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This file contains:
Memo from Ellsworth to DC (cc: Mitchell, Keindienst) RE: Washington delegates. 3pgs. [Memo], 5/6/1968
Letter from Sanford Weiner to Rosemary Woods RE: case for Ronald Reagan as Republican nominee. 3pgs. [Letter], 4/8/1968
Memo from (illegible) to DC and J. Mitchell RE: Rockerfeller campaign. 2pgs [Memo], 6/6/1968
Memo from Rose Mary Woods to Haldeman RE: Don Nixon's desire to work with the RN campaign. 1pg. [Memo], 4/29/1968
Memo from Ellworth to Haldeman RE: complaints of pro-Nixon activity in New York state. 2pgs. [Memo], 5/30/1968
New York Time article (R.W. Apple) RE: Rockerfeller believing he may be picked as RN's running mate. Not scanned. [Newspaper], 5/29/1968
Memo from Price (no recipeint listed) RE: recommendations for General Strategy from now through Wisconson. 15pgs. [Memo], 11/28/1967
Report (no author/recipient listed) RE: "An Outline of Strategy." 6pgs. [Report], n.d.
Report/Notes (no author/recipient listed) RE: "Nixon for President Advertising in the Primary Campaigns." 21pgs. [Report], 11/21/1967
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26126939
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WHSF: Returned, 35-18
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26126939
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WHSF: Returned, 35-18
description
This file contains:
Memo from Ellsworth to DC (cc: Mitchell, Keindienst) RE: Washington delegates. 3pgs. [Memo], 5/6/1968
Letter from Sanford Weiner to Rosemary Woods RE: case for Ronald Reagan as Republican nominee. 3pgs. [Letter], 4/8/1968
Memo from (illegible) to DC and J. Mitchell RE: Rockerfeller campaign. 2pgs [Memo], 6/6/1968
Memo from Rose Mary Woods to Haldeman RE: Don Nixon's desire to work with the RN campaign. 1pg. [Memo], 4/29/1968
Memo from Ellworth to Haldeman RE: complaints of pro-Nixon activity in New York state. 2pgs. [Memo], 5/30/1968
New York Time article (R.W. Apple) RE: Rockerfeller believing he may be picked as RN's running mate. Not scanned. [Newspaper], 5/29/1968
Memo from Price (no recipeint listed) RE: recommendations for General Strategy from now through Wisconson. 15pgs. [Memo], 11/28/1967
Report (no author/recipient listed) RE: "An Outline of Strategy." 6pgs. [Report], n.d.
Report/Notes (no author/recipient listed) RE: "Nixon for President Advertising in the Primary Campaigns." 21pgs. [Report], 11/21/1967
citationUrl
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Richard M. Nixon's Returned Materials Collection
Returned White House Special Files
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
White House Special Files Collection
Folder List
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
Document Type
Document Description
35
18
05/06/1968
Memo
Memo from Ellsworth to DC (cc: Mitchell,
Keindienst) RE: Washington delegates.
3pgs.
35
18
04/08/1968
Letter
Letter from Sanford Weiner to Rosemary
Woods RE: case for Ronald Reagan as
Republican nominee. 3pgs.
35
18
06/06/1968
Memo
Memo from (illegible) to DC and J. Mitchell
RE: Rockerfeller campaign. 2pgs
35
18
04/29/1968
Memo
Memo from Rose Mary Woods to Haldeman
RE: Don Nixon's desire to work with the RN
campaign. 1pg.
35
18
05/30/1968
Memo
Memo from Ellworth to Haldeman RE:
complaints of pro-Nixon activity in New
York state. 2pgs.
35
18
05/29/1968
Newspaper
New York Time article (R.W. Apple) RE:
Rockerfeller believing he may be picked as
RN's running mate. Not scanned.
Wednesday, January 28, 2009
Page 1 of 2
Box Number Folder Number Document Date
Document Type
Document Description
35
18
11/28/1967
Memo
Memo from Price (no recipeint listed) RE:
recommendations for General Strategy from
now through Wisconson. 15pgs.
35
18
n.d.
Report
Report (no author/recipient listed) RE: "An
Outline of Strategy." 6pgs.
35
18
11/21/1967
Report
Report/Notes (no author/recipient listed)
RE: "Nixon for President Advertising in the
Primary Campaigns." 21pgs.
Wednesday, January 28, 2009
Page 2 of 2
ghint
sked
MEMO
be
To:
DC (cc: Mitchell, Kleindienst)
From:
Bob Ellsworth
Date:
May 6, 1968
Re:
Washington delegates
shall
On Friday, May 3, Governor Hickel met with Governor Babcock,
Governor Evans, Washington State Chairman Johnson and Nixon State
Chairman Clinton.
(1) Governor Evans does not want to move at this time even if
it should mean drawing his keynote job in serious question -- even
if it should mean his exclusion from the delegation.
Hickel evaluates the delegation at the present time as 9 dele-
gates who are actually for Nixon (and friendly to Evans); 9 delegates
who are for Nixon but who would shift quickly to Reagan if given a
chance (and who are strongly anti-Evans); and 6 delegates who are
open to persuasion.
Since only 8 states have their state conventions after Washington
(Montana: June 21-22; New Mexico: June 22; Illinois: June 28; Ala-
bama: June 28-29; Arkansas: June 29; Missouri June 29; Utah: July 12-13;
and New York: late June), Governors Hickel and Babcock suggest that
the possibility be kept in mind of an appearance by the Candidate at
the Washington State Convention, to be handled as a major Western
United States appearance, with the address to be syndicated throughout
the West on television.
-2-
This decision need not be made until shortly before the
convention, and the decision should be positive only if (1) a
major West Coast television appeal would serve a useful purpose
either by way of negating what might at that time be a Reagan
surge or solidifying Western pro-Nixon strength in the face of a
Rockefeller surge and (2) if local conditions in Washington are
propitious, i.e., friendly, to a Nixon appearance so that crowds
seen on television would be highly enthusiastic and SO that a
substantial majority of the delegates selected would be willing
to identify themselves publicly with Nixon.
I strongly concur in the recommendation forwarded by the
Governors, and would add the suggestion that the Candidate's
scheduling take account of the fact that the Illinois State Con-
vention will be held on June 28, and it might be highly appropriate
for the Candidate to appear at that state convention also.
Related subject: At the Congressional dinner Sunday evening,
May 5, Bow of Ohio and Arends of Illinois both urged that a meeting
be scheduled with the delegations from their states. RN agreed
this was a good idea.
The Ohio delegates are selected on May 7; 48 of the Illinois
delegates will be selected on June 11 in the primary but the other
10 will not be selected until June 28 at the state convention.
In both cases, it was recommended and agreed that the appearance
should be as soon as possible after selection, to take first advantage
-3-
of the tendency of leaners and doubters to be won over by
personal contact.
SANFORD WEINER AND ASSOCIATES
Advertising - Public Relations
April 8, 1968
Miss Rosemary Woods
c/o Nixon for President Committee
450 Park Avenue
New York, N. Y.
Dear Rose:
It has now been nine months since we began presenting our thoughts
as to the potential of Ronald Reagan receiving the Republican
nomination for the Presidency. It is my feeling that moderate
Republican leaders, particularly in the Eastern part of the
United States, are still unable to believe that Reagan has the
ability, the money, the organization and the plan which can
give him the nomination. I would only point out that those of
us who work politics on a day to day basis in California and are
close enough to the Reagan scene to observe it, more than ever
before realize the threat and danger of the the Reagan movement.
I offer the following points of information, which substantiate
the Reagan thrust:
1/ During the past week six additional professionals have
been hired by the Reagan people to go to work in the
Oregon Primary. Also, an additional $100,000 has been
collected, and has been sent to their Oregon people.
2/ The professionals who have been working with Reagan on
a day to day basis in California have sold Reagan and
others, such as Henry Salvatori, on an intense program,
which will tout Reagan as a moderate, in addition to his
appeal as an actor and as Governor of California. The
first stage of this program has already begun. And it
was accomplished by Reagan meeting with negroes up and
down the state, followed by his announcement that he
will veto any anti-Rumford legislation. During the
coming weeks he will make some surprising statements
on his attitudes toward Civil Rights and Welfare Programs.
He will try to make it clear that Nixon is the conser-
vative candidate and that Reagan is the glamorous,
moderate candidate. His people will attempt to move
quickly into the void which exists on the so-called
moderate Republican side.
- 1 -
646-A SANTA CRUZ AVENUE
MENLO PARK, CALIFORNIA 94025
TELEPHONE (415) 328-5151
3/ The Reagan people are careful to point out to close
insiders that they have made the Rockefeller people
feel that Reagan would accept the Vice Presidency,
if the moderates would just leave him alone. They
also infer to anyone who gets close enough to ask,
that there is some sort of commitment with Nixon and
his people. Reagan has skillfully made sure that his
two chief opponents will not bother him in any way,
while he quietly builds an ambush against both of them.
I might point out that this sort of gimmick is nothing
new for Reagan. As you may recall, when he ran for
Governor of California, an 11th Commandment was invented
which made it a sin for one Republican to criticize
another. In reality, however, the 11th Commandment
kept George Christopher from waging an effective
campaign against Reagan. It is my fear that everyone
has fallen for the same old line all over again.
4/ A Candidate does not hire the amount of people that
now exists on the Reagan staff throughout the country,
a Candidate does not raise the amount of funds that
are currently being collected In many states throughout
the nation in order to campaign for the office of Vice
President. Reagan continues almost a daily poke at both
Nixon and Rockefeller, but no one seems willing to pay
any attention to it. The fact that he does have the
potential of parading himself as a moderate was clearly
evidenced in 1966. But again, everyone seems to have
forgotten.
As I have written before, and as I am sure others continue to
report from California, there still exists a nauseating void
for anyone who chooses to help Richard Nixon. Anyone who asks
Gaylord Parkinson or other so-called people "in the know, " are
told that there is to be no Nixon activity, because it might
disturb the Great White Father in Sacramento. However, the
Great White Father doesn't hesitate to throw knives into Nixon's
back. I was pleased to see the Nixon network mailing so that
people can at least sign their names to some sort of document.
But what happens after that? I agree with the premise that any
sort of face to face ballot contest in California would be wrong.
On the other hand, actively working citizen committees, petitions,
rallies and other signs of movement would have nothing to lose,
except to show the nation that there are people in California
who want Richard Nixon to be President.
I would like to modestly remind you that I was the one who
created the concept of electing movie stars to public office
with George Murphy. I think I understand more than most the
assets of someone such as Ronald Reagan. I was also the one who
directed the campaign against Shirley Temple, which proved that
a movie star can be beaten. And I believe I understand what is
- 2 -
necessary to accomplish that type of goal.
In 1966 I saw miscalculations elect Ronald Reagan Governor of
California. I cannot conscientiously sit by and let him be
underestimated once again on a broader scale. During the
coming weeks you will be seeing Ronald Reagan's face on television
throughout the country and you will be reading about his moderate
views in literature mailed throughout the nation. You will also
see not too pleasant wordage issued against Richard Nixon. I
would hope that the powers that be, begin acting now before it is
too late. Once Reagan is allowed to gallop for a time on his
white horse, he will be unstoppable.
Sincerely,
Samily Sanford L. Weiner
SLW/cj
cc: Patrick Hillings
- 3 -
June 6, 1968
TO:
DC
J.Mitchell
FROM:
80ml
RE:
Rockefeller Campaign
At breakfast with Walter Thayer I told him how
disturbed we were at the turn NR's campaign had taken, as
evidenced by the Douglass telegram to N.J. delegates,
NR's statements re RN, and the purported thrust of the NR
television spot program. I pointed out that this effort
was futile, as we now had the nomination won with strength
to spare.
Regarding the television spots, Thayer said he
had seen them all and that, as of now, they were not anti-
Nixon. There are eight spots in the series, all issue
oriented. The script is written but not yet produced.
Thayer's comment re the content was that RN could have
said it". He said there is divided opinion on the project
and it may well be scrapped.
Thayer went on to say it was entirely possible
that the thrust of the spots would be changed to "anti-
Nixon". He said the trend in this direction was also
disturbing to him. He had not known of the Douglass cable.
He deplored the negative note of some of NR's comments. He
went on to say that he had put in writing to NR that he would
withdraw publicly if NR's campaign became anti-Nixon and
divisive.
Thayer went on to say that the NR campaign forces
had split, with the pros (Hinman, Hughes, Douglass, Morton,
Spad, Bill Miller, Hall, Dierdorf and Wilson) having pushed
aside the amateurs (Irwin Miller, Whitney and Thayer). He
said Douglass was nice, bright but ineffective, while Hughes
was a difficult, complicated person. He was very high on
Irwin Miller. Thayer said he did not sit in on the strategy
meetings and did not use his office on 44th Street. He said
that unlike the '66 campaign, where Pfeiffer and Rownan gave
it real leadership, the current effort is confused and
leaderless.
-2-
All the "amateurs" are equally firm in their
conviction that NR should not be anti-Nixon. Thayer says
this conviction is based on the belief that it won't help
NR and will hurt the Republican Party. Thayer is satisfied
that the game is up for NR. He will continue to urge him
to be constructive, rather than destructive. If the latter
is the course taken, he will withdraw.
Thayer was warm in his praise of the way RN is
handling himself. It seemed obvious to me that he is
uncomfortable with NR and would like to get back on our
team.
Thayer negotiated with Cliff White to join the NR
forces. He claims to have determined that Salvatori's contract
with White was for $150, 000 for consulting with the California
delegation. White apparently was sufficiently interested in
Thayer's proposal to have had the gall to ask Salvatori
if his consulting obligations prohibited him from working
with the NR people. The answer was a flat "yes".
(Thank
the Lord we didn't get White.)
hold til
after convention Dem
ACH
April 21, 1968
in LA
will help unless
call, 13th mon
MEMORANDUM
HHH is nominee
TO:
Bob Haldeman
FROM:
Rose Mary Woods
In trying to clean out my brief case today,
I came across the note I called you about when Don Nixon asked
RN to have someone contact Ed Biles in California. You will
remember Don said he was a former Johnson intimate but wants
to help RN now. His telephone number is Code 213 279 2856.
Don told RN that he wants to work with us - has
worked with Democrats and minorities.
1-was a Johnson man - geril councel, 14years, very close
when LBJ afdrew wasgoing togofor RN
2- if HHH gets nomination -he can't help
3- of its Bobby or mclanthy - he 'el join with us
still concerned about anti semitism tag on RN.
have to get rid of this
med to concentrate on Latin Americans - up. wLA and Orange
he'll put us in touch with all the leaders.
May 30, 1968
MEMORANDUM
TO:
Haldeman
FROM:
Ellsworth
a
In case this should ever come up -- which I hope
it doesn't, and I hope DC does not become involved or
embroiled in any kind of comment on this -- you should
know what it is based on.
Hinman called Bellmon to complain about pro-Nixon
activity in New York state and to ask Bellmon to quash
it. This was while Romney was still very much a candi-
date.
Bellmon called Hinman back and said that he, Bell-
mon, knew nothing about and was not behind any pro-Nixon
activity in New York, and Hinman then said he wanted to
show Bellmon newspaper clippings which he preceded to do.
Bellmon then said that he, Bellmon, would undertake
to repudiate and otherwise dampen the Nixonites in New York
state if he could be assured that Rockefeller was going to
be a favorite son at least to the extent of insisting upon
having all of New York's first ballot votes go to him, Rocke-
feller, and not to Romney.
-2-
Bellmon never "broached" the possibility of
Rockefeller running for Vice President. Bellmon never
said that things would be much easier for Rockefeller
if he did not get in the race.
In fact, Bellmon states there is no foundation
in fact for the Rockefeller statement reported in the
news story.
MEMORANDUM
28 November 1967
From:
Price
Subj:
Recommendations for General Strategy from now through
Wisconsin
We enter with these factors in the equation:
1) RN is the front-runner, maintaining or increasing
strength in the polls with relatively little activity.
2) We can't be sure how solid this support is (e.g.,
the New Hampshire attitude that he's a good man but probably
can't win, thus their votes are really being cast away -- or
cast for LBJ).
3) Romney is certain to conduct a high-intensity
campaign, with a lot of strect-cornering and probably a lot of
TV. This has apparently been effective in Michigan; whether
1t's transferreble to a 1968 Presidential campaign is another
question.
4) Rockefeller and Reagan continue to exercise
their attractions from the sidelines. Rockefeller's strength
derives principally from RN's can't-win image. He's riding high,
not particularly because people like hir, but because they've
been told (which is something other than thinking) that he can
win and that he thus is the only realistic alternative to LBJ.
At this stage of the game, poll results don't particularly show
what voters think about a candidate; they reflect in large
measure what they've been told. They haven't begun thinking that
intensively. Reagan's strength derives from personal charisma,
-2-
glamor, but primarily the ideological fervor of the Right and
the emotional distress of those who fear or resent the Negro,
and who expect Reagan somehow to keep him "in his place" -- or
at least to echo their own anger and frustration.
RN is the overwhelming favorite of the delegate types;
ir we can lick the can't-win thing we've got it made. This is
the one possible obstacle between RN and the nomination. Thus
the whole thrust of our effort should be aimed at erasing this
image.
How?
To answer this, we have to analyse the image.
Basically, it divides into two parts:
a) He lost his last two elections.
b) He somehow "feels" like a loser.
We can't alter the facts of (a), and probably our capacity
to get people to look at those facts realistically is limited.
For
We can make any number of power arguments about the way in which
those results should be interpreted: in 1960, one of the
closest races in history against one of the most charismatic
of American political figures, the effect of the Catholic issue,
vote-stealing, defending the Eisenhower record, etc.; and in 1962,
the bitter split in the California Republican party, the fact
that he wasn't credible as a mere governor (too big for the job,
and he showed it), etc. But politics is only minimally a rational
science, and no matter how compelling these arguments -- even if
WE can get people to sit down and listen to them -- they'll
only be effective if we can get the people to make the emotional
-3-
leap, or what theologians call "the leap of faith." If we can
make them feel that he's got the aura of a winner, they'll
rationalize away the past defeats by themselves; if we can't
make them feel that, no matter what the rational explanations,
they 11 pull down the mental blind marked with those simple
words, "he lost."
The natural human use of reason is to support prejudices,
not to arrive at opinions.
Then how do we attack (b) -- the notion that he "feels"
like a loser?
First, we bear in mind that to a lot of people he feels
like a winner. It's the others we have to worry about. And we
might oversimplify by dividing these into two basic groups:
1) those who themselves feel there's "something about him I don't
like, " or "something about him that spells loser;" and 2) those
who themselves react altogether positively, but consider him a
loser-type because of the way others react to him. The line
between these two groups, of course, isn't sharp; and again we
have to bear in mind that most people's reactions to most public
figures are a nixture of positives and negatives. But for
purposes of analysis, we can proceed from this division.
Polls showing RN substantially ahead can be of considerable
use, particularly with those of Croup (2). But there's a caveat
here: poll strength is bound to fluctuate, and to the extent
that our defenses against "can't-win" are built on polls, they're
insecure. A slight downturn then could have a snowball effect.
But if we can erase the feeling of "can't-win," then we can survive
a substantial buffeting by the polls.
-4-
The hard core of the problem lies with those who themselves
feel there's "loser" somehow written on him -- i.e., with Group
(1). If we can get these, we'll automatically get Group (2).
Again, we might divide the factors entering into the
"can't-win" feeling into two broad categories: (a) historical,
and (b) personal. The historical factors would, of course,
include the fact of the two losses, but they run deeper. In a
sense, they're all wrapped up in the fact that for years Nixon
was one of those men it was fashionable to hate. It might take
people a moment to remember why they were supposed to hate him,
but they do remember that they were Even in communities where
he was locally popular, it was well known that he was hated
elsewhere -- and particularly in many of the Best Circles.
Generally, the sources of this hate centered around the
way he practiced, or was alleged to practice, his political craft.
Whatever the strange complex of passions that went into the
hysterical anti-anti-communism of the postwar and McCarthy
years; whatever the emotional responses of those who disliked
his style, the essence of the objections lay in Nixon's cutting
edge. He was viewed as a partisan figure first, a national figure
second; as devious and unfair in his debating tactics -- a master
of unsupported innuendo, etc.
Let's leave realities aside -- because what we have to
deal with now is not the facts of history, but an image of
history. The history we have to be concerned with is not what
happened, but what's remembered, which may be quite different.
Or, to put it another way, the historical untruth may be a
politicalreality.
-5-
We can't do anything about what did happen, and there's
not much we can directly do about people's impressions of what
happened; for better or for worse, these are part of the political
folklore. Thus what we have to do is to persuade people that
they're irrelevant to 1968. How? This has three prongs:
1. The passage of time; this has clearly worked
in our favor. The sharp edge of memory has dulled, the image
has mellowed; people don't maintain their passions forever.
Also, Stewart Alsop makes an interesting point in his 1960 book,
"Nizon and Rockefeller:" that with a couple of minor exceptions,
"after 1954 the anti-Nixon dossier dwindles away into almost
nothing at all
the fact is that, since 1954, Nixon has very
rarely gone too far, although the provocation has often been
great. " (152-153)
2. A dawning recognition on the part of some voters
that they (or the chroniclers) might have been wrong, and that
maybe the horrer stories weren't all true after all; and
3. The natural phenomenon of growth. This is where
I think there's the most gold to be mined. People understand
growth, readily and instinctively; they expect people to mellow
as they mature, and to learn from experience. Particularly in
the case of a person with RN's recognized ability and intelligence,
frow
they'd be surprised if he didn't gow and change with the years.
This doesn't mean a "new Nixon;" it simply means the natural
maturation of the same Nixon, and in this context it makes the
leaving behind of the ola sterectypes perfectly acceptable and
understandable. The great advantage of the growth idea is that
it doesn't require 3 former Mixon-hater to admit that he was wrong
-6-
in order to become a Nixon supporter now; he can still cherish
his prejudices of the past, he can still maintain his own sense
of infallibility, even while he shifts his position on a Nixon
candidacy.
But what of the personal factors, as opposed to the
historical?
These tend to be more a gut reaction, unarticulated,
non-analytical, a product of the particular chemistry between
the voter and the image of the candidate. We have to be very
clear on this point: that the response is to the image, not to
the man, since 99 per cent of the voters have no contact with
the man. It's not what's there that counts, it's what's projected --
and, carrying it one step further, it's not what he projects but
rather what the voter receives. It's not the man we have to
change, but rather the received impression. And this impression
often depends more on the medium and its use than it does on
the candidate himself.
Politics is much more emotional than it is rational, and
this is particularly true of Presidential politics. People
identify with a President in a way they do with no other public
figure. Potential presidents are measured against an ideal
that's a combination of leading man, God, father, hero, Pope,
king, with maybe just a touch of the aven.ing Furies thrown in.
They want him to be larger than life, a living legend, and yet
quintessentially human; someone to be held up to their children
as a model; someone to be cherished by themselves as a revered
member of the family, in somewhat the same way in which peasant
-7--
families pray to the icon in the corner. Reverence goes where
power is; it's no coincidence that there's such persistent
confusion between love and fear in the whole history of man's
relationship to his Gods. Awe enters into it.
And we shouldn't credit the press with a substantially
greater leaven of reason than the general public brings. The
press may be better at rationalizing their prejudices, but the
basic response remains an emotional one.
Selection of a President has to be an act of faith. It
becomes increasingly so as the business of government becomes
ever more incomprehensible to the average voter. This faith
isn't achieved by reason; it's achieved by charisma, by a
feeling of trust that can't be argued or reasoned, but that
comes across in those silences that surround the words. The
words are important -- but less for what they actually say than
for the sense they convey, for the impression they sive of the
man himself, his hopes, his standerds, his competence, his
intelligence, his essential humanness, and the directions of
history he represents.
Most countries divide the functions 02 head of government
(prine minister) and chief of state (king or president). We
don't. The traditional "issues" type debates center on the
role of the head of government, but I'm convinced that people
vote more for a chief of state -- and this is primerily an
emotional identification, embracing both a man himself and a
particular vision of the nation's ideals and its destiny.
-8-
All this is a roundabout way of getting at the point
that we should be concentrating on building a received image
of RN as the kind of man proud parents would ideally want their
sons to grow up to be: a man who embodies the national ideal,
its aspirations, its dreams, a man whose image the people want
in their homes as a source of inspiration, and whose voice they
want as the representative of their nation in the councils of
the world, and of their generation in the pages of history.
That's what being 8 "winner" means, in Presidential terms.
What, then, does this mean in terms of our uses of time
and of media between now and April 2?
For one thing, it means investing whatever time RN needs
in order to work out firmly in his own mind that vision of the
nation's future that he wants to be identified with. This is
crucial. It goes beyond the choice of a slogan, beyond the choice
of a few key "issues;" it's essential to the projection of RN
as the man for the 70s.
Secondly, it suggests that v.e take the time and the
money to experiment, in E controlled manner, with film and
television techniques, with particular emphasis on pinpointing
those controlled uses of the television medium that can best
convey the image we want to get across.
I know the whole business of contrived image-mongering
is repugnant to RN, with its implication of slick gimmicks and
phony merchandising. But it's simply not true that honesty is
its own salesman; for example, it takes make-up to make a man
look natural on TV. Similarly, it takes art to convey the truth
-9-
from us to the viewer. And we have to bear constantly in mind
that it's not what we say that counts, but what the listener
hears; not what we project, but how the viewer receives the
impression. I think it was Luce and Hadden, in their original
prospectus for Time, who laid down the rule that it's not what
the editors put into a magazine that counts, but what the readers
get out of it -- and that rule is just as applicable to us.
The TV medium itself introduces an element of distortion,
in terms both of its effect on the candidate and of the often
subliminal ways in which the image is received. And it inevitably
is going to convey a partial image == thus ours is the task of
finding how to control its use so the part that gets across is
the part we want to have gotten across.
Our concentrated viewing of clips from the CBS library
left a clear impression that RN comes across decidedly unevenly --
sometimes rather badly, sometimes exceedingly well, and that the
greater the element of informality and spontaneity the better
he comes across. This spontaneity is difficult to get in the
formal setting of a standard press conference or a set speech, when
he's
concentrating on the arrangement of words to convey a
particular thought in a particular way. Apart from all the
technical gimmicks, the key difference in LBJ's TV manner at his
last press conference -- and what really brought it off SO
stunningly -- was that he was no longer trying to formulate
sentences in a precise and guarded manner; he gave the impression
of being no longer self-conscious about his manner of expression,
but rather seemed to have his mind fixed on the thing he was
talking about. It was this apparent unselfconsciousness that
-10-
unleashed the power of the man; and this unselfconsciousness is
the essence of spontaneity. Suddenly, LBJ was transformed from
a man with a can't-win television image to a man with 8 can-win
image, and the lesson ought not to be lost on us.
We have to capture and capsule this spontaneity -- and
this means shooting RN in situations in which it's likely to emerge,
then having a chance to edit the film so that the parts shown
are the parts we want shown. We need to build a library of such
shots, which then will be available for a variety of uses -- and
SO that, in minimum time, we can put together a variety of one
or five-minute, or longer films of the man in motion, with the
idea of conveying a sense of his personality -- the personality
that most voters have simply not had a chance to see, or, if they
have, have lost in the montage of other images that form their
total perceptions of the man.
The Paul Niven show came across brilliantly, and it was
a fine example of an appearance in which the circumstances were
right: 8 relaxed, informal setting; a "conversation" rather than
a Meet-the-Press-type adversary proceeding; sufficient time and
scope to expand on the ideas presented; a chance to bring out the
qualities of the man. The people who say Nixon "can't win" tend
to have a two-dimensional, black-and-white image of him; this
kind of show makes it possible to bring out 8 third dimension,
and it's in this third dimension that the keys to victory lie.
In this third dimension, style and substance are
inseparable. And the substantive essence is not whatever facts
may be adduced (though facts are valuable), but the sense of
attitudes and approaches which have been thought through, not
-11-
only in depth, but also in terms of their relationship to those
other processes of government and aspects of society that they
may affect.
One of our great assets for 1968 is the sense that RN
comes to the fray freshened by an experience rare among men in
(unique)
public life, and among those of his generation: after a meteoric
rise, followed by eight years at the center of power and the
grinding experience of a Presidential campaign, time as a private
citizen to reflect on the lessons of public service, on the uses
of power, on the directions of change -- and in so doing to develop
a perspective on the Presidency that -no serious candidate in
this century has had the chance to achieve. It's 8 perspective
that an incumbent cannot have, because one has to get away from
the office to see it whole; and that an outsider cannot have,
because one has to have been there to know its nature.
Another thing we've got to get across is a sense of human
warmth. This is vital to the Presidential mystique, and has
largely been the "hidden side" of RN, as far as the public is
concerned. And it can be gotten across without loss of either
dignity or privacy. It shines through in a lot of those
spontaneous moments that have been caught on film. It would be
helped by an occasional groping for an answer. Just letting the
girls be seen can be a big plus. It came through at times on
the Niven show, and strongly on the Carson show. One of the
great plusses of the Carson show was that it hit a lot of people
with the jolt of the unexpected -- it showed people 8 side of RN
that they didn't know existed, and this jarred loose a lot of the
old prejudices and preconceptions.
-12-
Getting across this sense of warmth does not require
being a backslapper or a "buddy-buddy boy" or a hail-fellow-well-
met. To attempt to be such would be not only transparently
phony, but inappropriate; we're in a Presidential race, not at a
Shriners' convention. It can and should be done subtly, naturally
-- and this is one of the great advantages of the TV medium (which
is a close-up medium) in a relaxed setting, and also of film.
Here the warmth does come across -- in facial expressions, in
the inflections of voice, in the thoughtful exposition of a
problem in human terms and in a low-key manner.
Right now we should be concentrating as much as possible
on "cool" uses of TV, and on "cool" impressions -- both to
establish likeability (it's in the cool use that the warmth
comes through) and to fit the rhythms of a campaign that's going
to hot up later. That is, we want to leave room on the upper
end of the intensity scale, so that as we move toward November,
we've got reaches of intensity -- of "hotness" -- to expand into.
So: we should use TV, but we should be selective in
our uses of it. We don't need exposure for exposure's sake.
We don't have to establish recognition. But we do want to close
the gap between old myths and present realities: we want to
remind supporters of the candidate's strengths, and demonstrate
to non-supporters that the Herblock images are fiction. The
way to do this is to let more people see the candidate as we see
him, remembering that the important thing is not to win debates,
but to win the audience; not to persuade them to RN's point of
view, but to win their faith in his leadership.
#
#
#
-13-
POSTSCRIPTS:
How does all this translate into practical,
operational terms? Among other things, it means:
1. That for the next couple of months, at least,
RN should be underscheduled rather than overscheduled. This
may be the last opportunity for the concentrated thought
required to work out those basic "directions" that will
establish the thrust of the campaign.
2. That we resist the pressures which will inevitably
be brought for streetcornering, coffee-klatsching, etc.
3. That priority be given to meetings with the
news executives of key television stations in Boston, New
Hampshire and Wisconsin. The time to impress them is now,
before they get their patterns of campaign coverage locked into
place.
4. That in scheduling any TV appearances, sufficient
time be blocked out before the show to ensure that RN have a
chance (a) to collect his thoughts, and (b) to rest -- and that
this be an absolute and inviolabe rule.
5. That RN submit to filming for use in TV
commercial spots and a possible half-hour film.
6. That we proceed with the book, but that we
reassess the publication schedule with an eye to the political
climate in New Hampshire and Wisconsin. It's bound to contain
things which, taken wholly or partially out of context, would
upset conservative Republicans; if keeping the Right contented
-14-
1s the key to victory in Wisconsin, then we probably ought to
delay publication until May -- though bringing out one or
two advance excerpts tailored to the ideological needs of the
primary.
7. That in forays into the primary states, one
public event a day is enough. There's only going to be one
news story, and by keeping down the number of events it covers
we can better control its content. (An exception, of course,
would be those trips on which it was necessary to hit more than
one city.)
8. That RN should strive to avoid getting tangled
up in the passing controversies over present legislative
hassles, etc. He doesn't have to have a responsive answer to
whatever question a reporter may choose to ask; to the extent
that he tries to, he loses control over his own timing.
9. That we seek out opportunities for relaxed
television appearances, while trying to avoid a surfeit of the
stand-up press conference sort of thing -- and that when he is
in a standard press conference, he continue salting it with
light banter, etc. The voters know he's smart; we want to show
them that he's also a nice guy.
10. That he continue meeting with columnists,
commentators, etc. This is one of our chief counterthrusts to
the Rockefeller drive: his candidacy is largely a creation of
the media, and particularly of the print media. To the extent
that they discover Nixon as a reasonable alternative -- and to
the extent that they become convinced of the "winner" quality --
the less likely they'll be to keep trying to push Rockefeller forward.
-15-
11. I would agree emphatically with Pat that we
ought to avoid getting caught in a tug-of-war with Romney on
some one particular issue. Even though we might well score
debating points on him, we want to maintain the sense of a
candidacy that's on a plane above his -- again, we're interested
in winning the audience, not in winning the debate.
#
#
#
AN OUTLINE OF STRATEGY
The polls today show RN leading by a sizable margin in
N.H.; Governor Romney is the one who must play "hurry-up" football.
What sort of strategy should WE map out now for N.H.
1) I would right now lock into only the minimum necessary
appearances in N.H., essential to holding our lead, and considering
that George will campaign heavily. We must schedule enough so that
Rorney camp cannot argue "Only George Cared Enough to Come," and we
must not scheitule so much as to risk overexposure, to risk boring the
electorate, so that, the Hampshireites, weary with the contentious
disputants follow their 00wn arbitrary natures and write-in someone.
Ee should thus lock in only a necessary minimum in terms
of both tv and sppeches and appearances. What is that minimum?
2) The Nixon Coalition in N.H. right now (a guess) condists
of 1:0 per cent Republican Regulars, 40 per cent conservative Republic-
ans, and 20 per cent moderates and liberals who think Rocky 11 out,
Romney is out to lunch, and Reagan would be 2. disaster.
From the polls, from the reports we get, from the Plosseer
memos, we get this reading on the Nixon coalition. Almost to a man it
believes RN is the best qualified man to be President, most capable in
foreign policy, most capable on the issues: There is widespread concern
through this coalition that 2) RN is a loser and b) he cannot generate
sufficient enthusiast and excitement.
The points immediadely above indicate to me the necessity to
do more traditional campaigning than was envision in thet:Hew York
Times Story saying we would give lofty speeches, get in and out of the
State. They already think we are the smartest candidate; what the mais
ority want to "thew is can we win---and we can't convince them of this
by talking about Vietnac and the Middle East. In Wisconsin, we will
have the victory in N.H. to show we are winners- In New Hampshire,
we must have winner written all over us.
We have caid minimum essential appearances. Now, what kind?
First, we should give those lofty speeches on foreign policy which show
our suppriority over the opposition in clear terms. Such speeches as
well re-inforce (we don't need to create the impression; it is already
there) the concept of the great majority that we know more than anybody
else what we are talking about. Thus, we "flash" our credentials of
ability, experience and knowledge while Romney has to have his in-
spected at great length.
Then, to hammer the loser thing, (at the came time we dispell
the myths of RN being tough and mean and political and intense) we use
the tv to show everyone in New Hampshire that RN is enjoying the hell
oct of this campaign. He is smiling, confident, easy-going (no corntall
stuff) comes off well in "feature" settings, with kids, with folks etc.
In short, while RN talks like the President-in-Exile, he is a good
democrat (with a small d) who believes that communicating with the peo-
ple is one of the great joys of seeking the Presidency.
While our mail and advertising ought to be providing poll. and
every other thing we can to hit the loser thing RN's attitude as much
as anything else will create the impression of a rolling bandwagon.
(One thing we have going for us is that if Romney stays behind he may
get George Christopher-like, testy, irritable and bitchy and those are
the sure marks of 2 drowning candidate. They won't be missed by tv eye
or press either.)
That is the of tv we do want. Our controlled ads, RN
smiling when campaigning, RN the Statesman when speaking. We don't
need any press conference type stuff where RN is being baited by report-
ers and saying why he would oppose the rat control bill or something.
We just don't need that; and it should be considered a necessary evil
when we have to have it.
3) Basic Strategy then: First class printed advertising,
first class filmed spots and films of RN, plus f ends and the J sur-
rogates of RN should carry the message into N.H. and bear the brunt
of the campaign against George--while RN himself waits in reserve,
watching the progress of the conflict. RN only
does what is necessary and essential. If George fails to move in the
polls, if he puts his shoe in his mouth a few times, we follow the
same strategy. If he starts moving rapidly upward, we then start closin
some of the options we left open---we start locking in to telethons
perhaps; we start campaigning in earnest.
However, while RN has a schedule perhaps half that of Romney,
how do
our people ought to have the line out that RN has determined to do what
you
get
ever is necessary to get his message across to the people of N.H., to
away with
go into the towns if need be and the city halls etc. We will consider
it an all-out campaign. That might well be the line.
4) Romney Strategy. All-out street corner effort certainly.
Also, the necessity to talk a great deal on the issues to convime the
people he can handle them. The press will be picking him apart on is-
sues and specifics if he tries to duck them. If by three weeks before
the election Romney has not moved up considerably in the polls I woul
imagine a direct challenge would come to RN. Romeny might well grab on
end of an issue of which RN held the other and then try to have the
election decided on it. Perhaps it might be Vietnam.
We should avoid this at all costs. If its decided on the best
man and qualifications, we win; so let's avoid having it settled on the
single issue. We ought to ignore challenges to debate; We are running
against LPJ not George Romney voters should chcose who is better qual
ified, who can make a better case, who can win. We should avoid lockin
HORKS horns or getting into companative situations with Romney.
(I have heard that it is expected that RN and Romney both will
be on Meet the Press the day before election (rather the Sunday before))
agree
I would skip this drill, if we are well ahead.
(If We bump into George and we can't avoid it, we ought to
1960
play the JFK bit when Johnson kept demanding he debate at the Democratic
convention. If we are getting heat, we might pop in unexpectedly on
Romney somewhere, take the floor, and give them about ten minutes of
what needs to be changed in America, high-level, then say the Re ublicar
Party can provide that leadership. Within this party there are the hu-
man resources "to turn America around into the proper path of her destir
good
We have great Governors like George Romney and Senators like your own
"if"
Norris Cotton. We will win if we stand together, and I say right hre
If Governor Romney gets that nomination, he will have no more loyal sup-
porter than mer? This type of drill, where there is no contest, no gra-
ppling of arms toz wrestle.
5) ISSUES; It has been argued that RN should take a thematic
approach, give his philosophy, tell what is wrong with America, point
out the direction of the new solution, and perhpas a few major programs
might be broadly defined. This is fine; and it avoids the petty issues
that divide men. But the press will not let us get away with it; and
for them RN should be thoroughly briefed on the major issues of the day
with statistics and facts and phrases for the press conferences. While
we might not want get into the nitty-gritty; RN should be prepared
for it. There is no need to antagonize the press by staying off of
some issues RN is pressed on. Rn has never had problems problems in
this area, and he ought to level with the press. As one earlier memo
said, RN's demonstration not only of convictions, but of tremendous
knowledge and ability will be sharply contrasted in these writer's mind
with George---and thecontrast may be reffected in their stories.
Because of the nature of our coalition (conservative
personally or politically) in N.H., we ought not to come up there
and jolt their current impression of RN as Mr. Solid. Republican
progressive is a good posture. Even if we are going to come out
for something like the negative income tax, it ought to be delayed
until after this type of thing is over.
However, I would agree with Ray that we ought not, when
in N.H., lock the door to any proposal that might be worthwhile nat-
ionally later.
6) STRATEGY BETWEEN NOW AND NEW HAMPSHIRE
Our national coalition is inxxx similar to that in New
Hampshire; and to cement it the same rules apply. Demonstrate we
can generate enthusiam and excitement; demostrate (partly through the
primaries and partly in attitude) that we are a winner; demonstrate
(again, just re-inforce impressions rather than create them) that as
possible believe, we are by far the best qualified.
Thus, rather than political reporters walking thoough the
office; I would like to see an AP feature writer maybe and some friendl
only magazine writers. (As for thepolitical reporters, they should be
sent away with the message of RN, by no means overconfident, but cool,
calm, confident and fatalistic)
We would like to see some more (not very much) tv of RN, with
press
the accent on destroying the old myths. Also, perhaps come feature
shots, (again not overdone) of RN on a golf course or something that
is legitimate feature without being conrball or contrived.
We could use some more feature stuff on the youth of
the Staff, and the idea merchants etc. We ought to get the Draft
piece around to youth of the country. We ought to be thinking in
temrs of meterial that will make points with the Negro. These people
are not locked into LBJ; theyare not partciuaarly hostile to RN; they
are indifferent to RN, and maybe some of them can be sold
on RN.
On this feature stuff whether tv or press or photos or
situation- it ought to be such so as to surprise someonewho has a
stereotype of RN, but not so much as to make him think it is contrived.
What was ideal about the Carson thing was that it did three
things in one.
First, RN with his very brief and articulate piece on "world
peace" re - -inforced the notion of his ability in world affairs; then with
the needle about the "ten tickets" and the other gave the lie to the
impression that P.N is humorless then with the girls, this tore into
the mean damage and dispassionate image.
###
Notes re Nixon for President Advertising
in the Primary Campaigns
November 21, 1967
-1-
Consider this the first stab at an advertising
strategy -- a combination guide and thought-starter for
those who will be developing the Nixon for President adver-
tising in the primary states.
Much that is in these notes has been said before.
Some of the points are obvious. A few are less obvious and
perhaps new. But all have a direct bearing on our problem and
merit your close study.
There is nothing final about this document. It is a
beginning only. Like Alaskan sour dough, it should be constant-
ly kneaded with fresh ideas for best results.
-2-
We must start by answering three questions which are
basic to all advertising:
-What do we want to communicate? This is the most
important question. And once answered, all advertising should
carry the same message, and be judged solely on how clearly and
memorably it communicates it.
-How do we say what we want to communicate? With what
words, what audio and visual techniques, in what style, what tone
of voice?
Where should we put our advertising message so that
it will reach the most voters in the most effective way possible
at the least cost? This is the media decision, and because it is
a local problem it will be the subject of individual reports for
each state.
-3-
The content, or the "what", of the advertising
We must keep foremost in our minds the fact that we are
developing advertising for a primary campaign. LBJ and the Democratic
Party are not yet the opposition. Criticizing the present administra-
tion is merely a way -- and a good one, to be sure -- to present our
candidate as the Republican most qualified to head a new administra-
tion.
Thus, the overall objective of the advertising will be to
persuade voters, or confirm to the already-persuaded, that the
Republican nominee in 1968 should be Richard Nixon, rather than Romney
or Rockefeller or Reagan or Percy.
Issues will be discussed, but always in a way that clearly
establishes Richard Nixon as the Republican candidate who is best
equipped to deal with them.
And the advertising will certainly attack the record and
policies of the administration. As the McDonald Davis Schmidt
strategy states, "The most effective posture for a challenger to take
is that of constantly challenging. The advertising should be directed
toward 'what's wrong with things as they are. " True. But it must
always then lead directly, and without subtlety, into why our candi-
date is so uniquely qualified to right those wrongs.
-4-
It is part of the discipline of sound advertising to put
down, as briefly as possible, the advertising "proposition" -- the
simplest expression of the message we want to communicate. This
is not the theme or slogan; the words of the proposition may never
appear in advertising; yet all advertising must communicate the
thought of the proposition.
The proposition for the Nixon for President primary adver-
tising can be stated like this:
There's an uneasiness in the land. A feeling that
things aren't right. That we're moving in the wrong
direction. That none of the solutions to our prob-
lems are working. That we're not being told the
truth about what's going on.
The trouble is in Washington. Fix that and we're
on our way to fixing everything. Step one: move
LBJ out, move a Republican president in.
And of all the Republicans, the most qualified for
the job by far is Richard M. Nixon. More than any
other Republican candidate for the Presidency,
Richard Nixon will know what has to be done -- and
he'll know the best way to get it done. We'll all
-5-
feel a whole lot better knowing he's there in
Washington running things instead of somebody
else.
-6-
A proposition has to be supported in the advertising by facts.
What are our facts? What does Richard Nixon have that makes him "the
most qualified by far"?
Experience. On the national scene. In foreign affairs. He
knows how the Federal government works, and how to make it work for
the people. He's got it all over the other candidates in this respect.
Knowledgesbility. Resulting from his experience. His
travels. His conversations with the world's thinkers and achievers.
His years of intensive study.
Intellectual ability. Formidable. A disciplined mind. Able
to cope with the big problems, come up with new answers. Can more
than hold his own in his dealings with other world leaders.
Acceptability. Where it counts. In the capitols of the
world. In the top circles of business, politics, the professions.
Not a lways loved, he is universally respected. Not glamorous, he does
have a certain star quality going for him. Most doors are open to
him.
Ability to form a top team. Running the country is not a
one-man job. You have to have expert help -- and Richard Nixon knows
where the talent is. He can bring the best minds in the country into
-7-
government, get them to working on our problems. He won't have to
depend on home-town pals; he has ranged too far for too long to be
thus hampered.
Toughness. A good man to have on your side. Won't be
shoved around. Will stick to what he believes. Can he be brain-
washed? Try.
Integrity. Although there were some doubts in the past,
these have been dispelled by the years. Richard Nixon is now gen-
erally regarded as honest, a man who levels with people. (The way
he is handled from now on should strengthen that impression --
particularly important in light of the credibility issue.)
Conscientiousness. He is serious. Hardworking. Selfless.
Thorough. When you've got Nixon on a problem, you've got the best
of Nixon.
Vigorous. He is young, healthy, energetic -- not really a
big advantage over the other Republican candidates, who are equally
vigorous, but still a fact.
Party unifier. Self-explanatory. Probably not of much use
in advertising.
-8-
There are also negatives -- but these don't have to be as
damaging as some pessimists fear. If we recognize them, deal with
them intelligently instead of worrying about them, their effect can
be minimized. What, then, does Richard Nixon lack?
Newness. Which is not a total negative. Newness means
excitement -- but it also means inexperience. And we don't have time
for on-the-job training. When the chips are down, not too important.
Glamour. True. But again, when the chips are down, etc.
Humor. Can be corrected to a degree, but let's not be too
obvious about it. Romney's cornball attempts have hurt him. If we're
going to be witty, let a pro write the words.
Warmth. He can be helped greatly in this respect by how he
is handled, by what he says and how he says it, etc. Will be discussed
in more detail later.
There are other negatives which are supposed to be working
against Mr. Nixon but -- in this writer's opinion -- they now seem to
be part of a past that few people remember or much care about today.
agree!
In this category we can place the "tricky Dick" image, the reputation
for meanness and ruthlessness, for putting politics ahead of principle,
etc. These now seem strangely out-of-date and no longer applicable to
the man who is running in 1968.
-9-
A negative that does seem to hang on, however, is the loser
image. This is a negative of special significance in the primaries;
people don't want to waste their vote on a candidate who can't win
the national election. Of course, there's nothing like winning to bury
a reputation for losing. That's why Nixon's electability -- as shown
in the polls, by what people are saying, in the first primaries,
etc. -- should be an important element of our advertising content.
More on this later.
The foregoing has been a discussion of what we want to com-
municate -- or, in the case of the negatives; what we may want to
counteract. It can all be summed up in the next to last sentence of
the proposition:
More than any other Republican candidate for the
Presidency, Richard Nixon will know what has to
be done -- and he'll know the best way to get it
done.
It is imperative that this thought come through loud and
clear in every single piece of advertising. If it doesn't, the adver-
tising is not doing its job.
-10-
The execution, or the "how", of the advertising
In developing actual advertisements and commercials, we
should observe two general guidelines.
First, the style of the advertising must be appropriate --
to the man, to his background, to the office he is seeking. We are
representing in our advertising a former vice president of the United
States, a man with specific and well known personality traits, a
candidate for the most important office in the world.
Cuteness, obliqueness, wayoutness, slickness -- any obvious
gimmicks that say "Madison Ave. at work here" -- should be avoided.
They could, indeed, result in a public backlash that would hurt our
candidate. Imaginative approaches, contemporary techniques -- yes.
Right
But we must beware of "overcreativity", and make sure that the basic
seriousness of our purpose shows plainly in everything we do.
Second, we must not, in our zeal (or in our preoccupation with
Mostant
the loser image), forget that our candidate is the favorite.
In every race we're entering, the polls show Richard Nixon
well out in front -- and pulling farther ahead every week. We do
not, therefore, have to take the kind of chances which a lesser known
or less popular candidate might be tempted to take. We can afford a
-11-
"careful confidence". (It's to be hoped that this would be reflected
in Mr. Nixon's public appearances aswell as in the advertising; there
are times when his seriousness, and his determination to make a point,
True
start coming across as defensive or even a little desperate. More cool
is called for.)
At this point these notes will digress somewhat to analyze the
forces behind the Nixon Resurgence (which are not too different from
the forces which are moving Rockefeller to the fore) and comment on the
"new Nixon" myth.
It's interesting to note that Mr. Nixon's growing popularity
is not resulting from anything new he is saying or doing. What is
happening is a political process of elimination on a mass scale, coupled
with the cumulative effects of the "prior approval" factor. Listen to
this dialogue with last year's typical Republican voter:
"We're in a mess," says the voter. "Gotta get
LBJ out. Gotta get our boy in."
"You mean Nixon?"
"No, no. We've been there."
"Who, then?"
"I don't know. Ask me next year."
Time passes. Here we are in an election year. Can't cop out
-12-
any more. Have to face up.
"Okay, Mr. Republican voter, so if you don't like
Nixon, who do you want?"
"Well, there's Romney -- old Super Square -- he
looked pretty good until he started talking.
Reagan --- a glamour boy and better than I expected
but he still has to prove he could handle the Top
Job. Percy -- attractive but I really don't know
much about him. Rockefeller -- yeah, I could go
with him, except he keeps saying he doesn't want
to be President. That leaves Nixon. It
"But you said you didn't like him."
"Yeah. But I can't seem to remember why. There's
no denying he's qualified. In fact, he's really
a good man for the job. And I've been reading
some very favorable things a bout him. And I've
heard a lot of savvy people are getting behind
him. Nixon? Sure -- he'd get my vote!"
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The point of all this is simply that it's not a "new
Nixon" that's now at the top of the polls. It's the old Nixon
with his strengths looking stronger and his negatives blurred by
the years -- and, if he's not quite the White Knight we saw in our
dreams, he's still the best man by far we could send to Washington.
And remember all those new voters for whom there can't be a new
Nixon because they never knew the original Nixon: for them there's
only Nixon '68 -- and compared to the others (with the possible
exception of Reagan) that ain't bad!
In short, it's the attitude of the voters that's new --
not Mr. Nixon. The advertising, therefore, should not strain to
create a brand new image -- because the old one's doing pretty
well. Add a little warmth, a touch of humor, an aura of confidence
-- then publicize poll results, favorable articles, friendly quotes,
and anything else that says, "winner" -- and we can stay in front to
the end.
Summing up the creative guidelines:
- Make sure the advertising is appropriate.
- Remember that we are ahead.
- Forget the "new "ixon" nonsense. It's the new
voter attitude that's important.
-14-
Now let's look at a few specific ways we can accomplish
our objectives:
Endorsements. No advertising will ever have the influ-
ence that a friend's opinion has. Fifty million dollars worth of
Ford advertising can't convince you like your neighbor's comment,
"Best car I ever owned." This is the "prior approval" factor at
work; he likes it, so maybe I would (or should) too. It's a fac-
tor that seems to be working now for Richard Nixon -- and one we
should exploit.
Think back to our typical Republican voter as he mental-
ly eliminates the other candidates one by one. He wants to be for
Nixon; all he needs is the kind of nudge he'd get from hearing that
a lot of people he respects are also for Nixon. He needs assurance
that his opinion will have acceptance, that he won't look like a
loner, or a nut. Or, if he is still plagued by the old Nixon nega-
tives, the fact that knowledgeable people all around him are swing-
ing to Nixon could prompt him to say to himself, "Maybe I better re-
examine my thinking. If all those people are for him, there's a
chance I could be wrong " etc. An endorsement is also an effec-
tive way of talking about the candidate in the third person; the
endorser can say things quite naturally about the candidate that the
candidate could not comfortably say about himself.
-15-
Of course, an endorsement could have a negative
effect on a voter who doesn't like the endorser; this possibil-
ity can be minimized by always presenting more than one endorser
(a series of six or seven or eight short endorsements in a TV
commercial, for instance). This has the extra advantage of empha-
sizing the unifying and acceptability aspects of Richard Nixon --
as well as creating a bandwagon impression.
-16-
Polls. These are really tabulated endorsements, and can have
the same kind of "prior approval" effect described above. They can,
moreover, be used to promote the idea that Richard Nixon can win
nationally. As we said earlier, the best way to bury a reputation for
losing is to start winning. Advertising favorable out-of-state poll
results in New Hampshire (where the wasted vote is a real concern) might
convince voters that when they vote for Richard Nixon they're backing
a man who can go all the way.
About RN on TV. There's a school of thought that says keep
him off the tube, it's not his medium, etc. In this writer's opinion,
that's giving up too easily. We know we're going to use television;
it's our most powerful medium. But to use it for a series of commer-
cials which do not show the candidate, as has been suggested, would in-
evitably arouse suspicion. What're we hiding? So let's decide now
that Mr. Nixon will appear in our paid television announcements and
start figuring out the best ways to present him. A few thoughts:
The more informally he is presented the better.
He looks good in motion.
He should be presented in some kind of "situation" rather
than cold in a studio. The situation should look unstaged, even if
it's not. A newsreel-type on location interview technique, for
example, could be effective. The more visually interesting and local
-17-
the location the better.
Avoid closeups. A medium waist shot is about as tight as
the C amera should get. He looks good when he faces the camera head-
on.
Still photographs can be effectively used on TV. Interest-
ing cropping, artful diting and juxtaposition of scenes, an arresting sound
track, can all combine to make an unusual presentation. Added advan-
tages: there's a wide range of material to choose from, and we'd be
free to select only the most flattering pictures.
For short programs (a series of nightly 5-minute shows dur-
ing the finaltwo weeks is being proposed for New Hampshire) a "town
meeting" format should be considered. Each one could ake place in a
different local meeting place -- school, store, fire house, home,
etc.) A group of thirty or forty people would be invited. The prog-
ram could open with an exterior establishing shot, show Mr. Nixon
entering, applause, then a few brief comments, a question and answer
period, and closing remarks. A voice over announcer could handle the
opening and sign off.
The matter of Mr. Nixon projecting more "warmth" and "human-
ness" has been discussed at great length. (This applies to all of his
public appearances as well as the advertising.) Presenting him
-18-
informally as suggested above will help. Another suggestion: give
him words to say that will show his emotional involvement in the is-
sues. He is inclined to be too objective, too much the lawyer building
a case, too cold and logical. Buchanan wrote about RFK talking about
the starving children in Recife. That's what we have to inject -- be-
cause all of our problems, from Viet Nam to the cities to race to infla-
tion are all people problems. A casualty is not a statistic, it's an
American boy dying. Inflation is not percentage points, it's the price
of bacon. Mr. Nixon recognizes this, of course, but he should make
more of a point of displaying his feelings, aswellas his knowledge.
It would also help if his choice of words and phrases was more colorful.
He should be more quotable, use interesting and unusual labels, dynamic
references -- occasionally new similes or metaphors.
Other visual techniques. We are wide open for ideas which are
in keeping with the guidelines and objectives previously discussed. A
new way of visually expressing inflation, for example. Or a dramatic
way of symbolizing the frustration of Viet Nam. These do not have to
be far out graphics, necessarily. The main thing is that they communi-
cate quickly, clearly, and memorably.
Radio. An underrated medium. Used massively and imaginatively,
radio can be a way of getting to a lot of people effectively at a
relatively low cost. Let's keep it in the mix for the time being.
Also, let's remember that Mr. Nixon's voice is quite good, with none
-19-
of the problems associated with presenting him visually.
Direct Mail. Traditionally accepted as an effective medium
but seldom used in a new or interesting way. Need some fresh thinking
here. The San Francisco simulated telegram (Frank Lee to HT) looks like
a good idea to consider. Should we consider distributing poll results
via a post card mailing? Or distributing reprints of favorable news-
paper columns? An appeal to women? Would a TV script for a 5-minute
Q. and A. show be an interesting mailing?
Outdoor. Another traditional medium for political adver-
tising that seldom reflects any fresh thinking. Let this be notice
to all concerned that a layout with only a big formal picture of the
candidate and "Richard M. Nixon for President" won't even get into the
meeting.
Newspaper. This will probably represent only a minor media
investment. If we use newspapers at all, let's use them boldly. Full
pages. Layouts that are a departure from the usual political adver-
tisements. In cities where we can count on good reproduction, we
should experiment with layouts that are almost totally pictorial.
In areas where reproduction is. poor, a non-pictorial approach is obviously
called for. Since newspaper closing dates are so close to date of issue,
and because newspapers will probably be used in the final weeks only,
wecanwait until we're well into the campaign before finalizing our
-20-
approach. Ideallywe would tie in with the TV approach.
Miscellaneous. To be determined: the procedure for develop-
ing promotional material other than paid advertising -- buttons, bumper
stickers, car tops, etc. The button developed in Wisconsin looks great.
Perhaps we should decide right now to use the same design everywhere.
(And the lower case treatment and modern type face could be used in all
advertisements)