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    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "WHSF: Returned, 32-34",
    "description": "This file contains:\n\nFrom Glen Olds to Nixon, cc: Haldeman, Garment, Mitchell, Keogh, re: Report on Frank Lindsay's Cambridge Study Group on the transition and tasks of a new administration, 1 pg. [Memo], 9/12/1968\n\nFrom Bryce Harlow to John Mitchell, re: suggested program development plan for Nixon Administration, 2 pgs. [Memo], 9/21/1968\n\nFrom Anderson to DC, re: President Johnson's request for representatives on the problems of transition, 1pg. [Memo], 9/12/1968\n\nFrom Simmons to Higby, concerning The Transition: National Intelligence Mechanics at the White House, 2 pgs. [Memo], 10/11/2016\n\nHandwritten notes on Presidential transition, 4 pgs. [Other Document], 10/11/1968",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/26126830",
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        "Richard M. Nixon's Returned Materials Collection",
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    "url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/30/1268/26126830/content/presidential-libraries/nixon/RN-RET/3599958/WHSF_Box_32/WHSF32-34.pdf",
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    "ocrText": "Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nWhite House Special Files Collection\nFolder List\nBox Number\nFolder Number\nDocument Date\nDocument Type\nDocument Description\n32\n34\n09/12/1968\nMemo\nFrom Glen Olds to Nixon, cc: Haldeman,\nGarment, Mitchell, Keogh, re: Report on\nFrank Lindsay's Cambridge Study Group on\nthe transition and tasks of a new\nadministration, 1 pg.\n32\n34\n09/21/1968\nMemo\nFrom Bryce Harlow to John Mitchell, re:\nsuggested program development plan for\nNixon Administration, 2 pgs.\n32\n34\n09/12/1968\nMemo\nFrom Anderson to DC, re: President\nJohnson's request for representatives on the\nproblems of transition, 1pg.\n32\n34\n10/11\nMemo\nFrom Simmons to Higby, concerning The\nTransition: National Intelligence Mechanics\nat the White House, 2 pgs.\n32\n34\n10/11/1968\nOther Document\nHandwritten notes on Presidential transition,\n4 pgs.\nTuesday, August 05, 2008\nPage 1 of 1\nN\nYou have copy\nofthi already.\nWhat was.your\nNIXON FOR PRESIDENT COMMITTEE,\nP.O. BOX 1968, TIMES SQUARE STATION,\naction To\nNEW YORK, NEW YORK 10036\nPHONE (212) 661-6400\nKreenspan\nMEMORANDUM\nTo:\nR.N.\nDate: September 12, 1968\nFrom: Glenn Olds\nSubj: Report on Frank Lindsay's Cambridge Study Group on the transi-\ntion and tasks of a new administration\nAfter review of Frank's 30-page analysis of August 15 for R.N., dis-\ncussed with R.N. in January, Hal Booth (I now have on loan from State\nFarm doing the basic analysis of manpower need, input, and coordina-\ntion) and I spent the evening with their group in Cambridge, getting\ntheir recommendations and input. They are willing to continue to work\non this area, drawing on their rather rich resources. I worked out\nan agenda of work for them that I need not burden you with now. The\nagenda covered the substance of their report on (1) Personnel, (2)\nSubstantive program, (3) Government organization, and (4) Transitional\narrangements. (Note: see attached notes from meeting)\nIn the sensitive area of recommendations, however, they would like to\ntap discreetly the judgment of unusually broad gauged people in the\narea. It would strengthen their study if you were willing to indicate\nyour interest in their results. They propose the following which I\nbelieve is both innocent, protective of you and the campaign, but use-\nful.\n\"Mr. Nixon is aware that we are doing this study and has indi-\ncated that it could be helpful to him. However, this study\nhas not been commissioned by him, but rather is entirely 'self-\nstarted' with the hope that advance work will help him and his\nadvisers meet the urgent problems of staffing a new administra-\ntion.\n11\nYour reaction as to whether you concur or not will help me proceed in\nusing their help.\ncc: Messrs. Haldeman\nGarment\nMitchell\nKeogh\nfile\nTO:\nJohn Mitchell\nFROM:\nBryce Harlow\nDATE:\nSeptember 21, 1968\nRE:\nSuggested Program Development Plan\nfor Nixon Administration\n1. Retain Dr. Milton Eisenhower as Honorary Chairman.\n2. Retain Dr. Paul McCracken as Operational Chairman.\n3. Employ Roger Jones (Special Assistant to Director,\nBureau of the Budget) as*Executive Director to direct entire\neffort under McCracken's policy guidance.\n4. If Jones declines, Drs. Eisenhower and Arthur Burns\nand McCracken should promptly agree on a suitable Executive\nDirector.\n5. Until an Executive Director is employed, no additional\ntask forces will be activated, but those already in motion\nwill continue:\n(a) Two now functioning -- Budget and Tax.\n(b) Five in formation -- State-Federal Relations,\nFinancial Institutions, International Economic\nPolicy, Governmental Reorganization, Government-\nBusiness Relations.\n(c) Eleven other planned (stopped until Executive\nDirector is named).\n(d) Five Advisory Groups in operation -- Economics,\nDefense, Law Enforcement, Agriculture, Foreign\nPolicy.\n6. If RN should desire it, Jones could handle transition,\nas well as program development. In any case, RN should meet with\nMcCracken and Jones, to assure that objectives are clearly defined\nand to make Jones know he is RN's specific choice for this work.\nJohn Mitchell\n-2-\nSeptember 21, 1968\n7. Olds and Boothe will supply Jones, as requested,\nsuggested names for task forces from academic community;\nGreenspan, et al will furnish names of others, as requested.\nNeither Olds nor Research will be otherwise involved in this\neffort.\n8. Task force members will be kept entirely confidential;\nonly fact that the total effort is in progress can be publicized.\n9. Jones will function in Washington, Michigan or New York\nCity, as agreed between McCracken and Jones. He would doubtless\nbe needed at least to the end of November and possibly until new\nAdministration takes office. RN might wish to retain him permanently\nin a White House administrative role. Suspect his pay would have\nto be at roughly a $30,000 a year rate for this interim period,\nplus secretarial, etc. backup.\n10. I consider this effort a highly important one for RN;\nif elected, and if this task is done well, hh will save six\nmonths to a year in getting his new Administration in gear.\nEisenhower lost a year (1953) for the lack of this.\nBH/lac\n/\nLa a\nMemorandum\nXm\n9/12/68\nm has memo from Harlow\nIndianapolis\nwfgin me CC\nTo:\nDC\nRoger Jones -enec du -\nBH the his 70% sold.\nFrom:\nAnderson\nRe:\nPresident Johnson's request for representatives\non the problems of transition.\nmeat get someone on full time basis\nPresident Johnson has invited each of the three\nuse Jones\nmajor candidates to send representatives to the White as lision\nHouse to work with his representative, Charles Murphy, man.\non the problems of transition.\nRN said OK\nIt would seem that the two men who could handle\nthis most effectively are Bryce Harlow and Maury Stans.\nI have run this idea by Buchanan, Keogh, Greenspan\nand Allen. They agree that Harlow and Stans would bring\nto this difficult and delicate task an unmatched combination\nof seasoned judgment, broad government experience and an\nintimate knowledge of the key people in Washington.\nHenry Loorris force\narthumBurns- Tom\nFrank Lincoln\nPRESERVATION COPY\nRNC DC\n8234616 RMN NY\nTransition\nMEMO TO LARRY HIGBY FROM SIMMONS\nOCTOBER 11\nRECEIVED FOLLOWING MEMO TO HALDEMANPFROM JERRY FRIEDHEIM, MILITARY\nAFAIRS@ASSISTANT TO SENATOR TOWER, STAFF DIRECTOR, NIXON/AGNEW\nKEY ISSUES COMMITTEE\nSUBJECT: THE TRANSITION: NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE MECHANICS AT THE\nWHITE HOUSE\nA MAJOR FACTOR INFLUENCING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM DURING THE\nPEIIOD L964-L967 WAS THE WHITE HOUSE/NATIONAL POLICY MAKING\nMACHINERY THAT FOMULATED THE POLICY. TO WHIT: THE PROCESS BY\nWHICH NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND POLICY MAKING DECISIONS CAME TOEGTHER\nIN THE PERSON OF THE PRRSIDENT'S SPECIAL ADVISOR FOR NATIONAL\nSECURITY AFFAIRS, MR. WALT ROSTOW.\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL PLAYED NO SIGNIFIGANT ROLE IN\nTHE FORMULATION OF VIETNAME POLICY DURING L964-L968. THE DPUESDAY\nLUNCJEON C\\UB (INFORMAL WEEKLY LUNCHEON MEETING OF THE PRESIDENT\nWITH THOSE REGARDED AS HIS KEY ADVISORS: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,\nMCNAMARA; SECRETARY OF STATE, RSUK) WAS THE VITAL DECISION MAKING\nMECHANISM USED BY THE PRESIDENT AND AS SUCH THIS UNOFFICIAL BODY\nCONSTITUTED A GROUPING EQUIVALENT TO, OR SUPERIOR TO, THE NSC.\nBUT TO FOCUS ATTENTION ONLY AT THAT MECHANISM IS TO OVERLOOK THE\nDECISIVE ROLE PLAYED BY THE PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL ASSISTANT (MR.\nROSTOW) IN STAFFING FOR THOSE MEETINGS AND IN THE DECISIONS ARISING\nTHEREFROM.\nIN PRACTICE, THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR SECURITY AFFAIRS BECAME\nUNDER LBJ A SORT OF \"CHIEF OF STAFFF\" WHO PUT TOGETHER FOR THE\nPRESIDENT THE POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS SUBMITTED BY THE STATE\nDEPARTMENT AND THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. HE ALSO BECAME THE\nPRSSIDENT'S PRINCIPAL STAFF \"INTELLIGENCE OFFICER\" PASSING UPON\nAND PASSING UPWARD THE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS OF THE ENTIRE\nNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. THIS IS A DANGEROUS COMBINATION.\nIT BECAME ALL THE MORE DANGEROUS BECAUSE THE CONSENSUS\nPHILOSOPHY WHICH PERVADED THE WHITE HOUSE DURNNG THIS PERIOD,\nAND THE LARGE DEGREE OD PERSONAL AGREEMENT ON POLICY BETWEEN\nMCNAMARA, RUSK AND HELMS, CONTRIBUTED TO AN ENVIRONMENT WHICH EFFECTIVEL\nCLOSED OUT ARGUMENT AGAINST THE GENERAL DRIFTOF THE NATIONAL POLICY\nAS IT ALSO CLOSED OUT INTELLIGENCE PRODUTCS WHICH WOULD CONTRADICT\nOR AT LEAST UNDERMINE THE VALIDITY OF THE DIRECTION OF THIS NATIONAL\nPOLICY DRIFT.\nONE OF THE BETTER SPECIFIC EXAMPLESS OF THIS RESTRAINT UPON THE\nINTELLIGENCE PRODUCT WAS THE L964 DECISION TO CLOSE THE MILITARY\nATTACHE OFFICES IN SAIGON BECAUSE THEIR REPORTING WAS NOT\nCONSISTENT WITH THE VIEW THEN BEING PURSUED IN WASHINGTON. THIS.\nEFFECTIVELY DEPRIVED THE MILITARY SERVICES OF ANY MEANINGFUL \"CHECK\nAND BALANCE\" UPON INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION WITHIN THE VITAL DECISION\nMAKING CENTERS OF THE SAIGON GOVERNMENT, AND IT RENDERED MILITARY\nINTELLIGENCE IN VIETNAM VIRTUALLY SUBSERVIENT TO THE U,S. EMBASSY\nTHERE, THOUGH INDEPENEENT REPORTING CHANNELS CANTINUED TO EXIST.\nIN WASHINGTON MR. ROSTOW BECAME THE FOCAL POINT OF NATIONAL\nINTELLIGENCE PRODUCED BY THE CIA, WHIH ALSO UTILIZED THE PRODUTC\nas #HSOOTHEROM RAHE\nOF THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. HE\nWAS ALSO THE FOCAL POINT OF POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS GP\nGENERATED BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND DOD.\nPRESERVATION COPY\nEXPERIENCES SENIOR MILITARY COMMANDERS UNDERSTAND WELL THE RISKS\nWHIH\nWHICH ARE INHERENT IN HAVING THEIR G-2 IN ANY WAY SUBSERVIENT TO---\nOR IN ANY WAY RELATED TO THE PLANNING PROCESS. IN SUCH A SITUATION,\nINTELLIGENCE WHCCH IS IN THE BEST OF CONDITIONS NOT EASILY PER-\nCEPTIVE OF THE WHOLE \"REAL WORLD\" TENDS TO BECOME CONTAMINATED.\nPRESIDENT NIXON'S STAFF SHOULD INCLUDE A SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR\nNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE WHO WOULD HAVE DIRECT ACCESS TO THE PRESIDENT\nAND WOULD BE COMPLETELY INDEPENDENT OF ANY PART OF THE PLANNING OR\nDECISION MAKING PROCESS, HE SHOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR PROVIDING THE\nPRESIDENT (AND HIS STAFF) WITH THE \"FACTS\" IN so FAR AS THEY ARE\nKNOWN BY U.S. INTELLIGENCE. WHEN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY HAS\nDIFFERENT \"ANSWERS\" AS FREQUENTLY OCCURS, HE SHOULD BE OBLIGED\nTOADVISE THE PRESIDENT THAT DIFFERENCES OF OPINION EXIST ON THE GIVEN\nPOINT OF ISSUE.\nIT IS CMMONLY ASSUMED THAT THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE\nPERFORMS THE FUNCTION DESCRIBED ABOVE, BUT IN FACT HE NEVER HAS---\nMAINLY BECAUSE HE IS A BUSY ADMINISTRATOR INHIS ON RIGHT; AND ALSO\nBECAUSE IT IS THE NATURE OF PRSSIDENTIAL STAFFS (ALL STAFFS)\nTO PROCEED ALONG WITH THE BEST INFORMATION AVAILABLE AT THE MOMENT\nIN SERVICING THEIR BOSS' REQUIREMENTS. THUS THE PRESIDENT'S STAFF\nIS APT TOMOVE A GOOD DISTANCE ALONG IN THE FORULATION OF POLICY\nWITHOUT BENEFIT OF THE BEST INTELLIGENCE SIMPLY BECAUSE THE DCI IS\nNOT A PART OF THE PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL STAFF. AN INTELLIGENCE\nSPECIALIST, WHO KNOWS THE TRADE AND THE ENTIRE COMMUNITY CAPABILITIES,\nLIMITATIONS, VESTED INTERESTS, ETC., WOULD GREATLY IMPRIOVE THE\nHUREIHOUSESTHEFINTELLIGENCE PRODUCT BEING UTILIZED BY THE\nMR. ROSTOW ABLE SCHOLAR AND PERCEPTIVE STRATEGIST THAT HE IS,\nWAS NOT SUCH AN \"INDEPENDENT AGENT.\" FROM THIS LACK OF INDEPEN-\nDENCE FLOWED MANY OF THE LAST ADMINISTRATION'S VIETNAM MISTAKES,\nVACILLATIONS, PROCRASTINATION AND \"CREDIBILIT\n@\nPlease Call see\ntonight.\nPiro 10/11/68\nTransition\n2,500 bey people.\nCS. - Can be transferred.\n- Problem of in formation.\n- Put togother small org.\n1. Top Bus for Scaroned talent.\nWhat do you ask for? Man that\ncould run company some day.\n- Start top down.\n1. duterview then ched around.\nMust learn how to interview.\nTrain there in volved in campaign\nkendell, 'Donnell.\nTransition\n3 levels of priority.\n25\nI Top: : Cabinet Commin head.\nKas\n2. Top insider. - by plants for\nkey post.\nz\nthe administration.\n3. Top Man gower pool.\n1.\nWhat types of pegale. -\nDefense Dept. - young Officers.\nRools\nService.\nBuriness - Door to Door.\nOrientation\nWhat & Where we aregoing.\nUse advanement for recreting\nyoung Presidents Ong.\nRecripting UPO - Bus.\nPool\nAcAdemic Pool\nComputton.\nService has list of outstanding officen they would like to\nkeep. Hot young guys.\nWhat are the amountants top ? Underse Category.\nare they Civil Source or.\nPiro < will put together a plan.\nWhite home Staff.\n3 levels. -1. top wisidem.\n2. Top. people.\n3. Top pool.\n& Salary levels in While house\nE - Problem of the \"Mranbook\"\nAmbanador's Plums to fair degree-\nM- N: Possible funined arangement\nfor Canpaign\nFoundation.\nSeate for Pero"
}