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Iran/Arms Transaction: Notebook - Statements in Support of Geo-Strategic Opening (3)
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118565796
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Iran/Arms Transaction: Notebook - Statements in Support of Geo-Strategic Opening (3)
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Records of the Office of Counsel to the President (Reagan Administration)
Arthur Culvahouse's Office Files
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Culvahouse, Arthur B.: Files
Folder Title: Iran/Arms Transaction: Notebook -
Statements in Support of Geo-Strategic Opening (3)
Box: CFOA 1132
To see more digitized collections visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection
Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected]
Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing
National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name CULVAHOUSE, ARTHUR FILES
Withdrawer
DLB
10/2/2014
File Folder
IRAN/ARMS TRANSACTION: STATEMENTS IN
FOIA
SUPPORT OF GEO-STRATEGIC OPENING (NOTEBOOK)
S643
(3 OF 4)
Box Number
CFOA 1132
SYSTEMATIC
192
ID
Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
165897
PAPER
U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAN: COMMENT
3 6/28/1985 B1
ON DRAFT NSDD
165898
CABLE
WHO 3252
4 7/14/1985 B1
165899
CABLE
SECTO 13108
3 7/14/1985 B1
165900
FINDING
DUPLICATE OF #165895; RE: MIDDLE
1
ND
B1
EAST/HOSTAGES
The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing
Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
5
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
1243
WASHINGTON
402010 F
NTP01 NO
22
TOP SECRET
June 29, 1985
NSC - Robert C. McFarlane
-
Bud,
My comments on the draft NSDD on Iran are
attached.
Green
Attachment:
U.S. Policy Toward Iran: Comment on
Draft NSDD
TOP SECRET
DECL:OADR
du
10/2/14
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name
Withdrawer
CULVAHOUSE, ARTHUR 3.:FILES
DLB 10/2/2014
File Folder
FOIA
IRAN/ARMS TRANSACTION: STATEMENTS IN SUPPORT OF
S643
GEO-STRATEGIC OPENING (NOTEBOOK) (3 OF 4)
SYSTEMATIC
Box Number
CFOA 1132
192
ID
Document Type
No of
Doc Date
Restric-
Document Description
pages
tions
165897 PAPER
3 6/28/1985
BI
U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAN: COMMENT ON
DRAFT NSDD
The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
6
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name
Withdrawer
CULVAHOUSE, ARTHUR B.:FILES
DLB 10/2/2014
File Folder
FOIA
IRAN/ARMS TRANSACTION: STATEMENTS IN SUPPORT OF
S643
GEO-STRATEGIC OPENING (NOTEBOOK) (3 OF 4)
SYSTEMATIC
Box Number
CFOA 1132
192
ID
Document Type
No of Doc Date
Restric-
Document Description
pages
tions
165898 CABLE
4
7/14/1985
B1
WHO 3252
The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing
Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
7
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name
Withdrawer
CULVAHOUSE, ARTHUR B.:FILES
DLB 10/2/2014
File Folder
FOIA
IRAN/ARMS TRANSACTION: STATEMENTS IN SUPPORT OF
S643
GEO-STRATEGIC OPENING (NOTEBOOK) (3 OF 4)
SYSTEMATIC
Box Number
CFOA 1132
192
ID
Document Type
No of
Doc Date
Restric-
Document Description
pages
tions
165899 CABLE
3
7/14/1985
B1
SECTO 13108
The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
8
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name
Withdrawer
CULVAHOUSE, ARTHUR 3.:FILES
DLB 10/2/2014
File Folder
FOIA
IRAN/ARMS TRANSACTION: STATEMENTS IN SUPPORT OF
S643
GEO-STRATEGIC OPENING (NOTEBOOK) (3 OF 4)
SYSTEMATIC
Box Number
CFOA 1132
192
ID
Document Type
No of
Doc Date
Restric-
Document Description
pages
tions
165900 FINDING
1
ND
B1
DUPLICATE OF #165895; RE: MIDDLE
EAST/HOSTAGES
The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
9
TUP SECRET
SYSTEM IV
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
N
1323
UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
JOHN M. POINDEXTER
SUBJECT:
Covert Action Finding regarding Iran
This week, Prime Minister Peres of Israel secretly dispatched his
special advisor on terrorism with instructions to propose a plan
by which Israel, with limited assistance from the U.S., can act
to bring about a more moderate government in Iran. The Israelis
are very concerned that Iran's deteriorating position in the war
with Iraq, the potential for further radicalization in Iran, and
the possibility of enhanced Soviet influence in the Gulf all pose
significant threats to the security of Israel. They believe it
is essential that they act to at least preserve a balance of
power in the region.
The Israeli plan is premised on the assumption that moderate
elements in Iran can come to power if these factions demonstrate
their credibility in defending Iran against Iraq and in deterring
Soviet intervention. To achieve the strategic goal of a more
moderate Iranian government, the Israelis are prepared to
unilaterally commence selling military materiel to Western-
oriented Iranian factions. It is their belief that by so doing
they can achieve a heretofore unobtainable penetration of the
Iranian governing heirarchy. The Israelis are convinced that the
Iranians are so desperate for military materiel, expertise and
intelligence that the provision of these resources will result in
favorable long-term changes in personnel and attitudes within the
Iranian government. Further, once the exchange relationship has
commenced, a dependency would be established on those who are
providing the requisite resources, thus allowing the providor (s)
to coercively influence near-term events. Such an outcome is
consistent with our policy objectives and would present
significant advantages for U.S. national interests.
As described by the Prime Minister's emissary, the only
requirement the Israelis have is an assurance that they will be
allowed to purchase U.S. replenishments for the stocks that they
sell to Iran. A Presidential Covert Action Finding is required
in order for us to allow the Israeli transfers to proceed, for
our subsequent replenishment sales to Israel, or for other
assistance which may be deemed appropriate (e.g., intelligence)
Declassify on: OADR
NY
0.7
1 May 1987-
2,
E.O.
12356
UNGLASSITIED
N
1324
2
The Covert Action Finding attached at Tab A provides the lattitude
for the transactions indicated above to proceed. If this Finding
is signed, we would not interfere when the Israelis unilaterally
commence sales and deliveries of TOW missiles during January,
1986. The Finding also authorizes U.S. sales of basic TOWs to
Israel when they submit purchase orders for replenishing their
own stocks. The Iranians have indicated an immediate requirement
for 4,000 basic TOW weapons for use in the launchers they already
hold. We would be expected to replace the Israeli stocks in less
than 30 days. 4,000 missiles represent 1/3 of all available TOWs
in-Israel.
The Israelis are sensitive to a strong U.S. desire to free our
Beirut hostages and have insisted that the Iranians demonstrate
both influence and good intent by an early release of the five
Americans. Both sides have agreed that the hostages will be
immediately released upon commencement of this action. Prime
Minister Peres had his emissary pointedly note that they well
understand our position on not making concessions to terrorists.
They also point out, however, that terrorist groups, movements,
and organizations are significantly easier to influence through
governments than they are by direct approach. In that we have
been unable to exercise any suasion over Hizballah during the
course of nearly two years of kidnappings, this approach through
the government of Iran may well be our only way to achieve the
release of the Americans held in Beirut. It must again be noted
that since this dialogue with the Iranians began in September,
Reverend Weir has been released and there have been no Shia
terrorist attacks against American or Israeli persons, property,
or interests.
The Israelis have asked for our urgent response to this proposal
so that they can plan accordingly. They note that conditions
inside both Iran and Lebanon are highly violatile and that the
current crisis in the Middle East provides a rationale for a
significant Israeli purchase of TOWs and expedited delivery on
our part. The Israelis are cognizant that this entire operation
will be terminated if the Iranians abandon their goal of moderating
their government or allow further acts of terrorism. In order to
provide an answer to Prime Minister Peres, the Finding at Tab A
should be discussed with Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger,
Director Casey, and Attorney General Meese. If, based on their
input, you decide to proceed, the Finding should be signed.
Because of the extreme sensitivity of this project, it is
recommended that you exercise your constitutional perogative to
withhold notification of the Finding to the Congressional
oversight committees until such time that you deem it to be
appropriate.
on
7MayL
under
provisions
E.O.
13356
3
UNCLASSIFIED
N 1325
Recommendation
OK
No
That you agree to meet with Secretaries Shultz and
Weinberger, Director Casey, and Attorney General
Meese on this matter as soon as possible.
Prepared by:
Oliver L. North
Attachment
Tab A - Covert Action Finding
UNIVERSIFIED
Partially Declassified/Relcased on 7may1987 1987
under provisions of E.O. 12356
to B. Reger, National Security Council
ICLASSIFIED
Finding Pursuant to Section 662 of
N
1326
The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
As Amended, Concerning Operations
Undertaken by the Central Intelligence
Agency in Foreign Countries, Other Than
Those Intended Solely for the Purpose
of Intelligence Collection
I hereby find that the following operation in a foreign
country (including all support necessary to such operation) is
important to the national security of the United States, and due
to its extreme sensitivity and security risks, I determine it is
essential to limit prior notice, and direct the Director of
Central Intelligence to refrain from reporting this Finding to
the Congress as provided in Section 501 of the National Security
Act of 1947, as amended, until I otherwise direct.
SCOPE
DESCRIPTION
Iran
Assist selected friendly foreign liaison services and
third countries, which have established relationships
with Iranian elements, groups, and individuals
sympathetic to U.S. Government interests and which do
not conduct or support terrorist actions directed
against U.S. persons, property or interests, for the
purpose of: (1) establishing a more moderate govern-
ment in Iran, (2) obtaining from them significant
intelligence not otherwise obtainable, to determine the
current Iranian Government's intentions with respect to
its neighbors and with respect to terrorist acts, and
(3) furthering the release of the American hostages
held in Beirut and preventing additional terrorist acts
by these groups. Provide funds, intelligence, counter-
intelligence, training, guidance and communications and
other necessary assistance to these elements, groups,
individuals, liaison services and third countries in
support of these activities.
The USG will act to facilitate efforts by third parties
and third countries to establish contact with moderate
elements within and outside the Government of Iran by
providing these elaments with arms, equipment and
related materiel in order to enhance the credibility of
these elements in their effort to achieve a more
pro-U.S. government in Iran by demonstrating their
ability to obtain requisite resources to defend their
country against Iraq and intervention by the Soviet
Union. This support will be discontinued if the U.S.
Government learns that these elements have abandoned
their goals of moderating their government and
appropriated the materiel for purposes other than that
provided by this Finding.
The White House
OGCR TS 0801-86
Washington, D.C.
TOP SECRET
copy 1
Date: 6 January 1986
7May1987
1987
10
VEVIILI
bh#
UNCLASSIFTED
THE WHITE HOUSE
N 10046
WASHINGTON
January 17, 1986
TOP SECRET
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
JOHN M. POINDEXTER
mb
SUBJECT:
Covert Action Finding Regarding Iran
Prime Minister Peres of Israel secretly dispatched his special
advisor on terrorism with instructions to propose a plan by which
Israel, with limited assistance from the U.S., can create
conditions to help bring about a more moderate government in
Iran. The Israelis are very concerned that Iran's deteriorating
position in the war with Iraq, the potential for further
radicalization in Iran, and the possibility of enhanced Soviet
influence in the Gulf all pose significant threats to the
security of Israel. They believe it is essential that they act
to at least preserve a balance of power in the region.
The Israeli plan is premised on the assumption that moderate
elements in Iran can come to power if these factions demonstrate
their credibility in defending Iran against Iraq and in deterring
Soviet intervention. To achieve the strategic goal of a more
moderate Iranian government, the Israelis are prepared to
unilaterally commence selling military materiel to
Western-oriented Iranian factions. It is their belief that by so
doing they can achieve a heretofore unobtainable penetration of
the Iranian governing hierarchy. The Israelis are convinced that
the Iranians are so desperate for military materiel, expertise
and intelligence that the provision of these resources will
result in favorable long-term changes in personnel and attitudes
within the Iranian government. Further, once the exchange
relationship has commenced, a dependency would be established on
those who are providing the requisite resources, thus allowing
the provider (s) to coercively influence near-term events. Such
an outcome is consistent with our policy objectives and would
present significant advantages for U.S. national interests. As
described by the Prime Minister's emissary, the only requirement
the Israelis have is an assurance that they will be allowed to
purchase U.S. replenishments for the stocks that they sell to
Iran. We have researched the legal problems of Israel's selling
U.S. manufactured arms to Iran. Because of the requirement in
U.S. law for recipients of U.S. arms to notify the U.S.
government of transfers to third countries, I do not recommend
that you agree with the specific details of the Israeli plan.
However, there is another possibility. Some time ago Attorney
TOP SECRET
Particia Declassified / Released on
4 may/982
RECEIVED
T73
Declassify on: OADR
der provisions of E.O. 12356
ger, Natio al Security Council
NOI ASSIENED
Noy 29 1986
TOP SECRET
Copy is Receipt
TOP SECRET
UNCLASSIFIED
N 10047
TOP SECRET
2
General William French Smith determined that under an appropriate
finding you could authorize the CIA to sell arms to countries
outside of the provisions of the laws and reporting requirements
for foreign military sales. The objectives of the Israeli plan
could be met if the CIA, using an authorized agent as necessary,
purchased arms from the Department of Defense under the Economy
Act and then transferred them to Iran directly after receiving
appropriate payment from Iran.
The Covert Action Finding attached at Tab A provides the latitude
for the transactions indicated above to proceed. The Iranians
have indicated an immediate requirement for 4,000 basic TOW
weapons for use in the launchers they already hold.
The Israeli's are also sensitive to a strong U.S. desire to free
our Beirut hostages and have insisted that the Iranians
demonstrate both influence and good intent by an early release of
the five Americans. Both sides have agreed that the hostages
will be immediately released upon commencement of this action.
Prime Minister Peres had his emissary pointedly note that they
well understand our position on not making concessions to
terrorists. They also point out, however, that terrorist groups,
movements, and organizations are significantly easier to
influence through governments than they are by direct approach.
In that we have been unable to exercise any suasion over
Hizballah during the course of nearly two years of kidnappings,
this approach through the government of Iran may well be our only
way to achieve the release of the Americans held in Beirut. It
must again be noted that since this dialogue with the Iranians
began in September, Reverend Weir has been released and there
have been no Shia terrorist attacks against American or Israeli
persons, property, or interests.
Therefore it is proposed that Israel make the necessary
arrangements for the sale of 4000 TOW weapons to Iran.
Sufficient funds to cover the sale would be transferred to an
agent of the CIA. The CIA would then purchase the weapons from
the Department of Defense and deliver the weapons to Iran through
the agent. If all of the hostages are not released after the
first shipment of 1000 weapons, further transfers would cease.
On the other hand, since hostage release is in some respects a
byproduct of a larger effort to develop ties to potentially
moderate forces in Iran, you may wish to redirect such transfers
to other groups within the government at a later time.
TOP SECRET
UNCL ASSIFIED
TOP SECRET
IUP SECRET
CLASSIONS
TOP SECRET
3
The Israelis have asked for our urgent response to this proposal
so that they can plan accordingly. They note that conditions.
inside both Iran and Lebanon are highly volatile. The Israelis
are cognizant that this entire operation will be terminated if
the Iranians abandon their goal of moderating their government or
allow further acts of terrorism. You have discussed the general
outlines of the Israeli plan with Secretaries Shultz and
Weinberger, Attorney General Meese and Director Casey. The
Secretaries do not recommend you proceed with this plan.
Attorney General Meese and Director Casey believe the short-term
and long-term objectives of the plan warrant the policy risks
involved and recommend you approve the attached Finding. Because
of the extreme sensitivity of this project, it is recommended
that you exercise your statutory prerogative to withhold
notification of the Finding to the Congressional oversight
committees until such time that you deem it to be appropriate.
Recommendation
OK
NO
RB
That you sign the attached Finding.
-
Prepared by:
Oliver L. North
Attachment
Tab A - Covert Action Finding
1000 17 In 86
Print was singed verbally from this paper
VP, Don Rega and Don Forting were present
&
UNCLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET
N
9402
discopur Gane to Soction 632 o?
The Foteign Assistance Act. of 1961
As Amended, Concerning Operations
Undertaken by the Central Intelligence
Agency in Foreign Countries, Other Than
Those Intended Solely for the Purpose
of Intolligence Collection
I hereby find that the following operation in a foreign
country (including all support necessary to such operation) is
important to the national security of the United States, and due
to its extreme sensitivity and security risks, I determine it is
essential to limit prior notice, and direct the Director of
Central Insolligence to refrain from reporting this Finding to
the Congress as provided in Soction 501 of the National Security
Act of 1947, as amended, until I otherwise direct.
SCOPE
DESCRIPTION
an
Assist selected friendly foreign liaison services,
third countries and third parties which have
established relationships with Iranian elements,
groups, and individuals sympathetic to U.S. Government
interests and which do not conduct or support terrorist
actions directed against U.S. persons, property or
interests, for the purpose of: (1) establishing a more
moderate government in Iran, (2) obtaining from them
significant intelligence not otherwise obtainable, to
determine the current Iranian Government's intentions
with respect to its neighbors and with respect to
terrorist acts, and (3) furthering the release of the
American hostages held in Beirut and preventing
additional terrorist acts by these groups. Provide
funds, intelligence, counter-intelligence, training,
guidance and communications and other necessary
assistance to these elements, groups, individuals,
liaison services and third countries in support of
these activities.
The USG will act to facilitate efforts by third parties
and third countries to ostablish contact with moderate
elements within and outside the Government of Iran by
providing these elements with arms, equipment and
related materiel in order to enhance the credibility of
these elements in their effort to achieve a more
pro-U.S. government in Iran by demonstrating their
ability to obtain requisite resources to defend their
country against Iraq and intervention by the Soviet
Union. This support will be discontinued if the U.S.
Government learns that these elements have abandoned
their goals of moderating their government and
appropriated the materiel for purposes other than that
provided by this Finding.
The White House
Washington, D.C.
Rouid Rayan
OGCR TS 0801-86
Copy 1
Date January 17, 1986
BIT
8