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[JGR/Carter Briefing Book for Presidential Debate] (11 of 17)
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[JGR/Carter Briefing Book for Presidential Debate] (11 of 17)
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Records of the Office of Counsel to the President (Reagan Administration)
John Roberts' Subject Files
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Roberts, John G.: Files
Folder Title: [JGR/Carter Briefing Book for
Presidential Debate] (11 of 17)
Box: 7
To see more digitized collections visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection
Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected]
Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing
National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/
Gov. Reagan on Human Rights
Reagan's attitude toward human rights stems from the
belief that while the Soviet Union drives for world dominion,
we confuse our friends and allies with the selective applica-
tion of our policy of human rights, making it that much easier
for the Soviets to attain their goals:
"While the Soviets arrogantly warn us to stay out of
their way, we occupy ourselves by looking for human rights
violations in those countries which have historically been
our friends and allies. "
Chicago Council on
Foreign Relations
March 17, 1980
Latin America
Reagan's disregard for the basic precepts of human rights
is obvious in the admiring way he speaks on Argentina after
three years of rule by a military dictatorship. Reagan quoted
an economic advisor to the junta.
"
in the process of bringing stability to a terrorized
nation of 25 million, a small number (of people) were caught
in the cross fire, among them a few innocents. "
Radio Transcript
August, 1979
African - Southern Africa
As for South Africa, Reagan favors a hands-off policy:
"Isn't it time we laid off South Africa for awhile?
As
for letting South Africans work at solving their problems
while we solve our own, all in favor say 'Aye.
Radio Transcript
October 22, 1976
Gov. Reacan on Non-proliferation
A Reagan Administration might not be concerned with
pursuing a non-proliferation strategy:
"I just don't think it's (non-proliferation) any of
our business. "
Washington Post
January 31, 1980
Reagan clarified his assertion by adding:
"I think that all of us would like to see non-prolifer-
ation, but I don't think that any of us are succeeding in
that. We are the only one in the world that's trying to
stop it. The result is we have increased our problems
would be eased if this government would allow the repro-
cessing of nuclear waste into plutonium
"
Monterey, Peninsula Herald
February 3, 1980
0
September 18, 1980
Global Issues: Non-Proliferation Policy
Q: Your Administration seems to be retreating from its
strong commitment to pursue tough nuclear non-
proliferation policies. Many say the technological
genie is out of the bottle, and that this is why your
policy of denying US technology is a failure. How do
you assess proliferation dangers now, after four years
in office, and what actions do you intend to take to
slow the spread of nuclear weapons in a second term?
Response
Non-proliferation has been a key objective of my
Administration. It will continue to be. American
leadership in stopping the spread of nuclear weapons
and explosive technology is essential. Governor
Reagan has stated that he does not believe non-proliferation
is "any of our business." I could not disagree more.
Non-proliferation is a vital American security interest.
The spread of nuclear weapons could create or exacerbate
regional instabilities. It multiplies the chances that
nuclear weapons will be used.
Progress in non-proliferation is difficult. Nations
are being asked to accept international inspection of
their nuclear activities, and to forego the option of
nuclear weapons. This is a great deal to ask of sovereign
nations. That the vast majority have done this -- 114
nations have signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty -- indicates
widespread agreement that the spread of nuclear weapons or
explosive technology adds to no one's security. But in
return for this limitation, non-nuclear-weapon-states
demand -- rightly, in my judgment -- that the nuclear-
- 2 -
weapon states make progress in curbing the nuclear arms
race. Nonproliferation and nuclear arms control are
inter-related, and I intend to continue to press forward
on both fronts. Apparently Governor Reacan would not.
Important progress has been made toward U.S. non-
proliferation objectives in the last four years.
-- Working with Congress, we have developed the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, which requires that nations
working to enjoy the benefits of U.S. nuclear cooperation
must accept controls on their nuclear activities.
-- We are renegotiating existing bilateral nuclear
cooperation agreements to bring them into conformity with
the strong non-proliferation policies contained in the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act.
0
-- The International Nuclear Fuel Cvcle Evaluation,
which I initiated in 1977, successfully concluded in March
1980. It demonstrated that nuclear suppliers and recipients
can work together, and it heightened international under-
standing of the technology, risks and economies of the nuclear
fuel cycle.
-- We have concluded the Second Review Conference of
the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The conference reaffirmed
the continuing value and importance of the NPT, and their
determination to strengthen it. There was considerable
dissatisfaction, which we share, with the pace of nuclear
arms control negotiations. But progress was made on a
number of issues, and I am convinced that the NPT regime
remains fundamentally sound and healthy.
September 18, 1980
Global Issues: Arms Transfer Policy
Q: As a candidate in 1976 you stated that the United States
should cease being the arms merchant of the world. Soon
after you took office, a restrictive policy on conventional
arms transfers was applied.
What has become of your goal of limiting conventional arms
transfers? Haven't you abandoned this effort after it
caused serious problems with friendly governments and lost
US defense industry sales markets to European arms pro-
ducers? What is present US policy on arms transfers? Are
you going to take a more pragmatic approach to US arms
transfers, giving arms to regimes which support US interests,
even if they are not as democratic as we would like?
Response
I remain committed to a policy of restraint on arms
transfers. This has been a principal objective of my
Administration and it will remain SO.
From the outset of my Administration, I have tried to
make US arms transfer serve two basic goals:
-- To facilitate those transfers that clearly serve
the security interests of the United States, our allies
and friends;
-- To restrain transfers which are clearly in excess
of legitimate security needs, which could promote regional
arms races or increase instability.
In short, our purpose in supplying arms is security,
not profit.
Frankly, I have been disappointed at the failure of
other major arms suppliers to respond to our efforts to
promote international restraint. Based on this lack of
multilateral cooperation, this year I directed that the
2
ceiling on the dollar value of US arms transfers outside
NATO, Japan, Australia and New Zealand not be reduced;
it will remain at last year's level. In addition, I
have approved the development and production of the FX
export fighter. This exception to my policy of not
producing weapons solely for export was justified by the
need by our allies and friends for a sophisticated air-
craft to replace the F-5E, but who ão not need aircraft
as advanced as the F-16.
I emphasize that these actions do not mean that
our policy of restraint has ended. The basic guidelines
for US arms transfers that I established in 1977 remain
in effect, and I intend to continue to apply them.
- 3 -
-- we are working to encourage regional cooperation
and restraint. I have sent to the Senate Protocol I of
the Treaty of Tlatelolco which will contribute to the
lessening of nuclear dangers for our Latin American
neighbors. I urge its ratification by the Senate.
-- The Senate has ratified the Treatv with the
International Atomic Energy Acency to permit limited
inspection of U.S. peaceful nuclear facilities, though not
nuclear facilities with a national security significance.
This action will help us strengthen the IAEA's inspections
capabilities. It will also help us to argue to other
states that the Non-Proliferation Treaty and safeguards
are not discriminatory and that we, along with Britain and
France, also accept them.
More countries will approach the nuclear weapons
threshold in the decade ahead, some with uncertain
intentions in regions of tension and conflict. The time
remaining to reduce the appeal of nuclear weapons and to
develop safer wavs to address legitimate energy needs is
slipping away. Our non-proliferation efforts are more
vital now than everv before.
September 29, 1980
Persian Gulf Oil
Q:
In the energy field we import, as you know, 50 percent
of our domestic petroleum requirements. The economics
forced upon us are clear: we need to reduce demand and
increase supplies. The hard part is doing this. How
successful has the Carter Administration been?
What would happen to the U.S. economy if the Persian Gulf
oil was cut off? What would happen to Europe's economy
if its Persian Gulf oil was cut off?
Response:
The current hostilities between Iran and Iraq -- and the
threat this conflict poses for world oil resources --
clearly demonstrates the need for stability in the Persian
Gulf. This region supplies 60 percent of world oil imports,
which is equivalent to:
-- 40 percent of world oil consumption
-- 15 percent of U.S. oil consumption
-- 60 percent of Western Europe's oil consumption
-- 85 percent of Japan's oil consumption.
The conflict between Iran and Iraq has caused considerable
concern that world oil supplies might be severely reduced,
therefore driving up oil prices and endangering the
economic security of the consuming nations. This concern
is not justified by the present situation. It is true
that oil companies and shipments directly to Iran and Iraq
have been interrupted or suspended during the outbreak of
2
the hostilities. But even if this suspension of Iran
and Iraqi shipments should persist for an extended
period of time, the consuming nation's can compensate
for this shortfall.
Oil inventories in the world's major oil-consuming
nations are now at an all time high. The world's
margin of oil supply security is much greater today
than in the winter of 1978 and 1979, when the Iranian
revolution reduced oil supplies at a time when reserve
oil supplies were very low.
Our greater security today is due in part to energy
conservation and also to the substitution of other fuels
for oil, both in the United States and in other consuming
nations.
This has facilitated the building up of reserve
stocks to much more satisfactory levels than in 1979.
Hence, there is no reason for a repetition of the shortages
or the price escalation that resulted in 1979. Of course,
a total suspension of oil exports from the other nations
who ship through the Persian Gulf region would create a
serious threat to the world's oil supplies and consequently,
a threat to the economic health of all nations.
3
It is for this reason that we must continue to reduce
our dependence on foreign oil. We have been aware of
this need for some time, since the 1973 oil embargo.
Only within the last three years, however, have we as a
nation taken action. Today, the United States is importing
20 percent less oil than the day I took office. That
amounts to one-and-a-half million barrels of oil less
every day. We cannot, however, rest on this accomplishment.
We must do more. Our national security requires it.
September 29, 1980
North/South: Helping the Poor Nations
Q:
Recent reports on thestate of the world (the Brandt
Report, e.g.) are bleak indeed, pointing to a growing
gap between the rich and the poor countries, hinting
at the inevitability of mass famine, and raising the
spectre of wars of redistribution.
Is there any cause for optimism about the future of
North/South relations? What, specifically, can the
United States do to assist the world's poor? Has
the United States moved toward meeting its part of the
Bonn Summit commitment to increase development assistance?
Response:
The conditions in the Brandt report and other reports
are not inevitable. The projections should be seen as
timely warnings that will alert the nations of the world
to the need for vigorous, determined action, at both the
8
national and international levels.
To avert global disaster, I believe the United States
must assist the developing world to:
-- slow the rate of unchecked population growth;
-- combate world hunger;
-- increase energy production and conservation.
To do this, my Administration has taken the following
steps:
-- U.S. bilateral programs administered by A.I.D.
for agricultural and nutrition have increased from $474
million in 1977 to $758 million planned for 1981;
2
-- U.S. bilateral assistance to increase energy
production in developing nations has doubled in the
past two years.
We have also assisted the World Bank in its efforts
to meet these problems:
-- World Bank lending for agriculture and rural
development during the 1977-1979 period exceeded $8
billion;
-- World Bank lending for fossil fuel development
in poor countries is projected to reach $5.6 billion
over the next five years;
The problems that the Brandt report points to are of
concern to every American. They can be solved only
through cooperation among the developed and developing
nations of the world. Let me give you an example of
some successes we could have in the area of world food
production. By the mid-1980's we could help Thailand
export an additional five million tons of grain, bring
four million acres under irrigation in Bangladesh, double
cereal production in Peru, and bring a number of African
countries to food self-sufficiency. I might add that in
India, through the "green revolution" and the work of the
International Rice Research Institute, agriculture has
been built up sufficiently so that the country can now
feed its hugh population.
3
The United States, of course, cannot assure a world
without poverty, disease, and deprivation. But we can
be certain that without technical and financial assistance
from us, these aims will become immeasurably more difficult
to attain.
September 18, 1980
Trade: Disincentives
Q:
Are there too many government "disincentives" in
the trade area and, if so, which ones do you propose
to curtail?
A:
There may be disincentives that need to be pruned
out of our laws and regulations to allow the United States
a competitive opportunity in the world marketplace. My
Administration has already overturned hindersome government
regulations in the automobile industry and is presently
reviewing other industries to see if outdated, unfair, or
unreasonable regulations exist.
In a report I sent to Congress last month, I outlined
several new initiatives in the export area. I have set in
motion plans to provide tax relief for Americans working
abroad for U.S. companies; we will work to remove ambiguitie
in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act; and, we are determine
to improve Eximbank financing. I have also taken steps to
ensure that the Government stops issuing separate U.S. re-
export licenses in cases where we already approved re-expor
of the same product as part of COCOM.
But, disincentives are only the tip of the iceberg;
our trade problems are much more broadly based, and require
a truly major effort on several fronts if we are to be
successful in meeting this challenge.
In the auto industry, for example, we need a new tax
policy, with major changes in depreciation and investment
opportunities (including a refundable investment tax C
2
to spur the modernization of our nation's factories. We
need more attention to research and development to stimulate
the great American genius for technological innovation in
the private sector, expecially toward more fuel-efficient
automobiles. Greater investment in R&D may lead to
breakthroughs in battery technology which would make the
electric car more competitive. We need increased attention
to export promotion, using the Export-Import Bank, the
Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and other agencies
more energentically in this field. The formation of trading
companies, on the Japanese model, is also an intriguing
possibility.
In a word, we need a new U.S. industrial policy,
consisting of a unified effort by government, industry,
and labor to restore the United States once more to its
preeminent position as a world trader. One of the most
hopeful signs I have seen in this regard are the recent
efforts of management and labor in the auto industry to
seek together new ways to work as a team, each dedicated
to enhancing the quality of the product and the morale
of the working man and woman.
September 22, 1980
Trade: Access to Foreign Markets
Q:
Trade, ideally, is a two way street; yet, Japan exports in
large volume to the United States but seems reluctant to open
her market equally to our products.
Is this an accurate assessment and, if so, what would you
do about it if reelected?
A:
From 1950 through the early 1970s, Japan was a highly
protectionist country. Lately, though, the Japanese have
opened their market considerably in response to pressures
from the United States and the Third World. Despite this
encouraging sign, I intend to press upon the Japanese,
through negotiations, the importance of prompt removal of
residual barriers to imported automobiles and spare parts
from the United States, as well as other products, including
telecommunications equipment, processed foods, cosmetics,
medical devices, and cigarettes. The trade barriers against
U.S. agricultural products are particularly notorious.
Japan must open its market more fully and do more to facili-
tate imports from our country if we are to continue our
liberal trade relationship with the Japanese.
Nowhere could the Japanese demonstrate goodwill better
than by a decision to adhere to the Government Procurement
Code negotiated in Geneva -- including a decision to make
all procurément of the Nippon Telephone and Telegraph
Company subject to the obligations of the Code. The
Japanese auto companies must also overcome their reluctance
to pursue actively opportunities for marketing American
cars in Japan and purchasing American-made new and replace-
ment parts -- efforts which could help to reduce protec-
tionist pressures against Japanese autos.
2
At the invitation of my Administration, a Japanese
Auto Components Buying Mission visited the United States
in September. The full benefit of this mission will not,
of course, be realized overnight. With U.S. parts-
making capacity readily available, however, it should be
possible soon to see tangible results in the form of
contracts in some cases, and in other cases, concrete
steps toward contracts. I regard concrete results from
this mission to be an extremely important contribution by
Japanese firms to improving the present climate, creating
jobs, and improving the prospects of the depressed U.S.
auto parts industry.
A second mission from Japan also visited the United
States in September to explore opportunities to license
U.S. production of official Japanese auto parts, and to
explore joint ventures or other forms of investment
opportunities in the United States. This mission provided
another opportunity for positive steps to restore better
balance to automobile trade through economically viable
production arrangements and investments in the United
States.
The Japanese Government has agreed on the need for
significant and lasting results from the auto parts
buying and investment missions. Our two governments
will monitor closely the missions' results.
The U.S. automobile industry must meet its
responsibilities, too, by manufacturing automobiles
3
suitable for mass sales in foreign markets and
adopting a more aggréssive and intelligent marketing
approach. As former Special Trade Representative Bob
Strauss has noted, there are 1,250 to 1,500 representatives
of Japanese firms in New York today and every one of
them speaks English well and presents his products and
sales arguments effectively. They are selling Japanese
merchandise, and this is in New York City alone. In
Tokyo, there are probably 20 or 25 -- certainly less
than 100 -- Americans selling American products, and scarcely
any of them speaks Japanese. We can do better than this.
With government, industry, and labor working more
imaginatively together, we can compete with the best here
and abroad.
September 29, 1980
Trade:
Export Promotion
Q:
The GOP Platform paints a dark portrait of the Carter
Administration's competence -- and sheer interest --
in matters of export promotion. What has your
Administration done to help U.S. trade performance?
Response:
The truth of the matter is that there has been almost
twenty years of neglect in our export program, crossing
party lines and the public and private sectors. Since the
Kennedy Round in 1963, we have been slipping backwards.
We have had an accumulation of complacency, of ignoring
the problem. There is enough blame to go around to
industry, labor, various administrations and the Congress.
We have had the luxury of a large market right here in the
United States, and we have relied on it. Too heavily.
My Administration has begun to reverse these years of
neglect. Under the direction of my Special Trade
Representative, we brought to a successful conclusion
the multilateral trade negotiations, the most ambitious
set of negotiations to reduce barriers to international
trade in a decade.
The reorganization of the Federal government trade
agencies which I directed will assure more effective and
prompt governmental action to exploit the export
opportunities afforded by the MTN agreements.
2.
On another front, the Administration and the United
States coal industry are launching joint marketing efforts
to make this country a major exporter of steam coal. With
assurance of a reliable United States coal supply at
competitive prices, many of the electric power plants to
be built in the 1980's and 1990's can be coal-fired rather
than oil-burning. Coal exports will help us pay for our
declining but costly oil imports.
I have also directed the Export-Import Bank and the
Overseas Private Investment Corporation to give special
emphasis to export promotion in all of their new projects.
In this connection, it is important for us to keep in
mind that American exports have been increasing more
rapidly to Third World countries than any other nations
except Japan. This new market means jobs for Americans.
It also demonstrates why we must continue to work with
the Third World and to assist these financial institutions,
such as the World Bank, in their efforts to provide help
to the developing nations.
September 18, 1980
Trade: Increasing Productivity
Q:
There is a good deal of talk these days about the lack
of investment and productivity by American industry.
Certainly we lag behind our major competitors, especially
the Japanese. What can the Federal Government do to
increase investment and worker productivity, or is
this a problem for industry alone to resolve?
Response:
I am very pleased to see that in the United States
there is a growing consensus in favor of developing a new
industrial policy designed to rebuild our factories,
regain a competitive edge in the world marketplace, and
restore the reputation of our country as a place where
high-quality products are manufactured.
Specifically, my Administration will accelerate its
efforts to pass new investment tax policies in the Congress
(such as a refundable investment tax credit), direct
expenditures toward innovative research and development,
C
and encourage new avenues of export promotion.
We need a new vision of our industrial future, a new
partnership of labor, management, and Government working
together to promote U.S. business abroad. We can no longer
afford the antagonisms that have plagued industry for SO
long. Toward this end, industry and labor can do its part
to enhance worker morale and the quality of the product;
and the Government can help with needed tax provisions,
increased R&D expenditures, export promotion, clarification
of antitrust policy, and the elimination of unnecessary
regulatory burdens.
September 12, 1980
Trade: Japanese Autos
Q: Does the Carter Administration support a temporary
Orderly Marketing Agreement to curb Japanese auto
imports?
Response:
Trade Adjustment Actions
My Administration has sought to facilitate the retooling
of our industry to permit production of small, fuel-efficient,
competitive autos. We have also sought to reduce the burdens
borne by workers during this transitional period. In
cooperation with the Congress, We have provided special
financial assistance to the beleaguered Chrysler Corporation
and are developing, through tax policy, capital formation
incentives.
In July, I announced a number of specific actions
including relaxation of some regulatory requirements; new
adjustment assistance benefits to aid communities severely
affected by the changes in the auto industry; tax relief
proposals; and a package of loan programs to aid automobile
dealers. I also called for a joint industry, labor, and
government Automobile Industry Committee to undertake a
continuing dialogue on industry concerns. Members of this
committee met in Detroit this September to organize and
set their agenda. I have also encouraged Japanese investment
in the United States in automotive manufacturing facilities.
To date, Honda and Nissan have announced plans to produce cars
and trucks in the United States. Nissan has yet to definitively
pick a plant site. Toyota, the largest Japanese exporter
to this market, continues to study investment possibilities here.
2
To promote an increase in our exports to Japan, we have
reached an agreement with the Japanese Government on a number
of measures designed to increase access to the Japanese
market for U.S. made automobiles, parts and components. In
May, the Japanese Government agreed to eliminate import duties
next spring on most automobile parts, ameliorate the impact
of certain Japanese standards, and send automobile parts buying
and investment missions to the United States. These missions
visited our country in September and the tangible results of
these visits will be seen in the form of contracts and other
arrangements to restore better balance to automobile trade.
Request for Import Relief
In spite of the adjustment actions taken by the
Administration, the Congress, and most importantly, the industry
itself, many Americans continue to be concerned that the
unprecedented Japanese shipments during thistransitional period
will permanently alter the structure of our automobile market
to the disadvantage of American companies and workers.
This situation has led to calls in our country for import
restrictions. The United Auto Workers and Ford Motor Company
have petitioned the U.S. International Trade Commission for
temporary import relief under the provisions of Section 201 of
the Trade Act of 1974. At my request, the ITC has accelerated
the schedule for its decision. If the U.S. International Trade
Commission finds that imports of automobiles are a substantial
cause of injury, or threat thereof, and recommends import
3
relief, then I will be authorized under our domestic
law to restrict auto imports by means of tariffs, quotas,
tariff-rate quotas, or orderly marketing agreements.
So the framework created by law to examine claims for
import relief is presently engaged. This process should
be allowed to operate. While that investigation is in
progress, U.S. efforts to obtain restraints on Japanese
imports would be inconsistent with the procedures set forth
in the Trade Act of 1974.
Decline of the Dollar
Q:
What is your response to the GOP charge that "the
economic policy of the Carter Administration has led
to the most serious decline in the value of the dollar
in history"?
Response:
When I took office in 1977, we had just experienced
a long recession which had put a great strain on the
world economy and on the international financial system.
The origins of that recession were in a tangle of
complicated economic decisions made by both parties
over the last two decades. By late 1976, the world
economy was in a very precarious situation. To put it
bluntly, I had inherited a mess.
My Administration immediately undertook a program
of economic expansion to end the recession. I recognized
at the time that vigorous economic expansion in this
country, without expansion in other countries, could
worsen the U.S. trade position. I also understood that
the resulting trade imbalance could lead to the
depreciation of the dollar relative to some other currencies
It was necessary, however, for the United States
to go ahead alone. Not to have done SO would have courted
far graver dangers for the world economy -- extreme
financial difficulties for a number of countries and in-
increasing protectionist actions in most of the industrializ
countries.
2
Today the dollar has regained its strength, despite
Republican exaggerations to the contrary. The dollar
will be the world's leading currency for a long time
to come. The United States current account deficit,
which was $16 billion in 1978, is near balance this year.
We have achieved a fundamental redirection.
September 18, 1980
Intelligence Reform
Q: The Republican Platform states that "ill-considered
restrictions sponsored by the Democrats" have
"debilitated US intelligence capabilities
"
Are the CIA and other intelligence agencies hobbled
by restrictions imposed by Democrats?
what changes do you recommend to improve our intelligence
capabilities?
RESPONSE
The charge made by Governor Reagan that our intelligence
agencies no longer function effectively is dead wrong. We
have the best intelligence services in the world and I intend
to keep them that way.
In addition, over the past four years, I have worked
for intelligence reform. It was a part of my campaign for
the presidency in 1976, a part of the Democratic Platform
that year, and a part of my legislative package each year. In
1978 we achieved the passage of a sensible statute on wire-
tap authorization. This year we should have legislation --
long over-due -- to protect the identities of intelligence
employees, and an oversight bill for foreign intelligence
operations. In each of these measures, great care has been
taken to ensure that no restraints are placed on the intelligence
agencies that would interfere with their authorized duties.
Gov. Reagan on Intelligence Reform
Foreign Intelligence
Reagan believes the decline of America's intelligence
capabilities is due to Congress and the President.
"
a Democratic Congress, aided and abetted by the
Carter Administration, has succeeded in shackling and
demoralizing our intelligence services to the point that
they no longer function effectively as a part of our defenses. "
Speech to Chicago Council on
Foreign Relations
March 17, 1980
The Republic Platform calls for:
"A Republican Administration will seek to improve U.S.
intelligence capabilities for technical clandestine collection,
cogent analysis, coordinated counterintelligence, and covert
action.
"We will reestablish the President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board
0
"Republicans will undertake an urgent effort to rebuild
the intelligence agencies We will propose legislation to
enable intelligence officers and their agents to operate
safely and efficiently abroad.
"We will provide our government with the capability
to help influence international events vital to our national
security interests
"
1980 Republican Platform
Domestic Intelligence
Reagan would appear not to preclude the using of the
intelligence agencies to spy on American citizens.
"
in insuring the security of the people and the nation,
there may come times you have to spy on your own people.
Los Angeles Times
March 21, 1975
2
Gov. Reagan on Intelligence Reform
Reagan has also stated:
"I have commented before about what I think is the
Justice Department's foolishness in rendering our FBI
and CIA impotent, all in the name of privacy."
Reagan Radio Broadcast
February, 1979
September 21, 1980
Refugees
Q:
Recently we have witnessed the spectacle of thousands
of Cubans pouring into the United States illegally, some
of them apparently criminal elements. What have you done
to control this situation and, more generally, how can the
US aid desperate refugees in the future?
Response
The problem of refugees and displaced persons is
serious, widespread, and -- I regret to say -- growing.
More than 15 million inhabitants of our planet have fled
their homes in recent years because of wars, civil
disturbances, persecution, or hostile government policies.
The past year alone has witnessed the flight of more
than 1.2 million Afghans, 1 million Somalis, and hundreds
of thousands of Kampucheans, and others who remain home-
less and miserable. Ours is becoming an epoch of refugees.
Since 1975, the United States has welcomed over
600,000 refugees for permanent resettlement. In the past
year alone, we have taken in well over 230,000 refugees;
and this total does not include the over 150,000
Cubans and Haitians now in the United States, seeking
to settle here. We are doing everything we can to assist
refugees from around the world who look to us for help.
For example, I remain deeply committed to the support of the
massive relief program undertaken by the international
community through ICRC/UNICEF for relief of the Khmer
people inside Kampuchea and along the Thai border. We
also fully support the UNHCR program to help the many Khmer
in Thai holding centers.
2
But we need help if we are to help them. The
massive burdens that are imposed when thousands of
people migrate, as with the chaotic flow of Cubans
into our country, require attention that transcends
national boundaries. The task of resettlement must be
shared on an equitable basis SO that no single nation
or group of nations is faced with the entire refugee
burden. I am encouraging regional associations to work
closely with international agencies like the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees and the Inter-governmental
Committee for Refugee Migration to develop procedures
for coping with these complex problems.
And, despite the refusal of Cuba to cooperate in
devising orderly, legal arrangements for dealing with the
migration of Cuban refugees to this country, we are
working tirelessly to resettle and accommodate these
individuals as quickly and safely as their large numbers
will allow.
I recently announced a new three-point plan to improve our
response to this challenge. This plan acknowledges the
federal responsibility for the refugee burden placed upon
state and local government; strengthens law enforcement efforts
to bar additional illegal immigrants; and, establishes a new
and more efficient resettlement center, allowing the closure
of some refugee sites.
Gov. Reagan on Refugees
Reagan supported a "Berlin airlift - - massive and swift"
to rescue those Cuban residents seeking political asylum
from Castro. (Dallas Times Herald, April 10, 1980)
September 26, 1980
The United Nations
Q:
The United Nations has a league of critics, Governor
Reagan among them. There are those who dismiss it
as a drain on our resources, an impediment to our
bilateral diplomatic relations, a theater of the
absurd. More recently a special session of the UN
spent several days attacking Israel. Critics say
the UN is anti-American and anti-democratic. Many
Americans have grown weary of handing out foreign
aid to so-called friendly nations around the world
only to see them vote against us on the floor of
the General Assembly.
To what extent are these conclusions valid, and why
should the United States continue to honor its legal
obligations to the UN?
Response:
My Administration supports the United Nations and
will continue to do SO. I strongly oppose the view
Governor Reagan once expressed that we should serve
notice that WE are going home to sit for a while.
Despite the mvths surrounding the UN, many of which
Governor Reagan seems to have accepted, the fact is the
United States is not now, nor has it ever been, the
outvoted victim of most United Nations resolutions.
In the area of human rights for example, what for some
appeared to have been a lonely American concern, the
United Nations today is a major forum for improving the
standards of human rights and in promoting actions to
protect them.
We don't always get our way, of course. The United
Nations has almost a hundred new nations, each free of
colonial bondage and fiercely independent. We are no
2
longer in the position of dictating our will. And,
sometimes we strongly oppose actions taken by the
UN. The 1975 UN condemnation of Zionism as racism was
deplorable. The recent special session on the Middle
East was totally one-sided and inexcusable.
Despite this, those who still think of the
United Nations as an unfriendly and dangerous place
should remember some of its recent acts, such as the
decision of the International Courts of Justice on the
hostages in Iran and the overwhelming condemnation of
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Our country needs
the UN as much as it needs us.
Gov. Reagan on the U.N.
In the past, Reagan has, on special occasions, implied
that the United States should withdraw from the United Nations.
The first occasion arose in 1971 when the issue of admitting
China to the United Nations was being discussed.
"I was also disgusted and very frankly I think that it
confirms the moral bankruptcy of that international organiza-
tion I don't know whether to withdraw totally from the
adjuncts of the United Nations. You know the service
organizations surrounding it are doing good work."
Press Conference
October 26, 1971
In 1975, when the United Nations condemned Zionism as
racism, Reagan suggested that if the U.N. continues its
present conduct, the United States should serve notice
'we re going to go home and sit a while."
Los Angeles Times
November 17, 1975
Reagan has also attacked various organs of the United
Nations including UNESCO. In 1977 when the head of UNESCO,
Sean MacBride, attacked the capitalist system, Reagan gave
his reply.
"
UNESCO - the United Nationsl Educational, Scientific
and cultural organization
May actually be a base for
communist espionage. "
Jefferson City Post
December 15, 1977
Reagan Themes:
Foreign Policy and National Security
1. The Soviet Union surpasses us in virtually every category
of military strength.
2. The only place we search for human rights violations is
among our historically friends and allies.
3. We have been dishonored (by Soviet and Cuban adventurism,
murdered US diplomats, captive hostages); we have lost our
pride.
4. We have been apologetic at best about American capitalism
as a model for economic development.
5. Our government taxes industry too heavily and undermines
our international competiveness.
6. Our antitrust laws harm US competitiveness and benefit
foreign competitors.
7. The Democrats have neglected our military strength and
only after Afghanistan have awakened to the Soviet threat.
8. Even after Afghanistan, Carter's military budget leaves
us totally unable to match Soviet buildup (three times ours
in strategic arms, nearly twice ours in conventional arms).
9. Our defense posture must be invigorated across the board.
10. We must have a faster remedy to our land-based missile
vulnerability than Carter's complex and costly new missile
system.
11. We need higher pay and better management of the all-
volunteer force, not hundreds of new bureaucrats to administer
or draft registration.
12. We have to maintain a superior Navy.
13. We must restore our intelligence agencies, shackled and
demoralized by Democrats in Congress and the Carter Administra-
tion.
14. Carter meekly accepted a Soviet buildup in Cuba -- after
saying it was "unacceptable."
15. We stand by idly as Marxists topple the dominoes in
Latin America, one after the other, leading toward Mexico
in one direction and Panama in the other.
16. We pay the lion's share of a bloated UN budget only
to see its members criticize us while gazing benignly on
Soviet colonialism. (The recent UN condemnation of the
invasion into Afghanistan failed even to mention the Soviet
Union by name. )
17. We apologize, compromise, withdraw, and retreat, fall
silent when insulted and pay ransom when we are victimized.
18. We must regain the reputation of reliability toward our
allies.
19. We must rid ourselves of the "Vietnam Syndrome. "
20. Detente is largely an illusion.
21. We must above all have a grand strategy
*
*
These themes come from the March 17, 1980, Chicago
speech. The last one, like many others, remains vague
but mainly Reagan seems to mean by this that we must
stand tough against Soviet and Cuban military ventures.
Most Notable Reagan Quotes
On Foreign Policv
"In the case of foreign policy, I am equally unimpressed
with all this talk about our problems being too complex,
too intricate, to allow timely decision and action. The
fetish of complexity, the trick of making hard decisions
harder to make; the art, finally, of rationalizing the
non-decision, have made a ruin of American foreign
policy.
Reagan Speech
May 21, 1968
On Military Superiority
"Since when has it been wrong for America to aim to
be first in military strength? How is American military
superiority "dangerous?"
American Legion
August 20, 1980
On SALT II
"I cannot, however, agree to anv treaty, including the
SALT II treaty, which, in effect, legitimizes the
continuation of a one-sided nuclear arms buildup."
Veterans of Foreign Wars
August 18, 1980
On the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan
"One option might well be that we surround the
island of Cuba and stop all traffic in and out. "
New York Times
January 29, 1980
"So when they invaded Afghanistan, maybe that was
the time for us to have said, 'Look, don't talk to
us about trade. There will be none. Don't talk to
us about treaties, like SALT II. We are not going to
have any communication with you until (those forces in
Afghanistan) are back in the Soviet Union.
Time
June 30, 1980
- 2 -
On the Soviet Union
"Let's not delude ourselves, the Soviet Union
underlies all the unrest that is going on. If they
weren't engaged in the game of dominoes, there
wouldn't be any hot spots in the world.
Wall Street Journal
June 3, 1980
"When did the Cold War end?"
Wall Street Journal
June 30, 1980
On CSCE
"Frankly, I have an uneasy feeling that going to Madrid
is negating what we thought we could accomplish by
boycotting the Olympics. If the athletes can't go, whv
should the diplomats go?"
Time
June 30, 1980
On Iran
0
"But some place along the line there had to be an
ultimatum. Here again, because we have lost SO much
influence with freinds and allies, we were not in a
position to go to the rest of the world and say,
look, this is a violation of international law, and
present to them the idea of the world literally
quarantining Iran."
Time
June 30, 1980
On US Allies
"I think there is every indication that some of our
European friends are beginning to wonder if they
shouldn't look more toward -- or have a rapprochment
with -- the Soviet Union, because they are not sure
whether we are dependable or not."
Time
June 30, 1980
- 3 -
On China and Taiwan
"I would not pretend, as Carter does, that the
relationship we now have with Taiwan, enacted by
our Congress, is not official."
Associated Press
August 25, 1980
Republican Platform Charges Against the
Carter Administration
General
Without a Coherent Strategic Concept
Failure of Leadership, Incompetence
Foreign Policy of Chaos, Confusion, and Failure
Neglect of America's Defense Posture Without Parallel since 1930s
Reduced the Size and Capability of our Nuclear Forces
Defense Programs Cancelled or Delayed
On the Road to a Military Catastrophe
Danger Without Parallel since December 7, 1941
Oblivious to the Scope and Magnitude of the Threat
Lack of Meaningful Response to Use of Soviet Power
Losing the Respect of the World and our Honor
Endangered Energy and Raw Material Lifelines of Western World
Lack of Meaningful Response to Terrorists
National Security
Massive Cuts in U.S. Defense Spending; Reduced Budget by over
$38 Billion from Ford's last.Five-Year Defense Plan
Cut Back Cancelled, or Delayed Every Strategic Initiative Pro-
posed by Ford (Minuteman Missile Production Line, B-1 Bomber,
All Cruise Missiles, M-X, Trident Submarine, Trident II
Missile)
Soviets are Achieving Military Superiority; Moved from Essential
Equivalence to Inferiority in Strategic Nuclear Forces
Failure to Challenge Soviet Use of Surrogate Cuban Forces in
Africa and the Later Soviet Presence in Angola, Ethiopia,
and South Yemen
Mismanagement of Personnel Policy; Shambles of All-volunteer Army
Failure to Maintain Combat Readiness; U.S. Armed Forces at
Lowest State of Preparedness since 1950
Failure to Fund Fully the Space Shuttle Program, As Well As
Advanced Exploration Programs
Ill-informed, Capricious Intrusions of OMB and DOD Office of
Program Analysis and Evaluation have Brought Defense Plan-
ning Full Circle to the Worst Faults of the McNamara Years;
Inefficiency and Paralysis has Led to Huge Cost Overruns
and Protected Delays
2
Morale of National Intelligence Has Been Eroded; Along with
Public Confidence; National Intelligence Has Underestimated
the Size and Purpose of the Soviet Union's Military Efforts
Fundamentally flawed SALT II Treaty; Cover-up of Soviet Non-
Compliance, Including BW Convention (Sverdlovsk)
Misguided Intentions to Deliver Nuclear Material to India
Foreign Policy
US-Soviet Relations
Present Danger is Greater Than Ever Before in the 20 0-year
History of the United States
Carter has Encouraged the Most Extensive Raid on American
Technology by the Soviet Bloc since World War II
Partial and Incompetently Managed Grain Embargo
Human Rights in the USSR Ignored
Misleading American People About Soviet Policies and Behavior
NATO and Western Europe
Erosion of Alliance Security and Confidence in the US
Vulnerability of US Increased by Carter's Unilateral Cancella-
tions, Reductions, and Long Delays in the B-1, Trident, M-X,
Cruise Missile, and Ship-building Programs, as Has
Fundamentally Flawed SALT II
Alliance Security Decreased by Reversals on Neutron Bomb, Treat-
ment of Future Theater Nuclear Force Modernization, and
Manner of Dealing with Terrorist Actions Against Americans
Abroad
Caused Disunity in the Alliance; Lack of Close Coordination
Regarding Iran, the Middle East, Afghanistan, the Olympic
Boycott, Nuclear Proliferation, East-West Trade, Human
Rights, North-South Issues
Middle East, Persian Gulf
Carter Administration Involvement with the PLO
The Americas
Precipitous Decline in US Relations with Virtually Every Country
in the Region
Undifferentiated Charges of Human Rights Violations
Stands by While Castro Supports Forces of Warfare and Revolution
Throughout the Western Hemisphere
3
Dangerous and Incomprehensible Policies Toward Cuba
Implementing the Panama Canal Treaties will Cost US Taxpayer
$4.2 Billion
Asia and the Pacific
Balance on the Korean Peninsula has Sifted Dangerously Toward
the North
Africa
Soviet Bases, Tens of Thousands of Cuban Troops, and Soviet-
Bloc Subversion Unacceptable
Foreign Assistance and Regional Security
Carter Administration has Diminished the Role of American
Military Assistance and Foreign Military Sales in our
Foreign Policy
International Economic Policy
International Trade and Economic Policy
Largely Ignored the Role of International Economics
Most Serious Decline in the Value of the Dollar in History
Placed Exporting at the Bottom of its Priority List
Passive Approach to Trade
Failure to Pursue Negotiations Designed to Improve the Access
of American Exports to Foreign Markets has Contributed, in
part, to Protectionist Sentiment
Over-burdensome Government Regulations, Excessive Taxation,
Inflationary Monetary Policy, Unstable Economy
The Security of Energy and Raw Materials Access
Too much Concern has been Lavished on Nations Unable to Carry
out Sea-bed Mining, with Insufficient Attention Paid to
Gaining Early American Access to it
Kev Proposals in the 1980 Republican Platform
National Security
Will seek military superiority
Earliest possible deployment of the M-X missile
New manned strategic penetrating bomber
Deployment of an air defense system
Accelerate deployment of cruise missiles on
aircraft, land, ships, and submarines
Research and development of an effective anti-
ballistic missile system
Early modernization of our theater nuclear forces
Deployment in Europe of medium-range cruise missiles,
ballistic missiles, enhanced radiation warheads,
and the modernization of nuclear artillery
A permanent fleet in the Indian Ocean
Restoration of tactical aircraft development;
increase in stocks of ammunition, spare parts,
and supplies
Increase airlift capability; increase our aerial
tanker fleet
Restore Navy fleet to 600 ships at a rate equal
to or exceeding that planned by Ford
Improve all-volunteer force; no draft (or draft
registration)
Correct the great inequities in pay and benefits
of career military personnel
Increase funding for R&D
Support a vigorous space research program
Improve U.S. intelligence capabilities for collection,
analysis, counterintelligence, and covert action
2
Support legislation to invoke criminal sanctions
against anyone who discloses the identities of U.S.
intelligence officers abroad; support amendment
to the FOIA and Privacy Act
Repeal ill-considered restrictions sponsored by
Democrats, which have debilitated U.S. intelligence
capabilities while easing the subversion efforts
of our adversaries
Foreign Policy
U.S. - Soviet Relations
Oppose the transfer of high technology to the Soviet
Union and its Eastern European satellites
Call for the immediate lifting of the grain embargo
Insist on full Soviet compliance with the humanitarian
provisions of the Helsinki agreement
Publicize to the world the fundamental differences
in the two systems through RFE/RL
End the cover-up of Soviet violations of SALT I and II
NATO and Western Europe
Categorically reject unilateral moratoria on the
deployment by the U.S. and NATO of theater nuclear
weapons; oppose arms control agreements that
interfere with the transfer of military technology
to our Allies
Call for the integration of Spain into the North
Atlantic Alliance
Middle East, Persian Gulf
Reject any call for involvement with the PLO
Keep Jerusalem an undivided city
The Americas
Oppose the aid program for Nicaragua
Return to the fundamental principle of treating a friend
as a friend and self-proclaimed enemies as enemies,
without apology; make it clear to the Soviet Union and
Cuba that their subversion and their build-up of
3
Admit Puerto Rico to the Union
Seek a North America Accord between the U.S., Canada
and Mexico
Asia and the Pacific
Strongly support a substantially increased Japanese
national defense effort
Provide full economic aid and military material to assist
Thailand in repelling Vietnamese aggression
No expanded relations with Vietnam
Press for full accounting of Americans still listed
as missing in action
Regard any attempt to alter Taiwan's status by force
as a threat to peace in the region; give priority
consideration to Taiwan's defense requirements
Africa
Devote major resources to development on a bilateral
basis
Rebuild U.S. military assistance and foreign arms sales
International Economic Policy
Adopt an aggressive export policy
Will not stand idly by as the jobs of millions of Americans
in domestic industries, such as automobiles, textiles,
steel, and electronics are jeopardized and lost
Elimination of disincentives for exporters, including
inhibitive statutes and regulations
Work with trading partners to eliminate subsidies to
exports and dumping
Eliminate excessive taxation of Americans working abroad
Revitalize merchant marine
Domestic economic and regulatory policy must be adjusted
to remove impediments to greater development of our
own energy and raw materials resources
Anderson Themes:
Foreign Policy and National Security
1. Maintain a stable balance by preserving essential
equivalence with the Soviet Union.
2. US must put its economic house in order; rebuilding
economy is starting point for international recovery.
3. US must restore historic alliances; rely heavily on
collective security arrangements with our principle
allies in NATO and Japan.
4. Must modernize and diversity our strategic arsenal.
5. No MX -- "American ingenuity can devise a more flexible
and more cost-effective solution."
6. Will take steps to complete SALT II process; invigorate
the international quest for arms control.
7. Superpower relationship cannot be allowed to degenerate
further; must maintain "active communications" with the
Soviets, particularly when tensions are high.
8. Emphasize versatile and usable forces to counter any
conventional attack on our vital interests.
9. Establish and maintain peace in the Middle East; oppose
Palestinian state; move US Embassy to Jerusalem.
10. Carefully nuture new relationship with China.
11. No more important partner than Mexico.
12. Providing economic aid to Nicaragua promotes an atmosphere
of moderation.
13. Open a wider window to India.
14. Cooperate with the developing nations in ways which
respect their individuality and independence, and which serve
our mutual interests in trade and development.
15. Urges Japan to expand its foreign aid and its security
role; encourages Japan to build more plants in US, and remove
curbs on US goods (especially in telecommunictions, computers,
semiconductors).
16. Would continue present informal military and economic
relations with Taiwan.
17. Greater IMF help for LDC's energy development.
18. Discourages US investments in South Africa "whenever
possible in cooperation with our allies;" encourages compliance
with UN arms embargo.
19. Strong human rights stance; urges continued denial of
foreign aid to governments violating human rights; criticizes
US banks and corporations for underwriting US policy by providing
loans and investments to nations ineligible for government aid.
20. Linkage of trade with Soviet bloc to emigration flows.
21. Urges that foreign assistance be channeled through
multilateral agencies wherever possible.
22. Claims "benign neglect" has characterized export adminis-
tration, and proposes various remedies including:
expanded Eximbank financing;
reduced taxes on Americans abroad "engaged in
export activities;"
support for export trading companies to help
small and medium-sized firms enter export
markets.
KEY FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES:
CONTRASTS AMONG THE CANDIDATES
ISSUE
Carter
Reagan
Anderson
M-X
Yes
Yes
No
Aid to Nicaragua
Yes
No
Yes
SALT II
Yes
No
Yes
Comprehensive Test Ban
Yes
No
Yes
Draft Registration
Yes
No
No
Military Superiority
No
Yes
No
Neutron Bomb in Europe
No
Yes
No
Permanent Indian Ocean Fleet
No
Yes
No
600 Ship Navy
No
Yes
No
More Large Aircraft Carriers
No
Yes
No
Lift Grain Embargo
No
Yes
No
Bilateral Over Multilateral Aid
No
Yes
No
Nuclear Materials to India
Yes
No
NO
Key Proposals in the Anderson Platform, 1980
National Security
Essential Equivalence
Improve Command, Control, and Communications
Improve Warning Systems
Trident, Air-launched Cruise Missiles
R & D on New Bomber
Reject M-X ("American ingenuity can devise a more
flexible and cost-effective solution.
")
Redress Grave Personnel Problems
Pre-position Equipment Overseas
Increase Air and Sealift Capability
Allocate More Resources to Naval Forces
Complete SALT II Process
R & D on an Anti-satellite Capability
Greater Defense Role for Japan
Foreign Policy
Reinforce NATO
Stabilize US-USSR Relations
Support Camp David Accords
Strengthen Ties to Japan
Nurture Relations with PRC
Joint American/Mexican Commission
No Cuban Military Involvement in Hemisphere
Economic Aid to Nicaragua
Wider Window to India
Anti-apartheid Measures Toward South Africa
Economic Policy
Work Toward a More Equitable International Economic Order
Gov. Reagan on Foreign Policy
"In the case of foreign policy, I am equally unimpressed
with all this talk about our problems being too complex,
too intricate, to allow timely decision and action. The
fetish of complexity, the trick of making hard decisions
harder to make; the art, finally, of rationalizing the
non-decision, have made a ruin of American foreign policy. "
Reagan Speech
May 21, 1968
Gov. Reagan on Intervention
Reagan's record is filled with examples of suggestions --
some explicit, some implied -- that U.S. intervention be used
to resolve international disturbances.
Angola
In response to Soviet involvement in the Angolan civil
war, Reagan said the U.S. should have told the Russians:
"Out. We'll let them (Angola) do the fighting,
or you're going to have to deal with us."
New York Times
January 6, 1976
Cuba
In response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,
Reagan said:
0
"One option might well be that we surround
the island of Cuba and stop all traffic in and out. "
New York Times
January 29, 1980
Cyprus
Reagan has said that, in a manner similar to Eisenhower's
deployment of troops to Lebanon, as President he would have
favored sending a "token (U.S.) military force" to Cyprus
during the 1975 crisis on the island.
New York Times
June 4, 1976
Ecuador
In response to the Ecuadorians' 1 seizure of U.S. tuna boats
in 1975, Reagan suggested:
" (T) he U.S. government next winter should send along
a destroyer with the tuna boats to cruise, say, 13 miles
off the shore of Ecuador in an updated version of
Teddy Roosevelt's dictum to "talk softly, but carry a
2
Gov. Reagan on Intervention
Lebanon
In the same vein as Eisenhower's deployment of troops to
Lebanon, Reagan has said that, as President, he would have
sent troops to Lebanon during the 1976 civil war.
New York Times
June 4, 1976
Middle East
Responding to a question on whether the U.S. should establish
a military presence in the Sinai to counter the Soviets, Reagan
said:
"I think this might be a very, very good time for
the United States to show a presence in the Middle East.
I don't think it would be provocative and I don't think
it looks like anyone bullying
"
Boston Globe
January 13, 1980
North Korea
In response to the North Korean seizure of the U.S.S.
Pueblo, Reagan said:
"I cannot for the life of me understand why someone
in the United States government, particularly the
President, has not said, 'That ship had better come
out of that harbor in 24 hours or we are coming in
after it.
Los Angeles Times
January 25, 1968
Pakistan
After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Reagan advocated
sending advisers into Pakistan.
"I think the most logical thing is that they (the advisers)
would go to the country we have a treaty with, Pakistan,
and that training could be provided there, with U.S. and
Pakistan where we have a legitimate reason and right to be. "
St. Louis Globe-Democrat
January 11, 1980
3
Gov. Reacan on Intervention
Portugal
To prevent a Communist takeover of Portugal in 1975, Reagan
said the United States should have acted "in any way to prevent
or discourage" the Communists, adding "It was clearly in our
interest to do so." But he refused to be more specific.
Los Angeles Times
June 1, 1975
Rhodesia
To ensure an orderly transition in Rhodesia between a
minority-white to a black-majority rule, Reagan said:
"Whether it will be enough to have simply a show
of strength, a promise that we would (supply) troops
or whether you'd have to go in with occupation forces
or not I don't know. "
New York Times
June 4, 1976
North Vietnam
The Los Angeles Times reported that in a speech to the
National Headliners Club Reagan stated that the United States
should have met North Vietnam's final thrust in South Vietnam
with B-52 bombers.
Los Angeles Times
June 1, 1975
Foreign Affairs/Defense Issues:
The former permanent representative to the United Nations, envoy
to Peking and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency stressed
during his recent campaign for the Republican Presidential nomina-
tion that because of his background in foreign affairs he is more
competent- to deal with problems faring the United States around
the world then is President Carter.
Despite a reputation as a moderate in foreign affairs, Bush is a
"hardliner." His view of the world is focused on the "menace" of
Communism -- Russian Communism. It is his often stated opinion
that the Soviet Union is "seeking superiority" in the world and
the United States must take steps to counteract this aggression.
Nearly all of Mr. Bush's foreign policy and military issue positions
reflect his overriding preoccupation with the Soviet Union.
As a Presidential candidate Bush castigated the Carter Administration
for what he termed the following foreign policy failures:
Projecting a perception of vascillation and weakness in
U.S. foreign policy among our allies and adversaries alike.
Gutting American defense by slowing the MX and cruise missile
programs, and cutting funds for the B-1, a new carrier and naval
modernization.
Initiating a misguided human rights campaign, which overloads
our strategic interests and harms our allies.
Failing to act to release our hostages in Iran.
Presenting an unverifiable and weak SALT II agreement to the
American people.
Defense Spending:
If George Bush's view of the world is clouded by Soviet aggression,
his prescription for a stronger, more confident, United States is
crystal clear --- increase defense spending and improve our alliances
with friendly foreign powers.
Bush is clearly a "hawk" on defense spending, and views the need
for additional military hardware as essential. He criticizes the
Carter Administration for falling behind the Russians in terms of
military strength and calls for the near term funding of the
following defense needs:
a new manned bomber -- the B-1;
an accelerated MX deployment schedule;
a long range cruise missile;
a strengthened three ocean navy;
improved air defense capabilities;
expanded and improved strategic airlift capabilities;
expanded and improved conventional weaponry;
support for the volunteer army with registration for both men
and women;
an expanded military training program;
a strong intelligence service, capable of providing accurate
information on events abroad;
increased military R&D funding.
To meet these defense needs Bush has argued for an increase in
defense spending of $5-8 billion per year over the President's
latest defense budget figures.
Despite the fact that President Carter has increased spending on
defense every year since the last Ford budget -- an overall
increase of $73 billion -- Bush criticizes Carter for "gutting"
American defense by cuts in defense spending, which have resulted
in "underpaid military personnel, inadequate personnel to operate
equipment and equipment malfunction such as the helicopter mal-
function that led to the abortive Iranian hostage rescue attempt."
Houston City Hall Speech, Dallas Morning News, 4/29/80.
Bush believes the U.S. can build the military hardware -- the MX,
the B-1, a three ocean Navy and implement conventional forces
improvements all for $6-8 billion over several years and still
balance the budget by 1982. He would accomplish this feat by
"eliminating waste and move away from spending programs such
as CETA.' Business Week, 2/4/80.
"If it came down to that (more for defense, a tax cut and a
balanced budget), I would still have to go with defense increases
because we really do have a so-called window of danger. But it is
not unrealistic to think you can increase defense spending, have
a simply side tax cut and get a (budget) balance. Everybody says
that's impossible. The economists advising me don't think it's
impossible. " Washington Post, 4/20/80.
Intelligence:
The former CIA Director believes the American Intelligence System
should be strengthened, but with protections for the rights of U.S.
citizens. He is critical of the President's decision to halt
SR-71 flights (spy planes) over Cuba, and points this out as an
example. His only example of a weakening U.S. intelligence capacity.
Bush also feels the U.S. must "retain the capacity for covert
operations in other countries" and refuses to rule out "American
participation in the overthrow of foreign governments."
Under his direction at the CIA, new guidelines were adopted.
While many critics thought they were not tough enough, there
have been no charges of illegal intelligence activity during the
past six years.
"I would simply follow the law (concerning covert operations and
the CIA) It excludes assassination, for example. The findings
have to be -- and I think this is proper -- in writing by the
President, that a sensitive operation is in the national interest
and be reported to the Congress. But I think covert operations
should be sparingly used quiet support for a friend is covert
action. " Miami Herald, 2/3/80
SALT II:
Bush does not support the SALT II treaty, he believes several
amendments should be made to the treaty before it is passed.
Specifically:
the Soviet backfire bomber must be counted as a strategic weapon;
the size and strength of nuclear warheads and missiles must be
addressed to make the treaty more equal;
obstacles to deploying the MX missile must be removed;
the treaty must be made verifiable.
Bush does support an arms reduction agreement that is more verifiable
and believes the Soviets would be willing to make the changes he has
recommended because he believes pressure is mounting in the Soviet
Union against increased defense spending.
In 1964, during his unsuccessful race for the U.S. Senate in Texas,
Bush vigorously opposed the nuclear test ban treaty.
Nuclear Policy Abroad:
Bush is one of only a few national politicos who has ever stated
the view that there is such a thing as a winner in a nuclear
exchange. In an interview with Robert Scheer, a writer with
the Los Angeles Times, Bush outlined his views on nuclear
exchange.
Robert. Sheer: "Don't we reach a point with these strategic
weapons where we can wipe each other out so many times and
no one wants to use them or is willing to use them, that it
really doesn' matter whether we're 10% or 2% lower or
higher (than the Soviets) ?
Bush: "Yes, if you believe there is no such thing as a winner
in a nuclear exchange, that argument makes a little sense.
I don't believe that."
Scheer: "How do you win in a nuclear exchange?"
Bush: "You have a survivability of command in control,
survivability of industrial potential, protection of a
percentage of your citizens, and you have a capability
that inflicts more damage on the opposition than it can
inflict upon you. That's the way you can have a winner,
and the Soviets' planning is based on the ugly concept
of a winner in a nuclear exchange."
Scheer: "Do you mean like 5 percent would survive?
Two percent?"
Bush: "More than that -- if everybody fired everything he
had, you'd have more than that survive."
Scheer: "So have we made a mistake, then, in not thinking
of nuclear war as a possible option that we could survive?"
Bush: "Our strategic forces should be considered as a
deterrent, and that is the way I'd do it
11
Los Angeles Times, 1/24/80
Military Draft:
As a member of Congress, Bush supported President Nixon's plan
to eliminate the military draft, and remains opposed to a peacetime
draft today.
However, he supports registration, for both sexes. He is a strong
supporter of the All-Volunteer Army, but believes it must be
supplemented, to some degree, if we are to keep our forces at
proper levels. He does not explain how he would supplement the all
volunteer armed forces without implementing a peace time draft.
Soviet Union:
Bush feels the root cause of all our foreign policy problems is
the Soviet Union. Bush believes the Soviets are not satisfied
with nuclear parity with the U.S., instead he feels they are
seeking nuclear and conventional force superiority. "The Soviets
want a first strike capability, and don't think they are above
using it. Salinas, California, Californian, 1/28/80.
Afghanistan:
Bush believes the President's failure to spell out our commitments
to our allies and other non-alleged nations led to the invasion of
Afghanistan and continues to cause foreign policy credibility
problems for the U.S. Bush feels that a redefinition of our
foreign policy should be made, and include the following:
keep commitments
strengthen intelligence operations
place human rights concerns in proper balance with
strategic interests.
In addition, he favors shipping arms to Afghanistan rebels through
Pakistan and is critical of the President for not helping "people
that are resisting brutal aggression."
Soviet Grain Embargo:
He opposes the U.S. embargo of grain to the Soviets because he
feels it hurts us more than it hurts them. However, he would
support a total across the board trade embargo against the
Soviets. Bush has termed the President's embargo actions as
ineffective, and inconsistent. His one example is "we halt grain
shipments to the Soviets which lower our farm prices and yet we
sell phosphates to the Soviets to improve their crops. Face the
Nation, 1/20/80
Olympic Boycott:
Supported the decision to boycott the Moscow games, even proposed
withholding athlete's passports to force them to stay home and not
participate in the games.
Cuba:
He believes Cuba presents this country with one of its major
foreign policy challenges. Specifically, he cites the basing
of Soviet troops in Cuba as an outragous afront to our security
and insists they must be removed.
Agrees that the Administration has appeared "important" by not
dealing directly with the issue of Cuban troops in Africa. Bush
has stated, "the Cubans are surrogates for the Soviets they
are being used as pawns by the Soviets to gain political advantages
and seek hegemony everywhere." Political Profiles, Inc. , 12/79
Bush ridiculed Ronald Reagan's suggestion that we should blockade
Cuba in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan by saying
"the idea of blockading Cuba, which Ronald Reagan has proposed,
risks nuclear war and would require the entire Atlantic fleet.
It wasn't Cuba that invaded Afghanistan, it was Russia. The way
to peace is to keep this country strong, not through reckless
foreign policy." Washington Star, 3/22/80
Europe:
Bush strongly favors European unity
supports the admission
of Greece, Spain and Portugal to the EEC.
During the recent campaign he was highly critical of the President's
handling of the issue of deploying the neutron bomb in Western
Europe. Bush said, "Carter backed off after convincing West
Germany to deploy the neutron bomb, in the face of a massive
propoganda campaign launched by the Soviets, and left Chancellor
Schmidt out on a political limb." Face the Nation, 1/20/80
Human Rights:
Bush believes the U.S. human rights policy, under the Carter
Administration is misguided and harmful to our allies.
He argues that we should decide foreign policy on the basis of
strategic interests and not soley on a particular country's
human rights record. He uses Iran as an example by saying:
"our failure to defend our ally, the Shah, created a situation
where one form of tyranny is replaced with an even worse form
and one that is not in our strategic interest." Dallas Morning
News, 5/1/80
Bush supports efforts to improve human rights, but only in concert
with U.S. strategic interests.
Iran:
Bush leveled his harshest criticism of the President during his
recent campaign over the issue of Iran and the hostages being
held there. In an interview with Robert Shogan of the NY Times
in March, Bush said, "Carter has manipulated the news media, for
the benefit of his own reelection, it is time the American people
recognize our Iranian policy for what it is
one of failure,
inaction and even calculated deception. "
He also charged the President iwth full responsibility for the
hostage crisis by saying, "the weakness and inexperience of the
President have both led to this crisis and managed to isolate
us in our tragedy." Dallas Morning News, 4/29/80
Without offering his own suggestions to resolve this hostage
crisis, Bush demanded we close the Iranian embassy in Washington
and expell all Iranian diplomats.
He completely rejects the notion that the U.S. should apologize
for any past actions in Iran. For all the criticism of the
Shah's regime American support for Iran was the aim of our
policy for nearly three decades, and the wisdom of that policy
has been reinforced by recent events.' LA Times, 5/15/80. Bush
considered the Shah "a friend who was less then perfect in human
rights. 17' The Flint Journal, 5/11/80
Bush differed with Ronald Reagan's "live in the dust" position on
Iran, which would set a firm date for the release of the hostages
or risk American action to release the, by saying "Reagan owes
the American people a better explanation of his proposal. In the
decade of the 80's a foreign policy based on bluffs is as
ineffectual as it is dangerous." LA Times, 5/15/80
Panama:
Bush opposed the canal treaties primarily because of "the appearance
that we are retreating and pulling back on commitments. LA Times,
1/24/80
Middle East:
He strongly supports the State of Israel, believes we need to
strengthen our ties with moderate Arab states and feels the
Palestinian people should have a role to play in negotiations
that will determine their future.
Bush is generally supportive of the Camp David accords but argues
that Jordan and other Arab countries must be brought in to the peace
making process. He is opposed to allowing the PLO to participate
in any negotiations until they renounce their pledge to destroy
the state of Israel and cease terrosist attacks. He has likened
the PLO to an international KKK.
On the issue of settlements he is opposed to the construction of
additional settlements on the West Bank, but supports "the
legitimate construction for national security purposes" of those
settlements that currently exist.
He believes Ronald Reagan's suggestion that Sinain troops should
be based in the Sinai would be a mistake and would draw the Soviets
back into the middle east.
China:
Bush views himself as an expert on China which stems from his term
of duty as U.S. envoy to China in 1974. He sees China as a back-
ward country with a large standing conventional army. He also
believes the Chinese are not expansemistic, but rather they seek
to be self relient by the year 2000.
He is opposed to selling arms to the Chinese until he is certain
they have "no foreign ambitions."
Bush is highly critical of the way the Carter Administration ended
diplomatic relations with Tawain. "For the first time in our
history, a peacetime American government has renounced a treaty
with an ally (Taiwan) with cause or benefit." Washington Post,
12/78.
Bush's assignment in the U.N. was highlighted by the failure of
the United States to retain a seat in the General Assembly for
Taiwan. The U.S. position had been to support a "two China policy"
with both Taiwan and the People's Republic of China being represented.
As Ronald Reagan's emissary, George Bush recently visited China and
Japan to outline what many foreign policy advisors believe in Reagan's
version of a "two-China policy" for U.S. foreign relations in the
1980s. The Chinese are clearly not enthusiastic over Mr. Bush's
return to China, where he is viewed as a supporter of Taiwan and
an adversary of arms sales to the People's Republic.
East Asia:
Bush would push for stronger ties and security arrangements
with East Asian countries and isolate (economically) disruptive
nations
North Korea, Vietnam.
He would also encourage Japan to assume greater responsibility
in regional defense and security matters. In addition, he
supports an increase in air and naval forces in the Pacific
as well as the establishment of an Indian Ocean fleet.