Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
118565378
label
Iran/Arms Transaction: Constantine Menges
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
118565378
contentType
document
title
Iran/Arms Transaction: Constantine Menges
citationUrl
identifierLocal
123
collections
Records of the Office of Counsel to the President (Reagan Administration)
Arthur Culvahouse's Office Files
largeImageUrl
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
118565378
coverageEndDate
logicalDate
1988-12-31
year
1988
coverageStartDate
logicalDate
1987-01-01
year
1987
levelOfDescription
fileUnit
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
mediaId
0adc1587b3e15258
ocrText
Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Culvahouse, Arthur B.: Files
Folder Title: Iran/Arms Transaction: Constantine
Menges
Box: CFOA 1129
To see more digitized collections visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection
Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected]
Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing
National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name CULVAHOUSE, ARTHUR .:FILES
Withdrawer
DLB
2/18/2014
File Folder
IRAN/ARMS TRANSACTION: CONSTANTINE MENGES
FOIA
S643
Box Number
CFOA 1129
SYSTEMATIC
22
ID
Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
164213
PAPER
ADDENDUM TO MEMO RE: MENGES
1
ND
B1
164214
PAPER
DUPLICATE OF #164213
1
ND
B1
The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing
Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
1/2/18/14
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
(Dictated on 4/22/87)
Unclassified with
TOP SECRET Attachment
May 5, 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE
FROM:
PETER D. KEISLER
fok
SUBJECT:
Interview with Constantine Menges
On April 21, 1987, Constantine Menges was interviewed by Ken Buck
(House Select Committee), Bud Hall (House Select Committee), Mark
Belnick (Senate Select Committee), and Victoria Nourse (Senate
Select Committee). The interview began at 3:20 p.m. and ended at
approximately 4:30 p.m.
Menges said that he worked at the NSC from October 1983 through
July of 1986. He said that from October 1983 to July of 1985, he
served as a Special Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs and as Senior Director for Latin American
Affairs. Menges said that from July 1985 through July 1986, he
served as Director for International Communications and Informa-
tion, with responsibility for public diplomacy. Menges said that
during that time he remained a Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs.
Menges was asked why his responsibilities were changed. Menges
said that McFarlane had told him that he had done an outstanding
job on Latin American affairs, that the situation in Latin
America was now under control, that the President and McFarlane
felt that the area of public diplomacy was one in which we had
not yet done enough, and that therefore they wanted him to assume
that responsibility. Menges was asked whether he believed that
that was the real reason for the reassignment. Menges said that
he did not. Menges said that he believes that the real reason
for the reassignment was that he had insisted that the President
be informed on various matters, and that this made McFarlane
"very uncomfortable."
Menges was shown a letter that he had written to the President
dated August 6, 1985. In that letter, Menges had written that
(1) the State Department was undermining the President's poli-
cies, (2) the NSC process was not being appropriately used to see
that the President's policies were implemented, and (3) we needed
and did not have a strategy on counter-terrorism. Menges said
that he had given this letter to other individuals and asked
- 2 -
that they give it to the President, and did not know whether the
President has, in fact, ever seen it. Menges refused to identify
to the Committee staffers the persons to whom he had given the
letter. Menges said that he wrote the letter because he felt
that the President was not being properly served. Menges said
that the State Department was taking unilateral action, the NSC
process was not working, and he felt that these were things the
President needed to know.
Menges had stated in his letter that the President's policies had
been faithfully implemented by Secretary Weinberger, among
others. Menges was asked whether he had had any contact with
Weinberger that had exposed him to Weinberger's views. Menges
said that he saw Secretary Weinberger at NSC meetings, and
sometimes would see him at social events, or "semi-official
events." Menges said he saw William Casey at NSC meetings and at
other occasions. Menges said that Casey had brought him into the
Administration, and that he had worked at the CIA as the National
Intelligence Officer for Central America from September 1981
through October 1983.
Menges said that the President's policy on Central America
consisted of four elements: encouraging democracy, improving
living conditions, diplomacy, and opposition to the violent right
and the violent left. Menges said that the difference between
the President's approach and the State Department's approach
related to different definitions of what would constitute an
acceptable political settlement in Central America. Menges said
that the President had taken the position that the only accept-
able political settlement would involve Nicaragua's becoming a
true democracy, the end of Nicaragua's armed aggression against
its neighbors, the removal of Soviet bloc operatives from
Nicaragua, and the reduction of the Nicaraguan military forces to
a size comparable to those of its neighbors. Menges said that
the State Department had paid lip service to this position, but
that it had acted so as to move towards a political settlement
which would have left the Communist government in place and
dismantled the armed resistance forces. Menges said that this is
what happened in the spring of 1986 with respect to Philip Habib.
Menges was asked whether there had been any policy on how to keep
the Contras viable during the period in which the broadest
congressional restrictions on Contra aid were in force. Menges
said that there had been no systematic planning, because the
Contras were North's account. Menges said, somewhat sarcastically,
that if North were involved, there did not need to be any planning.
Menges was asked "How did that happen -- that one person got the
account and there was no planning?" Menges said that the answer
could be given "in two words: McFarlane and Poindexter." Menges
said that there were two sets of rules -- "one for 99% of us,"
requiring strict accountability, forbidding people to talk to
journalists without permission, and so on, and another set of
rules for North.
- 3 -
Menges said that he knew nothing about the weapon sales or the
arms shipments. Menges said that if he had known about those
things, he would have been more active in registering his con-
cerns about North. Menges said that there were people who talked
with McFarlane and Poindexter regarding their concerns about
North. Menges said that Jacqueline Tillman, after working with
North for three weeks, came to Menges and said that North was
delusional, a liar, and dangerous to the NSC and the country.
Menges said that he told Tillman that North "does lie a bit," and
was "a little sophomoric," but otherwise downplayed her concerns.
Menges said that in December of 1984, he had come to the conclu-
sion that he should not tell North about a specific operational
idea he had had, because North might go off and implement the
idea outside of proper channels. Menges said that in that case
he took great care to ensure that North would not hear about it.
Menges was asked why North was allowed so much latitude. Menges
said "You've all been in situations where someone is systematic-
ally deceptive of the people higher up." Menges said that "even
those of us who saw what was going on" would not have imagined
that North would have gone as far as he did. Menges said that
North was dedicated and loyal, and Menges had not thought that
North would "go beyond a certain point." Menges said that there
were also intangible factors -- McFarlane and North were both
Marines, Poindexter was a naval officer, the secretaries were
related, etc. Menges said that North was familiar with the
military mores, and therefore could function well in that envi-
ronment. Menges said that McFarlane and Poindexter found it
convenient to go along with North because North was always
action-oriented, and always seemed to "have things together."
Menges said that when he was reassigned, the President had been
told that he had been promoted. Menges said that this was
another example of McFarlane and Poindexter "deliberately deceiv-
ing the President." Menges said that they should have fired him
if that was what they wished, but that they could not do so
because there would have been protests from members of Congress.
Menges said that it was because of McFarlane's and Poindexter's
willingness to deceive the President that he wrote the August 6,
1985 letter. Menges said that he would have been willing to give
that letter to McFarlane and Poindexter and be fired for it,
instead of trying to transmit it to the President outside of the
normal channels, had he felt that either of them would have had
the "honor" to give the letter to the President.
Menges said that in preparing memos for the President, he would
indicate what prior decisions the President had made on various
relevant issues. Menges said that McFarlane and Poindexter would
take that material out -- "it's ancient history" -- and would do
so because the President, if he saw that material, would ask them
why he was being asked to revisit old decisions. Menges said
that "the answer would have been George Shultz."
- 4 -
Menges was asked whether North was theoretically supposed to be
reporting to him. Menges said that North was not supposed to be
reporting to him, and was in a separate directorate for Political-
Military Affairs. Menges said that he thought that this was a
problem, "because you had all these colonels there" in conflict
with the regional experts. Menges said that you could define the
jurisdiction of that directorate quite broadly. Menges was asked
how the two directorates -- his and North's -- coordinated their
work with each other. Menges said that his directorate was
responsible for doing the regular NSC work on Latin America.
Menges said that this involved making sure that the President
made key decisions, that his decisions were followed throughout
the government, that the policy was properly coordinated, that
new concerns and threats were called to the President's attention,
and that the President's policies were properly communicated.
Menges said that the regional directorates were responsible for
overall foreign policy strategy. Menges said that the political-
military unit was originally supposed to consist of technically-
oriented people who dealt with one issue -- military assistance.
Menges was asked, "In your view, what was left for Political-
Military Affairs to do on Central America once Boland II came
into effect?" Menges said that he did not know. Menges said
that he felt that the job of the NSC at that point was to persuade
Congress to change its mind, and Menges said that he had worked
hard on that. Menges said that he did not know what North was
doing with respect to the Contras during this time. Menges said
that North was the one who saw the Contra leaders when they were
in town, or if the President was to meet with them. Menges said
that North was the liaison to the Contras in the field. Menges
said that North also contributed to the legislative strategy, but
that North would often conduct his own private legislative
strategy operation.
Menges said that he had not known that North was involved in
coordinating the private resupply efforts. Menges said that he
had read such allegations in the newspapers in September 1985.
Menges said that he had known that "somebody on this globe" was
helping the Contras, but he had not known that North was involved
with facilitating this assistance. Menges said that he was not
involved in responding to inquiries from Congressmen concerning
what assistance was being provided.
Menges said that he did not know anything about the support given
the Contras by other countries. Menges noted that he "didn't
inquire." Menges said that he believed in compartmentalization.
Menges said he attended some of the RIG meetings on Latin
America. Menges said that Thomas Enders, and then Langhorne
Motley, would often exclude those who disagreed with them, and
that often meant him. Menges said that he had protested to
McFarlane several times that RIG meetings were being canceled.
Menges said that he has never attended a RIG meeting chaired by
Elliott Abrams. Menges said that he remembers that the day after
- 5 -
his "promotion," he and his wife were at a ceremonial occasion on
the White House South Lawn that Abrams attended as well. Menges
said that he went up to Abrams and told Abrams that he was sorry
that the two of them would not get to work together, and offered
to be helpful if Abrams needed assistance of any sort. Menges
said that he told Abrams at that time that North was a "person of
real ability," but that North consistently misstated the facts,
and that North's style was to "force you into action, box you
in." Menges said that if North ever came to Abrams and said that
there was "some intercept," or that "people will die" if some
step were not taken, Abrams should not take any action until he
had checked out the facts. Menges said that he told Abrams that
if Abrams needed help, he should give him a call. Menges said
that after that conversation, his wife said to him "Constantine,
he did not understand what you said, and he will not call you.
Menges said that he nevertheless felt that he had done his duty
in having that conversation with Abrams.
Menges said that the RIG was the policy-making body on Central
America. Menges said that the general decision-making process
was that the State Department would chair a subcabinet group,
either an IG or a RIG. Menges said that the intention had been
that RIG meetings would occur regularly, and members would have
the opportunity to discuss the general situation in the area.
Menges said that minutes were sometimes kept, but that it was
very episodic. Menges said that in the area of Latin America,
under Enders and then Motley, the RIG was a "highly manipulated
process," involving "typical bureaucratic politics." Menges said
that they would deliberately schedule RIG meetings for times when
he was going to be out of town.
Menges was asked why they were so worried about Constantine
Menges. Menges said that the Department of Defense and the
Central Intelligence Agency tended to agree with him, so if he
came it would be three to one against the State Department.
Menges said that he knew Weinberger, Casey, Ikle, and other
cabinet members, and that the less Menges knew, the less trouble
the Assistant Secretary would have. Menges was asked "But didn't
Defense and the CIA attend these meetings too?" Menges said that
they did, but that the State Department chair would often desig-
nate who from these agencies would attend. Menges said that from
the perspective of the State Department, Nestor Sanchez was
preferable to Fred Ikle because Sanchez would just "go along."
Menges said that he has never met Richard Armitage.
Menges said that Dewey Clarridge would sometimes attend the RIGs
on behalf of the CIA. Menges said that Clarridge was not gen-
erally on the same side of these issues as he was. Menges said
that "an inner club" formed, so that either RIGs would not be
held, or they would be pro forma meetings and the real meeting
would be a private meeting in somebody's office. Menges said
that a lot of work was done by the State Department to co-opt
Clarridge, taking advantage of his "lack of international
- 6 -
political judgment." Menges said that Clarridge would not
understand that certain actions might look tough but be counter-
productive, and in exchange for those actions would then agree to
go along with an unacceptable political settlement.
Menges was asked to describe the conversation he had with
McFarlane when he was reassigned. Menges said that he had come
to the meeting with McFarlane expecting to be fired, because the
other two senior "Reagan people" -- Lehman and Robinson -- had
already been removed. Menges said that the essence of his
conversation with McFarlane was that McFarlane was very positive
about the superb quality of his work, and said that things were
currently going well in Central America and that the area was
therefore now beneath his abilities. Menges said that McFarlane
told him that "the President and I" believed that it was impor-
tant to do more on public diplomacy, and that "we" would like him
to take on the new assignment. Menges said that McFarlane told
him that he would appear on talk shows and write articles.
Menges said that he told McFarlane that he thought that until
Nicaragua became democratic, there would be a lot of work remain-
ing to be done on Central America. Menges said that he suggested
that he devote two-thirds of his time to Latin America and
one-third of his time to public diplomacy. Menges said that
McFarlane then laughed and said that that would be unfair to
Menges. McFarlane then said that he had a meeting to go to, that
the President and he had made this decision, and that Menges
should let him know in a couple of days what he wanted to do.
Menges said that at that time he believed that the President had
had no part in this decision. Menges said that he later learned
that the President had in fact believed what McFarlane had told
Menges -- that Menges was being moved up. "So I had evidence
that the President was misled.
Menges was asked: "It seems that North would have to account to
somebody, which assumes knowledge on the part of his superiors.
Do you believe that McFarlane and Poindexter were aware that
profits from the arms sales were going to the Contras?" Menges
responded: "Based on the publicly available information, and my
knowledge of the environment, my sense is yes, that Poindexter
was aware of the diversion of the funds to the Contras. That's
my guess, my speculation." Menges said that he would guess that
McFarlane knew as well. Menges said that he believed that
McFarlane found out in the spring of 1986.
Menges said that the Tower Report and the PROF notes it repro-
duced clearly showed North's "pattern of action. Menges said
that North did in writing "what he did verbally with the rest of
us." Menges said that, for example, when North said in a PROF
note that Elliott Abrams had told him that he could call the
President of Costa Rica, his (Menges') speculation was that
Elliott Abrams never knew about it, that Elliott Abrams never
gave permission, and that North never made the call.
- 7 -
[Menges was then shown a classified PROF note. The discussion
concerning that PROF note is summarized in an addendum to this
memorandum.]
Menges was asked again why he did not seek to transmit his August
1985 letter to the President through proper channels. Menges
responded that he was convinced that McFarlane and Poindexter
would never have passed the document on to the President. Menges
said that he felt that as a citizen and as a Special Assistant to
the President, he had a right to send a letter to the President.
Menges was asked why he believed that McFarlane and Poindexter
would not have communicated his letter to the President. Menges
said that McFarlane and Poindexter were "constantly failing to
tell the President" about major matters.
Menges described an incident in which he was successful in having
an NSC meeting called to discuss a new State Department four-point
plan on Nicaragua. Menges said that he was able to get this
meeting scheduled only because McFarlane and Poindexter were
angry about having been lied to by Shultz and Motley. Menges
said that when representatives of the State Department had come
to the NSC to discuss their four point-plan, one day before a
special envoy was set to leave for Central America, they de-
scribed step one only. Menges said that step one was "outra-
geous: 300 out of 10,000 Cubans would leave without any
verification." Menges said that he asked them for the remaining
three points of the plan, and they responded that they did not
yet have them ready. Menges said that Poindexter had been
present at that meeting, and Menges was able later that day to
show Poindexter a copy of a memo from George Shultz which listed
all four points of the four-point plan, and he was therefore able
to tell Poindexter that Poindexter had been lied to. Menges said
that that was what led to the calling of the NSC meeting, but
that it should not have taken something like that. Menges said
that "if one is serving the President, and not George Shultz,"
the President should run foreign policy and there should be
frequent NSC meetings.
Menges said that in December of 1983, McFarlane was "still
behaving as an NSC adviser." Menges described an incident in
which Motley and Ambassador Richard Stone were flying to the
inauguration of the new President of Argentina, and sat together
on the airplane to Buenos Aires for ten hours. Menges said Stone
was scheduled to meet with Latin American leaders, and the next
day Stone found out from one Latin American President that Daniel
Ortega was "chortling" because Ortega was having a secret meeting
with Motley, on a separate track, and had been told by Motley
that the meetings that were going on with Ambassador Stone were
"bullshit." Menges said that Motley had not told Stone about
this on the plane. Menges said that he complained to McFarlane,
who complained to the State Department, and the State Department
indicated that this was unauthorized. Menges said that he then
had a telegram sent to Motley directing Motley to follow the
- 8 -
President's instructions and submit a written report on the trip
upon his return.
Menges said that McFarlane's behavior during this incident
contrasted with his later actions. Menges said that once the
State Department "stabbed Stone in the back in 1984" McFarlane
began to "waver," and "became Shultz's adviser, instead of the
President's." Menges said that McFarlane would not be willing to
"take Shultz on." Menges said that Shultz would often bypass the
NSC process and meet privately along with McFarlane with the
President, have a casual conversation with the President, and get
authorization for what he wished to do. Menges said that the
same thing was done on the Iran matter, and that in that case
Shultz's habit of using informal meetings to get Presidential
decisions was used against him.
CC: Arthur B. Culvahouse, Jr.
Jay B. Stephens
William B. Lytton III
C. Dean McGrath
Alan C. Raul
Paul Schott Stevens
Paul L. Colby
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name
Withdrawer
CULVAHOUSE, ARTHUR B.:FILES
DLB 2/18/2014
File Folder
FOIA
IRAN/ARMS TRANSACTION: CONSTANTINE MENGES
S643
SYSTEMATIC
Box Number
CFOA 1129
22
ID
Document Type
No of Doc Date
Restric-
Document Description
pages
tions
164213 PAPER
1
ND
B1
ADDENDUM TO MEMO RE: MENGES
The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
THE WHITE HOUSE
7/18/14
WASHINGTON
(Dictated on 4/22/87)
Unclassified with
TOP SECRET Attachment
May 5, 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE
FROM:
PETER D. KEISLER
SUBJECT:
Interview with Constantine Menges
On April 21, 1987, Constantine Menges was interviewed by Ken Buck
(House Select Committee), Bud Hall (House Select Committee), Mark
Belnick (Senate Select Committee), and Victoria Nourse (Senate
Select Committee). The interview began at 3:20 p.m. and ended at
approximately 4:30 p.m.
Menges said that he worked at the NSC from October 1983 through
July of 1986. He said that from October 1983 to July of 1985, he
served as a Special Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs and as Senior Director for Latin American
Affairs. Menges said that from July 1985 through July 1986, he
served as Director for International Communications and Informa-
tion, with responsibility for public diplomacy. Menges said that
during that time he remained a Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs.
Menges was asked why his responsibilities were changed. Menges
said that McFarlane had told him that he had done an outstanding
job on Latin American affairs, that the situation in Latin
America was now under control, that the President and McFarlane
felt that the area of public diplomacy was one in which we had
not yet done enough, and that therefore they wanted him to assume
that responsibility. Menges was asked whether he believed that
that was the real reason for the reassignment. Menges said that
he did not. Menges said that he believes that the real reason
for the reassignment was that he had insisted that the President
be informed on various matters, and that this made McFarlane
"very uncomfortable."
Menges was shown a letter that he had written to the President
dated August 6, 1985. In that letter, Menges had written that
(1) the State Department was undermining the President's poli-
cies, (2) the NSC process was not being appropriately used to see
that the President's policies were implemented, and (3) we needed
and did not have a strategy on counter-terrorism. Menges said
that he had given this letter to other individuals and asked
- 2 -
that they give it to the President, and did not know whether the
President has, in fact, ever seen it. Menges refused to identify
to the Committee staffers the persons to whom he had given the
letter. Menges said that he wrote the letter because he felt
that the President was not being properly served. Menges said
that the State Department was taking unilateral action, the NSC
process was not working, and he felt that these were things the
President needed to know.
Menges had stated in his letter that the President's policies had
been faithfully implemented by Secretary Weinberger, among
others. Menges was asked whether he had had any contact with
Weinberger that had exposed him to Weinberger's views. Menges
said that he saw Secretary Weinberger at NSC meetings, and
sometimes would see him at social events, or "semi-official
events." Menges said he saw William Casey at NSC meetings and at
other occasions. Menges said that Casey had brought him into the
Administration, and that he had worked at the CIA as the National
Intelligence Officer for Central America from September 1981
through October 1983.
Menges said that the President's policy on Central America
consisted of four elements: encouraging democracy, improving
living conditions, diplomacy, and opposition to the violent right
and the violent left. Menges said that the difference between
the President's approach and the State Department's approach
related to different definitions of what would constitute an
acceptable political settlement in Central America. Menges said
that the President had taken the position that the only accept-
able political settlement would involve Nicaragua's becoming a
true democracy, the end of Nicaragua's armed aggression against
its neighbors, the removal of Soviet bloc operatives from
Nicaragua, and the reduction of the Nicaraguan military forces to
a size comparable to those of its neighbors. Menges said that
the State Department had paid lip service to this position, but
that it had acted so as to move towards a political settlement
which would have left the Communist government in place and
dismantled the armed resistance forces. Menges said that this is
what happened in the spring of 1986 with respect to Philip Habib.
Menges was asked whether there had been any policy on how to keep
the Contras viable during the period in which the broadest
congressional restrictions on Contra aid were in force. Menges
said that there had been no systematic planning, because the
Contras were North's account. Menges said, somewhat sarcastically,
that if North were involved, there did not need to be any planning.
Menges was asked "How did that happen -- that one person got the
account and there was no planning?" Menges said that the answer
could be given "in two words: McFarlane and Poindexter." Menges
said that there were two sets of rules -- "one for 99% of us,"
requiring strict accountability, forbidding people to talk to
journalists without permission, and so on, and another set of
rules for North.
- 3 -
Menges said that he knew nothing about the weapon sales or the
arms shipments. Menges said that if he had known about those
things, he would have been more active in registering his con-
cerns about North. Menges said that there were people who talked
with McFarlane and Poindexter regarding their concerns about
North. Menges said that Jacqueline Tillman, after working with
North for three weeks, came to Menges and said that North was
delusional, a liar, and dangerous to the NSC and the country.
Menges said that he told Tillman that North "does lie a bit," and
was "a little sophomoric," but otherwise downplayed her concerns.
Menges said that in December of 1984, he had come to the conclu-
sion that he should not tell North about a specific operational
idea he had had, because North might go off and implement the
idea outside of proper channels. Menges said that in that case
he took great care to ensure that North would not hear about it.
Menges was asked why North was allowed so much latitude. Menges
said "You've all been in situations where someone is systematic-
ally deceptive of the people higher up." Menges said that "even
those of us who saw what was going on" would not have imagined
that North would have gone as far as he did. Menges said that
North was dedicated and loyal, and Menges had not thought that
North would "go beyond a certain point." Menges said that there
were also intangible factors McFarlane and North were both
Marines, Poindexter was a naval officer, the secretaries were
related, etc. Menges said that North was familiar with the
military mores, and therefore could function well in that envi-
ronment. Menges said that McFarlane and Poindexter found it
convenient to go along with North because North was always
action-oriented, and always seemed to "have things together."
Menges said that when he was reassigned, the President had been
told that he had been promoted. Menges said that this was
another example of McFarlane and Poindexter "deliberately deceiv-
ing the President." Menges said that they should have fired him
if that was what they wished, but that they could not do so
because there would have been protests from members of Congress.
Menges said that it was because of McFarlane's and Poindexter's
willingness to deceive the President that he wrote the August 6,
1985 letter. Menges said that he would have been willing to give
that letter to McFarlane and Poindexter and be fired for it,
instead of trying to transmit it to the President outside of the
normal channels, had he felt that either of them would have had
the "honor" to give the letter to the President.
Menges said that in preparing memos for the President, he would
indicate what prior decisions the President had made on various
relevant issues. Menges said that McFarlane and Poindexter would
take that material out -- "it's ancient history" -- and would do
so because the President, if he saw that material, would ask them
why he was being asked to revisit old decisions. Menges said
that "the answer would have been George Shultz."
- 4 -
Menges was asked whether North was theoretically supposed to be
reporting to him. Menges said that North was not supposed to be
reporting to him, and was in a separate directorate for Political-
Military Affairs. Menges said that he thought that this was a
problem, "because you had all these colonels there" in conflict
with the regional experts. Menges said that you could define the
jurisdiction of that directorate quite broadly. Menges was asked
how the two directorates his and North's -- coordinated their
work with each other. Menges said that his directorate was
responsible for doing the regular NSC work on Latin America.
Menges said that this involved making sure that the President
made key decisions, that his decisions were followed throughout
the government, that the policy was properly coordinated, that
new concerns and threats were called to the President's attention,
and that the President's policies were properly communicated.
Menges said that the regional directorates were responsible for
overall foreign policy strategy. Menges said that the political-
military unit was originally supposed to consist of technically-
oriented people who dealt with one issue -- military assistance.
Menges was asked, "In your view, what was left for Political-
Military Affairs to do on Central America once Boland II came
into effect?" Menges said that he did not know. Menges said
that he felt that the job of the NSC at that point was to persuade
Congress to change its mind, and Menges said that he had worked
hard on that. Menges said that he did not know what North was
doing with respect to the Contras during this time. Menges said
that North was the one who saw the Contra leaders when they were
in town, or if the President was to meet with them. Menges said
that North was the liaison to the Contras in the field. Menges
said that North also contributed to the legislative strategy, but
that North would often conduct his own private legislative
strategy operation.
Menges said that he had not known that North was involved in
coordinating the private resupply efforts. Menges said that he
had read such allegations in the newspapers in September 1985.
Menges said that he had known that "somebody on this globe" was
helping the Contras, but he had not known that North was involved
with facilitating this assistance. Menges said that he was not
involved in responding to inquiries from Congressmen concerning
what assistance was being provided.
Menges said that he did not know anything about the support given
the Contras by other countries. Menges noted that he "didn't
inquire.' Menges said that he believed in compartmentalization.
Menges said he attended some of the RIG meetings on Latin
America. Menges said that Thomas Enders, and then Langhorne
Motley, would often exclude those who disagreed with them, and
that often meant him. Menges said that he had protested to
McFarlane several times that RIG meetings were being canceled.
Menges said that he has never attended a RIG meeting chaired by
Elliott Abrams. Menges said that he remembers that the day after
- 5 -
his "promotion," he and his wife were at a ceremonial occasion on
the White House South Lawn that Abrams attended as well. Menges
said that he went up to Abrams and told Abrams that he was sorry
that the two of them would not get to work together, and offered
to be helpful if Abrams needed assistance of any sort. Menges
said that he told Abrams at that time that North was a "person of
real ability," but that North consistently misstated the facts,
and that North's style was to "force you into action, box you
in." Menges said that if North ever came to Abrams and said that
there was "some intercept," or that "people will die" if some
step were not taken, Abrams should not take any action until he
had checked out the facts. Menges said that he told Abrams that
if Abrams needed help, he should give him a call. Menges said
that after that conversation, his wife said to him "Constantine,
he did not understand what you said, and he will not call you.
Menges said that he nevertheless felt that he had done his duty
in having that conversation with Abrams.
Menges said that the RIG was the policy-making body on Central
America. Menges said that the general decision-making process
was that the State Department would chair a subcabinet group,
either an IG or a RIG. Menges said that the intention had been
that RIG meetings would occur regularly, and members would have
the opportunity to discuss the general situation in the area.
Menges said that minutes were sometimes kept, but that it was
very episodic. Menges said that in the area of Latin America,
under Enders and then Motley, the RIG was a "highly manipulated
process,' involving "typical bureaucratic politics." Menges said
that they would deliberately schedule RIG meetings for times when
he was going to be out of town.
Menges was asked why they were so worried about Constantine
Menges. Menges said that the Department of Defense and the
Central Intelligence Agency tended to agree with him, SO if he
came it would be three to one against the State Department.
Menges said that he knew Weinberger, Casey, Ikle, and other
cabinet members, and that the less Menges knew, the less trouble
the Assistant Secretary would have. Menges was asked "But didn't
Defense and the CIA attend these meetings too?" Menges said that
they did, but that the State Department chair would often desig-
nate who from these agencies would attend. Menges said that from
the perspective of the State Department, Nestor Sanchez was
preferable to Fred Ikle because Sanchez would just "go along."
Menges said that he has never met Richard Armitage.
Menges said that Dewey Clarridge would sometimes attend the RIGs
on behalf of the CIA. Menges said that Clarridge was not gen-
erally on the same side of these issues as he was. Menges said
that "an inner club" formed, so that either RIGs would not be
held, or they would be pro forma meetings and the real meeting
would be a private meeting in somebody's office. Menges said
that a lot of work was done by the State Department to co-opt
Clarridge, taking advantage of his "lack of international
- 6 -
political judgment." Menges said that Clarridge would not
understand that certain actions might look tough but be counter-
productive, and in exchange for those actions would then agree to
go along with an unacceptable political settlement.
Menges was asked to describe the conversation he had with
McFarlane when he was reassigned. Menges said that he had come
to the meeting with McFarlane expecting to be fired, because the
other two senior "Reagan people" -- Lehman and Robinson -- had
already been removed. Menges said that the essence of his
conversation with McFarlane was that McFarlane was very positive
about the superb quality of his work, and said that things were
currently going well in Central America and that the area was
therefore now beneath his abilities. Menges said that McFarlane
told him that "the President and I" believed that it was impor-
tant to do more on public diplomacy, and that "we" would like him
to take on the new assignment. Menges said that McFarlane told
him that he would appear on talk shows and write articles.
Menges said that he told McFarlane that he thought that until
Nicaragua became democratic, there would be a lot of work remain-
ing to be done on Central America. Menges said that he suggested
that he devote two-thirds of his time to Latin America and
one-third of his time to public diplomacy. Menges said that
McFarlane then laughed and said that that would be unfair to
Menges. McFarlane then said that he had a meeting to go to, that
the President and he had made this decision, and that Menges
should let him know in a couple of days what he wanted to do.
Menges said that at that time he believed that the President had
had no part in this decision. Menges said that he later learned
that the President had in fact believed what McFarlane had told
Menges that Menges was being moved up. "So I had evidence
that the President was misled."
Menges was asked: "It seems that North would have to account to
somebody, which assumes knowledge on the part of his superiors.
Do you believe that McFarlane and Poindexter were aware that
profits from the arms sales were going to the Contras?" Menges
responded: "Based on the publicly available information, and my
knowledge of the environment, my sense is yes, that Poindexter
was aware of the diversion of the funds to the Contras. That's
my guess, my speculation." Menges said that he would guess that
McFarlane knew as well. Menges said that he believed that
McFarlane found out in the spring of 1986.
Menges said that the Tower Report and the PROF notes it repro-
duced clearly showed North's "pattern of action." Menges said
that North did in writing "what he did verbally with the rest of
us." Menges said that, for example, when North said in a PROF
note that Elliott Abrams had told him that he could call the
President of Costa Rica, his (Menges') speculation was that
Elliott Abrams never knew about it, that Elliott Abrams never
gave permission, and that North never made the call.
- 7 -
[Menges was then shown a classified PROF note. The discussion
concerning that PROF note is summarized in an addendum to this
memorandum.)
Menges was asked again why he did not seek to transmit his August
1985 letter to the President through proper channels. Menges
responded that he was convinced that McFarlane and Pcindexter
would never have passed the document on to the President. Menges
said that he felt that as a citizen and as a Special Assistant to
the President, he had a right to send a letter to the President.
Menges was asked why he believed that McFarlane and Poindexter
would not have communicated his letter to the President. Menges
said that McFarlane and Poindexter were "constantly failing to
tell the President" about major matters.
Menges described an incident in which he was successful in having
an NSC meeting called to discuss a new State Department four-point
plan on Nicaragua. Menges said that he was able to get this
meeting scheduled only because McFarlane and Poindexter were
angry about having been lied to by Shultz and Motley. Menges
said that when representatives of the State Department had come
to the NSC to discuss their four point-plan, one day before a
special envoy was set to leave for Central America, they de-
scribed step one only. Menges said that step one was "outra-
geous: 300 out of 10,000 Cubans would leave without any
verification." Menges said that he asked them for the remaining
three points of the plan, and they responded that they did not
yet have them ready. Menges said that Poindexter had been
present at that meeting, and Menges was able later that day to
show Poindexter a copy of a memo from George Shultz which listed
all four points of the four-point plan, and he was therefore able
to tell Poindexter that Poindexter had been lied to. Menges said
that that was what led to the calling of the NSC meeting, but
that it should not have taken something like that. Menges said
that "if one is serving the President, and not George Shultz,"
the President should run foreign policy and there should be
frequent NSC meetings.
Menges said that in December of 1983, McFarlane was "still
behaving as an NSC adviser." Menges described an incident in
which Motley and Ambassador Richard Stone were flying to the
inauguration of the new President of Argentina, and sat together
on the airplane to Buenos Aires for ten hours. Menges said Stone
was scheduled to meet with Latin American leaders, and the next
day Stone found out from one Latin American President that Daniel
Ortega was "chortling" because Ortega was having a secret meeting
with Motley, on a separate track, and had been told by Motley
that the meetings that were going on with Ambassador Stone were
"bullshit." Menges said that Motley had not told Stone about
this on the plane. Menges said that he complained to McFarlane,
who complained to the State Department, and the State Department
indicated that this was unauthorized. Menges said that he then
had a telegram sent to Motley directing Motley to follow the
- 8 -
President's instructions and submit a written report on the trip
upon his return.
Menges said that McFarlane's behavior during this incident
contrasted with his later actions. Menges said that once the
State Department "stabbed Stone in the back in 1984" McFarlane
began to "waver," and "became Shultz's adviser, instead of the
President's. Menges said that McFarlane would not be willing to
"take Shultz on." Menges said that Shultz would often bypass the
NSC process and meet privately along with McFarlane with the
President, have a casual conversation with the President, and get
authorization for what he wished to do. Menges said that the
same thing was done on the Iran matter, and that in that case
Shultz's habit of using informal meetings to get Presidential
decisions was used against him.
CC: Arthur B. Culvahouse, Jr.
Jay B. Stephens
William B. Lytton III
C. Dean McGrath
Alan C. Raul
Paul Schott Stevens
Paul L. Colby
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name
Withdrawer
CULVAHOUSE, ARTHUR B.:FILES
DLB 2/18/2014
File Folder
FOIA
IRAN/ARMS TRANSACTION: CONSTANTINE MENGES
S643
SYSTEMATIC
Box Number
CFOA 1129
22
ID
Document Type
No of
Doc Date
Restric-
Document Description
pages
tions
164214 PAPER
1
ND
B1
DUPLICATE OF #164213
The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.