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Iran/Arms Transaction: President's Intelligence Oversight Board Meeting and Report 04/03/1987
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Iran/Arms Transaction: President's Intelligence Oversight Board Meeting and Report 04/03/1987
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Records of the Office of Counsel to the President (Reagan Administration)
Arthur Culvahouse's Office Files
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Culvahouse, Arthur B.: Files
Folder Title: Iran/Arms Transaction: President's
Intelligence Oversight Board Meeting and Report
04/03/1987
Box: CFOA 1129
To see more digitized collections visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name CULVAHOUSE, ARTHUR B.:FILES
Withdrawer
DLB
5/14/2014
File Folder
IRAN/ARMS TRANSACTION: PRESIDENT'S
FOIA
INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD MEETING AND
S643
REPORT - APRIL 3, 1987
Box Number
CFOA 1129
SYSTEMATIC
142
ID
Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
164965 LETTER
WILLIAM WEBSTER TO GLENN
2 8/6/1987 B1
CAMPBELL
164966 LETTER
COPY OF 164965, WITH SLIGHT
2 8/6/1987 B1
NOTATION
The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing
Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 2, 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR HOWARD H. BAKER, JR.
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
KENNETH L. DUBERSTEIN
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
ARTHUR B. CULVAHOUSE, JR
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT
Ase
SUBJECT:
President's Intelligence Oversight Board
Appointment and Report
Attached is a copy of my staffing memorandum to the President
for his 11:30 a.m. meeting with the Intelligence Oversight
Board. A copy of this memorandum should be provided to the
President through the normal staffing process.
I suggest that the President be given a prebriefing on this
issue during the 9:00 a.m. staff time. Simply put, the
President's Intelligence Oversight Board Interim Report is
badly flawed as it concludes that Messrs. Regan, Poindexter,
Casey violated Presidential directives and perhaps U.S. law
by not keeping the Intelligence Oversight Board fully
informed of covert action findings. The report should not be
publicly released, even though a public release apparently
will be recommended by Dr. Campbell and his fellow Board
members. The Intelligence Oversight Board has the authority,
under its Executive Order, to submit the report, but the
President has the discretion to require that the report be
kept confidential in the interests of not prejudicing
individuals subject to the ongoing Congressional and
Independent Counsel investigations.
Attachment
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 2, 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
ARTHUR B. CULVAHOUSE, JR
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT
ABC
SUBJECT:
Meeting with President's Intelligence
Oversight Board
You are scheduled to meet for ten minutes with the members of
the President's Intelligence Oversight Board at 11:30 a.m. on
Friday, April 3. The Intelligence Oversight Board is
chartered by Executive Order to assure the legality of
intelligence community activities and to inform the President
of intelligence activities that violate the Constitution,
U.S. law, or Presidential order and directives. The members
of the Board are Dr. W. Glenn Campbell, Charles J. Meyers and
Charles Tyroler II. You will be staffed by Howard Baker and
me.
The Intelligence Oversight Board has requested the meeting to
present its two page "Interim Report" regarding the "Iranian
arms sales and related matters." The Board's Interim Report,
a copy of which is attached, states that the Board has been
conducting an "inquiry" and "investigation".
The Board's Interim Report states that "contrary to law and
established practice," certain former senior officials
(including Don Regan, John Poindexter, and Bill Casey) failed
to keep the President's Intelligence Oversight Board apprised
of covert action findings and possible violations of law.
The Board's Interim Report further asserts that its counsel
attempted in the Fall of 1986 to alert the NSC staff (through
the NSC General Counsel) that NSC staff was actively
supporting military operations in Nicaragua.
Dr. Campbell advised Senator Baker today that the Board
intends to urge that you publicly release the Interim Report.
Senator Baker and I strongly urge you not to publicly release
the report. Dr. Campbell has been advised that of Senator
Baker's opinion.
Under the Executive Order which created the President's
Intelligence Oversight Board, the Board is entitled to
present reports to you, but you have the final determination
on whether or not to publicize a report. It is well within
- 2 -
your authority to determine that the release of the Interim
Report could inappropriately prejudice the rights of
individuals currently subject to investigation. The reasons
why we believe that the Report should not be publicly
released are as follows:
o
The report states that Messrs. Regan, Poindexter and
Casey "knew or certainly should have known" that they
were required "by law and established practice" to
apprise the Board of covert action findings and possible
violations of law. The Iran/Contra matter is subject to
ongoing investigations, and we believe that it would be
very inappropriate and prejudicial to these three men
for such an assertion by the President's Intelligence
Oversight Board to be publicized at this time. The
Tower Board, which conducted an extensive inquiry,
generally refrained from determinations that named
individuals might have violated legal requirements. The
Intelligence Oversight Board, with a single professional
staff member in a four paragraph report, seemingly
should have avoided such conclusions.
Publicizing the President's Intelligence Oversight Board
report simply will create additional controversy without
furthering the public's understanding of the facts. The
Intelligence Oversight Board Interim Report is more of a
grievance that the Board was not being kept fully
informed by the Intelligence Community (which complaint
may be justified), but the Interim Report simply is not
based on sufficient investigation and new facts to merit
release into the public domain.
The Interim Report makes factual statements about
individuals which cannot be verified at this time, or,
in the case of the allegation involving the NSC General
Counsel, have been denied.
RECOMMENDATION: Mr. President, Howard Baker and I
respectfully recommend that you: receive the Board's report;
thank the Board for its efforts and many years of service;
assure the Board that you will continue to rely upon their
-
oversight of the intelligence community; and take the report
under advisement and decide against publicly releasing the
Intelligence Oversight Board's Report at this time.
Attachment
1111. WHITE
PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD
April 2, 1987
FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD
SUBJECT:
Interim Report
Your Intelligence Oversight Board, pursuant to its responsi-
bilities under Executive Order 12334, has been conducting an
inquiry into the Iranian arms sales and related matters. Our
investigation is still in progress and we expect to be able to
report our conclusions to you in the near future. This is an
interim report.
Contrary to law and established practice, senior officials
of the Intelligence Community failed to keep your Board apprised
of covert action findings and possible violations of law.
Specifically, the November 1985 flight carrying arms to Iran, a
possible violation of the Hughes-Ryan Amendment requiring a
Presidential Finding for covert activities, was not reported to
this Board as required by your Executive Order 12334. Further,
a long standing requirement to brief the Board on covert action
findings, reaffirmed by you in January 1983, and again confirmed
in September 1985 by the Director of Central Intelligence, required
that the Board be briefed on the Presidential Finding of January 17,
1986. This requirement was not met Had these requirements of
law and established practice been respected, we are confident
that your Board could have rendered a valuable service by carefully
monitoring and giving you its independent advice on the legality
and prudence of these intelligence activities Those who knew
or certainly should have known of the above requirements include
former Chief of Staff Donald T. Regan, former National Security
Adviser John M. Poindexter and former Director of Central Intelligence
William J. Casey.
One recommendation that will undoubtedly result from our
inquiry will be to confirm the role of this Board in the review
of covert action findings. The Board can help you only when
fully informed. That this Board can help protect the Executive
against unwise intelligence activities 1s underlined by the fact
that late in October 1986 the Board's Counsel sought to alert
the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs of
impending public disclosures regarding NSC staff involvement in
Central America that would lead directly to the White House.
In spite of the fact that both the Iranian initiative and
the involvement of the National Security Council staff in support
of military operations in Nicaragua had been kept from this
Board, our Counsel developed independent information that led
to the belief that members of the NOC staff were deeply involved
in such operations in Nicaragua. Although there was no reason to
question the legality of these activities at that time, the
Board's Counsel informed the NSC's General Counsel of his concerns
and warned of the consequences of not dealing with them.
W. Glenn Campbell
Chairman
Charles J. Meyers, Esq.
Charles Tyroler, II
Member
Member
Intelligance Oversight Board
Report
Comments to
1)
Report, if released or leaked, will generate another
series of bad stories in the press. Its release will
hurt the Administration and the President and will
generate controversy.
2)
It is an interim report; the current timing is not
optimal. If there needs to be a report, in the Board's
judgement, then wait for the final report.
3)
The interim report seems to conclude that certain senior
officials, by name, violated the law by failing to keep
the Board apprised of covert action findings and of
other potential violations of law. Those people are
under investigation, and the release of the report will
prejudice their cases and generate hard feelings by them
toward the President. The Board should not get into the
business of finding guilt or innocence.
4)
The filing of the report will certainly cause the Board
to be requested to testify on the Hill, and the Board's
records and "investigation" files will be subpoenaed by
the Independent Counsel. That will not be good for the
President or the Board.
5)
These matters already are being investigated. Why
doesn't the Board withhold its interim report and final
report until it has the benefit of the Congressional
findings?
6)
Release of the report certainly will result in the
Board's general counsel becoming a witness in the House
and Senate hearings.
SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 9, 1987
Re: President's Intelligence Oversight
Board Interim Report
Dear Mr. Attorney General:
Enclosed is a copy of the Interim Report, dated April 2,
1987, of the President's Intelligence Oversight Board. As
you know, the President's Intelligence Oversight Board
presented this Interim Report to the President on April 3,
1987.
The President did not request the Interim Report, and, due to 73
its sensitivity and potential prejudicial impact upon
individuals who may be the subject of ongoing investigations,
the President determined that the Interim Report should not
be publicly released. The President further directed that
the Interim Report be closely held and safeguarded and
treated as if it were classified information. Accordingly,
copies of the Report are maintained only in two locations in
The White House (in the confidential file safe at central
records and in my safe), in addition to whatever copies the
President's Intelligence Oversight Board may have.
As you know, under Section 2 (b) of Executive Order 12334, the
President's Intelligence Oversight Board is instructed to
forward to the Attorney General reports it receives
concerning intelligence activities that the Board believes
may be unlawful. It is unclear to me whether the Board's
April 2 Interim Report concludes that violations of law may
have occurred, or simply that certain senior officials of the
intelligence community failed to follow "established
practice" in keeping the Board advised of covert action
findings. I further note that Section 4 of Executive Order
12334 requires Inspectors General and General Counsel of the
intelligence community, to the extent permitted by law, to
report to the Board intelligence activities that such
officials have reason to believe may be unlawful or contrary
to Executive Order or Presidential directive. Since the
individuals named in the Report did not serve in such
positions, it is likewise unclear to me whether the Board
believes that the requirements of Section 4 of Executive
Order 12334 were not followed.
SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
2
From our discussions, I know that you share the President's
view that the Report should remain confidential. You also
might wish to know that I have provided a copy of the Interim
Report to Judge Walsh with the understanding that it be
closely safeguarded and accorded confidential treatment.
Sincerely,
Arthur B. Culvahouse, Jr.
Counsel to the President
The Honorable Edwin Meese III
Attorney General
United States Department of Justice
10th Street and Constitution Avenue, N.W.
Room 5111
Washington, D.C. 20530
Enclosure
SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
1111.
WASHINGTON
PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD
April 2, 1987
FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD
SUBJECT: Interim Report
Your Intelligence Oversight Board, pursuant to its responsi-
bilities under Executive Order 12334, has been conducting an
inquiry into the Iranian arms sales and related matters. Our
investigation is still in progress and we expect to be able to
report our conclusions to you in the near future. This is an
interim report.
Contrary to law and established practice, senior officials
of the Intelligence Community failed to keep your Board apprised
of covert action findings and possible violations of law.
Specifically, the November 1985 flight carrying arms to Iran, a
possible violation of the Hughes-Ryan Amendment requiring a
Presidential Finding for covert activities, was not reported to
this Board as required by your Executive Order 12334. Further,
a long standing requirement to brief the Board on covert action
findings, reaffirmed by you in January 1983, and again confirmed
in September 1985 by the Director of Central Intelligence, required
that the Board be briefed on the Presidential Finding of January 17,
1986. This requirement was not met Had these requirements of
law and established practice been respected, we are confident
that your Board could have rendered a valuable service by carefully
monitoring and giving you its independent advice on the legality
and prudence of these intelligence activities Those who knew
or certainly should have known of the above requirements include
former Chief of Staff Donald T. Regan, former National Security
Adviser John M. Poindexter and former Director of Central Intelligence
William J. Casey.
One recommendation that will undoubtedly result from our
inquiry will be to confirm the role of this Board in the review
of covert action findings. The Board can help you only when
fully informed. That this Board can help protect the Executive
against unwise intelligence activities is underlined by the fact
that late in October 1986 the Board's Counsel sought to alert
the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs of
impending public disclosures regarding NSC staff involvement in
Central America that would lead directly to the White House.
In spite of the fact that both the Iranian initiative and
the involvement of the National Security Council staff in support
of military operations in Nicaragua had been kept from this
Board, our Counsel developed independent information that led
Codification of Presidential Proclamations and Executive Orders
Chapter 32-National Defense
knowledged publicly, and functions in support of such activities, but
SEC. 3. The Board shall, when required by this Order, report directly
which are not intended to influence United States political processes,
to the President. The Board shall consider and take appropriate action
public opinion, policies, or media and do not include diplomatic activi-
with respect to matters identified by the Director of Central Intelli-
ties or the collection and production of intelligence or related support
gence, the Central Intelligence Agency or other agencies of the Intelli-
functions.
gence Community. With respect to matters deemed appropriate by the
(i) United States person means a United States citizen, an alien known
President, the Board shall advise and make appropriate recommenda-
by the intelligence agency concerned to be a permanent resident alien,
tions to the Director of Central Intelligence, the Central Intelligence
an unincorporated association substantially composed of United States
Agency, and other agencies of the Intelligence Community.
citizens or permanent resident aliens, or a corporation incorporated in
SEC. 4. The heads of departments and agencies of the Intelligence
the United States, except for a corporation directed and controlled by a
Community shall, to the extent permitted by law, provide the Board
foreign government or governments.
with all information necessary to carry out its responsibilities. Inspec-
3.5 Purpose and Effect. This Order is intended to control and provide
tors General and General Counsel of the Intelligence Community shall,
direction and guidance to the Intelligence Community. Nothing con-
to the extent permitted by law, report to the Board concerning intelli-
tained herein or in any procedures promulgated hereunder is intended
gence activities that they have reason to believe may be unlawful or
to confer any substantive or procedural right or privilege on any
contrary to Executive order or Presidential directive.
person or organization.
SEC. 5. Information made available to the Board shall be given all
3.6 Revocation. Executive Order No. 12036 of January 24, 1978, as
necessary security protection in accordance with applicable laws and
amended, entitled "United States Intelligence Activities," is revoked.
regulations. Each member of the Board, each member of the Board's
staff, and each of the Board's consultants shall execute an agreement
Executive Order 12334-President's Intelligence Oversight Board
never to reveal any classified information obtained by virtue of his or
her service with the Board except to the President or to such persons
SOURCE: The provisions of Executive Order 12334 of Dec. 4, 1981, appear at 46 FR
as the President may designate.
59955, 3 CFR, 1981 Comp., P. 216, unless otherwise noted.
SEC. 6. Members of the Board shall serve without compensation, but
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and
may receive transportation, expense, and per diem allowances as au-
statutes of the United States of America, and in order to enhance the
thorized by law. Staff and consultants to the Board shall receive pay
security of the United States by assuring the legality of activities of the
and allowances as authorized by the President.
Intelligence Community, it is hereby ordered as follows:
SECTION 1. There is hereby established within the White House
Executive Order 12356-National security information
Office, Executive Office of the President, the President's Intelligence
Oversight Board, which shall be composed of three members. One
SOURCE: The provisions of Executive Order 12356 of Apr. 2, 1982, appear at 47 FR
member, appointed from among the membership of the President's For-
14874 and 15557, 3 CFR, 1982 Comp., p. 166, unless otherwise noted.
eign Intelligence Advisory Board, shall be designated by the President
TABLE OF CONTENTS
as Chairman. Members of the Board shall serve at the pleasure of the
Page
President and shall be appointed by the President from among trust-
worthy and distinguished citizens outside the Government who are
PREAMBLE
[588]
qualified on the basis of achievement, experience and independence.
The Board shall utilize such full-time staff and consultants as authorized
PART 1. Original Classification
by the President.
1.1 Classification Levels
[588]
SEC. 2. The Board shall:
1.2 Classification Authority
[589]
(a) Inform the President of intelligence activities that any member of
1.3 Classification Categories
[591]
the Board believes are in violation of the Constitution or laws of the
1.4 Duration of Classification
[591]
United States, Executive orders, or Presidential directives;
1.5 Identification and Markings
[592]
(b) Forward to the Attorney General reports received concerning in-
1.6 Limitations on Classification
[592]
telligence activities that the Board believes may be unlawful;
PART 2. Derivative Classification
(c) Review the internal guidelines of each agency within the Intelli-
2.1 Use of Derivative Classification
gence Community concerning the lawfulness of intelligence activities;
[593]
2.2 Classification Guides
(d) Review the practices and procedures of the Inspectors General
[593]
and General Counsel of the Intelligence Community for discovering
PART 3. Declassification and Downgrading
and reporting intelligence activities that may be unlawful or contrary to
3.1 Declassification Authority
[593]
Executive order or Presidential directive; and
3.2 Transferred Information
[594]
(e) Conduct such investigations as the Board deems necessary to
3.3 Systematic Review for Declassification
[594]
carry out its functions under this Order.
3.4 Mandatory Review for Declassification
[595]
586
587
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOT SE
WASHINGTON
PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD
29 June 1987
TO:
JOHN TUCK
DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND
EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF
FROM:
BRETTON G. SCIARONI
BGS
COUNSEL
SUBJECT.
Board Meeting with Baker, Carlucci and Webster
As you know, after the Board's April 3, 1986 meeting
with the President, Senator Baker had Mr. Culvahouse convey
to the Board his desire to nave a meeting with the Board
and the National Security Adviser and the Director of Central
Intelligence. That meeting was initially delayed because of
the necessity to wait for Judge Webster's confirmation.
However, now that nearly three months has elapsed since
the initial proposal by Senator Baker, it is imperative that
the meeting occur next week. The Chairman of the Board anc
one of the members have commitments for the rest of the
month of July, and it seems unlikely that such a meeting
will occur in August. Therefore, next week will be the last
opportunity to nold the meeting until the fall. Please let
me know which day next week will be convenient for the other
proposed participants.
Copy to: Arthur B. Culvanouse. Jr.
Counsel to the President
111 TOP WIR N
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD
April 16, 1987
FOR:
ARTHUR E. CULVAHOUSE, JR.
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
BRETTON G. SCIARONI
BGS
COUNSEL
SUBJECT: Proposed Meeting with the President's Intelligence
Oversight Board
At our meeting on April 3, 1987 you stated that Senator Baker
nad proposed that the Board hold an early meeting with himself.
In. Carlucci Judge Webster and you. As we understood it. the
purpose of the meeting is to discuss the ways in which the Board's
role can De clearly defined and strengthened in various respects.
AS you know, the Board can effectively assist the President
one, wr.er. fully informed of simificant develop entr. Trusenwentur
we are interested in measures that will make certain that we
successfully discharge our responsibilities in the
Our next board meeting is on Friday, April 2-. 19:5. It
would DE happy to hold the meeting any time during the DAY that 10
convenient for Senator Baker and for the other proposed participant.
Flease let me know as soon as possible when the meeting will ne
held.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 20, 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR HOWARD H. BAKER, JR.
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
FRANK C. CARLUCCI
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
WILLIAM H. WEBSTER
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
FROM:
ARTHUR B. CULVAHOUSE, JR.
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT
Are
SUBJECT:
Meeting in Howard Baker's Office,
5:00 p.m., Monday, July 20, 1987
The four of us are scheduled to meet at 5:00 p.m. on Monday,
July 20, in Howard Baker's office at the White House.
The purpose of the meeting is to consider a request by the
President's Intelligence Oversight Board (created by
Executive Order 12334) to meet with the Chief of Staff to
the President, the National Security Adviser and the
Director of Central Intelligence. At such a meeting, it is
anticipated that the Intelligence Oversight Board will
request that it be provided contemporaneous copies of all
covert action findings. As Howard Baker and Frank Carlucci
are aware, the Intelligence Oversight Board this Spring
issued an "Interim Report", based upon a staff
"investigation", concluding that three former high ranking
Executive Branch officials acted "contrary to law and
established practice" in failing to keep the Intelligence
Oversight Board aware of the Iranian arms transactions and
related matters. The Intelligence Oversight Board further
stated that former DCI William Casey had agreed to provide
the Intelligence Oversight Board with copies of special
activities findings.
Relatedly, I believe that the President's Intelligence
Oversight Board is likely to be criticized in the final
reports to be issued sometime this Fall by the House and
Senate Select Committees investigating the Iran/Contra
matters. As you know, the President's Special Review Board
(the Tower Board) and press commentators criticized the
- 2 -
Intelligence Oversight Board for exceeding its impartial
oversight role by issuing a legal opinion to LtCol Oliver
North concluding that the National Security Council was not
covered by the Boland Amendments. Accordingly, I believe
that it might be prudent to discuss, preliminarily and
internally, potential preemptive actions that might be taken
to respond to these past and probable future criticisms of
the Intelligence Oversight Board. In short, any discussion
with the Intelligence Oversight Board regarding its access
to special activities findings also should include
consideration of operational and structural changes designed
to enhance the Board's intelligence oversight function and
to moot any changes therein to be recommended by Congress.
July 20, 1987
I.
Request for Notification of Findings.
II.
Restructuring.
A.
Merge with PFIAB and/or Subcommittee of PFIAB
B.
Additional Members of Staff with Intelligence and
Legal Backgrounds
C.
New Membership and/or New Chairman with Access to
Findings and MONs
Codification of Presidential Proclamations and Executive Orders
Chapter 32-National Defense
knowledged publicly, and functions in support of such activities, but
SEC. 3. The Board shall, when required by this Order, report directly
which are not intended to influence United States political processes,
to the President. The Board shall consider and take appropriate action
public opinion, policies, or media and do not include diplomatic activi-
with respect to matters identified by the Director of Central Intelli-
ties or the collection and production of intelligence or related support
gence, the Central Intelligence Agency or other agencies of the Intelli-
functions.
gence Community. With respect to matters deemed appropriate by the
(i) United States person means a United States citizen, an alien known
President, the Board shall advise and make appropriate recommenda-
by the intelligence agency concerned to be a permanent resident alien,
tions to the Director of Central Intelligence, the Central Intelligence
an unincorporated association substantially composed of United States
Agency, and other agencies of the Intelligence Community.
citizens or permanent resident aliens, or a corporation incorporated in
SEC. 4. The heads of departments and agencies of the Intelligence
the United States, except for a corporation directed and controlled by a
Community shall, to the extent permitted by law, provide the Board
foreign government or governments.
with all information necessary to carry out its responsibilities. Inspec-
3.5 Purpose and Effect. This Order is intended to control and provide
tors General and General Counsel of the Intelligence Community shall,
direction and guidance to the Intelligence Community. Nothing con-
to the extent permitted by law, report to the Board concerning intelli-
tained herein or in any procedures promulgated hereunder is intended
gence activities that they have reason to believe may be unlawful or
to confer any substantive or procedural right or privilege on any
contrary to Executive order or Presidential directive.
person or organization.
SEC. 5. Information made available to the Board shall be given all
3.6 Revocation. Executive Order No. 12036 of January 24, 1978, as
necessary security protection in accordance with applicable laws and
amended, entitled "United States Intelligence Activities," is revoked.
regulations. Each member of the Board, each member of the Board's
staff, and each of the Board's consultants shall execute an agreement
Executive Order 12334-President's Intelligence Oversight Board
never to reveal any classified information obtained by virtue of his or
her service with the Board except to the President or to such persons
SOURCE: The provisions of Executive Order 12334 of Dec. 4, 1981, appear at 46 FR
as the President may designate.
59955, 3 CFR, 1981 Comp., p. 216, unless otherwise noted.
SEC. 6. Members of the Board shall serve without compensation, but
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and
may receive transportation, expense, and per diem allowances as au-
statutes of the United States of America, and in order to enhance the
thorized by law. Staff and consultants to the Board shall receive pay
security of the United States by assuring the legality of activities of the
and allowances as authorized by the President.
Intelligence Community, it is hereby ordered as follows:
SECTION 1. There is hereby established within the White House
Executive Order 12356-National security information
Office, Executive Office of the President, the President's Intelligence
Oversight Board, which shall be composed of three members. One
SOURCE: The provisions of Executive Order 12356 of Apr. 2, 1982, appear at 47 FR
member, appointed from among the membership of the President's For-
14874 and 15557, 3 CFR, 1982 Comp., p. 166, unless otherwise noted.
eign Intelligence Advisory Board, shall be designated by the President
TABLE OF CONTENTS
as Chairman. Members of the Board shall serve at the pleasure of the
Page
President and shall be appointed by the President from among trust-
worthy and distinguished citizens outside the Government who are
PREAMBLE
[588]
qualified on the basis of achievement, experience and independence.
The Board shall utilize such full-time staff and consultants as authorized
PART 1. Original Classification
by the President.
1.1 Classification Levels
[588]
SEC. 2. The Board shall:
1.2 Classification Authority
[589]
(a) Inform the President of intelligence activities that any member of
1.3 Classification Categories
[591]
the Board believes are in violation of the Constitution or laws of the
1.4 Duration of Classification
[591]
United States, Executive orders, or Presidential directives;
1.5 Identification and Markings
[592]
(b) Forward to the Attorney General reports received concerning in-
1.6 Limitations on Classification
[592]
telligence activities that the Board believes may be unlawful;
PART 2. Derivative Classification
(c) Review the internal guidelines of each agency within the Intelli-
2.1 Use of Derivative Classification
gence Community concerning the lawfulness of intelligence activities;
[593]
2.2 Classification Guides
(d) Review the practices and procedures of the Inspectors General
[593]
and General Counsel of the Intelligence Community for discovering
PART 3. Declassification and Downgrading
and reporting intelligence activities that may be unlawful or contrary to
3.1 Declassification Authority
[593]
Executive order or Presidential directive; and
3.2 Transferred Information
[594]
(e) Conduct such investigations as the Board deems necessary to
3.3 Systematic Review for Declassification
[594]
carry out its functions under this Order.
3.4 Mandatory Review for Declassification
[595]
586
587
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name
Withdrawer
CULVAHOUSE, ARTHUR 3.:FILES
DLB 5/14/2014
File Folder
FOIA
IRAN/ARMS TRANSACTION: PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE
S643
OVERSIGHT BOARD MEETING AND REPORT - APRIL 3, 1987
SYSTEMATIC
Box Number
CFOA 1129
142
ID
Document Type
No of
Doc Date
Restric-
Document Description
pages
tions
164965 LETTER
2
8/6/1987
B1
WILLIAM WEBSTER TO GLENN CAMPBELL
The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
A.B.,
Your thoughts on the attached.
M
Rhett
let me know
\
110.00
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
September 21, 1987
Dear Kathy,
Dr. Campbell asked that I get this
letter for the President to you. If
you have any questions or guidance for
me please feel free to call me on X2530.
FYI Dr. Campbell was in town yesterday
and today for the first time since his
heart surgery and is doing great. He will
be back in town this Sunday and plans to
attend the Ronald Reagan Foundation
Luncheon on Monday.
Thank you,
vr
Joan je Edwards
SECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD
September 21, 1987
Dear Mr. President:
We urgently request an early meeting with you, preferably
this Monday, September 28, 1987, to discuss the operations
and authority of your Board.
We attended a meeting on this subject with Senator Baker,
Judge Webster and Mr. Carlucci on July 31, 1987. Our
understanding of the agreement reached at the meeting was
summarized in a letter written the same day to Senator Baker
(copy attached). Our understanding was subsequently confirmed
by Judge Webster in a letter to us dated August 6, 1987 (copy
attached).
Finally, on September 9, 1987 we received a letter from Senator
Baker (copy attached) which we feel does not adequately
respond to our letter nor reflect the agreement we thought
had been reached. We SO informed Senator Baker in a memorandum
dated September 10, 1987 (copy attached) and asked for a
meeting with him. This had not taken place, nor been scheduled,
despite our best efforts.
Respectfully,
W. Glenn Campbell
Chairman
Charles Tyroler, II
Charles Jarvis Meyers
Members
By direction: JoonK. Edwards Secretacy
The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.
Copy to: Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr.
Chief of Staff to the President
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
WHEN SEPARATED FROM
SECRET
SECRET ATTACHMENT
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARL
July 31, 1987
Dear Senator Baker:
We much appreciated and enjoyed our meeting with you and
your colleagues this morning, and were happy to find that all
of us are in agreement.
To summarize our understanding of that agreement:
The Board will receive bi-annual briefings on all covert
actions being undertaken. a: least one to De conducted by the
Director of Central Intelligence.
The Board will receive the same timely briefings on new
Presidential findings as are to be accorded to the Congress.
We recognize that the President may decide to have neither of
us briefed or to have one of us and not the other.
In accordance with Executive Order 12334, the Board will
report directly to the President, who in his sole discretion
will determine whether or not to make such reports public.
The Board will continue its past consistent practice of not
granting interviews tc the media.
We have reviewed this letter with Dr. Campbell in California
who asks that you consider him a signer.
Sincerely
Charles Tyroler, II
Chank Member
Charles Jarvis Meyers
Member
The Honorable Howard H. Baker, Jr.
Chief of Staff to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C.
Copies to:
The Honorable William Webster
Director of the Central Intelligence
The Honorable Frank C. Carlucci
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name
Withdrawer
CULVAHOUSE, ARTHUR B.:FILES
DLB 5/14/2014
File Folder
FOIA
IRAN/ARMS TRANSACTION: PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE
S643
OVERSIGHT BOARD MEETING AND REPORT - APRIL 3, 1987
SYSTEMATIC
Box Number
CFOA 1129
142
ID
Document Type
No of
Doc Date
Restric-
Document Description
pages
tions
164966 LETTER
2
8/6/1987
B1
COPY OF 164965, WITH SLIGHT NOTATION
The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
August 31, 1987
Gentlemen:
I have received your letter of July 31, 1987 setting forth your
understanding of the arrangements discussed at our meeting of
even date therewith. You should be aware that the procedures
for notifying Congress of Presidential findings are presently
under review and that the precise notification procedures have
not yet been finalized or approved by the President. In
addition, the arrangements proposed by Bill Webster for
notification to the President's Intelligence Oversight Board
also are subject to being countermanded by the President
should he so determine (as acknowledged in your letter).
The Counsel to the President has pointed out that although your
letter is addressed to me as Chief of Staff, Executive Order
12334 requires certain activities to be reported to the
Intelligence Oversight Board by the "intelligence community,"
which by definition does not include the National Security
Council or the White House Staff; and, more importantly, that
the current procedures for notifying Congress (as well as the
anticipated new procedures) provide that Congressional
notification is to be carried out by the Director of Central
Intelligence or the head of such other agency or entity that
has operational control of the special activity. Accordingly,
the Director of Central Intelligence or the head of such other
agency or entity should bear the responsibility for consulta-
tion with the Intelligence Oversight Board subject, as
aforesaid, to other Presidential determination. Finally,
consistent with normal intelligence policy and coordination
procedures, I respectfully suggest that the Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs should continue to be
the point of contact within the White House staff for the
President's Intelligence Oversight Board.
Sincerely,
Chief of Staff to the President
The Honorable W. Glenn Campbell
The Honorable Charles Jarvis Meyers
The Honorable Charles Tyroler, II
President's Intelligence Oversight Board
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
Rec'd simetral jho
CC: The Honorable Frank C. Carlucci
The Honorable William H. Webster
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD
September 10, 1987
TO:
SENATOR HOWARD H. BAKER, JR.
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD
W. GLENN CAMPBELL, CHAIRMAN
CHARLES TYROLER, II
CHARLES JARVIS MEYERS
SUBJECT:
Letter of August 31, 1987
We believe our letter of July 31, 1987 states the agreements
reached on that date at our meeting with you, Judge Webster
and Mr. Carlucci. Judge Webster agrees; please see his
letter of 6 August 1987.
The letter of August 31, 1987 received in our White House
office on September 9 does not, in our view, comport with
the agreements reached on July 31, and we do feel that we
can operate effectively under the provisions of the August
letter. We of course agree that the President is free to
make both general and particular rules on intelligence
briefings for PIOB. That principle is made express in our
July 31 letter, but that letter also makes clear the
general rule on briefings of the Board. The August 31
letter leaves the matter confused, at best.
We note further that reporting directly to the President 1s
the procedure specified by Executive Order No. 12334 and,
in the light of recent events, we believe that is the
procedure best adapted to the performance of our duties
under the Executive Order.
We request a meeting on this matter with you on September 23.
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN
SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED
ENCLOSURE
SECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Date: 9/28/87
TO:
JOHN TUCK
FROM: ARTHUR B. CULVAHOUSE, JR.
Counsel to the President
FYI:
COMMENT: For HHB's signature.
ACTION:
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
September 28, 1987
Gentlemen:
In order to alleviate the concerns which you have expressed
in connection with the procedures for notifying the
President's Intelligence Oversight Board of special
activities findings, permit me to amplify my understanding.
I agree that the basic understanding is set forth in the
letter to the Board dated August 6, 1987, from the Director
of Central Intelligence. As recognized in your letter to me
of July 31, 1987, the President may decide to brief neither
Congress nor the Board, or to brief one of Congress or the
Board and not the other.
As you know, the current procedures for notifying Congress
provide that Congressional notification of special activities
is to be carried out by the Director of Central Intelligence
(or the head of such other agency or entity that has
operational control of the special activity). I understand
Bill Webster's August 6 letter as confirming that the CIA
will assume the similar responsibility for consultation with
the Board. The point I was trying to make in my August 31
letter is that the National Security Adviser to the President
and the Chief of Staff to the President are not in a position
to assure in each case that briefings have been provided to
the Board and that, as an institutional matter, the Board
should look to the Central Intelligence Agency for such
briefings. Of course, in matters of importance or urgency,
Frank Carlucci and I remain available for consultation with
the Board.
There is no dispute regarding whether the Board reports
directly to the President as specified under Executive Order
No. 12334. Of course the Board reports directly to the
President. No one suggests otherwise. What I do suggest,
and as stated in my August 31 letter, is that the White
House staff contact for the Board henceforth should be
the National Security Adviser to the President, just as the
National Security Adviser serves as the senior staff point of
contact within the White House for the Executive Branch
intelligence community.
2
I hope that the foregoing clarifies any concerns that the
Board might have.
Sincerely,
Howard H. Baker, Jr.
Chief of Staff to the President
President's Intelligence Oversight Board
Old Executive Office Building
Room 331
Washington, D.C. 20500
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD
September 26, 1987
Dear Mr. Culvahouse,
This is in response to your letter of 25 September, and
enclosure.
You have alleviated the Board's concerns and your draft
letter from Senator Baker is satisfactory.
Thank you for your understanding and cooperation.
Yours, 2kl
Charles Tyroler, II
Member
The Honorable Arthur B. Culvahouse, Jr
Counsel to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
September 25, 1987
Dear Mr. Tyroler:
Pursuant to our telephone conversation earlier this week,
enclosed is a draft letter to the President's Intelligence
Oversight Board from the Chief of Staff to the President,
which is designed to clarify the misunderstandings arising
from earlier correspondence. As I explained to you, I do not
think there is any disagreement, and I believe that Howard
Baker's draft letter should alleviate any concerns that the
President's Intelligence Oversight Board might have.
I would welcome any substantive comments from the Board as we
would hope to clarify this matter as quickly as possible and
thereby avoid any unnecessary procedural meetings with the
Chief of Staff or the President.
Permit me to emphasize one point that must be clear -- in
light of the Board's recent criticisms of former senior White
House staff. Howard Baker and Frank Carlucci will not have
operational responsibility for notifying the President's
Intelligence Oversight Board of special activities findings.
Under current law and Executive branch procedures, Congres-
sional notification clearly is the responsibility and
jurisdiction of the Central Intelligence Agency. Current
procedures for clearance, execution and notification of
findings are designed with that arrangement in mind. Accord-
ingly, while Howard Baker and Frank Carlucci have agreed with
Bill Webster that the Board should be notified of findings
contemporaneously with notification to Congress, and while
they support that policy, they cannot in practical terms be
viewed as enforcers or guarantors of that policy on a
day-to-day operating basis.
2
I look forward to receiving the Board's comments with respect
to the enclosed draft letter.
Sincerely,
Arthur B. Culvahouse, Jr.
Counsel to the President
Mr. Charles Tyroler, II
Member, President's Intelligence
Oversight Board
Old Executive Office Building
Room 331
Washington, D.C. 20500
CC: W. Glenn Campbell
Charles Jarvis Meyers
DRAFT
PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD
Gentlemen:
In order to alleviate the concerns which you have expressed
in connection with the procedures for notifying the
President's Intelligence Oversight Board of special
activities findings, permit me to amplify my understanding.
I agree that the basic understanding is set forth in the
letter to the Board dated August 6, 1987, from the Director
of Central Intelligence. As recognized in your letter to me
of July 31, 1987, the President may decide to brief neither
Congress nor the Board, or to brief one of Congress or the
Board and not the other.
As you know, the current procedures for notifying Congress
provide that Congressional notification of special activities
is to be carried out by the Director of Central Intelligence
(or the head of such other agency or entity that has
operational control of the special activity). I understand
Bill Webster's August 6 letter as confirming that the CIA
will assume the similar responsibility for consultation with
the Board. The point I was trying to make in my August 31
letter is that the National Security Adviser to the President
and the Chief of Staff to the President are not in a position
2
to assure in each case that briefings have been provided to
the Board and that, as an institutional matter, the Board
should look to the Central Intelligence Agency for such
briefings. Of course, in matters of importance or urgency,
Frank Carlucci and I remain available for consultation with
the Board.
There is no dispute regarding whether the Board reports
directly to the President as specified under Executive Order
No. 12334. Of course the Board reports directly to the
President. No one suggests otherwise. What I do suggest,
and as stated in my August 31 letter, is that the White
House staff contact for the Board henceforth should be
the National Security Adviser to the President, just as the
National Security Adviser serves as the senior staff point of
contact within the White House for the Executive Branch
intelligence community.
I hope that the foregoing clarifies any concerns that the
Board might have.
Sincerely,
Howard H. Baker, Jr.
Chief of Staff to the President
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
September 29, 1987
Gentlemen:
In order to alleviate the concerns which you have expressed
in connection with the procedures for notifying the
President's Intelligence Oversight Board of special
activities findings, permit me to amplify my understanding.
I agree that the basic understanding is set forth in the
letter to the Board dated August 6, 1987, from the Director
of Central Intelligence. As recognized in your letter to me
of July 31, 1987, the President may decide to brief neither
Congress nor the Board, or to brief one of Congress or the
Board and not the other.
As you know, the current procedures for notifying Congress
provide that Congressional notification of special activities
is to be carried out by the Director of Central Intelligence
(or the head of such other agency or entity that has
operational control of the special activity). I understand
Bill Webster's August 6 letter as confirming that the CIA
will assume the similar responsibility for consultation with
the Board. The point I was trying to make in my August 31
letter is that the National Security Adviser to the President
and the Chief of Staff to the President are not in a position
to assure in each case that briefings have been provided to
the Board and that, as an institutional matter, the Board
should look to the Central Intelligence Agency for such
briefings. Of course, in matters of importance or urgency,
Frank Carlucci and I remain available for consultation with
the Board.
There is no dispute regarding whether the Board reports
directly to the President as specified under Executive Order
No. 12334. Of course the Board reports directly to the
President. No one suggests otherwise. What I do suggest,
and as stated in my August 31 letter, is that the White
House staff contact for the Board henceforth should be
the National Security Adviser to the President, just as the
National Security Adviser serves as the senior staff point of
contact within the White House for the Executive Branch
intelligence community.
2
I hope that the foregoing clarifies any concerns that the
Board might have.
76152 H.
Chief
President's Intelligence Oversight Board
Old Executive Office Building
Room 331
Washington, D.C. 20500