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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Roberts, John G.: Files
Folder Title: JGR/Dozier, Gilbert (2 of 6)
Box: 18
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
DOCUMENT
NO. AND TYPE
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
1. petition
re: Gilbert Dozier, page 1 (1p, partial)
n.d.
P-6-36
CCB 12/14/00
in
COLLECTION:
ROBERTS, JOHN G.: Files
kdb
FILE FOLDER:
JGR/Dozier, Gilbert [2 of 6] OA-12361 Box18
12/26/95
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)l
Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. 562(b)]
P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRAI.
F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRAI.
F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute ((a)(3) of the PRAI.
FOIA].
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial
F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA).
information [(a)(4) of the PRAI.
F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information
P-6 Release would diaclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or
I(b)(4) of the FOIAI.
between such advisors [(a)(6) of the PRA.
F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy I(B)(6) of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwerranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of
the FOIA]
the PRAI.
F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of
the FOIA).
c.
Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
[(b)(8) of the FOIA].
F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of
the FOIA].
X
JOHN R. STANISH
125807
ATTORNEY AT LAW
COPY
8836 INDIANAPOLIS BLVD.
4640
HAMMOND, INDIANA 46324
JL001
(219) 844-5516
TLD
JL003
January 7th, 1983
WE002
J2007
Mr. David C. Stephenson
Acting Pardon Attorney
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
Re: Petition for Executive Clemency of
Gilbert L. Dozier
Dear Mr. Stephenson:
Enclosed you will find a Petition for Commutation of
Sentence, with supporting letters, on behalf of Mr. Gilbert L.
x
Dozier an inmate at FCI Fort Worth. Mr. Dozier is currently
serving a term of imprisonment totaling eighteen (18) years
following conviction under the RICO Statute. I will be
representing Mr. Dozier along with Mr. John M. Stuckey, Jr.,
Attorney at Law, Airport International Centre, Suite 205,
1005 Virginia Avenue, Atlanta, Georgia 30354, (404) 762-5768,
and Mr. Curtis C. Crawford, Attorney at Law, 408 Olive, Suite
715, St. Louis, Missouri 63102, (314) 621-4525.
I would appreciate the opportunity to meet with you
to discuss this matter within the next several weeks after
you have had a chance to review Mr. Dozier's petition.
If you have any questions or desire further information
from me prior to this meeting, please feel free to let me know.
Thank you for your cooperation.
Sincerely yours,
John R. Stanish
k/enc.
PETITION FOR COMMUTATION OF SENTENCE
(Type or Print - This form may be modified for use in applying for remission of fine.)
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
GILBERT
L
DOZIER
PETITIONER
Name:
First
Middle
Last
01326-095
confined in the Federal Institution at
Fort Worth,
a Federal prisoner, Reg. No.
City
Texas
in seeking a commutation of sentence, states that he is a citizen of
USA
State
Country
March 19th
34
born on
19
and has Social Security No
If not presently confined,
his address is
n/a
No.
Street
City
State Zip Code
PETITIONER was convicted on a plea of
not guilty
in the United States
guilty, not guilty, nolo contendere
District Court for the
Middle
District of
Louisiana
at
Baton Rouge
Eastern, Western, etc.
State
City
of the crime of
violation of 18 U.S.C. 1962(2) 1963, 1951 & 1952 (RICO)
Describe specifically and accurately
five years on Count I and five
Nov 12th
80
and was sentenced on
19
to imprisonment for years on Count II, consecutive
length of sentence
and/ to pay a fine of $ 25,000
which was amended on June 24, 1982, to add eight
years ampr sonment on Count III, consecutive to the terms of imprisonment under
Counts I and II. Therefore, the total term of imprisonment is 18 years
If conviction was appealed, complete the following paragraph:
PETITIONER appealed to the United States Court of Appeals, where the judgment was affirmed on
April 8th
19
82
An appeal
was
taken to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court
denied
a
was, was not
granted, denied
petition for a writ of certiorari on
October 17
82
19
If certiorari was granted, the judgment was affirmed
n/a
on
19
June 24
82
PETITIONER began the service of his sentence on
will be
19
He
eligible
was, is not, will be
for parole on
April 15
19
87
and his application for parole was
n/a.
He will
granted, denied
be released from confinement on
n/a
19
PETITIONER'S criminal record, other than the instant offense, is as follows: (List every arrest by local, State or Federal
authorities, whether resulting in a conviction or not, giving date, disposition of case and name and location of court.)
NONE
FORM OPA-6
10-16-74
PETITIONER respectfully prays that he be granted clemency for the following reasons:
Sentences imposed are excessive. Petitioner attaches hereto and
incorporates by reference as Exhibit "A", a copy of the Sentencing
Memorandum filed in the Trial Court and attaches as Exhibits "B", "C"
& "D", respectivelyletters of support from the following:
Honorable Ernest N. Morial, Mayor of New Orleans; Mr. Martin D. Woodin,
President, Louisiana State University System; Mr. Ray P. Authement,
President, University of Southwest Louisiana.
The statements made herein are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.
DATE
SIGNATURE OF PETITIONER
If space is insufficient, additional pages may be added. Letters in support of this application may be submitted with petition.
DOJ-1973-06
EXHIBIT "A" TO PETITION FOR
COMMUTATION OF SENTENCE
GILBERT L. DOZIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
VERSUS
CRIMINAL NO. 80-2
SECTION "A"
GILBERT L. DOZIER
SENTENCING MEMORANDUM ON
BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANT
Choosing the appropriate sentence for Gil Dozier's conduct is a
sensitive and difficult task for this court. The goals of corrections, the
facts of the case and the individual characteristics of this defendant must
be balanced and integrated to find the appropriate sanction. The
defendant is aware that the Court will have available a thorough and
accurate pre-sentence evaluation to help its decision-making. However,
while the difficult burden of decision-making is now upon the Court,
the weight of the actual decision will fall upon the defendant. He
therefore takes this opportunity to supplement that pre-sentence report
with an additional analysis and evaluation.
While the statutes violated carry severe sanctions of incarceration,
a penalty of incarceration is not warranted in this case. The multi-goals
of corrections can be best fulfilled by a monetary fine and a period of
probation with creative and appropriate special terms, some of which have
already been suggested to this Court through a Pre-sentence Evaluation.
The justification for this position is based on the mitigating facts
surrounding the offenses themselves, the considerations of general
deterrence (the primary goal of sentencing in this case), and the
individual characteristics of this defendant.
THE OFFENSE
The statutes which Gil Dozier was convicted of violating were
enacted by Congress to deal with grave and deep-seated societal
problems -- the RICO Act to intercept the insidious spread of
organized crime into legitimate business enterprises and the Hobbs Act
to similarly combat its influence "on the waterfront" in labor union
activity. The language of the statutes was drafted broadly to
encompass the breadth of its formidable target. The penalty was
appropriately severe.
Gil Dozier's conduct, while found violative of these statutes, was
not the sort of behavior targeted by Congress for which a severe penalty
was sanctioned. This is not to denigrate the seriousness of what the
defendant was accused and found guilty of doing. However, when a
massive effort is mobilized to combat a pervasive perceived evil,
sometimes those who have committed lesser transgressions are ensnared
in its net. When this occurs, the sentencing court must consider a
lessening of the penalty. Even the prosecuting attorney stated
repeatedly to the jury, "This is not a case involving organized crime."
The prosecutor was concerned the jury would not find the defendant to
fall within the scope of those statutes at all and was obviously aware
that the defendant's behavior, even at worst, did not and does not
warrant the severer sanctions of these laws.
Regarding the substantive acts of extortion and attempted
extortion, there was no allegation made nor any evidence presented
that the defendant exerted or threatened any physical force or personal
injury upon anyone, which would be the most serious breach of these
statutes. In fact, it is unknown whether the jury found the defendant
to have instilled any fear at all or whether he had simply improperly
solicited campaign contributions in too close connexity with his official
role. It is clear from the evidence that Dozier was aggressive, blunt and
at times manipulative, but the reaction to him was less fear than it was
anger and resentment. The thrust of the government's case appeared
to be that Dozier committed the offenses not through coercion or duress
but by improperly soliciting campaign funds under color of official
right.
Gil Dozier knew in 1975 that if he had any hope of being Governor
in 1979, he would need to begin the arduous fundraising task immediately
and relentlessly. Like any other elected official, the likeliest source of
-2-
funds was from his constituency -- in his case, the agri-business
community. However logical, it was fraught with danger as he had been
elected without the support, and indeed despite the opposition of, the
agriculture community. The overriding need for funds, the abrasiveness
of his personality and the approach to people who had been ardently
opposed to his election, guaranteed strain and tension. As Loy Weaver
himself said, "You know anytime you go to your political enemy
and ask for a contribution, he would consider that a threat. " While
this doesn't exonerate Gil Dozier, it does offer circumstances that are
mitigating. There was no allegation that Gil Dozier sought to line his
own pockets. On the contrary, he was engaged in the legitimate goal
of political fundraising, a goal made astronomically high because of the
office he sought. Millions of dollars were needed. Much of his own
financial resources poured into the campaign coffers. He was not out
to get rich off the public -- he wanted to be Governor. His goal was
laudable; the cost was overwhelming, and his tactics and style were
unacceptable. It was a combination of all those elements, not just
his personality, that led to his downfall.
PURPOSES OF SENTENCING
The Court is, we are sure, well aware of the factors traditionally
identified as the goals of a sentence in a criminal case. Those purposes
are (1) rehabilitation of the offender, (2) protection of society from the
offender, (3) general deterrence of other potential offenders, and (4)
retribution by society against the offender. See, e.g., M. Frankel,
Criminal Sentences -- Law Without Order, 58 (1973); Department of
Justice Statement on Sentencing, before the Subcomittee on Criminal
Laws and Procedures of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess., at 10 (June 20, 1977).
-3-
As the probation office agrees, there is no basis upon which
to believe that a prison sentence for Gil Dozier would serve any
rehabilitation purpose; on the contrary, a prison sentence in this
case could only have the opposite effect. As the Court is aware,
Mr. Dozier was utterly destroyed as a political figure by this case,
and cannot ever pursue what had been his primary ambition for the
past nine years. Furthermore, as an almost automatic consequence of
his conviction, he will lose his license to practice law, thus depriving
him of his career previous to entering public office. He is truly at
the bottom, in terms of his career, his reputation, and his ability
to make a life for himself and his family. His greatest need, in terms
of rehabilitation, is to begin picking up the pieces of his life, earning
the respect of others, and restoring his own self-respect. Any
substantial prison sentence would only delay that process and, by the
further degradation it would impose upon him, perhaps make it
unattainable.
Nor is there any purpose to be served by a sentence in this
case in terms of protecting the community against the acts of Gil
Dozier. The only acts anyone has accused him of were misuse of his
political powers, arising from overweening ambition. Gil Dozier will
never again hold public office. Nor, in light of the awesome consequences
he has already suffered as a result of the activities that led him to
stand before the Court for sentencing, is there the slightest basis to
contend that further punishment is necessary to ensure that Mr. Dozier
will never again engage in activities that could lead him back to such
a position.
The remaining traditional goals of sentencing are "general
deterrence" -- i.e., making an example of Gil Dozier to prevent others
from committing similar acts -- and retribution, which includes the
concept of the will of the community. We will address each of these
in some detail.
-4-
1.
Deterrence
With respect to deterrence, the nature of the offense involved
and the significance this case has already assumed in the political
life of this State are highly significant. We need not dwell on the facts
of the case, for the Court heard all the evidence. But whatever might
be said about Mr. Dozier's state of mind, three facts stand out clearly.
First, Mr. Dozier was raising funds to run for political office,
and had every right to ask for contributions from each and every
person he spoke to.
Mr. Dozier did not have the right to lead potential contributors
to believe their money was necessary to get favorable treatment from
his office, but he did have the right to attempt to raise the hundreds
of thousands of dollars necessary given the current system of campaign
financing in this State and elsewhere, to run for office. This is
hardly a case like that of the ABSCAM defendants, who used their
elected office for private gain, or of unelected public officials who have
no business asking for money from anybody. In other words, it is
not a case where the defendant's mere requests for money suggest
corruption, or where the defendant sought to line his own pockets.
Second, Mr. Dozier, for a man accused and now convicted
for extortion and racketeering on the basis of his requests for funds,
was astonishingly open about his activities. He made his pitch to
individuals, to packed meeting rooms, to friends, acquaintances,
political enemies and strangers, indiscriminately and repeatedly.
Indeed the evidence is uncontradicted that Mr. Dozier sought
large contributions from pretty much everybody he had occasion
to deal with as Commissioner of Agriculture. If one assumes he was
consciously and deliberately committing crimes, it is difficult to explain
the large number of total strangers and even political enemies he engaged
as potential partners in bribery -- including not only those who testified,
but the numerous others who were present and were not called as
witnesses, and the 30 auction barn owners and 35 dairy processors who
were supposed to be solicited by Floyd Volentine and Temple Brown,
respectively.
-5-
Third, there has been no showing that the defendant actually
conditioned his official acts on contributions of money, however much the
testimony may have established that he gave the impression that he would
do SO. This lack of connexity between his fundraising activity and what
he actually did in office was apparent throughout all the allegations of
the indictment. Most of the individuals who made no contribution
whatsoever nonetheless obtained what they desired from the Department
of Agriculture. Of those who made a contribution, if their requests
were meritorious, they were granted; if not, they were not. While
Mr. Dozier realizes the impression left with the individual (as the
prosecutor stated repeatedly, "at that moment in time") constitutes
the offense, the propriety of his official conduct and the fact that
it was unaffected by whether or not he obtained a contribution is
significant in mitigation. No harm in fact befell his "victims." Dozier
took office admittedly ignorant of much of the agriculture industry and
it was apparent from his direct examination that he diligently educated
himself and became knowledgable and capable in the position. He was
a competent and able Commissioner of Agriculture. This is an important
consideration, as an offense like this often justifies a severe sanction
if there is an actual corruption of the powers of the office. It is
respectfully suggested that the defendant did not in fact breach the public
trust vested in him.
The combination of these three facts -- that Mr. Dozier was
soliciting campaign contributions, that he was not bashful about it,
and that he did not actually sell the powers of his office -- establish,
we submit, that the conduct was regarded by him as at least in the
range of accepted political activity. Although the Court is very
familiar with the testimony of Representative Loy Weaver in this regard,
it is worth emphasizing that he too conceded as much. He stated to
the House Agriculture Committee as follows:
In my opinion, Mr. Dozier did not violate the
law
I don't think he did. He has every
right to solicit campaign contributions. I
-6-
don't deny that, I think the setting was wrong,
I think the technique was wrong, but that's a
political consideration, it's not a question of
criminal prosecution, in my judgment. (House
Committee on Agriculture Hearings, May 18,
1979, p. 11.)
Our point here is not to reargue the question of intent, which has
been decided by the jury. Rather, our point is that Gil Dozier and
other political officeholders in Louisiana and elsewhere had reason to
question whether the type of solicitations he made stepped over the
borderline between condoned, even if uncommendable, political activity,
and clearly illegal activity. This is not to say that Dozier was doing
what every other politician was doing and was arbitrarily singled out for
criminal condemnation. That question is not before the Court. Dozier
was not of the right temperament for politics. He was too aggressive and
self-centered in his ambitions. Although he mastered his job as
Commissioner of Agriculture with commendable ability and determination,
he didn't heed the lessons of his advisors that politics was in actuality
the "people business". To violate the law was not Gil Dozier's remotest
intention, yet his overbearing and arrogant manner did in fact create
certain impressions in the minds of others and tragically for him, led
to his criminal prosecution and conviction.
The points just discussed are important when considering the
question of deterrence. For to a considerable degree, the prosecution
of Gil Dozier itself has fulfilled the goal of deterrence. If this were
a case -- an anti-trust bid-rigging conspiracy, for example -- where the
conduct was clearly criminal and past prosecutions followed by lenient
sentences have shown that the conduct can be deterred only by harsh
sentences, the deterrence argument for imprisonment would be strong.
But this is not that kind of a case. This prosecution has broken new
ground in defining what sort of political fund-raising tactics will not be
tolerated. (In this regard, we attach hereto a copy of an article by
Bill Lynch from the Times - Picayune, which illustrates the point.)
-7-
From the point of view of elected public officials (except for
hard-case charlatans), it is not the prospect of a lengthy jail
sentence, but the likelihood of criminal prosecution, that serves as the
greatest deterrent. A public official knows that a criminal conviction for
a serious offense will destroy his career and his life, and as a result of
this prosecution it is now clear that heavy-handed solicitation of campaign
contributions will be prosecuted as extortion and racketeering. Under
such circumstances, the conviction of Gil Dozier alone -- without regard
to sentence -- is a weighty and entirely sufficient deterrent to other
public officials. An example has already been made of Gil Dozier: he
has been the subject of the pathbreaking prosecution, and - with all the
truly terrible consequences that he has suffered and will suffer entirely
apart from any sentence that might be imposed -- he has been made an
object lesson for other elected public officials in Louisiana. To add a
stiff prison sentence to those consequences is completely unnecessary
for any purpose of deterrence.
2. Retribution
The last purpose of punishment that must be addressed is that
of retribution, which focuses not on correction of the defendant or
protection of society from him or from other potential offenders, but
is rather an expression of the community's outrage against the offense.
The idea that retribution is a legitimate function of a criminal sentence
is troubling for two reasons. First, insofar as the factor of retribution
is governed by the perceived "demand" of the community for punishment
of the individual before the Court, it is peculiarly susceptible to
influence not by the actual circumstances of the defendant and the
offense he committed, but by the public passions raised by rumor,
hearsay and media hype. In other words, retribution is more likely
to be an expression of the unpopularity of the defendant than of a
dispassionate assessment of the criminality of his conduct. Certainly,
a judge cannot allow himself to be swayed in sentencing either by the
popularity or the unpopularity of the defendant, and should not
impose sentence with an eye to the public's approval or disapproval of
-8-
his judicial action, but the "retribution" concept invites just such
considerations.
Second, it must be recognized that the most-used punishment in
our system -- a prison sentence -- is a peculiarly inappropriate and
unsuitable method of retribution. Incarceration does not just
publicly humiliate a defendant or deprive him of property. It imposes
terrible burdens on his family, it deprives society of any useful
contribution he might make, it prevents him from beginning a new life,
and it costs society the resources necessary to hold him in an
institution.
Most judges and commentators feel that for "white collar" offenders,
the public disgrace associated with prosecution and conviction is
punishment enough without adding incarceration as a sanction.
"Sentencing the White-Collar Offender", 17 American Criminal Law
Review 479 (1980); "Reflections on White-Collar Sentencing", 86
Yale Law Journal, 589 (1977). Some judges feel that the return of
the indictment "is much more traumatic than even the sentence."
American Criminal Law Review, at 484. Another judge has
remarked (id. at 485):
[Y]ou have a person who has a certain status,
has surrounded himself with a certain aura, and
you strip the aura away and let him stand
in front of his peers, that itself is pretty
serious punishment.
This exposure is even more traumatic when the offender is a public
figure whose whole self-esteem is based on his image in the public
eye. See "Theory and Practice in Sentencing the Political Criminal:
A Comment", 10 Criminal Law Bulletin 737.
To say that Gil Dozier has been already punished at this point
is an understatement -- he has been devastated. Ever since May of
1979 when Loy Weaver first leveled his accusations during the legislative
committee hearing, Dozier has been on the defensive in a losing battle
to save his political career and defend his reputation. The voluminous
publicity generated by the news media exacerbated the struggle and
-9-
humiliation. (See the exhibits attached to defendant's motion for
transfer of venue.) By January 1980, when the indictment came down,
Dozier's career and reputation were already ashes. What followed was
months of continuing anxiety, family and business disruption and
financial strain to defend against the charges. The directs costs and
expenses of legal fees surpassed $200,000; other substantial losses in
his legal and business activities were incurred. In barely a year's
time Gil Dozier went from an image of a crusading reformer possible
headed for the Governor's Mansion to the political Darth Vader of
Louisiana, an object of ridicule, scorn and ultimately, criminal
conviction. To a man of such vast ambitions and overwhelming
self-esteem, the fall from grace was catastrophic. Whether he
deserved it or not, the past year and a half have been misery for Gil
Dozier. He now faces the potential loss of his license to practice law
and the continuing social, business and political stigma associated with
conviction. Incarceration now, even for a short period, would only
exacerbate the emotional and financial strain already incurred by
Dozier, his family and associates.
An extensive survey of federal judges and their sentencing
revealed a reluctance to impose incarceration on a white collar
offender, even though felt to be a possible deterrent, because of the
questionable fairness of doing so when the offender himself does not
warrant such a sanction either for additional punishment or
rehabilitation. American Criminal Law Review, supra. These judges
have found additional reasons as well for not imposing incarceration,
regardless of its deterrent value in such cases. White collar
offenders generally have no prior record, and come from a background
of accepted societal values, respectability and living conditions.
For them a period of incarceration, even brief, is extremely harsh.
These offenders usually have families dependent upon them for
financial and emotional support, and frequently the children are in
the formative years of exposure to and adoption of societal values;
to incarcerate the parent at that time could be devastating to that
-10-
development. Furthermore, such offenders are frequently active and
contributing members of society through church groups and civic
organizations, and their incarceration would deny those worthy causes
their input and contribution. Finally, the white collar offender because
of his skills, education and financial resources, is ideally suited for
a probationary term with special conditions that would provide whatever
additional sanction is needed and at the same time utilize his abilities
in a constructive way for society. See American Criminal Law Review,
supra. All of these considerations are applicable to the defendant, Gil
Dozier. The pre-sentence evaluation amply details his background,
family responsibilities, and community service.
3. Alternative Sentencing Terms
This has been a highly publicized case and societal indignation
towards Gil Dozier has been at a peak level for some time. A temptation
exists to severely punish the defendant to satisfy that indignation.
Yet society receives no restitution and no reparation by incarcerating
Gil Dozier. There may be a momentary feeling of vindictive
self-satisfaction at such a penalty, but in reality, the public as
taxpayers would simply be footing the bill for his room and board and
gaining nothing in return.
Increasingly over recent years, judges have been fashioning
special terms of probation that do in fact offer something in return for
the injury to society. "Creative Punishment: A Study of Effective
Sentencing Alternatives", 14 Washburn Law Journal 57 (1975);
American Criminal Law Reporter, supra. This is particularly appropriate
in a case such as this where a public official is viewed to have misused
his public office. See Criminal Law Bulletin, supra, Such "creative"
sentencing has included, for example, a term of probation requiring a
supervisor of a public service agency, convicted of defrauding the
federal government, to donate four hours a day for a charitable
organization that could not afford to pay a professional social
worker to organize their caseload and office administration, American
Criminal Law Reporter, supra, at 493.
-11-
Other judges have spoken of imposing probationary terms that
require a dentist to give free dental care; a physician free medical
care; an industrialist to set up a non-profit organization and corporate
administrators to donate time to charity organizations. Ibid. One
commentator recommended that the various Watergate offenders be
sentenced to probation periods and placed in community services which
"would make the best use of their talents as lawyers, accountants or
administrators, as opposed to working as clerks, carpenters or amateur
farmers while confined at the taxpayer's expense." Criminal Law Bulletin,
at 746. The same commentator recommended imposition of the maximum
fine possible so as not to deprecate the seriousness of the offense. Other
commentators have felt that stiff monetary fines alone are the appropriate
sanction for white-collar offenses; that they are equally effective as a
deterrent and are cheaper to administer than incarceration. "Optiminal
Sentences for White-Collar Criminals", 17 American Criminal Law Review
409 (1980).
A different approach was taken by a federal judge in California
who sentenced several corporate executives convicted of price fixing
to probation with a special term that they give oral presentations before
twelve civic, business or other groups about the circumstances of the
case and their involvement, submitting written reports to the Court on
each appearance. 86 Yale Law Journal 589 (1977).
Creative sentencing has occurred even outside the traditional
context of white collar offenses. A person convicted of exhibiting
obscene movies was mandated to set up a $2,000 trust fund to
purchase education films for area schools; a woman guilty of recklessly
causing a forest fire was sentenced to assist in reforestation and
reseeding projects and also compile seasonal data on forest fires and give
talks at area schools. A hunter convicted of killing an endangered
swan was ordered to work a certain period of time in the state game
preserve. An artist dealing in drugs was probated to teach art in a
school for mentally retarded children, a volunteer task so rewarding
-12-
that he subsequently was hired on a permanent basis. Wasburn Law
Journal, supra, at 65-66.
On behalf of Mr. Dozier, we have suggested to the Probation
Office various methods of community service that might be required of
Mr. Dozier as a condition of probation in lieu of confinement in a
penitentiary. We submit that society's best interests would be served by
such a sentence, and that unlike imprisonment,' an alternative sentence
would enable Gil Dozier to perform his obligations as a member of the
community and as a husband and father.
4. Sentencing Equality
While the Court's primary consideration in sentencing is to arrive
at a punishment which best serves the needs of society in view of the
special circumstances of the defendant and of the offense, we recognize
that uniformity in sentencing is also a legitimate goal, and the Court must
be mindful of sentences imposed in other cases. It would be bootless to
compare this case to any other specific cases, because instances can be
found of great disparities not matter what the Court does here. But
nationwide statistics do provide some guidance.
The Probation Office has provided the Court with statistics on
sentences imposed during the most recent fiscal year under the Hobbs Act.
Given the particular nature of Mr. Dozier's offense, we suggest that the
proper benchmark for comparison is not the Hobbs Act, but the
sentences imposed for bribery or solicitation of bribes. As the Court is
aware, extortion under the Hobbs Act customarily consists of
obtaining money or property by use of threats of harm against the
victim or his family or business. It includes ransom demands, bomb or
arson threats, and blackmail, as well as threats of harm to one's
business through wrongful use of economic power. But extortion under
the Hobbs Act may also consist of obtaining property "under color of
official right." The latter phrase includes leading persons to believe
that one's official actions will be influenced by payments of money -- or,
in this case, by campaign contributions. In other words, a case of
"extortion" under Section 1951 can be based simply on what would be
-13-
solicitation of bribery under state law, and both the indictment and the
evidence at trial make clear that this was the nature of Gil Dozier's
offense.
The figures reported by the Administrative Office of the U. S.
Courts for defendants convicted of bribery offenses show as follows:
In fiscal year 1980, over half (54.4%)
received sentences that involved
no imprisonment at all;
In fiscal year 1980, another 17.6% received
split sentences in 1980 (imprisonment of six
months or less);
-- During the five years preceding fiscal year
1980, fully two-thirds (67%) received
sentences not requiring imprisonment;
-- Another 15% during the five-year period
received split sentences;
-- Thus, 72% of all defendants in fiscal year
1980, and over 82% of all defendants during
the preceding five years, received sentences
that involved no more than 6 months
imprisonment.
We submit that in comparing Mr. Dozier's potential sentence to
those of others convicted of similar offenses, it is the bribery category,
and not the Hobbs Act category, that is the most relevant standard of
comparison. And this standard shows that any term of imprisonment
would be more severe than the average sentence imposed in such cases,
while a prison term of more than six months would be more harsh than
the sentences imposed in almost three-fourths of other cases around the
country.
5.
The Split Sentence Alternative
Should the Court conclude that a prison sentence is appropriate
in Gil Dozier's case, we respectfully submit that the "split sentence"
provision of 18 U.S.C. 3651 would be the most suitable tool. As the
Court knows, the second paragraph of Section 3651 permits imposition of
a lengthy prison term with a provision that the defendant be
incarcerated for a period of no more than six months; the balance of
the sentence is suspended when the defendant is placed on probation
-14-
with appropriate conditions. The Court may invoke this provision
"when satisfied that the ends of justice and the best interest of the
public as well as the defendant will be served thereby. n 18 U.S.C. 3651.
The split sentence provision thus enables the Court to impose
a prison term that expresses a very severe attitude toward the
seriousness of the offense, while taking account of the lack of need -- and,
indeed, the disservice to the defendant and the public -- of lengthy
incarceration. For a man of Gil Dozier's personal circumstances, serving
even a week in jail is a tremendous humiliation and severe punishment.
To require that he spend many months in prison would add little, if
anything, to the punitive effect of the sentence, and would pointlessly
postpone and make far more difficult his effort to begin a new life.
It would also pointlessly deprive his family of a husband and father
for a period that could not fail to have a severe impact on their lives.
And it would pointlessly waste the resources of society in holding, in a
federal penitentiary, a man who is no threat to the public and for whom
daily life as an inmate can serve only the purpose of degradation, not
correction.
6. Conclusion
For the reasons stated earlier in this memorandum, none of the
recognized purposes of sentencing would be served by incarceration of
Gil Dozier, for any period of time, and a sentence of probation with a
heavy fine would be consistent with the usual sentences imposed by
federal judges for offenses similar to those of which Gil Dozier has been
convicted. Gil Dozier has already suffered the penalty of personal
and political ruin. To compound his penalty with a prison sentence would
be, in a real sense, beating a dead horse. A stiff fine, particularly
appropriate since the offense involved the solicitation of money, coupled
with appropriate conditions of probation -- which might include a bar
-15-
against his running for political office during the term of probation --
would more than satisfy any lingering need for further sanctions for
Gil Dozier's conduct.
Respectfully submitted,
Camille F. Gravel In
E. DREW McKINNIS
CAMILLE F. GRAVEL, JR.
McKINNIS, JUBAN & BEVAN
GRAVEL, ROBERTSON & BRADY
1933 Wooddale Boulevard
711 Washington Street
Suite D
Alexandria, Louisiana 71301
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70806
318/487-4501
504/927-0300
WILLIAM H. JEFFRESS, JR.
MILLER, CASSIDY, LARROCA & LEWIN
2555 M. Street, N.W., Suite 500
Washington, D. C. 20037
202/293-6400
Attorneys for the Defendant
LOUISIANA CAPITAL REPORT
Dozier Case An Example
By BILL LYNCH
Intentions on the table. He wanted to
ing was said about a payoff - you pay"
Capital Bureau
run for office and he was asking people
this and I'll do that - but the jury
to ante up to help him. He wasn't
drew the clear inference that it was"
BATON ROUGE - Politicians,
trying to hide the fact
just that - a payoff.
beware!
Gravel and Jeffress did their best to
Dozier claimed it was a campaign
Campaign contributions may no
convince the jury that since this Is U.e
contribution. That he was running for.,
longer be used as a guise for shake-
way things have been done in Louisi-
governor or later for ré-election
downs and payoffs for political favors.
ana, there was no connection between
Others who aspire for public office.
Even subile shakedowns are taboo.
the solicitations and the official acts
may bear this in mind when they seck:
That's the message from a federal
performed by Dozier.
contributions.
court jury and the U.S. attorney's
The jury chose to agree with Lans-
It may well be best net to seek::
office in Baton Rouge in the conviction
den's viewpoint that Dozier's actions
contributions from persons or organi:~
of former Agriculture Commissioner
zations or firms doing business directly.
Gil Dozier.
with an agency. At the very least, such
Wayward office holders who swap
contributions or solicitations should be
their influence for cash can no longer
clearly divorced from any official
depend on the unwillingness or inept-
Acts need not
action that might be or is forthcoming
ness of the local district altorney or
that would have any effect on inter-
state attorney general's office as a
necessarily be
state commerce or provide 2 pattern of
means of escape from prosecution.
blatant demands for
racketeering.
The feds Look on a difficult case that
How then are candidates to ralse
seemed to clude the prowess of state
payoffs, but can be
money for their campaigns, since most
prosecutors and carried it to an almost
couched in subtle
funds come from persons and groups
undeniable conclusion of guilty
interested in 2 field governed by a
Much of the credit belongs to a young
terms designed to
particular office? There is certainly no
assistant U.S. attorney named Mitchell
bring the end result.
easy answer to that one
Lansden, who prefers to be called
It may mean that candidates will,
Mike.
just have to get along with less funds
His perspicacity, perseverance and
on which to campaign And that may
tenacity prevailed over some real
be 2 blessing in itself.
heavyweights on the defense team,
amounted to extortion under the fed
There has always been a problem in
namely Camille Gravel and William
eral law and bribery under the state
prosecuting cases against prominent
Jeffress, the latter being the young
law. Some of those state violations
public officials. Usually the accused
Washington lawyer who is making a
occurred in the jurisdiction of the Easi
employs the smartest and ablest lay-
big name for himself in defending Lou-
Baton Rouge district attorney who had
yers available The prosecutors are
isiana politicians. He defended Rep.
earlier exonerated Dozier from any
either young and inexperienced or not
Buddy Leach successfully. (Everyone
wrongdoing in his ballwick
quite as able
knows who Gravel is.)
One of the noteworthy comments to
But in the Dozier case, the prosecu-
Gravel and Jeffress did not have
the jury by Lansden concerned subtle
tion by Lansden and his colleagues
much to work with, other than trying
extortion, in which he explained that
from the development of the case
to convince the jury that Dozier's
acts need not necessarily be blatant
through the trial was a thoroughly
method of raising campaign funds is
demands for payoffs, but can be
professional performance.
the way things are done in Louisiana.
couched in subtle terms designed to
Sad to say, such accomplished efforts
Dozier readily admitted secking funds
bring the end result
generally lead to more lucrative
from any and every prospect, including
The jury quite apparently agreed. It
careers in private practice, leaving the
those =ho were seeking his good
convicted Dozier on what Lansden said
public field to the less experienced and
offices for help on business problems.
was nothing but a payoff when the
able.
Dozier, in his own perspective, prob-
agriculture commissioner accepted
In the meantime, the next case 10
ably still does not {cel he has done
$10,000 from a Homer man who was
watch is that oí Education Superinten-
anything wrong because he laid his
seeking an auction barn charter. Noth-
dent Kelly Nix.
Time Picagane 9/27/80
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Date
2.16.83
Suspense Date
MEMORANDUM FOR: Central Feles
FROM:
DIANNA G. HOLLAND
ACTION
Approved
Please handle/review
For your information
For your recommendation
For the files
Please see me
Please prepare response for
signature
As we discussed
Return to me for filing
COMMENT
Do be attached to
material
sent today on Dozier
COMMUTATION OF SENTENCE
GILBERT L. DOZIER
125807
CITY OF NEW ORLEANS
JL001
OFFICE OF THE MAYOR
ERNEST N. MORIAL
December 17, 1982
MAYOR
The Honorable Ronald Reagan
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500
Dear Mr. President:
I am writing to support a Petition For Commutation of Sentence
that has been filed with your office on behalf of Gilbert L.
Dozier.
Since you have before you extensive written arguments relating
to the merits of this Petition, I will not presume to comment
on the issues in the case except to say that, as an experienced
attorney and former judge, I find the sentence imposed upon Gilbert
Dozier to be extremely harsh and unusual in nature. I, therefore,
urge you to take whatever action may be appropriate to correct what
is obviously an unjust result in these proceedings.
I have been personally acquainted with Gilbert Dozier for some
years. His indictment and conviction in this case shocked and
saddened me, for I had always viewed him to be an extremely
capable public official. Without denigrating the seriousness of
what he was accused and ultimately found guilty of doing, I can
still say that I believe in the man and would hope to see him have
the opportunity to reclaim his life. And, while I realize that
he must be punished for his wrongdoings, I don't believe that a
prison sentence of the magnitude imposed is proper or deserving.
For men like Gilbert Dozier, the public disgrace associated with
prosecution and conviction is devasting. I know personally of his
political ambitions which are now destroyed beyond reclamation.
His professional career as an attorney is finished. All this
added to the mentally and physically debilitating ordeal of time
already spent in prison seems to me punishment enough in this
case. Gilbert Dozier now needs to have the opportunity to begin
again, to earn back the respect of his fellow citizens, and to
reclaim his own self-respect. I believe that given the opportunity
to do so, he will again become a valuable asset to his community.
"An Equal Opportunity Employer"
The Honorable Ronald Reagan
Page two
December 17, 1982
I thank you, Mr. President, for your consideration of this appeal
and hope that you will agree with me that this is a case deser-
ving of clemency.
Sincerely,
Ernest N. Morial
Mayor of New Orleans
ENM:ad
COMMUTATION OF SENTENCE
GILBERT L. DOZIER
MARTIN D. WOODIN
December 17, 1982
PRESIDENT
LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY SYSTEM
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. President:
My purpose in writing you is to lend my support to a Petition
for Commutation of Sentence for Mr. Gilbert L. Dozier.
I have known Mr. Dozier for many years as a student, military
officer, attorney and public official, as well as a devoted family
man. His conviction and sentencing were a shock to me and to many
of our mutual friends.
I was particularly saddened by the severity of the penalty
given Mr. Dozier, since I cannot come to the conclusion that it
serves the purposes of justice or society in general. Mr. Dozier
has suffered total public disgrace as well as immeasurable mental
anguish not only to himself but to his very fine wife and beautiful
children. He now deserves an opportunity to earn back the respect
of his fellow citizens and again become a productive member of this
community.
Mr. President, I urge your favorable consideration of this appeal.
Respectfully,
Instandia
M. D. Woodin
ID
# 222001 CU
COPY
WHITE HOUSE
J2001
JV
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET
0 - OUTGOING
H . INTERNAL
Dech- pls let
I . INCOMING
Date Correspondence
Received (YY/MM/DD)
/
Name of Correspondent:
William / Pimmone
me hnow states
MI Mail Report
User Codes: (A)
(B)
(C)
Subject: U.S.A. V. Gelbert h. Domer
Patition for Executive Clemency
ROUTE TO:
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DISPOSITION
Tracking
Type
Completion
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Date
of
Date
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(Staff Name)
Code DD YY/MM/DD
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ORIGINATOR 84,04,12
(84,06,16 JV
Referral Note:
WATOY
100 DD 84/04/13
C 24,6,16 JV
Referral Note:
CUFIEL
I 84 106116 JV
C8406116 C84 106116
Referral Note:
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Referral Note:
ACTION CODES:
DISPOSITION CODES:
A - Appropriate Action
I . Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
A. Answered
C Completed
C Comment/Recommendation
R - . Direct Reply w/Copy
B. - Non-Special Referral
S Suspended
D Draft Response
S For Signature
F - Furnish Fact Sheet
X Interim Reply
to be used as Enclosure
FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:
Type of Response = Initials of Signer
Code = "A"
Comments: Copyol- Jhnu1584 John Stanish Completion of Date John = Date of Outgoing
Sec ID 125807 Fyi
Stuckey letter TD David Stephenson
Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.
Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOB).
Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.
Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.
5/81
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 16, 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR FRED F. FIELDING
RMS
FROM:
RICHARD A. HAUSER
SUBJECT:
Gilbert L. Dozier
You have asked about the status of Gilbert L. Dozier's
Petition for Executive Clemency. The Department of Justice
forwarded a letter of advice for Dozier on March 19, 1984;
however, Lowell Jensen, in a telephone conversation on
April 5, 1984, asked that we hold off taking any action at
this time. It is my understanding that the Department of
Justice intends to supply additional information.
WHEN?
4/14
Attachment
WILLIAM E. TIMMONS
MEMO
PRESIDENT
222001cal W
TO FRED FIELDING -1
HELP ! !!
B.T.
we have received
recommendation from DOJ
granting effective Plemency
which RAH has reviewed;
however, he is waiting
L
for additional info
from DOJ
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
703429
Date
3.20.84 3/30 4/5
Suspense Date
MEMORANDUM FOR:
RAH
4/10
FROM:
DIANNA G. HOLLAND
4/16
ACTION
Approved
Please handle/review
For your information
For your recommendation
For the files
Please see me
Please prepare response for
signature
As we discussed
Return to me for filing
OMMENT
a little night reading
22222
MAR 1 6 1984
JOHN M. STUCKEY, JR.
ATTORNEY AT LAW
AIRPORT INTERNATIONAL CENTRE
SUITE 200, 1005 VIRGINIA AVENUE
TWELFTH FLOOR
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30354
1899 L STREET, NORTHWEST
WASHINGTON, D.C.20036
404 767-1777
202 659-9505
March 15, 1984
M
Mr. David C. Stephenson
Acting Pardon Attorney
U.S. Department of Justice
5550 Friendship Blvd., Suite 490
Chevy Chase, Maryland 20815
Re: United States of America V. Gilbert
L. Dozier, Docket # 8301125
Petition For Executive Clemency
Dear Mr. Stephenson:
The purpose of this letter is to supplement, update and summarize some of
the principal points and arguments contained in our original Memorandum
filed in support of Gilbert Dozier's Petition For Commutation of Sentence.
My co-counsel, John Stanish, joins me in urging you to make a formal
recommendation on this matter as soon as possible. Our original Petition
was filed on January 7, 1983. We feel strongly that we have now satisfied
all of the established prerequisites for the granting of Executive
Clemency, i.e., an unduly harsh and overly severe sentence, ineligibility
for parole, and an unassailable record of meritorious service to the
government.
The severity and disparity of Gilbert Dozier's sentence is an objective
fact, borne out both by statistical comparison of sentences within Mr.
Dozier's offense category, and, by comparison to punishments meted out to
"like kind" offenders. It must be fairly admitted that the substance of his
transgressions did not amount to the form of the charged offense. No one now
seriously contends that this was a "real" case of extortion under 18 U.S.C.
§1951. At worst, it was a case involving public corruption and solicitation
March 14, 1984
Page 2
of bribes. Yet, Gilbert Dozier received what government statistics on
federal sentencing patterns show was one of the harshest punishments ever
meted out in the "extortion" offense category to date of his conviction -
more prison time than was given to 80% of other "extortionists" (including
forceful and violent offenders) convicted and sentenced in the same year.
Conversely, 73% of all defendants convicted of bribery during the same
period were either not imprisoned at all, or, received sentences of six
months or less. The sentence is even more demonstrably unfair when compared
to punishments imposed on "like-kind" offenders, i.e., elected officials
convicted for violations of public trust. Gilbert Dozier was sentenced to
a total of 18 years in prison, 5 years probation and a $25,000 fine. The
harshest of the ABSCAM sentences was three years in prison and $20,000 in
fines. Prison sentences imposed on BRILAB convictions in the Western
District of Louisiana ranged from three years for the ranking state cabinet
officer to seven years for a known organized crime figure with numerous
prior convictions. The smallest bribe involved in any of these cases was at
least twice the amount of money Gilbert Dozier was charged with "extorting"
as campaign contributions. It should also be noted that Mr. Dozier has
already served more prison time than any of the Watergate defendants,
excepting Gordon Liddy.
We concede that you will undoubtedly view Mr. Dozier's offenses and related
punishments as falling into two categories, i.e., the "base" offense which
yielded a combined ten year sentence plus five years probation on release,
plus a $25,000 fine, and, the "jury tampering" offense which resulted in the
imposition of an additional eight years of prison time, bringing the maximum
sentence to 18 years, plus five years probation on release, plus a $25,000
fine and with a special provision barring parole eligibility prior to 58
months of imprisonment. Broken down into these separate elements, it is
glaringly apparent that the sentence, in its parts, and, in the sum of its
parts, is exceedingly harsh and grossly disparate in nature. We feel
strongly that there is not a modicum of "fundamental fairness" in any of its
elements. The severity of the "base" sentence cannot now be justified by
reference to Dozier's post conviction violations. Conversely, the harsh-
ness of the sentence handed him on the latter offense is not explained by the
fact of an unduly severe "base" sentence. No such reasoning can make this
sentence "fit" the crime.
With respect to the possible consideration of the "jury tampering" offense
as an aggravating factor, we urge you to note that these charges were
decided by the Court in the context of a probation violation hearing and
that Gilbert Dozier has not been properly tried and convicted of the
substantive offense of obstruction of justice. And, even assuming for the
sake of argument that such was the case, eight years of additional prison
time is an uncommonly severe punishment for such an offense. The case of The
United States V. Michael O'Keefe cited in our original supporting Memo-
randum is particularly pertinent in this regard. O'Keefe, Louisiana State
Senate President, was convicted in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana on one count of mail fraud (18 U.S.C. §1341) and two
counts of obstruction of justice (18 U.S.C. §1503), specifically entailing
his directly contacting a witness during the course of the trial in an
Mr. David C. Stephenson
March 14, 1984
Page 3
attempt to intimidate and influence that witnesses's testimony. O'Keefe
was convicted on all counts and sentenced to a total of sixteen months in
prison. Subsequently, O'Keefe was indicted again on ten counts of bank
fraud, tried in the same court and convicted on all ten counts. He was
sentenced today, March 14, 1984, to 2 years imprisonment on count one to run
concurrently with his sixteen month sentence on the previous mail fraud and
obstruction of justice convictions. Sentence was suspended on counts two
through ten of the second conviction with a fine of $10,000. The result of
these proceedings was a "net" eight months additional prison time for a
second offender previously tried and convicted on a charge of obstruction of
justice entailing acts much more immediate and direct, and, patently more
offensive than those allegedly committed by Mr. Dozier.
We have advised you of Mr. Dozier's efforts to cooperate, when requested to
do so, with federal prosecutors in the course of various on-going
investigations. You have in your files letters from four U.S. Attorneys,
including the Chief of the Organized Crime Strike Force in New Orleans,
documenting these cooperative efforts. The latest of these letters, one
dated January 12, 1984, from Joseph Cage, Jr., U.S. Attorney for the Western
District of Louisiana, confirms actions by Mr. Dozier amounting, in Mr.
Cage's words, to "meritorious service to the Government". At the very
least, the fact of Gilbert Dozier's valuable and meritorious service in this
regard should be considered to completely mitigate the aggravating nature
of the obstruction of justice charges against him. Further, we submit that
such cooperation and service should be the basis for action effecting his
immediate release from prison. (You are aware of the Ford case where a
fellow inmate, convinced by Mr. Dozier to cooperate with federal authori-
ties in the context of a drug investigation, was released immediately in
consideration of such cooperation.) As a consequence of his efforts to
assist the government, Mr. Dozier has subjected himself to considerable
risks. We urge you to immediately consider these aspects of the case and
take appropriate action.
We have asked you to recommend a reduction in Mr. Dozier's sentence in
conformity with applicable Parole Commission guidelines and have argued for
an Offense Category Four classification dictating a range of 14 to 20 months
of imprisonment. Mr. Dozier has now served 22 months incarceration and has
paid a $25,000 fine. Even by the strictest of interpretations of the
Commission's Offense Behavior Severity Index, Dozier's parole prognosis
would fall into the lower to mid range of Offense Category Five, i.e., 24 to
36 months recommended total time to serve. We respectfully submit that the
Commission's Guidelines are an unquestionably objective standard for you to
employ in correcting the error of Mr. Dozier's sentence, and now urge that
a recommendation be made for a reduction in all components of that sentence
to time served.
We recognize and appreciate the "arithmetical" impact of such a major
reduction in sentence, but, strongly believe that considerations of
fundamental fairness and justice should prevail regardless of apparent
"arithmetical" appropriateness. The appropriate end to this case should be
the imposition of "deserved punishment", i.e., a sentence that "fits"
Gilbert Dozier's crime, without undue regard for the structure or length of
Page 4
the original sentence which is positively and demonstrably unfair. Even by
the strictest standards of "justifiable vengeance", Gilbert Dozier has paid
for his crime. The effect of Executive Clemency should be his immediate
release from prison, not a moderate reduction in sentence or a transfer of
this matter to the Parole Commission for further consideration. Your office
has given Mr. Dozier's case thoughtful consideration and expert analysis.
The Bureau of Prisons has thoroughly reviewed the file and the Bureau
Director has recommended a reduction in sentence. By any standard this
matter is ripe for adjudication. Nothing is to be gained by a lengthy repeat
of this process in the context of Parole Commission proceedings. And, no
purpose is to be served by keeping Gilbert Dozier in prison one day beyond
the term of his current sentence.
We thank you and your staff for your very professional and fair considera-
tion of this case.
Respectfully submitted,
Justin
JMS, Jr:cen
CC: Mr. Lowell Jensen
Associate Attorney General
United States Department of Justice
10th & Constitution Avenue
Washington, D. C. 20530
DATE:
7-27-84
The Washington Post
PAGE:
A3
cent Commutation by Reagan
Stirs Controversy in Louisiana
By Howard Kurtz
er, who has served 25 months in
the lack of deterrent effect of fur-
and David Hoffman
prison, eligible for parole.
ther incarceration, the document
Washington Post Staff Writers
Moore said that "90 percent of
says.
President Reagan has stirred up
my constituents" believe that po-
The commutation was granted
a political controversy in Louisiana
litical influence was involved, "that
over the objections of the sentenc-
by commuting the 18-year jail sen-
someone got to the president of the
ing judge and the U.S. attorney who
United States and he let Dozier out.
tence of a former state official con-
handled the case.
victed of extortion and racketeering
It's hurt the president in Louisiana.
"Any reduction of sentences
Gil Dozier is an albatross around
whose advocates included former
would seriously interfere with the
White House aide Lyn Nofziger.
the president's neck."
administration of justice and the
The commutation was granted
He said Nofziger's involvement
protection of our jury system and
June 22 to former Louisiana agri-
"gives just the scintilla of evidence
would, in my opinion, lessen the
culture commissioner Gilbert L.
that causes the thing to stink."
confidence the public has in our
More than a month after the
Dozier, an elected Democrat who
criminal justice system," U.S. Dis-
was convicted in 1980 of demand-
commutation, the presidential ac-
trict Court Judge Frank J. Polozola
ing $329,000 in campaign contri-
tion is still generating headlines,
wrote the Justice Department.
letters to the editor and condem-
butions from farmers and industry
Stanford O. Bardwell Jr., the U.S.
officials in exchange for permits
nations from many public officials.
attorney in Baton Rouge, said Dozi-
issued by his department.
er's case was the first time a fed-
Nofziger, a longtime Reagan con-
Prosecutors said the shakedowns
eral racketeering statute was used
fidant who runs a public relations
to convict a Louisiana official.
involved licenses and regulatory
firm and serves as an unpaid con-
approvals for milk cooperatives,
"Dozier's conviction was symbol-
sultant to the Reagan-Bush cam-
cattle auctioneers, pesticide makers
ic to all the little people who had
paign, yesterday declined to answer
and others. They said there was
had the touch put on them by one
questions about his efforts on Dozi-
evidence that four people gave
politician or another over the
er's behalf.
Dozier $21,000 and that some large
years," Bardwell said. "The general
"I do not discuss my clients or
companies were asked for as much
feeling in the public here is that the
what I do for them," he said. "I have
as $50,000 to $100,000.
sentence was appropriate."
nothing further to say about it."
Bardwell said that court statistics
A federal judge increased Dozi-
Reagan told aides this week that
er's sentence after the conviction
cited by the Justice Department
he had not been aware of Nofziger's
were "distorted" and that Dozier
when prosecutors charged that he
involvement in the case, according
had tried to bribe a juror in the case
received only a quarter of the max-
to a White House official.
in an effort to win a new trial. Pros-
imum possible sentence for extor-
This is the 10th commutation
ecutors also introduced testimony
tion and racketeering.
granted by Reagan out of 588 re-
Bardwell said he informed the
that Dozier had inquired about con-
quests. The others were granted to
tracting to kill an unnamed person
department that he and John Volz,
embezzlers and other white-collar
in the case.
criminals, including former Mary-
the U.S. attorney in New Orleans,
Nofziger and two of Dozier's law-
land governor Marvin Mandel, who
interviewed Dozier at length last
yers met with Associate Attorney
served 19 months in prison on mail
year, But he denied that Dozier is a
General D. Lowell Jensen and other
fraud and racketeering charges, and
potential witness in any ongoing
Justice Department officials last
co-defendant W. Dale Hess.
investigation, saying that some of
November to press the clemency
A Justice Department spokesman
Dozier's allegations could not be
petition. Several Reagan adminis-
said the Dozier case was handled
confirmed and others were refuted.
tration officials and private attor-
routinely and that the commutation
"It proved to be a dead end," Bard-
neys said that Nofziger was repre-
was recommended in March by ca-
well said.
senting Dozier and that they believe
reer lawyers in the department's
Volz said he also had no ongoing
he was paid for his efforts.
Office of Pardon Attorney and ap-
probe involving Dozier. The third
Rep. W. Henson Moore (R-La.)
proved by Jensen.
U.S. attorney in Louisiana could not
said White House chief of staff
"The recommendation consid-
be reached.
James A. Baker III recently told
ered the disparity of the original
Dozier's campaign for commu-
'him that Nofziger also tried unsuc-
prison sentence ás compared to
tation was run by three of his law-
cessfully to discuss the case with
sentences imposed in similiar cir-
yers: John Stanish of Indiana, the
White House officials.
cumstances on like offenders for
Justice Department's pardon attor-
Reagan's decision followed the
similar offenses," an internal Justice
ney under President Carter; Curtis
recommendation of the Justice De-
Department document said.
Crawford of Missouri, who served
partment, which said Dozier's sen-
Other factors included Dozier's
on the U.S. Parole Commission in
tence was much longer than the
cooperation with law enforcement
the Nixon-Ford years, and John Stu-
average term imposed in similar
authorities, the prison time he has
ckey Jr. of Georgia, who worked in
cases. The commutation cut the
served, his payment of a $25,000
the Nixon White House.
sentence to six years, making Dozi-
fine, federal parole guidelines and
DOJ-1983-04
The petition, filed in January,
1983, was accompanied by letters
of recommendation from New Or-
leans Mayor Ernest Morial and two
university presidents in Louisiana.
"The Dozier sentence was just
way out of line
It was a ridic-
ulous sentence for a white-collar
first offender," said Stanish, who
attended several meetings with Jus-
tice officials, including the one with
Nofziger. A department spokesman
said such meetings are not unusual
in clemency cases.
The Justice Department recom-
mendation went to White House
counsel Fred F. Fielding, who pre-
pared a summary for top White
House aides. Reagan, who may wait
a year or more before acting on
such requests, generally follows the
department's recommendation.
John Cade Jr., who was Reagan's
1980 campaign chairman in Loui-
siana, said Nofziger had asked him
about the Dozier case at a May 14
meeting of Reagan campaign offi-
cials in Dallas.
Cade said Nofziger was familiar
with the case and asked "what I
thought about the severity of the
sentence." Cade said he wasn't sure
whether Nofziger was representing
Dozier or gauging the political im-
pact for the administration.
Parole officials are to decide in
two weeks whether to release Dozi-
er from a Fort Worth prison.
"I'm convinced the president
doesn't know to this day who Gil
Dozier is, that this was put on his
desk and he was told to sign it,"
Moore said. "If they had asked any-
one in Louisiana they would have
received the same advice: 'Don't
touch it with a 10-foot pole until
after the election.'
3