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[JGR/Carter Briefing Book for Presidential Debate] (8 of 17)
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[JGR/Carter Briefing Book for Presidential Debate] (8 of 17)
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Records of the Office of Counsel to the President (Reagan Administration)
John Roberts' Subject Files
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Roberts, John G.: Files
Folder Title: [JGR/Carter Briefing Book for
Presidential Debate] (8 of 17)
Box: 7
To see more digitized collections visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection
Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected]
Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing
National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/
September 26, 1980
Military Balance
Q. Your Administration has been accused of allowing the
military balance with the Soviet Union to deteriorate
to a position of US inferiority and ushering in a period
of grave danger to US interests around the world. The
Secretary of Defense has said that even with the post-
Afghanistan defense spending increases, it would
require 40 years to catch up to Soviet expenditures.
How do you view the trends -- and the implications of
these trends -- in the military balance? Are we,
in fact, number two today in military strength as
Governor Reagan has charged?
And, ão you believe that our security over the next
several years would have been helped or hurt if your
Administration had moved more aggressively on
production of such weapons as the neutron bomb,
B-I, MX and Trident II?
Response
The charge that the United States has fallen into a
position of military inferiority is false. Those who
0
claim that the United States is weak, that the United
States cannot carry out its objectives, that the United
States cannot deter conflict, and it cannot win a
conflict -- I think they do a disservice. We have very
substantial capabilities. The Soviets are aware of it.
Over the past 20 years, the military forces of the
Soviets have grown substantially, both in absolute numbers
and relative to our own. Discounting inflation, since 1960,
Soviet military spending has doubled, rising steadily in
real terms by three or four percent a year.
These Soviet efforts would put the USSR in a most
advantageous military position if we do not counter their
programs with force improvements of our own. We will not
allow any other nation to gain military superiority over us.
2
In the strategic area, the Soviets have reached parity
with us. By some measures, we are ahead; by others, the
Soviets are ahead. We have, for example, thousands more
warheads than the Soviets do. They have more intercontinental
ballistic missile payload. We have more submarine-launched
ballistic missile payload. We have a better balanced
strategic capability because we have bombers on alert.
We have roughly half of our submarine-launch ballistic
missiles deployed at all times. They have an edge in
land-based ICBMs. So, the balance in these terms is
reasonably even.
What is also clear, however, is that in strategic
nuclear forces, the Soviets have come from a position of
substantial inferiority 15 years ago to one of parity today.
Their forces have improved in quality as well as numbers.
The Soviets have a potential for strategic advantage, if we
fail to respond with adequate programs of our own.
We are responding. Today the United States is engaged
in the most comprehensive military modernization program
since the early 1960s.
In the strategic area, we are moving ahead on
strengthening all three legs of our Triad of land-based
missiles, submarine-launched missiles and bombers. Four
years ago there was no program for a survivable mobile
ICBM. Four years ago the Trident missile submarine
program was bogged down in contractor disputes and way
behind schedule. Four years ago there was no long-range,
3
air-launched cruise missile program. Four years ago,
the only major proposal to modernize our bomber force
was the B-1. We cancelled this program because it was
clear then -- and it is even clearer today -- that it would
have been dangerously vulnerable to improving Soviet
air defenses. Quite simply, the B-1 was obsolete and
a waste of money.
My Administration has also taken steps to reverse a
decade of decline in the military strength of the
Atlantic Alliance.
-- When I first began to meet with Atlantic Alliance
leaders almost four years ago, I found them very troubled
by the state of our military strength in the Atlantic
Alliance. I promised to raise our own level of defense
spending in real terms by some three percent per year and
our NATO Allies responded by making the same pledge.
-- With American leadership, NATO also took the crucial
step of adopting a bold Long-Term Defense Program which
will extend over 15 years. That program is helping us
to increase our capacity to deter or defeat any surprise
attack that may be launched against our European Allies
and therefore against ourselves.
-- Last year, the Alliance agreed to respond to Soviet
nuclear missile and bomber deployments by modernizing
and upgrading our long-range theater nuclear forces with
572 PERSHING II missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles.
Today, this program is underway and on schedule.
4
NATO is responding in a determined and coordinated
fashion to the military competition posed by the Warsaw
Pact. Never in the history of the Alliance has its military
solidarity been greater than it is today.
The recent chaos in Iran and the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan have emphasized that the challenges to our
vital interests and our security are not confined to one
geographic area. It has also demonstrated that we need
to correct deficiences in our conventional power projection
capabilities. The United States must be able to respond
quickly and effectively to military challenges anywhere
in the world.
Power projection is not new for the United States, but
the demands change over time. That is why we are engaged
in a systematic and significant enhancement of our
capabilities to move forces rapidly to distant trouble
spots.
Four years ago, we did not have adequate capability
to respond to threats in far way places such as the
Persian Gulf region as quickly and effectively as our
interests required. Our intensified effort involves a
number of different programs, including creation of RDF,
prepositioning the weapons and supplies for Marine troops
and Air Force tactical fighters in the region, increasing
our naval presence in the Indian Ocean, gaining access
to key port and airfield facilities in the area.
5
We all hope and work and pray that we will see a
world in which the weapons of war are no longer necessary,
but now we must deal with the hard facts, with the world
as it is. In the dangerous and uncertain world of today,
the keystone of our national security is still military
strength -- strength that is clearly recognized by
Americans, by our Allies, and by any potential adversary.
As long as I am President, I am determined to maintain
that strength.
Gov. Reagan on the Military Balance
"
in military strength we are already second to one:
namely, the Soviet Union. "
Chicago Council on
Foreign Relations
March 17, 1980
"At the time (1965) we led the Soviet Union in about 40
strategic military categories. Today, they lead us in all
but 6 or 8 and may well surpass us in those if present trends
continue. "
Veterans of Foreign Wars
August 18, 1980
September 26, 1980
Defense Spending
Q: The Republican platform accuses your Administration
of "massive cuts in US defense spending." They
charge that you have reduced defense spending by
over $38 billion from President Ford's last Five
Year Defense Plan and have underfunded a great
number of unglamorous Defense activities such as
research and development, manpower, the reserves,
just to name a few areas.
How do you respond to these charges?
Also, how will it be possible to maintain 3-5%
real growth through 1985 in the defense budget,
as you have promised, in light of growing public
support for stemming public spending and the great
difficulties in cutting back domestic programs?
Response:
I am eager to compare my defense record of steady,
sustained increase over the last four years with the
record of underinvestment and decline during the
previous eight years of two Republican Administrations.
Governor Reagan is fond of comparing the real
accomplishments of my Administration with President
Ford's FY 1978 budget, submitted after his defeat at
the polls left Republican officials free to propose
a budget that would neither have to be defended before
Concress nor executed; that would not have to meet the
tests of affordability and consistency. For example,
that bogus lame-duck document proposed twice as many
ships per year as the average number authorized during
the previous seven years.
In contrast the real Republican record, from
fiscal years 1970 through 1977, shows that outlays for
2
defense in constant dollars -- the measure of how much
we are actually spending for defense -- declined every
year. During the eight years prior to my Administration
defense spending declined in real terms -- after
inflation -- about 35%. Again, in real terms, Republican
requests to Congress declined over $30 billion in the
eight years before FY 1978.
Eight consecutive vears of decline cannot be
reversed overnight. We are now taking corrective action
to reverse the shrinking size of our Navy, the increasing
vulnerability of our intercontinental ballistic missile
force, the growing obsolescence of our tanks and
armored personnel carriers.
When my commitment to national security is evaluated
under the appropriate measure of defense expenditures --
outlays -- the record reveals that outlays rose steadily
from just over $134 billion in FY 1978 to almost $147 billi
in FY 1981 -- over 10% real growth in constant 1981
dollars over the four-vear period. As projected in my
current Five-Year Defense Program, defense spending will
have increased, over the eight years of my Administration,
by 27%. By 1985, the defense programs and plans I will
have sent to Congress will involve a cumulative real
increase of almost $150 billion above the last budget
yeat of the Ford Administration.
3
Moreover, my Administration is the first Administration
to commit itself to protecting the level of real growth in
defense spending from the effects of inflation. This
commitment underscores my determination to preserve the
Defense program in the face of unforeseen events such as
oil price rises and the cost of expanded military
operations in the Indian Ocean.
I intend to carry out my current five-year plan.
The most wasteful and self-defeating thing that we
could do would be to start this necessary program, then
alter it or cut it back after a year or two when such an
action might become politically attractive. It would also be
harmful for the Commander-in-Chief to attempt to justify
to the American people billions of dollars in unnecessary
and unneeded programs. Although Governor Reagan has been
very imprecise about how much his defense program would
cost, the plans outlined in the Republican Platform would
cost this nation over $50 billion annually by 1985 above
the substantial increases I have planned.
The defense program I have proposed for the next five
years will require some sacrifice -- but sacrifice that
we must afford. I am confident that the American people
understand the threats our country faces, and-will support
this program.
Gov. Reagan on Defense Spending
Reagan has never wavered from his strong support of
increased defense spending. Reagan and the Republican
party call for a military buildup to attain military
superiority. By engaging in an arms race with the Soviets,
Reagan believes that we can use our economic might to
defeat the Russians.
"They (the Soviets) know they can't match our
industrial capacity.'
New York Post
May 29, 1979
However, neither Reagan nor the Republican party has
made it clear how they would fund this build-up.
"
I've always believed that defense is something in
which you do not make the determination (of a budget) --
it's made for you by your possible opponent."
Washington Post
April 20, 1980
It would appear that Reagan would rely on Reagan-Kemp-
Roth to provide the needed revenues for the military build-up:
"We would use the increased revenues the federal
government would get from this tax decrease to rebuild our
defense capabilities."
Flint Journal
May 18, 1980
When pressed for figures on how much would be necessary to
achieve military supperiority, Reagan avoids specifics.
"Well, I've never gone by the figures. In fact, I think
it's wrong to say we're safe because we're spending 5 percent
more or 3 percent more or anything. No, go by the weapons.
Now, I have outlined a number of weapon shortages that we
have, but I don't have access to the high command. Just ask
these men who would have to fight the war what are the
essential weapons, the top priority that we must have now to
restore our ability to deter the Soviet Union. I tell you,
I think we're talking about the next few years that we must
change the situation, not eventually down the road."
National Journal Interview
March 9, 1980
2
Gov. Reagan on Defense Spending
Recently, Reagan spelled out his case against the Carter
Administration record on defense spending:
" (Secretary Brown) argues that defense spending dropped
more than 35% between 1969 and 1976 under Republic adminis-
trations, and it has risen 10% under (the Carter) administration.
The truth is that defense spending did go down between 1969
and 1975--and may I point out for the record that it went down
by six percent not 35 percent as Mr. Carter erroneously
charges. But the fundamental problem I have with Mr. Carter's
rewriting of history is its sheer, blatant hypocrisy. Who
was it who was principally responsible for the decline in
defense spending in those years? You and I know the answer
very well: The Democrats who controlled the Congress--men
like Walter Mondale and Teddy Kennedy. Those Democrats in
Congress cut more than $40 billion from the Republican
defense budget, and they block or delay almost every new
weapons systems but even more incredibly, let me ask: Who
was it in 1976 who campaigned up and down the land against
Gerald Ford's attempts to restore those defense cuts? Who
said the military budget had to be slashed even more? You
know and I know that it was Jimmy Carter.
President Ford had begun the restoration of our margin of
safety in 1975 with a five-year program for increasing our
defensive capability. In these last three years, President
Carter has cut that program by $38 billion. His defense
budget authorization requests reverted to the annual decline
that had been halted by the Ford Administration.
He has since lobbied steadily against congressional
efforts to increase defense spending.
Now, by such untruthful devices as manipulating inflation
factors, shifting the base from authority to outlays, changing
base years, and even ordering planned defense spending this
year reduced SO it would look as if he had met his promised
percentage increase for next year, the Carter Administration
tries to manufacture increases that in fact are largely phony. "
American Legion
August 20, 1980
Suptember 26, 1980
Stratecic Program Cancellations
Q:
Your critics have claimed that your Administration
has scaled down, cancelled or delayed every strategic
weapon program proposed by your Republican predecessor,
including production of Minuteman missiles, the B-1,
ground-, sea- and air-launched cruise missiles, the M-X,
the Trident submarine and the Trident II missile.
During this time, the Soviets have not shown similar
restraint, continuing to deploy several new types of
ICBMs and SLBMs with multiple warheads, and
developing a new generation of even more threatening
missiles.
How do you respond to the charge that your Administration
has failed to recognize the importance of maintaining
the strategic balance and that only in the past year have
you moved to fully fund necessary strategic programs?
Response:
That list of charges made by Governor Reagan is a
combination of half truths, falsehoods and misleading
statements. Let me summarize the strategic programs as
I found them when I entered the White House four years
ago and where we are today.
In 1977 there was no program for a mobile ICBM.
No final decisions had been made on the M-X missile, nor
on how to deploy it. There was no program for long-range,
air-launched cruise missiles; no program for ground-
launched cruise missiles; no program for sea-launched
cruise missiles. There were no plans to deploy additional
Minuteman III ICBMs, SO a continuing production line would
have been a useless, senseless waste of $300 million
per year.
The Trident ballistic missile submarine program was
bogged down in contractor disputes and way behind schedule.
There was no Trident II ballistic missile. In the past
2
three years I have resolved these disputes and gotten
the Trident program back on schedule. The first Trident
submarine went to sea last summer. The 4,000-mile
range Trident I missile is now being deployed on 12 Poseidon
submarines and will be deployed on all Trident submarines.
Looking further into the future, my Administration is
committed to developing the Trident II missile, with even
longer range and greater accuracy.
When I entered office, the only long-range bomber
program was the B-1. It had been on the drawing board SO
long =- in part because Presidents Nixon and Ford were
doubtful it would work -- that it was growing obsolete
before it could be put in the hands of the Strategic Air
Command. I cancelled the B-1 in 1977 because it had
very doubtful prospects of being able to penetrate
anticipated Soviet defenses. In the three years since then,
it has become even clearer that this was the correct
decision because the Soviets have gone ahead and improved
their air defenses and have programs in the works that
will improve them further.
Instead, because the existing cruise missile program
at that time was inadequate, I initiated the long-range,
air-launched cruise missile program. These missiles are
designed to be launched from outside the Soviet Union,
thus the B-52 or other aircraft may be used. These cruise
3
missiles are smaller and harder to detect and defend
against than the B-1. They will be able to penetrate
Soviet air defense system at the end of the 1980s and
into the 1990s when the B-1, as I said, would have had
very doubtful capability to penetrate. At the same time,
we are studying a number of different advance manned
bombers -- including Stealth -- for possible deployment
in the 1990s.
With respect to the growing vulnerability of our
Minuteman ICBM force, in 1976 there was indeed an M-X
program, but there was no program to solve our strategic
problem -- ICBM survivability -- the ability to survive a
massive Soviet attack of high accuracy intercontinental
ballistic missile warheads in large numbers. The preferred
M-X basing plan on the part of the officials at that time --
1976 -- was to put tham in Minuteman silos. The other scheme
in 1976 was one of underground tunnels, which at least
recognized the need for a different deployment system in orde
for the M-X missiles to survive. Neither of these proposals
was workable. Neither would have solved the problem of
survivability. We then spent about two years trying to find
a survivable system and we did. It's not inexpensive. But
it will cost no more than the Minuteman system or the B-52s.
And it will be able to survive. So, yes, we cancelled a
basing system for the M-X that wouldn't work and we
substituted a system that would.
Governor Reacanon Strategic Programs
Reagan has been a constant supporter of all weapon programs.
In fact, he has never publicly opposed any major weapon system
in the last 15 years.
The Republican platform calls for development of virtually
every weapon system under consideration:
"o the earliest possible deployment of the MX missile
in a prudent survivable configuration;
accelerated development and deployment of a new manned
strategic penetrating bomber that will exploit the
$5.5 billion already invested in the B-1, while
employing the most advanced technology available;
deployment of an air defense system comprised of
dedicated modern interceptor aircraft and early warning
support systems;
acceleration of development and deployment of strategic
cruise missiles deployed on aircraft, on land, and on
ships and submarines;
modernization of the military command and control system
to assure the responsiveness of U.S. strategic nuclear
forces to presidential command in peace or war; and
0
vigorous research and development of an effective
anti-ballistic missile system, such as is already at
hand in the Soviet Union, as well as more modern ABM
technologies.
"
1980 Republican Platform
September 23, 1980
M-X (including ABM)
Q:
There have been a number of reports that the M-X is
losing support as a result of its high cost, concern
about its impact on the states where it would be
deployed, and its viability in the absence of SALT.
In light of these problems, do you think M-X is
still a viable weapon? If, as seems likely, M-X is
delayed, what harm do you see to the national security?
Should the Administration be pursuing alternatives,
in the event of an extended delay in M-X? And,
what is your position on an ABM system to protect MX?
Response:
The M-X system is viable, and it is necessary for
the security of our nation. Our land-based Minuteman
ICBM force is becoming vulnerable and we must act
promptly to restore its invulnerability.
When I entered office in 1977 there was no program
for a survivable M-X. One alternative under consideration
would have put the M-X missile into Minuteman silos -- and
the M-X would have been just as vulnerable to a Soviet
attack as the Minutemen are now. Another alternative
at least recognized the need for improved survivability,
but detailed analysis of this alternative -- the trench
or tunnel system -- showed that it would not work either.
During the next two years I directed the Defense
Department to pursue a determined search for a M-X basing
system which would be able to survive and retaliate
after receiving the most devastating Soviet attack possible,
and allow the Soviets to verify how many missiles were
deployed.
2
After studying dozens of options, we found a
deployment system for the M-X which meets these criteria.
Governor Reagan has criticized my decision. I would
challenge him to be more specific about the alternative
he favors. Does he want to build a missile and have no
place to put it? Does he want to put it in the Minuteman
silos where they will be vulnerable to a nuclear Pearl
Harbor? Perhaps he wants to build thousands and thousands
of M-Xs and proliferate them all over the country, as
some of his advisors have stated, at a cost of untold
billions and a highly dangerous arms race.
The missile deployment I have approved will protect
us from a Soviet surprise attack and yet be consistent
with trying to curb arms and not engage in an arms race.
I am confident we have made the right decision.
Strategic nuclear forces necessary for our nation's
security are costly, but it is a burden we must bear to
protect our freedoms. The Defense Department cost estimate
for the M-X of about $33 billion in FY '80 dollars was
worked out with care, and not artificially squeezed to
make the M-X more saleable -- a tactic that has been used
to sell military programs in the past. Even at this cost,
M-X will be no more expensive than the Minuteman or the
Polaris missile systems, or the B-52 bombers.
3
While we have focused on the strategic and security
necessity for M-X, I have carefully reviewed the Air
Force's plans to ensure that the M-X will not place an
unfair burden on any of our citizens. I have met with
the Governors of Utah and Nevada to assure them that,
in deploying the M-X, we will respect all state water
laws and will do everything possible to deal with the
other economic impacts on the states. I am determined
to see that these issues are resolved to the satisfaction
of the residents around the deployment areas. I believe
this can be done while planning to have the first missiles
in service by 1986.
Finally, many Republican critics of my Administration
favor abrogating the ABM Treaty and deploying ABMs to pro-
tect M-X. I believe that would be a gross mistake at this
time. The ABM Treaty is a very important achievement, the
most important achivement of SALT I, and one which holds
down the arms competition. A decision to deploy ABMs should
not be made lightly. But if in the absence of the con-
straints of the SALT II Treaty, the Soviets deployed
tremendous numbers of warheads capable of attacking M-X
shelters, perhaps as high as 20,000 or 30,000 warheads,
then we might consider other responses, such as an anti-
ballistic missile system. We have a vigorous long-standing
technology program to develop ABMs and we would consider
deploying such a system if that becomes necessary in the
future.
Governor Reacan on MX
"To prevent the ultimate catastrophe of a massive nuclear
attack, we urgently need a program to preserve and restore our
strategic deterrent. The Administration proposes a costly and
complex new missile system. But we can't complete that until
the end of this decade. Given the rapidly growing vulnerability
of our land-based missile force, a faster remedy is needed."
Address to Chicago Council
on Foreign Relations
March 17, 1980
The race-track deployment proposed by the Carter Administra-
tion is enormously expensive and complicated, and will require
years to build. This proposed mode of deploying the MX should
be scrapped, because it is unworkable.
Response to question posed by
Arms Control Today, May 1980
Representative Anderson on the MX
I have opposed development and deployment of the MX missile
system as currently planned. Not only will this system be out-
rageously expensive and environmentally unsound, it will fail to
address the fundamental need to enhance American security. We
should not add thousands of new targets for Soviet military
planners to contemplate, but should instead take advantage of
technological advances in guidance, propulsion systems, command
and control systems, and platforms to develop a secure and
invulnerable system before the end of the decade. While the
need for prompt counter-silo capability has not been completely
resolved in my own mind, any such capability should not be
deployed in a manner that invites attack on the United States.
Response to question posed by
Arms Control Today, May 1980
September 18, 1980
New Strategic Bomber
(Including Stealth Controversy)
Q:
Three years ago you cancelled the B-1 bomber in favor of
less expensive cruise missiles. Now your Administration
is apparently on the verge of agreeing with the Air Force
that a new bomber may be needed for conventional missions
as well as for a strategic role.
Given the increasing anxiety over the effectiveness of
the aging B-52, do you still believe your 1977 decision
to cancel the B-1 was justified?
Also, your Administration has recently come under attack
for alledgedly leaking the so-called "Stealth" technology
for election year political purposes. Even if the original
leaks did not come from the Administration, Defense
Department officials seemed most eager to brief reporters
and draw attention to the once-secret technology which,
in Secretary Brown's words, "alters the military balance
significantly."
How do you answer the charge that your Administration's
handling of Stealth was politically motivated and has
damaged our national security?
Response:
Four years ago, the only major proposal to modernize
our bomber force was the B-1. In 1977, I cancelled this
program because it was clear then -- and it is even clearer
today -- that by the time the B-1 could have been off the
assembly lines and deployed at our SAC bases, improved
Soviet air defenses would have made this aircraft
dangerously vulnerable. Quite simply, the B-1 was
obsolete and a waste of money. Yet Governor Reagan has
continued to cite the B-1 as a bomber that should have
been built. The Republican program is a program of
obsolescence. They want to resurrect decommissioned ships.
They want to revive the ABM system, which President
2
Nixon discarded. With vulnerable bombers, mothballed
ships and obsolete missiles, they would waste billions
of defense dollars.
Instead of the B-1, I chose to modernize the bomber
force by exploiting some of the most advanced and
effective military technology in the world -- the air-
launched cruise missile. When I entered office four
years ago, no long-range, air-launched cruise missiles
were included in the defense program. Today, we are well
on our way to equipping our B-52s with over 3,000 of
these very highly accurate, long-range cruise missiles.
They will be able to penetrate Soviet defenses not only
in 1982, when the first full squadron will be ready,
but through the 1980s and beyond.
At the same time we are studying a new bomber
to meet any requirements for the 1990s -- the Stealth
aircraft is part of this study. This is a major
technological achievement that will affect the military
balance in the coming years. Programs to make aircraft
less visible to radar -- to give them a so-called Stealth
capability -- have existed for 20 years. When this
Administration came into office, Stealth was a low-
level technology program and its existence was not
classified as secret. The program had been dealt
with in open testimony and in open contracts. In the
spring of 1977, I turned Stealth into a major develop-
ment and production program. The existence of this
3
new program was classified at the highest level. The
funding level is now more than 100 times larger than
it was in early 1977. There have been major achievements
in the program.
Hundreds of contractor personnel are now working on
Stealth. Dozens of Members of Congress have been briefed
on the existence of the program. The increasing size of
the program and the increasing numbers of persons aware
of it made certain that its existence would have come out
in the near future.
Governor Reagan's charge that the information provided
by Secretary Brown's press conference would be helpful
to the Soviets is simply nonsense. The information
0
doesn't tell them how to change their air defense. They
are already developing and building the best air defenses
they can. Even if they could push their research harder
to develop yet better air defenses, they have no idea of
what characteristics to design against, or how much better
their defenses must be. Secrecy of the details of the
program, combined with our technological achievements,
will enable us to keep ahead of the Soviets in this program
for decades to come.
Stealth is one of a number of major technological
advantages that the U.S. possesses. These technological
advantages weigh heavily in the military balance and keep
4
us second to none. We have publicly discussed our
advantages in other technologies in the past, and will
continue to do so in the future because it is important
that our potential enemies, our allies and the American
people understand our military strength. This is an
essential factor in deterring war.
Governor Reagan on the B-1 and Cruise Missiles
"I don't think that the current administration (Carter) is
doing what should be done - not when it cancels the B-1 bomber,
which is probably the foremost advance in aircraft that has ever
been -- or has been presented since we went to the jet engines
"
Face The Nation
May 14, 1978
*
*
*
"We have an administration (Carter) that in three years has
done away with
the cruise missile
and you could go on with
weapon after weapon
"
San Jose News
March 10, 1980
September 27, 1980
Neutron Bomb
Q:
Critics of your Administration have cited your surprise
decision in April 1978 not to deploy the so-called
neutron bomb as a prime example of inconsistency that
has seriously harmed our position of leadership in the
NATO alliance. At that time you said the ultimate
decision on the neutron bomb would be made in light of
Soviet restraint.
What considerations led you to decide SO precipitously
against deploying the neutron bomb in 1978? What is
the status of your decision to defer production? What
signs of Soviet restraint have, so far, prevented you
from deciding to proceed with the neutron bomb?
Response:
My decision of April 7, 1978 to defer a deployment
decision still stands. I have directed that the Defense
Department proceed with programs to modernize battlefield
nuclear forces with improved weapons -- the LANCE missile
and 8-inch nuclear artillery shell. I have further directed
that the new warheads for these weapons be SO designed that
they can accept enhanced radiation elements and thus be
converted to enhanced radiation warheads in the future,
should we and our Allies decide on the need for such systems.
The military need for enhanced radiation weapons is not
clear. NATO is deploying highly sophisticated, conventional
"precision guided munitions" in anti-armor roles that are so
accurate that there is a high probability that each shot would
destroy an enemy tank. We and our NATO Allies are deploying
these precision guided munitions by the tens of thousands.
The question of enhanced radiation weapons remains a
sensitive one for our European Allies, on whose soil such
weapons would be stationed. Governor Reagan's bland assertion
that he would deploy enhanced radiation weapons in Europe
betravs an insensitivitv to European
2
could cause serious strains in the Alliance. Governor
Reagan ignores one essential fact: NATO is an Alliance of
sovereign states. We do not tell our Allies that we are
going to deploy a weapon on their territory. we consult
with them, we examine the military requirements, we
consider the political implications, then we as an Alliance
decide.
On December 12, 1979, NATO adopted a plan for modernizing
the theater nuclear forces (TNF) through the deployment of
Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles. This plan
is focused on long-range TNF because of their special contribution
to deterrence. This decision was the product of model political
and military consultations with our Allies.
Governor Reagan on the Neutron Bomb
Reagan strongly opposed any funding cuts in the development
of the neutron bomb. He views the neutron bomb as "an offensive
weapon that could bridge the gap for conventional weapons."
New York Times
May 6, 1980
Reagan has called the neutron bomb the closest thing to the
ideal weapon.
"Very simply it is the dream of death ray weapon of science
fiction. It kills enemy soldiers but doesn't blow up the
surrounding countryside or destroy villages, towns and cities.
It won't destroy an enemy tank -- just kill the tank crew.
"Now some express horror at this and charging immortality,
portray those who would use such a weapon as placing a
higher value on property than human life. This is sheer
unadulterated nonsense. It is harsh sounding, but all war
weapons back to the club, the sling and the arrow, are
designed to kill the soldiers of the enemy. With gunpowder
and artillery and later bombs and bombers, war could not be
confined to the battlefield. And so came total war and non-
combatants outnumbering soldiers in casualties."
Reagan Radio Transcript
March 1978 - April 1978
Reagan supports deployment of the neutron bomb in almost every
available delivery system.
"I favor development and deployment of the neutron warhead
for U.S. theatre nuclear forces, including ballistic missiles,
cruise missiles, artillery and bombs."
Washington Post
April 24, 1980
September 26, 1980
Nuclear Strategy
Q. The Republican Platform charges that your Administration
relies on a nuclear strategy known as mutual assured
destruction (or MAD) which would limit the President
in a crisis to choose between mass mutual suicide or
surrender. Yet you have recently signed Presidential
Directive 59, widely reported in the press to call for
giving the President greater flexibility to retaliate
with nuclear weapons against limited groups of targets.
How do you answer the charge that your directive was
timed to refute the Republican Platform statement?
Why was a Presidential Directive on this extremely
important and sensitive subject undertaken during a
political campaign?
Also, other critics claim that increasing the
President's flexibility to order nuclear attacks
will only make nuclear war more thinkable, hence
more likely. How do you answer this concern?
Response
I deeply regret the ill-informed attacks on our
Nation's nuclear deterrent strategy. There has been a
great deal of exaggeration put out about Presidential
Directive 59 in this campaign, and - welcome the
opportunity to state once again the true facts about
America's deterrent doctrine.
The United States has never had a doctrine based
solely and simply on spasmodic, massive attacks on Soviet
cities and populations, as Governor Reagan knows -- or
at least he should know. The President is not faced with
a Hobson's choice between suicide and surrender if the
Soviets launch a nuclear attack on military targets, while
sparing our cities. Previous Administrations going back
at least two decades recognized the danger of a strategic
doctrine that relied too heavily on the threat of attacking
2
Soviet cities to deter Soviet aggression. Therefore,
since the early 1960s, the United States has had the
capability to launch limited nuclear attacks on
Soviet targets other than cities. This capability has
grown as our nuclear forces have become more accurate
and sophisticated.
Our strategy and our capability to inflict massive
destruction in retaliation provide the means of convincing
the Soviet leaders that there is no rational objective they
might gain by using or threatening to use nuclear weapons
against the United States or our allies. The strategy
set forth in Presidential Directive 59 directs our
Nation's military leaders to further develop our plans
to carry out selective, limited attacks on those targets
we know the Soviet leaders value most. It restates and
redefines our plans to respond to any level of Soviet
nuclear attack by striking back in ways that damage
the political and military structure without hitting
Soviet cities and population.
Therefore, it should be clear to all that the
strategy contained in PD-59 is not a radical departure
from previous policy of both Democratic and Republican
Administrations. It is the result of a gradual
evolution of our doctrine over a number of years in
response to growing Soviet strategic capabilities and
to better understanding of Soviet military doctrine
and operational planning. U.S. strategic forces are
now, and will continue to be, capable of implementing
this strategy.
3
I want to stress that the United States remains
fully capable of devastating the Soviet Union under any
circumstances. Assured destruction of the Soviet Union
as a modern industrial society remains the cornerstone
of the strategy expressed in PD-59. It does not
signify a shift to a US plan to strike first at the
Soviet Union with nuclear forces, nor does it mean the
United States intends to use or threaten to use nuclear
weapons to gain foreign policy objectives. The only
sane purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter their use
by the other side.
I do not believe either side could "win" a limited
nuclear war. In PD-59, I want to ensure as best I can
that the Soviets do not believe so either.
Representative Anderson on Nuclear Strategy
In a speech before the Council on Foreign Relations in
New York on September 24, Anderson charged that both President
Carter and Ronald Reagan "have formed an alliance of folly"
in their positions on nuclear war strategy.
"Both seem to harbor the fatal illusion that nuclear wars
can be limited and perhaps even won. That conclusion is
reflected in Mr. Reagan's platform and in Mr. Carter's twin
commitments to the MX counterforce missile and to the new
targeting doctrine formulated in Presidential Directive 59."
"Obviously, neither Mr. Carter now Mr. Reagan is advocating
nuclear war. But I consider both of them to be seriously
misguided in their endorsement of the so-called nuclear war
fighting thesis."
" [Both] would build super-accurate counterforce weapons
to threaten Soviet missiles. Both would target weapons not
only on missile silos but on command centers as well. And
both insist that such weapons would be used only in a second
strike to disarm any Soviet missiles remaining after an
initial attack on the United States."
Anderson then spelled out his views.
"Any missiles capable of destroying enemy silos in a
second strike could obviously do SO in a first strike. The
creation of these weapons and plans would move both sides
toward a hair-trigger posture in which each would feel more
inclined to launch its land-based missiles on warning of
attack, lest they be destroyed on the ground."
"The futile pursuit of a capacity to wage limited nuclear
war may only make more likely the very event we dread."
September 23, 1980
Defense Manpower
Q:
According to the GOP, Carter Administration "mismanagement"
of the all-volunteer force concept has turned it into
a "shambles", a "national scandal" and "disgrace."
The Party Platform blames your Administration as well
for a "dramatic exodus" of skilled military personnel
from the services, a loss which is "the direct result
of neglect by the Commander-in-Chief." Additionally,
this year it became known that tens of thousands of
military families are eligible for food stamps.
How do you answer the charge that your Administration
permitted this situation to deteriorate? What is
your assessment of the strength and morale in our armed
services? What measures have you proposed to solve
the problems that do exist?
Response:
The continuing ability of our Armed Forces to
recruit and retain sufficient numbers of qualified young
men and women is a matter of the highest national priority.
I am keenly aware, from my own personal experience in
the Navy and from close attention to the subject as
President, of the real sacrifices as well as satisfactions
involved in military service. I greatly admire those
who are working SO hard to protect our country.
I realize that many experienced men and women are
leaving the Services because of a feeling that they are
not adequately compensated. I have taken several
steps to improve this situation and I will continue
to look for ways to help our service people as long as
I am President. In early September, I signed into law
legislation specifically targeted to the areas of most
immediate need. These included an increased subsistence
2
allowance, a 25% increase in aviation career incentive
pay, increased pay for enlisted personnel serving at
sea, and reenlistment bonuses for persons with 10-14
years of prior service.
I also signed into law a 11.7% pay increase for
military personnel effective October 1. Pay and benefits
for the Armed Forces will rise more than $4 billion in
1981, the greatest increase in the history of our nation,
in either war or peace.
These measures, by themselves, are only a first
step toward solving our manpower problems. In the past
my efforts have been complicated by a number of limiting
factors -- inadequate attention to the problem before
I came to office, Congressional cuts in my defense budget,
the need for fiscal restraint in the fight on inflation.
This year we have been very successful in building
support in the Congress for higher pay and benefits.
Our continued success through the 1980s will depend on
recognition of the hard fact that sustained commitment
of the American people will be required to pay the costs
of retaining and supporting a voluntary military force.
September 26, 1980
Defense Readiness
Q. In recent years, increasing publicity has been given to
the low readiness of our military forces: shortages of
spare parts, fuel and ammunition, growing backlogs of
deferred maintenance through inadequate facilities to
meet peacetime needs (let alone wartime requirements) and
shrinking industrial capacity to supply defense goods.
More recently, Army Chief of Staff General Meyer has
stated that we have "a hollow Army". Four years ago,
all 10 Army divisions based in the US were rated fully
combat ready. Now 6 of these divisions are rated not
combat ready and the other 4 are rated marginally
combat ready.
How serious do you believe this problem is? Where do
the most critical problems exist and what steps has your
Administration taken to correct them?
Response
Today our land, naval and air forces are fully capable
of substantial and successful combat. My Administration
has made extrordinary efforts to maintain readiness in
the face of rapidly escalating costs -- such as the
dramatic fuel price increase over the last year -- and
the shortfalls and inadequate programs when I entered
office.
In FY 81 we will spend over $52 billion to support
the maintenance and operations of our forces, an increase
of almost $5 billion, or about 10%, in real terms over
President Ford's last budget year. During the past four
years, one-third of total military spending has supported
readiness-related operations and maintenance. Expenditures
on procurement of munitions and spares -- another indicator
of immediate combat readiness -- total another $16 billion
during this same 78-81 period.
2
Four years ago, munitions and spare parts inventories
and production suffered from low baseline requirements
established by previous Administrations. Immediately
after taking office I commissioned, and followed through
on a sustainability study of unprecedented detail and
comprehensiveness. In part as a result of this study,
the record of the past four years is of real improvement
in munitions and war reserves. However, much work needs
to be done and it will be several years before those
inventories will be fully adequate to support all of our
combat forces at wartime sortie rates.
Let me address some of the specific problems we have
and the steps I have ordered to correct them.
Today the Army has 16 divisions, of which 10 are combat
ready. The forward deployed dfvisions in Europe and the
Pacific represent 45 percent of the Army and are maintained
at highest readiness status. The Army classifies divisions
as fully-combat ready to not-combat ready according to
personnel, equipment and training conditions. A division
rated low in one of these resource areas is capable of
operating with two of its three brigades if required to
deploy immediately. But all Army units could not be
transported at the same time. While early deploying
units are moving, the later units are brought up to
full capacity.
Our current efforts to improve Army readiness are
showing results:
3
First, recruiting for the past year has fully
met objectives and those soldiers are now beginning to
arrive in units.
Second, non-commissioned officer shortages will
be improved through reducing unneeded personnel in
forward deployed forces.
Third, in recruiting, I am expanding bonus
programs that are keyed toward critical skills. I have
also supported legislation to improve educational benefits,
including provisions that pass on unused educational
benefits to dependents. To alleviate the shortage of
middle-grade NCOs, I am expanding bonus programs to
include mid-range NCOs (6-10 years' service) in infantry,
armor, field artillery, and other selected skills. (By
comparison only a third of Soviet divisions are combat
ready. The remaining two-thirds are at reduced or
cadre strength, having varying percentages of active
duty personnel and equipment assigned to them, and would
have to be filled out in an emergency with reservists.)
There has also been much attention focused on the
readiness of our tactical air forces. It is untrue that
a significant percentage of our aircraft can't fly. The
index used by the Air Force is a measure of the peacetime
logistic support system, not of how the air forces would
perform in war. If we were to make a transition to war
from our normal day-to-day peacetime posture, we would
selectively defer non-urgent inspections and preventive
maintenance; we would also, of course, have unlimited
4
access to our war reserve spares and would, as necessary,
use serviceable components from out-of-commission and
damaged aircraft to maximize our wartime capability.
Today, our armed forces stand ready to fight, if
that should become necessary. In response to events in
Southwest Asia, I ordered the rapid deployment of two
aircraft carrier battle groups to the Indian Ocean. Since
the beginning of this year, we have deployed two aircraft
carriers; over 25 other ships and more than 150 combat
aircraft in one of the areas of the world most remote
from the United States. To be sure, there have been
sacrifices and hardships on the crews and their families.
But we accomplished this deployment rapidly and smoothly,
and can sustain it in the Indian Ocean as long as it is
needed. No other Navy in the world could have performed
as well.
September 26, 1980
Military Draft
Q.
Critics on your left have attacked your reinstitution of
draft registration as the first step to resuming the
peacetime draft. Critics on your right have claimed that
the draft registration program is an empty, symbolic
gesture and would do nothing to speed mobilization in
a crisis.
What were your objectives in ordering draft registration?
How can you claim draft registration will expedite
mobilization in a crisis when a Selective Service report
early this year concluded that it would have no effect?
Response
I have repeatedly stated my opposition to the
peacetime draft. With the personnel initiatives I have
taken to raise military pay and benefits closer to
compensate civilian occupations, I believe that a peacetime
draft will not be necessary.
But it is important for us all to realize that the
U.S. is committed to a sustained response to a long-term
strategic challenge. We should be prepared to make the
necessary sacrifices and that these sacrifices be borne
by all. We should be prepared to reinstitute the draft
on very short notice, if that becomes necessary.
What is the argument against registration? That we
should not be prepared? I for one do not believe this is
the case. I feel it is a fundamental matter of patriotism
that Americans support. Symbolically, we would also be
saying to the Soviet Union that the simple act of
registration was too high a price to pay to enhance our
security -- certainly a reckless notion to impart.
2
Moreover, our allies continue to look to us for
leadership of the Atlantic Alliance. They rightly
require of us wisdom and strength -- political, economic
and military -- to properly manage the changing international
security environment.
Draft registration is a tangible demonstration to
our allies and potential adversaries of our national
strength and will. It also assists our planning for
national emergencies in which an actual draft could
be necessary.
Governor Reagan on the Military Draft
Reagan opposes both the President's move to reinstate
draft registration and any peacetime draft.
"I do not favor a peacetime draft or registration. "
Acceptance Speech
July 17, 1980
He also challenges the underlying premise for registration.
"Indeed, draft registration may actually decrease our
military preparedness, by making people think we have solved
our defense problem
"
Quoted by Senator Hatfield
Congressional Record
June 4, 1980
Asked for an alternative to the peacetime draft, Reagan calls
for a buildup of reserves. (It is not clear if he favors the
same buildup as an alternative to registration.)
"There is a need for a million-man active reserve, a
reserve that is equipped with the latest weapons, trained
in them and combat ready. We've allowed (our reserve force)
to deteriorate very badly. It is much too small, it is not
equipped with the latest weapons and it doesn't have the
training. "
National Journal
March 8, 1980
To finance this force, Reagan would rely on pay incentives.
Q: So you believe we can have a million-man reserve
strictly on a volunteer basis?
Reagan: Yes.
Q: How, with pay incentives?
Reagan: Yes, it could be pay incentives.
National Journal
March 8, 1980
September 26, 1980
Rapid Deployment Force
Q:
The Administration's critics have charged that the RDF
is just a paper organization, a political gimmick
designed to draw attention away from four years of
neglect. They also charge that since all of the military
forces assigned to the RDF are already in existence,
the main value of the Administration's initiative is
more political than military. Would you comment on
these charges.
Also, since our existing forces are stretched so thin,
how can they be drawn down to take on new commitments
elsewhere? What will the RDF be able to accomplish
that could not be done before? If the challenges to
our security worldwide are really on the rise, don't we
need to increase the size of our armed forces and step
up purchases of new equipment? Finally, does the
formation of the RDF signify an increased willingness
of the US to intervene militarily in regional disputes?
Response:
Those who charge that the RDF is a political gimmick
are demonstrating their lack of understanding of military
forces. The present international challenges we face
and the interests we must be prepared to defend require us
enhance our capabilities, not add to our current force
structure.
Force structure aside, we are dramatically improving
our capability to engage and support more of our forces at
greater distances from the United States. This is the
essence of the Rapid Deployment Force. Having Rapid
Deployment Forces does not increase the probability that
we will use them. On the contrary, we intend for their
existence to deter the very developments that would
otherwise invoke their use.
2
The Rapid Deployment Force draws its forces from Army;
Navy; Air Force; and Marine units which are oriented
toward non-NATO contingencies and that can respond quickly
to crises, primarily in areas in which we have no permanent
military presence. The specific composition of the Rapid
Deployment Force is not fixed -- the forces employed by the
Rapid Deployment Force would be dependent upon the situation
we faced. A company of 200 men might be sufficient to
respond to requests by friendly countries to provide a
natural disaster assistance team or communications-and-
command support teams; a Marine Amphibious Force of 50,000
men or a mechanized Army Corps of over 100,000 men might be
required to provide sufficient warfighting capability to
regain territory overrun by the enemy or to hold critical
0
objectives until reinforcements could reach the area.
Although the forces for the Rapid Deployment Force
currently exist, we are buying selected items to improve
significantlyits mobility and responsiveness. We are
developing special ships for prepositioning several brigades
of Marine Corps heavy equipment -- tanks and artillery.
We are buying additional KC-10 cargo/tanker aircraft to
support our long-range airlift, and we are developing
a new transport aircraft, the C-X, for hauling outsized
cargo, like tanks. Our 1981 shipbuilding program has
been increased to 95 units over the next five years.
3
We have already deployed a seven-ship, prepositioned
support force afloat at Diego Garcia, in the Indian Ocean.
The seven-ship group is composed of chartered Roll-on/
roll-off ships, cargo ships and tankers. This group of
ships stores Marine Corps armored equipment, artillery
and other large items of rolling stock that place the
largest demand on airlift.
Today, the RDF is ready to respond to a broad range
of military contingencies in defense of our vital national
interests. Through carefully selected procurement
programs we are improving significantly that capability.
It is important that our potential adversaries understand
that we have the ability and the will to defend our
interests and that any miscalculation on their part
would be extremely costly to them.
September 12, 1980
Naval Strength
Q: In comparing your defense record with that of President
Ford, the most dramatic area of cuts is naval ship-
building. During the last four years, the naval
share of the DOD budget has shrunk from 40 percent
to 33 percent. President Ford's last five-year
ship contruction plan was cut from 157 ships to 83.
Your shipbuilding proposals since then have gone up
and down, showing no consistent pattern. In 1979,
you vetoed the Defense bill because it contained a
nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. And you have
requested only about one-third the Marine amphibious
ships needed to maintain the current force level.
Have you downgraded the Navy's role in our national
defense? How do you answer the charge that you have
been dismantling the nation's naval and marine forces?
Response
I am glad to compare the record of my Administration
with those of the previous Republican Administrations
often quoted by Governor Reagan. During the decade
before I entered office, the size of our Navy was cut in
half as older ships were retired and the Republicans
debated the future role of the Navy. Shipbuilding during
those years was actually significantly less than the
program we are now following.
Like President Ford's defense budget for fiscal year
1978, submitted after his defeat at the polls left Republican
officals free to propose a budget that would neither have
to be defended before Congress nor executed, the Ford 1977,
156-ship five-year plan was a lame-duck document that did
not have to meet the tests of affordability and consistency.
The program proposed twice as many ships per year as the
average number authorized during the previous seven years
of Republican Administration.
2
In contrast, the program I have followed is based on
a policy to structure a realistic, executable five-year
shipbuilding program within available resources, rather
than 'to continue to delude ourselves with unrealistic
shipbuilding plans or to resurrect old mothballed ships.
My Administration's five-year shipbuilding plan pro-
vides for the construction of 97 new ships, and for major
modernization of five other ships, including three aircraft
carriers. Two-thirds of these new ships are combatants,
the rest are support vessels. My shipbuilding plan
reflects two deliberate decisions to increase our strength
and military flexibility: the construction of highly
capable combatant ships (as exemplified by the construction
of sixteen CG-47 class, AEGIS-equipped guided missile
cruisers), and support for our Rapid Deployment Forces.
through the procurement of 14 newly designed maritime
prepositioning ships.
I am determined to keep our naval forces more powerful
than those of any other nation on earth. Our shipbuilding
program will sustain a 550-ship Navy in the 1990s; and we
will continue to build the most capable ships afloat. Sea-
power is indispensable to our global strategy -- in peace
and also in war.
Governor Reagan on Naval. Strength
Reagan has criticized the Carter Administration for slashing
Navy programs.
"In 1969, Admiral Thomas Moorer, then Chief of Naval Operations,
told Congress that a Navy of 850 ships should be attained by
1980. By the end of this fiscal year, only 5 or 6 weeks away,
our conventional Navy will consist of only 415 active ships.
Carter has slashed the Navy shipbuilding program in half, and
has provided for -- at the very best -- a one-and-a-half
ocean Navy for a three-ocean global requirement.
Reagan Speech to American Legion
August 20, 1980
Reagan calls for a reversal in this trend.
"We must immediately reverse the deterioration of our
naval strength, and provide all of the armed services with
the equipment and spare parts they need."
Reagan Speech to American Legion
August 20, 1980
The Republican Platform calls for building more aircraft
carriers, submarines and amphibious ships:
"Republicans pledge to reverse Mr. Carter's dismantling of
U.S. naval and Marine forces. We will restore our fleet to
600 ships at a rate equal to or exceeding that planned by
President Ford. We will build more aircraft carriers, sub-
marines, and amphibious ships. We will restore naval and
Marine aircraft procurement to economical rates enabling
rapid modernization of the current forces, and expansion to
meet the requirements of additional aircraft carriers.
1980 Republican Platform
September, 18, 1980
Arms Control: Role in US Security
Q: What is your concept of the role of arms control in pro-
tecting US security? Do we pursue arms control in and
of itself, or as a means of advancing specific foreign
policy or national security objectives? Do you have a
strategy which guides your Administration and ties our
defense planning and arms control negotiations together?
Why do you think there is SO much suspicion of arms con-
trol in the last few years? Does arms control have any
place in the present international atmosphere?
Response
I remain deeply committed to the process of mutual
and verifiable arms control, particularly to the effort
to prevent the spread and further development of nuclear
weapons.
Preventing nuclear war is the foremost responsibility
of the two superpowers. That is why we have negotiated the
strategic arms limitation talks, treaties -- SALT I AND SALT
II. Especially now in a time of great tension, observing the
mutual constraints imposed by the terms of these treaties will
be in the best interest of both countries. My decision to
defer, but not abandon our efforts to secure ratification of
the SALT II Treaty reflects my firm conviction that the
United States has a profound national security interest in
the constraints on Soviet nuclear forces which only that
treaty can provide.
Governor Reagan denounces the SALT II treaty. He would
turn away from that treaty to a fruitless pursuit of an
unachievable military superiority. Then, he says, he would
- 2 -
negotiate with the Soviets. There are two problems with
Governor Reagan's strategy: One, the Soviets will no more
let us build to nuclear superiority over them than we will
them over us; two, the Soviets are not going to negotiate
under the conditions Governor Reagan describes. So, the
American people would be left with an all-out -- and
unwinnable -- arms race and no chance for negotiating limits
on Soviet forces, as we have done in the SALT II Treaty.
Careful, balanced and verifiable arms control agreements
can complement our defense programs in maintaining the
military balance of power and preserving international peace
and stability. Let there be no mistake: I believe the SALT
Treaty is in the security interests of the United States.
When conditions permit, I will seek its ratification, and
a
press on to SALT III.
My Administration will continue to pursue arms control
agreements where these clearly can contribute to the security
of the United States and its allies and friends. Unlike
Governor Reagan, I do not regard balanced, verifiable arms
limitations, such as the SALT II treaty, as "appeasement."
September 27, 1980
Arms Control: Administration Record
Q:
Your Administration began with a great emphasis on
arms control. You sought agreements on strategic weapons,
on anti-satellite weapons, on military forces in the
Indian Ocean, on restraining conventional arms transfers,
on chemical weapons, on force reductions in Europe,
and others. With the exception of the SALT Treaty, which
has not been ratified, none of these other arms control
negotiations have come to anything.
How do you assess your Administration's arms control
record after four years? What reason is there to
believe you will be any more successful in negotiating
with the Soviets in a second term?
Response:
Significant progress in arms control -- particularly
in controlling and reducing strategic nuclear weapons -- has
been one of the basic goals of my Administration from the
outset.
Except for concluding the SALT II Treaty, not nearly
as much has been accomplished as I had hoped. But, I am not
going to turn away from my deep commitment to the pursuit
of mutual arms control agreements which enhance the security
of the United States and its allies, and which strengthen
international stability and the hopes for peace.
The SALT Treaty
The most prominent arms control achievement of my
Administration is, of course, SALT II. The SALT process, and
the SALT II Treaty, which Governor Reagan would abandon in
favor of an impossible pursuit of military superiority, is
the product of three Republican and Democratic Administrations
- 2 -
all of which were convinced that limiting Soviet strategic
arms strengthens U.S. security and reduces the risk of
nuclear war.
Because SALT II limits competition between the United
States and the Soviet Union in the most dangerous arena,
this Treaty is the single most important bilateral agreement
of the decade:
-- SALT II will permit us better to maintain strategic
equivalence in nuclear weapons and devote our
defense spending more on our highest priority
needs for conventional force improvements;
-- Without it, the Soviets can add more power to their
forces and better conceal from us what they are
doing;
-- Without SALT II, and the beginning of SALT III,
deeper cuts would take many more years to achieve;
and
-- Without SALT II, our efforts to control the
proliferation of nuclear weapons will be more
difficult.
I believe that the Senate will ratify SALT II because
the Treaty is, in its simplest terms, in the interest of
our Nation's security.
The successful negotiation of the SALT Treaty, of
course, represents only one step -- although an enormously
important one -- toward a very long-term goal. The short-
3
term milestone is a reflection of the treaty itself and
I know that milestone seems to be getting farther and
farther away instead of closer. I am determined to press
on for greater reductions and tighter controls over
strategic weapons in SALT III.
Other Arms Control Accomplishments
More broadly in the area of arms control, my
Administration has made every effort -- against continuing
adverse trends -- to reduce the international traffic in
armaments and in that way to turn the funds which are
spent in the Third World for swords into outlays for
greatly needed plough shares. My Administration has also
initiated the multilateral negotiations on a comprehensive
test ban and is pursuing negotiations on controlling
chemical, biological, and radiological weapons. We have
also established a negotiating forum for limiting Soviet
anti-satellite capabilities.
Progress has been slow. But my determination to
pursue the goal of arms control is undiluted.
September 26, 1980
Arms Control - SALT Treaty
Q: What are the prospects for the SALT Treaty? Is it
dead, or do you intend to seek its ratification if
you are reelected? If this Treaty cannot be ratified,
will you withdraw it from the Senate and try to
renegotiate it with the Soviets? Why is a SALT Treaty
that does nothing to reduce the Soviet threat or the
levels of nuclear weapons worth so much effort? Might
it be better to forget the treaty and start fresh
negotiations for a real arms reduction treaty, as your
Republican challenger says he wants?
Response
The SALT II Treaty is a major accomplishment of my
Administration. It is not a favor we are doing the
Soviet Union. It contributes directly and significantly
to the security of the United Stated and our Allies.
It is a fundamental element of political and strategic
stability in a turbulent and dangerous world.
While the SALT Treaty is pending ratification, my
Administration will observe its basic terms SO long as
the Soviet Union complies with those terms as well --
as monitored by us. I am determined to seek ratification
of the Treaty at the earliest opportune time. I asked
the Senate to delay voting on the Treaty not to kill it,
but because I recognized that it lacked sufficient
political support to win.
Governor Reagan and the Republican Party would
abandon SALT and the arms control process built up by
every President since Eisenhower. Instead, he would put
off negotiations with the Soviet Union until the US
had achieved military superiority -- which in the real
world means never.
I remain committed to the mutual, negotiated
reduction and control of nuclear weapons. SALT II is
such an agreement. The benefits of this Treaty to the
security interests of the US are clear:
Under the Treaty, the United States will not
have to reduce any strategic systems, while
the Soviets will have to reduce 250.
Under the Treaty, the United States will be
able to carry out all our planned strategic
modernization programs, including the Trident I
missile, the air-launched cruise missile, and
the M-X land-based missile. The Soviets will
be limited to deploying only one new land-based
missile, instead of the four that they have been
developing.
O
The Soviets will be limited to a maximum of ten
warheads on their large land-based missiles,
while the US will be able to place ten on the
M-X when it replaces the current Minuteman missile
which carries only three.
These are the benefits of the SALT Treaty. I want
the American people to understand clearly what the conse-
quences of a world without the SALT Treaty, a world which
Governor Reagan apparently wants, would be like:
Without SALT, the Soviets could deploy over
3,000
bombers and missiles, instead of the
2,400 they are allowed under the Treaty.
Without SALT, the Soviets could deploy as many
warheads on their large missiles as they are
capable of carrying, fifteen or twenty or even
more on each missile instead of ten.
Without SALT, the Soviets could target an
additional three to six thousand more warheads
on American cities and military targets than
they would under the Treaty.
Without the predictability of SALT, defense
planning by our military leaders would be much
more difficult. The M-X programs, a central
element in our planned strategic modernization,
would be harder to design and to build, and
more costly, because we could not know what
the size of Soviet forces would be and would
have to predict the worst.
Without SALT, our ability to monitor Soviet
forces -- and thus to evaluate Soviet capabili-
ties -- would be reduced, because the Soviets
would be freed from the SALT constraints on
deliberate concealment of strategic forces.
Without SALT, the likely increase in Soviet
strategic capabilities would require us to spend
event more on defense, perhaps on the order of
an additional $30 billion over a 10 year
period. This would compound our already
difficult budget choices. We would of course
spend what is necessary for our security, but
with SALT, it would be less.
We did not negotiate this Treaty to make friends
with the Soviet Union. We negotiated it because we are
adversaries, and it is in our security interest to have
reliable, effective and verifiable limits on Soviet
forces. In a period of heightened tension, it is all
the more necessary to have reliable constraints on the
competition in strategic weapons.
After the SALT Treaty is ratified, I am determined
to proceed in SALT III to more comprehensive and deep
reductions in the numbers of nuclear weapons and to more
0
stringent qualitative controls on weapons development.
SALT III must also bring in new categories of nuclear
weapons, such as long-range theater nuclear systems in
Europe.
SALT I marked the first step towards slowing the
arms race. SALT II will bring actual reductions and
qualitative limits on Soviet forces. SALT III must go
on to produce even more drastic reductions and tigher
controls over weapons development.
Governor Reagan on SALT
Reagan opposed the SALT II Treaty as it was negotiated by
both the Ford and Carter administrations. His objections, even
before the details of the Treaty were known, were on the grounds
it would allow the Soviets to achieve nuclear parity.
"We should be far more aware of our bargaining strength
than we seem to be. The Soviet Union seems most anxious to
enter a SALT II agreement. They have reason to be worried
about a defense weapons system in which we hold a huge
technological lead, a bright spot for us called the cruise
missile
The best way to have an equitable SALT II agreement
is to negotiate from a firmly established position. We
should not be SO eager for an agreement that we make unneces-
sary concessions, for to grant such concessions is to whet
the Soviet appetite- for more. "
New York Times
February 11, 1976
Reagan then changed his objections. He no longer objected to
Soviet parity but rather he claimed the Soviets would become
superior to the United States.
"President Carter and his supporters in the Congress
are
negotiating a SALT II treaty that could very well make this
nation NUMBER TWO behind the Soviet Union in defense and
offense capability."
Ronald Reagan Letter
February, 1979
Reagan did not change this latter objection and used it as a
standard campaign line.
"SALT II is not strategic arms limitation. It is strategic
arms buildup, with the Soviets adding a minimum of 3,000
nuclear warheads to their inventory
If
New York Times
September 16, 1979
In late 1979, Reagan began to add his own SALT proposals to
his criticism of SALT II. Where at first he had objected to the
Soviets achieving nuclear parity, in 1979 he began to advocate a
new policy.
"
(an) arms limitation agreement that legitimately reduces
nuclear armaments to the point that neither country represents
a threat to the other."
San Jose Mercury
September 16, 1979
-2-
Governor Reagan on SALT
By early 1980, Reagan was joining his standard criticism of
SALT II with his proposal of first achieving military superiority,
and then negotiating a nuclear arms reduction treaty.
"We also should have learned the lesson that we cannot
negotiate arms control agreements that will slow down the
Soviets move ahead of us in every category of armaments.
Once we clearly demonstrate to the Soviet leadership that
we are determined to compete, arms control negotiations will
again have a chance. On such a basis, I would be prepared
to negotiate vigorously for verifiable reductions in
armaments, since only on such a basis could reductions be
equitable."
Chicago Council on Foreign Relations
March 17, 1980
Reagan also believes that the United States should not abide
by the provisions of SALT II prior to its ratification:
"I believe the SALT II Treaty should be withdrawn, and I
especially believe that the U.S. should not abide by its
terms prior to ratification. To abide by the terms of the
proposed agreement would violate Article XXXIII of the Arms
Control and Disarmament Act of 1961.
"SALT II is not Strategic Arms Limitation; it is Strategic
Arms Build-up, with the Soviet Union authorized to add a
minimum of 3,000 nuclear warheads to their arsenal, and the
U.S. embarking on a $35 billion catch-up program which will
not be complete until 1990, if then, and there will be ten
very dangerous years in between."
Response to question posed by
Arms Control Today, May 1980
Finally, in August, he stated:
I cannot, however, agree to any treaty, including the SALT II
treaty, which, in effect, legitimizes the continuation of a
one-sided nuclear arms buildup.
Veterans of Foreign Wars
August 18, 1980