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This file contains:
From Butterfield to Haldeman RE: a telephone conversation with Ross Perot. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 1 pg. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Memo], 7/28/1972
From Halletet to Haldeman RE: the use of RN's daughters in the campaign. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/24/1972
From Cole to Haldeman laying out political strategies for the campaign season. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/19/1972
From Hallett to Haldeman RE: RN's public image during the campaign. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/15/1972
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WHSF: Contested, 8-2
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This file contains:
From Butterfield to Haldeman RE: a telephone conversation with Ross Perot. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 1 pg. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Memo], 7/28/1972
From Halletet to Haldeman RE: the use of RN's daughters in the campaign. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/24/1972
From Cole to Haldeman laying out political strategies for the campaign season. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/19/1972
From Hallett to Haldeman RE: RN's public image during the campaign. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/15/1972
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Richard M. Nixon's Returned Materials Collection
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
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Document Description
8
2
7/28/1972
Domestic Policy
Memo
From Butterfield to Haldeman RE: a
telephone conversation with Ross Perot.
Handwritten notes added by unknown. 1 pg.
8
2
7/24/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Halletet to Haldeman RE: the use of
RN's daughters in the campaign. 2 pgs.
8
2
6/19/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Cole to Haldeman laying out political
strategies for the campaign season. 4 pgs.
8
2
6/15/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Hallett to Haldeman RE: RN's public
image during the campaign. 5 pgs.
Wednesday, August 25, 2010
Page 1 of 1
HFU
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
M.S
Kabbady Tell
1/28
WASHINGTON
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL/PERSONAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
MR. H. R. HALDEMAN
to
FROM:
ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD
SUBJECT:
Ross Perot
Bob:
In accordance with one of Larry's weekend requests, made on your
behalf, I called Ross Perot and asked if I could be of assistance in
whatever matter he wanted to talk to you about. After some light
chit-chat and a brief discussion of the health of each other's family
members, he said that he needed to get some things squared away
with you personally on the subject of his position or status vis-a-vis
"the Nixon team". He said that Maury Stans and others were on
his back constantly and that he felt it necessary to talk to you about
his relationship with us before he gave any answers or took any actions.
He went on to articulate his continued high regard for the President
and the job he is doing. But he admitted to a feeling of being "pretty
much out in left field".
In short, Ross wants to be wooed by a phone call (preferably from the
President, but at least from you) and various other gestures back into
the fold. His final comment was: "It's been so long since I've heard
from anyone there that I suppose if I were half-smart I'd understand
the message and know it was meant to be permanent."
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL/PERSONAL
7/31 Gak coverd for Stans
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 24, 1972
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
HR. R. HALDEMAN Dell
DOUG HALLETT
RE:
Larry Higby's Memo of July 19
This is in response to the second part of Larry Higby's memoran-
dum of July 19, asking for my thoughts on the best use of Mrs. Nix-
on, Tricia, and Julie, during the campaign.
I have become a great fan of Mrs. Nixon's -- I think she is a great
asset and can be a very substantial addition to the campaign. She
should appear with the President quite frequently. In addition, she
should have her own schedule of appearances at volunteer projects,
hospitals, schools, etc. -- these she does fabulously well. Like
the President, her appearances should be at least theoretically gov-
ernmental. Carefully-selected TV talk shows might be another pos-
sibility these, however, would have to be carefully selected
obviously Liz Drew's show would not be appropriate.
I would combine Tricia's appearances to the Deep South and joint
appearance with Mr. Cox in which he is a speaker or otherwise the
dominant performer. As part of this, she might do some Northern
talk shows in conjunction with Mr. Cox or even alone, But these
should be carefully selected. Merv Griffin's audience is appropriate
-- Dick Cavett's would not be. If anybody has to waste time appear-
ing before women's Republican lunches -- and I hope as little of this
as possible can be done -- Tricia is the one.
Julie is excellent before virtually all kind of audiences except the
most superheated and sophisticated liberal types. Ethnic picnics,
volunteer projects, children's hospitals, schools, etc. -- these
are the kinds of colorful, visual, and informal events at which I
think Julie does well. Since she speaks Spanish, she should be
-2-
programmed for a lot of Spanish-type appearances in New York,
New Jersey, Illinois, Texas, and especially California.
My memorandum of June 15 already suggested a Sunday evening
before-the-election family show and a Monday daytime Nixon
women show -- I reiterate these suggestions here.
CC: Charles W. Colson
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 19, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
KEN COLE
This is in response to your memorandum of June 12 which
requested my views and analysis of the following points:
1. The President's posture between the Conventions.
Most people are "down" on politicians and political
campaigning. The longer the President can stay
above the battle, the better off he will be. The
President should keep being "President" just as long
as he possibly can. Therefore, he should continue
as usual at least up to the Republican Convention.
During the Convention interlude, the President should
be engaged in things that reflect favorably on him -
follow-up to the trip to Russia, further efforts at
ending the Vietnam War, events to highlight the suc-
cess of his economic program and his concern for the
still unemployed. Additionally, he should make one
last effort at urging the Congress to pass remaining
legislation proposed by this Administration. This
could best be done by a series of meetings with Senate
and House Committee Chairmen and/or concerned Committee
members. In addition, the President could meet with
supportive special interest groups.
Meetings such as these would allow the President the
opportunity to demonstrate familiarity with his domestic
legislation and to articulate the principles which
support his proposals. Each meeting should be followed
with a press briefing by John Ehrlichman and, if
desirable, the appropriate Cabinet Officer. We could,
- 2 -
if planned sufficiently in advance, arrange for network
and local TV stories which demonstrate the problem the
President is trying to correct and how his solution
would work. For instance, on the environmental issue,
we could encourage the networks and local TV stations
to get film of water pollution which could be utilized
in their reports of the President's meeting with Congres-
sional representatives to encourage them to pass his water
pollution legislation.
Most importantly, in the Cabinet meeting last Friday
we heard the President was eloquent on foreign policy
and the balance of international power. He needs to
re-articulate publicly his domestic philosophy - what
he stands for - what he's for and against domestically.
It may be that his acceptance speech at the convention
would be the best place, but he needs to set his domestic
philosophy before the public, not on a programmatic basis,
but in the overall sense he needs to state his goal for
the nation domestically and how we are going to get there.
2. The President's posture from the Republican Convention to
the Election.
Here again, the longer he can stay "President" the better
off he will be. In this case, whether or not the Congress
is in session will have some bearing on what the President
is able to do. If the Congress is in session, the President
should continue the scenario outlined for the between Con-
ventions period. If it is not in session, then we must
find graphic ways for the President to demonstrate the
failure of Congress. For instance, he could make trips
to problem areas and then kick Congress for allowing a
problem to go on because of their failure to pass the
legislation the President recommended. These trips should
be "non-political".
In either event, the President should not start political
campaigning until, at the earliest, the first of October.
If Congress is still in session then, he should be out of
Washington only on weekends. This could perhaps be
stretched to include one trip during the week, although I
think it is important to convey the image of the President
being in Washington "running the country" while others are
out campaigning.
- 3 -
The President's efforts should be concentrated in key
states. He should not try to visit all 50 states, but
he might make some regional visits which would include
states otherwise missed, for instance the farm states.
He should do events which provide for some kind of
encounter with the "average man". Generally these
should be issue oriented situations. Additionally, he
should also do the standard rallies and motorcades, and
although many will argue that the McGinnis book discredited
the citizen TV Q&A, I think the same kind of thing which
was done in 1968 could be utilized again - assuming we
can figure out a way to avoid being accused of rigging
the panel.
3. Thoughts as to strategy for the campaign on issues, timing,
points of attack, etc.
The President should not attack anyone for anything
during the campaign. This should be left to the
surrogates. He should at all times be the statesman
who has brought peace to the world and economic stability
to our country. And, who has applied and intends to
continue to apply these same visionary attributes to
our domestic problems. The President should articulate
only positive things relative to key issue areas and key
interest groups.
The surrogates on the other hand should be on the attack
beginning with the close of the Democratic Convention.
What they should be attacking will, of course, be depen-
dent upon the candidate as each has staked out his own
positions. It seems to me though that no matter who the
candidate is there are two things which we can challenge
regardless. One is the failure of the Congress, and the
second is the inability of the Federal Government to
produce because of bureaucracy. I don't think we should
have any qualms about attacking the Federal establishment,
even if it means pointing the finger at ourselves, although
I do believe we can be divorced from most of the goings on.
4. The opposition's strategy and what we can do.
The Democrats will attack the President's credibility and
his lack of concern for the average man. They will have
absolutely no regard for the accuracy or validity of their
charges and they will use the War, the economy - high food
prices and high unemployment - and other people issues
- 4 -
such as hunger, housing, crime and taxes to demonstrate
their claims. While we will be tied to specifics, the
Democrats will be able to avoid them, and they will get
a lot of help from the media in conveying their message.
The President should stay above all of this. He should
be on the offensive with issues like peace, the economy
and the failure of Congress to legislate his domestic
reforms. As I said before, he should not attack the
Democrats for their faulty charges. Rather, this should
be left to the surrogates whose efforts should be geared,
in addition to positive statements, to disclosing the
fallacies of opposition proposals, pressuring the opposi-
tion for specifics and painting the opposition as extreme
and irresponsible. We, like the Democrats, should not be
too concerned about the substance of our charges - as long
as the President is not making them. Presidential spokes-
men will have far more flexibility for demagoguery than
will the President.
We should have our own plan as to how to win this election,
and the development of the plan should assume that the
worst charges possible are made against the President.
We should then operate against this plan, and never, once,
deviate from it. Just because the opposition makes some
false charges, the President should not be rushing out to
respond. Rather we should just let it go, or let a sur-
rogate handle it.
My rationale for all of this is that the majority of the
people of this country desire most a President who is
strong in his leadership, compassionate in his judgments
and courageous in the face of adversity. I think they
have that kind of President in President Nixon. And I
believe that this situation, thanks to the China visit,
Russia, the mining of Haiphong and the President's strong
action to bring the economy back in line is becoming
increasingly clear to the public in general. Everything
the President does between now and the election must be
geared to contribute to this image.
4
CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
EAES Unit
WASHINGTON
DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINIS MARKING
E.O. 12065, 6-102
June 15, 1972
By Emp
10-6-80
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
DOUGLASHALLET
SUBJECT:
Your Memo of June 12.
The following is in response to the four questions raised in your
June 12 memorandum:
1. The President should be visibly involved in domestic issues --
particularly the more gutsy domestic issues which give him a
change-oriented, anti-status quo image. The President's foreign
policy successes will be easy to bring to peoples' minds during
the campaign itself. His domestic policy biases will not -- and
some we will not want to bring to mind at that time 80 as not to
offend the more stable parts of our coalition. Between the conven-
tions, the President could address a Spanish group and even visit a
barrio, take his domestic policy staff and Cabinet team to a city like
Indianapolis for a two-day, in-depth exposure to its problems, visit
a rural, agricultural community for a day, appear at a local union
meeting and a factory, do a walking tour of a Catholic, ethnic urban
community like Bay Ridge, New York City, do a one-day health tour --
i. e. visit a hospital, an urban clinic, a medical school, make an
address on education before a prestige audience dealing with questions
like the chit system, non-public education, "free schools", busing, etc.
in a coherent, thoughtful way, tying them all together under the theme
of eliminating governmental intervention in education as much as
possible, do an address on incomes VS. services strategy before a
prestige audience of poverty types, announce something on tax reform,
sock it to some major corporations once or twice to erase ITT. The
President should also do something on the human and personal side
perhaps my old stand-by Colorado River run or a camping trip or
something, anything to keep him out of Key Biscayne and San Clemente
and demonstrate he can relate to something other than fat-cat vacation
spas.
CORPIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
EYES CNLY
2.
The President has had a rather vigorous schedule in recent months.
Keeping it going will make whatever campaign-related appearances he
he wants to make seem not so out-of-the-ordinary and non-Presiden-
tial. We can also do certain kinds of visual, theoretically govern-
mental, events now that we will not be able to do after September for
both lack of time and obvious politics. Between the conventions, then,
offers the best opportunity to assert the same sense of dynamism in
our domestic policy as we already have made clear on the foreign side.
The over-all theme which can be related to our foreign policy and the
Nixon Doctrine -- is that government has been too active, both at home
and abroad, and what we are doing recognizes the need to readjust the
balance, return power to the people, take it away from the pointy-headed,
sandwich-carrying bureaucrats, and reprivatize much of what government
has undertaken in the past decade. This period is also a perfect time to
look beyond the conventions and even the election by giving the President's
domestic policy a more radical, dynamic image -- in the first term it was
necessary to clean up the foreign and economic messes left by the previous
Administration; in the second Administration the people can expect a
more vigorous attention to domestic issues and one which is explicitly
anti-governmental.
2. With something along the lines of the above accomplished between the
convention, the question of when he should start campaigning will never
really have to be faced. Anything explicitly campaign-oriented can just
be woven in to what the President is already doing. Immediately after
the convention, the President might do a quickie foreign trip the 1970
one, I thought, was fairly effective. Thinking up some excuse for the
President to visit the Pope in Italy might be particularly good. When he
comes back, his campaign pa should not be much, if any, faster than
his between-convention pace. Two kinds of events should be undertaken.
The first would be a more limited version of what he should do between
conventions. While obviously devotion of a full day or two to something
like health or urban problems becomes impossible to arrange after the
September 1 date, what is realistic is a one-topic speech event or state-
ment tied to a visual event: i. e. addressing a conservation group and
visiting a pollution-control facility on the same day. I could foresee
perhaps 10 to 12 half-days spent like this on each of the major issues.
The second type of event would be the partisan rally. These should be
regionalized, perhaps 5 or 6 the entire campaign. They would be
scrupulously prepared so that the President would fly into a city and be
met with no less than 200, people anytime he did an explicitly partisan
event. The cities for these rallies should be picked now and planning
should be undertaken immediately. Other than these two kinds of events,
CONFIDENTIAL
wall
4
CONFIDENTIAL
EYES ONLY.
the President should be actively and visibly involved in the affairs of
government here in Washington, blasting the Congress for inaction on
his domestic program and tying up the final strings on his structure of
peace. On the media front, we should have factual, issue-oriented
(one issue per message) 30-second to 2-minute spots on 10 or 12 key
issues without any involvement personally of the President, a 30-minute
"Nixon in the White House" newsy-type documentary to play over and
over, a 30-minute Nixon biography for the same purpose, and two one-
hour conversations -- one of the President with common people (a veteran,
a union agent, a blue-collar housewife, a black, etc.) and one with a
group of foreign policy types. The Sunday evening before the election
the President might do a 30-minute conversation with a group of kids.
Monday afternoon Mrs. Nixon and the girls might do something on prices,
education, etc. in an informal setting with one of our women appointees
interviewing. The night before the election, the President and family
should be on for an hour -- informal issue-oriented but general conversa-
tion leading up to a very philosophical, very statesmanlike, but natural,
peroration by the President. Ethnic -- i.e. Nixon and Jews -- and
negative -- i.e. McGovern and aerospace employment -- spots should
be used by front groups in particular areas.
The oratorical tone of the President's remarks can become somewhat more
offensive after September 1. The real gut-fighting should be left to others,
but the idea that the Democratic Party, even with George McGovern, is
the party of big government, large taxes, discord, over-intervention at
home and abroad, etc. should be gotten across. The President's partisan
speeches can contrast what is the case now with what was the case in 1968.
Others should tie George McGovern to the Eastern Establishment, the
Council on Foreign Relations, the New York Times, etc. but the
President's partisan speeches -- as opposed to the 10 or 12 suggested
substantive speeches can make it absolutely crystal-clear that George
McGovern's idea of change is no different than Franklin Roosevelt's or
Harry Truman's or Lyndon Johnson's -- and that that conception of change
is now no-change at all. By doing this, the President can take from
McGovern the anti-establishment image, identify himself with the little
guy and McGovern with the furry people in the Eastern Corridor, and give
voice responsibly to people's real concerns. Foreign policy here
explicitly should support domestic policy -- Democratic bias towards
extending democracy at home and abroad has gotten this country into
grave difficulty and what President Nixon is doing is getting it out.
CORPIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
4
EYES ONLY
4.
3. and 4. The opposition will be vigorously moderating its position while main-
taining its rhetorical and image posture. Liberalscare about words more
than substance and McGovern believes he can carry them along while
expanding his base into the center -- but the psychological posture will
not change. Counter-acting it must be done carefully, in two directions
simultaneously. On the lower end of the spectrum is the radicalism issue
and McGovern's radical posture on a number of different issues amnesty,
defense cuts as they affect jobs, marijuana, etc. Our efforts here should
be restrained 60 that what McGovern says and not what we say is the
issue. They should also be very carefully particularized and very care-
fully documented. One-liners in the Vice-President's speeches about
abortion can only help Mc Govern by making us seem silly for relying
on a minor issue most people are far-advanced on. Mailings, non-
national speakers, carefully-distributed pamphlets by front groups, ads
in ethnic press, etc., on the other hand, can be extremely helpful. Ditto
with Jewish voters on Israel, defense-space workers in Florida, Texas
and California, veterans groups, anti-busing types, etc. The danger
here is thinking we aren't getting our position across because we don't
read it in the Washington Post. That, really, is what we want. We
want to reach with these issues the kind of people who don't read the
Washington Post and we should be actually happy if it doesn't appear there,
nor on the nightly news shows, etc. The most extreme kinds of charges --
i. e. he's a friend of Ellsberg or Abbie Hoffman, etc. should be even
more carefully regulated to assure maximal benefit where they help but
no disadvantage in the far more numerous areas where use of this
material will hurt. Cheap-shotting McGovern's $110, 000 home, etc.
should only be in context of a mere substantive attack on his essentially
Eastern Establishment liberalism.
On the higher end of the spectrum will be the foreign policy issues,
welfare, national security, etc. Our efforts here should be equally
careful. We must remember that the only way McGovern can win is
by holding frustrated middle-class ethnics and taking upper-middle
class suburbanites and combining them with the minorities to win bare
majorities in the big industrial states like California, Illinois and New
York. McGovern knows he cannot take the South. He knows, too, that
the kind of support he gets only comes after the most intense cultivation,
through media and house-calling, and the development of an emotional-
psychological identity among his voters with him. In my view, this
means McGovern will have a firmly left-wing Northern Democratic
Vice-President and he will spend an unprecedented amount of time
campaigning in the Northeast and Mid-west and Far-west. By doing 80, it
is possible that he could lose the popular vote and still win the electoral
vote count. And since it is possible and since it is the only possible
way he could win we should worry about countering McGovern's potential
CONFIDENTIAL
hirm
ONLY
CONFIDENTIAL
EYES ONLY
5.
appeal among these Northern, more sophisticated, more change-oriented
voters, and not worry so much about other types of voters who have no
choice but to vote for us and whose support can be reinforced by the
kinds of covert operation suggested above.
Our discussions of the major issues should be on a responsonsible,
positive plane. Our point is that McGovern's proposals are either
irresponsible and counter-productive his defense budget -- or that
they are just retreads of New Deal and Great Society programs. The
real change, the real responsible change and particularly libertarian
change, has already come from President Nixon. These points should
be made by the Vice President, our Cabinet officers, and most of our
surrogate speakers.
It would be particularly helpful if we could get liberal Republicans i.e.
Javits, Scranton, etc. -- out campaigning on these points. The tempta-
tion, I know, will be to wave the flag and reach for the punch-line, but
we must remember that the audience in front of a speaker is not nearly
so important as the columnists, news commentators, etc. through which
he is reflected to the public as a whole. In 1970, the President didn't
really go around throwing verbal bombs all the time, but because he did
a few times that was the impression which was created. We want the
tone of our national campaign as opposed to particular community
and sect efforts, to be positive and to keep it that way we have to be
especially cautious in view of the media's desire to see us become
negative. This is the best way, indeed the only way, to not let McGovern
have the Mr. Clean-honesty-anti-establishment, etc. type issues benefit
him among the only voters who can elect him President. We want to
embody change and we cannot do that if we are demogoguing -- the media,
McGovern's personal impression, his ability to weave out of his positions
unless they are explicitly documented, the counter-productiveness of
demogoguery among the national constituency, the resulting sacrifice
of our Presidential image and the advantages of incumbency make it
unhelpful anyway. And if we can take the change, Mr. Clean, anti-establish-
ment range of issues away from McGovern, we have taken away the only
basis on which he can possibly win.
EYES