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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Roberts, John G.: Files
Folder Title: JGR/Balanced Budget Amendment
(1 of 2)
Box: 5
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To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
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Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected]
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OFFICE OF THE OF MANAGE PRESIDENT STATE OF THE UNITED
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503
March 3, 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN ROBERTS
White House Counsel's Office
FROM:
John Cooney
SUBJECT:
Balanced Budget Amendment
Dick Hauser suggested I send you for review the papers on the
Balanced Budget Amendment. Senate Republicans have asked us to
submit today, as soon as possible, an Administration floor
position on the matter.
The proposed position is that the Administration supports S.J.
Res. 225, with the consensus tax amendment. The tax amendment is
section 2 of the attached text. I enclose for your review
excerpts from the Committee report on S.J. Res. 225, prior to
amendment, and the Committee report on S.J. Res. 13, a more
traditional version of the Balanced Budget Amendment which is
nearly identical to the version the Administration endorsed in
1982. (If you need more information, I am also enclosing my only
copies of the full reports -- please return).
-- Both Resolutions would limit outlays to receipts, but
S.J. Res. 13 would also limit the growth rate in receipts to the
rate of growth in the prior year's national income, thereby
preventing balancing the budget simply through tax increases.
--- S.J. Res. 13 requires completion of action on the budget
bill prior to the start of the applicable fiscal year. This
corresponds to the practice under State balanced budget
requirements, which generally require the balance to be
determined on the basis of good faith estimates reached before
the start of the fiscal year.
- S.J. Res. 13 provides that actual outlays may not exceed
estimated receipts. This retains effective control of the
process in the hands of Congress and the President. Furthermore,
if actual receipts come in under projections, outlays would not
need to be decreased or taxes raised during the course of the
fiscal year.
-- By contrast, S.J. Res 225 requires that actual outlays
not exceed actual reciepts. This version also does not have an
implementation mechanism built into it; this question apparently
would be left for further legislation. As a result, this version
is subject to an interpretation that Congress and the President
are under a "continuing obligation" to ensure that actual outlays
and receipts are balanced throughout the fiscal year. Thus,
questions about implementation might arise late in the fiscal
year -- for instance, during consideration of supplemental
appropriations bills or other bills that might increase spending
and exacerbate the deficit during the current fiscal year.
The proponents will seek to move S.J. Res. 225 because Simon and
other Committee Democrats (Biden and Byrd) voted for this
versions in Committee, and it is thought that this version
therefore has a chance of commanding enough Democratic votes to
fly through the Senate and increase the pressure on the House
Democratic leadership to permit a floor vote on the matter.
Plese let me know if you need any further information.
SJ
Res
2
Calendar No. 357
within seven years after its submission to the States for
ratification:
99TH CONGRESS
}
SENATE
{
REPORT
1st Session
99-162
"ARTICLE -
"SECTION 1. Prior to each fiscal year, the Congress shall
adopt a statement for that year in which total outlays are
not greater than total receipts. The Congress may amend
such statement provided amended outlays are not greater
BALANCED BUDGET-TAX LIMITATION CONSTITUTIONAL
than amended receipts. With the approval of three-fifths of
the whole number of both Houses, the Congress, in such
AMENDMENT
statement, may provide for a specific excess of outlays over
receipts. Actual outlays shall not exceed the outlays set
forth in such statement.
OCTOBER 23 (legislative day, OCTOBER 21), 1985.-Ordered to be printed
"SECTION 2. Total receipts in the statement adopted pur-
suant to this article shall not increase by a rate greater
than the rate of increase in national income in the previ-
ous year, unless a majority of the whole number of both
Mr. THURMOND, from the Committee on the Judiciary,
Houses shall have passed a bill directed solely to approv-
submitted the following
ing specific additional receipts and such bill has become
law.
"SECTION 3. The Congress may waive the provisions of
REPORT
this article for any fiscal year in which a declaration of
war is in effect.
"SECTION 4. This article shall take effect for the second
together with
fiscal year beginning after its ratification.".
ADDITIONAL AND MINORITY VIEWS
The proposed amendment is cosponsored by the following Mem-
bers of the Senate: Mr. Thurmond, Mr. Hatch, Mr. DeConcini, Mr.
Grassley, Mr. Denton, Mr. Heflin, Mr. Specter, Mr. Abdnor, Mr.
[To accompany S.J. Res. 13]
Boren, Mr. Cochran, Mr. D'Amato, Mr. Goldwater, Mrs. Hawkins,
The Committee on the Judiciary, to which was referred the joint
Mr. Hecht, Mr. Lugar, Mr. Mattingly, Mr. McClure, Mr. Nickles,
resolution (S.J. Res. 13) proposing an amendment to the Constitu-
Mr. Nunn, Mr. Packwood, Mr. Proxmire, Mr. Quayle, Mr. Symms,
tion to require a balanced Federal budget and to limit taxing and
Mr. Trible, Mr. Wallop, Mr. Wilson, Mr. Zorinsky, Mr. Laxalt, Mr.
spending, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon
East, Mr. Exon, Mr. Helms, Mr. Simpson, Mr. Danforth, Mr. Garn,
with amendments and an amendment to the title and recommend
Mr. Pryor, Mr. Gramm, Mr. Boschwitz, Mr. Rudman, Mr. Murkow-
that the joint resolution as amended do pass.
ski, Mr. Dole, Mr. Humphrey, Mr. Warner, Mr. Johnston, Mr. Pres-
sler, Mr. Burdick, Mr. Roth, Mr. Stevens, Mr. Kasten, Mr. Bentsen,
I. TEXT OF SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 13
Mr. Stennis, and Mr. McConnell.
The text of Senate Joint Resolution 13 as reported by the Com-
II. SUMMARY
mittee on the Judiciary reads as follows:
Efforts to secure a constitutional rule to require a balanced Fed-
Joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitu-
eral budget and to limit the growth of Federal spending have inten-
tion relating to a Federal balanced budget and tax limi-
sified as the Federal government's persistent failure to balance its
tation
budget has produced debt of nearly $2 trillion ($2,000,000,000,000)
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of
and as the Federal share of the economy has continued to increase.
the United States of America in Congress assembled (two-
It is the Committee's view that, in large measure, the nation's
thirds of each House concurring therein), That the follow-
economic problems are attributable to these facts. Unacceptable
ing article is proposed as an amendment to the Constitu-
levels of inflation, and unemployment, as well as enormous foreign
tion of the United States, which shall be valid to all in-
trade imbalances, can be traced directly or indirectly to the fiscal
tents and purposes as part of the Constitution if ratified by
policies and practices of the national government.
the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States
In proposing Senate Joint Resolution 13, the Committee seeks to
re-establish constitutional limitations upon Federal spending and
deficit practices that existed in earlier years through an array of
2
ARTICLE -
Calendar No. 358
Section 1. Outlays of the United States for any fiscal
99TH CONGRESS
REPORT
year shall not exceed receipts to the United States for that
1st Session
}
SENATE
99-163
year, unless three-fifths of the whole number of both
Houses of Congress shall provide for a specific excess of
outlays over receipts.
Section 2. The Congress may waive the provisions of this
article for any fiscal year in which a declaration of war is
in effect.
Section 3. This article shall take effect for the second
BALANCED BUDGET CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
fiscal year beginning after its ratification.
The proposed amendment, introduced originally in the Commit-
tee on the Judiciary, is cosponsored by the following Members of
OCTOBER 23 (legislative day, OCTOBER 21), 1985.-Ordered to be printed
the Senate: Mr. Thurmond, Mr. Hatch, Mr. DeConcini, Mr. Simon,
and Mr. Simpson.
II. SUMMARY
Mr. THURMOND, from the Committee on the Judiciary,
Efforts to secure a constitutional rule to require a balanced Fed-
submitted the following
eral budget have intensified as the Federal government's persistent
failure to balance its budget has produced a public debt of approxi-
mately $2 trillion ($2,000,000,000,000).
REPORT
It is the Committee's view that, in large measure the nation's
economic problems are attributable to this fact. Unacceptable
together with
levels of inflation, and unemployment, as well as enormous foreign
trade imbalances, can be traced directly or indirectly to the fiscal
SUPPLEMENTAL, ADDITIONAL, AND MINORITY VIEWS
policies and practices of the national government.
In proposing Senate Joint Resolution 225, the Committee seeks to
[To accompany S.J. Res. 225]
re-establish constitutional limitations upon Federal deficit practices
that existed in earlier years through an array of formal and infor-
The Committee on the Judiciary, to which was referred the joint
mal constitutional provisions and which have been eroded over the
resolution (S.J. Res. 225) proposing an amendment to the Constitu-
course of recent years. The abandonment of the "unwritten consti-
tion to require a balanced Federal budget, having considered the
tution" requirement of balanced budgets, the passage of the 16th
same, reports favorably thereon with amendments and an amend-
Amendment, and the development of new judicial doctrines con-
ment to the title and recommends that the joint resolution as
cerning the Federal spending authority are some of the features
amended do pass.
that have contributed to the present situation in which there is a
virtual absence of external constraints upon the ability of Congress
I. TEXT OF SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 225
to spend.
The text of Senate Joint Resolution 225 as reported by the Com-
Specifically, the proposed amendment addresses a serious spend-
mittee on the Judiciary reads as follows:
ing bias in the present fiscal process arising from the fact that
Members of Congress do not have to cast votes in behalf of new
Joint resolution proposing an amendment to the
taxes in order to accommodate new spending programs. Rather
Constitution relating to a Federal balanced budget
than having to cast such politically disadvantageous votes, they
may simply resort to increased levels of deficit spending.
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of
Members of Congress, thus, are free to respond to the concentrat-
the United States of America in Congress assembled (two-
ed pressures of spending interest groups-and reap the political ad-
thirds of each House concurring therein), That the follow-
vantages of doing so-without having to reap concomitant political
ing article is proposed as an amendment to the Constitu-
disadvantages by reducing spending programs favored by some
tion of the United States, which shall be valid to all in-
other spending interests or by expressly raising taxes.
tents and purposes as part of the Constitution if ratified by
The result is that spending continues inexorably to rise whatever
the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States
the genuine will of the people. The result is an essentially undemo-
within seven years after its submission to the States for
cratic and unresponsive process that enables Members of Congress
ratification:
to avoid ultimate accountability for their spending and taxing deci-
52-916
John Corney
Calendar No. 358
99TH CONGRESS
1st Session
}
{
REPORT
SENATE
99-163
BALANCED BUDGET CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENT
REPORT
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE
ON
S.J. Res. 225
together with
SUPPLEMENTAL, ADDITIONAL, AND MINORITY
VIEWS
OCTOBER 23 (legislative day, OCTOBER 21), 1985.-Ordered to be printed
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
52-916 o
WASHINGTON 1985
CONTENTS
Page
I. Text of Senate Joint Resolution 225
1
II. Summary
2
III. Concept of Senate Joint Resolution 225
3
IV. Provisions of Senate Joint Resolution 225
8
V. History of Senate Joint Resolution 225
8
VI. History of constitutional amendment effort
14
VII. History of balanced budget concept
17
VIII. Senate Joint Resolution 225 and the Constitution
24
IX. Economic background
30
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
X. Statutory law versus constitutional amendment
40
XI. Detailed analysis of Senate Joint Resolution 225
41
STROM THURMOND, South Carolina, Chairman
XII. Implementation of Senate Joint Resolution 225
54
CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, JR., Maryland
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware
XIII. Enforcement
56
PAUL LAXALT, Nevada
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
XIV. State experience
63
ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
XV. Public attitudes on a balanced budget amendment
72
ALAN K. SIMPSON, Wyoming
HOWARD M. METZENBAUM, Ohio
XVI. Some questions concerning Senate Joint Resolution 225
72
JOHN P. EAST, North Carolina
DENNIS DECONCINI, Arizona
XVII. Regulatory impact statement
76
CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa
PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont
XVIII. Changes in existing law
76
JEREMIAH DENTON, Alabama
HOWELL HEFLIN, Alabama
XIX. Cost of the legislation
76
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania
PAUL SIMON, Illinois
XX. Conclusion
77
MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky
Supplemental views of Mr. Biden
78
DENNIS W. SHEDD, Chief Counsel and Staff Director
Additional views of Mr. Denton
80
DIANA WATERMAN, General Counsel
Additional views of Mr. Heflin
83
Additional views of Mr. Simon
85
DEBORAH G. BERNSTEIN, Chief Clerk
MARK H. GITENSTEIN, Minority Chief Counsel
Minority views of Mr. Mathias
88
Minority views of Mr. Metzenbaum
91
(III)
SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION
ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah, Chairman
STROM THURMOND, South Carolina
DENNIS DECONCINI, Arizona
CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa
PAUL SIMON, Illinois
STEPHEN J. MARKMAN, Chief Counsel and Staff Director
RANDALL RADER, General Counsel
BoB FEIDLER, Minority Chief Counsel
NATHALIE BLACKWELL, Clerk
(II)
Calendar No. 358
99TH CONGRESS
1st Session
}
REPORT
SENATE
99-163
BALANCED BUDGET CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
OCTOBER 23 (legislative day, OCTOBER 21), 1985.-Ordered to be printed
Mr. THURMOND, from the Committee on the Judiciary,
submitted the following
REPORT
together with
SUPPLEMENTAL, ADDITIONAL, AND MINORITY VIEWS
[To accompany S.J. Res. 225]
The Committee on the Judiciary, to which was referred the joint
resolution (S.J. Res. 225) proposing an amendment to the Constitu-
tion to require a balanced Federal budget, having considered the
same, reports favorably thereon with amendments and an amend-
ment to the title and recommends that the joint resolution as
amended do pass.
I. TEXT OF SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 225
The text of Senate Joint Resolution 225 as reported by the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary reads as follows:
Joint resolution proposing an amendment to the
Constitution relating to a Federal balanced budget
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled (two-
thirds of each House concurring therein), That the follow-
ing article is proposed as an amendment to the Constitu-
tion of the United States, which shall be valid to all in-
tents and purposes as part of the Constitution if ratified by
the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States
within seven years after its submission to the States for
ratification:
52-916
2
3
ARTICLE -
sions. It is the existence of this institutional bias that convinces
this Committee that a constitutional solution is now required.
Section 1. Outlays of the United States for any fiscal
Senate Joint Resolution 225 proposes to overcome this spending
year shall not exceed receipts to the United States for that
year, unless three-fifths of the whole number of both
bias by restoring the linkage between Federal spending and taxing
decisions. It does not propose to read any specific level of spending
Houses of Congress shall provide for a specific excess of
or taxing forever into the Constitution and it does not propose to
outlays over receipts.
intrude the Constitution into the day-to-day spending and taxing
Section 2. The Congress may waive the provisions of this
decisions of the representative branch of the government. It merely
article for any fiscal year in which a declaration of war is
in effect.
proposes to create a fiscal environment in which the competition
Section 3. This article shall take effect for the second
between the tax-spenders and the tax-payers is a more equal one-
one in which spending decisions will once more be constrained by
fiscal year beginning after its ratification.
available revenues.
The proposed amendment, introduced originally in the Commit-
The amendment would establish a balanced budget as a norm of
tee on the Judiciary, is cosponsored by the following Members of
Federal fiscal policy. It could be overcome, however, by three-fifths
the Senate: Mr. Thurmond, Mr. Hatch, Mr. DeConcini, Mr. Simon,
votes in both Houses of Congress. The amendment would create an
and Mr. Simpson.
effective spending limitation, unless Congress was willing to vote
for new taxes to account for increased spending.
II. SUMMARY
The Committee does not view this amendment as a panacea for
Efforts to secure a constitutional rule to require a balanced Fed-
the economic problems of the nation. Its Members have differing
eral budget have intensified as the Federal government's persistent
prescriptions for overcoming these problems. The Committee, how-
failure to balance its budget has produced a public debt of approxi-
ever, does view the amendment as a major step toward securing a
mately $2 trillion ($2,000,000,000,000).
political environment in which fiscally responsible policies will be
It is the Committee's view that, in large measure the nation's
more easily attainable, as well as an environment more conducive
economic problems are attributable to this fact. Unacceptable
to honest and accountable fiscal decisionmaking.
levels of inflation, and unemployment, as well as enormous foreign
The Committee believes Senate Joint Resolution 225 to represent
trade imbalances, can be traced directly or indirectly to the fiscal
both responsible economic policy and responsible constitutional
policies and practices of the national government.
policy. It believes, too, that passage of this resolution would consti-
In proposing Senate Joint Resolution 225, the Committee seeks to
tute an appropriate response by Congress to the pending applica-
re-establish constitutional limitations upon Federal deficit practices
tions by nearly two-thirds of the States for a constitutional conven-
that existed in earlier years through an array of formal and infor-
tion on this issue.
mal constitutional provisions and which have been eroded over the
In these views, the Committee believes that it is in agreement
course of recent years. The abandonment of the "unwritten consti-
with President Ronald Reagan who wrote in 1980:
tution" requirement of balanced budgets, the passage of the 16th
Excessive Federal spending and deficits have become so
Amendment, and the development of new judicial doctrines con-
engrained in government today that a constitutional
cerning the Federal spending authority are some of the features
amendment is necessary to limit this spending. I shall con-
that have contributed to the present situation in which there is a
tinue to emphasize the need for such an amendment.
virtual absence of external constraints upon the ability of Congress
to spend.
And, in these views, the Committee believes that it is in agreement
Specifically, the proposed amendment addresses a serious spend-
with the overwhelming number of the American people who have
ing bias in the present fiscal process arising from the fact that
consistently expressed their support for such a constitutional
Members of Congress do not have to cast votes in behalf of new
amendment.
taxes in order to accommodate new spending programs. Rather
III. CONCEPT OF SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 225
than having to cast such politically disadvantageous votes, they
may simply resort to increased levels of deficit spending.
The primary purpose of Senate Joint Resolution 225 is to correct
Members of Congress, thus, are free to respond to the concentrat-
a bias in the present political process in behalf of ever-increasing
ed pressures of spending interest groups-and reap the political ad-
levels of Federal government spending. Whether such spending is
vantages of doing so-without having to reap concomitant political
financed by higher taxes or new debt, most of the economic prob-
disadvantages by reducing spending programs favored by some
lems suffered by the nation in recent years are ultimately caused
other spending interests or by expressly raising taxes.
by excessive government spending. High interest rates, and the re-
The result is that spending continues inexorably to rise whatever
sulting decline in investment and productivity, as well as unaccept-
the genuine will of the people. The result is an essentially undemo-
able levels of unemployment, all follow when the government uses
cratic and unresponsive process that enables Members of Congress
an excessive share of the nation's resources, leaving too little for
to avoid ultimate accountability for their spending and taxing deci-
productive use by the private sector. If the Federal Reserve Board
4
5
attempts to reduce these economic problems by increasing the
urging the voters that sound and enlightened patriotism
money supply faster than increases in the supply of goods and serv-
calls for the success of their modest proposal. They will go
ices, inflation results.
further if need be, and are quite prepared to lay out cash
While it is true that much of the enormous growth in Federal
to get the necessary votes for returning candidates in their
government spending over the past two decades may be a response
interest. In contrast the individual who is threatened with
to evolving notions of the rule of the public sector on the part of
losing one franc a year-even if he is fully aware of what
the American citizenry-i.e., a genuine shift in the will and desire
is afoot-will not for SO small a thing forego a picnic in the
of the people-it is the contention of this Committee that a sub-
country, or fall out with useful or congenial friends, or get
stantial part of this growth stems from far less benign factors.
on the wrong side of the mayor or the perfect. In these cir-
In short, it is the Committee's view that the American political
cumstances the outcome is not in doubt; the spoilators will
process is defective insofar as it is skewed toward artificially high
win hands down. Cours 'Economie Politique (1896)
levels of spending. It is skewed in this direction because of the
More recently, Arthur Burns, former Chairman of the Federal
characteristics of the fiscal order that have developed in this coun-
try in recent decades. It is a fiscal order in which Members of Con-
Reserve Board, expressed similar thoughts:
gress have every political incentive to spend money and almost no
The proximate causes of this governmental bias are
incentive to forego such spending. It is a fiscal order in which
quite clear. In general, spending programs are more popu-
spending decisions have become increasingly divorced from the
lar with people than higher taxes. The potential benefici-
availability of revenues.
aries of a spending program are often a numerical minori-
ty, but they have a stonger incentive to keep informed, to
Concentrated benefits-dispersed costs
organize, and to lobby for their favorite program than
It is important first to understand what some economists and po-
those who bear the cost have to oppose it. The rising cost
litical scientist have described as the "concentrated benefit-dis-
of political campaigns and the concurrent proliferation of
persed cost" phenomenon. This describes the fact that the benefits
fundraising committees put intense pressure on legislators
of any given spending program normally are concentrated within a
to vote for spending programs favored by such groups. We
relativey small class of beneficiaries, while the costs of such a pro-
may, in fact, be entering an era in which governmental
gram are dispersed throughout a relatively large class of persons,
processes are overwhelmed by the naked demands of in-
i.e., the taxpayers. Thus, those parties who benefit from a particu-
creasingly well-organized and effective interest groups. It
lar spending measure stand to benefit greatly while those who bear
is this concern that has led me to look with favor on even
the costs are affected insignificantly. The Italian economist Pareto
preemptory devices for offsetting the existing bias toward
described it in these terms:
larger Federal spending and borrowing. AEI Economist,
Let us suppose that in a country of thirty million inhab-
April 1979
itants it is proposed, under some pretext or other, to get
The proposed amendment addresses an important element of the
each citizen to pay out one franc a year, and to distribute
spending bias: the access members of Congress have to deficit
the total amount amongst thirty persons. Every one of the
spending. This enables Members of Congress to avoid having to
beneficiaries will receive one million francs a year. The
vote new taxes in order to finance new spending.
two groups will differ very greatly in their response to this
situation. Those who hope to gain a million a year will
Deficit spending
know no rest by day or night. They will win newspapers
A principal cause of the spending bias involves the virtually un-
over to their interest by financial inducements and drum
limited access that members of Congress have to deficit spending.
up support from all quarters. A discreet hand will warm
As the "unwritten constitution" requirement of budget balance has
the palms of needy legislators, even of ministers.
been disregarded in recent years, Members of Congress no longer
On the other hand, the despoiled are much less active. A
are constrained in their ability to increase spending by the concom-
great deal of money is needed to launch an electoral cam-
itant need to increase ordinary revenues. Permissible levels of
paign. Now there are insuperable material difficulties mili-
spending no longer are defined, as they traditionally have been, by
tating against asking each citizen to contribute a few cen-
levels of revenue available. In consequence, Members of Congress
times. One has to ask a few people to make substantial
are free to obtain the resulting political advantages, without
contributions. But then, for such people, there is the likeli-
having either to (a) reduce spending for some other spending inter-
hood that their individual contribution to the campaign
est and incur the resulting political disadvantages, or (b) increase
against the spoliation will exceed the total amount they
tax revenues and incur the resulting political disadvantages.
stand to lose by the measure in question.
When elec-
Members of Congress do not have to reduce levels of spending for
tion day comes, similar difficulties are encountered.
one program in order to accomplish increases in other programs
Those who hope to gain a million apiece have agents ev-
because there is no effective limit as to how much Congress may
erywhere, who descend in swarms on the electorate,
spend in its budget. Once the traditional linkage has been severed
7
6
As a result, Senate Joint Resolution 225 effects a subtle, but im-
between spending and revenues, there is no need for Members to
portant, change in the psychology of the budget process. Under the
establish priorities as between alternative spending proposals; each
present system, each spending interest, in effect, competes to raise
can be satisfied simply by increasing the level of the deficit. The
the total ante in the Federal treasury. Under a system, however, in
availability of deficit spending enables Members to avoid the hard
which some form of spending ceiling is in effect, these same inter-
political decision of having to choose among spending proposals and
ests suddenly will be competing with one another in order to ensure
thereby insure for themselves some element of political disadvan-
themselves a certain proportion of a fixed ante in the Federal
tage as well as political advantage.
Members of Congress do not have to increase revenues in order
treasury. Not only will spending interests have to convince Con-
to accommodate increased spending because levels of spending no
gress that their favored programs merit funding at a certain level,
longer are related in any meaningful way to levels of revenue.
but they will, in addition, have to establish the priority of their pro-
Thus, not only is there no need for Congress to antagonize any
grams. A spending ceiling comprised of something beyond mere
other spending interest in the process of supporting a given spend-
Congressional self-restraint will force Members of Congress to view
ing measure, but there is no need to antagonize taxpayers general-
spending requests in terms of relative desirability, not simply in
ly by appearing to raise their tax burdens. Again, there is no ele-
terms of whether or not a program is desirable at all. An element
ment of political disadvantage Members of Congress are required to
of competition among the spending interests will be introduced into
incur in order to reap the political advantages of responding to the
the budget process, undoubtedly to the long-term interests of those
spending interests.
who finance the spending programs favored by these interests.
In this respect, the availability of unlimited deficit spending
Thus, the proposed amendment would make it easier for well-
allows the political costs of spending measures to be deferred in
meaning, but beleaguered, Members of Congress to exercise fiscal
time, while enabling the political benefits to be enjoyed immediate-
responsibility in making their policy decision. There would be an
ly. While the benefits of the measure usually will be understood
external constraint, something beyond their own ability to resist
immediately by its beneficiaries, the costs-in the form of higher
the importunities of the spending interests, upon which they could
future taxes, higher future inflation, and higher future interest
rely. As Professor Roger Freeman of the Hoover Institution has
rates-usually will be evident only at some remote time. Indeed,
noted:
there may be no political costs whatsoever unless those who suffer
It is not that Members of Congress do not wish to
from these economic ills are sophisticated enough to understand
produce a balanced budget but that under the circum-
the cause-effect relationship between the earlier spending and the
stances they can only do so at a grave political risk to
later symptoms.
their survival. They need a defense against excessive de-
mands which allows them to say "no" to a multitude of
Approach of Senate Joint Resolution 225
pressure groups. Such a defense cannot be built by statute
In seeking to reduce the spending bias in our present system-
because any act of Congress can be amended or repealed
the unlimited availability of deficit spending-the major purpose of
by this Congress or the next. Only a constitutional amend-
Senate Joint Resolution 225-is to ensure that, under normal cir-
ment can impose credible and effective spending re-
cumstances, votes by Congress for increased spending will be ac-
straints.
companied either by votes (a) to reduce other spending programs or
(b) to increase taxes to pay for such programs. For the first time
Professor James Buchanan goes on to elaborate:
since the abandonment of the traditional balanced budget require-
The fault lies not in the bad intentions of elected politi-
ment, Congress will be required to cast some politically difficult
cians. The basic causes for the dramatic, and readily ob-
vote as a precondition for a politically attractive vote to increase
servable, shift in U.S. fiscal habits after World War II and
spending.
notably after 1960 are not hard to identify. Keynesian
Section 1 of the proposed amendment would address the spend-
teachings had succeeded in effectively repealing an impor-
ing bias-unlimited access by Members of Congress to deficit
tant element of the unwritten fiscal constitution within
spending-by requiring a three-fifths vote of each House of Con-
which American politics had been carried out throughout
gress before the Federal government could engage in such spend-
almost two centuries of its history.
ing. Such a procedure would not prohibit deficit spending, but
Much of the argument in this and other sections has drawn upon
would simply reestablish, as a norm, a budget in balance rather
Professor Buchanan's work, in conjunction with Professor Richard
than one in deficit. A consensus greater than a normal majority
Wagner, Democracy in Deficits, Academic Press (1977).
would be required to violate this norm. Unless such a consensus ex-
In summary, the purpose of Senate Joint Resolution 225 is to
isted, Congress would be bound in its spending by its available rev-
eliminate political process which allows members to avoid having
enues and would be forced to account for new spending in one pro-
to vote for higher taxes in order to pay for higher spending and to
gram area by either reduced spending in another program area or
establish a more genuinely neutral environment within which the
by increased taxes. The political advantages resulting from support
budget competition occurs. The proposed amendment does not
for new spending then would be matched, at least to some degree,
define what constitutes or what does not constitute a responsible
by countervailing political disadvantages.
8
9
budget, but only defines the institutional framework within which
Although sporadic efforts at calling a national convention on the
such budgets can be put together.
subject of a balanced budget had been made in the past, the effort
begun in 1975-under the leadership of such organizations as the
IV. PROVISIONS OF SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 225
National Taxpayers Union and the American Farm Bureau Feder-
Section 1
ation-is the first to attract serious national attention. To date,
thirty-two states (see table 1) have applied for a constitutional con-
Section 1 of the proposed amendment addresses the present
vention on this subject, although there remains some dispute as to
spending bias resulting from the unlimited access Congress has to
whether or not each of these applications are constitutionally valid.
deficit spending. It would establish the norm of a balanced Federal
Under Article V, Congress is "obliged" (to use the words of Alexan-
budget, i.e., one in which government outlays do not exceed govern-
der Hamilton in The Federalist No. 85) to call a convention upon
ment receipts. This norm could be overcome upon the vote of three-
the applications of 34 of the present fifty states.
fifths of the total membership of each House of Congress to ap-
A companion effort in the States also deserves mention for con-
prove a specific level of deficit. This provision establishes no specif-
tributing to a political environment receptive to constitutional ini-
ic procedures for ensuring a balanced budget but simply imposes a
tiative concerning spending and taxing. Under the leadership of
general obligation upon both the Congress and the President to es-
the National Tax Limitation Committee, a growing. number of
tablish whatever procedures are necessary and proper for achiev-
States in the mid-1970's began to consider placing spending and
ing such a result.
taxing limitations within their constitutions (see section XIII). The
most highly publicized of these efforts were the successful Proposi-
Section 2
tion 13 and Proposition 4 efforts in California.
Section 2 would authorize Congress to waive any of the require-
In response to these efforts in the States, as well as out of their
ments imposed upon it by this amendment for a fiscal year in
own conviction as to the need for a constitutional restraint upon
which a declaration of war is in effect.
Congress' fiscal authority, members of the Senate Judiciary Sub-
committee on the Constitution began efforts early in the 96th Con-
Section 3
gress to develop a constitutional proposal satisfying State demands
Section 3 establishes as the effective date of this amendment the
for an effective and appropriate limitation upon the fiscal author-
second fiscal year beginning after its ratification. The requirements
ity of Congress. Given the broad range of diverse constitutional
of this amendment would, in their entirety, be applicable for such
amendments introduced by different members to require balanced
fiscal year.
budgets or to establish various spending and tax limitations, the
priority of this Committee was to develop a consensus measure that
V. HISTORY OF SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 225
would attract the support of as many proponents of a constitution-
al initiative as possible. The achievement of this consensus has
In 1975, efforts commenced within the States to petition Congress
been the focus of much of the efforts that have taken place in the
for a constitutional convention under Article V of the Constitution
Committee on the Judiciary since that time.
for the purpose of considering a balanced budget constitutional
amendment. Under Article V, there are two methods by which the
TABLE 1.-STATE LEGISLATURES WHICH HAVE PASSED BALANCED BUDGET AMENDMENT
Constitution can be altered. The first method, the method by which
APPLICATIONS
each of the first 26 amendments to the Constitution has been ef-
fected, requires the proposal of an amendment by two-thirds of
State
Measure
Year adopted
each House of Congress, and ratification by three-fourths of the
Alabama
States. The second method, that being currently pursued by the
HJR 227, Act 302
1976.
Alaska
HJR 17
1982,
States with regards to the balanced budget amendment, requires
Arizona
SJR 1002, HCM 2003
1979, 1977.
the proposal of an amendment by a constitutional convention
Arkansas
HJR 1
1979.
called by Congress in response to the applications of two-thirds of
Colorado
SJM 1
1978.
Delaware
HCR 36
1975
the States. Ratification by three-fourths of the States is then neces-
Florida
Sen. Memorial No. 234, HM 2801
1976.
sary before the amendment becomes part of the Constitution. (For
Georgia
Res. Act No. 93, HR No. 469-1267
1976.
more discussion of this procedure, see Senate Report No. 99-135,
Idaho
HCR 7
1979.
Indiana
SJR 8
1979.
the "Constitutional Convention Implementation Act".)
lowa
SJR 1
1979.
While the second method has never been directly responsible for
Kansas
SCR 1661
1978.
securing an amendment to the Constitution, efforts in the early
Louisiana
SCR 4, SR 73, HCR 269
1979, 1978, 1975.
years of this century by the States to call a convention to propose
Maryland
SJR 4 (Original), Md JR 77 (Enrolled)
1975.
Mississippi
HCR 51
1975.
an amendment to provide for the direct election of Senators were
Missouri
SCR 3
1983.
forestalled only when Congress on its own proposed the 17th
Nebraska
LR 106
1976,
Amendment.
Nevada
SJR 8, SJR 2
1979, 1977.
New Hampshire
HCR 8.
1979
10
11
TABLE 1.-STATE LEGISLATURES WHICH HAVE PASSED BALANCED BUDGET AMENDMENT
lisher of Quest Publications. On February 22, 1980, testimony was
APPLICATIONS-Continued
heard in Salt Lake City, Utah from Robert Crawford, Professor of
Economics at Brigham Young University, Jefferson Fordham, Pro-
State
Measure
Year adopted
fessor of Law at the University of Utah, Timothy Meeding, Assist-
ant Professor of Economics at the University of Utah, Jewell Ras-
New Mexico
SJR 1
1976.
North Carolina
Resolution 5
mussen, University of Utah, Glenn Lewis, Utah Council of Small
1979.
North Dakota
SCR 4018
1975.
Business David Tomlinson, Chairman of the Utah delegation to the
Oklahoma
HJR 1049
1976.
White House Conference on Small Business, Jack Olson, Utah Tax-
Oregon
SJ Memorial No. 2
1977.
payers Association, Charles Ackerlow, businessman in Salt Lake
Pennsylvania
HR 236
1976.
City, Robert Hansen, Utah Attorney General, and Utah State Rep-
South Carolina
S 1024, S 670
1978, 1976.
South Dakota
SJR 1
1979.
resentative Norman Bangerter, Gray Brockbank, and Kevin Watt.
Tennessee
HJR 22
1977.
Following these hearings as well as extensive consultation with
Texas
HCR 13, HCR 31
1978, 1977.
the Senate Balanced Budget Caucus, under the leadership of Sena-
Utah
HJR 12
1979.
tors Richard Lugar, David Boren, and William Armstrong, five
Virginia
SJR 36
1976.
members of the Subcommittee on the Constitution introduced
Wyoming
HJR 12 (original) JR 1 (Enrolled)
1977.
Senate Joint Resolution 126 (Senator Orrin Hatch, Strom Thur-
Source: National Taxpayers Union.
mond, Dennis DeConcini, Howell Heflin, and Alan Simpson). On
December 18, 1979, this measure was reported out of the Subcom-
Eight days of hearings were held on this subject during the 96th
mittee on the Constitution by a 5-2 vote. On March 15, 1980, how-
Congress by the Subcommittee on the Constitution. On March 12,
ever, Senate Joint Resolution 126 was defeated by a narrow 9-8
1979, testimony was heard from Senator Robert Dole of Kansas,
margin in the full Committee on the Judiciary.
Senator Edmund Muskie of Maine, Senator Strom Thurmond of
Senate Joint Resolution 126 was re-introduced during the 97th
South Carolina, Senator John Stennis of Mississippi, and Senator
Congress, first as Senate Joint Resolution 9, then as Senate Joint
Harry Byrd, Jr., of Virginia. On May 23, 1979, testimony was heard
Resolution 43, and finally as Senate Joint Resolution 58 with the
from Senator James McClure of Idaho, Secretary of Treasury Mi-
same principal sponsors as during the previous Congress. A com-
chael Blumenthal, Senator Dennis DeConcini of Arizona, and Sena-
panion bill (H.J. Res. 100) was introduiced in the House by Rep.
tor Carl Levin of Michigan. On July 25, 1979, testimony was heard
Skip Bafalis of Florida. Four additional days of hearing were con-
from Senator Richard Lugar of Indiana, Senator John Heinz of
ducted, again by the Senate Subcommittee on the constitution
Pennsylvania, Senator Richard Stone of Florida, and Senator Mal-
under the chairmanship of Senator Hatch. On March 11, 1981, tes-
colm Wallop of Wyoming. On October 4, 1979, testimony was heard
timony was heard from Senator William Armstrong of Colorado,
from Lane Kirkland, Secretary-Treasurer of the AFL-CIO, Thomas
Senator David Boren of Oklahoma, Senator Richard Lugar of Indi-
O'Neil, III, Chairman of Citizens for the Constitution, James David-
ana, Senator Howell Heflin of Alabama, State Senator James Clark
son, Chairman of the National Taxpayers Union, and Marshall
of Maryland, and Roger Freeman, Senior Fellow, Hoover Institu-
Beil, a representative of the New York Bar Association's Commit-
tion. On April 9, 1981, testimony was heard from Senator John
tee on Federal Legislation. On October 11, 1979, testimony was
Heinz of Pennsylvania, Laurence Silberman, Vice-President of
heard from Senator David Pryor of Arkansas, Alice Rivlin, Direc-
Crocker National Bank, San Francisco, California, Lowell Harris,
tor of the Congressional Budget Office, Martin Gerber, Vice-Presi-
Professor of Economics at Columbia University, Charles Baird, Pro-
dent of the United Auto Workers, Allan Grant, President of the
fessor of Economics at California State University (Hayward),
American Farm Bureau Federation, and Jay Van Andel, Chairman
Harry Bell, President, South Carolina Farm Bureau representing
of the Board of the United States Chamber of Commerce.
the American Farm Bureau Federation, and Professor George
On November 1, 1979, testimony was heard from Senator Roger
Haimbaugh, Professor of Law at the University of South Carolina.
Jepsen of Iowa, Alan Greenspan, former member of the Council of
On May 20, testimony was heard from George Snyder, President,
Economic Advisers, Philip Saunders, Professor of Economics at the
David Keating, Legislative Director, National Taxpayer's Union,
University of Indiana, Richard Everett, Vice President of the Chase
William Shaker, Executive Vice President of the National Tax
Manhattan Bank, Merlyn Carlson, Vice-President of the National
Limitation Committee, Craig Stubblebine, Director of the Center
Cattleman's Association, Lewis Uhler, President of the National
for the Study of Law Structures at Claremont Men's College, and
Tax Limitation Committee, and Craig Stubblebine, Director of the
former Senator Carl Curtis of Nebraska. On May 29, testimony was
Center for the Study of Law Structures at Claremont Men's Col-
heard in Phoenix, Arizona, from Alvin Rabushka, Senior Fellow,
lege. On January 14, 1980, testimony was heard in Mobile, Ala-
Hoover Institution, Robert Matthews, Phoenix Chamber of Com-
bama, from Senator Thad Cochran of Mississippi, Ronald E. Bird,
merce, Melvin Morris, Arizona Tax Research Association, Robert
Professor of Economics at the University of Alabama, Tyrone
Robb, Arizona Chamber of Commerce, Paul Jones, Valley National
Black, Professor of Economics at the University of Southern Missis-
Bank, and James Weaver, Sun City Homeowners Association.
sippi, Kenneth Giddens, President of WKRG-TV, William Hearin,
On May 6, 1981, the Subcommittee on the Constitution favorably
Publisher of the Mobile Press Register, and Thomas Druey, Pub-
reported out Senate Joint Resolution 58 by a 4-0 vote following an
12
13
amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by Senator Hatch.
timony: James Davidson, National Taxpayers Union; Carol Cox,
While maintaining the basic concept of Senate Joint Resolution 126
Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget; Lew Uhler, National
and its successors, a number of substantive and perfecting changes
Tax Limitation Committee; Professor Steven A. Reiss; Professor
were made, some drawn from such measures as Senate Joint Reso-
William Craig Stubblebine; the National Association of Manufac-
lution 56 introduced by Senators Heinz and Nunn. On May 19,
turers; the National Assocation for the Advancement of Colored
1981, the full Senate Committee on the Judiciary favorably report-
People (NAACP); the National Education Association; the Ameri-
ed out S.J. Res. 58 by an 11-5 vote, following several additional
can Farm Bureau Federation; and the National Association of Re-
technical changes offered by Senator Dole.
altors.
On July 12, 1982, the Senate began consideration of S.J. Res. 58.
On March 15, 1984, the Subcommittee on the Constitution ap-
Following the adoption of a package of amendments by Senators
proved S.J. Res. 5 by a 4-1 vote and recommended the measure to
Domenici and Chiles (clarifying that nothing in the amendment
the full Committee. On September 13, 1984, the Senate Judiciary
was designed to confer impoundment authority upon the President;
Committee approved S.J. Res. 5 with an amendment offered by
altering the base period in section 2 for determining growth in the
Senator DeConcini approved on June 7, 1984, by the margin of 11-
economy; and adding a new section obligating Congress to "enforce
4. The DeConcini amendment added a new section 3 relating to ex-
and implement" the provisions of the amendment); and the accept-
ecutive authority and renumbered subsequent sections.
ance of an extremely controversial amendment by Senator Arm-
Due to an early adjournment to accommodate the 1984 Presiden-
strong (establishing a permanent level of national debt and requir-
tial election, time ran out in the 98th Congress before S.J. Res. 5
ing a three-fifths vote to increase the size of the debt), the Senate
could come to the Senate for a vote.
on August 4, 1982, by a vote of 69-31 proposed S.J. Res. 58 as an
In the 99th Congress, S.J. Res. 13, a resolution identical to S.J.
amendment to the United States Constitution. This marked the
Res. 5 from the prior Congress, was introduced on January 3, 1985,
first time either House of Congress had approved such a measure.
the first day of the new Congress. It was referred to the Senate Ju-
On October 1, 1982, the House of Representatives, following a su-
diciary Committee and subsequently to the Subcommittee on the
cessful discharge petition effort, considered H.J. Res. 450, the
Constitution. On May 7, the Subcommittee held a hearing on S.J.
House counterpart of S.J. Res. 58. This occurred under the leader-
Res. 13. The following witnesses were heard: Senator Pete Wilson
ship of Representative Barber Conable (R-NY) and Representative
of California; Governor Dick Thornburgh of Pennsylvania; the Hon-
Ed Jenkins (D-Ga.). Although a substantial majority of the House
orable Manuel Johnson, Assistant Secretary of Treasury; Mr. Roy
voted in behalf of the amendment, it fell short of the necessary
L. Ash, Committee for Economic Development; Dr. Martin Ander-
two-thirds vote by a 236-187 margin. This followed the rejection of
son, Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution; Dr. Rudolf Penner, Director,
a substitute balanced budget amendment which was endorsed by a
Congressional Budget Office.
sufficient number of Members such that more than two-thirds of
On May 15, 1985, the Subcommittee held a markup to consider
the Members of the House were recorded as being in favor of one
S.J. Res. 13. On a voice vote, the Subcommittee accepted a substi-
form or another of a balanced budget constitutional amendment.
tute amendment offered by Senator Strom Thurmond of South
In the 98th Congress, S.J. Res. 5 was introduced on January 26,
Carolina. This amendment streamlined S.J. Res. 13, but left its sub-
1983, and referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee. On Febru-
stance unaltered. On a vote of 3 to 2, the Subcommittee rejected an
ary 22, 1983, S.J. Res. 5 was referred to the Subcommittee on the
amendment by Senator Paul Simon of Illinois which would have
Constitution. The Subcommittee, chaired by Senator Orrin G.
deleted section 2 of the Resolution (providing that total receipts
Hatch, held 2 days of hearings on the resolution. On December 12,
shall not grow faster than the rate of increase in the national
1983, the Subcommittee met in Los Angeles, California, and re-
income). Finally, on a unanimous 5-0 vote, the Subcommittee ap-
ceived testimony from Senator Pete Wilson of California; James D.
proved S.J. Res. 13 as amended by the Thurmond amendment. Sen-
Davidson, National Taxpayers Union; Congressman William E.
ator Simon, however, reserved his right to oppose the measure at
Dannemeyer of California; Lew Uhler, National Tax Limitation
full Committee in the absence of section 2 being deleted.
Committee; Roy Ash, Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget;
During May, June, and July, as the Judiciary Committee debated
Professor John T. Noonan, University of California Berkeley Law
the implications of S.J. Res. 13, some members of the Committee
School; Gerald W. McEntee, President of the American Federation
expressed a desire to further simplify the proposed constitutional
of State, County, and Municipal Employees; Martyn Hopper, Na-
amendment to balance the budget. Consequently on July 11, at the
tional Federation of Independent Business; Richard Johnson, Cali-
same time the Committee voted 11-7 in favor of reporting S.J. Res.
fornia Chamber of Commerce; Carl Jones, Legislative Director of
13 to the Senate, Chairman Thurmond and Senators Hatch, DeCon-
Congress of California Seniors; John Gamper, California Farm
cini, and Simon proposed an alternative resolution for committee
Bureau Federation; George C. Shaw, California Teachers Associa-
consideration. This proposal, S.J. Res. 225, was approved by the
tion; Professor Robert Goldstein, UCLA School of Law on behalf of
Committee on a vote of 14 to 4. The following members of the Com-
the Southern California Region of the American Jewish Congress;
mittee voted in favor of S.J. Res. 225:
and Professor William Craig Stubblebine, Claremont-McKenna Col-
lege. On March 6, 1984, the Subcommittee held a second day of
Thurmond
hearings The following witnesses and organizations presented Les-
Laxalt*
15
14
Following the War, Congress made renewed efforts to introduce
Hatch
broad budgetary reforms. In 1919, the Victory Liberty Loan Act (40
Simpson
Stat. 1311) established a sinking fund for debt retirement. During
East
the decade of the 1920's, this resulted in a one-third reduction in
Grassley
the level of the total national debt, from approximately $24 billion
Denton
to $16 billion. As in earlier years, the clear national consensus in
Specter
support of the balanced budget principle resulted in little need to
McConnell
focus Congressional attention on statutory or constitutional legisla-
Biden
tion to mandate a balanced budget. Indeed, the policy of gradual
Byrd
debt retirement during the 1920's necessitated Congressional com-
DeConcini
mitment to regular surplus budgets.
Heflin
The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 (42 Stat. 20) was impor-
Simon*
tant both in defining the role of the executive and legislative
The following members voted against reporting S.J. Res. 225:
branches in the budgetary process and in formally incorporating
Kennedy*
government expenditures and revenues into an official budget.
Metzenbaum
Under the Act, the President was to take responsibility for formu-
Leahy*
lating an initial budget and submitting it on an annual basis to the
Mathias*
Congress. Congress then was to act on the recommendations in this
budget.
*By proxy.
In addition to extensive input from the Balanced Budget Caucus
Not until the mid-1930's did concern about budget deficits find
and other Senators not members of the Committee, the Committee
regular expression on the floor of Congress. The Great Depression
on the Judiciary in developing the proposed amendment has bene-
was accompanied by large, uninterrupted deficits between 1931 and
fitted significantly from consultation with large numbers of econo-
1940. In addition, such deficits generally were of a significantly
mists, constitutional scholars, state legislators, and other interested
larger scale than earlier deficits. A debate emerged during this
individuals and organizations. The National Tax Limitation Com-
period-one continuing to this day-as to whether such deficits
mittee and the National Taxpayers Union deserve particular men-
were necessary for government management of economic crises, or
tion in this regard, as does the Center for the Study of Law Struc-
whether they in fact contributed to the creation of such crises.
tures at Claremont Men's College under its director, Professor
In 1935, Senator Millard Tydings of Maryland introduced the
first measure seeking to require an annual balanced Federal
Craig Stubblebine.
budget (S.J. Res. 36, 74th Congress). This resolution sought to pro-
VI. HISTORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT EFFORT
hibit appropriations from exceeding revenues, unless new taxes or
debt were reauthorized. Any new debt incurred would have to be
Efforts to secure a constitutional balanced budget requirement
liquidated over a 15-year period. In the following year in the House
have become more intense as the Federal government has run
of Representatives, Representative William McFarlane of Texas in-
more frequent budget deficits of increasingly large magnitude.
troduced a bill to invest authority in the President to modify tax
During the 19th century, when the balanced budget norm was ef-
rates in order to cover proposed deficits in the budget (H.R. 11895,
fectively part of the "unwritten constitution" of the land, there
74th Congress). Neither the Tydings nor the McFarlane proposals
was little need for Congress to focus on this problem. The deficits
were considered seriously by Congress.
that did occur generally were insignificant, often related to war-
The first constitutional amendment to balance the budget was
time circumstances, and generally were compensated for by subse-
proposed in 1936 by Minnesota Representative Harold Knutson
quent government surpluses. The occasionally troublesome deficit,
such as those developing from the depression of the early 1870's,
(H.J. Res. 579, 74th Congress). The proposed measure established a
per capita limitation on the Federal public debt during peacetime.
met with legislative responses designed to secure their elimination.
Following a series of recommendations by Presidental commis-
Deficits might be run by Congress, but only to the extent that the
sions on Federal budgetary practices and reforms, Congress in 1909
per capita ceiling was not breached. The particular limit suggested
approved the Sundry Civil Appropriation Act (35 Stat. 959), the
by this measure was lower than the outstanding debt at the time
first major legislative initiative seeking to establish explicit limita-
and would have mandated significant budgetary surpluses in order
tions upon Government fiscal practices. This act directed the Presi-
to conform to the level.
dent and the Secretary of the Treasury to propose measures to
Again, a World War distracted attention from efforts to secure
reduce expenditures or increase revenues if a deficit appeared prob-
annual balanced budgets, although Senator Tydings and Represent-
able. Though the Act did not expressly mandate a balanced budget,
ative Wesley Disney of Oklahoma joined during this period to in-
it clearly suggested that efforts to achieve such a balance should
troduce several constitutional amendments to prohibit government
precede the issuance of a new debt. World War I soon diverted at-
approprations from exceeding receipts (e.g., S.J. Res. 97 and H.J.
Ren 195, 78th Congress).
tention from this issue.
17
16
its receipts (P.L. 96-389, section 3). Again, in 1979, a provision in a
Following World War II, the balanced budget debate was re-
measure to increase the public debt limit stated that "Congress
sumed. Senate Joint Resolution 61, introduced by Senator Tydings
shall balance the Federal budget" (P.L. 96-5, section 5). Under this
and Styles Bridges of New Hampshire, was reported out by the
legislation, the Congressional Budget Committees were required to
Committee on Appropriations in 1947 (Sen. Rept. No. 80-154) but
propose balanced budgets for FY 1981 and subsequent years.
received no further consideration. In 1949, the Senate unanimously
In addition to concerns about balanced Federal budgets, many
approved a proposal by Arkansas Senator John McClellan to re-
Members of Congress have been equally concerned about the rela-
quire the President to submit for FY 1951, in addition to his pre-
tive size of public sector spending over the years. Reflecting this
ferred budget, a balanced budget (S.J. Res. 131, 81st Congress). Con-
concern, legislation linking Federal spending to the gross national
gress then would compare these budgets in an effort to identify
product, was introduced shortly after the Second World War. In
possible areas of expenditure reductions or revenue increases. This
1952, Senators Robert Taft of Ohio and Homer Ferguson of Michi-
proposal was stricken during conference, however. A similar pro-
gan introduced a proposed constitutional amendment to prohibit
posal during the subsequent Congress also failed to proceed
the authorization of expenditures for non-military purposes in
through the entire legislative process (H.R. 1689, 82d Congress).
excess of 5 percent of the estimated national income for any fiscal
During the 1950's, an increasing number of Constitutional initia-
year (S.J. Res. 155, 82d Congress). During the subsequent Congress,
tives for balanced budgets came to be introduced regularly in Con-
Representative Ralph Gwinn of New York offered a measure to
gress. Constitutional amendments were proposed first by Senators
limit public expenditures to one-seventh of the national personal
Bridges and Harry Byrd of Virginia, and later by Senator Strom
income (H.J. Res. 326, 83d Congress), while Representative Richard
Thurmond of South Carolina and Carl Curtis of Nebraska, to re-
Poff of Virginia offered an amendment to prohibit appropriations
quire the submission by the President of an annual balanced
in excess of twenty percent of the preceding year's national income
budget and to prevent Congress from adjourning without having
(H.J. Res. 217, 83d Congress).
enacted such a budget. Another amendment, introduced by Sena-
During this period, as well, a sustained effort was made to call
tors Byrd and Bridges during this period, would have required Con-
an Article V constitutional convention for the purposes of limiting
gress to earmark $500 million annually for debt reduction activi-
the Federal taxing power. Initiated during the late 1930's in re-
ties, in effect mandating an annual $500 million budget surplus. No
action was taken on any of these measures, although one hearing
sponse to sharply increasing tax rates, 17 States had submitted ap-
was held in 1956 by the Senate Judiciary Committee (June 14,
plications by the end of the Second World War. By 1963, there
were 31 extant applications although many were, by that time,
1956, on S.J. Res. 126 and S.J. Res. 133, 83d Congress).
Since the outset of the 84th Congress in 1955, an average of four
stale or had been rescinded by subsequent State legislative ses-
sions.
amendments to the Constitution to require a balanced Federal
While few constitutional amendments were introduced to limit
budget have been proposed during each Congress. In addition, nu-
merous statutory proposals to achieve this end have been intro-
Federal spending during the 1960's, new constitutional initiatives
duced and considered during this period. The Revenue Act of 1964
emerged with the next decade. In 1973, an amendment offered by
Representative Jack Kemp sought to limit Federal expenditures
(P.L. 88-272), for example, stated:
and receipts to a percentage of the previous year's National Income
To further the objective of balanced budgets in the near
(H.J. Res. 816, 93rd Congress), while an amendment proposed 6
future, Congress by this action recognizes the importance
years later by Representatives Barber Conable and Ed Jenkins and
of taking all reasonable means to restrain government
Senators John Heinz and Richard Stone (and later by Senator Sam
spending-Section 1.
Nunn) sought to limit the growth of Federal outlays to the growth
The Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-344)
of the Gross National Product (H.J. Res. 395, S.J. Res. 56, 96th Con-
enacted major reforms in the Congressional budget process de-
gress). This latter amendment drew upon a draft prepared by the
signed to enable Congress to consider individual spending measures
National Tax Limitation Committee. The Humphrey-Hawkins Full
in light of overall budget objectives.
Employment Act (P.L. 95-523) established as a national target the
In the Humphrey-Hawkins Full Employment Act (P.L. 95-523), a
reduction of Federal outlays to "the lowest ratio of outlays to GNP
balanced budget was declared to be a national public policy priori-
consistent with national needs and priorities." Section 2(j). This
ty. Section 2(a); 6(i).
language replaced that proposed earlier by a Senate Committee to
An amendment offered by Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia to a
set this level at twenty-one percent of the GNP by 1981 and twenty
1978 tax reduction measure to make such reductions contingent
percent by 1983.
upon a balanced budget by 1982 was rejected during conference, al-
though it has been adopted in varying forms by both the full
VII. HISTORY OF BALANCED BUDGET CONCEPT
Senate and House. Later during the Congress, however, Rep, (now
No concept is more a part of traditional American fiscal policy
Senator) Charles Grassley of Iowa and Senator Harry Byrd, Jr.,
than that of a balanced budget. Throughout most of the nation's
combined to enact into law an amendment to an IMF loan program
history, the requirement of budget balancing under normal eco-
authorization measure requiring that, beginning with FY 1981,
nomic circumstances was considered part of our "unwritten consti-
total budget outlays of the Federal government "shall not" exceed
18
19
tution". As University of Virginia Professor William Breit has ob-
Early American Presidents were in virtually unanimous agree-
served:
ment on the dangers of excessive public debt. In his Inaugural Ad-
The balanced-budget rule which served as part of the
dress, President John Adams stated:
Constitution was, of course, not in the form of a written
The consequences arising from the continual accumula-
statement that every expenditure had to be balanced by a
tion of public debts in other countries ought to admonish
tax. But it nevertheless had constitutional status. For ex-
us to be careful to prevent their growth in our own.
penditures in excess of receipts were considered to be in
violation of moral principles. The imperative of the bal-
President James Madison stated that one of the primary goals of
his Administration would be:
anced budget was an extra-legal rule or custom that grew
up around the formal document. It existed outside the pre-
To liberate the public resources by an honorable dis-
cise letter of the Constitution on all fours with the system
charge of public debts.
of political parties, the presidential cabinet, the actual op-
President James Monroe held a similar position observing that:
eration of the electoral college system, and the doctrine of
After the elimination of the public debt, the Government
judicial review. Buchanan & Wagner, Fiscal Responsibility
would be left at liberty
to apply such portions of the
in Constitutional Democracy 10 (1978).
revenue as may not be necessary for current expenses to
The balanced-budget rule was an effective constitutional con-
such other objects as may be most conducive to the public
straint in the sense of being part of a set of fixed principles ante-
security and welfare.
cedent to and controlling the day to day decisions of the national
President John Quincy Adams also found a balanced budget to
legislature.
be a sound maxim of political economy:
18th and 19th centuries
Stewards of the public money should never suffer with-
Influenced by individuals such as Adam Smith, David Hume, and
out urgent necessity to be transcended the maxim of keep-
David Ricardo, the drafters of the Constitution and their immedi-
ing the expenditures of the year within the limits of its re-
ate successors at the helm of the new government strongly feared
ceipts.
the effects of public debt. As Thomas Jefferson stated [the quota-
Among the most uncompromising advocates of budget balance
tions in this section are taken from Kimmel, Lewis, Federal Budget
was President Andrew Jackson, who viewed public debt in unique-
and Fiscal Policy: 1789-1958]:
ly populistic terms:
The public debt is the greatest of dangers to be feared by
Once the budget is balanced and the debts paid off, our
a republican government.
population will be relieved from a considerable portion of
Alexander Hamilton, who perhaps more than any other individ-
its present burdens and will find not only new motives to
ual, influenced the course of American economic policy during our
patriotic affection, but additional means for the display of
individual enterprise.
nation's first century, noted:
As the vicissitudes of nations begat a perpetual tendency
Prior to the Civil War, customs duties ordinarily were more than
to the accumulation of debt, there ought to be a perpetual,
adequate to cover the limited expenditures of the national govern-
ment. During these years, deficits were rare. The majority of
anxious, and unceasing effort to reduce that which at any
time exists, as fast as shall be practicable, consistent with
budget deficits that did occur were attributed to foreign conflicts-
the War of 1812 and the Mexican War of 1846-and to several brief
integrity and good faith.
recessions in the late 1830's and the late 1850's. Whatever occasion-
Earlier, in the Federalist # 30, Hamilton had recognized the un-
al deficits occurred, efforts normally would follow to repay them as
healthy propensity for public debt on the part of most governments
expeditiously as possible.
when he wrote:
Despite the enormous debts accumulated by the national govern-
I believe that it may be regarded as a position warrant-
ment as a result of the Civil War, the period following it through
ed by the history of mankind that, in the usual progress of
the end of the century brought little change with respect to the
things, the necessities of a nation, in every stage of its ex-
balanced budget philosophy. A run of 28 years of consecutive
budget surpluses occurred during this period. The norm of an
istence, will be found at least equal to its resources.
annual balanced budget continued to exert considerable influence
Both Hamilton and Jefferson were in agreement that, whatever
on the exercise of public policy. Any significant departures from
debt happened to be accrued by a nation, it ought to be repaid
balance or from efforts to repay existing public debt were treated
within some prescribed period of time. In Jefferson's view, the prof-
an sources of alarm.
ligacy of one generation ought not to forever burden its successors.
President Andrew Johnson, in proposing to effect substantial re-
ductions in the war debt, observed:
20
21
We should look at the national debt, as just as it is, not
and early 1930's. While there are many economic explanations for
as a national blessing but as a heavy burden on the indus-
the Great Depression, it is extremely difficult to understand the ar-
try of the country to be discharged without necessary
gument of a small minority of individuals that the commitment of
delay.
the Hoover Administration to a balanced budget was in any way
President William McKinley took the position that, even during
responsible. It is an argument that even most proponents of the
unsatisfactory economic conditions, "the government should not be
"new economics" have rejected. Apart from this argument's failure
permitted to run behind its debt." President Benjamin Harrison de-
to explain why the commitment of earlier administrations to bal-
scribed unnecessary public debt as "criminal".
anced budgets failed to trigger similar economic collapses, it is an
The principal arguments raised throughout most of the 19th cen-
argument that is inconsistent with the facts of Hoover Administra-
tury to public debt were as follows: first, interest on the debt was a
tion policies. Despite the fact that there was at that time a sub-
heavy burden upon the working classes; second, interest payments
stantial bipartisan consensus in favor of the need to balance the
represented a redistribution of income in favor of the well-to-do-
Federal government's budget, such budgets were not produced. In
the words of Lewis H. Kimmel in his historical analysis of Federal
classes; and finally, the capital freed from unproductive employ-
ment through debt reduction invariably would find its way into
budget and fiscal policy, "The fight for a balanced budget had been
made, but the battle was never won."
more productive and enterprising uses. As Samuel Inghams, Secre-
This is not to say that budget deficits were responsible for the
tary of the Treasury under Andrew Jackson, noted:
Depression, either. The Federal budget was probably not a major
Interest is now paid to capitalists out of the profits of
factor-one way or another-in causing the Depression. First, there
labor; not only will this labor be released from the burden,
was the far smaller scale of the Federal budget at that time. In the
but the capital, thus thrown out of an unproductive use,
year 1929, the gross national product of the United States was ap-
will seek a productive employment; giving thereby a new
proximately $100 billion. Federal expenditures for FY 1929 repre-
impetus to enterprise in agriculture, the arts, commerce,
sented approximately 3 percent of the GNP and the surplus for
and navigation.
that fiscal year of $734 million represented approximately three-
quarters of one percent of the GNP. Thus even from the most de-
20th century
termined Keynesian perspective, it is difficult to argue that the
The strong national consensus favoring a balanced national
Federal government was engaged in any significant removal of pur-
budget continued through the early decades of the 20th century.
chasing power from that private sector. The fiscal posture was one
President Wilson argued in behalf of balanced peacetime budgets
of moderate restraint at best. Second, the Federal budget is ab-
in observing:
solved of responsibility because the movement of the budget from
Money being spent without new taxation and appropria-
nominal surplus to substantial deficit-the consequence of a rapid
tion without accompanying taxation is as bad as taxation
decline in the level of receipts-was such as to mitigate rather
without representation.
than aggravate the severity of the downturn, from the Keynesian
perspective. Later efforts to increase spending on emergency relief
It was President Calvin Coolidge's goal to run actual surpluses in
programs acted in precisely the same fiscal direction. Finally, the
order to repay the large national debt (for that time) of $24 billion
national downturn during this period was accompanied by a mone-
that had resulted from the First World War. He stated as his Ad-
tary deflation of unprecedented severity, one that took an extreme-
ministration's primary fiscal objective-maintaining revenues at a
ly long period of time to reverse.
level "not too greatly in excess of expenditures." He stated further:
While there are various theories of the cause for the Depres-
The nation must make financial sacrifices accompanied
sion-Milton Friedman's analysis of trends in the supply of money
by a stern self denial in public expenditures until we have
during this period (A Monetary History of the United States; 1867-
conquered the disabilities of our public finance
1960, 1960), Charles Kindleberger's observations on the absence of
we
must keep our budget balanced for each year.
an international lender of last resort (The World in Depression,
1973), Jude Wanniski's account of the Smoot-Hawley tariff (The
The surpluses of the 1920's, however, were followed by an unbro-
Way the World Works, 1980) and so forth-there is little basis for
ken string of ten peace-time deficits during the 1930's and then 6
attributing the Depression to the state of the Federal budget, much
war-related deficits. This sustained period of deficit spending repre-
less to the idea that this budget normally should be in balance.
sented something entirely unprecedented in United States history,
The Federal budget for fiscal year 1931 was the first budget to be
although the nation had suffered a prolonged series of deficits in
prepared following the crash of the stock market in late 1929. It
relation to the Civil War. New economic theories that placed great
was submitted by President Hoover about six weeks after the col-
weight upon the ability of the Federal government to "manage"
lapse of the market. In this budget, surpluses were estimated for
fiscal policy through deficits and surpluses emerged during this
fiscal year 1931 and 1932, of $758 million and $499 million respec-
period.
tively. These estimations remained in effect even after a reduction
The new theories found a fertile climate in part as a result of the
in personal and corporate income taxes was enacted into law in De-
Great Depression that had overcome the economy in the late 1920's
cember of 1929, carrying with it an expected, immediate revenue
22
23
loss of $80 million for each of these two years. It was not until
public debt of the United States stood at a figure approximately six
April of 1930 that President Hoover conceded that not only would
times as large as the debt existing before the War and approxi-
the predicted surpluses not accrue, but that deficits could be ex-
War. mately ten times that of the total debt following the first World
pected for fiscal year 1931 of $20 to $30 million. The final deficit
for fiscal year 1931 was $462 million or approximately fifteen per-
Following World War II, although the annual balanced budget
cent of the total level of public expenditures. The final deficit for
was no longer the sole standard by which fiscal policy was judged,
the succeding fiscal year was an overwhelming $2.7 billion, or ap-
there was continued expression of support for the idea of balanced
proximately sixty percent of the total level of public expenditures.
budgets, particularly during times of economic expansion. Even the
Annual deficits of a similar magnitude recurred during the remain-
"new economics" required the achievement of surpluses during
der of the decade as first one, then a second depression took place.
these periods in order to overcome the deficits incurred during eco-
The depression that struck the country in the late 1930's-nearly
nomic downturns. President Truman observed in his budget mes-
as powerful as that in the early 1930's-finally was overcome only
sage for 1984 that:
by this country's entry into the Second World War.
As long as business, employment and national income con-
While the Hoover Administration never retreated from its tradi-
tinue high, we should maintain tax revenues at levels that
tionalist attitude toward the balanced budget, the trend in expendi-
will not only meet current expenditures but also leave a
tures during its tenure was upward, primarily because of greater
surplus for retirement of the public debt.
outlays for public works and the Reconstruction Finance Corpora-
tion. Total Federal expenditures had increased by nearly $2 billion
The idea of budget deficits as a regular instrument of fiscal
between fiscal year 1927 and fiscal year 1932, an increase of ap-
policy, however, was increasingly evident during this period, al-
proximately 64 percent. Growing levels of public spending became
though the Truman Administration managed to balance half of its
a major issue in the 1934 Presidential campaign as Franklin Roose-
velt criticized the incumbent administration for failing to achieve
by only a small amount.
budgets while incurring total deficits that exceeded total surpluses
the "one sound foundation of permanent economic recovery"-a
President Eisenhower continued along much the same lines, al-
"complete and honest balancing of the federal budget". Only six
though he expressed far more public support for the concept of a
days after his inauguration, President Roosevelt summarized his
regularly balanced budget than did his predecessor. He observed in
views concerning the growing level of budget deficit:
his 1957 budget message:
With the utmost seriousness, I point out to Congress the
We strengthen our financial position by a balanced budget.
profound effect of this fact upon our national economy. It
We must make sure that we do not undermine our finan-
has contributed to the recent collapse of our banking
deficits. cial strength by laying the groundwork for future budget
structure. It has accentuated the stagnation of the econom-
ic life of our people. It has added to the ranks of the unem-
It was not until the recession of 1957-58 that the Eisenhower Ad-
ployed. Our Government's house is not in order and for
ministration proved incapable of compensating for deficits with
many reasons no effective action has been taken to restore
subsequent surpluses. The $12.9 billion budget deficit in 1985 was
it to order.
(at nation. the time) the largest peace-time deficit in the history of the
The Economy Act of 1933 (48 Stat. 8) was enacted at this time,
providing for spending reductions of approximately $500 million, in
The real turning point in the history of U.S. fiscal policies OC-
an effort to reduce the alarming growth of the public debt. During
curred during the 1960's. Even the Keynesian objective of balanc-
much of its first term in office, despite mounting public deficits,
lar, annual, uncompensated deficits.
ing surplus years with deficit years succumbed to the idea of regu-
the Roosevelt Administration continued to express its support for
the achievement of a balanced budget. It was not until such deficits
During the past 25 years, the Federal government has run defi-
had persisted for several years that the Administration attempted
cits in all but a single year. The deficits have come during good
publicly to explain its fiscal policies in terms of the "new econom-
times and they have come during bad times. They have come from
ics" and in terms of the need for the Federal government to engage
Presidents who have pledged themselves to balanced budgets as
in the kind of demand management or "pump priming" required
well as from Presidents whose fiscal priorities were elsewhere.
by this school of economic theory. For much of his first term, Presi-
They have come from Presidents of both parties.
dent Roosevelt argued that it was the "deficit of today" that was
Even more alarmingly, the magnitude of these deficits has in-
making possible the "surplus of tomorrow". The proposed budget
creased enormously during this period. For the 7 fiscal years
for fiscal year 1937 was reported by the Administration as being in
ending in fiscal year 1967, the total deficit was approximately $35
balance, "except for recovery and relief".
billion. For the next seven fiscal years ending in fiscal year 1974,
World War II had an indelible impact upon Federal government
the total deficit was approximately $91 billion. For the next 7 fiscal
fiscal policies. During the war years, Federal expenditures rose
years, ending in fiscal year 1981, the total deficit was approximate-
from $9 billion to almost $100 billion, with the total national debt
ly $450 billion. The estimated deficit for fiscal year 1982-86 will be
standing about $250 billion when the fighting ended. The total
approximately $920 billion. The total national debt today stands at
25
24
A linkage existed between spending and revenue in the sense
approximately $2 trillion, with nearly half of that total incurred
that public expenditures generally were set at levels that were
during the past 8 years alone.
matched by public revenues. Revenue estimates generally were es-
Whatever lip service may have been given to the concept of a
tablished prior to expenditure estimates and served to define per-
balanced budget during the past two decades, it is clear that there
missible levels of expenditures. It was an historical norm, described
either is the lack of will to conform with this ideal, or that funda-
by Professor Alvin Rabushka of the Hoover Institution, as one in
mental obstacles to its achievement exist, within the political
which:
system. It is possible then to summarize the history of the Federal budg-
Public officials first determined what resources were
etary record into several distinct periods of varying lengths. Over
available to Government and against that constraint chose
the longest of these periods-from 1789 to 1932-balanced budgets
among the many competing claims on public spending.
or surplus budgets were the norm. While budget procedures had
Under this system, public officials could support new spending
little of their present organization, the concept of a balanced
programs but only when they also were prepared to reduce other
budget was accepted widely as the hallmark of fiscal responsibility.
spending programs commensurately or to raise revenues to cover
Those deficits that did occur-during wartime or during the most
such new spending. This political reality served as an effective
severe recessions-normally were compensated for by subsequent
check upon the creation of unlimited numbers of new spending ini-
surpluses. During the second period-from 1932 to 1960-the rigid
tiatives.
rule of annual balanced budgets gave way to a fiscal policy in
As new economic theories began to take hold in the middle years
which balanced budgets remained an overall objective but in which
of the twentieth century and as the traditional balanced budget re-
deficit spending nevertheless was viewed as a tool occasionally
quirement came increasingly to be disregarded, an entirely new
useful to effect appropriate economic results. Finally, the most
fiscal environment evolved. With the severing of the historical link-
recent period-1960 to date-has seen unrelieved instances of defi-
age between spending and revenue, spending decisions increasingly
cit spending and increasingly high levels of deficit spending. The
have become divorced from revenue decisions. Spending decisions
balanced budget concept, a concept which had exercised a decisive-
increasingly have been reached without consideration of whether
ly restraining influence during the first period, and a diminished
or not revenues existed to finance such spending. The virtually un-
though still restraining influence during the second period, had
limited accessibility to deficit spending has served to bridge what-
dwindled into almost total irrelevance by the end of this latter
ever gaps have developed between levels of expenditures and levels
period. Not coincidentally, in the view of this Committee, the end
of revenues.
of this period saw the United States still engaged in some of the
As Professor Craig Stubblebine of Claremont College has noted:
most prolonged and intractable economic difficulties in its history.
Planned deficits in years good and bad signify Congres-
VIII. SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 225 AND THE CONSTITUTION
sional rejection of the fiscal rule which served America for
the greater part of its life
with erosion of these fiscal
In developing Senate Joint Resolution 225, the committee has
disciplines, understood by and adhered to by the founders
been concerned not only with developing an amendment reflecting
of this nation, no one should be surprised that the Con-
sound economic policy but one reflecting sound constitutional
gress has been unable to exercise the restraint necessary
policy as well. The committee fully appreciates the differing im-
to secure and maintain economic stability.
peratives in putting together a constitutional provision, as opposed
The implications of this access to deficit spending as a substitute
to a simple statutory provision.
for the traditional balanced budget norm are important for our po-
Spending bias
litical system. It means that Members of Congress invariably have
The purpose of the proposed amendment is not to write into the
political incentives to respond to the demands of spending interest
Constitution any permanent economic policy; rather, as is more
groups for greater public spending. Such spending, unlike in past
fully discussed in section III, it is to eliminate a pronounced struc-
years, need not be accompanied by votes to reduce spending in
tural bias toward increased levels of spending that has developed
other areas or by votes to increase public revenues. In other words,
within the political system without corresponding increases in rev-
the political advantages to be accrued by responding favorably to a
enue. The existence of this bias has led to a fiscal process in this
spending interest no longer are accompanied by equivalent political
country resulting in repeated substantial deficits which are detri-
disadvantages growing out of the need to antagonize some other
mental to all facets of the economy.
spending interest or to antagonize the taxpaying public generally.
Throughout most of the history of this country, public spending
Dr. William Niskanen, a member of the President's Council of
was constrained by an "unwritten Constitution" requirement of a
Economic Advisors, has remarked in this regard:
balanced budget. While occasional deficits would be incurred, gen-
Once the nexus between Federal spending and tax reve-
erally during wartime, public debt was regarded as something un-
nues was broken, no consensus developed on any other
desirable, something to be reduced and eliminated as quickly as
rule to constrain the level of spending and the deficit.
26
27
Professor Buchanan has remarked further:
The simple arithmetic of politics suggests a regime of
proposed amendment that would prevent Congress from approving
any particular item of expenditure or taxation. There is nothing in
permanent and continuing deficits in democratic society
the proposed amendment that would establish any permanent level
where there exists no constraint that dictates some balanc-
of expenditure or taxation in the Constitution. And there is noth-
ing of the costs and the benefits of spending programs. "To
ing that would make it significantly more difficult to increase ex-
spend without taxing"-this stuff of politician's dreams
penditures or taxation than to reduce expenditures or taxation.
must somehow be held in check by rules of fiscal prudence.
What the proposed amendment would do is modify the elements
Recognition of the difficulties posed for the body politic by spe-
within the present political system that enable Members of Con-
cial interest groups stems at least as far back as Madison's dis-
gress to spend public funds without having to account for this
courses in the Federalist Papers. In the Federalist No. 10, Madison
spending. There is nothing in Senate Joint Resolution 225 that
emphasized the paramount responsibility of the new Government
would preclude Congress from continuing to increase public spend-
to "break and control the violence of faction." Later in the same
ing; all that would be required is that the costs of such spending no
essay, he proceeded to define such "factions" as a:
longer be obscured or deferred beyond public recognition. Unlike
majority or minority of the whole, who are united and ac-
some proposed constitutional amendments that would make it diffi-
tuated by some common impulse or passion, or of interest
cult for Congress to respond to even genuine public sentiment for
adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent
increased levels of spending or taxing, Senate Joint Resolution 225
and aggregate interests of the whole.
however, it would ensure that no insuperable obstacles existed to
would not pose an insuperable obstacle to this end. Concomitantly,
The causes of such "factions" are "sown in the nature of man" and
reduced levels of spending or taxing, as now is the case.
must be controlled by the institutions created by the new Constitu-
As Professors Buchanan and Wagner have observed:
tion.
While not necessarily anticipating the precise harm that would
We must restore some rule that will restrict politicians
be done to the "interests of the whole" by "factions" in the area of
in their natural, understandable proclivity to spend and to
refrain from taxing
national economic policy, Madison did discourse upon the need for
budgets will tend toward chronic
the institutions of the new Government to temper the influence of
deficits until and unless politicians are constrained by
factions, not to compound it. "Ambition must be made to counter-
some constitutional rule which requires that the taxing
and spending sides of the fiscal account be balanced.
act ambition," Madison observed in the Federalist No. 51.
Senate Joint Resolution 225 would democratize the budget proc-
Representativeness of process
ess by making it a more honest and open process. Congress, as al-
The objective of Senate Joint Resolution 225 then is not to "read
ready noted, would remain fully capable of increasing public spend-
economic policy into the Constitution", as some have suggested, but
ing or taxing, but only in the event that it was equally willing to
to alter the spending bias in order to make the budget process one
cast the "difficult" votes necessary to accomplish this. The amend-
that is more responsive and more democratic. It does not seek to
ment would mandate that increased public spending for a program
establish an alternative bias in behalf of reduced levels of expendi-
be matched either by votes to reduce spending for some other pro-
tures, but simply to restore a semblance of neutrality. As Professor
gram, or by votes for increased taxes. Members of Congress would
Antonin Scalia (now U.S. Circuit Court Judge) has observed:
have to go on record either in support of cutting some spending
while the extraordinary legislative requirements [of the
program, or of raising taxes generally, before it could effect higher
proposed amendment] pertain to economic measures, they
public spending. Tax increases would have to be voted explicitly,
are motivated by political science and governmental
rather than implicitly imposed through deficit spending and infla-
tion. As Professor Friedman has stated:
theory rather than economics, and their intended effect is
to eliminate rather than produce an economic bias or pre-
deficits are bad
They are bad because they encourage
sumption.
political irresponsibility. They enable our representatives
Passage of this amendment would ensure that the political equa-
in Washington to buy votes at our expense without having
tion confronting Members of Congress who must vote on spending
to vote explicitly for taxes to finance the largesse.
measures carries some element of countervailing political advan-
Professor Robert Crawford of Brigham Young University has ob-
tage and disadvantage.
served that the proposed amendment:
It is the premise of Senate Joint Resolution 225 that the repre-
Would increase the flow of economic information into
sentative political processes ought to be charged with primary re-
the political marketplace.
sponsibility for making day-to-day decisions with respect to spend-
ing and taxing. Unlike many other proposed constitutional amend-
Rather than having to analyze hundreds of rollcall votes annual-
ments on this subject. Senate Joint Resolution 225 minimizes con-
ly in order to assess the performance of their Representatives and
stitutional intrusion into these decisions. There is nothing in the
Senators, members of the public (and their intermediaries) would
have to analyze a mere handful of key votes in order to determine
28
29
which legislators were responsible for increased levels of public ex-
While there is no formal limitation in the Constitution regarding
penditure, taxation, and debt. If the citizenry genuinely were desir-
the subject matter of amendments, it may be fair, nevertheless, to
ous of increases, no doubt this would be reflected by their ballots;
suggest that: (1) a proposed amendment may be inconsistent with
if, however, as many Members of this Committee suspect is pres-
the purpose and spirit of that document; (2) the object of the pro-
ently the case, the citizenry was not SO desirous, this too would be
posed amendment is an inappropriate object to be addressed by the
reflected by their ballots.
Constitution; or (3) the form or structure of the amendment is in-
In summary, the key provision in Senate Joint Resolution 225
consistent with the Constitution.
the balanced budget norm in section 1-is a necessary element of
As discussed above, what Senate Joint Resolution 225 seeks to
any measure to promote a more neutral budget process; it is not
achieve is the elimination of a structural bias within our political
necessarily an end in itself. So long as unlimited deficit spending
system that has arisen through the confluence of growing interest
remains available to Members of Congress, and SO long as Congress
group power and the abolition of the historical balanced budget
does not have to vote higher taxes if it wants higher spending, the
constraint upon national fiscal policy.y
budget process will continue to be skewed sharply in behalf of
Beyond that fact, however, it must be stated that the growth in
higher levels of spending and only minimally responsive to the will
the Federal Government in recent decades-a growth that never
of the electorate in this regard.
could have been anticipated by our Founding Fathers-does have
Perhaps most importantly, so long as these elements remain in
implications for the freedom and well-being of the citizenry. As
place, the budget process will continue to be a dishonest one, with
John Maynard Keynes has observed:
members of Congress perpetually able to avoid accountability for
their spending and taxing decisions, perpetually able to escape
There is no subtler, no surer, means of overturning the
public identification for their policies, and perpetually able to reap
existing basis of society than to debauch the currency. The
process engages all of the hidden forces of economic law on
the immediate political benefits of their actions while postponing
the side of destruction and does it in a manner in which
indefinitely the political costs.
not one man in a million is able to diagnose. Economic
Economic policy and Constitution
Consequences of the Peace (1920).
While it is the view of the Committee that Senate Joint Resolu-
In short, national solvency, the ability to pay one's debts, is a fun-
tion 225 primarily proposes an amendment of process, and that it
damental value of any nation.
reads into the Constitution a political principle of enduring value
The concept of "limited government" or "enumerated powers"
rather than a transient economic policy, it is still worth addressing
that was at the root of the Constitution and that served to check
the objections of those who find difficulty with the concept of plac-
the growth of the public sector during most of the history of our
ing a balanced budget provision or taxing limitation in the consti-
country has been altered drastically by the evolution of public
tution. Professor Lawrence Tribe of the Harvard Law School, for
policy and constitutional interpretation during the 20th century in
example states:
a manner that never could have been predicted by the drafters of
the Constitution.
The Constitution embodies fundamental law and should
not be made the instrument of specific social or economic
These include the continued expansion of the notion of what con-
stitutes "commerce
policies
to endure as a source of unity rather than di-
among the several States"; the develop-
vision, the constitution must embody only our most funda-
ment of new theories of Congressional authority under the 14th
mental and lasting values
but unlike the ideals em-
Amendment; the acceptance of the Hamiltonian conception of the
bodied in the Constitution, fiscal austerity-hower sound
breadth of the general welfare clause; the adoption of the 16th
as a current goal-speaks neither of the structure of gov-
Amendment allowing the imposition of income taxes; and the ero-
ernment nor to the rights of the people
it should be
sion of the traditional norm of a balanced Federal budget. In place
amended only to modify fundamental law-not to accom-
of a spending power limited to the "enumerated" powers of Article
plish policy goals.
I of the Constitution, the Courts have transformed this section into
It is first worth noting that, with a single exception (mainte-
one investing Congress with broad and virtually unlimited spend-
ing authority. Professor Milton Friedman has stated:
nance of equal State representation in the Senate), there is no
extant limitation upon the subject matter of Constitutional amend-
Such limits on total government spending were provided
ments. Although efforts were made at the Constitutional Conven-
at an earlier date by the gold standard, an unwritten con-
tion to place substantive limitations in the Article V amending
stitutional prohibition on deficit budgets, and Supreme
clause, they were largely unsuccessful. Periodic amendments
Court interpretation of "inter-State commerce", "due proc-
during the 19th century to place substantive limitations upon the
ess" and similar terms in the Constitution in such a way
amending authority were also unsuccessful. Later challenges to
as narrowly to limit Federal action in the economic area.
both the 18th and 19th Amendments on the grounds of "unconsti-
These limits have now been swept away. They cannot be
tutionality" failed as well. National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350
restored in their initial form. But some replacement is des-
(1920); Leser V. Garnett 258, U.S. 130 (1922).
perately needed.
30
31
Professor Breit states further that:
creasingly prone to deficit financing since World War II, and (2)
The Federal sector, during that period, has come to command an
The balanced budget norm was SO deeply ingrained
increasing share of the nation's economic output and income.
during this time as to form a constraint of considerable
power on the actions of government
the unwritten
Federal deficits: increasingly frequent and large
constitution maxim of the balanced budget
had the
The Federal government has run a budget deficit in twenty-four
result of chaining Leviathan. Buchanan & Wagner, Fiscal
of the past twenty-five years, and in forty-seven of the past fifty-
Responsibility in Constitutional Democracy 17 (1978).
five years. Deficit spending has come to occur during good econom-
The new economics (as well as the new jurisprudence) has thus
ic conditions and during bad economic conditions. While the past
had the impact of removing these formal and informal limitations
decade has seen little change in the frequency of these deficits, it
upon the growth of the Federal public sector-a sector that today
has seen, however, significant change in the size of deficits.
consumes approximately one-fourth of the Gross National Product,
Since 1970, the United States has incurred the eleven largest
up from approximately 3 percent in 1930, 10 percent in 1940, 14
peacetime deficits in the history of the Nation with nine deficits
percent in 1950, 18 percent in 1960, and 20 percent in 1970.
over the past decade in excess of $50 billion. Following FY 1970,
Not only has the public sector grown relative to the economy
the total national debt of the Nation stood at $383 billion; following
generally, but it has increasingly grown through public expendi-
FY 1985 just fifteen years later, this figure will stand at approxi-
tures that are not financed by tax revenues-deficit spending. But
mately $2 trillion ($2,000,000,000,000). Nearly half of this total debt
it is not simply the economic health that is being threatened: it is
has been incurred during the past eight years alone, with well over
the political health as well. As Professor (now U.S. Circuit Court
two-thirds having been incurred in the past two decades alone. (See
judge) Robert Bork has observed:
table 2.)
The long-term growth of government's share of national
TABLE 2.-NATIONAL DEBT IN THE 20TH CENTURY
wealth is a serious near-term threat to the vitality of the
less obviously perhaps rising government
(In billions of dollars)
economy
spending is a long-term threat to American political free-
Year
Debt
Year
Debt
Year
Debt
dom. Social and political discontents may increase beyond
tolerable levels as the decreased size of the pie intensifies
1900
1
1929
17
1958
280
disputes about its division. Inflation, which may become
1901
1
1930
16
1959
288
endemic if spending is not controlled, has destroyed democ-
1902
1
1931
17
1960
291
1903
1932
19
1961
293
racies before. Increasing subsidies with conditions attached
1904
1933
23
1962
303
are a mode of coercion that may evade constitutional guar-
1905
1934
27
1963
311
antees allowing government to buy decreased freedom it
1906
1935
29
1964
317
could not order directly. Rising spending also fosters the
1907
1936
34
1965
323
1908
1937
36
1966
329
growth of great bureaucracies whose choices increasingly
1909
1938
37
1967
341
displace those of elected representatives. Even if the rule
1910
1939
48
1968
370
of the bureaucracies proves both stable and benevolent,
1911
1940
51
1969
367
which is by no means to be assumed, it is not the sover-
1912
1941
58
1970
383
1913
1942
79
1971
410
eignty of the people. Wall Street Journal, April 4, 1979.
1914
1943
143
1972
437
He goes on to conclude:
1915
1944
204
1973
468
1916
1945
260
1974
486
Any systemic malfunction of government serious enough
1917
3
1946
271
1975
544
to threaten prosperity and freedom may properly be ad-
1918
12
1947
257
1976
632
1919
25
1948
252
1977
709
dressed by the Constitution.
1920
24
1949
253
1978
780
The amendment does not read a particular economic theory into
1921
24
1950
257
1979
834
1922
23
1951
255
1980
914
the Constitution; it does not read precise spending or taxing levels
1923
22
1952
259
1981
1,004
permanently into the Constitution; it does not preempt the day-to-
1924
21
1953
266
1982
1,147
day legislative decisions of the representative branch of the nation-
1925
21
1954
271
1983
1,382
al government; and it is a sufficiently flexible provision to permit
1926
20
1955
274
1984
1,577
1927
19
1956
273
1985 1
1,850
the government to respond to economic circumstances of a widely
1928
18
1957
272
varying nature.
1 Estimated in fiscal year 1986.
IX. ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
Source: Office of Management Budget.
Two statements summarize the economic issues addressed by
With the rising national debt has come rising interest payments.
Senate Joint Resolution 225: (1) The Federal sector has become in-
Where interest absorbed approximately six percent of the national
32
33
budget twenty years ago, in fiscal year 1985 interest payments will
later in fiscal year 1977; the first $500 billion budget in fiscal year
represent over thirteen percent of the total budget. Total interest
1980; the first $600 billion budget in fiscal year 1981; the first $700
of $130 billion for fiscal year 1985 represents a total larger than
billion budget in fiscal year 1982; the first $800 billion budget in
the entire Federal budget during the early 1960's, and comprised
fiscal year 1984. (See table 4.)
the third largest expenditure item in the Federal budget. It is a
figure nearly half as large as spending for national defense and
TABLE 4.-BUDGET RECEIPTS AND OUTLAYS, 1789-1986 1
nearly one-third as large as spending for income security programs,
including Social Security.
[In millions of dollars]
Federal spending and taxing: an increasing share
Fiscal year
Budget receipts
Budget outlays
Budget surplus or
deficit(-)
Prior to World War I, Federal spending represented a minor
share of the nation's economic output of goods and services. Other
1789-1849
1,160
1,090
+70
1850-1900
14,462
15,453
-991
than in times of war, the relatively small amounts of Federal
1901-1905
2,797
2,678
+119
spending were financed primarily by import duties. Government
1906-1910
3,143
3,196
-52
spending at all levels represented less than 9 percent of the Gross
1911-1915
3,517
3,568
-49
National Product (GNP).
1916-1920
17,286
40,195
-22,909
1921
5,571
5,062
+509
Beginning with ratification of the 16th Amendment in 1913, pro-
1922
4,026
3,289
+736
viding Federal access to taxation of incomes, and with the onset of
1923
3,853
3,140
+713
World War I, the Federal sector has demonstrated a continuing
1924
3,871
2,908
+963
propensity for growth, whatever the economic circumstances. Over
1925
3,641
2,924
+717
1926
3,795
2,930
+865
the next twenty years, government spending nearly doubled as a
1927
4,013
2,857
+1,155
percentage of the economy. Since that period, however, spending
1928
3,900
2,961
+939
has accelerated at an even more rapid pace, particularly Federal
1929
3,862
3,127
+734
government spending. In 1929, Federal expenditures of $3 billion
1930
4,058
3,320
+738
1931
3,116
3,577
-462
represented just three percent of the total GNP. By 1950, the
1932
1,924
4,659
-2,735
peacetime share had risen to fifteen percent of GNP or $43 billion.
1933
1,997
4,598
-2,602
For fiscal year 1984, Federal government spending of $852 billion
1934
3,015
6,645
-3,630
commanded nearly 24 percent of GNP-the highest in the peace-
1935
3,706
6,497
-2,791
1936
3,997
8,422
-4,425
time history of the United States. (See table 3.)
1937
4,956
7,733
-2,777
1938
5,588
6,765
-1,177
TABLE 3.-FEDERAL REVENUES AND OUTLAYS AS PERCENTAGE OF GNP
1939
4,979
8,841
-3,862
1940
6,361
9,456
-3,095
26
1941
8,621
13,634
-5,013
Actual
Projectd
1942
14,350
35,114
-20,764
1943
23,649
78,533
-54,884
20
1944
44,276
91,280
-47,004
1945
45,216
92,690
-47,474
1946
39,327
55,183
-15,856
22
Outlays
1947
38,394
34,532
+3,862
1948
Person
41,774
29,773
+12,001
1949
39,437
38,834
+603
20
1950
39,485
42,597
-3,112
1951
51,646
45,546
+6,100
1952
66,204
67,721
-1,517
12
1953
69,574
76,107
-6,533
1954
69,719
70,890
-1,170
1955
65,469
68,509
-3,041
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1956
74,547
70,460
+4,087
Fiscal Years
1957
79,990
76,741
+3,249
1958
79,636
82,575
-2,939
Source: Baseline Budget Projections for Fiscal Years 1985-1989, CBO February
1959
79,249
92,104
-12,855
1984.
1960
92,492
92,223
+269
1961
94,389
97,795
-3,406
To illustrate this growth in another way, the first $100 billion
1962
99,676
106,813
-7,137
1963
106,560
111,311
-4,751
budget in the history of the nation occurred as recently as fiscal
1964
112,662
118,584
-5,922
year 1962, more than 170 years after the founding of the Republic.
1965
116,833
118,430
-1,596
The first $200 billion budget, however, followed nine years later in
1966
130,856
134,652
-3,796
1967
fiscal year 1971. The first $300 billion budget occurred four years
148,906
157,608
-8,702
1968
152,973
178,134
-25,161
later in fiscal year 1975; the first $400 billion budget two years
34
35
TABLE 4.-BUDGET RECEIPTS AND OUTLAYS, 1789-1986 1-Continued
needed restricting, a fiscal surplus was called for. Debt creation, ac-
[In millions of dollars]
cording to Keynes, was a valuable tool for economic policy; but at
other times, or in the wrong amounts, debt creation could be a dan-
Fiscal year
Budget receipts
Budget outlays
Budget surplus or
deficit(
gerous force.
Underlying these deficits, however, was a genuine concern for ef-
1969
186,882
183,645
+3,236
fective fiscal management. The real value of national debt-that is,
1970
192,807
195,652
-2,845
1971
187,139
210,172
-23,033
national debt expressed in constant (1972) dollars-has shown a re-
1972
207,309
230,681
-23,373
markable stability over the years 1950 to 1976, swinging up slightly
1973
230,799
245,647
-14,849
in recession years and down slightly in boom years. (Table 5.)
1974
263,224
267,912
-4,688
1975
279,090
324,245
-45,154
TABLE 5.-NATIONAL DEBT/GNP PRICE DEFLATOR
1976
298,060
364,473
-66,413
TQ 2
81,232
94,188
- 12,956
[Billions of 1972 dollars]
1977
355,559
400,506
-44,948
1971
427
1978
1929
52
399,516
448,368
-48,807
1979
1933
92
1972
437
463,302
490,997
-27,694
1980
1939
169
1973
442
517,112
576,675
-59,563
1940
175
1974
422
1981
599,272
657,204
-57,932
1982
1945
686
1975
432
617,766
728,375
-110,609
1950
479
1976
478
1983
600,562
795,969
-195,407
1955
451
1977
506
1984
666,457
851,786
-185,324
1960
424
1978
518
1985 est
736,859
959,085
-222,226
1965
434
1979
510
1986 est
793,729
973,725
-179,996
1966
428
1980
512
1
Data for 1789-1939 are for the administrative budget data for 1940 and all following years are for the unified budget.
1967
431
1981
513
2 In calendar year 1976, the Federal fiscal year was converted from a July 1-June 30 basis to an Oct. I-Sept. 30 basis. The TQ refers to the
1968
448
1982
553
transition quarter from July 1 to Sept. 30, 1976.
1969
448
1983
642
1970
419
1984
713
Despite the fact that an increasing share of this spending has
been accounted for through deficit financing, Federal tax burdens
have had to increase enormously in recent years to pay for these
But as newer theories became popular (supply side, monetarism,
expenditures. Per capita tax receipts have nearly doubled in the
among others), the traditional Keynesian concern with the size of
past 8 years alone, while the number of individual taxpayers
the deficit was largely abandoned. And deficits correspondingly ex-
paying more than 20 percent of their income to the Federal govern-
ploded.
ment has more than tripled in the past 15 years. Approximately 75
The average real national debt in the 1981-1984 period was $602
percent of all American families, through a combination of taxes
billion (1972 dollars), an increase of some 39 percent over the
and inflation, now have fewer real, after-tax dollars currently than
period from 1950-77.
15 years ago.
Without the traditional constraint on deficits, the spending bias
has come into full operation. According to projections by the Con-
Nature of the debt
gressional Budget Office, Federal outlays will be some $260 billion
The enormity of the current deficits has raised the need for a
higher, and revenues will be more than $1.2 trillion lower, in the
balanced budget to emergency levels. Yet, many continue to argue
1980's.
that we have had deficits for half a century and the sky has not
National debt as a ratio of Gross National Product serves as a
fallen. The sad truth is that in the past decade we have have begun
measure of the importance of federal debt in the economy. As table
to run an entirely new type of deficit that is much more destruc-
6 shows, Federal debt declined steadily as a share of the economy
tive than the relatively smaller ones of the past.
from the end of World War II until the beginning of the 1980's.
The debt we are now incurring is a radically different character
than the debt in the recent past. It is of unprecedented size in real
TABLE 6.-NATIONAL DEBT/GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
terms. And there is no plausible possibility that new debt issues
[1972 dollars]
will end at any foreseeable date in the future. Most importantly, it
1929
.16
1971
.38
reverses the long downward trend in the size of the national debt
1933
.41
1972
.37
and as a share of the country's economic activity.
1939
.53
1973
.35
Prior to the Great Depression, Congress was bound by a moral
1940
.51
1974
.34
rule against budget deficits. But the economic tragedies of the
1945
1.22
1975
.35
1950
.90
1976
.37
1930's, and the advent of the theories of John Maynard Keynes in
1955
.69
1977
37
1936, caused legislators to rethink their policies on budget deficits.
1960
.58
1978
.36
When the economy needed stimulating, deficits were seen as an ap-
1965
.47
1979
36
1966
.43
1980
.35
propriate remedy to the problem. Conversely, when the economy
1967
42
1981
.34
36
37
TABLE 6.-NATIONAL DEBT/GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT-Continued
FIGURE 1.-Two HUNDRED YEARS OF PRICE STABILITY
[1972 dollars]
1968
.39
1982
.37
Indes
1969
.39
42
500
1983
1970
.38
1984
44
400
Within a few short years, debt as a share of the economy has
reached levels unheard of, except in time of war. And the spiral
300
continues ever higher. Congressional Budget Office projections
Revolutionary
World War #
War
show federal debt increasing in importance for the remainder of
200
War of 1812
Civil War
the decade. (Table 7.)
TABLE 7.-DEBT HELD BY THE PUBLIC AS A PERCENT OF GNP CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE
100
World Was "
PROJECTIONS
0
1986
41.8
1989
47.9
1750
1800
1850
1900
1950
2000
1987
44.0
1990
49.7
Depression
1988
46.0
Source: Claremont Economics Institute, "Forecast, Update, May 10, 1979."
In short, national debt as a share of the economy today is grow-
ing for the first time since World War II. The situation is without
precedent in our history.
The pattern of U.S. price levels from the beginning of our nation
to the present is shown in Figure 1. Typically, war-time inflation
Economic symptoms
has been followed by a period of falling prices. As late as the
From modest beginnings, the Federal government has grown to
1930's, the index of prices was essentially at the same level as that
become the dominant economic influence in the United States. No
of 150 years earlier. By contrast, the period following World War II
other entity comes close to it in ability to condition the course of
is distinguished precisely by the failure of prices to return to their
economic events. It is the view of the Committee that most of the
pre-war levels. Only in response to the price stabilizing policies of
economic difficulties currently being suffered by the nation are at-
the 1950's was there a period of relative price equilibrium during
tributable, directly or indirectly, to recent economic policies pur-
the early 1960's. This period of stability, however, signaled only an
sued by the Federal government. Three statements summarize the
end to the World War II and Korean War inflations; it did not con-
consequences of increasing Federal deficits, taxation, and spending:
tribute to a return to pre-war price levels. Since the mid-1960's, in-
(1) After two centuries of relatively stable prices, inflation-al-
flation has come to dominate the economy-an inflation unmistak-
though improving in recent years-has not been fully under con-
ably associated with the Federal deficits of the late 1960's and
trol for two decades; (2) Rather than sustained economic growth,
1970's. Although recent efforts to restrain inflation have been rela-
the economy over the past two decades has been characterized by
tively successful, nevertheless the 1939 dollar which had declined
extended periods of economic stagnation; and (3) Rather than high
to a value of forty cents by 1968, has declined to a value of well
levels of savings and capital formation, the economy has come to be
under twenty cents today.
characterized by relatively low levels of savings and capital forma-
As Federal spending and deficits have achieved peacetime record
tion.
levels, the nation's economy has crested and fallen. From sub-
stained high annual growth rates in the 1960's of 5 to 6 percent,
the real economic growth of the country declined toward zero in
1980. The real gross national product actually declined in four sep-
arate years over the decade prior to 1980. The more that the Feder-
al sector has drawn from the nation's economic product, the less
robust the economy has been. As the nation's annual growth de-
clined, SO too did its relative economic position among world econo-
mies.
38
39
Also closely associated with the pattern of rising Federal spend-
Decades of inflation have done damage beyond swift correction.
ing and deficits has been the sharply declining pattern of personal
For instance, Congress has been under pressure to "index" a varie-
savings and private investment. In recent years, personal savings
ty of its funding programs-from school lunches to Social Securi-
have declined from seven to eight percent of disposable personal
ty-in an effort to maintain relative levels of funding. Such spend-
income to less than five percent, a greater than 50 percent reduc-
ing has, of course, contributed to still higher levels of Federal defi-
tion. At the same time, private domestic investment has steadily
cits.
declined as a proportion of the GNP. These levels are now among
Professor Lowell Harris of Columbia University summarizes the
the lowest in the world among industrialized, Western nations.
issue in the following manner:
Proximate cause and effect
Easing the financing of a Federal deficit by supplying
new bank credit (money) has appeal. New money can be
The inflation which began in 1968 has been closely associated
injected into the economy, easing someone's problems.
with large and continuing Federal deficits. These deficits have
Businesses and governments get dollars that had not exist-
placed the Federal Reserve Banking System in an increasingly un-
ed. Such injections seem to permit the accomplishment of
tenable position. If the Federal Reserve refuses to purchase the
good things. But as the funds thus created add to the flow
new debt offered by the Treasury, increasing pressure is placed
through the economy, the cumulating results will differ
upon private capital markets. Federal financing of deficits is com-
from the initial results. The dollar loses buying power.
petitive with private demand for borrowed funds. As a result,
Budget deficits invite the creation of money, and monetary
'crowding out" occurs as Federal borrowing displaces private bor-
expansion lies at the base of inflation
Federal deficits
rowing, leading both to higher rates of interest and lower rates of
tempt the use of money creation as a means of getting dol-
private capital formation. As Professor Roger Freeman of the
lars for the Treasury without evident pain.
Hoover Institution summarizes it,
In the face of unusually high levels of Federal spending, the al-
If the Treasury competes for funds, it drives up interest
ternative to deficit financing is, of course, increased taxation. This,
rates and crowds out other would-be-borrowers. Thereby, it re-
too, has adverse economic consequences, apart from the diminished
duces the funds which are available for private investment,
freedom of the citizen to consume, as he chooses, the fruits of his
holds back industrial expansion and improvement in productiv-
own labor. More taxes mean less post-tax personal income. On the
ity and limits job creation.
one hand, less income means less money to save, less money for
If, on the other hand, the Federal Reserve purchases the new
private investment in future output, and less economic growth. On
debt, the monetization of this debt may lead to a money supply
the other hand, less income after taxes means less incentive to
growing faster than the economy's ability to absorb this growth
engage in productive economic activity generally-less incentive to
without adding to prices. More money generally means higher
work, less incentive to invest, and less incentive to do the things
prices for goods and services available in the economy. Higher
that contribute to economic growth. High rates of income taxation
prices today further generate expectations of even higher prices to-
further distort the allocation of productive resources, invariably
toward less efficient use.
morrow. As former Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Arthur
Burns, has observed:
U.S. competitiveness in world markets
When the Government runs a budget deficit, it pumps
Experience with persistent large deficits in the 1980's has fo-
more money into the pocketbooks of people than it takes
cused attention on another problem associated with excessive gov-
out of their pocketbooks
The persistence of substan-
ernment borrowing: undermining the Nation's trade position in
tial deficits in Federal finances is mainly reponsible for
world markets.
the serious inflation that got under way in this country in
The huge borrowing needs of the Federal Government, coupled
the mid-1960's
when the deficit increases at a time of
with the credit demands of businesses and consumers, have re-
economic expansion, as it has done lately, we should not
quired a huge influx of capital into the U.S., making the U.S. at-
be surprised to find the rate of inflation quickening.
tractive to foreign investment. This has helped avoid any severe ef-
Professor Milton Friedman notes further:
fects from "crowding out" private credit needs and has helped keep
inflation and interest rates lower than they might otherwise be.
Interest rates are high because inflation is high. Infla-
But clearly the day of reckoning cannot be postponed for long
tion is high because the rate of money creation is high.
when the Federal Government incurs massive deficits year after
Faced with abnormally large Federal budget deficits, the Federal
year.
Reserve has tended to purchase a significant portion of the new
America's need for foreign capital has had a major-some would
debt. As inflation has resulted, individuals have accelerated their
say disastrous-impact on the balance of trade. A strong dollar
purchase of consumer goods and services, in the process bidding up
makes it more difficult for U.S. producers to sell their goods over-
prices further, reducing personal savings, and reducing private cap-
seas, and easier for foreign producers to market their goods in the
ital formation.
U.S. At least in the short run, that means slower growth and fewer
40
41
jobs in those sectors of the American economy that depend heavily
of $50 billion for that fiscal year. Statutory limitations remain ef-
on export markets. The decline in our manufacturing sector, the
fective only as long as no majority coalition forms to overcome
loss of markets for our agricultural products, and our record trade
such statutory constraints.
deficit with Japan are bringing calls for new measures to protect
It is the premise of the proposed amendment that some greater
American industries from foreign competition: measures which
rule is required if Congress is to overcome the spending bias exist-
could threaten the prospects for healthy economic growth around
ing within our political system. So long as simple majorities are
the globe, ultimately destroying jobs and economic opportunity for
able to engage in the same scope of fiscal practices as under
Americans.
present law-and they will always be able to do SO if they are limit-
It is clear in any event that continuing massive budget deficits
ed by nothing more than a simple statutory constraint-this spend-
will have an enormous cost for the American economy. As econom-
ing bias will continue to exist. Congress will continue to have un-
ic growth accelerates in other developed countries, they will
limited access to deficit spending and it will continue to have avail-
become more attractive to investment. The foreign investment that
able automatic tax increases.
sustains our debt-ridden economy could dry up, and we would face
Since the adoption of the congressional budget reforms in 1974,
the prospect of massive inflation or of skyrocketing interest rates
for example, it is worth noting, Congress has achieved regular
that would bring the economy to a halt. The dangers of persistent
budget deficits of unprecedented proportions.
deficits have never been clearer than they are today.
It is the existence of this fundamental bias that also mitigates
In the view of the Committee, a constitutional rule limiting the
against the effectiveness of the other alternatives: increased resolve
growth of Federal deficits, spending, and taxation would contribute
substantially toward the restoration of stable prices, stable employ-
to exercise fiscal restraint by Members of Congress or the election
of Members who will demonstrate such restraint.
ment, and stable economic growth.
The premise of Senate Joint Resolution 225 is that there is a struc-
X. STATUTORY LAW VERSUS CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
tural bias within our political system that causes higher levels of
spending than fiscal prudence dictates, not that a majority of Mem-
An amendment to the Constitution is a serious step, one to be
bers of Congress are determined to engage in fiscally irresponsible
taken if and only if no other response is perceived as likely to
policies. Senate Joint Resolution 225 is designed to enable Members
prove effective. Alternatives to constitutional change deserve seri-
of Congress to overcome this bias by establishing an external con-
ous consideration. The major alternatives to a constitutional
straint upon the ambit of their fiscal activities. If this analysis is
amendment of the kind proposed in this resolution are: (1) some
correct, the spending bias can be overcome only by an external con-
measure of statutory restraint; (2) new resolve by Members of Con-
straint-something upon which Members of Congress can rely
gress to restrain levels of Federal spending, taxation, and deficit; or
when spending interest pressures become excessive.
(3) the election to Congress of new Members who possess such re-
The alternatives to a Constitutional amendment are not viable
solve.
precisely because the fiscal history that Congress has written over
It is the view of the Committee that these alternatives are not
recent decades reflects a serious defect in the institutional setting
effective alternatives. In one form or another, each of these alter-
within which it operates. Only a Constitutional amendment can
natives has been employed in the past, with unsatisfactory results.
correct this. Periodic efforts by Congress during times of economic
There is little reason to believe that these alternatives will be any
crisis to exercise unusual fiscal restraint are simply insufficient.
more effective in the future.
The first alternative is for Congress to resort to some form of
Rather, there must be continuing efforts in this regard in order to
statutory constraint. As pointed out in section VI, a large number
prevent such crisis in the first place.
of such constraints have been proposed over the years, with several
In a democracy, constitutions establish the structure of govern-
of these having been enacted into law. None, however, has succeed-
ment by imposing restraints on the behavior of those who repre-
ed in constraining the congressional propensity to spend tax, and
sent them. For years, the body politic has suffered from the remov-
engage in deficit financing. The most obvious reason for this, ulti-
al of constraints upon the Congress imposed explicitly or assumed
mately, is that no Congress can bind a succeeding Congress by a
implicitly by the framers of the Constitution. The present amend-
ment would reimpose, explicitly, those constraints as only a Consti-
simple statute.
Put another way, no statutory measure can contain provisions
tutional amendment can.
requiring a greater or more onerous voting rule for its repeal than
XI. DETAILED ANALYSIS OF SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 225
for its adoption. Any balanced budget or tax limitation statute can
be repealed, in whole or in part, by the simple expedient of adopt-
The key provision of Senate Joint Resolution 225 is contained in
ing a new statute or a new budget which is in conflict with the ear-
Section 1. This section establishes, as a fiscal norm, the concept of
lier measure. The existence of the Byrd-Grassley amendment, for
a balanced Federal budget. This balance is achieved by the man-
example, requiring a balanced Federal budget for FY 1981 (P.L. 95-
date of the section that "Outlays of the United States for any fiscal
435) has provided no deterrent whatsoever to Congress engaging in
year shall not exceed receipts to the United States for that
"business as usual" and adopting a budget with a deficit in excess
year,
42
43
The section does not state the process that Congress must follow
intended to exclude from outlays repurchase and/or retirement of
in achieving the result of a balanced budget. The Committee recog-
Federal debt.
nizes that there are numerous equitable ways of achieving a budget
"
receipts
"
is intended to include all moneys received by
that is in balance. It recognizes that some traditional practices as-
the Treasury of the United States, either directly or indirectly,
sociated with the budget process are valid and will continue while
through Federal or quasi-Federal agencies created under the au-
other processes will need to be modified in order to assure compli-
thority of acts of Congress. In present usage, receipts is intended to
ance with the amendment.
be synonoymous with the definition of "budget receipts" as found
The Committee in reporting out Senate Joint Resolution 13 (the
in "A Glossary of Terms Used in the Budget Process" (1984). It is
balanced budget/tax limitation amendments, reported simulta-
intended to exclude from receipts the proceeds of debt issuance and
neously with S.J. Res. 225), felt that such amendment could best be
to not include "off-setting collections".
implemented by requiring a statement of receipts and outlays for
fiscal year
is intended as a term defined by statute
the following fiscal year prior to such fiscal year. Although Senate
and, as such, is to have no constitutional standing apart from its
Joint Resolution 225 contains no such mandate, it is the Commit-
statutory definition. Under current law, the Federal fiscal year
tee's belief that such a procedure also makes sense in the context
begins on 1 October of one calendar year and ends on 30 September
of this amendment but that it was unnecessary and potentially re-
of the following calendar year. The amendment does not require an
strictive to build this particular process explicitly into an amend-
immutable definition of fiscal year; other fiscal years could be de-
ment of the immediate form. If the Congress decided to use "state-
fined without straining the intent of the amendment.
ments" as the planning vehicle to conform to the dictates of this
"Outlays", "receipts", "fiscal year" are all terms defined by or to
amendment, it is clear that such statements could be revised at
be defined by statute and, as such, have no constitutional standing
any time before or during the fiscal year which the statement re-
apart from these statutory definitions. The intentions of the Com-
flects.
mittee with regard to current concepts have been set out elsewhere
Section 1 does contain an exceptions or escape clause to the bal-
in the report. At the same time, the Committee is sensitive to the
anced budget requirement; namely, by three-fifths vote of both
likelihood that such concepts will undergo modification through
Houses of Congress a specific excess of outlays over receipts may be
time. Provided these modifications are not designed to subvert the
provided. Such a vote could come at any time prior to or during the
restrictions imposed by the amendment, but rather are designed to
fiscal year the budget for which consideration is being given. The
further those purposes, there is no intention that the meanings
vote would also have to be specific as to the amount of excess of
given here are immutable.
outlays over receipts that are permitted. A three-fifths vote approv-
shall not
" is a term readily obvious in its intent and
ing a deficit would only be required if the proposed deficit were
spirit to all who read these words except those intent on obviating
greater than a deficit already approved for that fiscal year.
their purpose through deception of the public and to the Supreme
It is the intent of the Committee that the Congress and the
Court. Simply put, it means you cannot. The amendment contains
President, pursuant to legislation or through exercise of their
no enforcement clause because it feels that this mandate is perfect-
powers under the first and second articles, shall ensure that out-
ly clear, and that the retribution that would be felt by Members
lays do not exceed receipts for a fiscal year. There is a mandate
and the President for blatantly violating the highest law of the
generally to monitor the flow of outlays and to take such steps as
land would be sure and quick.
are necessary and proper to prevent them from exceeding the total
"
exceed
" means that outlays may not be greater than
of receipts. This neither anticipates nor necessitates any alteration
receipts. Receipts may exceed outlays. The term is not meant in an
in the balance of powers between the legislative and executive
absolute sense. It is not possible to monitor outlays and receipts in
branches of the National Government, but merely imposes an addi-
a trillion dollar budget SO that there will be an exact balance at the
tional responsibility upon each of these, to be achieved through the
close of business on the final day of a fiscal year. The intent of the
exercise of existing authorities. The amendment imposes an obliga-
Committee is that the Congress should use every reasonable means
tion upon the Congress to react to the flow of actual receipts and
to achieve substantial balance in outlays and receipts for each
outlays during the fiscal year and to assure that at the end of the
fiscal year. For example, the spirit of the amendment would not be
year outlays do not exceed receipts.
violated if at the close of the fiscal year a de minimus imbalance
was determined to have occurred. What is de minimus is subject to
Section 1, first clause
some interpretation, but given present-day monitoring abilities and
"Outlays" is intended to include all disbursements from the
the size of the Federal budget, it would be fair to say that a $10
Treasury of the United States, either directly or indirectly through
billion imbalance-or roughly 1 percent of the Federal outlays-
Federal or quasi-Federal agencies created under the authority of
would not reflect an intent to avoid the purpose of this amend-
acts of Congress, and either "on-budget" or "off-budget". With cer-
ment. Greater imbalances may conceivably occur, and as they grow
tain exceptions, outlays are those withdrawals subject to Article I,
more regular and larger in amount it is anticipated that public
section 9, which provides that "no money shall be drawn from the
sentiment will sharpen the estimating abilities of the executive and
Treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law". It is
legislative branches.
44
45
Section 1, second clause
1, section 8, neither adding to nor subtracting from those powers.
"
three-fifths of the whole number
" is intended to identi-
The committee intends that ordinary and prudent defense appro-
fy the minimum proportion of the total membership of each House
priations and preparations for a war perceived by the Congress to
needed for action by the Congress. Under current law, three-fifths
be imminent be funded fully within the limitations imposed by the
of the Senate membership is 60 and of the House of Representa-
amendment, although Congress may establish higher levels of
tives is 261. Vacancies would reduce the minimum majorities.
spending and/or deficits for these or any other purposes under sec-
"
the whole number of both Houses
" is intended to be
tions 1 and 2.
consistent with the use of the phrase "the whole number of Sena-
for any fiscal year
is in effect
" is intended to re-
tors" in the 12th amendment to the Constitution, denoting the
quire a waiver of the provisions of the amendment on a year-by-
entire membership of the individual House of Congress in question;
year basis. That is, Congress cannot adopt a waiver resolution
"both Houses" is intended to identify the Senate and the House of
which shall apply to more than one fiscal year. Rather, the Con-
Representatives, each acting separately, in keeping with uses of the
gress annually must adopt a separate waiver for the fiscal year at
terms "both Houses", the "Senate", and "House of Representa-
issue.
tives" now in the Constitution. Specifically, "both Houses" is not
Although this section is identical to language contained in each
intended to connote a joint session of Congress or of its equivalent.
of the earlier versions of S.J. Res. 225, including that approved by
"
shall provide for
is intended to be a mandatory re-
the Senate in 1982, some proponents of the measure have raised
quirement that when Congress determines that outlays shall
concern about whether the language of section 3 goes far enough in
exceed receipts they must do so by affirmative action that includes
assuring that Congress could respond to urgent threats to national
a three-fifths vote to have the imbalance and that the degree of im-
security.
balance be specifically stated in dollars.
Senator Heflin offered an amendment in Committee, which was
"
a specific excess of outlays over receipts." is intended to
defeated 10-7, designed to respond to this concern. The Heflin
identify the maximum number of dollars by which outlays may
amendment would automatically waive the balanced budget re-
exceed receipts in the statement of receipts and outlays for the
quirement in time of declared war; authorize the Congress to waive
fiscal year adopted by the Congress pursuant to the first and
such requirement if the United States is engaged in military con-
second sentences of this section.
flict which causes an "imminent military threat to the national se-
Of necessity, there would be a rollcall vote in determining wheth-
curity"; and enable Congress to provide for additional outlays for
er there exists a three-fifths majority in each House in favor of a
the defense of the nation if Congress declares by an absolute major-
specific level of deficit. The Committee intends that the substance
ity of the whole number of each House that there is an "unforseen
of such a vote be restricted to the issue of such a deficit. For exam-
and imminent military threat to the national security", through a
ple, it would be inconsistent with the objectives of this provision if
joint resolution enacted into law.
such a deficit were conditioned or qualified by particular circum-
Although there was virtually unanimous consensus that Con-
stances (e.g., "whenever the measure of unemployment exceeds ten
gress ought to retain maximum flexibility in responding to nation-
percent"), or if there was specification of the uses to which the
al security crises, the majority of the Committee felt that S.J. Res.
excess outlays were to be allocated. Neither a provision for excess
225 already dealt adequately with this. In the event of a defense-
outlays attached as a rider to a resolution addressing some other
related emergency, the Congress under S.J. Res. 225 could: (a)
subject nor a resolution to which a rider addressing some other
waive the entire amendment in case of declared war; (b) waive the
subject has been attached would be consistent with this provision.
balanced budget requirement by three-fifths vote; or (c) adjust
Section 2
spending levels or spending priorities within the existing budget by
a simple majority vote. Further, it was contended that the approxi-
The Congress may waive the provisions of this article for
mately $70 billion Defense Department operation and maintenance
any fiscal year in which a declaration of war is in effect.
account exists for the very purpose of ensuring that the armed
"
may waive
is intended to provide Congress with discre-
services are always able to respond in a timely manner to military
tionary authority to operate outside of the provisions of particular
threats.
sections of this amendment in the event of declarations of war.
Proponents of Senator Heflin's amendment felt, on the other
Such a waiver would be by concurrent resolution of Congress, a res-
hand, that the existing provisions of the amendment are excessive-
olution which would not have to be submitted to the President for
ly restrictive and that a three-fifths vote requirement to allow for
approval or disapproval.
defense spending may prove too difficult or time consuming. Con-
the provisions of this article
" is intended to refer pri-
cern was expressed that appropriate military responses might be
marily to sections 1 and 2 of the amendment. The Congress may
dependent on the expediency of the moment. Senator Heflin de-
waive any or all of these provisions. Waiver of sections 3, 5, or 6
scribed his amendment as a "safeguard mechanism" to be used in
would seem pointless.
those situations in which 60 votes may be impossible to achieve but
declaration of war
" is intended to be construed in the
in which Congressional majorities (and the President) support the
context of the powers of the Congress to declare war under Article
use of such funds.
46
47
The Committee acknowledges that the Heflin amendment has
as deductions from budget authority and outlays rather
substantial merit and it is expected that further efforts at negotia-
than as budget receipts.
tion and compromise will continue on this important issue as S.J.
Such receipts are not intended to include "off-setting collections"
Res. 225 approaches floor consideration.
which Glossary defines as:
Section 3
Collections from Government accounts or from transac-
This article shall take effect for the second fiscal year
tions with the public that are of a business-type or market-
beginning after its ratification.
oriented nature. They are classified into two major catego-
ries: (a) collections credited to appropriation or fund ac-
"
shall
take effect " is intended to be interpreted in the
counts, and (b) off-setting receipts (i.e., amounts deposited
same manner as the same phrase contained in Section 5 of the 20th
in receipt accounts). In general, the distinction between
Amendment.
these two major categories is that "collections credited to
"
for the second fiscal year beginning " means that all of
appropriation or fund accounts" normally can be used
the obligations imposed upon Congress and the President by this
without appropriation action by Congress whereas funds in
amendment for any fiscal year shall be complied with for such
fiscal year, the first day of which begins at least one full fiscal year
"receipt accounts" cannot be used without being appropri-
ated. Offsetting collections are deducted from disburse-
and less than two full fiscal years after the date of ratification.
"
its ratification
is intended to be construed as ratifica-
ments in calculating total outlays. Corresponding offsets
tion of this article under Article V of the Constitution.
are made in arriving at total budget authority and net ob-
ligations incurred.
Definitions
"Collections credited to appropriation or fund accounts"
occur in two circumstances:
Because it believed report language to be adequate in addressing
the issue, the Committee in approving S.J. Res. 225 excluded a defi-
Reimbursements
nitional section contained in previous versions of the amendment
When authorized by law, amounts collected for materi-
which read as follows:
als or services furnished are treated as reimbursements to
Total receipts shall include all receipts of the United
appropriations. For accounting purposes, earned reim-
States except those derived from borrowing and total out-
bursements are also known as revenues. These collections
lays shall include all outlays of the United States except
those for repayment of debt principal.
tions. are netted in determining outlays from such appropria-
Although this language was believed to be unnecessary in the body
Revolving funds
of the proposed amendment, it continues to reflect the intent of the
Committee in approving the constitutional amendment. The follow-
In the three types of revolving funds-public enterprise,
ing is a further elaboration of these terms:
intra-governmental, and trust revolving-collections are
receipts is intended to include all moneys received by
netted against spending and outlays are reported as the
net amount.
the Treasury of the United States, either directly or indirectly,
through Federal or quasi-Federal agencies created under the au-
Offsetting receipts are amounts deposited in receipts ac-
thority of acts of Congress. In present usage, receipts is intended to
counts (i.e., general funds, special funds, or trust fund).
be synonymous with the definition of "budget receipts". "A Glossa-
These receipts generally are deducted from budget author-
ry of Terms Used in the Budget Process" (1981) defines "budget re-
ity and outlays by function and/or subfunction, and by
ceipts" as:
agency.
Collections from the public (based on the Government's
"Offsetting receipts" are subdivided as follows:
exercise of its sovereign powers) and from payments by
Proprietary receipts from the public
participants in certain voluntary Federal social insurance
programs. These collections, also called governmental re-
Collections from the public deposited in receipts ac-
ceipts, consist primarily of tax receipts and social insur-
counts of the general fund, special funds, or trust funds as
ance premium, but also include receipts from court fines,
a result of the Government's business-type or market-ori-
certain licenses, and deposits of earning by the Federal Re-
ented activities (e.g., loan repayment, interest, sale of prop-
serve System. Gifts and contributions (as distinguished
erty and products, charges for nonregulatory services, and
from payments for services or cost-sharing deposits by
rent and royalties). Such collections are not counted as
State and local governments) are also counted as budget
budget receipts, and with one exception, are offset against
receipts. Budget receipts are compared with total outlays
total budget authority and outlays by agency and by func-
in caluclating the budget surplus or deficit. Excluded from
tion. The exception consists of receipts from rents and roy-
budget receipts are offsetting receipts, which are counted
alties from Outer Continental Shelf lands that are deduct-
49
48
"
except those derived from borrowing
" is intended to ex-
ed from total budget authority and outlays for the Govern-
clude from receipts the proceeds of debt issuance. To "borrow" is to
ment as an whole rather than from any single agency or
receive with the implied or expressed intention of returning the
function.
same or an equivalent. As noted, budget receipts include contribu-
tions to social insurance programs, even though they carry an im-
Intragovernmental transactions
plied intention of returning the same or an equivalent. It is intend-
Payments into receipt accounts from Federal appropria-
ed that such contributions be included in "receipts" and not in
tions or fund accounts. They are treated as an offset to
those receipts derived from borrowing. The differing treatment in-
budget authority and outlays, rather than as a budget re-
tended turns on the distinction between those receipts which create
ceipt. Intragovernmental transactions may be intrabudget-
obligations the title to which can be transferred by the present
ary (where both the payment and receipt occur within the
owners to others, either by sale or by gift, and those receipts which,
budgetary universe) or they may result from the payment
while creating an implied obligation to return the same, do not
by an off-budget Federal entity whose funds are excluded
create a transferable title. Treasury notes and bonds fall into the
from the budget totals. Normally, intragovernmental
first class of obligation; social insurance programs fall into the
transactions are deducted from both the outlays and the
second class of obligations.
budget authority for the agency receiving the payment.
Also excluded from borrowings are those temporary obligations
However, in two cases, these transactions are not deducted
represented by accounts payable. While these obligations normally
from the figures of any agency or function. Instead, intra-
are transferable by their owners, they do not generate a flow of re-
governmental transactions that involve agencies' pay-
ceipts to the Treasury at the moment of creation, although they do
ments (including payments by off-budget Federal entities)
constitute an "outlay" when extinguished.
as employers into employee retirement trust funds and the
"
total receipts
" is intended to be construed as the sum-
payment of interest of nonrevolving trust funds appear as
mation or total of all receipts, exclusive of borrowings and certain
specially deducted lines in computing total budget author-
other classes of receipts, which the Congress reasonably can expect
ity and outlays for the Government.
to be received by the Treasury of the Untied States during the
Also not intended to be a receipt for the purpose of this section
fiscal year in question.
"
are "refunds", defined by Glossary as:
outlays
is intended to include all disbursements from
the Treasury of the United States, either directly or indirectly
Returns of advances or recoveries or erroneous disburse-
through Federal or quasi-Federal agencies created under the au-
ments from appropriation or fund accounts that are direct-
thority of acts of Congress, and either "on-budget" or "off-budget".
ly related to, and reductions of, previously recorded pay-
With certain notable exceptions, outlays are those withdrawals sub-
ments from the accounts. Also considered refunds are re-
turns to the taxpayers of receipt collections in excess of
ject to Article I, section 9, which provides that "no money shall be
drawn from the Treasury, but in consequence of appropriations
liabilites (i.e., tax refunds). These refunds are recorded
made by law". Glossary defines "outlays" in the following manner:
only if the cash is actually disbursed to the taxpayer. If
the taxpayer chooses to apply credits for tax refunds to
Obligations are generally liquidated when checks are
succeeding tax liabilities, the transaction is not recorded
issued or cash disbursed. Such payments are called out-
as a refund. In certain cases, payments are made under
lays. In lieu of issuing checks, obligations may also be liq-
refund authority that exceed tax liabilities. Such excesses
uidated (and outlays occur) by the maturing of interest
over liabilities are treated as budget outlays rather than
coupons in the case of some bonds, or by the issuance of
bonds or notes (or increases in the redemption value of
refunds or receipts.
bonds outstanding). Outlays during a fiscal year may be
Specifically, receipts are to be distinguished from "revenues."
for payment of obligations incurred in prior years (prior
The U.S. Department of Commerce's Governmental Finances de-
year outlays) or in the same year. Outlays, therefore, flow
fines "revenue" as:
in part from unexpended balances of prior-year budget au-
All amounts of money received by a government from
thority and in part from budget authority provided for the
external sources-net of refunds and other correcting
year in which the money is spent. Total budget outlays are
transactions-other than from issue of debt, liquidation of
stated net of offsetting collections, and exclude outlays of
investments, and as agency and private trust transactions.
off-budget Federal entities. The terms expenditure and net
Excludes noncash transactions such as receipts of services,
disbursement are frequently used interchangeably with
commodities, and other "receipts in kind".
the term outlays.
While alike in excluding refunds and debt, revenues does not ex-
Glossary defines "budget authority" as:
clude offsetting receipts from the sale of services to the public. For
Authority provided by law to enter into obligations
the purposes of the amendment, it is intended that these offsetting
which will result in immediate or future outlays involving
receipts not be construed to be a part of "receipts".
50
51
Federal Government funds, except that budget authority
ever, the outlays of off-budget Federal entities are added to
does not include authority to insure or guarantee the re-
the budget deficit to derive the total Government deficit
payment of indebtedness incurrred by another person or
that has to be financed by borrowing from the public or by
government. The basic forms of budget authority are ap-
other means.
propriations, authority to borrow, and contract authority.
The Glossary of the United States Budget in Brief (OMB, 1982)
The latter two types of authority are also commonly re-
notes that these "transactions belong in the budget under current
ferred to as "backdoor authority."
budget accounting concepts." It is the intention of the Committee
The major forms of budget authority include the following:
that the outlays of these off-budget entities be included with on-
budget outlays for the purposes of the various provisions of the
Appropriations
amendment.
An authorization by an act of Congress that permits
Among the Federal programs that would not be covered by S.J.
Federal agencies to incur obligations and to make pay-
Res. 13 is the electric power program of the Tennessee Valley Au-
ments out of the Treasury for specified purposes. An ap-
thority. Since 1959, the financing of that program has been the sole
propriation usually follows enactment of authorizing legis-
responsibility of its own electric power ratepayers-not the U.S.
lation. An appropriation act is the most common means of
Treasury and the Nation's taxpayers. Consequently, the receipts
providing budget authority, but in some cases the authoriz-
and outlays of that program are not part of the problem S.J. Res.
ing legislation itself provides the budget authority. Appro-
13 is directed to solving.
priations do not represent cash actually set aside in the
Specifically, outlays are to be distinguished from "expenditures"
Treasury for purposes specified in the appropriation act;
as currently defined. The U.S. Department of Commerce's Govern-
they represent limitations of amounts which agencies may
ment Finances defines "expenditure" as
obligate during the period of time specified in the respec-
All amounts of money paid out by a government-net of
tive appropriations act. Several types of appropriations are
recoveries and other correcting transactions-other than
not counted as budget authority, since they do not provide
for retirement of debt, investment in securities, extension
authority to incur additional obligations. Examples of
of credit, or as agency transactions. Expenditure includes
these include:
only external transactions of a government and excludes
Appropriations to liquidate contract authority-con-
noncash transactions such as the provision of perquisites
gressional action to provide funds to pay obligations
or other payments in kind.
incurred against contract authority;
Appropriations to reduce outstanding debt-congres-
While alike in excluding debt and interagency transactions, ex-
sional action to provide funds for debt retirement; and,
penditures does not exclude those outlays reduced by offsetting re-
ceipts from the sale of services to the public. For the purposes of
Appropriations for refunds of receipts.
the amendment, it is intended that these offset outlays not be con-
Authority to borrow
strued to be a part of "outlays". In addition, the concept of expend-
Also called borrowing authority or authority to spend
itures does not include certain "off-budget" outlays treated as loans
or exchanges of assets. For the purposes of the amendment, it is
debt receipts. Statutory authority that permits a Federal
intended that all "off-budget outlays" be construed to be a part of
agency to incur obligations and to make payments for
"outlays".
specified purposes out of borrowed monies.
Like "receipts," "outlays" is intended to exclude interagency and
Contract authority
intra-agency transactions.
Statutory authority that permits obligations to be in-
except those for repayment of debt principal
"
is intend-
curred in advance of appropriations or in anticipation of
ed to exclude from outlays repurchase and/or retirement of Feder-
al debt. Glossary defines "federal debt" as follows,
receipts to be credited to a revolving fund or other ac-
count. (By definition, contract authority is unfunded and
There are three basic tabulations of Federal debt: gross
must subsequently be funded by an appropriation to liqui-
Federal debt, debt held by the public, and debt subject to
date obligations incurred under the contract authority, or
statutory limit.
by the collection and use of receipts.)
Gross federal debt
Glossary defined "off-budget Federal entities" as:
Consists of public debt and agency debt and includes all
Certain federally owned and controlled entities whose
public and agency debt issues outstanding. "Public debt" is
transactions (e.g., budget authority or outlays) have been
the portion of the Federal debt incurred when the Treas-
excluded from budget totals under provisions of law. The
ury or Federal Financing Bank (FFB) borrows funds direct-
fiscal activities of these entities, therefore, are not reflect-
ly from the public or another fund account. To avoid
ed in either budget authority or budget outlay totals. How-
double counting, FFB borrowing from the Treasury is not
53
52
"
receipts
"
"
borrowing
"
"
outlays
"
included in public debt. (The Treasury borrowing required
and
repayment of debt principal
"
are terms defined by
to obtain the money to lend the FFB is already part of the
or to be defined by statute and, as such, have no constitutional
public debt.)
standing apart from these statutory definitions. The intentions of
"Agency debt" is that portion of the Federal Debt in-
the Committee with respect to current concepts have been set forth
curred when a Federal agency, other than Treasury or the
above. At the same time, the Committee is sensitive to the likeli-
Federal Financing Bank (FFB), is authorized by law to
hood that such concepts will undergo modification through time.
borrow funds directly from the public or another fund or
Provided such modifications are not designed to subvert the restric-
account. To avoid double counting, agency borrowing from
tions on the Congress imposed by the amendment, but rather are
Treasury or the FFB and Federal fund advances to trust
designed to further those purposes, there is no intention that the
funds are not included in the Federal debt. (The Treasury
or FFB borrowing required to obtain the money to lend to
meanings given here be immutable through time.
An adoption of some new concept, definition, or computational
the agency is already part of the public debt.
method need only be accompanied by a transition period during
Debt held by the public
which the measures of receipts and outlays are derived under both
Part of the gross Federal debt held by the public. (The
the old and the next concept, definition, or computational proce-
Federal Reserve System is included in the "public" for this
dures.
purpose.) Debt held by government trust funds (e.g., Social
For example, the Committee believes that Congressional budget-
Security Trust Fund), revolving funds, and off-budget Fed-
ing decisions with respect to loan guarantees might be enhanced by
eral entities is excluded from debt held by the public.
including in outlays the present value of such obligations in the
fiscal year of obligation, rather than in the fiscal year of discharge.
Debt subject to statutory limit
Should a consensus emerge with respect, first, to an acceptable
As defined by the Second Liberty Bond Act of 1917, as
method of computing their present value and, second, to the desir-
amended, it currently includes virtually all public debt.
ability of their inclusion in current year outlays, the Committee
However, only a small portion of agency debt is included
would believe that such inclusion would constitute a furthering of
in this tabulation of Federal debt.
the purposes of the amendment.
refers to a capital sum due as a debt. Specifically excluded from
"Principal" is intended to be distinguished from "interest" and
Similarly, should the Congress come to conclude that budgeting
and accounting operations of the Federal Government were better
principal is any interest accrued or paid in conjunction with the
conducted on an accrual basis, continuing compliance with the
amendment would not necessarily be subverted by such a change;
debt obligation.
As with receipts, there is no intention to exclude from outlays
rather compliance might be enhanced.
those benefit payments arising from social insurance programs. As
With respect to the exclusion from receipts and outlays of those
noted, receipts into such programs do not create and the benefit
transactions involving "proprietary sales to the public", the consen-
payments attendant thereto do not extinguish, a transferable obli- in-
sus of the Committee is that such transactions represent voluntary
gation-in contrast to Federal debt. Also, as noted, there is no from
relationships between the government and the people. As such,
tention to exclude from outlays those disbursements arising
there is a presumption that these relationships reflect the individ-
accounts payable unless the associated outlays already have been
ual's own determination that purchases of Federal goods and serv-
accrued. To treat accounts payable otherwise would be to double-
ices offer to him a preferred alternative.
count the outlays attendant thereto.
The Committee is cognizant of the possibility that such an exclu-
Loans for which the Federal Government guarantees in whole or
sion is an invitation to the Congress to subvert the intentions of
in part the repayment of principal and/or interest impose no fund-
the amendment through the establishment of exclusive franchise
ing obligation on the Treasury unless and until such loans come obli-
entities under Federal charter. Operating without the discipline of
into default and the Treasury must discharge and guarantee
competition, such entities would have implicit taxing powers with
gation. Such a discharge is intended to be construed as an which outlay the in
which to fund programs which, absent the amendment, would have
the fiscal year of discharge, not in the fiscal year during
been organized within the Federal Government and would have
loan was guaranteed. Such a discharge is not intended to be con-
been subject to the normal budgetary procedures of the Congress.
strued as a repayment of debt principal; unlike the debt repay-
It is the clear intention of the Committee that such subterfuges be
ments to be excluded, such discharges do not involve a prior receipt
construed as violations of the amendment.
by the Treasury of borrowed funds.
The Committee also believes and intends that the creation of in-
mation or total of all outlays, exclusive of debt repayment and cer-
total outlays
is intended to be construed as the sum-
dependent entities with explicit taxing powers would be an uncon-
stitutional delegation of current Congressional authority. It would
tain other classes of outlays, for which the Congress reasonably can
be, as well, at variance with the intentions of the amendment.
expect payment to be made by the Treasury of the United States
during the fiscal year in question.
55
54
gent constraints on errors in the budget process, and make adjust-
XII. IMPLEMENTATION OF S.J. RES. 225
ments during the year more difficult. By doing this, it will make
Since conventional approaches to the budget in recent years have
the Congress pay much closer attention to the accuracy of forecasts
been unable to prevent a dangerous increase in the deficit, uncon-
and think more carefully at the start of the year about its budget-
ventional approaches to the budget must be considered, and S.J.
ary choices.
Res. 225 is the best of the available alternatives.
Therefore, the amendment will force greater reliance on the ac-
The balanced budget amendment will create changes in the
curacy of forecasts of actual receipts and outlays under alternative
budget process, for which new solutions must be found. It is also
budgeted levels of taxing and obligational authority. Since reve-
likely that the problems we envision prior to the implementation of
nues and outlays are closely tied to economic activity, and since
the amendment are just a few of the issues that will develop over
economic activity is the most difficult element to predict in the
time. Because the amendment is a new approach to a difficult prob-
budget process, most of the uncertainty arises in the issue of pre-
lem, the solutions proposed here should certainly be seen, not as
dicting economic activity.
definitive statements, but as steps in an evolutionary process. Still,
A number of organizations publish predictions on national eco-
the principles outlined here are certainly an expression of our in-
nomic activity and the forecasts differ widely. Unfortunately, these
tentions for what the amendment will achieve.
predictions are frequently bent to fit a political agenda rather than
fitted to a consistent economic pattern. The most consistently accu-
Off-budget spending
rate predictions from a public sector agency have been those of the
One concern is whether this amendment will create pressure to
Congressional Budget Office. It would be wise, therefore, to rely on
circumvent the normal budget process, by creating "off-budget"
CBO's proven and reliable forecasts for creating future budgets.
categories of expenditures.
Furthermore, CBO's explicitly nonbiased nature, and the biparti-
If some categories of federal spending were not included in "out-
san vigor of the advocacy process in its chief client, the Congress,
lays" as defined under this amendment, then the advocates of
will help to ensure the impartiality of future forecasts.
every category of spending would be tempted to have their pet pro-
grams excluded from the constraints of the amendment. Not only
Unanticipated deficits
would this circumvent the intent of the amendment, it could de-
A third concern is the possibility that during the course of the
stroy the federal budget process as a comprehensive approach to
fiscal year, outlays may exceed budgeted obligational authority or
government spending, receipts and borrowing. We would have re-
actual receipts may be less than anticipated receipts.
duced our fiscal controls, not increased them.
It is not possible to control either outlays or receipts very exact-
For that reason it is the intent of the committee that all federal
ly. Outlays are unpredictable because events triggering entitlement
spending and taxing programs be included under the constraints of
payments occur unpredictably. In addition, outlays are hard to con-
the amendment. The recourse of taking programs off the budget
trol because once authorized, obligations may be incurred which
should not be available as a way to avoid these constraints, and
cannot be predicted and the payment rate on those obligations may
using a comprehensive measure of all governmental receipts and
be different than Congress anticipated during the budget process.
outlays eliminates that recourse. What concerns the committee is
Receipts are even harder to predict accurately. Federal revenues
the total amount of new federal debt, regardless of whether that
are closely tied to the level of economic activity. If the economy be-
debt is generate by Treasury borrowing or by the borrowing of fed-
haves differently than anticipated, receipts will be different as
well.
eral agencies.
One possible way to control this problem is through Presidential
Uncertain economic predictions
action. The Congress granted the President the powers of recission
Another concern is that outlays and receipts may be as hard to
and deferral under the Budget and Impoundment Control Act of
predict as they have been to control. Yet this amendment requires
1974. Under this amendment, the President would be able to exer-
that we make extremely accurate predictions for these items each
cise that authority to ensure that actual total outlays not exceed
fiscal year. How can this be done?
actual total receipts. There are several constitutional questions sur-
First, it is important to recognize that we face this problem al-
rounding the actual implementation of the 1974 Act and this is not
ready. Congress does not appropriate outlays; Congress appropri-
the place to resolve the many difficulties; however, this legislation
ates obligational authority. If the authority appropriated at the
remains an important key to resolving many possible problems
start of the year turns out to be different than actual outlays, the
with implementing a balanced budget amendment.
Congress must respond. That is no different in principle than the
Thus, while unforseen deficits will coincide with unpredictable
problems that will arise under the balanced budget amendment.
economic activity, the Congress has already created a fine remedy
Second, the intrinsic unpredictability of both receipts and outlays
by granting a certain degree of fiscal control to the President. The
means that actual budgetary totals are arrived at in two steps:
Chief Executive must become sensitive in using this new power,
first, through a process of forecasting at the start of the fiscal year,
but this fiscal relief valve will be a welcome component in control-
and second, through adjustments to those forecasts made over the
ling future deficits.
course of the year. The amendment will, however, place more strin-
57
56
Congressional enforcement
power granted to it by the Constitution. See Marbury V. Madison, 1
Cranch 137 (1803).
Although the Committee has deleted language contained in pre-
The Committee expects the Congress and the President to carry
vious versions of the proposed amendment expressly imposing upon
out their responsibilities under the proposed amendment through
the Congress the responsibility to "enforce and implement this arti-
both (a) the authority presently available to Congress and the
cle by appropriate legislation", it has done SO only because it views
President to affect and influence the fiscal process; and (b) any new
such a responsibility as implicit in this article. Members of Con-
authority created by Congress under its Article I enforcement au-
gress are required by Article VI generally to "support this Consti-
thority, and otherwise consistent with the Constitution by which
tution" while the President is required by Article II, section 1,
the Congress and the President can affect and influence the fiscal
clause 7, to "preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution". It is
process.
fully expected by the Committee that the Congress and the Presi-
It is not the intent of this amendment, then, to establish any new
dent will effect such legislative initiatives, and devise such proce-
authority in the President, absent Congressional action, or to imply
dures, as will be necessary to ensure the effective implementation
any reordering of the separation of powers balance between these
of the proposed constitutional amendment.
branches of the national government. The amendment, for exam-
Conclusion
ple, does not invest in the President any new authority to impound
appropriated funds. It is not mandated that Congress implement
The implementation of a balanced budget amendment will un-
any particular enforcement provision; it is expected only that the
doubtedly bring changes in the budget process. We have anticipat-
Congress ensure that there be some effective means by which the
ed the difficulties of off-budget spending and uncertain economic
Congress and the President may each exercise authority to enforce
forecasts. But there will be countless others that we have not envi-
the amendment.
sioned and solutions must accompany each new problem. We sup-
In the absence of such legislation, it is still expected that the
port this balanced budget amendment because a government that
President will exercise his budget proposing authority, his veto au-
consistently spends more than it receives is neither serving the
thority, and any other authority presently available to him to
needs of its people nor following a path of growth and success. Any
carry out the mandate of the proposed amendment. The same
solutions must therefore take into account the intentions of this
would be expected of Congress, of course.
amendment: to eliminate budget deficits and establish responsible
While there may be no sanctions expressly contained in Senate
fiscal planning.
Joint Resolution 225 for the violation of any particular provision, it
must first be recognized that Congress and the President are ex-
XIII. ENFORCEMENT
pected to act in accordance with the Constitution. Both Members of
Generally
Congress and the President are obligated to take oaths of office
that require compliance with the Constitution. Thus, in summary,
While earlier versions of proposed balanced budget amendments
it is the Committee's view that: (1) the language and the intent of
contained language to the effect that, "The Congress shall have the
Senate Joint Resolution 225 are clear; (2) Congress and the Presi-
power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation", this was
dent are to abide by this language and intent; and (3) where neces-
not included in the proposed amendment because it was believed to
sary, Congress is to enact legislation that will better enable the
be unnecessary language. Unlike earlier amendments to the Con-
Congress and the President to comply with the language and intent
stitution that contained similar enforcement provisions, e.g., the
of the amendment.
19th, 23d, 24th, and 26th Amendments, Senate Joint Resolution 225
In addition, Senate Joint Resolution 225 is designed to promote
imposes no limitation upon State actions; it limits only the author-
its own enforcement through the political processes. By requiring a
ity of the national government. Thus, the Committee felt that the
three-fifths vote to approve deficit spending in any fiscal year,
language of the "necessary and proper" clause in Article I, section
Senate Joint Resolution 225 is designed to enable the electorate to
8, would clearly effect the same results as an independent enforce-
better identify those members of Congress most responsible for
ment provision in the proposed amendment. Article I, section 8,
higher levels of spending, taxing, and deficits. To the extent that
clause 17, reads as follows:
the amendment succeeds in creating a more useful flow of political
The Congress shall have the power
To make all
information to the electorate, and this is a major objective of the
laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
amendment, it will be enforced most effectively at the polls every
execution the foregoing powers and all other powers vested
other November.
by this Constitution in the government of the United
Role of Federal courts
States or in any department or officer thereof.
It is anticipated by the Committee that Congress will enact legis-
The question arises, however, about the role of the Federal
lation in a timely manner that will establish the process through
courts-particularly the Supreme Court-in enforcing the provi-
which the proposed amendment will be implemented. Congress'
sions of the amendment. While several witnesses have testified
power in this regard will be as broad as its power under the "neces-
before the Committee to the effect that explicit provisions ought to
sary and proper" clause to carry into effect any other authority or
be incorporated into the amendment establishing judicial enforce-
58
59
ment, others have testified strongly in support of explicit prohibi-
ment would normally arise from a violation of aggregate statement
tions upon such enforcement.
levels and no individual spending or revenue measure is likely to
The Committee has chosen to say nothing in the amendment
be solely responsible for that violation. In other words, even if Con-
itself about this issue. By addressing it in this manner, the Com-
gress exceeded the statement limits in some respect, it would still
mittee believes that it has established the correct balance in refus-
be unlikely that the courts would or could look beyond the viola-
ing to establish constitutional sanction for the Federal courts to in-
tion to examine which particular spending or revenue measures
volve themselves in fundamental macroeconomic questions, while
caused those results. This would normally preclude the showing of
not undermining their equally fundamental obligation to "say
a differentiated injury to some party.
what the law is". Marbury V. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803).
Federal courts increasingly have been facing the question of
While there are a number of Members of this Committee who
standing in the context of suits brought by Members of Congress.
are seriously concerned about the diminished practice of judicial
While the Supreme Court has yet to consider the issue on its
self-restraint in recent years, it is nevertheless the view of the
merits, the trend in lower court decisions has been to treat the leg-
Committee that traditional judicial and constitutional conceptions
islator in a manner similar to any other citizen. As the District of
of justiciability, and standing, as well as the idea of what consti-
Columbia Circuit Court has observed, the legislator-litigant "re-
tutes a "political question" best reserved to non-judicial branches
ceives no special consideration in the standing inquiry", Reuss V.
of the government, suffice to ensure that the courts will not in-
Balles, 584 F. 2d 461, 466 (1978). He is still obligated to demon-
volve themselves, as a normal matter, in reviewing the operations
strate a particularized injury before standing will attach.
of the budget process. This, certainly, is the clear intent and expec-
What constitutes such an injury still remains highly unclear.
tation of this Committee.
Most of the cases that have been considered by the courts have in-
It is the view of the Committee that the role of the Federal judi-
volved instances in which executive branch actions have resulted
ciary in reviewing compliance with the proposed amendment will
in alleged injuries to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Kennedy V. Sampson,
be sharply limited-by both the Constitution and past judicial prac-
364 F. Supp. 1075, 1078 (D.C.D.C. 1974); Mitchell V. Laird, 488 F. 2d
tices-for the following reasons: (a) there would only rarely, if ever,
611 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Recent district court decisions throw serious
be "standing" in any individual or group of individuals to chal-
doubt on the ability of Members of Congress to sue on the basis of
lenge alleged breaches of the amendment; (b) even if such "stand-
allegedly wrongful actions taken by Congress itself. In McClure V.
ing" were conferred, the courts would normally treat issues raised
Carter, 513 F. Supp. 265 (Dist. Ct. Idaho 1981), aff'd by order, sub
under the amendment as "political questions" to be decided in the
nom, McClure V. Reagan, 454 U.S. 1025 (1981), the Court held that
discretion of other branches of government; and (3) it is question-
a Congressional plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the appoint-
able that the courts would find most issues arising under the
ment of a Federal judge in violation of the ineligibility clause of
amendment to be "justiciable" in the sense of presenting the kind
the Constitution (Article I, section 6, clause 2). In explaining its de-
of "case" to which the judicial power attaches under Article III of
cision, the Court stated,
the Constitution.
Senator McClure had the opportunity to persuade his
The doctrine of standing is generally regarded as constitutionally
colleagues to vote against the confirmation and, in the con-
mandated by the "cases and controversies" clauses of Article III.
scientious performance of his duties, did just that. That he
The "gist of the question of standing" is whether the party seeking
and like-minded Senators did not prevail in the Senate
relief has,
does not mean that the effectiveness of Senator McClure's
alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the contro-
vote was impaired. It means merely that he was on the
versy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharp-
losing side. Under the Constitution, it was the duty of
ens the presentation of issues upon which the court SO
Congress itself, in the first instance, to determine Judge
largely depends for illuminations of difficult constitutional
Mikva's qualifications both on the merits and on the issue
questions. Baker V. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
of whether he was constitutionally eligible to serve as a
The personal stake or personal injury in fact must be direct and
judge. Pg. 270.
specific, not a "generalized grievance" whose impact would be
This concept of Congressional standing was clouded somewhat by
"plainly undifferentiated and common to all members of the
Riegle V. Federal Open Market Committee, 656 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir.
public". United States V. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 177, 179-80
1981), which invented a two-step analysis for handling legislator
(1974). "A plaintiff must allege some particularized injury that sets
suits. The court held that separation of powers or political question
him apart from the man on the street". Richardson, supra, at 194.
concerns should not enter into the determination of legislator-
Under the proposed amendment, a party would have to demon-
plaintiff standing. But if, after standing had been properly alleged,
strate that he suffered a differentiated or uncommon injury as a
the court believed that the "congressional plaintiff could obtain
result of Congressional violation of its constitutional duties to bal-
substantial relief from his fellow legislators through the enact-
ance its budget, or limit spending or taxing to prescribed levels.
ment, repeal, or amendment of a statute, [the] court should exer-
Under most circumstances, this would be an extremely difficult
cise its equitable discretion to dismiss the legislator's action." Id. at
demonstration, particularly since the actual breach of the amend-
881. This standard, the court believed, "would counsel the courts to
60
61
refrain from hearing cases which represent the most obvious intru-
still pose a formidable obstacle to a court taking cognizance of
sion by the judiciary into the legislative arena: challenges concern-
issues arising under the proposed amendment. An observer of the
ing congressional action or inaction regarding legislation." Id.
doctrine has described it in these terms:
Whether or not this new test will stand the test of time-and Su-
Political questions, are ones committed to other than ju-
preme Court review-remains to be seen.
dicial organs of government, not in terms excluding judi-
Since most breaches of the proposed amendment would normally
cial control, but with respect to issues so distinctly politi-
result not from the failure of the executive branch to take appro-
cal in character that the courts regard it as improper to
priate actions, but from the failure of a majority of Congress itself
seek to exercise control, although in the exercise of the ju-
to abide by the provisions of the amendment or to establish appro-
risdiction conferred upon it by the Constitution, the
Congressional standing or the exercise of the more recently fash-
priate compliance procedures, either the traditional approach to
United States Supreme Court may feel called upon to de-
termine issues equally as delicate as those which it avoids.
ioned "equitable discretion" should work equally well in prevent-
Dodd, Judicially Non-Enforceable Provisions of Constitu-
ing individual or small groups of Members of Congress from obtain-
tions, 79 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 54, 85
ing inappropriate judicial remedies.
(1931).
Where the alleged violation occurs on the part of the executive
branch, the diminution in Congressional influence, i.e., influence
A "political question" has been described as one in which the
on the part of Congress as a whole, must amount to a disenfran-
courts "forego their unique and paramount function of judicial
chisement, a complete nullification or withdrawal of a voting op-
review of constitutionality." Henkin, Is There a Political Question
portunity, and the Congressional plaintiff must point to a clear
Doctrine?, 85 Yale Law Journal 579, 599 (1976). The test formulated
standard in the Constitution or in statutes by which disenfran-
by the Supreme Court in determining the existence of a "political
chisement can be shown. Goldwater V. Carter, 617 F. 2d. 697, 702
question" has been articulated as follows:
(D.C. Cir. 1979). It is insufficient that an individual legislator's in-
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a
fluence be merely diminished so long as recourse to the legislative
political question is found to be textually demonstrable
process remains.
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate po-
Like suits brought by citizens and congressmen, taxpayer suits
litical department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and
would find Article III's standing requirements to pose almost insur-
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility
mountable barriers. The recent Supreme Court case of Valley Forge
of deciding without an initial policy determination of a
Christian College V. Americans United, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982),
kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility
clarifies the enormous obstacles to a taxpayer in attempting to en-
of a court's undertaking independent resolution without
force the Amendment in court. The Court dismissed as injusticiable
expressing lack of respect due coordinate branches of gov-
this taxpayer's claim that a federal donation of property to a paro-
ernment; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence
chial school violated the First Amendment. The Court reasoned
to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of
that the taxpayers had failed to satisfy the standing tests estab-
embarrassment from multifarious departments on one
lished by Flast V. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). This result would be
question. Baker V. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
likely in any case brought by a taxpayer to enforce the Amend-
ment because, as stated earlier, the Court would rarely, if ever, be
It is the Committee's view that the clear constitutional commit-
able to conclusively find, given the multitude of contributing enact-
ment to Congress to control Federal spending (Article I, sections 8
ments and economic factors whenever the Amendment's limits
and 9) is sufficient to ensure that the courts will exercise maxi-
come to be exceeded, that any particular "challenged enactment
mum caution in interfering with Congressional determinations
exceeds specific constitutional limitations." Id. at 102-103. Even if
under the proposed amendment. It is evident that the process of de-
this were possible, however, the taxpayer would have to prove, in
veloping a budget involves precisely the kinds of determinations for
addition to the Flast requirements, an actual personal injury suf-
which legislatures are most capable and courts least capable. The
fered by himself as a consequence of the alleged constitutional
need to respond to public sentiment, the need to negotiate the de-
breach. See Valley Forge, supra at 485. In Valley Forge, the Court
mands of various and competing spending interests, and the need
could find no injury to the plaintiffs, "economic or otherwise," in
to make difficult policy determinations about public spending and
the taxpayer's assertion that the Constitution had been breached
revenue priorities are clearly factors that mitigate in behalf of leg-
by the actions in question. Since it would be difficult, if not impos-
islative-branch, rather than judical-branch, determinations. Fur-
sible, to identify any specific congressional act as a breach of the
ther, it is questionable that there are adequate standards for "judi-
Amendment, it would be even more difficult to show that that par-
cal manageability" of the class of cases most likely to arise under
ticular act also caused a personal injury in fact to the plaintiff.
the proposed amendment. Any examination of aggregate spending,
Valley Forge has raised the already lofty standing barriers to likely
taxing, and deficit figures produced by Congress would run up
suits to judicially enforce this Amendment.
against the problem of uncovering "differentiated" injury to some
Even if these barriers were overcome, and standing were con-
party, while any deeper, more probing analysis, necessitating judi-
ferred upon some litigant, the "political question" doctrine would
cial inquiry into the process by which such numbers were pro-
63
62
duced, almost certainly would involve the courts in matters beyond
belief that the most serious and unambiguous violations of its pro-
their expertise-matters the determination for which are placed
visions ought to be subject to external check-it nevertheless is ex-
pected that the amendment will be largely self-enforcing and self-
clearly within a coordinate branch of government.
The Committee also doubts that much litigation arising under
monitoring. First, Congress and the President each are expected to
the proposed amendment would be "justiciable" in the sense that
establish appropriate procedures for complying with the amend-
appropriate relief could be fashioned by the courts. In describing
ment and ensuring the existence of reviewable procedures to meet
the components of a "case or controversy", the Supreme Court has
the requirements of the amendment. Second, Congress and the
President each are expected to monitor the actions of the other
noted that there must be,
branch and, to the limits of their authority, enforce the provisions
a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific
of the amendment against that branch; and, finally, the public is
relief through a decree of a conclusive character. Aetna
expected, and will be in an enhanced position, to monitor the ac-
Life Insurance Co. V. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937).
tions of both of these branches of government and, where they fall
In other words, the courts must inquire "whether or not the
short of complying with the provisions of the amendment, to en-
claim presented and the relief sought are of the type which admit
force it through electoral means. Only as a final resort, and only
of judicial resolution". Powell V. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
under the most compelling circumstances (as, for example, when
It is difficult to conceive of workable and enforceable judicial de-
the practices of either the Congress or the Executive undermine
crees or orders being issued with respect to controversies under
the ability of the amendment to be self-enforcing), is there antici-
Senate Joint Resolution 5 that would not involve the judicial
pated to be a significant role for the judicial branch. This judicial
branch in matters of budget policy that are clearly within the pri-
branch role would arise, if at all, to ensure that the reviewable pro-
mary authority of either the legislative or executive branches of
cedures implementing the amendment are not subverted beyond
the national government. It is doubtful that the courts would
the ability of the other branch or the people to redress.
relish, or that Congress would permit, the Federal Judiciary to
issue the kinds of orders and decrees, and maintain the kind of
XIV. STATE EXPERIENCE
continuing oversight to ensure the effectiveness of such orders and
In contrast to past Federal fiscal policies, continued deficit spend-
decrees, that would be necessary in matters of budget policy in
ing by the State has been a rarity. Perennially, more States incur
order to ensure compliance with the proposed amendment.
general surpluses than incur general deficits. The vast majority of
Because balanced budget requirements in State constitutions
the States are prohibited, by constitution, from spending more than
vary widely, it is difficult to draw any final conclusion from the ex-
available revenues. A growing number of States, in addition, have
perience of state courts with lawsuits requesting judicial enforce-
imposed constitutional restrictions upon their own ability to spend
ment. The infrequent decisions indicate, however, the reluctance of
or tax in excess of prescribed levels.
the state courts to become involved in decisions inappropriate for
In comparing Federal and State fiscal policies, there are widely
judicial decisionmaking. In New York, for instance, the court of ap-
varying budgeting, accounting, and reporting practices. Also, by
peals refused to review legislative enactments for conformity with
virtue of its access to the monetary printing press, there are differ-
the constitutional balanced budget mandate. Wein V. Carey, 362
ent fiscal options available to the Federal government than are
N.E. 2d 587 (1977). In Maryland, the state's highest court declared
available to State governments. In addition, there are different
moot a case challenging legislative actions as inconsistent with the
functions to be served by the fiscal policies of the Federal govern-
balanced budget requirement because the fiscal year had expired
ment than by those of the States. Despite an appreciation of these
before the case reached final resolution. This court refused to
differences, the Committee believes that the ability of the States to
invoke the state's exception to mootness for issues of public impor-
operate within their constitutional constraints has been instruc-
tance. Bishop V. Governor, 380 A. 2d 220 (1977). The New Jersey Su-
tive. Such constraints have proven to be workable and have not in-
preme Court admitted that it lacks power to order or enjoin the ap-
hibited significantly the ability of State governments to perform
propriation of funds to enforce the balanced budget rule, but did
their most widely accepted functions. Because it has been required,
retain the option of offering advisory opinions on legislative
State legislatures have learned to operate effectively within the ex-
action-an option barred in the federal courts by Article III.
ternal limitation of their constitutions, many of which are signifi-
Camden V. Byrne, 411 A. 2d 462 (1980). These few cases are indica-
cantly more restrictive than S.J. Res. 225.
tive of the difficulties experienced by courts in attempting to ad-
By the end of 1984, 44 States had constitutional provisions limit-
minister any remedy for a legislative function-allocation of
ing their ability to incur budget deficits. An additional eight States
funds-committed generally by state constitutions to other
had enacted statutory constraints to this effect. These limitations
branches of government. Thus, these cases reinforce the Commit-
fall into a number of broad categories. Some would constrain the
tee's understanding and intent that this Amendment will be self-
Governor by requiring the submission of a balanced budget. For ex-
enforcing.
ample, California's Constitution reads in part as follows,
In summary then, while the Committee has chosen consciously
not to prohibit judicial review altogether of "cases or controver-
Within the first 10 days of each calendar year, the Gov-
sies" arising in the context of the proposed amendment-in the
ernor shall submit to the legislature, with an explanatory
64
65
message, a budget for the ensuing fiscal year containing
itemized statements for recommended state expenditures
TABLE 8.-BALANCED BUDGET REQUIREMENTS
and estimated state revenues. If recommended expendi-
(Is requirement for balanced budget statutory(S) or constitutional(C)?
tures exceed estimated revenue, he shall recommend the
What 10 the nature of requirement?)
sources from which the additional revenues should be pro-
(1)
(2)
(4)
(6)
(8)
vided. (Article 4, section 12a.)
May Carry Over
State
State
Governor
Legisla-
a Deficit
Cannot
Cannot
(points) (1)
(2)
Only has
In addition, the California Constitution requires that proposals to
ture Only
but Must
Carry Over
Carry Over
to Submit
has to Pass
be Corrected
a Deficit
a Deficit
Consti-
a Balanced
Degree of
Balanced
incur state debt be submitted to the electorate for approval.
in Next
Into Next
States
Into Next
Statutory
tutional
Stringency Scale
Budget
Budget
Fiscal Year
Biennium
Fiscal Year
(high=10; low-1)
Other States would impose direct constitutional limitations upon
New England
Connecticut
X
S*
S
the State legislature. For example, Louisiana's Constitution reads
S
Maine
X
5
Massachusetts
$
9
X
C
as follows,
New Hampshire
X
3
S
Rhode Island
2
X
Vermont
C
10
Total appropriations by the legislature for any fiscal
No Requirement*
Mideast
0
Delaware
X
year shall not exceed anticipated state revenues for that
Maryland
C*
10
X
c
C
C
New Jersey
6
X
fiscal year. (Article VII, section 10(b).)
New York
C
10
X
C
Pennsylvania
X
X
3
S,C
S
S,C
Great Lakes
6
Other States would combine restrictions upon the Governor and
Illinois
X
C
C
the State legislature. For example, Maryland's Constitution reads
Indiana
X
4
Michigan
on
X
10
C
Ohio
as follows,
X
X
6
Wisconsin
5,0
X
10
CA
Plains
6
The budget and the budget bill as submitted by the Gov-
Iowa
X
Kansas
x
C
10
Minnesota
c
10
ernor to the General Assembly shall have a figure for the
X
X
Missouri
S.C
#
X
Nebraska
0
10
total of all proposed appropriations and a figure for the
X
C
North Dakota
10
X
C
#
total of all estimated revenues available to pay the appro-
South Dakota
X
X
Southeast
5,0
10
priations, and the figure for total estimated revenues. Nei-
Alabama
X
c
Arkansas
X
10
Florida
S
X
9
ther the Governor in submitting an amendment or supple-
X
Georgia
S.C
10
X
ment to the budget bill nor the General Assembly in
Kentucky
C
X
10
X
C*
Louisiana
S
10
X
C
Mississippi
X
=
amending the budget bill shall thereby cause the figure for
North Carolina
S
X
9
x
total estimated revenues, including any revisions, and in
South Carolina
S,C
X
10
X
S,C
C
Tennessee
10
X
C
C
the budget bill as enacted the figure for total estimated
Virginia
X
10
X
S,C
West Virginia
8
X
C*
Southwest
10
revenues shall always equal or exceed the figure for total
Arizona
X
C
appropriations. (Article III, section 52(5a).)
New Mexico
10
X
C
Oklahoma
10
X
Texas
C
X
10
C
C
Finally, some States would allow the contraction of extremely
Rocky Mountain
8
Colorado
X
C
small amounts of debt which, in practice, effectively prohibits the
Idaho
10
X
C
Montana
10
X
C
C
Utah
C
use of such debt to finance significant expenditure items. For ex-
X
10
X
Wyoming
S.C
10
X
C
ample, Iowa's Constitution reads,
Far West
8
California
X
C
C*
Nevada
X
6
X
S
C
The State may contract debts to supply casual deficits or
Oregon
X
4
X
$
C
Washington
X
8
X
failures in revenues or to meet expenses not otherwise pro-
Alaska
S.C
X
8
X
$
C
Hawait
X
X
6
S,C
vided; but the contingent
shall never exceed the sum
C
C
10
of two hundred and fifty thousand dollars. (Article VII,
Source: ACIR staff compilation based on 1984 surveys of executive and legislative fiscal directors, and Limitations on
section 2.)
State Deficits, Council of State Governments, Lexington, Kentucky, May 1976.
*See notes on next page.
Table 8 summarizes existing constitutional and statutory restric-
tions upon State deficits.
U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
66
67
In addition, by mid-1985, 10 States had adopted constitutional
TABLE 8.-BALANCED BUDGET REQUIREMENTS
limitations upon State expenditures and revenue. An additional 12
(Continued)
States had adopted statutory restrictions to this effect. These limi-
tations are summarized in table 9.
One recent study concluded that such limitations have had a
NOTE: The following states have a balanced budget relating to constitutional debt limitations (debt limit
"constraining effect on the proclivity of public sector spending at
in parenthesis): Alaska ($350,000), Arizona ($350,000), Colorado ($100,000), Iowa ($250,000), Kentucky
($500,000), Missouri ($100,000), Nebraska ($100,000), New Jersey (1% of appropriations), New Mexico
the State and local level". Uhimchuk, Constitutional Tax Limits at
($200,000), Ohio ($150,000), Oklahoma ($500,000), South Dakota ($100,000), Texas ($200,000), and Utah
(1.5% of takable property value).
the State Level (1981).
CALIFORNIA: Article XVI, Sec. 1, requires that the legislature shall not, in any manner, create a debt in
excess of $300,000 without a vote of the people. This section has been interpreted to allow a carry-over defi-
cit, as Long as the deficit is repaid within "a short period of time."
CONNECTICUT: If revenues are deficient by 5% due to Lower than projected revenue collections after the budget
has been passed, che General Assembly must approve expenditure cuts. (Statute 4-85; Subsection C)
DELAWARE: "No appropriation, supplemental approxiation or budget act shall cause the aggregate State General
Fund appropriations enacted for any given fiscal year to exceed 98 percent of the estimated State General Fund
revenue for such fiscal year from all sources, including estimated unencumbered Funds remaining at the end of
the previous fiscal year..." (Const. Art. VIII, Sec. 6) The state provides for this 2 Percent Fund and a
5 percent Budget Reserve Account to be used for an unanticipated deficit. There are no provisions in the Const-
tution that call for specific action If a projected deficit exceeds 7 percent of general fund revenues.
INDIANA: "No law shall authorize any debt to be contracted, on behalf of the state, except in the following
cases: To meet casual deficits in the revenue..." (Const. Art. 10, Sec. 5)
KENTUCKY: Agencies must set aside 2-1/22 of their budget each year in the event of a revenue shortfall
(KRS 48.120).
VERMONT: Governor to statutorily required to submit recommendation to alleviate deficits from previous years
in his or her budget request. There 1s no requirement that the governor must submit & balanced budget.
WEST VIRGINIA: "No debt shall be contracted by this state except to meet casual deficits in the revenue..."
(Const. Art. X, Sec.4)
WISCONSIN: Section $20.004 of Wisconsin statutes requires that no bill may be passed If the bill will cause the
General Fund balances at the end of the biennium to be Iess than one percent of total General Fund appropria-
tion.
U.S. Advisory Commision on Intergovernmental Relations
TABLE 9.-DESCRIPTION OF STATE TAX AND EXPENDITURE LIMITS
Provisions in the Case of
State, Year of Adoption,
Provisions
Transfer of Responsibility
Treatment of
Type of Limit, Method of
for Government Programs
Surpluses:
Limit Applies to:
The Limit is:
for Waiver:
Approval
ALASKA*
State appropriations
Appropriations shall
Limit may be exceeded for
None
SNOILVIEW NO NOISSINNOO AMOUT sn
not exceed $2.5 bil-
capital projects or appro--
1982
lion by more than
priations to the permanent
Constitutional
the cumulative per-
fund if the bill is (1)
Expenditure
centage change in
approved by the governor
Legislative
Referendum
population and in-
or 3/4 of the legislature
flation since 7/1/81.
and (2) approved by voters
*Automatic vote for re-
consideration of limit
1a set for 1986.
No provision
Appropriations
Appropriations of state
Requires 2/3 approval of
Legislature shall provide
ARIZONA
tax revenues shall not
each house of the legis-
for adjustments to limit if
1978
of state tax
revenues
exceed 7% of state
lature on specific addi-
court order or legislative
Constitutional
personal income.
tional appropriation.
enactment transfers respons-
Expenditure
ibility between state and
Legislative
local governments or between
Referendum
federal and state govts.
Yearly growth in appro-
In the event of an
1) The appropriations
Surplus revenues shall be
CALIFORNIA
Appropriations
priations limit shall
emergency the appropria-
limit shall be altered
returned by revision of tax
1979
of state tax
not exceed percentage
tion limit may be ex-
if program responsi-
rates or fee schedules with-
Constitutional
revenues
increase in population
ceeded provided increased
bility is transferred
in next two flacal years.
Expenditure
expenditures are compen-
from one government entity
89
and inflation.
Citizen
sated for by reduced ex-
to another, from govt. to
Initiative
penditures over 3 follow-
private entity or from
ing years. Alternatively,
funding through general
the limit may be changed
revenues to funding
by voters but the change
through special revenues.
is operative for only
2) The state shall provide
4 years.
the funding when it requires
local govt. to provide &
program.
3) Appropriations required
for purpose of complying
with federal requirements
are not under limit.
Statute may be amended at
None
General fund revenues in ex-
State general fund
Yearly growth of state
COLORADO
cess of limit and after re-
general fund appropria-
any time by majority vote
1977
appropriations
tention of unrestricted
tions shall not exceed
of legislature.
Statutory
general fund year end balances
7%.
of 6% of revenues shall be
Expenditure
used for tax relief, capital
Legislative
Vote
construction, highway ex-
penditures and water projects.
State general fund
Requires 2/3 approval of
State shall share in
If state general fund balance
Rate of growth of
HAWAII
general fund appropri-
cost of any new program or
in each of two succeeding
each house of the legis-
1978
appropriations
lature on specific addi-
service increase required
years exceeds 5% of general
ations shall not exceed
Constitutional
average rate of growth
tional appropriation.
of local governments by the
fund revenues, legislature
Expenditure
legislature.
shall provide for tax refund.
Constitutional
of state personal income
for 3 previous years.
Convention
Referendum
(Continued on next page)
State, Year of Adoption,
Provisions in the Case of
Type of Limit, Method of
Provisions
Transfer of Responsibility
Treatment of
Approval
Limit Applies to:
The Limit is:
for Waiver:
for Government Programs
Surpluses:
IDAHO
State general fund
Appropriations shall
Requires 2/3 approval of
Adjustments to limit
No provision
1980
appropriations
not exceed 5-1/3% of
each house of the legis-
shall be made If court
Statutory
state personal income.
lature on specific addi-
order or legislative en-
Expenditure
tional appropriation
actment transfere responsi-
Legislative
bility between state and
Vote
local governments or be-
tween federal and state
governments.
LOUISIANA
State tax revenue
Tax revenue shall not
Statute may be amended
None
State tax revenue in excess
1979
exceed
at any time by majority
of limit shall be deposited
Statutory
of legislature.
in the Tax Surplus Fund;
Revenue
FY 78-79 tax rev.
appropriations from that fund
Legislative
1977 state pers. Inc.
may be made for paying tax re-
Vote
funds.
multiplied by last yr.'s
state personal income.
MICHIGAN
State revenue
Revenue shall not exceed
Government must first
1) Limit may be adjusted
Revenues exceeding limit by
1978
specify an emergency, then
if program responsibility
1% or more shall be used for
Constitutional
FY 78-79 state rev.
the legislature must con-
is transferred from one
tax refunds set in propor-
Revenue
1977 state pers. inc.
cur by 2/3 vote in each
level of govt. to another.
tion to income tax liability.
Citizen Initiative
house.
2) State 18 prohibited
Excess less than 1% may be
multiplied by the
from reducing current pro-
transferred to the State
69
greater of state per-
portion of local services
Budget Stabilization Fund.
sonal income in prior
financed through state aid.
calendar year or average
3) No new program shall be
state personal income
required of local govts. un-
over previous 3 calender
less cost is paid by state.
years.
4) The proportion of total
state spending paid to all
units of local government as
US ADV ISORY COMMISSION ON RELATIONS
& group shall not be reduced
below proportion for FY 78-
79.
MISSOURI
State revenue
Revenue shall not exceed
Governor must first
1) Limit may be adjusted
Revenues exceeding limit by 12
1980
specify an energency, then
if program responsibility
or more shall be refunded pro
Constitutional
FY 80-81 state rev.
the legislature must con-
is transferred from one
rata based on income tax lia-
Revenue
1979 state pers. inc.
cur by 2/3 vote in each
level of govt. to another.
bility. Excess less than 12
Citizen Initiative
house.
2) State is prohibited
shall be transferred to the
multiplied by the
from reducing current
general revenue fund.
greater of state person-
proportion of local
al income in prior cal-
services financed through
endar year or average
state aid.
state personal income
3) No DEW program shall
over previous 3 calen-
be required of local
dar years.
governments unless cost
is paid by state.
(Continued on next page)
TABLE 9.-DESCRIPTION OF STATE TAX AND EXPENDITURE LIMITS
(Continued)
State, Year of Adoption,
Provisions in the Case of
Type of Limit, Method of
Provisions
Transfer of Responsibility
Treatment of
Approval
Limit Applies to:
The Limit is:
for Waiver:
for Government Programs
Surpluses:
SNOILVING NO NOISSINHOO AMOSI on
MONTANA
State appropriations
State biennial appro-
Governor must declare
None
No provision
1981
priations shall not ex-
an emergency. Legislature
Statutory
ceed state appropria-
must then approve specific
Expenditure
tions for the preceding
additional expenditures by
Legislative Vote
biennium plus the pro-
2/3 vote of each house.
duct of preceding bien-
nial appropriations and
the growth percentage.
The growth percentage is
the percentage differ-
ence between average
state personal income
for the 3 calender years
immediately praceding
the next biennium and
the average state per-
sonal income for the 3
calendar years ime-
diately preceding the
current biennium.
NEVADA
Governor's proposed
Proposed biennial ex-
Not applicable because
None
No provision
1979
general fund ex-
penditures authorized
nonbinding.
70
Statutory
penditures
for the 1975-76 bi-
Expenditure
ennium multiplied by
NON-BINDING
[1 + percentage popu-]
Legislative Vote
I
lation change
[
since 7/1/74
multiplied by
[1 + percentage in-]
I
flation
NEW JERSEY*
State appropriations
Fiscal year appropria-
Must be approved by majori-
Adjustment to limit shall
No provision
1976
tions shall not exceed
ty of voters in state
be made 1f program responsi-
Statutory
referendum at a general
bility 18 transferred be-
Expenditure
FY state per cap. inc.
election prior to fiscal
tween state and local
Legislative Vote
prior FY st. per cap.in.
year in which limit is to
governments.
*Expired 1983
be exceeded.
multiplied by appropria-
tions in prior FY.
OREGON
State general fund
The rate of growth of
Statute may be amended at
Adjustment to Iimit shall be
Revenue exceeding limit by
1979
appropriations
appropriations in each
any time by majority of
made if program funding is
22 or more shall be used for
Statutory
biennium shall not ex-
legislature.
transferred from general
tax refunds proportional to
Expenditure
ceed rate of growth of
fund to non-general fund
income tax liability.
Legislative Vote
state personal income in
sources.
2 preceding calendar
years.
RHODE ISLAND
Governor's general
Yearly growth in Gov-
Not applicable because
None
No provision
1977
fund appropriation
ernor's general fund
nonbinding.
Statutory
request
appropriation request
Expenditure
shall not exceed 6%.
NON-BINDING
Legislative Vote
TABLE 9.-DESCRIPTION OF STATE TAX AND EXPENDITURE LIMITS
State, Year of Adoption,
Type of Limit, Method of
Approval
Limit Applies to:
Provisions
Provisions in the Case of
The Limit is:
for Waiver:
Transfer of Responsibility
Treatment of
for Government Programs
SOUTH CAROLINA
Surpluses:
State appropriations
1980, 1984
Yearly growth in state
Limit may be exceeded for
appropriations shall not
None
Constitutional
one year by & 2/3s vote of
Excess revenues may be spent
Expenditure
exceed average growth
the legislature if it first
to match federal programs, for
Legislative Referendum
of personal income over
declares a financial emer-
debt purposes, tax relief, or
3 preceding yrs. or 9.5%
gency. Also, every 5 years
transferred to reserve fund.
of total state personal
the legislature can review
income, whichever is
the composition of the
greater. Also the number
limit.
of state employees is
tied to state population
TENNESSEE
Appropriations of
1978
Growth in state appro-
state tax revenues
Specific additional amount
pristions shall not
State must share in cost 1f
Constitutional
may be approved by majority
No provision
exceed growth in state
it increases expenditure
Expenditure
vote of the legislature.
personal income.
requirements of local
Constitutional
governments.
Convention
Referendum
TEXAS
Appropriations of
1978
Growth of biennial
state tax revenues
Specific additional amount
None
Constitutional
appropriations shall
may be approved by majority
No provision
Expenditure
not exceed rate of
vote of the legislature
Legislative
growth of state personal
if it first adopts a reso-
income.
Referendum
lution that an emergency
exists,
71
UTAH
State appropriations
1979
Growth in appropria-
Limit may be exceeded by
tions may not exceed
1) Limit shall be adjusted
Statutory
2/3 vote of legislature
Revenue in excess of limit
85% of the increase in
if program responsibility
if fiscal emergency is
up to 2% of appropriations
Expenditure
NEVER IMPLEMENTED
state personal income.
is transferred between
declared by legislature
may be kept in unappropriated
state and local govts.
Legislative Vote
and legislature follows
state funds balance;
or from the federal govt.
required procedures for
other excess revenue shall be
to the state.
publicizing its intent and
rebated to taxpayers.
2) Limit shall be decreased
US ADV ISORY COMMISSION ON RELATIONS
holding public hearing.
if funding source moved
from sources covered under
limit to sources exempt
from limit. Revenue from
exempt sources that is
moved to non-exempt
accounts shall come
under the limit.
WASHINGTON
State tax revenue
1979
Growth in tax revenues
Emergency must be declared
Statutory
shall not exceed average
by 2/3 vote of legislature
1) Limit shall be adjusted
Excess revenue becomes part
Revenue
rate of growth of state
then legislature must
if program responsibility
of state tax revenue for next
personal income over
is transferred between
Citizen Initiative
approve specific additional
fiscal year.
preceding 3 years.
state and local govts.
appropriations by 2/3 vote,
or between state and
federal govt.
2) State must reimburse
local govts. for increased
cost if legislature in-
poses program responsi-
bility on local govts.
Source: ACIR staff compilation from 1984 ACIR State Fiscal Survey of legislative and executive
budget officers and from state tax and expenditure limit legislation.
73
72
2. Is there any spending or taxing limitation element contained
XV. PUBLIC ATTITUDES ON A BALANCED BUDGET AMENDMENT
within Senate Joint Resolution 225
Public opinion polls have consistently demonstrated strong
The only spending or taxing limitation element in Senate Joint
public support for the idea of a balanced budget constitutional
Resolution 225 is an implicit one. To the extent that Congress and
amendment. Polls dating back to the 1930's have persistently
the President are aware that increased levels of spending must be
shown a public sympathetic to the idea of placing permanent limi-
accompanied by increased levels of taxes, there may well be a de-
tations upon the ability of Congress to spend in excess of available
terrent effect upon increased levels of spending.
revenues. The following is a sampling of some polls taken on this
3. Are the issues addressed by Senate Joint Resolution 225 suitable for
issue:
the Constitution?
TABLE 10-SUPPORT FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
Yes. The proposed amendment seeks to reestablish constitutional
limitations upon Federal deficit practices that existed in earlier
[In percent]
years through an array of formal and informal constitutional provi-
No
Favor
Oppose
opinion
sions and which have been eroded over the course of recent years.
Specifically, Senate Joint Resolution 225 addresses a serious spend-
"A proposed amendment to the Constitution would require Congress to approve a balanced
ing bias in the present political process because Members of Con-
federal budget each year. Government spending would have to be limited to no more than
gress do not have to cast votes in behalf of new taxes in order to
expected revenues, unless a three-fifths majority of Congress voted to spend more than
accommodate new spending programs. Rather than having to cast
expected revenues. Would you favor or oppose this amendment to the Constitution?" (Asked
such politically disadvantageous votes, they may resort to in-
only of those persons in the samples who said they had "heard or read about the proposal
for a constitutional amendment which would require the federal government to balance the
creased levels of deficit spending. This spending bias has created
severe economic and political difficulties that are fully deserving of
national budget each year."):
71
21
8
June 1983
63
23
14
being addressed by the Constitution.
August 1982
74
17
9
4. How does Senate Joint Resolution 225 address this spending bias?
May 1982
73
19
8
September 1981
70
22
8
The proposed amendment overcomes this bias by eliminating an
April 1981
67
13
20
important element in our political system responsible for the bias:
March 1980
"Would you favor or oppose a constitutional amendment that would require Congress to balance
unlimited access to deficit spending. Section 1 would reestablish
the federal budget each year-that is, keep taxes and expenditure in balance?":
78
12
10
the balanced budget as a fiscal norm. Senate Joint Resolution
February 1979
81
11
8
225-by doing this, would help restore the traditional linkage be-
June 1978
78
13
9
tween spending and taxing and ensure that votes to increase spend-
March 1976
ing would be matched by votes to increase taxes.
Source: Gallup Polls based upon personal interviews with national samples of around 1,500 adults, 18 years of age and older.
Further, as a recent New York Times-CBS Poll has concluded, "a
5. Shouldn't Senate Joint Resolution 225 be tried as a statute before
being placed in the Constitution?
level of support across the country and demographically." This
proposed budget-balancing amendment had a remarkably uniform
Previous efforts to impose fiscal responsibility upon Congress
seems to be true of each of these polls. Over 65 percent of those
through statutes have not been successful because they do not ad-
identifying themselves as Democrats, and Republicans, from all
dress the fundamental spending bias within our political system.
sections of the country, favored such an amendment.
Congress, for example, was required under the law to balance its
budget for fiscal year 1981. (P.L. 96-389, section 3) Not only can
XVI. SOME QUESTIONS CONCERNING SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 225
statutes always be repealed or ignored by a simple majority vote of
Congress, but they do not address the underlying institutional
1. What procedures does Senate Joint Resolution 225 require for
defect or bias that makes it difficult for Congress to pursue fiscally
achieving a balanced budget?
responsible policies. To achieve this, some external constraint upon
Senate Joint Resolution 225 does not establish any specific proce-
Congress is necessary.
dures by which Congress and the President are to achieve such a
6. Will Senate Joint Resolution 225 preclude Congress from being re-
budget. The proposed amendment simply states that it is constitu-
sponsive to economic conditions?
tional policy that such a budget be achieved (in the absence of a
three-fifths vote by Congress) and leaves it to Congress and the
No. While the proposed amendment establishes a fiscal norm of
President to establish whatever procedures are necessary and
balanced budgets, these norms can be overcome by qualified ma-
proper for doing SO. The proposed amendment recognizes that there
jorities of Congress. If the slightly higher majorities for overcoming
may be various methods by which a balanced budget can be as-
these norms cannot be obtained, there is reason to question wheth-
er or not a consensus exists on how best to respond to changing
sured and does not seek to direct any specific procedures.
economic conditions.
75
74
12. Can the Congress avoid the restraints of Senate Joint Resolution
7. Haven't economists criticized the notion of a balanced budgt
225 by spending "off-budget"?
amendment?
No. The proposed amendment makes no distinction between on-
Some have. However, their criticism has been directed largely
budget and off-budget spending. The term "outlay" is defined in
toward amendments which mandate balanced budgets whatever
this report to include both sorts of expenditures.
the current economic conditions. Senate Joint Resolution 225
avoids this criticism in two ways. The Congress can adopt a deficit
13. Can the Congress avoid the restraints of Senate Joint Resolution
budget if a qualified majority of each House of Congress deems that
225 by guaranteeing loans?
conditions warrant a deficit.
Temporarily. Since loan guarantees do not represent outlays in
8. Why doesn't Senate Joint Resolution 225 provide for the retire-
the year in which the loans are guaranteed, the proposed amend-
ment of the accumulated Federal debt?
ment does not preclude the Congress from authorizing such agree-
ments. However, to the extent that a guaranteed loan is defaulted
By establishing the norm of a balanced budget and thereby limit-
by the borrower, the outlays will come under the terms of the
ing future increases in the size of the national debt, the proposed
amendment in the year of the default.
amendment will lead to an increasingly less burdensome debt as
the economy continues to grow. Beyond that, nothing in Senate
14. Can the Congress avoid the restraints of Senate Joint Resolution
Joint Resolution 225 prohibits Congress from paying off its present
225 by imposing increased costs upon the private sector through
debt as it chooses. The Committee did not choose, however, to man-
increased rules and regulations?
date a surplus budget which would have been necessary in order to
Yes. Congressional use of regulation has always been an option
provide for the regular repayment of debt.
to explicit taxing and spending, and will remain one under Senate
Joint Resolution 225. As Professor James Buchanan has said about
9. Will Senate Joint Resolution 225 affect the ability of Congress to
this point however, "to fix the fence in one spot does not ensure
finance war expenditures through deficit spending?
that the cattle will not get out of the pasture at some other place.
No. (1) section 4 authorizes Congress to deficit spend in the event
But it does mean that the cattle are less likely to get out than
of a declaration of war; (2) Congress by a three-fifths vote can
before the fence in the one spot was fixed."
choose to deficit spend for military purposes; and (3) Congress can
always choose to rearrange priorities within its budget limits to
15. With economic conditions so uncertain, how can Congress esti-
better accommodate military spending. If none of these situations
mate its maximum available receipts?
obtain, it might be difficult to describe a particular situation as in-
Under the current law, the budgetary process is a continuing one
volving a national "emergency".
up until the beginning of each fiscal year. When Congress receives
the annual Presidential budget message in January, it will have
10. Won't Senate Joint Resolution 225 prevent a prompt response to
available the first national income growth estimates of the Com-
an emergency arising when the Congress is out of session?
merce Department. By February and March, the second and third
No, at least no more so than under the present Constitution. No
preliminary estimates will be available. In July, well before the Oc-
administration can expend moneys that the Congress has not ap-
tober beginning of the fiscal year, the Commerce Department pub-
propriated. If, prior to its recess or adjournment, the Congress has
lishes its first formal estimates of national income growth. Typical-
not provided for emergency funding, only a recall of Congress into
ly, these are extremely close to the final growth data available two
session could deal with this situation. This is neither more nor less
years later. It should be noted that the absolute levels of national
true under the amendment.
income are not an issue in the proposed amendment, only the rate
of growth in the indicator.
11. Will Senate Joint Resolution 225 preclude Congress from meet-
ing the genuine needs of the American people?
16. How is Senate Joint Resolution 225 to be enforced?
No. The vast majority of the voters have expressed strong inter-
The proposed amendment is designed to be enforced primarily
through the political processes. As one witness has observed of the
est in reduced levels of overall spending and deficits. In any event,
amendment, "it would increase the flow of economic information in
if the fiscal norm established in section 1 is inadequate to meet
the political marketplace." Rather than voters having to wade
these genuine needs, a majority of the membership of each House
through hundreds of votes cast by their Senators and Representa-
of Congress may vote at any time to set higher spending levels-so
tives each year in order to determine their views on spending and
long as it is also prepared to vote for higher taxes to finance such
taxing, they would be able to analyze only a small number of key
spending, or to allow deficit spending by a three-fifths vote.
votes. Further, Members of Congress would be more directly ac-
countable for their decisions since they would neither be able to
defer the costs of new spending programs-through deficit financ-
ing-nor totally avoid responsibility for imposing these costs—
76
77
through automatic tax increases. In addition, Senate Joint Resolu-
two. Under the policies of the First Concurrent Resolution on the
tion 225 attempts to draw a balance SO that federal courts will be
Budget-Fiscal Year 1986, CBO projects that the deficit in fiscal
in a position to review the most serious and unambiguous viola-
year 1988 will be about 3 percent of the Gross National Product
tions of the amendment, but not in a position to review basic day
(GNP). If the amendment takes effect and the Congress chooses to
to day fiscal decisions better left to Congress and the Executive. Fi-
balance the budget by reducing outlays, total federal outlays in
nally, it is expected that Members of Congress themselves and the
1988 would have to be reduced by 13 percent from the policies of
Executive branch will seek to abide by the text and the spirit of
the Congressional budget resolution so as not to exceed revenues.
the supreme law of the land.
Such a reduction would result in total outlays (including off-budget
items) of about 19.5 percent of GNP. If, on the other hand, the Con-
XVII. REGULATORY IMPACT STATEMENT
gress were to choose to maintain spending levels assumed in the
In compliance with paragraph 11(b), rule XXVI of the Standing
budget resolution and to eliminate the deficit by raising revenues,
Rules of the Senate, the Committee has concluded that Senate
a revenue increase of about 15 percent would be required in 1988.
Joint Resolution 225 will have no regulatory impact.
The Congress could choose any one of many combinations encom-
passing both revenue increases and outlay reductions totaling 3
XVIII. CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW
percent of GNP.
In compliance with paragraph 12, rule XXVI of the Standing
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased to
Rules of the Senate, Senate Joint Resolution 225 does not change
provide them.
existing United States Code but instead adds a new amendment to
With best wishes,
the United States Constitution.
Sincerely,
ERIC HANUSHEK
XIX. COST OF THE LEGISLATION
(For Rudolph G. Penner, Director).
In accordance with paragraph 11(a), Rule XXVI, Standing Rules
XX. CONCLUSION
of the Senate, the Committee offers the following report of the Con-
gressional Budget Office:
For the foregoing reasons, the Committee on the Judiciary rec-
ommends the enactment of the subject resolution proposing an
U.S. CONGRESS,
amendment to the United States Constitution.
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE,
Washington, DC, September 24, 1985.
Hon. STROM THURMOND,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Congressional Budget Office has re-
viewed a joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitu-
tion relating to federal budget procedures, as ordered reported by
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, July 11, 1985.
This resolution proposes an amendment to the Constitution that
would not allow outlays for any fiscal year to exceed receipts for
that year unless three-fifths of the total membership of both
Houses of the Congress vote in favor of a specific excess of outlays
over receipts. The amendment states that these provisions may be
waived for any fiscal year in which a declaration of war is in effect,
and that the amendment shall take effect for the second fiscal year
beginning after the article is ratified.
The budgetary impact of this amendment is very uncertain, be-
cause it depends on when it takes effect and the extent to which
the Congress would exercise the discretion provided by the amend-
ment to approve larger revenue increases and/or budget deficits.
The earliest the amendment could take effect would be for fiscal
year 1988, if it were approved by the 99th Congress and ratified by
the requisite number of states by September 30, 1986.
The Congress could choose to eliminate the deficit by reducing
spending, by increasing revenues, or by some combination of the
79
dent overestimated revenues by $33 billion, while underestimating
spending by $33 billion also. Thus both the Congress and the Presi-
dent, who worked together in developing fiscal policy, made serious
errors in estimating. This is a problem which requires further con-
sideration.
SUPPLEMENTAL VIEWS OF MR. BIDEN
Despite my misgivings, it is time to move the process on by re-
porting this amendment. But I will want to consider changes to
I voted to report to the Senate this constitutional amendment to
this amendment, or receive assurances about my concerns that I
require a balanced budget.
have not received to date before it comes up for consideration on
I did SO because I believe the principle it expresses is right. Its
the floor.
goal is right. There should not be deficit followed by deficit, year
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.
after year, as we have experienced them recently. We cannot afford
to double our national debt again as we have done in the last 5
years. I believe that a constitutional amendment calling for an end
to deficit spending will have a marked effect upon Congress. Con-
gress ought to act to end deficits without a constitutional mandate
such as this. However, I now believe that such a mandate may be
required to obtain action.
At the same time, I have reservations about the language of this
amendment and the way in which its mandate can be carried out.
The amendment imposes its control on "outlays" which may not
exceed receipts. But Congress does not directly control outlays.
Congress provides spending authority, but the executive branch
creates the outlays as it uses the spending authority. Sometimes it
is years before a specific piece of spending authority translates into
outlays. Although the timing of the creating of outlays is largely
an executive responsiblity, I would not want the adoption of an
amendment like this to be interpreted as granting impoundment
powers to the President as a means of enforcing this amendment.
Congress must still retain its primary responsibility for Federal
fiscal affairs. I want to work with other members of the Commit-
tee, and other interested Senators, to see whether we cannot im-
prove the language of this amendment before it comes up for
Senate action. It must be made clear that this amendment is not
intended to change the basic powers of either Branch.
I am also concerned that Senator Helfin's amendent to broaden
the power of Congress to appropriate all necessary funds to meet
threats to the national security was not adopted by the Committee.
As I have indicated in earlier debate, I consider the language in
Section 2, which limits waivers to times when a Declaration of War
is in effect, as too restrictive and unrealistic in today's perilous
times.
Yet a third concern I have with this amendment in its present
form is the practical means that can be found to control the levels
of spending and outlays to assure that the nation will not end the
fiscal year in the red. Our budget will be over $1 trillion before this
amendment to the constitution can be ratified. In estimating, a 1%
error is usually considered minimal. Yet a mere 1% error in budg-
eting would give us a $10 billion deficit, in violation of this amend-
ment. Take 1982, a most difficult economic year, as an example of
what can happen. On the revenue side of the ledger, Congress actu-
ally overestimated revenues by $40 billion. At the same time it un-
derestimated spending by $33 billion. In that same year, the Presi-
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81
Britain and Japan began building in excess of all prior treaty limi-
tation. H.R. 9218 was introduced to authorize sufficient build-up of
our naval strength to reach the 5-5-3 ratio.
The report of the House Committee on Naval Affairs on H.R.
9218 stated: "It is essential to have, for our proper national de-
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF MR. DENTON
fense, the increase provided in this bill, or else the security of our
Nation is jeopardized.
The increase authorized in this bill will
I believe that we face a crisis of confidence among the American
furnish the minimum national defense necessary to attain our na-
public. Most taxpayers simply do not believe that Congress has the
tional security and preserve our Republic." Senator Walsh stated
willpower to cut spending and balance the federal budget. This mis-
in support of the bill: "The question which the bill presents, and
trust appears well founded when one reviews the history of statuto-
the only question, is the question of national security and safety,
ry efforts to reform the budget process and restrain spending.
and, to that end, the maintenance of an adequate navy." The bill
The prudent and responsible management of public funds is a
passed the Senate on May 3, 1938, by a vote of 56 to 28, two votes
fundamental requirement of government. I am afraid that statuto-
short of a three-fifths majority.
ry approaches to reasserting that important principle will continue
After the outbreak of World War II, Congress passed the Neu-
to fail. Only the enactment of a constitutional amendment will ex-
trality Act of 1939, the "Cash and Carry" Act, permitting belliger-
plicity mandate fiscal responsibility and be enforceable by and on
ent nations to purchase war materials in the United States and
future Congresses.
transport them abroad in their own vessels with payment only in
In drafting this constitutional amendment, we must not lose
cash. This made American industrial power available to our allies.
sight of the fundamental responsibility of the federal government,
By the end of 1940 Great Britain could not hope to acquire the nec-
as stated in the preamble of the Constitution, to "provide for the
essary dollars to keep on buying the weapons they needed. By the
common defence.' This is not an option but the transcendental re-
middle of December, British contracting for United States goods in
quirement of the government, and we do no service for our country
this country had virtually ceased. President Roosevelt urged Con-
or in fulfillment of our obligations as Senators when we ignore that
gress to pass a bill allowing the manufacture and provision of
fact.
weapons to nations at war with axis powers so that the flow of nec-
We in the Congress have too often fallen into the dangerous trap
essary weapons to Britain would not be stopped.
of viewing "providing for the common defence" as if that require-
In response to the President's request, Congress passed H.R.
ment were only one of several competing requirements of equal pri-
1776, the Lend-Lease Act, which empowered the President to au-
ority. Clearly the common defense is more important than, for ex-
thorize the various heads of government departments and agencies
ample, welfare or education assistance or even the size of the na-
to manufacture and procure "defense articles" for the government
tional debt. If our country is not secure, then those other require-
of any country whose defense the President deemed vital to the de-
ments are meaningless.
fense of the United States and to exchange, lease, lend, or other-
Many of my colleagues prefer to pass a balanced budget constitu-
wise dispose of defense articles to such countries.
tional amendment without a specific national security waiver pro-
According to then Secretary of War Stimson, the Lend-Lease Act
vision because such a provision, they believe, is too broad and open
was one of the most important legislative achievements of the
to too much interpretation. They say that if our country faces a
entire war. The House of Representatives Committee on Foreign
genuine, imminent threat to the national security, they are confi-
Affairs concluded in their report on H.R. 1776: "It is the firm opin-
dent that at least three-fifths of both Houses of Congress would be
ion of your committee, that taking into consideration existing
willing to authorize a deficit in order to finance the military prepa-
world conditions, prompt enactment of H.R. 1776 into law is of the
ration necessary to meet that threat.
highest importance to the vital interests of our country-and even
I sincerely hope that they are correct in their judgment. I too am
of our civilization."
fairly confident that at least three-fifths of this body would respond
The Senate vote on H.R. 1776 was 60 to 31, only 2 votes over a
through whatever means necessary, and without hesitation, to
three-fifths majority. The House vote was 260 to 165, 1 vote short of
meet any imminent national security threat. I am also reasonably
a three-fifths majority.
confident that that will be the case 5, 10, and 100 years from now.
These are examples of how the perception of a threat to our na-
But I am not absolutely sure.
tional security can be very controversial before we are actually en-
There are several examples in history which demonstrate that
gaged in a military conflict. It underscores the need to preserve as
some votes on issues crucial to our national security have been
much flexibility as possible for Congress to act in the face of a na-
quite controversial and would not have passed had a three-fifths
tional security threat. When we are debating whether a constitu-
majority requirement been in effect. For example, prior to 1936 the
tional amendment might diminish in any way our ability or flexi-
Washington Treaty limited the authorized naval strength of the
bility to protect the national security, we must make every effort
United States, Great Britain, and Japan to a 5-5-3 ratio, respec-
to ensure that it will not! We cannot gamble with the ability of our
tively. When the naval limitation treaty expired in 1936, Great
children and of their children to protect the security of this nation.
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In the dynamic geopolitical situation of today, how can we attempt
82
to predict what types of threat to our national security we may
face many years hence?
Furthermore, a future threat to our national security may not
necessarily be a military threat to our country. It may be a threat
to another country which is vital to our national security, or it
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF MR. HEFLIN
may even be a terrorist threat mounted on such a scale that our
national security is genuinely threatened. We must be careful to
Senate Joint Resolution 225, the constitutional amendment to
take these possibilities into account when we fashion a balanced
balance the federal budget, reported favorably by the Committee
budget amendment.
on the Judiciary, is indeed a positive stop toward fiscal responsibil-
Finally, let us dispense with any suggestion that it is defense
ity. Congress must take the initiative to enact and send to the
spending that has caused our current budgetary problems and that
people a resolution to balance the federal budget. I have supported
irresponsible defense spending might undermine the proposed
such a concept since coming to the United States Senate, and I am
amendment. I point out to my colleagues that the proportion of the
committed to reducing the federal deficit which is crippling this na-
federal budget that is spent on defense has declined by nearly half
tion's financial security. I will support passage of this resolution,
during the past 25 years. When John F. Kennedy was President,
but I believe it can be made stronger and more effective.
we spent nearly one-half of the Federal budget on defense and
Senate Joint Resolution 225 requires Congress to adopt a state-
about one-quarter of it on social programs. Now the proportions are
ment prior to the fiscal year in which outlays are not greater than
reversed, and we spend more than half of the Federal budget on
receipts. Congress may provide for a specific excess of outlays over
social programs and only slightly more than one-quarter on de-
receipts by a three-fifths vote of each House of Congress. This lan-
fense.
guage ensures a balanced statement at the beginning of a fiscal
As important as a balanced budget is to the well-being of our
year. It does not ensure a balanced budget at the end of a fiscal
nation, we cannot force a balanced budget at the expense of our
year.
ability to protect the national security.
In order to make Congress more accountable for the end product
JEREMIAH DENTON.
of the budgetary process, there must be some self-enforcing provi-
sion that adds substance to the balanced budget amendment. In the
97th Congress, Senator William Armstrong (R-CO), and Senator
David Boren (D-OK.), proposed an enforcement mechanism, which
was adopted by the Senate. The amendment requires a three-fifths
vote to raise the debt limit of the United States after the balanced
budget amendment becomes effective.
If the purpose of the balanced budget amendment is to allow for
a planned deficit only by a three-fifths vote, then requiring a three-
fifths vote to raise the debt limit after a deficit has actually oc-
curred is perfectly consistent.
Under S.J. Res. 225, the initial statement of receipts and outlays
is only a projection. It is an estimate of receipts and outlays for the
fiscal year. While S.J. Res. 13 requires actual outlays not to exceed
planned outlays, there is no guarantee that actual receipts will not
fall below planned receipts. Therefore, even with the most careful
projections, deficits may occur. S.J. Res. 225 exacts no price for an
unplanned deficit.
If we are truly committed to living within the confines of a bal-
anced budget, then Congress must be responsible for unplanned
deficits as well as planned deficits. This amendment makes Con-
gress just as accountable at the end of the fiscal year as it is at the
beginning. Congress may also be more prudent in its initial projec-
tions if it must answer for its results.
I offered this amendment in Committee, but withdrew it based
on the assurances of my colleagues that such a provision was being
considered. I believe it is crucial to any workable and effective con-
stitutional amendment to balance the budget.
(83)
84
The success of any constitutional amendment to balance the
budget will require responsible legislating by each individual
Member of Congress, participation of the Executive Branch and pa-
tience and sacrifice on the part of the American public. But Con-
gress has a responsibility to enact not just a balanced budget
amendment, but an amendment with vision-and one that can ac-
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF MR. SIMON
complish what is should accomplish-a budget we can live with,
I am pleased to join my colleagues on this committee in support-
and live within.
ing a balanced budget amendment. Since my first days in Congress,
HOWELL HEFLIN.
I have urged my fellow members of Congress to support such a pro-
posal.
During my years in government I have reached the unfortunate
conclusion that while we have the ability to balance budgets, we do
not have the discipline to make the difficult choices that must be
made.
Yet we cannot continue to run these staggering deficits year
after year. Already interest payments on our national debt consti-
tute the third largest budget expenditure behind defense spending
and social security benefits. Most estimates predict that by the end
of this decade, interest will be the single greatest government ex-
pense.
This year we are spending $181 billion on interest payments.
Every day the government throws away $500 million. Not one of
those dollars goes to feeding the hungry, or sheltering the home-
less, or educating our children. Instead it is wasted on useless in-
terest payments. Whatever side of the aisle you are on, you have to
agree that this is not good public policy.
The size of our current deficits is also having another effect on
our economy. The high interest rates brought about by these defi-
cits is unfairly punishing low and middle income families. While
the rich can reap the benefits of high-yield bonds, those without
the money to play this high stakes game cannot afford to finance a
mortgage, or make the payments on a new car, or put a son or
daughter through college. The present deficits are causing a huge
welfare-for-the-rich program, the greatest redistribution of wealth
in our nation's history.
Beyond this our deficit spending is causing our worst trade defi-
cit in history. The budget deficits have created a much too strong
dollar, causing an increase in imports and a drastic decline in ex-
ports. American manufacturers too often cannot compete in inter-
national markets and less expensive foreign goods fllod our domes-
tic economy. We have already lost an estimated three million jobs
because of this trade deficit and countless more are sure to follow.
Neither the current trade legislation, nor a dozen bills like them,
will have much effect on our balance of trade until we bring the
primary problem of the deficit under control.
If we do nothing we will eventually have to monetize our imbal-
ances. The Treasury will succumb to intense pressures and we will
simply print enough money to satisfy the terrible demand for dol-
lars. This will cause runaway inflation. At that point deficits will
have choked the life out of the strongest economy in history.
Beyond these economic arguments lies a constitutional one.
Thirty-two state legislatures have passed resolutions calling for a
(85)
86
87
constitutional convention to address this issue if Congress does not
must decide the best course to follow. We must balance the budget
pass an amendment calling for a balanced budget. Only two more
in order to ensure our children an effective federal government
states are needed to meet the three-fifths requirement for such a
and the freedom to find a job, buy a home for their family and
pursue the American dream.
convention. We have never held such a meeting and no one here
can imagine what effect this unprecedented convention would have
A properly worded balanced budget amendment would be a first
on our democracy.
step back to responsible fiscal planning and toward protecting our
Clearly there is a need for a balanced budget amendment. In the
freedom for the generations that follow.
Senate we are faced with two such choices. This present option and
S.J. Res. 13. This amendment is a decidedly better approach to the
problem.
This amendment contains the flexibility that an amendment to
the Constitution must have. It does not prescribe a single mecha-
nism for achieving a balanced budget. Instead it understands that
political decisions must be left to the political system. This is an
example that earlier amendments to the Constitution followed. We
did not instruct the states on how to enforce Prohibition, nor did
we make a progressive income tax part of the 16th amendment.
I want an amendment that will balance the budget, but I also
want an amendment that our children and grandchildren can live
with.
This amendment I have cosponsored along with Senators Thur-
mond, Hatch and DeConcini is a simple, clearly-worded, and bi-par-
tisan approach to this complex problem. It is an amendment that is
fair both to our constituents and to future generations.
I disagree with my cosponsors on the role of the courts in enforc-
ing this amendment. Some of my colleagues have argued that the
question of resolving an unbalanced budget is a political question
and must be solved by the political system. I do not want to saddle
the Supreme Court with responsibility for creating a federal budget
nor do I want to bring the judicial branch into the debate on fiscal
policy. But we cannot ignore the role of the courts-particularly
the Supreme Court-when we create an amendment to the Consti-
tution to demanding a balanced budget. This, by definition, makes
the budget a constitutional matter. If Congress and the President
pass a budget that clearly makes no attempt to abide by this new
constitutional mandate, the federal courts would have no choice
but to intervene.
It is my sincere hope that this will never happen. But we must
understand the consequences of this decision. A constitutional
amendment will force us to balance the budget and preserve our
system of government for the generations that follow. The possibili-
ty of stern review of our actions by the federal courts will help pro-
vide the resolve we have lacked in recent budgets.
Our Constitution has been successful for over two hundred
years because it was thoughtfully worded enough to allow each
generation of lawmakers the opportunity to decide the best course
for the American people. Today our freedom is threatened in an un-
precedented way by the specter of these terrible deficits and we
89
able. It, therefore, will not achieve its goal of a balanced federal
budget. This failure could erode respect for other provisions of the
Constitution. The passage of an unenforceable constitutional
amendment is an exercise in public relations, not constitutional
law.
MINORITY VIEWS OF MR. MATHIAS
If the majority is incorrect about standing to enforce the amend-
ment, federal judges could become intimately involved in every
The Senate Judiciary Committee has once again reported to the
facet of spending and taxing decisions. The judiciary could be
Senate a proposed constitutional amendment to provide for a bal-
called on to determine the constitutionality of virtually every tax
anced budget. This year, the Committee was unable to agree on a
and spending bill passed by Congress and signed by the President.
single formulation for this proposed amendment and has therefore
reported two distinct proposals to the Senate for consideration.
BALANCED BUDGETS TODAY
While both proposed amendments purport to achieve the same
Why is the Judiciary Committee SO eager to embark on a path
result-balanced federal budgets, they take different approaches.
that presents these and many other pitfalls? In my view, the sup-
S.J. Res. 13 is substantially similar to S.J. Res. 5 which was report-
port for a constitutional amendment on balanced budgets is based
ed by this Committee in the 98th Congress. This proposed amend-
on a false premise-that the Constitution is somehow flawed, and
ment requires anticipated revenues to equal anticipated receipts in
that but for this error in the original drafting of the document, our
each fiscal year. S.J. Res. 13 also restricts the ability of Congress to
fiscal house would be in order. I cannot agree with this assumption.
increase receipts by requiring that any increase in Federal reve-
The Constitution, without further amendment, grants ample power
nues above the rate of growth in national income must be specifi-
to the Congress and the President to adopt a balanced budget now.
cally authorized by an act of Congress, passed by a majority of the
The deficit problem is not the fault of inadequacies in the Consti-
membership of each house, "directed solely to approving specific
tution. It is the fault of Presidents of both parties who have pro-
additional receipts."
posed spending measures in excess of federal revenues without pro-
The other proposed constitutional amendment reported by the
posing equal taxes to finance those spending priorities. It is the
Committee, S.J. Res. 225, is terser in language, although I fear it will
fault of Congress which, although it has consistently reduced
prove no less complex in application. This proposal simply provides
spending demands by all Presidents, has just as consistently been
that outlays for any fiscal year may not exceed revenues for that
unwilling to deny any President's wishes to increase spending with-
fiscal year. The difficulty that could arise from the fact that many
out increasing taxes.
months and many uncertainties separate the estimate of outlays
Congress and the President share responsibility to propose and
and the collection of revenues is ignored.
adopt balanced budgets. In the past five years alone, Congress has
cut the deficit in budgets proposed by the President by over $167
SHORTCOMINGS OF THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
billion. Yet both of the proposed amendments to the Constitution
In my view, neither of these proposed amendments is adequate to
address only the legislative branch. Neither requires the executive
the task of assuring balanced budgets. At best, either amendment
to play any role in restricting federal spending or in proposing bal-
will raise false expectations; at worst, either amendment could lead
anced budgets. In the 98th Congress, S.J. Res. 5, as reported by this
to concerted efforts to circumvent its provisions. This latter result
Committee, included a requirement that the President propose a
would adversely affect enforcement of and respect for constitution-
balanced budget. This year, however, this committee rejected the
al provisions generally.
opportunity to include that requirement. Rather than recognizing
The Committee's inability to propound a single formulation for
the role of the President in the budget process, the Committee has
the proposed amendment should warn us that the particular word-
acted as if Congress legislated in a vacuum. Our retreat from im-
ing of a balanced budget amendment may be outdated before its
posing executive as well as legislative responsibility further erodes
passage, expecially since ratification is a lengthy process which
confidence in these proposed amendments and cannot give the
may take several years to complete.
American people confidence that this Committee takes the problem
In addition, both of these proposed amendments open the door to
of budget deficits seriously.
unprecedented judicial involvement in the budget process. Neither
STATUTORY APPROACH
amendment includes a specific enforcement mechanism. The com-
mittee rejected an amendment which would have granted explicit
The best way to assure the American people that we are serious
standing for citizens' suits to enforce both the balanced budget and
about the deficit is to vote for legislation that will bring the budget
tax limitation sections of the proposed amendments. The majority
into balance. Throughout my career in Congress I have supported
believes that judicial involvement would be rare because citizens
fiscally sound policies that require the federal government to limit
would lack standing to complain of violations. But if this belief is
spending to essential programs and to finance those programs
correct, the amendment, in either form, is essentially unenforce-
through appropriate taxes. But if a majority of the Senate is not
(88)
willing to vote for budget resolutions that will lead to a balanced
90
budget, another alternative, short of a constitutional amendment,
should be considered.
I have consistently favored a statutory approach to the balanced
budget question. It is often said that "Congress should not legislate
in the dark." It is even more essential that Congress not amend the
Constitution in the dark. A statutory approach could achieve im-
MINORITY VIEWS OF MR. METZENBAUM
mediate results, since, unlike a constitutional amendment, the stat-
The Judiciary Committee has voted to report two versions of a
ute could be effective immediately. Balanced budgets could be man-
balanced budget amendment to the Senate. Both versions are fun-
dated immediately, not at the end of a lengthy ratification process.
damentally flawed proposals to tamper with the Constitution. Not
In addition, the statutory approach could ameliorate some of the
only is the balanced budget amendment unworkable, it is highly
problems caused by our ignorance of the effects of mandating a bal-
deceptive. Proponents point to it as a cure for the Nation's fiscal
anced budget. We know very little about the impact of this pro-
crisis. In fact, it is just the opposite. It is a way to divert attention
posed amendment on the economy, on federal finance, or on the
from the difficult task of taking responsible action.
separation of powers, particularly the relationship between the and leg-
The public has been led to believe the balanced budget amend-
islative and judicial branches. These questions should be fully
ment will painlessly eliminate massive deficits that plague our Na-
completely answered before we change the Constitution. A statuto-
tion's economic stability. This conception is a dangerous illusion.
approach would provide that opportunity. The Congress could
Our current fiscal disaster is the result of a foolishly drastic tax
ry discern the effect of particular language, ascertain the proper roles
cut in 1981, which many of us now regret, a reckless military build-
for the executive and judicial branches in the process of mandatory
balanced budgets and revise any statute by the action of a simple
up that has not made us more secure, and a failure to close tax
loopholes that allow corporations and the wealthy to avoid their
majority of the Congress and Presidential concurrence.
fair share of taxes. Only if we attack the cause of the deficits will
A constitutional amendment has none of these virtues. Not only
will it be ineffective today, during the period of greatest need, but
we ever make a start on balancing the budget. This amendment, on
the other hand, will be exploited for political gamesmanship when
any flaws discovered after ratification will have to be corrected by
statemanship is particulary necessary for responsible action.
the time-consuming process of reamending the Constitution.
BROAD-BASED OPPOSITION
CONCLUSION
The public should be highly suspicious of this amendment if for
These proposed amendments raise more questions than they
Their benefits will not be felt for years, if at all. In the
no other reason than SO many serious analysts and political observ-
answer. interim, they provide a poor substitute for real action to control
ers, of all political philosophies, have spoken out against it.
The National Council of Senior Citizens justifiably fears that it
the Federal budget process. For these reasons, I oppose sending
means "renewed attacks on social security, medicare and medic-
either of these proposed constitutional amendments to the Senate.
aid."
CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, JR.
Paul Volcker, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, testi-
fied that it isn't workable and can be used as a substitute for actu-
ally solving the deficit problem.
Former President Ford said it would raise false hopes.
The Committee for Constitutional Integrity, a distinguished
group of lawyers and law professors, says it would undermine the
flexibility and diminish the integrity of the Constitution.
Columnist George Will says it is a "hoax," and a "trivialization
of the Constitution."
Columnist James J. Kilpatrick says it is an "unenforceable, unin-
telligible amendment to the Constitution that will get us nowhere."
Rudolph Penner, the Director of the Congressional Budget Office,
testified that the balanced budget amendment "can be easily
evaded" and that "it invites political stalemate."
Roy Ash, former Director of the Office of Management and
Budget for Presidents Nixon and Ford, testified that the amend-
ment would lead to a loss of fiscal control and accomplish the oppo-
site of what its proponents claim.
(91)
92
93
The staff of President Reagan's own Office of Management and
Budget prepared an internal report listing major flaws in the
passes a tax cut that is still ineffective in reducing revenues suffi-
amendment and arguing strongly against it.
ciently, the Constitution is violated and taxpayer suits may result.
Despite informed, broad-based opposition, and a host of intracta-
In addition, the revenue limitation provision can make a budget
ble substantive and procedural problems, rhetorical support for the
deficit more likely by placing a stringent limitation on the Nation's
amendment remains high and rises as the deficit situation worsens.
ability to collect revenue. For example, the provision may force
It is no accident that, as the budget deficits soar, and the actual
Congress to enact a tax cut even if it is apparent that revenues al-
solution becomes more difficult, a misleading, oversimplified
ready will fall short of expenditures. This bias toward limiting rev-
remedy becomes more attractive.
enues, regardless of the Nation's needs, conflicts with the professed
major purpose of the amendment-balancing the budget.
MISUSE OF THE CONSITITUTION
This provision also builds in a clear bias toward forced tax reduc-
tions. During a recession, national income falls and tax revenues
The amendment would misuse the Constitution to address prob-
fall as a result. However, there is a strong tendency for tax reve-
lems that must be dealt with through legislative means. Annual
nues to decline faster than national income because of the progres-
economic and fiscal policies cannot and should not be imposed by
sivity of the Tax Code. Consequently, during a recession, tax reve-
the Constitution. There are too many contingencies, too many un-
nues will generally fall as a percentage of national income.
certainties that arise in the Nation's economic life to deal with
Since section 2 limits the increase in tax revenues to the rate of
them through the inflexible mechanism of a constitutional amend-
growth of national income in the prior year, the provision will
ment.
limit the natural tendency of tax revenues to increase faster than
The amendment is almost certainly unworkable in times of re-
the rate of increase in national income as the Nation recovers from
cession when social spending automatically increases as tax reve-
a recession. The result is to build in a bias toward a long-term re-
nues fall. It provides for no national emergencies other than a
formal declaration of war. During times of rapid social and eco-
output. duction in tax revenues as a percentage of the Nation's total
nomic change, Congress has historically been able to implement
This type of forced tax reduction threatens to undercut the coun-
necessary taxing and spending decisions through regular legislative
try's ability to pay for essential programs such as defense, Social
procedures. A constitutional amendment introduces the ominous
Security, Medicare, education and other services. It is one thing for
element of an inflexible impediment that can only be modified with
the Congress to reduce taxes in particular circumstances after in-
extreme difficulty-a protracted process of ratifying another consti-
formed debate. It is unwise, even reckless, to force long-term tax
tutional amendment.
reductions through the Constitution.
In short, this section threatens to undercut revenues necessary to
THE REVENUE LIMITATION PROVISION
support essential Federal responsibilities for defense and social pro-
Below I comment on the provisions of both versions of the
grams. It is inconceivable Congress could comply with it on a con-
amendment dealing with the relationship of outlays and expendi-
sistent basis, and it is likely to result in deficits by forcing Congress
tures. First, I turn to the specific provision in the "revenue limita-
to cut taxes when more revenue is needed to balance the budget.
tion" form of the amendment that limits the growth in tax reve-
nues. Section 2 prohibits Federal revenues from growing faster
THE BALANCED BUDGET REQUIREMENT-FAILURE TO ACCOMMODATE
ECONOMIC CYCLES
than the rate of growth in national income unless legislation, limit-
ed solely to increasing taxes, has been enacted.
Attempting to balance the budget during a time of economic re-
This provision attempts to prevent any automatic increase in tax
cession is a policy guaranteed to plunge the Nation into a deeper
revenues beyond those resulting from growth in the economy. Any
recession. As the economy spirals downward, tax revenues will de-
additional growth in revenues would presumably require a tax cut
cline and social spending-income and health care assistance and
or a refund unless a specific tax increase bill was enacted. Conse-
unemployment compensation-will automatically rise. These addi-
quently, payroll taxes for Social Security and Medicare or other
tional expenditures not only cushion the blow in economic hard
taxes would have to be cut to accommodate revenue increases
times for those hardest hit by the recession, they also help restore
which exceed the limitation. Such a limitation would also apply
overall economic activity and stability. Yet the amendment re-
even if revenues were far short of expenditures.
quires the exact opposite-major new taxes or cuts in spending-
It is very difficult to understand how this provision would be en-
that will inevitably promote further deterioration of the economy.
forced. For example, it may become apparent that tax revenues
As President Reagan's own OMB staff wrote:
will exceed the limitation only when there is little time left in the
Since business cycle contractions are inherent in a free
fiscal year for Congress to act. In theory, Congress would have to
enact a tax cut to avoid violating the Constitution and the tax cut
economy, the proposed policy rule would create artificial
would have to become effective immediately. These assumptions
policy choices and political conflicts on a recurring basis,
are highly unrealistic in most cases. If Congress fails to act, or
i.e., whether in the face of a contracting economy to: raise
taxes, radically reduce spending until recovery raises re-
94
95
ceipts, or achieve super-majorities to validate recession
deficits.
an additional $191.5 billion in fiscal year 1982 and $206.9 billion in
Both versions reported by the committee purport to require that
fiscal year 1983. By fiscal year 1983, Congress would have been
outlays not exceed receipts, although there are two different ap-
forced to slash by more than half unemployment compensation, all
proaches to implementing this limitation. The first version, re-
education and social service programs, the SSI and AFDC income
ferred to in this statement as the "revenue limitation" version, re-
assistance progams, veteran's programs, medicare, medicaid, and
quires that Congress adopt a statement of receipts and outlays
interest on the national debt.
every other Federal program besides defense, social security, and
before a fiscal year begins. Further, Congress may amend this
statement through the normal legislative process only in a way
that keeps outlays less than revenues. As discussed further below,
whose econometric model is widely used in Government and indus-
A similar analysis conducted by Data Resources, Inc., a firm
this version does not prohibit a deficit at all, even one of hundreds
try, showed the same results. DRI made projections based on alter-
of billions of dollars, from a reduction of tax revenues below the
period of economic growth, and alternatively, after a period of eco- a
native assumptions, first that the amendment took effect during
level adopted in the statement. The second version, referred to here
as the "revenue permissive" version, flatly requires that outlays
nomic decline. The results of both economic simulations were deep
for the year not exceed receipts.
recessions with record high unemployment.
The "revenue limitation" version requires Congress to adopt a
DISTORTING POLICY DECISIONS
statement at the beginning of the year that reflects a balanced
budget. If we are in the midst of a recession at that time, the fiscal
Because the amendment would create major roadblocks to Con-
policies Congress would have to adopt would be the precise opposite
gress' ability to deal with changes in economic conditions, it will
of those needed to pull the Nation back to economic recovery.
The "revenue permissive" version of the amendment has an even
bias in favor of a tax increase to correct deficits that become
forced to abide by the amendment's limitations. There is a clear
undoubtedly introduce distortions in policy decisions as Congress is
worse result in a time of economic downturn. Under the "revenue
limitation" version, the requirement to balance the budget occurs
points out:
ent in the latter part of the fiscal year. As the OMB staff appar- report
only at the beginning of the fiscal year. A shortfall from revenue
loss would be allowed without triggering the amendment as long as
An annual balanced budget rule is inherently biased
outlays did not exceed the level in the statement. However, the
toward higher taxes rather than lower spending because:
revenue permissive version prohibits any deficit at all, including
Cash flow changes owing to tax policy can be enacted, im-
one that results from a falloff in revenues. Consequently, the
plemented, and realized in three months
amendment would tend to force a tax increase or major cuts in
changes owing to spending policy require three months to
cash flow
social spending-unemployment compensation, health care, and
three years to enact, implement and realize in most
Social Security benefits-at the time when economic suffering is
cases-or even longer.
greatest.
This perverse effect inherent in both versions has led many of
Defense outlays for major weapon systems, as well as certain
the Nation's most prominent economists-including six American
other outlays, are the result of spending decisions often made
Nobel laureates in economic science, four former Chairmen of the
earlier. It is absurd to believe that Congress could, on short notice years
President's Council of Economic Advisers, and 11 past presidents of
the American Economic Association-To Oppose a Balanced
spending cuts would be particularly difficult because correcting a
with a major effect on current-year outlays. Moreover, relying on
as a fiscal year draws to a close, make changes in budgetary policy
Budget Amendment.
It is true that Congress could always waive the provisions of the
budget imbalance would require a proportionally greater cut in
amendment with a three-fifths vote. However, the whole point of
program spending the later it is made in the fiscal year.
this "super-majority" requirement is to make it difficult to achieve.
Second, there will be an irresistible temptation to convert
Since it would be difficult for Congress to vote a waiver, there will
spending to misleading "off budget" status in order to avoid the more ef-
be substantial opportunities for legislative stalemate while a reces-
fects of the amendment. "Off budget" spending has grown steadily
sion deepens and suffering by those hardest hit by the recession
worsens.
Actual econometric simulations of the effect of the amendment
fied that the amendment will encourage subterfuges to load spend-
former Director of the Office and Management and Budget, testi-
over recent decades and is now about $16 billion. Roy L. Ash,
bear out the seriousness of this problem. A Wharton Econometric
spending. However, as he put it:
ing on to the private sector SO it will not appear as Government
analysis estimated the impact of a hypothetical balanced budget re-
quirement in effect in July 1981.
The analysis showed that the deep and painful recession the
official budget but show up in prices instead.
The costs don't disappear; they're just not a part of the
country endured would have turned into a major depression. Be-
There are other "escape hatches" for a Congress forced to deal
cause Federal revenues declined so sharply, in order to balance the
with the realities of fiscal policy but hamstrung by the amend-
budget Federal spending would have had to have been reduced by
ment, incuding transferring responsibility to the private sector
through the gimmicks of tax credits and loan guarantees. These ef-
96
97
fects are not simply loopholes, but serious distortions in economic
policy-making, leading to misleading information about actual
between would the projections at the beginning of the year, Congress
Since it is inevitable that there will often be a wide divergence
budget policy and less accountability to the public.
THE DECLARATION OF WAR PROVISION
Both versions of the amendment reported by the committee
dent year. Consequently, under this version Congress and the Presi-
the outlays do not exceed the outlays projected at the beginning of
that balance. However, the "revenue limitation" version only requires
have to revise the budget throughout the year to keep it in
allow Congress to waive the amendment when a declaration of war
can ignore the effect of tax revenues on the deficit. An
is in effect. During an actual declared war, the Nation would un-
doubtedly incur large deficits and Congress would quickly enact a
tax revenue without triggering the amendment.
mous deficit can occur because of a tax giveaway or other loss enor- of
waiver resolution. However, the history of the Nation shows very
few examples of a declared war. There has been no declaration of
White House consistently assured the country that the deficits
For example, during the beginning of the administration, the
war in effect since World War II even though the United States
President assured us that the budget could be balanced in few
would be far smaller than those we actually experienced. The
has been involved in Major military conflicts in Korea and Viet-
nam as well as more limited conflicts elsewhere. The amendment's
sults of these reckless policies are now painfully clear. In January re-
years, even with his massive tax cut and military buildup. The a
limitations would greatly hamper the ability of the Congress to ap-
propriate funds for emergency military action.
billion 1981, OMB estimated the deficit for fiscal year 1982 would be $27.5
A three-fifths vote in both Houses of Congress will not be easily
achieved, particularly if there is dispute about the involvement of
the of revenue shortfalls. The "revenue limitation" version of
result $57.9 billion and $110.6 billion. These huge deficits were largely were the
and for fiscal year 1983, $8.0 billion. The actual deficits
the United States in the conflict. The result is to place a dangerous
limitation on the flexibility of the Nation to respond in military
either amendment would permit huge deficits from revenue losses,
emergencies.
from a recession or irresponsible tax cuts.
The "revenue permissive" version of the amendment is
ENFORCEABILITY PROBLEMS
and only will this version lead Congress to try to increase taxes
Not exceed receipts at the end of the year without a three-fifths vote.
more unrealistic by attempting to require flatly that outlays even not
The amendment has a host of enforceability problems that make
it almost impossible to implement in the way its proponents argue.
First, every key term in the amendment-"outlays," "national
cut spending during a recession, it will lead to consistent
income," and "statement of receipts"-is undefined. None of these
compliance because of the inability of the Government to plan non- ac-
terms has a precise, universally accepted meaning and each is sub-
curately for fluctuations in revenues and expenditures.
ject to manipulation and lengthy disputes. "Outlays"-actual Gov-
decisions by Congress for funds to be expended. Outlays, in fact,
are often based on appropriation decisions that occurred years ear-
billion a $700 billion annual outlay limitation, an overrun report, of $50
obtaining under complete information. According to the staff
known until the final days of the fiscal year because of delays in
The OMB staff report admits that actual outlays would not be
ernment expenditures-are clearly different from appropriations-
lier. The amendment is also unclear in the treatment of Govern-
fiscal would not be realized until 24 days before the end of the
ment loan guarantees and other off-budget expenditures.
$50 year. There is no realistic way Congress could decide
Both versions of the amendment reported by the committee
make totally unrealistic assumptions about the ability of Congress
action OMB report states: "Under almost all circumstances, no remedial
billion adjustment that could take effect in 3 weeks. As upon the a
to estimate accurately expenditures and revenues. The "revenue
limitation" version requires Congress to make an estimate of out-
lays and revenues prior to the beginning of the fiscal year. In reali-
could not be known until after the fiscal year is over and Congress
will according to the report, the final total of the fiscal year's outlays
could be taken to reduce outlays in the last month." In fact,
ty, recent administration projections of tax revenues and outlays
not make effective adjustments.
have been widely out of line with actual events. For example,
fiscal lead to deficits that are impossible to eliminate in the last days of
Even small errors in estimating revenues and expenditures will
OMB, in submitting the President's budgets, assumed deficits of
$45 billion, $91.5 billion, and $189 billion for fiscal years 1982-84.
Based on the same policy assumptions, the Congressional Budget
"revenue $20 billion. The balanced budget amendment, particularly the
is are by 2 percent, the deficit resulting from a $1 trillion budget
off year. For example, if congressional estimates of the budget a
Office projected deficits of $67 billion, $120.6 billion, and $176 bil-
lion. The actual deficits for those years turned out to be $110.6 bil-
be permissive" version, can only pretend that Congress will
lion, $195.4 billion, and $185.3 billion.
Even if an administration does not systematically underestimate
year, to have an effect on the budget during the year.
able to make adjustments of this size in the final days of a fiscal
the likely deficits of its budget proposals, there is a high degree of
inherent uncertainty in spending and revenue projections. It is im-
possible to guarantee congressional budget decisions at the begin-
'cases "chosen consciously not to prohibit judicial review altogether of
forced. The committee's report states that the committee has en-
The amendment is extremely unclear on how it would be
ning of a fiscal year will lead to a balanced budget at the end of
amendment or controversies' arising in the context of the proposed
the year.
litical question" doctrine of Baker V. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), and
(p. 67). The majority report assumes that the "po-
98
99
the requirement of a justiciable case or controversy (see, e.g., Aetna
Life Insurance Co. V. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937)) mean that pri-
ple, even if Congress, by a super-majority vote, enacts a resolution
vate litigation over compliance with the amendment would be
allowing a particular deficit level, the actual deficit may turn out
minimized.
to be higher. In fact, in times of economic instability it is extremely
In fact, however, some have argued there will be massive litiga-
likely that a congressional super-majority resolution will not ade-
tion by organizations and individuals challenging spending and
quately foresee the final outlays and receipts for the year. If the
taxing decisions. The Committee on Federal Legislation of the New
year ends and Congress has failed to enact an additional revised
York City Bar Association commented in regard to the amendment
resolution, litigation challenging the validity of spending and tax
collection is certain to ensue.
reported in the 97th Congress:
Similarly, if Congress underestimates tax receipts because of eco-
The amendment
will involve the judiciary in the
nomic growth and fails to pass a specific resolution called for in
budgetary process extensively in that it seems likely that
section 2 of the "revenue limitation" form of the amendment, the
there will be a host of lawsuits-annually recurring-chal-
limitation of section 2 could easily be violated. If unexpected tax
lenging particular expenditures and appropriations and
receipts even marginally exceed the year's increase in national
every attempt to raise or lower taxes.
income-itself impossible to estimate precisely-the Federal courts
Judge Bork of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals wrote:
may be faced with taxpayer suits demanding court-ordered refunds
The result of such an amendment would likely be hun-
or cancellation of spending programs.
dreds, if not thousands, of lawsuits around the country,
ABSENCE OF PRESIDENTIAL INVOLVEMENT
many of them on inconsistent theories and providing in-
consistent results. By the time the Supreme Court
One of the greatest ironies in the debate over the balanced
straightened the whole matter out the budget in question
budget amendment is that the greatest proponent of the balanced
would be at least four years out of date and lawsuits in-
budget amendment, President Reagan, is the person most responsi-
volving the next three fiscal year would be climbing
ble for huge deficits. This administration has proposed budgets
toward the Supreme Court.
with massive deficits from its first days in office. It has never come
Proponents of the amendment argue that there will be little liti-
close to proposing a balanced budget and it has never recommend-
gation concerning the amendment because the standing require-
ed changes to spending or tax policies that would result in one in
mens are difficult to meet. But, if no one has standing, who will
the foreseeable future.
enforce the amendment at all? During committee consideration, I
The table below shows the deficits estimated by CBO under the
proposed allowing individual citizens to bring suit to enforce the
President's own budget submissions.
amendment, but it was clear that the majority of the committee
did not favor allowing ordinary citizens to enforce it. However, the
Administration proposal-CBO estimate of deficit
absence of any way to enforce the amendment means that Con-
[Billions]
Fiscal year:
gress could ignore it and the public could do nothing. The public
1982
will soon grow cynical about an amendment passed with a great
1983
$67
fanfare of promises that proves to be unworkable and unenforce-
1984
137
1985
176
able.
1986
180
Finally, the amendment does not require a balanced budget. It
186
allows a 60-percent vote by both Houses of Congress to avoid its
Despite the absolutely essential role that the President plays in
harmful and restrictive effects. In fact, the answer of many of the
keeping the budget in balance, neither version of the amendment
amendment's proponents to the host of problems it presents is that
requires any role whatsoever by the Chief Executive. The original
Congress is not bound by it if it achieves these supermajority
version of S.J. Res. 13 provided that the President should submit a
votes. This argument is the equivalent of saying: "Don't worry
statement "consistent with" the provision of the amendment. This
about the amendment. It will be easy to get around it." This is not
cryptic and vague phrase did not obligate the President to submit a
only the weakest type of argument for tampering with the Consti-
balanced budget, as indicated by the debate over a similar provi-
tution in such a fundamental way, it is wrong. It will not be easy
sion in the committee during the 98th Congress. However, even
to get around the amendment.
A minority of either House can insist on compliance with the
this minimal involvement by the President was eliminated by the
amendment, or insist that particular spending or taxing decisions
Committee. Consequently, the present pattern of the President pro-
be made as the price to be paid for the unacceptable risks of a con-
Congress for them-is allowed to continue.
posing reckless budget deficits-followed by the President blaming
stitutional crisis. Furthermore, the uncertainties of when super-
majority resolutions are necessary and the likely need for periodic
During committee consideration, I offered an amendment to re-
additional resolutions will inevitably raise a host of questions about
quire that the President submit a balanced budget to the Congress.
the constitutional validity of spending and tax decisions. For exam-
Nothing would have precluded the President from submitting other
budget analyses or recommendations, but at the very least, the
100
President would have been required to propose how the budget
could be balanced. This amendment was defeated.
DIVERTING ATTENTION FROM OUR FISCAL CRISIS
Probably the worst aspect of this amendment is that it diverts
congressional and public attention from the urgent and real prob-
lem that faces us-massive deficits looming indefinitely on the ho-
rizon. The amendment is a political free lunch, holding out the
false promise that a simply worded constitutional amendment can
solve painlessly our impending fiscal crisis.
The idea that this amendment serves as a substitute for responsi-
ble fiscal policy now is an illusion. The amendment would almost
certainly not take effect for three years, even under the most ex-
treme assumptions. The average time for ratification of amend-
ments to the Constitution is one year and eight months. Further,
the amendment would not take effect until the second fiscal year
beginning after its ratification. Consequently, in the unlikely event
that this amendment is approved by both Houses of Congress by
October 1, 1986, and ratified before the end of October 1, 1988, it
would not take effect until fiscal year 1990. Our fiscal House must
be put in order long before this amendment is likely to become ef-
fective.
There is no possible way to correct the mistakes of the past with-
out imposing revisions to the Tax Code, to make it fair and to close
loopholes, cutting the President's massive defense buildup and
closely reviewing domestic spending. Yet this President, who holds
out the balanced budget amendment as our solution to the deficits,
has never come close to proposing a balanced budget.
The hard reality is that the component of the budget that is
pointed to as the place to cut-controllable, non-entitlement, non-
defense spending-is about 15 percent of expenditures. This portion
of the budget could be eliminated entirely and the deficit would not
be eliminated. Pretending that a balanced budget amendment, if it
were in effect now, would make this problem go away is the worst
form of self-deception.
CONCLUSION
In short, the balanced budget amendment is a charade. Its princi-
pal effect is to mislead the public into believing there is a simple
and painless solution to massive deficits. It is a blatant misuse of
the constitutional amendment process. The solution is for the
President to be responsible and propose a balanced budget and for
Congress to stop talking out of both sides of its mouth and vote for
one.
HOWARD M. METZENBAUM.
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