS ACTING AS STALKING HORSE FOR MOSCOW IN PROPOSING
CES IN HELSINKI, KARJALAINEN SAID FINLAND WAS ACTING
STRICTLY IN TIS ON INTERESTS IN MAKING PROPOSAL.
2. SENATOR PERCY POINTED OUT THAT USG WELL AWARE FINLAND'S
SINCERITY--AND THAT OF PRIMIN HIMSELF-IN PROPOSING CES.
FURTHER, SENATOR SAID U.S. DID NOT IN PRINCIPLE OPPOSE CES
BUT THAT US AND ITS NATO ALLIES BELIEVED THAT PROGRESS SHOULD
BE MADE ON CONCRETE ISSUES, SUCH AS BERLIN, SALT, ETC.--
BEFORE POWERS COULD TAKE STEPS TOWARDS REALIZATION OF CES.
IF BY THEIR ACTIONS, SOVIETS SHOWED THEY WOULD BE PREPARED
TO DEAL WITH CES IN BUSINESSLIKE MANNER, THEN GROUNDWORK
WOULD BE LAID FOR EVENTUAL CONFERENCE. SENATOR NOTED THAT
HE HAD RECENTLY ATTENDED NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY, AT WHICH
POSITIVE RESOLUTION ON CES HAD BEEN VOTED. BUT US AND
NATO ALLIES WOULD NOT BE WILLING TO ATTEND CONFERENCE WHICH
WOULD BE SIMPLY PROPAGANDA FORUM FOR MOSCOV.
3. PRIMIN THEN REFERRED TO HIS PROPOSAL FOR "GATHERING"
OF AMBASSADORS IN HELSINKI WHICH COULD SERVE AS A KIND OF
PRELIMINARY CES. HE POINTED OUT THAT SUCH A MEETING WOULD
SERVE AS EXCELLENT TEST OF SOVIET INTENTIONS; WEST COULD
AT THIS GATHERING DETERMINE WHETHER SOVIETS REALLY READY
FOR SERIOUS CES NEGOTIATIONS. BY ATTENDANCE AT SUCH A
MEETING, HE CONCLUDED, WESTERN NATIONS WOULD LOSE NOTHING.
4. SENATOR PERCY DECLINED TO COMMENT ON SUBSTANCE OF
PROPOSAL, BUT PROMISED TO TRANSMIT PRIMIN'S VIEWS TO
PRESIDENT NIXON WHEN SENATOR RETURNS TO U.S.
GP3.
CORRECTED COPY
PETERSON
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
UNQUOTE ROGERS
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET LIMDIS
RECEIVED
NNNNVV EHA602
WHCA
RR RUEHEX
DE RUEHC 188730/2 3222142
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
1970 NOV 18 21 59
R 182102Z NOV 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO THE WHITE HOUSE
BT
SECRET FINAL SECTION OF 2 STATE 188730/2
LIMDIS
COUNTRY'S IMPORTANCE IN WORLD AFFAIRS AS WELL AS THE
FAVORABLE REFERENCES TO HIS OWN STATURE AS A STATESMAN
OF PEACE. FURTHER, KARJALAINEN APPEARED TO BE DEEPLY
INTRIGUED BY THE PROSPECT OF PLAYING A POSITIVE ROLE IN SEEKING
A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE VIETNAM CONFLICT, BOTH IN
TERMS OF ITS FAVORABLE IMPACT ON FINLAND'S NEUTRAL IMAGE AND
ON HIS OWN POLITICAL AMBITIONS. INDICATIVE OF THIS IS THE
PRIMIN'S COMMITTING HIMSELF TO INFORM THE EMBASSY WITHIN A
FEW DAYS OF HIS GOVERNMENT'S DECISION ON THE SENATOR'S REQUEST.
A KEY FACTOR IN ANY DECISION TO TAKE AN INITIATIVE WILL BE
THE ATTITUDE OF PRESIDENT KEKKONEN, WHO HOLDS PRIMARY
RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONDUCTING THE COUNTRY'S FOREIGN AFFAIRS.
(SENATOR PERCY'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT KEKKONEN IS THE SUBJECT
OF A SEPARATE MESSAGE.)
GP-3 PETERSON UNQUOTE ROGERS
BT
SEGNET LIMDIS
NNNN
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WH BD
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET 518
PAGE 01 HELSIN 01067 071909Z
51
ACTION SS-45
INFO OCT-01 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 1046 W
O 071700Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3019
INFO US ARMY PROC CENTER FRANKFURT
SITUATION STUATION ROOM ROOM
6114 WHITE HOUSE HOUSE
SEC R ET HELSINKI 1067
'70 SEP 8 AM 8:24
EXDIS
JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE
REF: STATE 146284
i. EMBASSY HAS CAREFULLY STUDIED REFTEL AND HAS FOLLOWING COMENTS:
A ᵃ ALTHOUGH ARMY PROCUREMENT AGENCY, FRANKFURT, HAS
PREVIOUSLY CONCLUDED CONTRACT WITH LAPUA FOR AMMUNITION,
THIS WAS FOR TEST AND TRAINING PURPOSES IN UNITED STATES.
FROM INFORMATION AVAILABLE HERE, IT APPEARS NO RPT NO
END-USE CERTIFICATE WAS REQUIRED ON THIS CONTRACT.
B ᵒ IF END-USE CERTIFICATE WERE REQUIRED ON PROPOSED
CONTRACT FOR USE OF AMMUNITION IN CAMBODIA, IT HIGHLY
LIKELY THAT FINNISH GOVERNMENT WOULD REFUSE TO GRANT
APPROVAL.
C. even IF END-USE CERTIFICATE NOT RPT NOT REQUIRED FOR PORPOSED
CONTRACT, THERE IS REAL DANGER THAT INFORMATION ON CONTRACT
WOULD BECOME PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE. IN THIS EVENT IT WOULD
PLACE FINNISH GOVERNMENT IN HIGHLY EMBARRASSING POSITION
AND ALMOST CERTAINLY BE INJURIOUS TO FINNISH-U.S. RELATIONS.
FURTHERMORE, SOVIETS WOULD REACT STRONGLY TO NEWS OF SUCH
CONTRACT, WITH CONSEQUENT UNFAVORABLE REPERCUSSIONS FOR
FINNISH-SOVIET RELATIONS. FINALLY, PUBLICATION OF CONTRACT
WOULD STRIKE BLOW TO CREDIBILITY OF FINNISH NEUTRALITY
WHICH FINNS HAVE so PAINSTAKINGLY STRIVEN TO DEVELOP
AND MAINTAIN.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE SECRET AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
*
Department of State
EXEMS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 HELSIN 01067 071909Z
2. ON BASIS OF ABOVE CONSIDERATIONS, EMBASSY RECOMMENDS
STRONGLY AGAINST ANY EFFORT TO PROCURE AMMUNITION IN FINLAND
FOR USE IN CAMBODIA.
PETERSON
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED THOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF E EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
FINLAND
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
EXC-S
Department of State
ORLINED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET 845
PAGE 01 HELSIN 01500 0515552
42
ACTION SS-45
INFO OCT-01 /046 W
120516
R 051530Z DEC 69
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2220
'69 DEC '69 DEC 5 PM 2:27
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
S E R ET HELSINKI 1500
EXDIS
SUBJ: APPROACH TO GOVERNMENT ON VIETNAM PEACE TALKS
REF 8 STATE 181401: HELSINKI 1133
1. FONMINISTRY DIRGEN VANAMO CALLED ME TO FONMINISTRY
TODAY TO GIVE ORAL REPLY TO OUR APPROACH OF OCTOBER 29
WHEN WE REQUESTED GOF, EITHER DIRECTLY OR THROUGH ITS
ALLIES, TO EXPRESS ITS SUPPORT OF OUR EFFORTS FOR PEACE
AND TO SEEK TO PERSUADE HANOI TO MAKE RESPONSE TO OUR
PROPOSALS WHICH WOULD ENABLE US TO MAKE PROGRESS TOWARDS
PEACE IN VIETNAM.
2. IN PREFACE TO HIS FORMAL REPLY, DIRGEN SAID GOF HAD
STUDIED CAREFULLY AND EXTENSIVELY U.S. APPROACH AND THAT
BECAUSE OF ITS REGARD FOR VERY FRIENDLY RELATIONS BETWEEN
TWO COUNTRIES HAD DECIDED TO REPLY.
3. VANAMO BEGAN REPLY WITH GENERAL STATEMENT THAT GOF
BELIEVED VIETNAM QUESTION TO BE POLITICAL PROBLEM WHICH
SHOULD BE SETTLED BY PEACEFUL MEANS. GOF, HE CONTINUED,
HAS SUPPORTED PROPOSALS OUTLINED BY UN SECGEN U THANT
FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF QUESTION.
4. HE SAID FINLAND WELCOMED BEGINNING OF PARIS TALKS
AND HOPED THEY WOULD BRING ABOUT SETTLEMENT OF COMPLICATED
VIETNAM QUESTION. HOWEVER, HE POINTED OUT THAT IN LINE
WITH ITS POLICY OF NEUTRALITY, GOF HAS NOT TAKEN ANY
STAND ON PROPOSALS ADVANCED AT PARIS TALKS AND
NOTED THAT GOF DOES NOT RECOGNIZE EITHER PART OF VIETNAM.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OR AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 HELSIN 01500 051555Z
EXC-S EXPIC EXPIC
5. VANAMO CONCLUDED WITH STATEMENT THAT GOF WOULD FOLLOW
VIETNAM DEVELOPMENTS AND "IN ACCORDANCE WITH HER POLICY OF
NEUTRALITY WILL CONSIDER WHAT SHE, FOR HER PART, COULD USEFULLY
DO IN THIS QUESTION...
60 FOLLOWING COMPLETION OF HIS FORMAL REPLY, WE DISCUSSED
VIETNAM ISSUE FOR SOME MINUTES. I POINTED OUT THAT U.S.
GOVERNMENT EXPLORING EVERY POSSIBLE AVENUE IN EFFORT TO
REACH JUST PEACE IN VIETNAM. I ASKED IF GOF HAD ANY
SUGGESTIONS WHICH MIGHT CONTRIBUTE TO SEARCH FOR PEACE
VANAMO REPLIED THAT GOF "SMALL COUNTRY" WHICH COULD
HARDLY DARE TO OFFER SUGGESTIONS TO GREAT POWER LIKE U.S.
I COUNTERED THAT FINLAND'S SMALLNESS HAD NOT APPEARED TO
BE FACTOR WHEN FONMIN KARUALAINEN HAD PROPOSED IN
OCTOBER 1968 SPEECH IN UNGA FOR HALT TO BOMBING OF
N. VIETNAM. VANAMO LAUGHED RATHER SHEEPISHLY AT THIS
POINT, BUT REPLIED SOMEWHAT LAMELY THAT KARJALAINEN HAD
SIMPLY BEEN EXPRESSING SUPPORT FOR U THANT PROPOSALS.
7. ALTHOUGH ATMOSPHERE THROUGHOUT MEETING WAS AMICABLE,
I MADE CLEAR TO DIRGEN U.S. CONVICTION THAT NATIONS OF
WORLD SHOULD USE THEIR INFLUENCE TO PERSUADE HANOI
TO MOVE TOWARDS SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS, SO THAT A JUST
PEACE COULD BE ACHIEVED IN THAT WAR-TORN COUNTRY.
8. I INFORMED DIRGEN I WOULD COMMUNICATE GOF REPLY
TO MY GOVERNMENT. GP.1.
PETERSON
DEC 2 bN 5:51
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODU
WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF STATE
Finland
*
OF STATES AMERICA UNITED
Department
State
EXPIS
TELEGRAM
'69 OCT 29 PM 4:35
for
SECRET 922
02
PAGE 01 HELSIN 01133 291452Z
50
ACTION SS 45
INFO OCT 01/046 W
030408
R 291425Z OCT 69
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1965
SECR E T HELSINKI 1133
EXDIS
SUBU: APPROACH TO GOVERNMENT ON VIETNAM PEACE TALKS
REF: STATE 181401
1 - I CALLED ON FONMIN KARJALAINEN OCTOBER 29 TO DISCUSS
VIETNAM IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS REFTEL. I CITED
FONMIN'S SPEECH OF OCTOBER 7, 1968, TO UNGA, IN WHICH
KARJALAINEN HAD CALLED FOR HALT TO BOMBING OF N. VIETNAM
AND REDUCTION OF MILITARY ACTIVITY "SO AS TO PREPARE GROUND
FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT THAT WOULD ENABLE PEOPLE OF VIETNAM
TO DETERMINE THEIR FUTURE WITHOUT INTERFERENCE FROM OUTSIDE."
I POINTED OUT THAT U.S. HAD STOPPED ALL BOMBING OF NORTH
VIETNAM, AND THEN LISTED OTHER STEPS U.S. HAD TAKEN TO
REDUCE LEVEL OF CONFLICT» INCLUDING WITHDRAWAL OF 60,000
MEN BY DECEMBER 15. UNFORTUNATELY, OTHER SIDE HAD NOT
RESPONDED TO OUR MOVES. I CONCLUDED WITH REQUEST THAT GOF
APPROACH HANOI, EITHER DIRECTLY OR THROUGH ITS ALLIES, TO
EXPRESS ITS SUPPORT OF OUR EFFORTS FOR PEACE AND TO SEEK
TO PERSUADE HANOI TO MAKE RESPONSE TO OUR PROPOSALS WHICH
WOULD ENABLE US TO MAKE PROGRESS TOWARDS PEACE IN VIETNAM.
2. KARJALAINEN THANKED ME FOR VISIT AND SAID GOF WILLING
TO DO EVERYTHING WITHIN ITS POWER TO CONTRIBUTE TO CAUSE
OF PEACE. HOWEVER, HE POINTED OUT THAT FINLAND SMALL COUNTRY
WITH LIMITED INFLUENCE IN WORLD AFFAIRS. I COUNTERED THAT
ALTHOUGH FINLAND SMALL, ITS MORAL FORCE CONSIDERABLE, AND
THAT GOF COULD MAKE CONTRIBUTION TO PEACE BY URGING HANOI
TO ADOPT MORE POSITIVE ATTITUDE TOWARDS OUR PROPOSALS.
I THEN LEFT AIDE MEMOIRE DESCRIBING IN DETAIL STEPS TAKEN
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard SECRET Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF STATE
Department of State
OF STATES AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
SECRET
EXPIS EXCES EXCES
PAGE 02 HELSIN 01133 291452Z
BY U.S. TO GET SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS STARTED.
3. FONMIN AGREED TO TAKE MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION, AND
REITERATED DESIRE OF GOF TO ASSIST CAUSE OF WORLD PEACE.
GP-1.
PETERSON
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED
THOUT THE SECRET AUTHORIZATION O
HE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
510/20/8690
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXPIS
*
Department of State
STATES UNITED AMERICA
TELEGRAM
OF
SECREY 777
PAGE 01 STATE 085682
52
ORIGIN SS=25
2
EXPIRES
INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 R
DRAFTED BY EUR/RPMIEJSTREATORSDAH
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
5-4-73 EXT. 21626
APPROVED BY EUR:GSSPRINGSTEEN
'73 MAY 5 AM 9:34
S/S-08 JMEALUM
EUR/RPM:RJMCGUIRE
ACDA/IR:DLINEBAUGH
D0D/ISAGENERAL LOBDELL
PM/DCA8VBAKER
JS=J=5:COL. LAFFERTY (INFO)
NSC:DCLIFT
112555
0 050141Z MAY 73
FM SECSTATE NASHDC
EXQIC
TO AMEMBASSY HELSINKI IMMEDIATE
INFO USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE
SECRE T STATE 085682
EXDIS
E.O. 11652:GDS
TAGS: PFOR, PARM
SUBJECT: CSCE: CBM: POLICY ON MILIYARY MOVEMENTS
REF: HELSINKI 1157 (EXDIS) ; STATE 83486
1. YOU SHOULD INFORM ALLIED DELS CONCERNING YOUR EXCHANGE
EXATC
WITH MENDELEVICH REPORTED HELSINKI 1157, AND PROPOSED
ALTERNATIVE APPROACH AS OUTLINED STATE 83486.
2. WE NOTE YOUR VIEW CPARA 6, HELSINKI'S 1157) THAT SOME
ALLIES WILL PREFER THAT DECISIONS ON "MOVEMENTS" BE TAKEN
IN NATO. WE BELIEVE OUR PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE LANGUAGE
KEEPS GREN "MOVEMENTS" ISSUE AND PRESERVES ESSENTIAL
SUBSTANCE OF ALLIED POSITION WHILE PROVIDING ACCEPTABLE
COMPROMISE TO MEET TACTICAL SITUATION IN HELSINKI, WE
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT ETCHREE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
TELEGRAM
EXPIS EXPIS
STATES UNITED AMERICA
OF
SECREY
PAGE 02 STATE 085682
STRONGLY PREFER THEREFORE TO KEEP FOCUS OF DISCUSSION ON
SUCH TACTICAL MATTERS IN HELSINKT, RESERVING ONLY MAJOR
SUBSTANTIVE P.O. ICY SHIFTS FOR NAC DISCUSSION. ACCORDINGLY,
YOU SHOULD SUBGEST TO ALLIED DELS THAT THEY SEEK INSTRUCTION
TO ALLOW CONSOLTATIONS TO GO FORWARD AT HELSINKI ON THIS
ISSUE SO THAY YOU MAY MAKE PROMPT PRESENTATION TO
MENDELEVICH ON ALTERNATIVE APPROACH.
3. BEGIN FYI: WE ARE CONCERNED THAT SETZING NAC AND SPC
WITH THIS ISSUE COULD LEAD TO DELAY IN REACHING COMPROMISE
ESSENTIAL TO REACHING AGREEMENT ON BASKET Y MANDATE NEEDED
TO MAINTAIN MOMENTUM TOWARD CONVENING CSCE IN LATE
JUNE. END FYI. RUSH
W 8:3d
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUS ETO-REE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
9/10/20/8690
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
*
*
Department of State
STATES AMERICA UNITED ame
APR 33 PM 9:44
TELEGRAM
OF
WHITE HOUSE
WH
SITUATION ROOM
SECRET 021
EXPIS EXQIN EXPIN EXPIS
PAGE 01 STATE 083486
51
ORIGIN SS=25
3
INFO OCT-01 ADP=00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00 1026 R
DRAFTED BY: EUR/RPM:RLWILLIAMSON/EJSTREATOR
APPROVED BY: EUR:WJSTOESSEL
EUR:GSSPRINGSTEEN
EUR/RPM:RJMCGUIRE
OSD/ISA:GEN LOBDELL
JCS/J=5:ADM DOYLE
ACDA/IR:DLINEBAUGH
PM/DCA&VBAKER (SUBS)
NSC:WHYLAND
S/S=O:RWRIGHT
096552
O P 0301062 MAY 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY HELSINKI IMMEDIATE
INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY
SECRET STATE 083486
EXDIS
CORRECTEDCOPY COMISSION PARA 2)
E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PFOR, PARM, NATO, UR
SUBJECT: CSCE: CBM'S: POLICY ON MILITARY "MOVEMENTS"
HELSINKI FOR VEST
1. AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, YOU SHOULD MEET WITH MENDELEVICH
TO DISCUSS INCLUSION OF TERM "MAJOR MILITARY MOVEMENTS"
IN CBM'S, MAKING POINTS CONTAINED IN PARA 3 BELOW. (BEGIN
FYI: BASED ON INDICATIONS WE HAVE RECEIVED. SOVIETS WILL
NOT RPT NOT ACCEPT "movements." HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE IT IS
ESSENTIAL THAT YOU MAKE A STRONG CASE TO mendelevich ON
THIS ISSUE IN ORDER TO PROVIDE A BASIS FOR PROPOSING TO
ALLIES THAT THEY PUT FORWARD A COMPROMISE FORMULATION
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE SECRET AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
PRM
DS-1652
of STATE
*
Department of State
STATES AMERICA ANITA some
TELEGRAM
OF
SECRET
EXQI EXPIS EXAIS
PAGE 02 STATE 083486
DESIGNED TO WORK TOWARD AGREEMENT. END FYI.)
2. YOU SHOULD REPORT FULLY TO DEPARTMENT MENDELEVICHIS
REACTIONS, AND ANY SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR POSSIBLE
COMPROMISE, TOGETHER WITH YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS. THERE-
AFTER, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT YOUR VIEWS, WE WOULD ENVISAGE
FOLLOWING POSSIBLE SCENARIO. IF, AS WE ANTICIPATE,
SOVIET REACTION IS ENTIRELY NEGATIVE, UPON RECEIPT OF
AUTHORIZATION FROM DEPARTMENT, YOU WOULD BRIEF ALLIED DELS
ON YOUR MEETING WITH MENDELEVICH, STRESSING THAT YOU HAD
MADE VIGOROUS ATTEMPT TO BRING SOVIETS TO ACREE TO
INCLUSION OF "MOVEMENTS," AND THAT SOVIETS WILL NOT AGREE.
YOU WOULD FURTHER EXPRESS OUR VIEW THAT WESTERN INTEREST
IN THIS QUESTION SHOULD BE DIRECTED TOWARDS SUBSTANCE
AND NOT TOWARDS POINTLESS DEBATE OVER DEFINITIONS AND
TERMINOLOGY, AND THAT UNDUE STRESS SHOULD NOT BE PLACED
ON "MAJOR MILITARY MOVEMENTS" ISSUE. ACCORDINGLY, ALLIES
SHOULD SEEK TO FIND SUITABLE ALTERNATIVE LANGUAGE FOR THE
BASKET I MANDATE, WHICH WOULD PROTECT ALLIED INTERESTS,
AND STILL BE ACCEPTABLE TO PACT COUNTRIES. FOR EXAMPLE,
ALLIES MIGHT EMPLOY IN MANDATE PHRASE, "PRIOR NOTIFICATION
OF LARGE-SCALE CHANGES IN THE LOCATION OF FORCES,
INCLUDING MAJOR MANEUVERS." IF ATTEMPTS TO FIND
COMPROMISE LANGUAGE PROVE UNACCEPTABLE, ALLIES WOULD STILL
HAVE OPTION OF ACCEPTING SOVIET PREFERENCE IN MPT AND
THEN IN THE COMMITTEE STAGE OF CSCE SEEKING TO DEFINE
MANEUVERS IN A FASHION COVERING MOVEMENTS o REAL
CONSEQUENCE. IN PROPOSING AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH, YOU
WOULD POINT OUT US WILLINGNESS TO WORK WITH ALLIES TO
PROTECT SUBSTANTIVE ALLIED INTEREST IN THIS QUESTION,
BUT POINT OUT THAT WE ARE NOT PREPARED TO EIGAGE IN A
PROTRACTED TERMINOLOGICAL DISPUTE OVER MOVEMENTS, OR SEE
PROGRESS IN TALKS SLOWED OVER THIS ISSUE. YOU ALSO COULD
PROPOSE TO ALLIES THAT YOU DISCUSS ALTERNATIVE MANDATE
LANGUAGE FOR BASKET I (ABOVE) WITH MENDELEVICH, DRAWING
ON POINTS IN PARA 4, BELOW.
3. IN INITIAL DISCUSSION WITH MENDELEVICH, YOU MAY WISH
TO DRAW ON FOLLOWING POINTS:
(A) IN ALLIED VIEW, CONFIDENCE-BJILDING
MEASURES ARE DESIGNED TO ENHANCE THE CONFICENCE OF THE
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED THOUT THESORHORIZATION OF E EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
DEPARTMENT
STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
EXPIS EXPIS EXAIS
SECRET
PAGE 03 STATE 083486
PARTICIPATING STATES THAT THE MILITARY ACTIVITIES OF
OTHER STATES ARE NOT THREATENING, AS SUCH, CBMIS WOULD
SERVE TO SUPPORT ANY DECLARATION ON NON-USE OR THREAT OF
USE OF FORCE.
(B) TO RESTRICT THE CBMIS ONLY TO MANEUVERS
COULD LEAD TO AMBIGUITIES AND MISUNDERSTANDINGS WHICH
WOULD SERVE TO DECREASE RATHER THAN INCREASE CONFIDENCE.
RETENTION OF "MAJOR MILITARY MOVEMENTS,' THE MORE
ENCOMPASSING TERM, WOULD IN ALLIED VIEW ELIMINATE THIS
PROBLEM.
(C) ON THE OTHER HAND, ALLIES WOULD NOT FAVOR
SO STRICT A DEFINITION OF THE TERM "MAJOR MILITARY
MOVEMENT" THAT REQUIREMENT FOR PRIOR NOTIFICATION WOULD
BE ADMINISTRATIVELY BURDENSOME AND CONFLICT WITH NORMAL,
NON-THREATENING ACTIVITIES OF THE VARIOUS COUNTRIES
FORCES.
(D) INSTEAD, IN ALLIED VIEW, "MAJOR MILITARY
MOVEMENTS" SHOULD ENCOMPASS THOSE LARGE-SCALE DEPLOYMENTS
OF FORCES FOR WHICH CONSIDERABLE ADVANCED PLANNING IS
REQUIRED IN ANY CASE, AND WHICH CANNOT BE CONCEALED. TO
REQUIRE PRE-ANNOUNCEMENT OF SUCH MAJOR MOVEMENTS WOULD NOT
IMPOSE EXCESSIVE ADMINISTRATIVE BURDENS, AND WOULD SERVE
TO INCREASE CONFIDENCE. MOREOVER, AS ALLIES ENVISAGE
ADVANCE NOTIFICATION, THE INITIATIVE OF ANNOUNCEMENT WOULD
LIE WITH THE INDIVIDUAL governments.
(E) THE ALLIES HAVE NOT REACHED FIRM CONCLUSIONS
ON THE TYPES OF MOVEMENTS WHICH WOULD CONSTITUTE A "MAJOR
MILITARY MOVEMENT.' WHILE THE SIZE OF THE MOVEMENT IN ANY
CASE WOULD HAVE TO BE QUITE LARGE, LOCATION AND OTHER
FACTORS WOULD ALSO PLAY A ROLE. IN ANY CASE, THE ALLIES
DO NOT ENVISAGE PRIOR ANNOUNCEMENT TO INHIBIT REGULAR
ACTIVITIES OF THE FORCES OF ANY GOVERNMENT.
(F) WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT THESE PROBLEMS CAN
BE RESOLVED TO THE SATISFACTION OF ALL PARTICIPANTS IN
DISCUSSIONS DURING THE SECOND STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE,
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE SECRET AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
FORM
PEPARTMENT
of
STATE
*
*
Department of State
on STATES AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
SECRET
EXPIS EXPIS EXPIRE EXPIS
PAGE 04 STATE 083486
WHEN THESE MATTERS CAN BE DEALT WITH IN GREATER DETAIL.
THE ALLIES FOR THEIR PART WOULD BE WILLING THEN TO PROVIDE
ILLUSTRATIVE LISTS OF THEIR ACTIVITIES TO INDICATE THE
KINDS OF ACTIVITIES OF WHICH PRIOR ANNOUNCEMENT WOULD BE
DESIRABLE.
4g FOLLOWING ARE SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS RELATED TO
ALTERNATIVE FORMULATION IN PARA 2:
(A) ALLIES ARE DISAPPOINTED IN SOVIET
UNWILLINGNESS TO INCLUDE TERM "MAJOR MILITARY MOVEMENTS"
IN MANDATE FORMULATION ON CBMIS.
(B) IN WESTERN TERMINOLOGY, MANEUVERS ALONE
DO NOT COVER ALL OF THE LARGE SCALE CHANGES IN FORCE
DISPOSITIONS, FOR WHICH PRIOR ANNOUNCEMENT WOULD SERVE
TO IMPROVE CONFIDENCE ON ALL SIDES.
(C) nonetheless, THE ALLIES ARE NOT INTERESTED
IN A PROLONGED DEBATE OVER DEFINITIONS, AND ARE PREPARED
TO DROP THEIR INSISTENCE ON "MOVEMENTS" IF MUTUALLY
SATISFACTORY ALTERNATIVE LANGUAGE CAN BE DEVELOPED.
(D) FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES, THE MANDATE
MIGHT BE CHANGED TO READ ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES:
"PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF LARGE-SCALE CHANGES IN THE
LOCATION OF FORCES, INCLUDING MAJOR MANEUVERS." WE
BELIEVE THIS LANGUAGE DOES NOT PREJUDICE THE POSITION OF
EITHER SIDE. WE ARE NOT WEDDED TO THIS SUGGESTION, AND
WOULD BE HAPPY TO CONSIDER ANY ALTERNATIVE LANGUAGE WHICH
THE SOVIETS MIGHT WISH TO SUGGEST. WE MAKE THIS
SUGGESTION, HOWEVER, IN THE HOPE THAT IT WOULD MAKE CLEAR
TO ALL CONCERNED THAT ONLY VERY LARGE SCALE CHANGES IN
THE DISPOSITION OF FORCES, WHETHER PERMANENT OR
TEMPORARY, WOULD REQUIRE PRIOR ANNOUNCEMENT, AND THAT THE
ALLIES DO NOT HAVE IN MIND PRIOR ANNOUNCEMENT REQUIREMENTS
WHICH WOULD INTERFERE WITH NORMAL MILITARY ACTIVITIES OF
ANY PARTICIPATING STATE.
5. FOR USNATO: ABOVE IS FYI ONLY.
ROGERS
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
6A0/20/EL90
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
PEPARTMENT or STATE
Department of State
OF STATE AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
'73 APR 33 AM 8:53
SECRET 566
WHITE HOUSE
PAGE 01 STATE 083486
SITUATION ROOM
70-61
ORIGIN SS-25
2
INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 R
DRAFTED BY EUR/RPM:RLWILLIAMSON/EJSTREATOR:DG
5/2/73 EXT 23199
APPROVED BY EUR:WJSTOESSEL
EUR:GSSPRINGSTEEN
EUR/RPM:RJMCGUIRE
OSD/ISA:GEN LOBDELL
JCS/J-5ADM DOYLE
ACDA/IR:DLINEBAUGH
PM/DCA-VBAKER (SUBS)
MSC:WHYLAND
S/S-O:R. WRIGHT
090936
0 P 0301067 MAY 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY HELSINKI IMMEDIATE
INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY
SECRE T STATE 083486
EXDIS
E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PFOR, PARM, NATO, UR
SUBJECT: CSCE: CBM'S: POLICY ON MILITARY "MOVEMENTS"
HELSINKI FOR VEST
1. AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, YOU SHOULD MEET WITH MENDELEVICH
TO DISCUSS INCLUSION OF TERM "MAJOR MILITARY MOVEMENTS"
IN CBM'S, MAKING POINTS CONTAINED IN PARA 3 BELOW. (BEGIN
FYI: BASED ON INDICATIONS WE HAVE RECEIVED, SOVIETS WILL
NOT RPT NOT ACCEPT "movements." HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE IT IS
ESSENTIAL THAT YOU MAKE A STRONG CASE TO MENDELEVICH ON
THIS ISSUE IN ORDER TO PROVIDE A BASIS FOR PROPOSING TO
ALLIES THAT THEY PUT FORWARD A COMPROMISE FORMULATION
DESIGNED TO WORK TOWARD agreement. END FYI.)
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
FORM
DECLASSIFIED
DS-1652
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
of
STATE
*
OF STATE AMERICA UNITED
Department of State
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 STATE 083486
2. YOU SHOULD REPORT FULLY TO DEPARTMENT mendelevichis
REACTIONS, AND ANY SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR POSSIBLE
COMPROMISE, TOGETHER WITH YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS. THERE-
AFTER, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT YOUR VIEWS, WE WOULD ENVISAGE
FOLLOWING POSSIBLE SCENARIO. IF, AS WE ANTICIPATE,
SOVIET REACTION IS ENTIRELY NEGATIVE, UPON RECEIPT OF
AUTHORIZATION FROM DEPARTMENT, YOU WOULD BRIEF ALLIED DELS
ON YOUR MEETING WITH mendelevich, STRESSING THAT YOU HAD
MADE VIGOROUS ATTEMPT TO BRING SOVIETS TO AGREE TO
INCLUSION OF "MOVEMENTS," AND THAT SOVIETS WILL NOT AGREE.
YOU WOULD FURTHER EXPRESS OUR VIEW THAT WESTERN INTEREST
AND NOT TOWARDS POINTLESS DEBATE OVER DEFINITIONS AND
TERMINOLOGY, AND THAT UNDUE STRESS SHOULD NOT BE PLACED
ON "MAJOR MILITARY MOVEMENTS" ISSUE. ACCORDINGLY, ALLIES
SHOULD SEEK TO FIND SUITABLE ALTERNATIVE LANGUAGE FOR THE
BASKET I MANDATE, WHICH WOULD PROTECT ALLIED INTERESTS,
AND STILL BE ACCEPTABLE TO PACT COUNTRIES. FOR EXAMPLE,
ALLIES MIGHT EMPLOY IN MANDATE PHRASE, "PRIOR NOTIFICATION
OF LARGE-SCALE CHANGES IN THE LOCATION OF FORCES,
INCLUDING MAJOR maneuvers. IF ATTEMPTS TO FIND
COMPROMISE LANGUAGE PROVE UNACCEPTABLE, ALLIES WOULD STILL
HAVE OPTION OF ACCEPTING SOVIET PREFERENCE IN MPT AND
THEN IN THE COMMITTEE STAGE OF CSCE SEEKING TO DEFINE
MANEUVERS IN A FASHION COVERING MOVEMENTS OF REAL
CONSEQUENCE. IN PROPOSING AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH, YOU
WOULD POINT OUT US WILLINGNESS TO WORK WITH ALLIES TO
PROTECT SUBSTANTIVE ALLIED INTEREST IN THIS QUESTION,
BUT POINT OUT THAT WE ARE NOT PREPARED TO ENGAGE IN A
PROTRACTED TERMINOLOGICAL DISPUTE OVER movements, OR SEE
PROGRESS IN TALKS SLOWED OVER THIS ISSUE. YOU ALSO COULD
PROPOSE TO ALLIES THAT YOU DISCUSS ALTERNATIVE MANDATE
ANGUAGE FOR BASKET I (ABOVE) WITH mendelevich, DRAWING
ON POINTS IN PARA 4, BELOW.
IN INITIAL DISCUSSION WITH mendelevich, YOU MAY WISH
TO DRAW ON FOLLOWING POINTS:
(A) IN ALLIED VIEW, CONFIDENCE-BUILDING
MEASURES ARE DESIGNED TO ENHANCE THE CONFIDENCE OF THE
PARTICIPATING STATES THAT THE MILITARY ACTIVITIES OF
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED VITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
FORM
DECLASSIFIED
DS-1652
0.00
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
PEPARTMENT
or
STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
OF
SECRET
PAGE 03 STATE 083486
OTHER STATES ARE NOT THREATENING. AS SUCH, CBMIS WOULD
SERVE TO SUPPORT ANY DECLARATION ON NON-USE OR THREAT OF
USE OF FORCE.
(B) TO RESTRICT THE CBMIS ONLY TO MANEUVERS
EXCE
COULD LEAD TO AMBIGUITIES AND MISUNDERSTANDINGS WHICH
WOULD SERVE TO DECREASE RATHER THAN INCREASE CONFIDENCE.
RETENTION OF "MAJOR MILITARY MOVEMENTS,' THE MORE
ENCOMPASSING TERM, WOULD IN ALLIED VIEW ELIMINATE THIS
PROBLEM.
(C) ON THE OTHER HAND, ALLIES WOULD NOT FAVOR
SO STRICT A DEFINITION OF THE TERM "MAJOR MILITARY
MOVEMENT" THAT REQUIREMENT FOR PRIOR NOTIFICATION WOULD
BE ADMINISTRATIVELY BURDENSOME AND CONFLICT WITH NORMAL,
NON-THREATENING ACTIVITIES OF THE VARIOUS COUNTRIES!
FORCES.
(D) INSTEAD, IN ALLIED VIEW, "MAJOR MILITARY
MOVEMENTS" SHOULD ENCOMPASS THOSE LARGE-SCALE DEPLOYMENTS
OF FORCES FOR WHICH CONSIDERABLE ADVANCED PLANNING IS
REQUIRED IN ANY CASE, AND WHICH CANNOT BE CONCEALED. TO
REQUIRE PRE-ANNOUNCEMENT OF SUCH MAJOR MOVEMENTS WOULD NOT
IMPOSE EXCESSIVE ADMINISTRATIVE BURDENS, AND WOULD SERVE
TO INCREASE CONFIDENCE. MOREOVER, AS ALLIES ENVISAGE
ADVANCE NOTIFICATION, THE INITIATIVE OF ANNOUNCEMENT WOULD
LIE WITH THE INDIVIDUAL governments.
(E) THE ALLIES HAVE NOT REACHED FIRM CONCLUSIONS
ON THE TYPES OF MOVEMENTS WHICH WOULD CONSTITUTE A "MAJOR
MILITARY movement." WHILE THE SIZE OF THE MOVEMENT IN ANY
CASE WOULD HAVE TO BE QUITE LARGE, LOCATION AND OTHER
FACTORS WOULD ALSO PLAY A ROLE. IN ANY CASE, THE ALLIES
DO NOT ENVISAGE PRIOR ANNOUNCEMENT TO INHIBIT REGULAR
ACTIVITIES OF THE FORCES OF ANY government.
(F) WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT THESE PROBLEMS CAN
BE RESOLVED TO THE SATISFACTION OF ALL PARTICIPANTS IN
DISCUSSIONS DURING THE SECOND STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE,
WHEN THESE MATTERS CAN BE DEALT WITH IN GREATER DETAIL.
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
FORM
DECLASSIFIED
DS-165his document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
PEPARTMENT OF STATE
*
Department of State
OF STATES AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
EXEIS EXPIS
SECRET
PAGE 04 STATE 083486
THE ALLIES FOR THEIR PART WOULD BE WILLING THEN TO PROVIDE
ILLUSTRATIVE LISTS OF THEIR ACTIVITIES TO INDICATE THE
KINDS OF ACTIVITIES OF WHICH PRIOR ANNOUNCEMENT WOULD BE
DESIRABLE.
4. FOLLOWING ARE SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS RELATED TO
ALTERNATIVE FORMULATION IN PARA 2:
(A) ALLIES ARE DISAPPOINTED IN SOVIET
UNWILLINGNESS TO INCLUDE TERM "MAJOR MILITARY movements"
IN MANDATE FORMULATION ON CBM'S.
(B) IN WESTERN TERMINOLOGY, MANEUVERS ALONE
DO NOT COVER ALL OF THE LARGE SCALE CHANGES IN FORCE
DISPOSITIONS, FOR WHICH PRIOR ANNOUNCEMENT WOULD SERVE
TO IMPROVE CONFIDENCE ON ALL SIDES.
(C) NONETHELESS, THE ALLIES ARE NOT INTERESTED
IN A PROLONGED DEBATE OVER DEFINITIONS, AND ARE PREPARED
TO DROP THEIR INSISTENCE ON "MOVEMENTS" IF MUTUALLY
SATISFACTORY ALTERNATIVE LANGUAGE CAN BE DEVELOPED.
(D) FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES, THE MANDATE
MIGHT BE CHANGED TO READ ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES:
"PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF LARGE-SCALE CHANGES IN THE
LOCATION OF FORCES, INCLUDING MAJOR maneuvers.' WE
BELIEVE THIS LANGUAGE DOES NOT PREJUDICE THE POSITION OF
EITHER STDE. WE ARE NOT WEDDED TO THIS SUGGESTION, AND
WOULD BE HAPPY TO CONSIDER ANY ALTERNATIVE LANGUAGE WHICH
THE SOVIETS MIGHT WISH TO SUGGEST. WE MAKE THIS
SUGGESTION, HOWEVER, IN THE HOPE THAT IT WOULD MAKE CLEAR
TO ALL CONCERNED THAT ONLY VERY LARGE SCALE CHANGES IN
EXPIS
THE DISPOSITION OF FORCES, WHETHER PERMANENT OR
TEMPORARY, WOULD REQUIRE PRIOR ANNOUNCEMENT, AND THAT THE
ALLIES DO NOT HAVE IN MIND PRIOR ANNOUNCEMENT REQUIREMENTS
WHICH WOULD INTERFERE WITH NORMAL MILITARY ACTIVITIES OF
ANY PARTICIPATING STATE.
5. FOR USNATO: ABOVE IS FYI ONLY.
OGERS
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED VITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
FORM
DS-165his document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
810/20/8490
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WHA
22.
*
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL 132
PAGE 01 STATE 021732
AM 7:36
EXPIS EXPIS EXPIS
82
ORIGIN SS-25
2
INFO OCT-01 /026 R
66646
DRAFTED BY: PM/MAS:AWFORD
APPROVED BY: PM/MAS .. CHRISTIAN CHAPMAN
EUR/RPM - MR. REHFELD
S/S-O: C. MAGEE
052910
R 0800007 FEB 72
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
C CONFIDENTIA L STATE 021732
EXDIS
SUBJECT TEN PERCENT DEPOSIT OF VALUE OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE
REFERENCE: HELSINKI 143
WE RECOGNIZE THAT ONLY MILITARY ASSISTANCE ACTUALLY
IN FINLAND IS SMALL TRAINING PROGRAM. HOWEVER, THAT
PROGRAM IS MAP FUNDED, NOT SERVICE FUNDED. IT WILL
THEREFORE BE SUBJECT TO TEN PERCENT DEPOSIT REQUIREMENT
UNDER SECTION 514 (PARA 9 OF STATE 14505). AGREEMENT
WITH GOF TO DEPOSIT TEN PERCENT OF VALUE OF TRAINING
PROGRAM WILL THEREFORE BE NECESSARY. ROGERS
CONFIDENTIAL
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
'72
*
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
ATION ROOM
ITE ITE HOUSE DUSE
wH
CONFIDENTIAL 262
PAGE 01 STATE 014505
PM 10:24
EXPIS EXQIN EXPIS
90
ORIGIN SS 25
3
INFO OCT-01 1008 R
66644
DRAFTED BY:PM/MAS:AWFORD
APPROVED BY:PM/MAS-ALAN W. FORD
EUR/RPM-MR. REHFELD
S/S-MR. MILLER
113169
R 280230Z JAN 72
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
AMEMBASSY OSLO
CONFIDENTIALSTATE 014505
EXDIS
THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE SENT TO ACCRA ADDIS AMMAN ANKARA ASUNCION
ATHENS BAMAKO BEIRUT BOGOTA BRASILIA BUENOS AIRES CARACAS
COLOMBO DAKAR DJAKARTA GUATEMALA JIDDA KABUL KATHMANDU KUALA
LUMPUR KINSHASA LAGOS LA PAZ LIMA LISBON MANAGUA MANILA MEXICO
MONROVIA MONTEVIDEO PANAMA QUITO SAN SALVADOR SANTIAGO
SANTO DOMINGO SEOUL TAIPEI TEGUCIGALPA TEHRAN ISLAMABAD MADRID
NEW DELHI PHNOM PENH RABAT RANGOON TUNIS CINCPAC CINCEUR CINCSO
DTD 26 JAN
QUOTE 014505
CINCPAC, CINCEUR, CINCSO ALSO FOR POLADS.
SUBJ: 10 PERCENT DEPOSIT OF VALUE OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE
1. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AUTHORIZATION BILL FOR FY 1972
HAS BEEN REPORTED OUT OF CONFERENCE AND HAS PASSED SENATE
(STATE 2303751. IT HAS NOW ALSO PASSED THE HOUSE AND IS
EXPECTED SHORTLY TO BE SIGNED INTO LAW. THIS MESSAGE INTERPRETS
AND SPELLS OUT SOME OF THE NECESSARY STEPS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF
ONE PARTICULAR PROVISION OF THIS BILL® SUBJECT TO COMPLETION
OF CIRCULAR 175 PROCEDURE, YOU WILL RECEIVE TELEGRAPHIC INSTRUCTIONS
CONFIDENTIAL
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
#
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
EXPIR EXATE
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 STATE 014505
TO CARRY OUT IMPLEMENTING STEPS DESCRIBED BELOW.
2. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AUTHORIZATION BILL FOR FY 1972
CONTAINS FOLLOWING NEW PROVISION:
"SECTION 514. SPECIAL FOREIGN COUNTRY ACCOUNTS.
(A) EXCEPT AS OTHERWISE PROVIDED IN THIS SECTION, NO
DEFENSE ARTICLE MAY BE GIVEN, AND NO GRANT OF MILITARY
ASSISTANCE MAY BE MADE, UNDER THIS ACT TO A FOREIGN COUNTRY
UNLESS THE COUNTRY AGREES -
(1) TO DEPOSIT IN A SPECIAL ACCOUNT ESTABLISHED BY
THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT THE FOLLOWING AMOUNTS OF CURRENCY
OF THAT COUNTRY:
(A) IN THE CASE OF ANY EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLE
TO BE GIVEN TO THAT COUNTRY, AN AMOUNT EQUAL TO 10 PER CENTUM
...
OF THE FAIR VALUE OF THE ARTICLE, AS DETERMINED BY THE SECRETARY
OF STATE, AT THE TIME THE AGREEMENT TO GIVE THE ARTICLE TO THE
COUNTRY IS MADE: AND
(B) IN THE CASE OF A GRANT OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE
TO BE MADE TO THAT COUNTRY, AN AMOUNT EQUAL TO 10 PER CENTUM
OF EACH SUCH GRANT: AND
(2) TO ALLOW THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TO use
SUCH AMOUNTS FROM THAT SPECIAL ACCOUNT AS MAY BE DETERMINED,
FROM TIME TO TIME, BY THE PRESIDENT TO BE NECESSARY TO PAY
ALL OFFICIAL COSTS OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PAYABLE
IN THE CURRENCY OF THAT COUNTRY, INCLUDING ALL COSTS RELATING
TO THE FINANCING OF INTERNATIONAL EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL
EXCHANGE ACTIVITIES IN WHICH THE COUNTRY PARTICIPATES UNDER
THE PROGRAMS AUTHORIZED BY THE MUTUAL EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1961.
(B) THE PRESIDENT MAY WAIVE ANY AMOUNT OF CURRENCY OF A
FOREIGN COUNTRY REQUIRED TO BE DEPOSITED UNDER SUBSECTION
(A)(1) OF THIS SECTION IF HE DETERMINES THAT THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT WILL BE ARLE TO PAY ALL OF ITS OFFICIAL COSTS
PAYABLE IN THE CURRENCY OF THAT COUNTRY ENUMERATED UNDER
SUBSECTION (A)(2) OF THIS SECTION WITHOUT THE DEPOSIT
CONFIDENTIAL
ss
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED THOUT THE AUTHORIZATION C HE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
#
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 STATE 014505
EXPIS EXPIS EXPIS EXPIS
OF SUCH AMOUNT AND WITHOUT HAVING TO EXPEND UNITED STATES
DOLLARS TO PURCHASE CURRENCY OF THAT COUNTRY TO PAY SUCH
COSTS.
(C) THE PROVISIONS OF THIS SECTION SHALL NOT APPLY IN
ANY CASE IN WHICH AN EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLE IS GIVEN, OR A
GRANT OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE IS MADE :-
(1) TO A FOREIGN COUNTRY UNDER AN AGREEMENT WITH
THAT COUNTRY WHICH ALLOWS THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TO
OPERATE A MILITARY OR OTHER SIMILAR BASE IN THAT COUNTRY IN
EXCHANGE FOR THAT ARTICLE OR GRANT: AND
(2) TO SOUTH VIETNAM, CAMBODIA, OR LAOS.
(D) IN NO EVENT SHALL ANY FOREIGN COUNTRY BE REQUIRED,
UNDER THIS SECTION, TO MAKE DEPOSITS IN A SPECIAL ACCOUNT
AGGREGATING MORE THAN DOLS 20,000,000 IN ANY ONE YEAR".
3 ₱ EXCLUSIONS
AS ORIGINALLY PROPOSED, SECTION 514 WOULD HAVE BEEN
APPLICABLE TO MILITARY ASSISTANCE "UNDER THIS OR ANY OTHER
LAW". AN AMENDMENT LIMITED IT TO ASSISTANCE "UNDER THIS
ACT" I.E., FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961 (FAA). ACCORD-
INGLY DEPOSIT REQUIREMENT DOES NOT APPLY TO SERVICE-FUNDED
MILITARY ASSISTANCE. THUS, SUCH ASSISTANCE TO SOUTH VIETNAM,
LAOS, THAILAND (FY 1972 AND PRIOR YEAR UNDELIVERED BALANCES)
AND KOREA (FOR ITS FORCES IN VIETNAM) IS EXCLUDED FROM
OPERATION OF THIS SECTION.
40 BILL ALSO PROVIDES THAT PRESIDENT MAY WAIVE 10 PERCENT
DEPOSIT requirement FOR ANY RECIPIENT COUNTRY IN WHICH ALL
USG OFFICIAL expenses CAN BE PAID WITHOUT SUCH DEPOSIT AND
WITHOUT HAVING TO SPEND DOLLARS TO PURCHASE THAT COUNTRY'S
CURRENCY (SUBSECTION (B)). AT PRESENT TIME, ONLY MAP
RECIPIENT COUNTRIES INCLUDING PRIOR YEAR PIPELINES) WHICH
ARE ALSO "EXCESS CURRENCY" COUNTRIES ARE TUNISIA, MOROCCO,
INDIA, PAKISTAN, AND BURMA THE LIST OF EXCESS CURRENCY
COUNTRIES CHANGES FROM TIME TO TIME AND, WHEN SUCH CHANGES
ARE MADE, ADDRESSEES WILL BE NOTIFIED.
CONF UNITED
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
CONFID IAL
PAGE 04 STATE 014505
EXETC EXPIR EXPIR
5. SUBSECTION (C)(1) OF BILL ALSO EXCLUDES FROM 10 PERCENT
DEPOSIT REQUIREMENT MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES THAT
PROVIDE, PURSUANT TO AN AGREEMENT, MILITARY BASES AND FACILI-
TIES TO THE U.S. IN EXCHANGE FOR SUCH ASSISTANCE. BOTH
LANGUAGE OF BILL AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY LEAD TO CONCLUSION
THAT THIS EXCLUSION APPLIES ONLY WHERE THERE IS AN EXPLICIT
MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING WITH HOST COUNTRY THAT SUCH ASSISTANCE
IS QUID PRO QUO FOR BASE RIGHTS. SPAIN CLEARLY FITS THIS
DESCRIPTION. EMBASSY ADDRESSEES MAY WISH TO REVIEW EXISTING
RELATIONSHIPS TO DETERMINE WHETHER THEY PROPERLY FIT UNDER
THIS EXCLUSION. dept WOULD NOT FAVOR REVISION OF
EXISTING AGREEMENTS TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE EXPLICITLY IN
EXCHANGE FOR BASE RIGHTS. WE ARE CONCERNED THAT SUCH AGREE-
MENTS WOULD INCREASE "POLITICAL HOSTAGE" CHARACTER OF OUR
BASES AND WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY INCREASE LONG-TERM COST OF
MAINTAINING SUCH BASES.
60 FINALLY, SECTION IS MADE EXPRESSLY INAPPLICABLE TO
SOUTH VIETNAM, CAMBODIA, AND LAOS ISUBSECTION (C)(2)).
70 IMPLEMENTING ACTIONS
SUBSECTION (A)(1) REQUIRES RECIPIENT COUNTRY TO AGREE
TO MAKE 10 PERCENT DEPOSIT, AND SUBSECTION (A)(2) REQUIRES ITS
AGREEMENT FOR USE OF THE DEPOSITED FUNDS TO PAY ALL USG
OFFICIAL EXPENSES PAYABLE IN RECIPIENT COUNTRY'S
CURRENCY, INCLUDING COSTS OF EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL
EXCHANGE PROGRAM. SUCH AN AGREEMENT WILL BE NECESSARY
BEFORE ANY ASSISTANCE CAN BE DELIVERED AFTER BILL BECOMES
LAW. 10 PERCENT PROVISION WILL ONLY BE EFFECTIVE FOR MATERIAL
DELIVERED AFTER ENACTMENT OF BILL. SINCE THERE IS ASSIST-
ANCE IN PIPELINE FOR HOST COUNTRIES OF MOST ACTION ADDRESSEES,
AN AGREEMENT WILL BE NEEDED IMMEDIATELY AFTER BILL BECOMES
LAW. THIS COULD, WE BELIEVE BEST BE ACCOMPLISHED BY AN
EXCHANGE OF NOTES ALONG FOLLOWING LINES, WHICH COULD EITHER
STAND ALONE AS SEPARATE AGREEMENT OR BE PUT IN FORM OF AN
AMENDMENT TO AN EXISTING MILITARY ASSISTANCE AGREEMENT
"THE EMBASSY OF THE USA PRESENTS ITS COMPLEMENTS TO THE
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF
AND HAS THE HONOR TO REFER TO RECENT DISCUSSIONS REGARDING
THE UNITED STATES FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1971,
CONFITE
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED THOUT THE AUTHORIZATION O HE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
CONF LAL
PAGE 05 STATE 014505
EXPIS EXPIS EXPIS EXQIN
WHICH INCLUDES A PROVISION REQUIRING PAYMENT TO
THE USG IN ILOCAL CURRENCY) OF TEN PERCENT OF THE VALUE OF
GRANT MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLES PRO-
VIDED BY THE U.S. TO THE GOVERNMENT OF
"IN ACCORDANCE WITH THAT PROVISION, IT IS PROPOSED THAT
THE GOVERNMENT OF WILL DEPOSIT IN AN ACCOUNT TO
BE SPECIFIED BY THE USG, AT A RATE OF EXCHANGE WHICH IS NOT
LESS FAVORABLE TO THE USG THAN THE BEST LEGAL RATE AT WHICH
U.S. DOLLARS ARE SOLD BY AUTHORIZED DEALERS IN THE COUNTRY
OF
FOR ILOCAL CURRENCY) ON THE DATE DEPOSITS ARE
MADE THE FOLLOWING AMOUNTS IN (LOCAL CURRENCY):
(A) IN THE CASE OF ANY EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLE GIVEN TO
THE GOVERNMENT OF
AN AMOUNT EQUAL TO TEN PERCENT
OF THE FAIR VALUE OF THAT ARTICLE, AS DETERMINED BY THE USG,
AND (B) IN THE CASE OF A GRANT OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO
THE GOVERNMENT OF
AN AMOUNT EQUAL TO TEN
PERCENT OF EACH SUCH GRANT. THE GOVERNMENT OF
WILL BE NOTIFIED QUARTERLY OF DELIVERIES OF EXCESS DEFENSE
ARTICLES AND GRANT MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND THE VALUES
THEREOF. DEPOSITS TO THE ACCOUNT OF THE USG WILL BE DUE
UPON NOTIFICATION OF SUCH DELIVERIES. NO MORE THAN DOLS 20
MILLION IN (LOCAL CURRENCY) WILL BE REQUIRED TO BE DEPOSITED
FOR DELIVERIES IN ANY ONE U.S. FISCAL YEAR.
"IT IS FURTHER PROPOSED THAT THE AMOUNTS TO BE DEPOSITED
MAY BE USED TO PAY ALL OFFICIAL COSTS OF THE USG PAYABLE
IN (LOCAL CURRENCY), INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ALL COSTS
RELATING TO THE FINANCING OF INTERNATIONAL EDUCATIONAL AND
CULTURAL EXCHANGE ACTIVITIES UNDER PROGRAMS AUTHORIZED BY
THE UNITED STATES MUTUAL EDUCATION AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE
ACT OF 1961.
"IT IS FINALLY PROPOSED THAT THE MINISTRY'S REPLY
STATING THAT THE FOREGOING IS ACCEPTABLE TO THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE REPUBLIC OF SHALL, TOGETHER WITH THIS NOTE,
CONSTITUTE AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN OUR GOVERNMENTS ON THIS
SUBJECT EFFECTIVE FROM AND AFTER (DATE OF ENACTMENT OF THE
FAA OF 1971)
8. WE WILL, EXCEPT FOR UNUSUAL CASES OF WHICH YOU
CONFI
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXPIR
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
CONF A
PAGE 06 STATE 014505
WILL BE NOTIFIED, CONTINUE TO FOLLOW PRESENT PRACTICE OF
VALUING EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLES AT ONE-THIRD OF ACQUISITION
COST. GRANT ASSISTANCE OF NON-EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLES AND
SERVICES UNDER N FAA WILL OF COURSE BE VALUED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH SECTION 644(M) OF THE FAA.
9 ° "MILITARY ASSISTANCE" IS INTERPRETED TO INCLUDE
ALL ASSISTANCE UNDER PART II OF THE FAA (EXCLUDING CHAPTER 4.0
THAT IS, SUPPORTING ASSISTANCE) E.G., TANGIBLE ITEMS,
CONSUMABLES, PCH AND T AND TRAINING.
10. EMBASSIES SHOULD NOTE THAT EXPENDITURE OF THE LOCAL
CURRENCIES DEPOSITED UNDER THESE AGREEMENTS ARE SUBJECT TO
THE AVAILABILITY OF APPROPRIATIONS. THEY WILL HAVE TO BE
PURCHASED FROM TREASURY WITH APPROPRIATED DOLLARS, LIKE ANY
OTHER FOREIGN CURRENCY ACQUISITION. FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS
ON MAINTENANCE AND USE OF THESE LOCAL CURRENCY ACCOUNTS WILL
BE FORWARDED separately.
11. LIMITATION
THE BILL EXPLICITLY PROVIDES THAT DEPOSITS WILL NOT BE
REQUIRED FROM ANY COUNTRY IN EXCESS OF DOLS 20 MILLION IN ANY
ONE YEAR (SUBSECTION (D)). IN IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION
514(B), NO DEPOSITS WILL BE REQUIRED FROM ANY COUNTRY
CLASSIFIED AS AN EXCESS CURRENCY COUNTRY. IN ADDITION,
USG WILL ON BASIS OF ITS NEED FOR CURRENCY OF OTHER COUN-
TRIES TO PAY ITS OFFICIAL COSTS, WAIVE OR REDUCE DEPOSIT REQUIREMENTS
FOR SUCH COUNTRIES TO SOME AMOUNT LESS THAN 10 PERCENT OF VALUE
OF MAP AND EXCESS. DEFERMENT OF INITIAL BILLING, COVERING
DELIVERIES AFTER DATE OF BILL'S ANACTMENT, TO ACCOMMODATE
BUDGETARY REVISION PROBLEMS OF HOST GOVERNMENTS WILL BE
CONSIDERED ON A COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY BASIS.
12. NO ACTION WILL NEED TO BE TAKEN WITH REGARD TO
HOST GOVERNMENT PAYMENT OF ALL OR PART OF MAAG COSTS (OR
THE PROVISION OF HOUSING, OFFICES OR FACILITIES TO THE MAAG)
SINCE SUCH PAYMENTS SIMPLY REDUCE THE TOTAL USG OFFICIAL
EXPENDITURES IN THAT COUNTRY AND THUS THE TOTAL AMOUNTS
NEEDED UNDER THE 10 PERCENT DEPOSIT REQUIREMENT
13. ACTION
CONFIDENTIAL
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED THOUT THE AUTHORIZATION O HE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OF STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
CONF
PAGE 07 STATE 014505
IN ABSENCE OF COMPELLING REASON NOT TO DO SO, ACTION
ADDRESSEES SHOULD INITIATE INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS WITH
GOVERNMENTS TO WHICH THEY ARE ACCREDITED IN ORDER TO LAY
GROUNDWORK FOR AN AGREEMENT. PLEASE ADVISE AS SOON AS
POSSIBLE IF ANY RECIPIENTS AFTER FULL DISCUSSION, INDICATE
AN UNWILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT 10 PERCENT PAYMENT REQUIREMENT SO
THAT ORDERS TO CUT OFF PIPELINE ASSISTANCE MAY BE ISSUED ON
TIMELY BASIS BY DOD. NO AGREEMENT SHOULD BE CONCLUDED UNTIL
RECEIPT OF TELEGRAPHIC INSTRUCTIONS WHICH WILL BE SENT AS SOON
AS BILL BECOMES LAW.
EXPIS EXPIS
14. FOR LISBON: SEPTEL FOLLOWS.
15. FOR SEOUL: SEPTEL FOLLOWS. ROGER
UNQUOTE
ROGERS
CONF IDI
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL 990
PAGE 01 STATE 175821
53
ORIGIN ACDA-19
INFO OCT-01 NSC-10 SS-20 PM-05: EUR-20 L-04 CIAE-00 INR-08
NSAE-00 RSC-01 IO=13 USIE-00 PRS-01 P-03 DODE-00 /105 R
66608
DRAFTED BY ACDA/PA:RSMITH:MEW
10/23/70
APPROVED BY ACDA/D:GSMITH
WHITE HOUSE:HOUDEK
PMUSHAW
ACDA/DD:PJFARLEY
S/S:RTCURRAN
bd
017682
R 261801Z OCT 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
CONFIDENTIAL STATE 175821
SALT
ATTENTION MURPHY, USIS
FOLLOWING IS ADVANCE TEXT OF
ARRIVALI STATEMENT BY
AMBASSADOR GERARD SMITH, DIRECTOR, U.S. ARMS CONTROLI
AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY AND HEAD OFI THE U.S. DELEGATION TO
THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS, HELSINKI, OCTOBER 30,
1970.
QTE IT IS A PLEASURE TO RETURNI TO HELSINKI FOR THE THIRD
PHASE OF THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS. MY
DELEGATION REMEMBERS THE WARM HOSPITALITY EXTENDED US BY
THE FINNISH GOVERNMENT, THE OFFICIALS OF HELSINKI, AND THE
FINNISH PEOPLE IN GENERAL WHEN WE OPENED THESE IMPORTANT
TALKS HERE LAST YEAR.
QTE WE FEEL THAT THE TWO PREVIOUS PHASES OF THE TALKS WERE
useful IN OUR SEARCH FOR AN AGREEMENT ON ONE OF THE GRAVEST
PROBLEMS FACING THE WORLD TODAY: HOW TO CONTROL ANDI RE-
STRAIN THE STRATEGIC ARMS COMPETITION. I AM HOPEFULI THAT
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
*
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 STATE 175821
THE NEGOTIATIONS HERE WILL BE MARKED BY FURTHER PROGRESS.
UNQTE.
FOREGOING IS FOR RELEASE UPON AMBASSADOR SMITH'S ARRIVAL.
ROGERS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential 25 Library
CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED
150/21/8690
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WH
I
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF HEMENT
TELEGRAM
SECRET 013:
PAGE 01 STATE 146284
FXQI EXPIN EXPIS EXPIS
51
ORIGIN SS-45
INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 1046 R
2/3
66605
DRAFTED BY: EAPR BOWEN: EUR/AIS: RMBEAUDRY
APPROVED BY: EUR: MR DAVIES
PM: MR PICKERING
EA: MR WILSON
ASD/ EA AND PR: ADM FLANIGAN
EUR/SCAN: MR BODDE
S/S: MR BREWSTER
048764
O 051722Z SEP 70 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY HELSINKI IMMEDIATE
INFO US ARMY PROC CENTER FRANKFURT
SECRET STATE 146284
EXDIS
JOINT state/defense MESSAGE
1 - DOD URGENTLY REQUIRES QUANTITIES OF AK-47 AMMUNITION
FOR TRANSFER TO CAMBODIAN FORCES UNDERI MAP. US ARMY
PROCUREMENT CENTER, FRANKFURT, GERMANY, IS PLANNING
TO PROCURE 2,000,000 ROUNDS OF AK-47 AMMUNITION FROMI
LAPUA IN FINLAND. HALF ARE TO BE DELIVERED IN
NOVEMBER AND HALF ARENTO BE DELIVERED IN DECEMBER.
IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT PRIOR SHIPMENTS: HAVE
BEEN MADE WITHOUT A REQUIREMENT FOR END-USE CERTIFICATE
BY THE FINNS.
2. US ARMY HAS PROCURED THIS TYPE OF AMMUNITION FROM
LAPUA IN THE PAST FOR TEST PURPOSES. UNLESS: EMBASSY
PERCEIVES OBJECTION TO ABOVE PROPOSAL, PROCUREMENT
AUTHORIZATION WILL BE ISSUED. EMBASSY COMMENTS REQUIRED
SOONEST.
JOHNSON
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE SECRET AJTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ed
*
*
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 245
PAGE 01 STATE 111059
51
ORIGIN EUR-25
INFO OCT-01 CPR=02 SS-20 PM-05 NSC-10 P-03 R.SC-01 USIA-12
PRS-01 1080 R
66606
DRAFTED BY:EUR/SCAN:JGSAMPAS
APPROVED BY:EUR*MARGARET JOY TIBBETTS
EUR/SCAN:MR INGRAM
S/CPR:MR SMOAK
WHITE HOUSE:MR SONNENFELDT
S/S:MR LEVITSKY
066009
R 111621Z JUL 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 111059
SUBJ: RESPONSE TO FOURTH OF JULY CONGRATULATORY
MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT kekkonen
PLEASE TRANSMIT FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT KEKKONEN's
QUOTE THE PEOPLE OF THE US JOIN WITH ME IN EXPRESSING TO
YOUR EXCELLENCY DEEP APPRECIATION FOR YOUR KIND MESSAGE ON
OUR INDEPENDENCE DAY.
QUOTE MRS. NIXON JOINS ME IN LOOKING FORWARD TO YOUR
VISIT TO WASHINGTON LATER THIS MONTH. WE ARE SORRY THAT
MRS. kekkonen WILL BE UNABLE TO ACCOMPANY YOU. RICHARD
NIXON END QUOTE.
FYI PRESIDENT KEKKONEN HAS SENT INDEPENDENCE DAY MESSAGE TO
PRESIDENT NIXON WHICH READS: QUOTE ON THE OCCASIONI OF THE
INDEPENDENCE DAY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA I WISH TO
EXTEND TO YOUR EXCELLENCY MY MOST CORDIAL CONGRATULATIONS
TOGETHER WITH MY BEST WISHES FOR YOUR PERSONAL WELFARE
AND FOR THE PROSPERITY OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
#
#
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
LIMITED OFFICIAL use
PAGE 02 STATE 111059
OF AMERICA. URHO KEKKONEN PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF
FINLAND END QUOTE.
DEPARTMENT DOES NOT PLAN TO RELEASE TEXT OF PRESIDENT'S
REPLY BUT HAS NO OBJECTION TO ITS RECEIPT BY GOF. END FYI.
JOHNSON
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
E50/50/8690
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
COP 8 OF 15 COPIES
202-2
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
SECRET
0 080750Z JUL 73
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
CONTROL: 1789Q
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6505
RECD: 8 JULY 73 -
BT
SECRET HELSINKI 1901
4 12 AM
NODIS
SECTO 51
DEPT PASS AMEMBASSY BONN FOR INFO
200-0
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (WALTER SCHEEL)
SUBJECT: LUNCHEON FOR SCHEEL)
REF: STATE 132724 (TOSEC 78)
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
'73 JUL 8 AM 10: 10:12 12
SECRETARY AGREES TO HOST LUNCHEON FOR SCHEEL ON
JULY 12 IF SCHEDULE PERMITS.
ROGERS
BT
NOTE: NOT PASSED BONN BY OC/T.
NODIU
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCE Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
7
200-2
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
SECRET
1057Q
0 051805Z JUL 73
05 JUL 73Z 1900
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6452
BT
Kenwedy 1 -FARLANE
SECRET HELSINKI 1839 CORRECTED COPY
NODIS
SeNT TO HAK
SECTO 21
DEPARTMENT REPEAT BONN FOR AMBASSADOR
NODIS
FOR ELIOT FROM STOESSEL
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (ROGERS, WILLIAM P.)
SUBJECT: SCHEEL VISIT TO WASHINGTON
1. SCHEEL HAS INFORMED SECRETARY HE HAS RECEIVED
COMMUNICATION FROM BRANDT STATING THAT HE SHOULD PROCEED
TO WASHINGTON NEXT WEEK FOR CONSULTATIONS WITH DR.
KISSINGER ON US-EUROPEAN RELATIONS.
2. SCHEEL PROPOSES, IF AGREEABLE TO KISSINGER, THAT
HE ARRIVE WASHINGTON JULY 11 IN EVENING FOR TALKS ON
JULY 12. SCHEEL WOULD DEPART FOR BONN MORNING OF
JULY 13.
3. SCHEEL OBVIOUSLY WILL LEAVE TO KISSINGER MANNER
IN WHICH TALKS SHOULD BE ORGANIZED. HIS OWN PREFERENCE
WOULD BE FOR HEAD-TO-HEAD MEETING, FOLLOWED BY SESSION
200-0
WITH ONE OR TWO ADVISORS ON EACH SIDE. SCHEEL WILL ALSO
WISH TO SEE SECRETARY AND WOULD DEEPLY APPRECIATE DRIEF
MEETING WITH PRESIDENT IF POSSIBLE.
4. IF ANY BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON SUBJECT MATTER OF
TALXS WITH KISSINGER COULD BE PROVIDED PRIOR TO SCHEEL'S
ARRIVAL IN WASHINGTON, SCHEEL STATEY HE WOULD BE VERY
PLEASED TO HAVE IT.
5. SCHEEL WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY VAN WELL AND BRUNNER
FROM FOREIGN OFFICE, AND HALLIER FROM HIS OWN OFFICE.
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCE produced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NODIS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
2 HELSINKI 1839, Jul 5, 1973 NODIS
6. SCHEEL WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR ANY COMMENTS ON SUGGESTED
SCHEDULE AND OTHER POINTS WHICH WE COULD PASS TO HIM HERE
PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE FROM HELSINKI, TENTATIVELY
SCHEDULED FOR SATURDAY AFTERNOON, HELSINKI TIME, JULY 7.
ROGERS
BT
NOTE: NOT PASSED BONN BY OC/T.
ZODIS
NODIS
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT DECLASSIFIED HORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Richard Nixon Presidential Library
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
W/d
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
TOP SECRET
8
R 111500Z MAY 70
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
Contro 1: 25070
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2641
BT
Recd
:
TOPSECRET HELSINKI 506
El OL.
13 May 70
10: a.m.
NODIS
EYES ONLY FOR UNDER SECRETARY JOHNSON FROM AMBASSADOR
REF: STATE 069963
in Wd
29 ATION HOUSE ROOM
1. THE ACTION BY ARMY REGARDING PROCUREMENT OF AK-47
AMMUNITION HAS BEEN HANDLED BY ARMY PROCUREMENT CENTER,
FRANKFURT, GERMANY, THROUGH THE ARMY ATTACHE OF THE DEFENSE
ATTACHE OFFICE OF THIS EMBASSY. INITIAL ACTIONS BEGAN
IN FEBRUARY 1970 THROUGH CONTACTS BY THE PROCUREMENT AGENCY
THROUGH DAO TO DETERMINE THE CAPABILITY OF TWO FACTORIES TO
PR ODUCE THIS AMMO, TO INCLUDE AN ORAL BID FOR PRODUCTION.
2. DURING THE PERIOD APRIL21-25, 1970, A REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE PROCUREMENT AGENCY VISITED FINLAND. HIS VISIT WAS
COORDINATED WITH THE COUNTRY TEAM AND ALSO THE FOREIGN
SECTION OF THE FINNISH DEFENSE FORCES (FDF). PURPOSE OF
HIS VISIT WAS TO INSPECT THE QUALITY CONTROL STANDARDS OF
THE LAPUA AMMUNITION FACTORY (GOVERNMENT OWNED) AND SAKO OY
CA PRIVATELY OWNED RIFLE AND AMMO MANUFACTURING COMPANY).
DURING THIS VISIT HE BROUGHT WITH HIM THE FORMAL REQUESTS
FOR BIDS FOR THE TWO COMPANIES AND USED THE VISIT AS AN
OPPORTUNITY TO CLARIFY TECHNICAL QUESTIONS CONTAINED IN THE
PAPERS. INCLUDED ALSO WAS A REQUEST FOR BID FROM VALMET OY
FOR AK-47 ASSAULT RIFLE MAGAZINES WHICH WAS FORWARDED TO
THAT COMPANY SEPARATELY BY THE DAO. DURING THIS VISIT THE
REPRESENTATIVE EMPHASIZED TO ARMA THE URGENCY OF THE
PROCUREMENT. THE REQUEST FOR BIDS HAD A SUBMISSION DATE
TO THE PROCUREMENT AGENCY OF MAY 4, 1970. THE REQUEST
FOR BID CONTAINED 1.2 MILLION ROUNDS OF AK-47 AMMUNITION AND
5,000 ASSAULT RIFLE MAGAZINES.
3. ON MAY 6, 1970 CONTRACTS WERE AWARDED TO LAPUA AND SAKO
VIA TELEX BY THE PROCUREMENT AGENCY, FORMAL PAPER WORK TO
FOLLOW. LAPUA WAS AWARDED A CONTRACT FOR 1.2 MILLION ROUNDS
OF AK-47 AMMO (CARTRIDGE 7.62 MM XM39, M43). SAKO WAS AWARDED
A CONTRACT FOR 100,000 ROUNDS OF SAME AMMO AND ALSO 5,000
ASSAULT RIFLE MAGAZINES. THE REQUESTS FOR BIDS ALSO CONTAIN
OPTIONS FOR PROCUREMENT OF ADDITIONAL AMMUNITION. THE
Reproduced at the Richard-Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET
-2- Helsinki 506 dated 11 May 70
Control: 2507Q
PROCUREMENT AGENCY INFORMED ARMA PRIVATELY THAT SUCH
ADDITIONAL AMOUNTS MAY GO BY INCREMENTS TO AS HIGH AS TEN
MILLION ROUNDS. THE VALMET COMPANY DID NOT SUBMIT A BID
TFOR THE MAGAZINES, ALTHOUGH IT IS THE PRIME MANUFACTURER OF
THIS EQUIPMENT.
4. FOR INFORMATION THERE HAS BEEN A VERY CORDIAL AND
BUSINESSLIKE WORKING RELATIONSHIP DURING THE VISIT BY THE
PROCUREMENT AGENCY REP AND THE FREQUENT CONTACTS WITH
OFFICIALS OF BOTH COMPANIES BY ARMA, ALL OF WHICH INDICATED
THAT THEY DESIRED THE CONTRACT. LAPUA IS THE PRIME
MANUFACTURER OF THE SAME TYPE OF AMMUNITION FOR THE FDF.
THE PROCUREMENT AGENCY REP WAS INFORMED THAT THEY WERE
WORKING ON A TEN MILLION ROUND ORDER FOR THE FDF AT THIS
TIME. ALTHOUGH SAKO IS PRIMARILY A MANUFACTURER OF SPORTING
RIFLES AND AMMUNITION (MANY BEING EXPORTED TO THE U.S.),
IT ALSO HAS THE CAPABILITY OF MANUFACTURING MILITARY
AMMUNITION. THIS SAME AMMUNITION AND MAGAZINE USED IN THE
FINNISH ASSAULT RIFLE IS COMPATIBLE WITH ALL EAST BLOC
AND CHICOM MANUFACTURED ASSAULT RIFLES.
5. THE FOREGOING REPRESENTS THE RELEVANT FACTS AND
DEVELOPMENTS IN THIS MATTER TO DATE. I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT
THE COUNTRY TEAM HERE IN HELSINKI WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT
THIS ACTION AS WE HAVE IN THE RECENT WEEKS. MY SINCERE
THANKS FOR YOUR MESSAGE WHICH INFORMS ME OF THE HIGH LEVEL
SUPPORT OF THIS PROJECT AND THE DESIRES THAT THIS MATTER
REMAIN CONFIDENTIAL.
PETERSON
BT
Note: Message delayed in transmission.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
N
6
OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
D
SECRET
0 071842Z JUL 73
17530
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
07 JUL 73 Z19 40 Kennedy
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6499
S
BT
LL
SECR E T HELSINKI 1895
TOHAIL
NODIS
SECTO 45
N
FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM THE SECRETARY
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR
SUBJECT: CSCE MINISTERIAL MEETING
D
1. THE CSCE MINISTERIAL MEETING HELD AT HELSINKI
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
73 JUL 8 AM 10: 12
JULY 2-7, IN WHICH WE WERE JOINED BY COLLEAGUES FROM
33 EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND CANADA, MARKED A FURTHER
AND REASONABLY SUCCESSFUL STEP IN THIS ENTERPRISE
LAUNCHED LAST NOVEMBER. WE COMMITTED OUR GOVERNMENTS
S
TO RECOMMENDATIONS DEVELOPED IN SIX MONTHS OF PREPARA-
TORY TALKS, AND AGREED TO ESTABLISH COMMITTEES TO
DEVELOP TEXTS COVERING PRINCIPLES GOVERNING RELATIONS
BETWEEN STATES, COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC AND OTHER
SPHERES, AND FREER MOVEMENT OF PEOPLES, IDEAS, AND
INFORMATION.
2. IN SESSIONS FREE OF CONTENTION AND SERIOUS IN
TONE, THE SOVIETS AND OTHER EASTERN COUNTRIES LAID
NODIS
HEAVIEST STRESS, AS EXPECTED, ON PRINCIPLES GOVERNING
RELATIONS, PARTICULARLY INVIOLABILITY OF FRONTIERS.
I WAS JOINED VIGOROUSLY BY THE FRG AND OTHER ALLIES
IN EMPHASIZING RENUNCIATION OF THE USE OR THREAT OF
FORCE, AND MAKING CLEAR SUPPORT FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF
PEACEFUL CHANGE IN FRONTIERS, IF BASED ON POPULAR
WILL.
3. AT THE SAME TIME, ALL WESTERN AND NONALIGNED STATES
ENDORSED ENHANCED HUMAN CONTACTS, THE FREER FLOW OF
INFORMATION, AND CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGES.
RETURNING TO POSITIONS THEY HAD EARLIER TAKEN IN THE
PREPARATORY TALKS, THE SOVIETS AND OTHER PACT STATES
EMPHASIZED THAT CONTACTS SHOULD TAKE PLACE IN CONFORMITY
WITH NATIONAL REGULATIONS, REFLECTING THEIR DESIRE TO
MAINTAIN EXISTING BARRIERS LARGELY INTACT.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITH at the OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
N
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
D
SECRET
S
-2- HELSINKI 1895, JUL 7, NODIS
4. THE UNITED FRONT OF OUR ALLIES ON BOTH OF THE
FOREGOING ISSUES WILL MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR THE SOVIETS
TO ACHIEVE WITHOUT REAL CHALLENGE THEIR PARAMOUNT
OBJECTIVE OF AFFIRMING THROUGH CSCE THE IMMUTABILITY
N
OF PRESENT BOUNDARIES IN EUROPE; THEY WILL BE UNDER
CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE TO MODIFY THEIR PRESENT
RESTRICTIVE PRACTICES IN THE AREAS OF HUMAN CONTACTS
AND THE FLOW OF INFORMATION AND IDEAS.
5. I HAVE BEEN STRUCK, TOO, BY THE REALISTIC
D
ATTITUDE OF OUR ALLIES, ESPECIALLY AS REFLECTED IN
THE COMMENTS OF DOUGLAS-HOME, SCHEEL, AND JOBERT.
WHILE ALL SHARE HOPE FOR SOME PROGRESS, IT IS CLEAR
THAT NONE BELIEVES CSCE WILL BE A PANACEA. NOR ARE
OUR ALLIES FEEDING EUPHORIC PUBLIC EXPECTATION. ON
THE CONTRARY, THEIR CAUTIOUS COMMENTS SUGGEST THEY
S
ARE TRYING TO CONVEY TO PUBLIC OPINION IN THEIR COUN-
TRIES THAT CSCE IS ONLY A LIMITED STEP AND THAT NATO'S
DEFENSES MUST BE MAINTAINED.
6. THE REACTIONS TO THE US POSITION WERE FAVORABLE.
THE RESTATEMENT OF YOUR POSITION CONCERNING THE US
COMMITMENT TO EUROPE WAS ESPECIALLY WELCOMED BY OUR
ALLIES.
ZODIS
7. THE NEXT STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE WILL BEGIN AT
COMMITTEE LEVEL IN SEPTEMBER. THE SOVIETS CONTINUED
TO PRESS FOR CONCLUDING THE CONFERENCE AT A MEETING
AT HIGHEST LEVEL TOWARD THE END OF THIS YEAR, BUT
THESE POINTS WERE NOT REALLY DEBATED. THERE
CONTINUES TO BE SUBSTANTIAL RESERVE ABOUT THE LEVEL
AND THE WORK REMAINING MAKES A CONSIDERABLY LATER
DATE A MORE REALISTIC PROSPECT FOR THE FINAL PHASE.
ROGERS
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED produced at the OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
WH
20212
GF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
SECRET
7
1057Q
0 051805Z JUL 73
05 JUL 73Z 1900
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6452
Sent to S.C.
BT
SECRET HELSINKI 1839
Kennedy
mcFarkne
NODIS
Sounenfeldt
DEPARTMENT REPEAT BONN FOR AMBASSADOR
NODIS
FOR ELIOT FROM STOESSEL
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (ROGERS, WILLIAM P.)
SUBJECT: SCHEEL VISIT TO WASHINGTON
1. SCHEEL HAS INFORMED SECRETARY HE HAS RECEIVED
COMMUNICATION FROM BRANDT STATING THAT HE SHOULD PROCEED
TO WASHINGTON NEXT WEEK FOR CONSULTATIONS WITH DR.
KISSINGER ON US-EUROPEAN RELATIONS.
2. SCHEEL PROPOSES, IF AGREEABLE TO KISSINGER, THAT
HE ARRIVE WASHINGTON JULY 11 IN EVENING FOR TALKS ON
JULY 12. SCHEEL WOULD DEPART FOR BONN MORNING OF
JULY 13.
3. SCHEEL OBVIOUSLY WILL LEAVE TO KISSINGER MANNER
IN WHICH TALKS SHOULD BE ORGANIZED. HIS OWN PREFERENCE
WOULD BE FOR HEAD-TO-HEAD MEETING, FOLLOWED BY SESSION
200-2
WITH ONE OR TWO ADVISORS ON EACH SIDE. SCHEEL WILL ALSO
WISH TO SEE SECRETARY AND WOULD DEEPLY APPRECIATE DRIEF
MEETING WITH PRESIDENT IF POSSIBLE.
4. IF ANY BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON SUBJECT MATTER OF
TALKS WITH KISSINGER COULD BE PROVIDED PRIOR TO SCHEEL'S
ARRIVAL IN WASHINGTON, SCHEEL STATEY HE WOULD BE VERY
PLEASED TO HAVE IT.
5. SCHEEL WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY VAN WELL AND BRUNNER
FROM FOREIGN OFFICE, AND HALLIER FROM HIS OWN OFFICE.
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCE the Richard Nixon OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
202-2
OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
-2-- HELSINKI 1839, Jul 5, 1973 NODIS
6. SCHEEL WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR ANY COMMENTS ON SUGGESTED
SCHEDULE AND OTHER POINTS WHICH WE COULD PASS TO HIM HERE
PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE FROM HELSINKI, TENTATIVELY
SCHEDULED FOR SATURDAY AFTERNOON, HELSINKI TIME, JULY 7.
ROGERS
BT
NOTE: NOT PASSED BONN BY OC/T.
200-2
200-2
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCE will Richard Nixon OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
COPY 7 OF 15 COPIES
OF STATE
73 JUL 6 PM 10:57 SECRET
202-2
WH
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICAN
SITUATION ROOM
TELEGRAM
0 062134Z JUL 73 ZFF6
CONTROL: 1525Q
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUESHLQ/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI IMMEDIATE 5391
INFO RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 8154
BT
SECRET STATE 132724
NODIS
TOSEC 78
NODIS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (WALTER SCHEEL)
SUBJECT: SCHEEL VISIT TO WASHINGTON
REF: HELSINKI 1839
1. DR. KISSINGER WILL BE HAPPY TO MEET WITH FOREIGN
MINISTER SCHEEL ON JULY 12, AND WILL ENDEAVOR ALSO TO
ARRANGE A MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT.
2. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING SUBJECT MATTER OF
TALKS AND ORGANIZATION, INCLUDING PARTICIPANTS, NOT NOW
AVAILABLE, BUT WE HOPE IT CAN BE PROVIDED TO scheel IN BONN
PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE JULY 11.
3. WOULD THE SECRETARY WISH TO DO ANYTHING MORE THAN MEET
WITH SCHEEL? FOR EXAMPLE, WOULD HE WISH TO HAVE A
LUNCHEON FOR HIM ON JULY 12, PROVIDED THAT SCHEDULE
COORDINATION WILL PERMIT THIS? RUSH
202-2
EUR;WSTABLER: EMT
7/6/73:21010
S/S - MR. MILLER
EUR/CE - MR. SKOUG
WHITE HOUSE - GEN. SCOWCROFT {SUBS}
S - - MR. LISSY
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
EYES ONLY
7
LL
NODIS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WRIGHT
Department of State
SONNEN FELDT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
SECRET
R 072125Z FEB 72
CONTROL: 001717Q
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
RECD: 07 FEB '72, 438PM
TO RUESHL/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 2992
INFO RUQSNI/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 2451
BT
SECRET STATE 021361
NODIS
NAIROBI FOR AMBASSADOR BUSH
NODIS
SUBJECT: JAKOBSON AFFAIR
REF: HELSINKI 147
STATE 18868
1. FINNISH CHARGE PUSA CALLED ON FESSENDEN EVENING OF
FEBRUARY 4. PUSA SAID HE HAD RECEIVED A CABLE FROM
HELSINKI IN RESPONSE TO HIS MESSAGE REPORTING CONVER-
SATION WITH FESSENDEN ABOUT JAKOBSON AFFAIR.
2. IN THE CABLE FINNISH FOREIGN MINISTRY INFORMED
PUSA THAT IT WOULD BE BEST IF MATTER WERE CLOSED AND
"LEFT TO DIE."
3. IN VIEW OF FINNISH GOVERNMENT'S OBVIOUS EMBARRASS-
MENI AND DESIRE TO BURY ISSUE, DEPARTMENT FEELS MATTER
IS CLOSED. HYVARINEN'S HEART ATTACK, AS REPORTED IN
HELSINKI'S 147. REINFORCES THIS DECISION. EMBASSY SHOULD
THEREFORE NOT DISCUSS AFFAIR. GP-4 ROGERS
200-2
BT
1361
DRAFTED BY: EUR/SCAN: WBodde, Jr.
APPROVED BY: EUR - Mr. Fessenden
EUR/SCAN - Mr. Fleisher
IO- Mr. Depalma
C - Mr. Pedersen
s/s - - Mr. Miller
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 63 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECREPTSduced Presidential Library
NLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
10
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET.
CONTROL: 5799
R 212243Z JUL 71
RECD: 21 JUL '71, 8:01PM
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUESHL/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 2545
ROOM
RUESPNQ/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 3366
RUESFMQ/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 4249
RUESSNQ/AMEMBASSY oslo 2597
RUFHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 7409
RUFHAU/AMEMBASSY VIENNA 8099
RUESXBQ/AMEMBASSY BERN 3708
RUDTLN/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 2352
RUESMDQ/AMEMBASSY MADRID 7059
RUESFDQ/AMEMBASSY LISBON 3459
RUESGPQ/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 5208
RUFHNA/USMISSION NATO 0540
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NY 8967
RUFHBG/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG 1766
BT
SECRE I STATE 132194
NODIS
1. AT THEIR REQUEST, CHIEFS-OF FOLLOWING EUROPEAN MISSIONE
CALLED ON ASSISTANT SECRETARY GREEN FOR BRIEFING ON PRESIDENT
NIXON'S JULY 15 ANNOUNCEMENT: AUSTRIA, BELGIUM, DENMARK,
FINLAND, IRELAND, NETHERLANDS, NORWAY, PORTUGAL, SPAIN, SWEDEN,
SWITZERLAND. DURING TWENTY MINUTE SESSION GREEN MADE FOLLOWING
POINTS:
2. HE APPRECIATED GROUP'S DESIRE FOR INFORMATION BUT SPEAKING
FRANKLY THERE WAS NOT MUCH HE COULD SAY BEYOND THE PRESIDENTIAL
ANNOUNCEMENT, HE CITED PRESIDENT NIXON'S 1971 FOREIGN POLICY
REPORT STATEMENT, "IN THIS DECADE, THEREFORE, THERE WILL BE NO
MORE IMPORTANT CHALLENGE THAN THAT OF DRAWING THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA INTO A CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE WORLD
COMMUNITY AND PARTICULARLY WITH THE REST OF ASIA." CONSISTENT
WITH THAT VIEW, PRESIDENT HAD TAKEN A NUMBER OF UNILATERAL STEPS
DESIGNED TO OPEN UP COMMUNICATION WITH THE PRC, TO RENEW THE
DIALOGUE, TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH PEKING AND TO FACILITATE
PRC MOVEMENT INTO THE INTERNATIONAL MAINSTREAM. INTERNAL CHANGES
WITHIN PRC SINCE END OF CULTURAL REVOLUTION OFFERED HOPE THAT NOW
MIGHT BE A PROPITIOUS TIME FOR SUCH AN INITIATIVE.
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETAR
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
-2- STATE 132194, JUL 21, 1971 (NODIS)
3. HE REGRETTED OUR INABILITY TO hold ADVANCE CONSULTATION
WITH FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS ON THIS LATEST MOVE BUT IT HAD TO BE
HANDLED WITH THE GREATEST SECRECY: NO COUNTRY WAS INFORMED IN
ADVANCE AND VERY FEW WERE PRIVY TO THIS INFORMATION IN USG.
HE HOPED THAT THOSE PRESENT WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE THE NECESSITY
FOR HOLDING DOWN SPECULATION WHICH COULD IMPAIR OR JEOPARDIZE
THE SUCCESS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL VISIT, NO DATE FOR WHICH HAD YET
BEEN SET.
4. THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP WAS NOT RPT NOT DIRECTED AGAINST ANY COUNT
N
ON THE CONTRARY AS WE MOVED TOWARD BETTER RELATIONS WITH PEKING
THERE WAS NO REASON FOR OTHERS TO BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE AT
THEIR EXPENSE. WE CONTINUE TO STAND BY OUR FRIENDS, INCLUDING
THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA, AND OUR COMMITMENTS TO THEM.
5. ALTHOUGH HE COULD NOT GO INTO SUBSTANCE OF THE CHOU-KISSINGER
TALKS, HE COULD SAY THAT THERE WERE NO AGREEMENTS BEYOND THAT
SET FORTH IN THE COMMUNIQUE. THE TALKS WERE EXPLORATORY IN
NATURE, DIRECTED AT PREPARATIONS FOR PRESIDENTIAL TRIP INCLUDING
THE DRAFTING OF THE COMMUNIQUE.
6. WORLD REACTION HAD BEEN ALMOST UNIFORMALY FAVORABLE AND GREEN
THANKED THOSE PRESENT WHOSE GOVERNMENTS HAD SUPPORTED OUR MOVE.
7. IN THE ENSURING QUESTION AND ANSWER PERIOD, GREEN SAID: (A)
USG IS CLOSE TO A DECISION ON THE CHIREP ISSUE BUT MUST CONSULT
FURTHER, ESPECIALLY WITH TAIPEI; (B) WE COULD NOT COMMENT ON THE
MODALITIES OF FUTURE CONTACTS WITH PEKING; AND (C) THE TERM
"NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS" IN THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE WAS CAREFULLY
N
CHOSEN BECAUSE IT IS NOT SPECIFIC WITH REGARD TO THE QUESTION
OF DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION. ROGERS
BT
DRAFTED BY: EA/ACA:WABrown
APPROVED BY: EA-MGreen
IO-UNP-JAArmitage
S/S-Mr.Miller
EUR/RPM-Mr.Floyd
EUR-Mr.Fessenden
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 65 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMIN
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
NLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 66 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINI DECLASSIFIED
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
NLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
LDX CHANNEL MESSAGE COVER FORM
TO:
WH
1. Sent by:
971
(Msg. No.)
3. Transmitted by: Stemberg
4. Received by: WHSR CB
Date & Time:
Date & Time: 12/1232
28
S. Description: Depart. Tel. to HELSINKI
6. Clefn & Controls:
SECRET/LIMDIS
7. No. of Pge.
1
8.
Procedence IMMEDIATE 9. Validated by: JPWalsh
Henry Kissinger
XXXXXX
10. Deliver to:
For: Clearance
The White House
Information
Per Request
HAIR concerns Called 5/5 OKY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon 2/335 Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
is
DELIVERED
IW
047
100,
MOOR
0240
OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State
INDICATE
L)CHARGE to
SECRET
700 69.
Classification
FOR octt USE ONLY
Origin
ACTION: Amembassy HELSINKI
IN#
INFO: Amembassy COPENHAGEN
MOSCOW
OSLO
12 PM 12 35
STOCKHOLM
VIENNA
US MISSION NATO
US MISSION GENEVA
CINCPAC FOR POLAD
REF: Helsinki 714
LIMDIS
SUBJECT: Helsinki as Site for SALT Talks
Embassy should tell Hyvarinen we appreciate Finnish offer
of Helsinki for SALT talks. However, & we do not rpt not
wish to encourage Finns to believe Helsinki will be selected
particularly since principal sites under consideration should have
Vienna and Geneva.
Инаштах In any case, Finns will realize
questions of site must be subject of agreement between
ourselves and Soviets and we can not pt not take any. firm
position at this time. Thus far, Vienna & Geneva
have been principal sites under END ensideration.
EUR :MJTibb 11177 7/12/69
Oversid by,
3221
Telepraphic liansmission and
classitication approved by EUR - George S. Springsteen
ACDA - Mr. Gleysteen
s/s 3
Lhu
White House -
SECRET
roam 0.05 05-322
Reproduced at theyRichard/Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.