Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
118565152
label
[Polling Information - 1982] (1)
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
118565152
contentType
document
title
[Polling Information - 1982] (1)
citationUrl
identifierLocal
137
collections
Records of the White House Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff (Reagan Administration)
Michael Deaver's Political Files
thumbnailUrl
largeImageUrl
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
118565152
coverageEndDate
logicalDate
1985-12-31
year
1985
coverageStartDate
logicalDate
1981-01-01
year
1981
levelOfDescription
fileUnit
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
mediaId
45d91221c4508e96
ocrText
Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Deaver, Michael: Files
Folder Title: [Polling Information-1982] (1 of 6)
Box: 65
To see more digitized collections
visit: https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection
Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected]
Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing
National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/
THE WHITE HOUSE
waShIngton
7/22/83
to Biff:
Additional information to
be included in the boxes (5)
from MKDeaver's office
that we sent over to you
on Wed., July 20th.
Thanks.
Donna Blume
P20x3
Decision/Making/Information&
Intelligent alternatives
for today's decision makers
6858 Old Dominion Drive, Suite 105, McLean, Virginia 22101, (703) 556-0001
March 29, 1982
Mr. James A. Baker III
White House Chief of Staff
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Jim:
Attached is the final draft of A Political Action
Plan: 1982. Your suggestions as well as Mike's and Ed's have been
included.
Two additional short pieces will follow -- a six to
ten page summary and a contingency plan which will be furnished
separately for distribution to the three of you only.
I drew upon the suggestions of a number of
individuals, but those of Richard Beal and Edie Mahe were
particularly helpful.
The next steps as I see them would be to rank order
the strategic objectives/action plans and start implementing them.
I would be happy to assist in this regard if you believe I might be
of help.
Sincerely,
6
Richard B. Wirthlin
President
ch
CC: Edwin Meese, III
Michael Deaver
A POLITICAL ACTION PLAN
MARCH 17, 1982
Political Action Plan 1982
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
I. Why a Political Action Plan?
1
II. What's at Stake for the Presidency and Others in 1982?
3
III. Where We Stand Today
11
IV. What Can We Expect May Through October 1982?
32
V. The Likely Democratic Attack Themes
35
VI. What Should We Do?
55
Political Action Plan 1982
1
SECTION I
WHY A POLITICAL ACTION PLAN?
Against most measures the resources of the U.S. Presidency are
enormous. But against most others -- the President's personal time
and the number of pieces of legislation he can propose -- the
Presidency functions in a most finite world.
Given these and other constraints, we offer as the major objective
of this Political Action Plan: 1982 some suggested steps that might
be taken between now and November to maximize the President's leverage
and expand both his political and policy options in 1983 and beyond.
Four questions establish a frame of reference for the proposed
action steps. These are:
What is at stake?
What is our present status?
What range of circumstances can we expect between May and
October of 1982?
What attack themes will the Democrats likely mount?
After responding to these questions, the analysis then turns to
the most basic query of all
What should we do?
Political Action Plan 1982: Why a Plan?
2
This one fundamental assumption strongly influences almost
everything that follows: Ultimately the power of the President rests
with the support of the people. That support can move Congresses that
obstruct. Contrarily, if popular support wanes then the President's
policy options will most surely narrow.
As we pointed out in the Initial Actions Project of January 29,
1981, while Americans demand a great deal from a President, they are
willing to entrust him with considerable authority to lead. This
stewardship grant can be kept strongly in place only if the following
occur over the next few months: the inflation rate continues to
moderate, fear of the spectre of unemployment softens, interest rates
fall and we send a strong and specific signal that we are taking steps
that will lead -- in the intermediate future -- to balanced federal
budgets.
Political Action Plan 1982
3
SECTION II
WHAT'S AT STAKE FOR THE PRESIDENCY AND OTHERS IN 1982?
A second year typically is not a boom year for U.S. Presidents.
Historically:
the President's party loses seats in the House of
Representatives,
the adoption and implementation of his programs lose momentum,
and
his leadership becomes factionalized.
Much more than this is at stake for the Reagan presidency as it
enters its second year -- 1982.
In brief, what happens this year will strongly condition, if not
determine, whether we lose or seize firmly the opportunity to
restructure and redirect the public policy agenda in this country for
the next two decades.
The results of the 1982 election are, in short, crucial to
sustaining the Reagan revolution beyond his first two years in office.
The partisan debate will never again be fought along the same old
lines that have conditioned presidential elections in this country for
the past thirty-five years. That will be the case almost regardless
of whether this president succeeds or fails. That debate will not
take, as an automatic "given," the position that government spending
can solve most of our social problems. The federal government will
Political Action Plan 1982: What's at Stake?
4
likely be viewed by Republicans and Democrats alike as functioning in
a world of limits just as the rest of us do. If the economy rebounds
strongly in 1982-83, the tone of the partisan debate will be more
"free-market" oriented than in the past.
On the other hand, if the economy should remain lethargic or slide
further into the bowels of a recession/depression, other more
draconian and radical measures await us in the wings. Some liberal
writers already brood expectantly about the need to control completely
corporate investment (in a fashion that would be radical in appearance
for Americans, if not Europeans) should our policies fall short.
However, if Ronald Reagan succeeds, he can solidify the political
consolidation that surfaced in 1980 and strengthen considerably the
newly emerging demographic constituency for the Republican party.
Whether we succeed or fail still hinges on the economy. And,
perhaps even more narrowly, our political success depends on what
happens to the federal budget deficit, interest rates, and
unemployment.
Success will be partially contingent upon our ability to persuade
the Congress to pass an acceptable budget and enact legislation. But
even more important our success hinges on the question "Will the hope
Americans now hold for economic recovery be confirmed in 1982?" In
sum, many Americans who are now suffering economically must have their
own personal lives touched for the better economically some time
during the next six months if we are to realize political victories in
the fall.
Franklin D. Roosevelt stitched together his new coalition almost
entirely with the thread of hope for the future. He kept it together
Political Action Plan 1982: What's at Stake?
5
for almost a decade without much economic improvement; unemployment
really was not brought under control until World War II.
But what Roosevelt accomplished over two terms -- building on
Americans' patience that garnered and extended political support -- we
probably cannot sustain more than two years.
Our shorter string reflects neither on the personality nor the
leadership of Roosevelt's versus Reagan's, but rather on a different
press, a different technology, and different party and institutional
allies.
A president today faces not only an aggressive and frequently
unfriendly press who scrutinize every action, but the electronic press
plays to the "important" news breaks which need to tell a story in a
two-minute bite and generally focuses on failures rather than
successes -- on hope lost rather than hope gained. This dries up the
reservoir of patience that might otherwise have endured.
The medium of television as a communication vehicle is more
powerful, more intimate, and more uncontrolled than Roosevelt's prime
medium -- the radio. While the President knows and uses television
extremely well, we have not maximized the potential of television and
other media as effectively as Roosevelt used radio. We have lost a
year relying almost solely on set "major event speeches" and "press
conferences" to communicate with the American people. We must paint
with a much broader communications brush in 1982.
The supporting political institutions -- the party and its allies
-- were much more firmly ensconced behind Roosevelt in his first year
than they have been for us. It was the "first time" voters who came
into, and stayed with, the New Deal fold. Our landslide generated
from switchers who were earlier more aligned with the Democrats and
much less prone to stay in the Republican fold. The promise of
Political Action Plan 1982: What's at Stake?
6
realignment came with the 1980 victory -- but it is still to be
realized among voters who were not politicized solely by the forces of
the 1980 election.
During the first six months of 1981, allegiance to the Republican
party increased sharply, by June virtually closing the gap between
Democratics and Republicans. However, the visage of Jimmy Carter's
failed presidency has faded, and this, plus the rise in unemployment
and the fairness issue, have widened the partisan gap once again. But
it should be kept clearly in mind that the gap between Republicans and
Democrats is still only half as large as it was in June of 1980 when
the major elements of the presidential election took shape. Many
Democrats and Independents cast ballots for a Republican president for
the first time. Large blocs of those same groups must cast a second
Republican ballot for a senator or a congressman in 1982 before those
voters will be imprinted as Republicans in the same fashion as
Roosevelt's Democrats were in the first year of his administration.
Furthermore, the time remaining to impact the process itself over
the next three years now runs extremely short. Remember, when the
1983 budget year expires -- the budget we just presented to the
Congress and the first we have shaped from beginning to end -- the
1984 presidential vote will be but three months away.
Given the consequences of what happens in fact and in perception
over the next eight months, we can conclude not only that this
Presidency is at stake, but also that both his program of a new
beginning and the viability of his party are on the line.
We outline below, more specifically, four possible election
outcomes in 1982 and the resulting consequences for the President, his
program, and the Republican party.
Political Action Plan 1982: What's at Stake?
7
Democratic Landslide
A Democratic landslide would occur if we lost three to five seats
in the Senate, 30 to 50 in the House, eight to ten governors, and 12
to 15 state legislature majorities. (All gains or losses are
expressed in "net" terms.) The consequence: a repudiation of the
President and his agenda.
The President. Due to the repudiation, the President would become
a lame duck. The Reagan revolution would be terminated. The stature
of the presidency itself would be diminished. The media would conduct
sustained and debilitating attacks. The public's confidence would
fall. Political and policy options would be lost. A leadership
crisis would probably occur.
The Program. The programs and policies of the President would be
paralyzed. Confusion and division would exist over carrying out
elements of the program that had already been passed. There would be
a resurgence of government by bureaucrats, and a reassertion of the
need to reduce the "private" sector and expand the "public" sector by
extracting investment funds from the private sector through much
heavier taxes on the income and property of affluent Americans.
The Party. Serious conflicts would erupt between moderates and
conservatives. The emerging demographic constituency would be lost.
A convention fight would be assured. Congressional leaders would
begin scrambling for power. Republicans would be locked into minority
status for the decade. The results could cause the future leadership
generation to shy away from the party.
Political Action Plan 1982: What's at Stake?
8
Democratic Advantage
A Democratic advantage would occur with a crippling Democratic
victory marked by one gain to two Republican losses in the Senate, 15
to 30 losses in the House, six or seven gubernatorial losses, and
eight to eleven state house losses.
The President. The President would be forced into an extensive
use of the veto and into frequent compromises. Media attacks would
occur regularly, public confidence would be shaken, the President's
maneuverability would be limited, and he would have to operate in a
reactive mode.
The Program. A "maintenance" mentality would emerge regarding the
President's program. New initiatives would be retarded and the
bureaucracy would bide its time, selectively snarling programs with
red tape. There would be much internal division and confusion over
the programs and policies.
The Party. Ideological splits would resurface. Elected
Republicans would separate themselves from the White House. The
constituency would be seriously shaken. Jockeying for position at the
next national convention would begin.
A Standoff
A standoff would occur if the Republicans won two or three seats
in the Senate, held losses in the House to 5 to 15, suffered only
three to five gubernatorial losses, and lost three to seven state
houses.
The President. The President could claim a victory, using history
as the standard. He could continue to advance his agenda, but he
Political Action Plan 1982: What's at Stake?
9
would be required to go to the mat on many issues. He would operate
in an uncertain, but not necessarily dangerous, political atmosphere.
The Program. While the public would still require some evidence
that the programs will work, initiative would be possible. A sense of
direction would be maintained and the bureaucrats kept at bay.
Congressional Republicans would generally become more supportive of
the programs.
The Party. A sense of accomplishment would permeate. The
demographic constituency would be solidified, but not expanded, unless
in 1983 we experienced a booming economy. New Republican leaders at
the state and local levels would emerge.
Republican Advantage
Should the GOP win four to six Senate seats, achieve House results
somewhere between five wins and five losses, win two or not lose more
than two gubernatorial races, and do the same with state houses (net
two wins to two losses), this would signal a significant victory and
the Republicans would garner the advantage.
The President. The President would achieve great credibility and
be able to take the initiative to advance his agenda more quickly than
before. The agenda could be expanded into new areas.
The Program. Initiative and innovation would be highly possible.
There would be a sense of direction and togetherness among policy
advisors and the bureaucracy would be brought under control.
The Party. The problems of victory would emerge. There would be
some sense of independence from the White House on specific issues.
The 1984 election would be the focus of power struggles. New
Political Action Plan 1982: What's at Stake?
10
personnel would come into the party organizations. The demographic
constituency would have been solidified and expanded.
The more likely scenarios at this juncture appear to be
"Democratic Advantage" and "Standoff." It should be noted that from
an historical perspective, even the "Standoff" scenario runs
substantially better than the historical odds. Since the early
twenties, there have been two elections -- 1952 and 1968 -- that
folowed a Republican takeover of the White House. A perusal of those
elections shows that on the average we have neither gained nor lost
any Senate seats, but we did lose fifteen House seats and nine
governors. Granted two cases mark pretty thin ground for historical
precedent -- it should not be ignored.
Of course, it is very possible that the November election results
will not fall neatly into any single outcome example. The resulting
electoral consequences will likely shade between those described. But
there is one conclusion we can draw with certainty: at stake in the
1982 elections is the direction in which the country will move
politically in the decades of the eighties and nineties.
Political Action Plan 1982
11
SECTION III
WHERE WE STAND TODAY
The Issues
To target politically its resources -- time, personnel and
political effort -- the Administration must address satisfactorily the
issues that the public itself considers to be pressing as well as
other issues that strengthen our Republican core and swing political
coalitions. Since certain specific public attitudes do shift in
response to current events, these target issues cannot be set in
cement. However, the public in general has been very consistent over
the last year and a half in its rank ordering of what it deems the
salient issues of the day.
Although there have been some shifts in recent weeks -- most
notably, unemployment has risen dramatically as a public concern --
the salient issues chosen by the public and their relative order has
been quite stable. Each of these items and our current status with
them will be discussed below in more detail.
Economic issues dominate the list. Unemployment ranks first,
eclipsing inflation over the past month as the problem of greatest
concern. Other economic issues such as a balanced federal budget,
concurrent concern over the size of the federal debt, taxation and
interest rates round out the list.
A variety of social issues comprise the second largest category of
concern. The issues here range from education to Social Security to
race relations, but crime dominates. Worries related to international
relations, war, and peace are the third most frequently mentioned
cluster, followed by a general category that includes leadership and
the state of American morality.
Political Action Plan 1982: Where We Stand Today
12
Number One National Problem
February 25 to March 6, 1982
Percent
Economic Issues
66
Unemployment
23
Inflation
17
Economy/General
12
Government spending/
Balanced budget
7
High interest rates
6
Taxation
1
Social/Domestic Issues
11
Crime
3
Social Security
3
Poverty
1
Racial problems
1
Drugs
1
Education
2
International Issues
9
War and peace
5
Foreign policy
2
Defense
1
SALT II
1
Morality and Leadership
7
Declining moral values
5
Government leadership
1
Government control
1
Other Issues and Problems
7
Energy
2
Farm
1
Reagan
2
No opinion
2
TOTAL
100
Source: February Tracking (#5541)
February 25 to March 6, 1982, N=1500.
Political Action Plan 1982: Where We Stand Today
13
The Economy
Americans expect the next twelve months to be difficult ones for
the economy, but many anticipate things will be better next year than
they are now or have been in the past. Eight out of every ten
Americans expect 1982 to be a year of economic difficulty rather than
prosperity. Similarly, 58% of the people say the national economy has
gotten worse over the past year, while 28% say it has stayed the same.
Only 13% of the public thinks the economy has gotten better.
Despite the awareness that certain aspects of the economy have not
recovered during the past year, Americans, while becoming a bit
apprehensive, are not giving up hope on the economy in general or on
the Reagan economic program in particular. However, if the economic
news worsens that hope could disappear rapidly.
Looking ahead to next year, half of the people predict that the
national economy will get better, while almost one-fourth expect it
will get worse. The remaining quarter anticipate that things will
stay the same as they are now. Even a third of those who feel that
the economy has worsened during the first year of the Reagan
Administration say that things will get better during the next twelve
months. Note in particular that, among those who say the economy held
steady during 1981, nearly two-thirds expect things to get better in
1982.
Reagan's Economic Program
It is encouraging that the public presently does not blame
Reagan's economic program for the current status of the nation's
economy. Over eight out of every ten Americans agree with the
statement "Our current economic problems are not the product of
Reagan's economic plan that is only just now getting underway; they
Political Action Plan 1982: Where We Stand Today
14
are the inheritance of decades of tax and tax, and spend and spend."
Nevertheless, Americans expect the administration to put together a
program that will rejuvenate the economy.
Furthermore, half of all Americans feel that Reagan's economic
package will help rather than hurt the economy. Concurrently, the
public margin of patience accorded the economic program continues to
be wide: two-thirds of the public still say it will be a year or more
before the nation sees either the helpful or harmful effects of the
President's economic program. Although Congress may be shortening its
time allotted for judging the economic program, their constituents are
not.
Even so, support for Reaganomics over the past few months has
slipped, and it would only be prudent to assume that the margin of
patience will close rather quickly if high unemployment and interest
rates persist into the summer.
Even now, not all aspects of the economic package are approved;
time can run out on our economic program. Although a modest majority
of people feel the program is fair and will reduce inflation,
attitudes split on the questions of its effect on unemployment and its
helpfulness specifically to "people like you." Note: nearly six out
of every ten Americans now say the economic program best meets the
needs of upper-income people, rather than the middle class (10%), all
people equally (22%), or the poor (2%).
Inflation
Despite the gains that have been made in reducing inflation, the
public remains largely unaware of these results.
Half of all Americans think that inflation has gotten worse over
the last year, while 28% think it has stayed the same. Only 24% say
Political Action Plan 1982: Where We Stand Today
15
it has gotten better when compared to a year ago. This issue
continues to be the first-mentioned response to the number one
national problem question, even though the rate of inflation has
slowed very considerably over the last year.
In addition, there is guarded optimism about the future course of
inflation. Over one-quarter of the public think inflation will get
worse, one-third think it will stay the same, and the remaining 35%
think it will get better.
The Reagan Administration's policies to reduce inflation continue
to receive strong public approval. Nearly two-thirds of the public
agree with the idea that "only by reducing both the federal budget and
tax rates will we be able to reduce inflation and increase
productivity." They, however, express great worry about federal
deficits. (See the section on the budget and deficits that follows.)
Unemployment
Unemployment has, for a long time, been cited as the number one
problem on a statewide level. Over the last five or six months, it
has increased in importance every month. The rise in national concern
can be attributed in part to a wide-spread awareness of the issue.
Over eight out of every ten Americans say that unemployment has gotten
worse during the last year, with only 3% saying the employment
situation has improved. The remainder say it has stayed the same.
Looking to the future, four out of every ten people do expect
employment to improve during the next year; a third expect it to get
worse.
Increasing concern over this issue has triggered more willingness
to devote federal monies to alleviate the effects of unemployment.
Currently, 41% of the public think the federal government should spend
Political Action Plan 1982: Where We Stand Today
16
more on unemployment compensation, with 26% of those people are
willing to have their own taxes increased to fund this activity. A
year ago, only 28% wanted to spend more than currently dedicated to
this program.
Federal Budget and Deficits
While public discussion and concern over the size of the federal
debt, government spending, and attempts to balance the budget have
been considerable, the public remains largely unaware of the size of
the debt. Half of all Americans cannot provide an answer when asked,
"From what you've heard and read, how large is the present federal
debt?" Of those who do answer, three out of ten say the debt is under
$500 billion; one out of five say it is $800 billion or larger.
Despite this, in the eyes of most Americans, balancing the budget
should be a premier goal of government. Nine out of every ten
Americans consider it extremely or at least somewhat important that
Congress and the President adjust spending and taxes so the federal
budget will be balanced by 1985.
This attitude reflects in a number of ways, including projected
ballot box decisions. Over half of all Americans say they would be
likely to vote against a candidate running for Congress who supported
"almost all the issues that (they) did, except he did not think it was
important to try to limit the federal debt." This attitude must be
considered a landmine for this administration.
In order to achieve a balanced budget, Americans would support
cuts in government spending -- first and foremost in defense, second
by eliminating waste and fraud in government, and a few would support
a raise in personal taxes. There is strong support for increasing
corporate taxes.
Political Action Plan 1982: Where We Stand Today
17
Lastly, one of the most popular proposals of the State of the
Union address was the plan to reduce the number of federal employees
and cut waste and fraud in government rather than increase taxes in
order to balance the budget. Nearly eight out of every ten people
approve this plan. The most favored proposal from the address also
dealt with taxes -- 80% favor strengthening a law which requires all
large corporations to pay a minimum tax.
Interest Rates
Another element of the economic issues mentioned by the public --
interest rates -- receives 6% of the mentions as the number one
problem in the country. Last fall, 1,500 people were asked who or
what they thought was primarily responsible for high interest rates.
Only 6% blamed the President specifically, 2% blamed Congress and
another 25% blamed other agencies or actions of the government.
Financial institutions received 19% of the credited fault, the Federal
Reserve system got 9% and the economy in general was tagged by 20%.
The relatively small saliency of the issue greatly understates its
political importance. High rates of interest cut directly and deeply
into our core support groups; interest rates have become a "surrogate
measure" of inflation and, according to some of our best economists,
have the potential of stifling and postponing the recovery. Among the
20 or 30 reasons a cross section of Americans give when asked, "What
causes inflation and unemployment?", high interest rates rank near the
top of the list.
While the President is not blamed now for high interest rates,
Americans may well expect him to do something about them soon.
Political Action Plan 1982: Where We Stand Today
18
International Relations
The emergence of "world peace" and defense-related issues on the
number one problem list is very sensitive to current news events.
Consequently, following declaration of martial law in Poland, or the
downing of jets over Libya, the number of Americans worried about
peace rises significantly. But even at these crisis points, the
economic concerns predominate.
Although most Americans agree with the need for a strong national
defense, many question whether the defense budget should be treated as
inviolate. Despite the fact that nearly three-quarters of all
Americans agree that the "only way to insure peace is with a strong
national defense," cutting defense spending is the most favored option
when it comes to looking for ways to balance the federal budget.
Should the economy get rougher, fewer people would likely be
willing to support a burgeoning military budget at the expense of
other -- primarily domestic -- programs or the overall goal of a
balanced federal budget. For instance, a year ago 76% of Americans
said the government should spend more on defense than it did then.
Now, that figure has dropped to 50%, with only 37% saying they would
be willing to have their taxes increased as a consequence of greater
military expenditures. By comparison, 30% presently want to spend
less, while only 13% felt this way a year ago.
On the specific issue of the crisis in Poland, people tend to
support the President and the actions he has taken so far. When asked
about the economic and diplomatic sanctions imposed against the Soviet
Union as a response to their activities in Poland, 43% of all
Americans felt the President's actions were "about right" while 14%
said they were too strong and 33% said they were not strong enough.
Political Action Plan 1982: Where We Stand Today
19
Regarding E1 Salvador, the biggest fear expressed by the American
people is that involvement with that Central American country would
lead to another Viet Nam. Over two-thirds of the public feel that
giving aid in particular would precipitate involvement similar to that
experienced by the U.S. in Southeast Asia. This attitude surfaces
despite the fact that more people recognize the presence of the
Communists to be at fault in E1 Salvador than attribute the current
problems to the rightists in the country.
The issue in the general arena of foreign relations that could
swamp us, if we do not handle it with great care, is the proposed
freeze on the production and deployment of nuclear weapons. Even when
apprised of the difficulties of verification of this plan, 75% of all
Americans favor the freeze.
Domestic Issues
A variety of other domestic issues have also been assessed during
the past year. While support or opposition to these issues often
varies from subgroup to subgroup -- much more so than on international
or economic issues -- certain patterns have developed. Items tested
this year and the aggregate attitudes indicate:
A majority of Americans support extension of the Voting Rights
Act, despite the fact that a significantly large percentage of
the population (37%) does not understand the issue well enough
to be able to express an opinion.
Seven out of every ten Americans approve of the concept of
returning voluntary prayer to the schools.
Political Action Plan 1982: Where We Stand Today
20
By a 54% majority, Americans approve of giving tuition tax
credits to parents paying tuition to private elementary and
secondary schools. By an even larger majority (71%), people
approve of giving similar tax breaks to parents who are
supporting children in college.
Regarding other educational issues, two-thirds of the people
would like to see federal spending on education increased, and
they also oppose abolition of the federal Department of
Education. School lunches, on the other hand, receive less
total support: 50% would like to see spending increased, while
29% want to spend less and 18% want to spend the same as now.
Part of the blame for the present crime rate is placed on the
American judicial system. Over 80% of the people agree with
the statement that our legal system "overly protects the rights
of criminals while it leaves society and the innocent victims
of crime without justice." In addition, an overwhelming 75% of
all Americans want to see federal spending on crime prevention
increased, and 58% are willing to have their taxes increased to
support these programs.
Support for entitlement programs varies greatly from program to
program, particularly when the question is phrased in economic
terms. For instance, 54% of Americans would like to see
funding for Medicaid increased. AFDC and food stamps, on the
other hand, are not as widely supported. In fact, 60% would
like to see food stamp funding reduced. For AFDC,
approximately one-third would like to cut funding, 36% increase
it, and 21% maintain the current funding levels.
Energy concerns do not generate the same interest they
commanded during the 1970's. However, there is no consensus to
abandon working on these problems; only a third of all
Political Action Plan 1982: Where We Stand Today
21
Americans approve of a proposal to dismantle the federal
Department of Energy. Also, nearly six out of ten people would
like to see spending on energy conservation programs increased
while only 23% want to see these expenditures decreased.
New Federalism
The public generally approves of the Reagan policy of "New
Federalism," inaugurated publicly during the 1982 State of the Union
address. Six out of every ten Americans approve of shifting the
authority for over 40 federal programs to state and local governments
with the revenue sources to fund them. The only qualification to the
statement was that this process would be phased in over ten years.
Nearly the same proportion approve of the Medicaid/AFDC swap; 57%
responded favorably to the statement of "having the federal government
take over the Medicaid program while states, in return, will take
control of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children and food stamps
programs."
The specific item from our New Federalism program that we did not
implement that receives the highest approval, however, is the plan to
establish a "trust fund" of money collected from certain federal
excise taxes that states can use to fund programs formerly adminstered
by the federal government. Two-thirds of the public approve of this
provision.
Although the public supports certain aspects of the plan, the term
itself remains largely unfamiliar to most of the voting age
population. Consequently, the President will be required to educate
the public on the principles and reasoning which underlie his
federalism proposal, if it is to succeed.
Political Action Plan 1982: Where We Stand Today
22
Support for the President
As an analytic measure the presidential job rating generates
almost as much heat as light. It points to only the most vague
outlines of presidential support and falls far short in assessing the
true breadth and width of how Americans feel about the President.
Nevertheless, the job rating is particularly useful when
identifying relative coalitional strength and changes in coalitional
support. Because a major portion of this section focuses on such
change we will use the job rating as well as thermometer scaling as
our two broad measures to assess in general terms where the President
stands with the people.
President Reagan's job rating has suffered some erosion recently
because of the wrangling over the 1983 budget and the rather intense
and unfavorable press that the budget message generated.
Between September of 1981 and February of 1982 the President's
approval rating fell 10% and the disapproval rating increased 11%.
Change in Presidential Job Rating
September 1981 to February 1982
September
February
Change In
1981
1982
Job Rating
Approve
61%
51%
-10%
Disapprove
32
43
+11
The chart that follows shows the President's job rating since he
took office. As that chart reflects, there have been some substantial
changes in the level of presidential support just in the last 30 days.
PRESIDENT REAGAN'S JOB RATING
April 1981 - February 1982
Percent
100
APPROVE
90
DISAPPROVE
80
70
NO OPINION
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
23
4/12
5/17
6/14
7/18
8/16
9/15
10/14
11/18
12/17
1/19
2/14
End Field Date
1/31
Political Action Plan 1982: Where We Stand Today
24
Not only has there been fluctuation in total support of the
President through time, there are also marked differences in support
between various constituents in America. Using thermometer scaling
(100 indicates very positive feelings towards the President and zero
indicates very negative feelings), the President averaged a rather
strong 67 for the entire year 1981.
The most positive Reagan support group, not unsurprisingly, were
those who were "Very Conservative Republicans" (thermometer rating
85). At the bottom of 73 coalitional groups were the Blacks (41).
Using this technique our support groups can be identified as:
very conservative GOP (85),
somewhat conservative GOP (83),
liberal GOP (82),
those who feel the country is going in the right direction
(80),
moderate GOP (80),
those who switched party allegiance last year (77),
Minnesota, South Dakota, North Dakota, Nebraska (74),
Florida and Texas (73),
farmers (73),
German (73),
Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire, Connecticut (72),
Montana, Idaho, Utah, Arizona (72),
English (72),
Irish (71),
French (70),
Italian (69),
Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma (69),
Indiana, Wisconsin (69), and
Iowa, Missouri, Kansas (69).
Political Action Plan 1982: Where We Stand Today
25
The groups which were least supportive of Ronald Reagan last year
were:
Blacks (41),
those who felt the country had seriously gotten off on the
wrong track (56),
Jewish (59), and
Hispanics (64).
While the above may give some indication as to where the President
might be most favorably received as he travels in 1982, the more
cogent reason to study the strengths of relative constituencies lies
in coalition building. If the President can move some of our swing
constituencies toward the Republican banner by two or three percentage
points between now and the fall, this will greatly enhance the win
probabilities of many marginal Republicans seeking election or
reelection. But we must, as a first priority, give thought and effort
to reinforce and strengthen our base coalition.
Coalitional Change
In the Initial Actions Project of January 1981 we identified, on
the basis of the election outcome, five major groups that appeared
then to offer us the best targets to build and strengthen our
coalition by attracting and holding key swing voters. These groups
are union members, blue-collar workers, Hispanics, the middle-aged,
and voters in the South. Over the last year we have not fared very
well with four of these five groups.
Between March of 1981 and January of 1982 we lost 30 points on the
presidential thermometer rating with Hispanics, 15 points with union
members, 13 points among blue-collar members, and 10 points with
adults in the South.
Political Action Plan 1982: Where We Stand Today
26
But over the last year our strength also ebbed substantially with
one critical group in our 1980 base -- older citizens. The Reagan
thermometer rating fell 13 points with senior citizens.
Because we did not ask the thermometers in our most recent
brushfire survey, we will judge current changes in our base and swing
coalitions on the basis of job rating. As the table below reflects,
we have lost considerable support since September with important
elements of our base coalitions. The loss was greatest in the West
and among Republican identifiers, less among conservatives.
Changes in Base Support
September 1981 to February 1982
September
February
1981
1982
Change
West
Approve
65%
54%
-11%
Disapprove
27
39
+12
Republicans (Including Independent Leaners)
Approve
88
77
-11
Disapprove
8
18
+10
Conservatives
Approve
70
62
- 8
Disapprove
24
32
+ 8