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Matlock Chron June 1984 [06/26/1984-ND]
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135840566
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Matlock Chron June 1984 [06/26/1984-ND]
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Records of the National Security Council, Directorate of European and Soviet Affairs (Reagan Administration)
Jack F. Matlock, Jr.'s Chronological Files
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1986-12-31
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1983-01-01
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: Matlock Chron June 1984
[06/26/1984-ND]
Box: 5
To see more digitized collections visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection
Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected]
Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing
National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection: MATLOCK, JACK: Files
Archivist: lov
File Folder: Matlock Chron June 1984 [6/26-ND]
Date: July 29, 1999
Box 908875
DOCUMENT
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
NO. AND TYPE
+. Memo
Jack Matlock to Baldrige, Reagan, Shultz, re US.
6/26/84
P1/F1
Soviet Joint Commercial Commission [4951], 1p
R 9/13/00 NLSF95-074/2#31
2. Memo
Matlock to Robert McFarlane, re US USSR Joint
6/21/84
P1/F1
Commercial Commission [4951], 1p
R
"
"
#32
3. Memo
McFarlane to Matlock, re Joint US Soviet Trade
6/20/84
P1/F1
Council [4951], 1p
R
"
#33
4. PROFS note
McFarlane to Matlock, re Joint US Soviet Trade
6/20/84
P1/F1
Council, 1p
R
"
#34
5 Memo
Matlock to arlane, re fishing (with notations)
6/26/84
P1/F1
[4877], 1p
P5
R 10/17/05 M02-011#23
6 Memo
Robert Kimmitt to Charles Hill, re fishing [4877], 1p
nd
P1/F1
R 9/13/00 NLSF95-074/2 #35
7. Memo
Charles Hill to McF arlane, re fishing [4877], 2p
6/18/84
P1/F1
R 7/2/00 NLSF95-074/2 # 36
8. Memo
Matlock to McFarlane, re review of fishing [3447],
5/21/84
P1/F1
2p R 10/17/05 Moz # 24
P5
9. Memo
Kimmitt to Hill, re review [3447], 1p
ND
P1/F1
R 9/13/00 NLSF95-074/2 #37
10. Memo
Hill to McFarlane, re review of fishing [3447], 3p
4/28/84
P1/F1
R 7/7/00 NLSF 95-074/2#38
11. List
of participants, 4p (partial)
ND
P6
12.
re NSC picnic, 1p
ND
P6
Questionnaire
13. Memo
McFarlane to the President, re conversation with
ND
P1/F1
Dobrynin, 1p-
R 9/13/00 NLSF95-074/2#39
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
FOIA].
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information
F-3 Release would violate a Federal statue [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
[(a)(4) of the PRA].
F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or
[(b)(4) of the FOIA].
between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of
FOIA].
the PRA].
F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of
the FOIA].
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
F-8 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(8) of
the FOIA].
F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of
the FOIA].
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection: MATLOCK, JACK: Files
Archivist: lov
File Folder: Matlock Chron June 1984 [6/26-ND]
Date: July 29, 1999
Box 90887 5
DOCUMENT
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
NO. AND TYPE
14. Talking
with Dobrynin on July 1, 1p
nd
P1/F1
Points
R 10/17/05 M02 # 25
P5-
=
15. Memo
Shultz to the President, re Chernenko's June 6 letter
6/14/84
P1/F1
and Dobynin's R talking points [90695], 3p
7/7/00 NLSF95-074/2 # 40
16. Letter
translation of Chernenko to the President [90695], 8p
6/6/84
P1/F1
R 9/13/00 NLSF95-074/2 #41
17. Letter
in Russian, Chernenko to the President, 6p
6/6/84
P1/F1
R 9/13/00 NLSF95-074/2 #42
18. Talking
Dobrynin's, 4p 4
nd
P1/F1
points
R 7/7/00 NLSF95-074/2 #43
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
FOIA].
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information
F-3 Release would violate a Federal statue [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
[(a)(4) of the PRA].
F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or
[(b)(4) of the FOIA].
between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of
FOIA].
the PRA].
F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of
the FOIA].
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
F-8 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(8) of
the FOIA].
F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of
the FOIA].
PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O 13233
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer CAS
Box Number
5
FOIA M02-011
File Folder
MATLOCK CHRON JUNE 1984 (6/26-ND)
DATE 3/22/2007
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
MVH 3/17/08
5 MEMO
MATLOCK TO MCFARI ANE RE FISHING
1 6/26/1984
(#23)
MVN 3/17/08
8 MEMO
MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE FISHING
2 5/21/1984
(#24)
CONFIDENTIAL
Mattock
4951
THE WHITE HOUSE
VIA LDX
Chron
WASHINGTON
June 26, 1984
CONF IDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
The Secretary of State
THE HONORABLE DONALD T. REGAN
Secretary of the Treasury
THE HONORABLE MALCOLM BALDRIGE
The Secretary of Commerce
SUBJECT:
Joint U.S.-Soviet Joint Commercial Commission tot
As you are aware, we have proposed to the Soviet Union that the
Long Term Agreement to Facilitate Economic, Industrial, and
Technical Cooperation be extended for another ten-year period.
Tax
In 1981 the President decided that the Secretary of Commerce
would act as the U.S. Co-Chairman of the Joint Commercial
Commission for which this agreement provides. Therefore, if the
agreement is extended, the Department of Commerce should take the
lead in preparing the U.S. position for a joint meeting of
experts to prepare for a possible session of the Joint Commercial
Commission. Preparations should be cleared through the normal
interagency process and policy issues should be reviewed in the
Senior Interdepartmental Group on International Economic Policy
as appropriate. TCT
Coordinated negotiating positions should be submitted for NSC
review before presentation to the Soviets. Tel
FOR THE PRESIDENT:
Rada Robert C. McFar lane
DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED
NLS F95-074/2#31
CONF IDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
BY LOI , NARA, DATE 10/25/00
CONFIDENTIAL
4951
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET
June 21, 1984
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
SIGNED
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK Jan
SUBJECT:
U.S.-USSR Joint Commercial Commission
I have prepared a memorandum for your signature to the Secretaries
of Commerce, Treasury and State (Tab I) designating Baldrige as
the U.S. Co-Chairman of the Joint Commercial Commission, and
instructing them to staff policy issues through the SIG/IEP.
The Soviets have not yet replied to our proposal to renew the
Long-Term Agreement, but we expect them to do so next week. My
understanding is that renewal would be effected by an exchange of
diplomatic notes, so there may be nothing for Mac to sign.
Roger RUR Robinson concurs.
Recommendation:
That you sign the memorandum at TAB I.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments:
Tab I
Proposed memo for your signature
Tab II
Your memorandum of June 20
DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED
NLS F95-074/2#32
BY Los , NARA, DATE 10/25/00
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
SECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
4951
WASHINGTON
SECRET
June 20, 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR JACK MATLOCK
FROM:
ROBERT C. McFARLANE Bard
SUBJECT:
Joint US-Soviet Trade Council
As you know, we have agreed to extend the US-Soviet Economic and
Industrial Cooperation Agreement as a consequence of the Sushkov
visit. Mac Baldridge called me today to note a possible
bureaucratic hitch. When first established in 1974, Commerce
chaired it on the US side. Then when George Shultz became
Treasury Secretary he took it over. Now Treasury (staff level)
is saying that they should remain in the chair. Mac says that he
told the Russians that he was the US Chairman back in 1981. As a
near term matter, the Soviets are about to sign the agreement (it
was initialed when Sushkov was here) and we need someone to sign
for the US. Mac also says that back in 1981, Ed Meese approved
Commerce's resuming the chair although that was never put in
writing. I think Commerce ought to be the US chair and believe
we should put that in writing designating Secretary of Commerce
as the US Chairman. Mac is willing for the policy issues to be
taken up in the SIG-IEP. Please think about this and get
together a directive, "In 1981 the President decided that the
Secretary of Commerce would chair the US side of the US-Soviet
etc etc etc..."
Please coordinate with Roger Robinson.
Many thanks.
CC: Admiral Poindexter
Bob Kimmitt
Roger Robinson
Don Fortier
DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED
NLS F95-074/2#33
BY 4J , NARA, DATE 10/25/00
SECRET
Declassify: OADR
SECRET
MSG FROM: NSRCM --CPUA
TO: NSGVE --CPUA
06/20/84 17:01:24
To: NSWGH --CPUA
-- SECRET --
NOTE FROM: ROBERT MCFARLANE
EXPEDITE
SUBJECT: Note to Jack Matlock
Subject: Joint US-Soviet Trade Council
As you know we have agreed to extend the US-Soviet Economic and Industrial
Cooperation agreement as a consequence of the Sushkov visit. Mac Baldridge
called me today to note a possible bureaucratic hitch. When first established
in 1974, Commerce chaired it on the US side. Then when George Shultz become
Treasury Secretary he took it over. Now Treasury (staff level) is saying that
they should remain in the chair. Mac says that he told the Russians that he
was the US Chairman back in 81. As a near term matter, the Soviet are about to
sign the agreement (it was initialed when Sushkov was here) and we need
someone to sign for the US. Mac also says that back in 81, Ed Meese approved
Commerce's resuming the chair although that was never put in writing. I think
Commerce ought to be the US chair and believe we should put that in writing
designating Sec Commerce as the US chairman. Mac is willing for the policy
issues to be taken up in the SIG-IEP. Please think about this and get together
a directive "In 1981 the President decided that the Sec of Commerce would
chair the US side of the US-Soviet etc etc etc "Plese coordinate with Roger
Robinson
Many thanks
copy to Roger Robinson, Don Fortier
CC: NSJMP --CPUA
NSRMK --CPUA
NSGVE --CPUA
DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED
EXPEDITE
NLS
F95-074/2#34
BY LOI , NARA, DATE 10/25/00
4877
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
CONFIDENTIAL
June 26, 1984
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK A
SUBJECT:
U.S.-USSR Fishing Relationship
You will recall that State and Commerce recommended in April that
the Soviets be granted a directed fishing allocation in the range
of 50,000 tons and that expanded joint ventures be permitted if
there are no overriding security problems. State was requested
to examine the question of timing in view of the current overall
U.S.-Soviet relationship (TAB III).
On the timing question, State now recommends that we proceed at
this time since the steps recommended are beneficial to U.S.
firms and have strong Congressional support (TAB II).
Since this is a very limited step, is responsive to domestic
interests and consistent with our policy of trying to establish a
better working relationship with the USSR, I believe the State/
Commerce recommendation is justified. It is, however, a close
call.
conclers for Don Fortier, Chris Lehman, Richard R Levine and John Lenczowski
Steve Sestananch
JL does virt concur
concur.
Talthough I agree with John L.
This is yet another it th
Recommendation:
signals of weakness to
but not
the Krem/in for which
with state's
That you approve the Kimmitt-Hill Memorandum at Tab I approving we will
the State/Commerce recommendation.
press guidance
have to pay
which should not
Approve
Disapprove
dearly at some
be so forward
point.
leaning we
Attachments:
hould enghanse
) condition that
Tab I
Proposed Kimmitt to Hill memorandum
joint venture be
Tab II
State's memorandum, June 18, 1984
expanded, 2) that
Tab III
Memorandum on this subject, May 21, 1984
estoration of pre-
held Afghan only bach 10%, allocation from and Declassify 3) is we have
DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED
CONFIDENTIAL
on:
OADR
NLS M02-011 # 23
because
conditions prohibit.
BY LOS NARA, DATE 10/17/05
6/26
C
4877
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
CONF IDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State
SUBJECT:
U.S.-USSR Fishing Relationship N
The recommendations of the Departments of State and Commerce in
the memorandum from Mr. Hill to Mr. McFarlane of April 28, 1984,
have been approved. These steps are:
1.
Restoration of a directed allocation of 50,000 metric tons,
conditioned on a Soviet commitment to increase the existing
joint venture with an American firm commensurately; and
2.
Permission for further joint ventures providing there are no
overriding security problems. 100
Any steps taken should be coordinated in normal fashion with the
appropriate internal security agencies. (8)
The proposed press release should be submitted to the NSC for
approval. I
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary
DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED
NLS F95-074/2#35
BY LOI NARA, DATE 10/25/00
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassi fy on: OADR
4877
S/S 8417472 XR 8417471
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
June 18, 1984
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. McFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE
SUBJECT: Review of US-USSR Fishing Relationship
On May 23, the NSC requested the views of the Department of
State on the question of the timing of the President's decision
on partial restoration of the bilateral fisheries relationship
with the USSR and, if such a step is to be taken now, on how we
would explain a favorable decision in light of current strains
on the bilateral relationship.
The Department of State recommends that the President
decide now on whether to grant the Soviets a directed fishing
allocation in the range of 50,000 tons and permit expanded
joint ventures, if requested, provided there are no overriding
security problems. We do not believe that the President's
decision should be delayed by the factors mentioned in your
memo of May 23 because:
1) The war in Afghanistan will continue for years and our
sanctions have made their point. While our sanctions policy as
such remains in place, therefore, we should be willing to make
specific exceptions that are in our interest, such as these.
2) The Olympic boycott is largely an example of the Soviet
tendency to retreat into self-isolation and our policy purpose
is to encourage the Soviets to constructive engagement with us
through steps that are mutually advantageous, like these.
3) We are attempting to persuade the Soviets to take
action in the Sakharov case through quiet diplomacy and
international pressure rather than through bilateral economic
sanctions. Implementation of steps to activate four bilateral
agreements will be affected by developments in the Sakharov
case. But in our view this logic does not extend to the whole
agenda of relations such as arms control and economic
relations. In particular, it does not extend to economic steps
of clear benefit to us, like these.
DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
NLS F95-074/2#36
BY LOJ NARA, DATE 7/18/00
CONFIDENTIAL
- 2 -
In their original recommendation of April 28, State and
Commerce noted that this would be a carefully modulated step,
which excluded renegotiation of a bilateral fisheries agreement
at this time. Our recommendation was based on the fact that
the proposed steps would be of direct economic benefit to the
currently depressed US fishing industry and were strongly
supported by relevant Congressional delegations. This
continues to be the case as we recently confirmed with contacts
on the Hill. In addition, our recommendation was based on our
belief that we should maintain the structure of economic
relations between the United States and the Soviet Union,
expanding it those areas in which it is appropriate from a
security and economic standpoint to do so.
If the President decides to go forward, we recommend that
we inform the Soviets here and in Moscow and do a low key
public announcement. We believe that this course would enable
us to present this action publicly as an example of the US
policy of taking steps to increase exchanges of non-strategic
goods as enunciated by the President in his June 4 speech. Our
press guidance would underscore the benefits to the US fishing
industry, noting US willingness to build upon existing
structure in the US-USSR economic relationship where
appropriate.
Charles Bnickmley Hill
Executive Secretary
CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED
NLS M02-011#24
3447
MEMORANDUM
BY LOT NARA, DATE 10/17/05
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
CONF IDENTIAL
May2 1984
ACTION
FROM:
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCHARLANE Am
JACK MATLOCK
SUBJECT:
Review of U.S.-USSR Fishing Relationship
The interagency review of measures proposed last year by
Congressman Breaux regarding the fisheries relationship with the
USSR has been completed. You will recall that Breaux had
proposed removing the Afghanistan sanction and restoring our
bilateral fisheries relationship with the Soviets. Recently, we
agreed with the Soviets to extend the existing fisheries
agreement to December 31, 1985, but no allocation of fish was
made to the USSR.
Following the interagency review, State and Commerce recommend
that two steps be taken:
--
restore a directed allocation of 50,000 metric tons,
conditioned on a Soviet commitment to increase the existing
joint venture with an American firm commensurately; and
permit further joint ventures providing there are no over-
riding security problems.
The IG considered a third step -- to seek renegotiation of the
bilateral fisheries agreement at this time -- but concluded that
this step should not be taken now, but should be kept under
review with regard to the future development of political
conditions.
Discussion:
The reasons given by the IG for restoring a small fisheries
allocation to the Soviets (50,000 metric tons would be one tenth
of the allocation they had before Afghanistan) and allowing
further joint ventures are based on a judgment that these moves
would be of benefit to the American fishing industry, which is
currently depressed.
Given the strong Congressional interest (from the Pacific
Northwest and Alaska) in restoring the bilateral fisheries
relationship and the desirability of maintaining a minimal
framework for non-strategic economic interaction with the
Soviets, I believe that the IG's recommendations should be
approved eventually.
CONF IDENTIAL
2
However, I believe that at the moment the timing is bad. The
Soviets are still engaged in a major offensive in Afghanistan,
and we face a possible tragedy in the Soviet handling of the
Sakharov's hunger strike. I recommend, therefore, that State be
requested to review its recommendation in light of the present
political situation, and provide its views on whether a decision
on this issue should be made now, or should be deferred in light
of current additional strains in the U.S.-Soviet relationship.
&
SRS
Lenczowski, Levine and Sestanovich concur.
Recommendation:
That you authorize transmittal of the attached Kimmitt-Hill
memorandum, which requests State to review its recommendation in
respect to timing.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments:
Tab I
Proposed Kimmitt to Hill memorandum
Tab II
Hill to McFarlane memorandum, April 28, 1984
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
3447
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State
SUBJECT:
Review of U.S.-USSR Fishing Relationship Yet
Since your memorandum of April 28, 1984, on this subject was
sent, a number of additional strains have developed in the
U.S.-Soviet relationship. These include the Soviet boycott of
the Olympics, the intensification of the war in Afghanistan, and
the steps taken against Mrs. Bonner and Academician Sakharov. (C)
In view of the above, the Department's views are requested on the
question of timing the President's decision on the fisheries
matter. Specifically, should such a step be taken now, and if
so, how should we explain a favorable decision on this matter in
light of present circumstances? (C)
Upon receipt of the Department's views on the timing question,
the matter will be forwarded to the President for decision. tel
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary
DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED
NLS F95-074/2#317
BY LOJ , NARA, DATE 10/25/00
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
COMEIRENTIAL
3447
8412440
XR 8412439
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
April 28, 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. McFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE
SUBJECT: Review of US - USSR Fishing Relationship
The NSC on March 21, 1983, requested an interagency review
of measures proposed by Congressman Breaux regarding the
fisheries relationship with the USSR. Breaux's proposals would
remove an Afghanistan sanction and restore our bilateral
fisheries relationship. They are strongly supported by the
fishing industry and other Senators and Congressmen from the
Pacific Northwest and Alaska. We and the Soviets just agreed to
extend the existing fisheries agreement for eighteen months,
through December 31, 1985.
The interagency review, interrupted by the KAL incident, has
been completed. The concerned agencies (State and Commerce; NSC
unable to attend) considered the following three steps:
--granting the Soviets a directed fish allocation of
approximately 50,000 metric tons to permit expansion of the
existing joint venture based in Seattle. Prior to the
Afghanistan invasion, the Soviets had a 500,000-ton
allocation. A directed allocation would permit Soviet
vessels to remain on station fishing when weather conditions
require the smaller U.S. fishing boats to seek shelter.
This would permit an expanded Soviet processing capability
to remain in place for longer periods of time, which would
benefit the joint venture. At present, Soviet vessels can
only process U.S.-caught fish;
--allow further joint ventures in other areas of the U.S.
fishing zone as they are proposed, assuming there are no
overriding security problems;
--inform the Soviets we are prepared to renegotiate the
US-Soviet fisheries agreement, with the possibility of
negotiating an agreement to allow US fishermen access to
Soviet fisheries. This would almost certainly require a
large directed allocation to the Soviets in return.
The IG determined that there are strong economic reasons to
restore the fisheries relationship and that the current
sanctions are imposing economic hardships on the U.S. fishing
industry:
-- The US firm currently involved in the existing joint
DECLASSIFIED
NLS F95-074/2#38
CONFIDENTIAL
DECL: QADR
BY LOJ NARA, DATE 7/18/00
CONFIDENTIAL
venture has stated that it expects to increase the joint venture
operations by the amount of the direct allocation given to the
USSR. The joint venture currently processes about 160,000 MT of
US-caught fish annually, valued at $30 million, and involving 40
US vessels which otherwise would not be employed. An additional
50,000 MT caught by the joint venture would result in an
estimated $8 million increase in proceeds to participating US
fishermen.
-- Establishment of new joint ventures with the Soviets in
US waters would increase our leverage with other countries now
fishing off the US coast (Japan and Korea) to expand cooperation
with the US fishing industry.
-- The US fishing industry is depressed and the impact from
the joint ventures is substantial; the multiplier effect on
local fish-related industries from each dollar earned by the
present joint venture is estimated at four to one.
-- There has been a significant reverse flow of technology
and expertise to the US fishing industry from the Soviets as the
result of the joint venture and our cooperative fisheries
research programs. Restoration of Soviet fishing privileges
would enhance our opportunities to take greater advantage of
these benefits.
The IG also concluded that forward movement would be
consistent with the President's January 16 speech calling for a
constructive dialogue with the Soviets. The fishing sanction on
Poland has been removed and the restoration of Soviet privileges
would underscore our commitment to review sanctions to ensure
that US business interests are not unfairly penalized. Finally
this action parallels negotiation of the the new LTA.
The Departments of State and Commerce have concluded that we
should now take the first two steps: restoring a directed
allocation of 50,000 MT, conditioned on a Soviet commitment to
increase the existing joint venture commensurately; and,
permitting further joint ventures providing there are no
overriding security problems. We would not publicly encourage
new joint ventures, however. The allocation would be granted in
at least two stages to permit observation of Soviet
performance.
It was deemed inappropriate to seek renegotiation of the
bilateral fisheries agreement at this time. We will keep this
step under review should political conditions permit our moving
in that direction in the future.
CONF IDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
We now request NSC concurrence with the recommendations of
the interagency review and that the matter be forwarded to the
President for his review of all the options and decision.
Hill
Executive Secretary
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
June 26, 1984
Dear Charlie:
Thank you very much for your letter of June 18, and for the copy
of your article.
I found it full of insights which are useful indeed. Your
observations on the limitations and pitfalls of summitry are
pretty well understood around this building. Would that they
were understood better on Capitol Hill and among the public at
large!
It happens that the President will be delivering a speech on some
of the topics you deal with tomorrow. I'll send a text along in
case you miss it.
On the point about the utility of having a special assistant to
the Secretary on Soviet affairs, I am not totally convinced that
this is the best way to proceed. There is always a potential
problem when there is no "line" responsibility. But maybe my
attitude is unduly influenced by my present position: my work is
easier not having to compete with a specialist of comparable rank
in State -- and I have no problem getting my views either to the
Secretary or the President. If I were in State, the latter
contact would inevitably be more indirect.
These are, of course, minor points. Thanks for your thoughtful-
ness in thinking of me and our very best wishes to you and Gaby
for your upcoming trip to Moscow. Give everyone at the Embassy
our best regards.
Jack F. Matlock
Sincerel July
The Honorable Charles G. Stefan
8012 S.W. Fifth Avenue
Gainesville, Florida 32607
C
4997
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION
June 26, 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE
FROM:
JACK F. MATLOCK, JR.
SUBJECT:
Presidential Meeting Memo for U.S.-Soviet
Exchanges, June 27, 1984
Attached at Tab I is the Presidential Meeting Memorandum for
the Conference on U.S.-Soviet Exchanges, June 27, 1984.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.
Approve
Disapprove
Bob Sims, Karna KS Small, Ron Sable, Ty Cobb and Steve Steiner
Rd
TC
564
{
concur.
Attachments
Tab I
Presidential Meeting Memo
Tab A
List of Participants
Tab B
Remarks
4997
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEETING WITH PARTICIPANTS IN CONFERENCE
ON U.S.-SOVIET EXCHANGES
DATE: June 27, 1984
LOCATION: East Room
TIME: 1:30 p.m. - 1:45 p.m.
FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE
I.
PURPOSE
To demonstrate our efforts to improve the U.S.-Soviet
working relationship and to expand contacts with the
peoples of the USSR.
II.
BACKGROUND
A conference of representatives of private foundations
and universities involved in U.S.-Soviet exchanges is
being held at the Smithsonian, June 26-27. This is an
excellent forum for a statement describing your efforts
to improve the bilateral working relationship with the
USSR and to expand exchanges. This is the third broad
policy area laid out in your January speech on
U.S. -Soviet relations and follows your recent
statements on the first two areas, namely arms control
and regional issues.
III. PARTICIPANTS
List of participants is at Tab A.
IV.
PRESS PLAN
Open press coverage.
V.
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
At 1:20 p.m. you go to Green Room to welcome leaders of
the Conference on U.S.-Soviet Exchanges, Professor
Billington, Dr. Hamburg, Dr. Ellison and Mr. Brad
Johnson. Senator Dick Lugar, who has been a key player
in this area, may also be with this group. You proceed
with them to East Room at 1:30 p.m. and address
approximately 100 Conference attendees, as well as
selected Members of Congress and senior Administration
officials.
Prepared by:
Jack Matlock
Attachment
Tab A
List of Participants
Tab B
Remarks
PARTICIPANTS
The President
Secretary of State George Shultz
Robert C. McFarlane
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Ambassador Jack Matlock
Special Assistant to the President
National Security Council
Professor James Billington
Director, Wilson Center
Dr. David Hamburg
President
Carnegie Corporation of New York
Dr. Herbert Ellison
Secretary of Kennan Institute
Mr. Brad Johnson
Research Associate
Kennan Institute
and approximately 100 members of
the Conference, and selected
members of Congress and senior
Administration officials
REMARKS ARE BEING COORDINATED
BY AMBASSADOR MATLOCK AND SPEECHWRITERS
C-JM
REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS
To:
Officer-in-charge
Appointments Center
Room 060, OEOB
Wednesday, June 27,
84
Please admit the following appointments on
, 19
for
The President
of
:
(NAME OF PERSON TO BE VISITED)
(AGENCY)
See attached list.
MEETING LOCATION
Building White House
Requested by Francesca Lapinski
Room No. East Room
Room No. 368 Telephone x5646
Time of Meeting 1:00 p.m.
Date of request June 26, 1984
Additions and/or changes made by telephone should be limited to five (5) names or less.
APPOINTMENTS CENTER: SIG/OEOB - 395-6046 or WHITE HOUSE - 456-6742
UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE
SSF 2037 (03-81)
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
Dan Amstutz
11/8/32
Michael H. Armacost
4/15/37
Diana Arsenian
10/31/58
Jeremy Azrael
3/23/35
Harley Balzer
REDACTED
3/25/48
William Barlow
6/5/21
William J. Baroody, Jr.
11/5/37
Irving Becker
5/1/27
James Billington
ACTED
6/1/29
Michael Brainerd
4/15/43
Stephanie Bursenos
7/15/37
John A. Busterud
3/7/21
Maura Cantrill
9/18/64
Alan Campbell
10/19/39
REDACTE
Jerome M. Clubb
12/7/28
Tyrus Cobb
Walter Connor
ACTED
4/20/42
Paul Cook
5/14/25
Harriet Crosby
8/30/45
Karla Cruise
10/30/63
Barbara Dash
12/21/52
Dan E. Davidson
9/18/44
REDACT
George Demko
4/10/33
Mark Dillon
7/11/51
Douglas Doan
1/21/57
Paula Dobriansky
)ACTED
Alla Dombrowsky
10/7/41
Honorable Thomas Downey, U.S. House of Representatives
Herbert J. Ellison
10/3/29
Cynthia Ely
6/28/31
Erick Erickson
12/28/48
Amy Evans
8/19/56
Ralph T. Fisher, Jr.
REDACT
4/5/20
Wesley A. Fisher
10/23/44
Michael Flack
9/12/20
John Geraghty
7/1/43
ACTED
Robert H. Getz
3/30/62
Christine Glenday
6/6/51
Nancy Graham
5/10/26
Damon Gray
-2-
Bernard Gwertzman, The New York Times
Jeffrey Hahn
5/22/44
David Hamburg
REDACT
10/1/25
Alan Hart
6/16/44
Stephen Hayes
5/27/47
Alan Hecht
)
7/23/44
Ruth Hegyeli
8/14/31
Kurt F. J. Heinrich
5/31/21
Peter Henry
5/10/43
Michael Hurley
4/20/50
Micnela Iovine
6/29/48
William James
REDAC
10/5/45
Brad Johnson
10/13/55
Robert Junghans
7/16/25
Madeleine Kalb
11/4/36
Allen Kassof
D
12/17/30
Edward Keenan
5/13/35
John Kiser, Kiser Research, Inc.
Genevieve Knezo
8/8/42
Helen Kodman
12/13/48
Christopher Lehman
John Lenczowski
REDA
Alice LeMaistre
7/3/45
Robert Litwak
4/5/53
Edward Luck
10/17/48
Julian MacDonald
TED
5/17/26
Gifford Malone, Acting Director, Office of Programs, USIA
Suzanne Massie
1/8/31
Ambassador Jack Matlock
Rebecca B. Matlock
12/7/28
David Maxwell
12/2/44
Honorable James McNulty, U.S. House of Representatives
Jacquie McNulty
REDACT
8/18/29
John Mercer
7/25/59
John Metzler
9/19/47
Laurence Mitchell
6/25/23
William Moody
DACTED
2/4/39
REDACT
-3-
Frederick A. Mosher
ED
12/20/32
Lewis Murray
Sherry Mueller Norton
8/17/43
Michael Oja
11/20/59
Ned Ostenso
6/22/30
R. Mark Palmer
7/14/41
B. Lynn Pascoe
REDA
7/7/43
Honorable Claiborne Pell, U.S. Senate
Grant Pendill
12/3/28
Pierre Perrolle
4/29/44
Honorable Thomas Petri, U.S. House of Representatives
Vladimir Petrov
11/15/15
Michael Pillsbury, National Security Advisor, Senate Steering
Committee, U.S. Senate
Louise Platt
4/15/40
Alexander Rabinowitch
8/30/34
Victor Rabinowitch
TED
8/30/34
Bermard Ramundo
6/12/25
Susan Rasky, The New York Times
Peter Reddaway, British Passport:
9/18/39
Marlin Remick
4/2/27
Robert Robertson
3/5/29
Erik Ronhovde
5/13/37
Sophie Sa
11/16/43
William Salmon
REI
9/3/35
Jack Schmidt
7/23/26
Laurie Schultz
1/30/57
Alex M. Shane
7/16/33
Secretary of State George ₱. Shultz
Thomas W. Simons
9/4/38
John Skillman
10/8/27
Damon Smith
11/26/34
Parker Snowe
ED
8/20/57
Jed Snyder
3/24/55
Edward Snyder
3/24/55
Linwood Starbird
5/16/47
Steven Steiner
Phillip Stewart
1/16/38
John Stremlau
REL
1/25/44
Peter R. Summer
Meredith Taylor
3/30/62
John Thomas
3/6/28
ED
-4- -
Vladimir Toumanoff
4/11/23
Catherine Torgerson
4/26/61
Donald Treadgold
11/24/22
Ronald Trowbridge
12/4/37
RED
Charles Trumbull
5/17/43
Janice Tuten
5/29/56
Leon Twarog
5/20/19
Paul Von Ward
9/11/39 or 34
CTED
Gary Waxmonsky
9/28/50
James Wertsch
5/16/47
Charles E. Wick, Director, U.S. Information Agency
Honorable Timothy Wirth, U.S. House of Representatives
John Zimmerman
10/12/47
RE
SITUATION ROOM
NSC/S PROFILE
UNCLASSIFIED
ID 8404997
RECEIVED 23 JUN 84 10
TO
MCFARLANE
FROM RYAN, F
DOCDATE 22 JUN 84
RYAN, F
26 JUN 84
KEYWORDS: USSR
AP
Donatring
SUBJECT TALKERS FOR CONFERENCE ON US SOVIET EXCHANGES WITH PRES ON 27 JUN
1984
ACTION: PREPARE TALKERS
DUE: 24 JUN 84 STATUS IP FILES WH
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
MATLOCK
LENCZOWSKI
SESTANOVICH
ROBINSON
MARTIN
KIMMITT
COMMENTS
REF#
LOG
NSCIFID
(V
)
ACTION OFFICER (S)
ASSIGNED
ACTION REQUIRED
DUE
COPIES TO
Matlock
-
6/26 Rec'd Ryan Revised Meno
Wm
NSC/S
C 27June NFAR per JM
THE WHITE HOUSE
REVISED
WASHINGTON
84 JUN 26 P 6: 14
4997 add-on
6/26/84
MEMORANDUM
TO:
ROBERT MCFARLANE/WILLIAM HENKEL
FROM:
FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR.
77R
SUBJ:
APPROVED PRESIDENTIAL ACTIVITY
MEETING:
The meeting with participants in Conference on
US-Soviet Exchanges is now scheduled for 1:30 pm
on June 27 rather than 1:00 pm as previously
DATE:
notified.
The location will now be the East Room rather
TIME:
than Rose Garden with Indian Treaty Room as backup.
DURATION:
LOCATION:
REMARKS REQUIRED:
MEDIA COVERAGE:
FIRST LADY
PARTICIPATION:
NOTE: PROJECT OFFICER, SEE ATTACHED CHECKLIST
cc: R. Darman
J. Rosebush
R. Kimmitt
R. Deprospero
R. Scouten
J. Matlock
B. Elliott
B. Shaddix
D. Fischer
W. Sittmann
C. Fuller
L. Speakes
W. Henkel
WHCA Audio/Visual
E. Hickey
WHCA Operations
G. Hodges
A. Wrobleski
C. McCain
Nell Yates
B. Oglesby
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
Dan Amstutz, Under Secretary, USDA
Michael H. Armacost, Under Secretary Political Affairs, State
Diana Arsenian, The Carnegie Corporation of New York
Harley Balzer, Department of History, Georgetown University
William Barlow, East-West Trade Development
Irving Becker, The William and Mary Greve Foundation
Diana Bieliauskas, Office of International Affairs, National
Academy of Science
James Billington, Director, The Wilson Center
Michael Brainerd, Director, Citizen Exchange Council
Stephanie Bursenos, Fogarty International Center, National
Institutes of Health
John A. Busterud, Attorney at Law, Palo Alto
Maura Cantrill, The Kennan Institute
Alan Campbell, The Wilson Center
Jerome M. Clubb, Inter-university Consortium for Political and
Social Research, Ann Arbor
Tyrus Cobb, National Security Council
Walter Connor, Foreign Service Institute
Paul Cook, Department of State
Harriet Crosby, President, Institute for Soviet-American Relations
Karla Cruise, The Kennan Institute
Barbara Dash, The Kennan Institute
Dan E. Davidson, Executive Director, American Council of Teachers
of Russian
George Demko, Office of Research, U.S. Department of State
Mark Dillon, Office of the Director, U.S. Information Agency
Douglas Doan, NSC
Paula Dobriansky, NSC
Alla Dombrowsky, U.S. Information Agency
Honorable Thomas Downey, U.S. House of Representatives
Herbert J. Ellison, Secretary, The Kennan Institute
Cynthia Ely, The Wilson Center
Erick Erickson, U.S. Department of Agriculture
Amy Evans, Environmental Protection Agency
Ralph T. Fisher, Jr., Russian and East European Center,
University of Illinois
Wesley A. Fisher, International Research and Exchanges Board
Michael Flack, Washington, D.C.
John Geraghty, International Affairs, U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development
Robert H. Getz, The Kennan Institute
Prosser Gifford, Deputy Director, The Wilson Center
Christine Glenday, National Academy of Sciences
Nancy Graham, Chief Executive Officer, Institute for Soviet-
American Relations
Damon Gray, Washington, D.C.
-2-
Bernard Gwertzman, The New York Times
Jeffrey Hahn, Short-Term Visiting Grantee, Kennan Institute
David Hamburg, President, The Carnegie Corporation of New York
Alan Hart, Journalist, Smithsonian Institution
Stephen Hayes, Director, AFS International/Intercultural
Programs, Inc.
Allen Hecht, Director, National Climate Program Office, National
Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration
Ruth Hegyeli, National Institutes of Health
Kurt F. J. Heinrich, Office of International Relations, National
Bureau of Standards
Peter Henry, Office of International Health, U.S. House of
Representatives
John Holmfield, Science Policy Staff, U.S. House of Representatives
Michael Hurley, Visitor Program Service
Micnela Iozine, National Academy of Sciences
William James, Jackson School of International Studies,
University of Washington
Brad Johnson, Research Associate, The Kennan Institute
Robert Junghaus, Chief, International Activities Group, National
Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration
Madeleine Kalb
Allen Kassof, Executive Director, International Research and
Exchanges Board
Edward Keenan, Russian Research Center, Harvard University
John Kiser, Kiser Research, Inc.
Genevieve Knezo, Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service
Helen Kodman, National Institutes of Health
Chris Kojm, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, U.S.
House of Representatives
Christopher Lehman, NSC
John Lenczowski, NSC
Alice LeMaistre, Office of European Affairs, U.S. Information Agency
Tod Leventhal, Voice of America
Robert Litwak, The Wilson Center
Edward Luck, UN Association
Julian MacDonald, The Council for International Exchange of Scholars
Gifford Malone, Acting Director, Office of Programs, U.S.
Information Agency
Suzanne Massie, Irvington, New York
Ambassador Jack Matlock, National Security Council
Rebecca B. Matlock, Washington, D.C.
David Maxwell, Dean, Undergraduate Studies, Tufts University
Honorable James McNulty, U.S. House of Representatives
-3-
Jacquie McNulty, Washington, D.C.
John Mercer, International Policy Studies
John Metzler, U.S. Department of Energy
Laurence Mitchell, Natinal Academy of Sciences
William Moody, The Rockefeller Brothers Fund
Frederick P. Mosher, The Carnegie Corporation of New York
International Education
Lewis Murray, Bureau of Legislative/Intergovernmental Affairs, State
Sherry Mueller Norton, Institute for Intergovernmental Education
Michael Oja, Washington, D.C.
Ned Ostenso, National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration
R. Mark Palmer, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs,
U.S. Department of State
B. Lynn Pascoe, Deputy Director, Office of Soviet Affairs, State
Honorable Claiborne Pell, U.S. Senate
Grant Pendill, American Committee on East-West Accord
Jan Perkowski, Chair, CIEE Russian Language Program Consortium
Pierre Perrolle, National Science Foundation
Honorable Thomas Petri, U.S. House of Representatives
Vladimir Petrov, George Washington University
Michael Pillsbury, National Security Advisor, Senate Steering
Committee, U.S. Senate
Louise Platt, The Wilson Center
Cassandra A. Pyle, Director, The Council for International
Exchange of Scholars
Alexander Rabinowitch, Executive Director, Russian and East
European Institute, Indiana University
Victor Rabinowitch, National Academy of Sciences
Bermard Ramundo, U.S. Department of Transportation
Susan Rasky, The New York Times
Peter Reddaway, Kennan Institute; British Passport: 660933C
Marlin Remick, Deputy Director, Office of European Affairs, USIA
Yale Richmond, National Endowment for Democracy
Robert Robertson, Occidental International
Erik Ronho de, Institute of International Education
Sophie Sa, Social Science Research Council
William Salmon, Senior Advisor for Science and Technology, U.S.
Department of State
Jack Schmidt, Fogarty International Center, National Institutes
of Health
Laurie Schultz, Office of Representative James Jeffords
Alex M. Shane, Director of International Programs, State
University of New York, Albany
-4-
Gerson Sher, National Science Foundation
Secretary of State George P. Shultz
Thomas W. Simons, Deputy Asst Secretary European/Soviet Affairs, State
John Skillman, Deputy Director, Council on International
Education Exchange
Damon Smith, Washington, D.C.
Parker Snowe, Friends Committee on National Legislation
Jed Snyder, Research Associate, The Wilson Center
Edward Snyder, Friends Committee on National Legislation
Linwood Starbird, Department of State
Steven Steiner, National Security Council
Phillip Stewart, Associate, The Kettering Foundation
John Stremlau, Associate Director, International Relations, The
Rockefeller Foundation
Peter R. Summer, NSC
Meredith Taylor, The Kennan Institute
John Thomas, U.S. Department of State
Richard Thompson, Deputy Director, Center for International
Education, Department of Education
Vladimir Toumanoff, Executive Director, National Council for
Soviet and East European Research
Catherine Torgerson, NSC
Donald Treadgold, Russian and East European Studies, University
of Washington
Ronald Trowbridge, USIA
Charles Trumbull, Science Applications, Inc.
Janice Tuten, The Wilson Center
Leon Twarog, Director, Center for Slavic and East European
Studies, Ohio State University
Paul Von Ward, President, Delphi Research Associates, Inc.
Gary Waxmonsky, Environmental Protection Agency
James Wertsch, Northwestern University
Charles E. Wick, Director, U.S. Information Agency
Honorable Timothy Wirth, U.S. House of Representatives
John Zimmerman, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, State
SUGGESTED INVITEES TO ROSE GARDEN CEREMONY
Wednesday, June 27, 1984 -- 1:00 P.M.
HOUSE
SENATE
Wirth, Timothy E. (D-Colo)
Pell, Claiborne (D-RI)
Downey, Thomas J. (D-NY)
Hatfield, Mark O. (R-Ore)
Petri, Thomas E. (R-Wis)
-
Evans, Daniel J. (R-Wash)
McNaulty, James E., Jr. (D-Ariz)
Biden, Joseph R., Jr. (D-Del)
Hamilton, Lee (D-Ind)
Mathias, Charles McC., (R-Md)
Bereuter, Doug (R-Nebr)
Leahy, Patrick J. (D-Vt)
)
Glickman, Dan (D-Kan)
Lugar, Richard G. (R-Ind)
Foley, Thomas S. (D-Wash)
-
Percy, Charles H. (R-I11)
Leach, Jim (R-Iowa)
- Cohen, William S. (R-Maine)
Fascell, Dante (D-Fla)
- Dole, Robert (R-Kansas)
Simon, Paul (D-I11)
Optional
Optional
Smith, Neal (D-Iowa)
- Laxalt, Paul (R-Nev)
— O'Brien, George M. (R-Ill)
- DeConcini, Dennis (D-Ariz)
- Schroeder, Patricia (D-Colo)
- Inouye, Daniel K. (D-Haw)
— Kemp, Jack (R-NY)
- Bradley, Bill (D-NJ)
- Oakar, Mary Rose (D-Ohio)
- Glenn, John (D-Ohio)
-
Levin, Carl (D-Mich)
Hatch, Orin (R-Utah)
- Tower, John (R-Tex)
- Goldwater, Barry (R-Ariz)
State Invitees
- Secretary of State George Shultz
Michael H. Armacost, UnderSec/Political Affairs
I
Richard R. Burt, Asst.Sec/European & Canadian Affairs
-
W. Tapley Bennett, Jr. Asst.Sec/Bur. of Legis. & Intergovernmental Affairs
Mark Palmer, Dep.Asst.Sec/European & Canadian Affairs
Thomas W. Simons, Jr., Dir./Office of Soviet Union Affairs
B. Lynn Pascoe, Dep.Dir./Office of Soviet Union Affairs
John Zimmerman, Office of Soviet Union Affairs
-
Lewis Murray, Bureau of Legislative & Intergovernmental Affairs
Technical Agency Invitees
- Ambassador Theodore Britton, Dir., Office-International Affairs, HUD
- Undersecretary Dan Amstutz, USDA
- Fitzhugh Green, Dep. Adminis., EPA, or his Designate
- C. Everett Koop, Surgeon General, DHHS
- Alvin Trivelpiece, Asst. Secretary, DOE
- not invited
invited: not accepted,
invited = accepted
e
5074
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
June 29, 1984
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK For
SUBJECT:
Letter to Mr Giffen of U.S. -USSR Trade and
Economic Council
Attached at Tab I is a letter of acknowledgement to James Giffen,
who wrote to thank you for meeting with Bill Verity and Vladimir
Sushkov last month.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the letter at Tab I.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments:
Tab I
Proposed response
Tab II
Incoming letter, June 15, 1984
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Dear Mr. Giffen:
Thank you for your letter of June 15. I am
pleased that the recent meeting of the
U.S. -USSR Trade and Economic Council went
so well.
I am also pleased that the long-term
agreement will be renewed and that
preparations will begin to reactivate the
Joint Commercial Commission.
Sincerely,
Robert C. McFarlane
Mr. James H. Giffen
U.S.-USSR Trade and Economic
Council, Inc.
805 Third Avenue
New York, New York 10022
Trade US-USSR and
Economic Council, Inc.
June 15, 1984
Dear Mr. McFarlane,
Before any further time passes I want to express to you my
profound appreciation for taking the time out of your busy
schedule to meet with Mr. Vladimir N. Sushkov and C.
William Verity, Jr. the Soviet and American Co-Chairmen of
the US-USSR Trade & Economic Council when they were in
Washington last month.
You will recall that Mr. Sushkov headed a delegation who
were in the U.S. in connection with the Annual Meetings of
the Council in New York. He found the opportunity to meet
with you very worthwhile and enlightening and expressed the
hope that we could continue to maintain open communications
with people such as yourself.
You may be interested in knowing that the meetings in New
York were considered by the membership to be extremely
successful. Over 140 American member firms were
represented and there were over 300 participants from both
the American and Soviet sides.
Again, my sincere thanks and if I may be of any help,
please let me know.
Sincerely,
SALH
James H. Giffen
Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20500
805 Third Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022 212/644-4550
3 Shevchenko Embankment, Moscow 121248, USSR
C-JM
June 29, 1984
Q:
Is there much chance for a summit meeting with the Soviet
Union?
A:
I'm sure that when our dialogue reaches the point that
a meeting will be useful, one will be arranged. But we
haven't reached that point yet, and I can't predict when it
will happen. As far as I'm concerned, I'm ready and
willing.
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION
June 28, 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR JACK MATLOCK
FROM:
KARNA SMALL KS
SUBJECT:
Presidential Interviews
On Monday, the President is scheduled to be interviewed by local
TV stations in Florida and Texas. They have submitted a few
questions in advance. May I have your answers to these questions
no later than opening of business, tomorrow morning, Friday, June
29.
I appreciate your help on this.
Q:
Is there much chance for a summit meeting with the Soviet
Union?
RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY
THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 12 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
SUBJECT:
Conversation with Dobrynin at Barbeque Today
You will presumably have the opportunity to speak to Soviet
Ambassador Dobrynin at the barbeque this evening for the
diplomatic corps. (Since he is Dean of the Corps, it will be
normal for you to exchange some words with him.)
I would recommend that you take the opportunity to encourage a
favorable Soviet response to our proposal for talks in Vienna
this September. We cannot be sure that the Soviets will
respond positively. If they are determined to deal only on
their own terms, they will reject our reply and claim that it
does not respond to their proposal for negotiations on space
weapons. In fact, however, it offers them a face-saving way
out of the box they have put themselves in regarding START and
INF.
The best approach, I believe, would be to treat the matter in
an up-beat fashion, assuming that we have been totally
responsive. This would also provide an opportunity to
reiterate your desire to get the dialogue into a
problem-solving mode.
The attached talking points may be useful.
Attachment:
TAB A - Suggested Talking Points with Dobrynin
DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED
NLS F95-074/2 #39
BY LOJ NARA, DATE 10/25/00
Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock
SECRET/SENSITIVE
1.
SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS
Ambassador Dobrynin at Barbeque for Diplomatic Corps
July 1, 6:30 P.M.
-- I understand you are going back to Moscow Tuesday and want
you to carry a personal message from me to Mr. Chernenko.
-- I recognize that the proposal you gave us Friday was an
important move on your part. Our response is serious and
positive.
-- We accept your invitation to meet in Vienna September 18.
We will be ready at that time to talk about both anti-satellite
weapons and nuclear arms reductions -- and of course other arms
control concerns if you wish.
-- In particular, tell Mr. Chernenko that I am eager to make
some real progress. Your proposal and our favorable response
can provide a valuable opportunity that we must take advantage
of. I am confident that if we both take a problem-solving
approach, we can work out together arms control arrangements
that meet both our countries' needs and concerns.
-- I will be telling George Shultz and Art Hartman to get
moving with your people in working out the necessary
preparations so that these talks can be successful.
-- And tell Chairman Chernenko that I will reply to his last
letter soon. Frankly, I was discouraged when I got it, because
the correspondence didn't seem to be getting anywhere. I hope
these latest developments will change that.
If Dobrynin says that our reply was not responsive to their
proposal, you might want to express surprise and say that when
they spoke of all weapons using space, you naturally assumed
that they included ballistic missiles.
If Dobrynin should complain about our rapid release of our
statement, you could remind him that we were merely following
their example. Of course, it will be easier in the future to
discuss matters confidentially before we go public, but both
sides have to follow this practice if it is to work.
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DOCDATE 13 JUN 84
CHERNENKO, KONSTANTI
06 JUN 84
SHULTZ, G
14 JUN 84
KEYWORDS: USSR
HS
SUBJECT. CHERNENKO LTR REPLYING TO PRES LTR RE STATE OF US - USSR RELATIONS
ACTION. NFAR / NOTED BY PRES
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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
84 JUN 34
WASHINGTON
June 14, 1984
SECRET/SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
George P. Shultz ros
SUBJECT:
Chernenko's June 6 Letter and Dobrynin's
Talking Points: Analysis
I would like to share with you my analysis of Chernenko's
reply to your last letter and to the points Dobrynin handed over
in my meeting last Tuesday.
These communications basically contain nothing new, and
confirm my impression that the Soviets are currently uncertain
about how to handle us. Since the letter was signed June 6, it
does not respond to your Dublin speech. But your last letter
already contained your offer to negotiate on non-use of force if
they would negotiate on confidence-building measures at
Stockholm. Meanwhile, we have put down two other new arms
control negotiating proposals, on chemical weapons and in MBFR.
The Soviet reaction has been to pull out of the Olympics and to
ratchet up their propaganda campaign, while claiming privately
that they are willing to move forward (and agreeing to another
round of talks on minor consular issues). In this letter and
these points, Chernenko repeats the general argument that they
want to move forward and we do not, but offers practically
nothing to back it up.
Chernenko's language is correct and non-polemical. In
response to your effort to explain why we see a threat in many
Soviet actions, he goes on at length with a familiar rendition
of Soviet complaints about us (encirclement with bases, INF
missiles at their doorstep, etc.). The core theme is that we
refuse to treat the USSR as an "equal."
On the security side, Chernenko basically reiterates the
same tired agenda of one-sided arms control proposals as the
solution to the problems in the relationship. On regional
issues, he calls for restraint and says Dobrynin will present
some "specific considerations" on our proposals for talks, but
all Dobrynin had to say was that they are willing to listen to
our views on southern Africa and the Middle East/Persian Gulf
before deciding whether they will sit down for actual exchanges
of views.
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As in previous letters, Chernenko leaves bilateral issues to
others, i.e. Gromyko and the Foreign Ministry, but even here
Dobrynin had mainly complaints that we are not moving on the
things they care about, like fishing allocations and Aeroflot
flights to the U.S. However, he also promised to get back to us
soon on our proposals for new rounds of talks on hotline upgrade
and the Pacific maritime boundary and for talks on search and
rescue operations in the northern Pacific.
Finally, Chernenko closes with a complaint that you keep
injecting Soviet internal affairs -- meaning human rights --
into your letters.
On the arms control side, there are a few items of detail
worth pointing out:
-- In terms of the emphasis given to various arms control
items, the "Chernenko agenda" as it now stands is: negotiations
on outer space arms control; renouncing construction of
large-scale anti-ballistic missile defense systems; limitations
on naval activities and naval armaments (a recent Gromyko
"initiative"); non-use of force; and nuclear testing.
-- On non-use of force, Chernenko is careful: he touts
their proposal for a Warsaw Pact-NATO treaty on non-use of
force, which they propose to discuss separately from the
Stockholm conference; he next talks about chemical weapons and
MBFR, and only then turns to Stockholm, where he expresses the
hope that "the United States will take a position that would
make possible agreement on mutually acceptable solutions."
Dobrynin's points do not mention non-use of force at all. This
suggests there may be some unresolved differences between
Chernenko and Gromyko on how to handle your offer to discuss
non-use of force together with our confidence-building measures
in Stockholm. (Their negotiator in Stockholm is being almost
totally non-committal at this point.)
-- Finally, both communications promise to negotiate on
chemical weapons in Geneva and MBFR in Vienna, even though they
are very skeptical of our offers, but Dobrynin's points turn
down our offer of private discussions here on either issue "in
view of the character of the latest American proposals." In
other words, they accept bilateral discussions, but only at the
negotiating sites.
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In sum, then, the Soviets have given us a mixed but, on
balance, a poor showing. The tone is defensive, and so is the
content. This is not surprising: they are on the defensive
because we have the initiative in most aspects of our
relationship. I found it interesting that Dobrynin -- in his
remarks -- insisted so strongly that they "are not afraid to be
seen negotiating with this Administration," and that they can do
business even this year. But there may be some daylight between
him and Moscow, where they continue to appear unwilling to
negotiate on the basis of the substantial agenda you have put
forward. So, despite Dobrynin's complaint about accusations
that they are "hibernating," I think that remains a fairly
accurate description of what they are doing.
To sustain our initiative, I think you should respond fairly
quickly to Chernenko's message, and I will be sending you a
draft in the next week or so. Overall, our response should be
to keep pressing them both privately and publicly, as you did so
successfully in your Dublin speech.
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His Excellency
Ronald W. Reagan
The President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. President,
In connection with your letter I would like to express some
thoughts in continuation of our exchange of views with you.
I, of course, took note of the pledge of commitment to the
lessening of tensions between our countries made by you in the
handwritten addition to your letter. In turn, I can affirm once
again what I wrote in my first letter to you -- namely, that it
has been and continues to be our wish that there be a turn toward
steady, good relations between the USSR and the USA. As a
matter of fact, the numerous specific proposals submitted by our
side, including those proposals put forward in my letters to
you, have been aimed at reaching that very objective.
As regards interpreting a certain period in the history of
our relations, about which you had already written once before,
here our views differ. We have presented our point of view in
this regard, so I will not repeat myself. I will note, however,
that one side's having military superiority or seeking such
superiority cannot be perceived by the other side as an
indication of good intentions. There can be only one indication
-- a willingness to conduct affairs as equals, a willingness
reflected in practical policies. The position of the Soviet
Union in this regard is clear and precise: we are not seeking
superiority, but we will not allow superiority over us. I do
not see anything here that should be unacceptable to the United
States, if one wants stability and a lessening of tensions. It
is from a position of equality that it is possible to agree on
really mutually-acceptable solutions, when neither side can have
reason to believe that it is making unilateral concessions.
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I thought it necessary to point this out, having in mind the
way in which the intentions of the Soviet Union are interpreted
in your letter. I cannot agree with this. This has already
been stated on our side in the past. But since you return again
to the question of intentions and how they can be perceived, I
will express a few opinions, illustrating them with specific
examples.
If one is to sum up what on many occasions has been publicly
stated by you and other representatives of the Administration,
one concludes that the only situation that would be acceptable
to the United States would be one in which it was militarily
ahead of the USSR. The fact of the matter, however, is that
such a situation has not been and is not acceptable to us. In
this respect we have experience -- bitter experience. The
history of our relations, especially in the postwar period, has
seen quite a few complications too. Quite a few attempts have
been made to exert political, economic, and even military
pressure on us.
Let us take the current situation. There is, it seems, an
American idiom "to turn the table." Try to look at the realities
of the international situation from our end. And at once one
will see distinctly that the Soviet Union is encircled by a
chain of American military bases. These bases are full of
nuclear weapons. Their mission is well known -- they are
targeted on us. Nothing like it can be found around your
country.
And what about the fact that entire regions of the globe
have been proclaimed spheres of American vital interests? And
not only proclaimed, but made the object of a U.S. military
presence. And this is done, among other places, at our very
doorstep. And again we, for our part, are not doing anything
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- 3 -
like it. What conclusions should we draw from this as to the
intentions of the U.S.? I believe the conclusions readily
present themselves. Such an approach is nothing other then a
hypertrophied idea of one's interests in which the legitimate
interests of others are completely ignored, an effort to gain,
to put it mildly, positions of privilege at the expense of the
other side. This approach is not compatible with the objective
of ensuring stability. On the contrary, such an approach as a
matter of policy objectively helps to create and sustain
tensions.
Or let us take strategic arms. Here, too, no claims can be
directed toward the Soviet Union. The fact that there is rough
parity between the USSR and the USA and, in a wider sense,
between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, can be disputed by no expert
familiar with the situation. The SALT-2 Treaty was a reflection
of this fact. It was not the end of the road, and we did not
consider it as such. But the merit of the treaty was, among
other things, that it established, I would say, with
mathematical precision the strategic balance that has evolved.
Your military experts can tell you that the Soviet Union has
done nothing to upset this balance. At the same time we see
what kind of attitude is displayed toward the Treaty by the
other side. Is it not the criterion by which to judge its
intentions?
The same applies as well to medium-range nuclear forces in
Europe. I will recall only that it was we who offered to reduce
their number to the minimum on the side of the USSR and NATO.
In response, "Pershings" and cruise missiles are appearing near
our borders. How would you regard it, Mr. President, had
something similar happened with respect to the U.S.? I believe
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that your assesment of the intentions of the other side under
the circumstances could only be one -- as regards both the other
side's approach to negotiations and the essence of its
intentions.
But even under these circumstances we have displayed and
continue to display utmost restraint. The response we were
forced to take, in terms of its scope and character, has not
gone beyond the limits necessary to neutralize the threat posed
to us and our allies. Moreover, we propose to return to the
initial situation and, instead of further unleashing an arms
race, to address ourselves in a decisive fashion to curbing the
arms race, and to radically limiting and reducing nuclear arms.
This is far from imposing conditions. As a matter of fact, what
is unfair about the two sides cancelling those measures whose
effect was to heighten the level of nuclear confrontation and,
conversely, to lessen global security? There can be nothing
unfair or damaging for either side in this. A return to the
previous situation in the present circumstances would constitute
forward movement by both sides toward stabilizing the situation,
toward the practical renewal of the entire process of limiting
nuclear weapons that is of decisive importance for the future of
international relations and for peace as such.
So far, however, we see no indication that the American side
proceeds from such an assumption. Regrettably, nothing new on
this major issue of the day can be found in your letter either.
I say this not for the sake of polemics, but rather in the hope
that you will still find it possible to appreciate the way out
of the extremely grave situation that we are suggesting.
SECRET SENSITIVE
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From my correspondence with you, Mr. President, as well as
from previous correspondence, one can conclude that, in general
terms there seems to be an understanding on your part that there
are a number of important questions concerning the problem of
security which require solutions and where joint efforts by our
two countries are necessary.
For my part, in my last message I specifically mentioned
several of these questions. Let me remind you that these
included renouncing the construction of large-scale anti-
ballistic missile defense systems, entering into negotiations on
preventing the militarization of outer space and on banning
anti-sattelite weapons, a freeze on nuclear weapons, resuming
talks on a complete and comprehensive ban on nuclear tests, and
some other measures. In other words, we are not for dialogue in
a general sense between our two countries, but propose to fill
it with concrete, weighty substance. We are convinced that
practical movement in these and other directions and mutual
determination to achieve practical results would fundamentally
ease the situation in our relations and throughout the world in
general. The degree of trust would increase significantly.
But we have not received a response to these proposals that
would enable us to say that the United States is prepared for
such concrete actions. I will not make a judgment as to what is
the problem here, but I am convinced that, seriously speaking,
there is no good reason and, moreover, no justification for
avoiding the solution of problems that can play a decisive role
in determining the road the world will take in the near future.
Awareness of this is growing on the part of the public and the
leaders of many states. Graphic evidence of this is the recent
appeal by the leaders of six countries from four continents to
the governments of the nuclear powers. Mr. President, this
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appeal is a very serious reminder, to our countries as well, of
the enormous responsibility they bear for the destinies of the
world and mankind. Our common duty is to respond to this appeal
honestly, without delay, and through concrete actions. For its
part, the Soviet Union is prepared for it.
In addition to those of our proposals already mentioned, I
would also like to draw your attention to additional areas of
possible cooperation in the interests of strengthening peace.
One of these is the limitation of naval activity and naval
armaments. This problem is very urgent; it is no coincidence
that the United Nations has attached such importance to it as
well. We have specific ideas on what could be done to reduce
the growing tensions on the high seas, to ensure freedom of
navigation and the safety of international sea communications.
We have spoken in favor of discussing this problem within the
framework of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament or in separate
multilateral negotiations. Taking into account the role of our
countries, we also propose to discuss this set of questions on a
bilateral basis. We would like to know your opinion on this
score.
Furthermore, the Warsaw Pact countries recently made a
proposal to NATO countries to begin multilateral consultations
on the subject of concluding a Treaty on mutual non-use of
military force and the maintenance of peaceful relations. The
essence and the importance of the idea of such a Treaty are well
known. Attention to this proposal has been growing from the
moment of its introduction. And here our two countries could
also play an important part. We are ready to study any ideas
the American side might have on this question.
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The Soviet Union will, furthermore, do everything in its
power to promote agreements on the problem of banning chemical
weapons and on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in
Central Europe. Our delegations in Geneva and Vienna will be
prepared to cooperate with American representatives. It goes
without saying that, within the framework of these fora, we
shall also express in detail our views on recent positions
advanced by the American side. However, I have to note that the
overall impression -- and not only ours -- is that these
positions do not constitute a constructive contribution to the
work already done in these fora.
Recently the Soviet Union introduced at the Stockholm
conference a concrete and carefully balanced document directed
at attaining a really significant agreement, which would
fundamentally strengthen security on the European continent. In
preparing this document, we took into account the opinions
expressed at the first round of the conference as well as in the
course of bilateral consultations, including those with American
representatives. We would like to expect that in Stockholm the
United States will take a position that would make possible
agreement on mutually acceptable solutions.
As it has already been pointed out on our part in corres-
pondence with you, we favor a bilateral exchange of opinions on
regional matters. Our Ambassador is instructed to present to
the Secretary of State more specific considerations on these and
some other matters. Here I find it necessary to stress the main
point: the need for restraint, for refraining from actions -- no
matter what their motives -- which could only intensify dangerous
tensions in various regions and make difficult the achievement of
a just political settlement. The world has proven more than once
that it is a hundred times more difficult to extinguish a fire
than to prevent it. To remember this is in everyone's interests.
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I do not want to conclude this letter on a negative note,
but in view of some of the remarks in your letter, I must point
out that introduction into relations between states of questions
concerning solely domestic affairs of our country or yours does
not serve the task of improving these relations -- if this is
our goal. I wish questions of such a nature did not burden our
correspondence, which both of us, as I understand it, value.
Sincerely,
K. Chernenko
Moscow
June 6, 1984
0934M
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Президенту Соединенных Штатов Америки
Вашингтон
BY hoJ NARA, DATE 10/25/00
Уважаемый господин Президент,
B связи C Вашим письмом хотел бы высказать некоторые сооб-
ражения B продолжение нашего C Вами обмена мнениями.
я, конечно, обратил внимание Ha заверение B приверженности
делу снижения напряженности между нашими странами, 0 чем ΓoBo-
рится B сделанном Вами рукописном добавлении K TeKcTy письма. B
свою очередь MoΓy вновь подтвердить To, 0 чем я писал еще B пер-
BOM письме BaM, a именно - поворот K ровным, добрым отношениям
между CCCP И США был И остается нашим желанием. Собственно, эту
цель И преследуют Te многочисленные конкретные предложения, Ko-
торые выдвигались C нашей стороны, B TOM числе B моих письмах
BaM.
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наших отношений, 0 чем Вы однажды уже писали, TO здесь наши оцен-
ки расходятся. Мы излагали свою точку зрения Ha этот счет и пов-
торяться He cTaHy. Отмечу, однако, что наличие BoeHHoΓo преиму-
щества y одной стороны или стремление K TaKoBoMy He может воспри-
ниматься другой стороной KaK показатель наличия добрых намерений.
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равных, готовность, выраженная B практической политике. TaKoBa
ясная и четкая позиция CoBeTcKoΓo Союза: мы He стремимся K пре-
имуществу, HO и He допустим eΓo над собой. He вижу, что здесь MO-
жет быть неприемлемым для Соединенных Штатов, если желать cTa-
бильности, снижения напряженности. C позиций paBeHcTBa можно
договариваться 0 действительно взаимоприемлемых решениях, когда
ни y одной из cTopoH He может быть причин считать, что oHa идет
Ha односторонние уступки.
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рениях и KaK они MoΓyT представляться, выскажу некоторые суждения,
проиллюстрировав их конкретными примерами.
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гими представителями администрации, TO получается, что США ycTpa-
ивало только TaKoB положение, когда B BoeHHoM отношении они были
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ивало и He устраивает. Ha этот счет y Hac есть опыт И опыт тяже-
лый. Немало было осложнений и B истории отношений наших cTpaH,
особенно B послевоенный период. Немало было попыток оказать Ha
Hac политическое, экономическое, да И BoeHHoe давление.
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cKoe выражение "развернуть стол". Постарайтесь взглянуть Ha pe-
альности международной обстановки C нашего конца. И cpa3y cTaHeT
отчетливо видно, что Советский Союз окружен цепью американских
военных баз. Ha этих базах полно ядерного оружия. Предназначение
eΓo известно - OHO нацелено против Hac. Ничего подобного BoKpyΓ
Вашей страны HeT.
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американских жизненных интересов? И He просто объявляются, a
становятся объектом BoeHHoΓo присутствия США. И это происходит B
TOM числе y caMoΓo нашего порога. Опять-таки мы CO своей стороны I
чего подобного He делаем. Какие из этого выводы ДОЛЖНЫ мы делать
относительно намерений США? Полагаю, они напрашиваются сами собой.
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позиции 3a счет другой стороны. He совмещается это c целями дости
жения стабильности. Напротив, такая линия B политике объективно
ведет K созданию и поддержанию напряженности.
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никаких претензий K CoBeTcKoMy Союзу. To, что между CCCP и США,
a B широком смысле между странами Варшавского Договора и HATO
есть примерный паритет, He cTaHeT оспаривать ни один знающий
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положение дел специалист. Отражением этого явился договор OCB-2.
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BO, помимо прочего, B ToM, что B HeM было, я бы сказал, c MaTeMa-
тической точностью зафиксировано сложившееся стратегическое paB-
новесие.
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сделал ничего, чтобы нарушить равновесие. B TO же время мы видим,
KaKoe отношение проявляется K этому договору c другой стороны.
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ности B Европе. Напомню лишь, что именно мы предлагали сократить
их ДО минимума Ha cTopoHe CCCP И HATO. B oTBeT вблизи наших Γpa-
НИЦ появляются "Першинги" и крылатые ракеты. KaK бы Вы, господин
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Ваша оценка намерений другой стороны B этом сдучае была бы одно-
значной - KaK B отношении ee подхода K переговорам, TaK и B ToM,
что касается ee намерений по существу.
Ho даже B этих условиях мы проявили и проявляем максимум
выдержки. Наша вынужденная ответная реакция по cBoeMy объему и
xapaKTepy He выходит 3a рамки нейтрализации создаваемой HaM и Ha-
шим союзникам угрозы. Более ToΓo, мы предлагаем вернуться K из-
начальному положению и BMecTo развертывания гонки вооружений
решительно заняться ee свертыванием, радикальным ограничением и
сокращением ядерных вооружений. Это отнюдь He выдвижение каких-то
условий. Собственно говоря, что несправедливого B ToM, что Doe
стороны отменили бы свои мероприятия, B результате которых ypoBeH
ядерного противостояния повысился, a степень всеобщей безопаснос:
напротив, понизилась? Ничего несправедливого или ущербного ни ДЛЯ
одной стороны B этом быть He может. Bo3BpaT K прежнему положению
B данном случае был бы движением обеих cTopoH вперед B направлен
стабилизации положения, K практическому возобновлению вего про-
цесса ограничения ядерных вооружений, имеющего решающее значение
для будущего международных отношений, для мира KaK TaKoBoΓo.
Пока, однако, мы He видим признаков ToΓo, что американская
cTopoHa исходит из такой предпосылки. K сожалению, B этом главно
4.
сейчас вопросе He обнаруживается HoBoΓo И B Вашем письме. Говорю
об этом He ради полемики, a B надежде, что Вы Bce же сможете оце-
нить предлагаемый нами выход из крайне серьезного положения.
Из нашей c Вами, господин Президент, да и предыдущей пере-
писки можно сделать вывод, что C Вашей стороны B общем плане Bpo-
де бы есть понимание, что имеется целый ряд крупных вопросов,
относящихся K проблеме безопасности, которые требуют решения и
где необходимы совместные усилия наших двух cTpaH.
Co своей стороны B предыдущем послании Я KoHKpeTHo назвал
несколько таких вопросов. Напомню, речь шла 00 oTKa3e oT создания
широкомасштабных систем противоракетной обороны, 0 вступлении B
переговоры относительно недопущения милитаризации KocMoca и
запрещении протевоспутникового оружия, 0 замораживании ядерного
оружия, возобновлении переговоров 0 всеобщем и полном запрещении
испытаний ядерного оружия И 0 некоторых других Mepax. Иными сло-
вами, мы He вообще 3a диалог между нашими странами, a предлагаем
наполнить eΓo конкретным весомым содержанием. Мы убеждены, что
практическое продвижение по этим и другим направлениям, взаимная
нацеленность Ha практические результаты коренным образом pa3-
рядили бы обстановку и B наших отношениях, и B международном
плане B целом. Значительно повысилась бы И степень доверия.
Ho МЫ He получили Ha эти наши предложения отклика, который
позволял бы говорить, что Соединенные Штаты готовы K таким KoHKpeT
ным действиям. He cTaHy судить, B чем здесь дело, HO убежден,
что по большому счету ничем нельзя обосновать и TeM более оправ-
дать уход OT решения проблем, которые MoΓyT сыграть определяющую
роль B ToM, по KaKoMy пути пойдет мир уже B ближайшем будущем.
Осознание этого Bce глубже внедряется B yMax общественности И
руководителей многих государств. Наглядное подтверждение ToMy -
недавний призыв K правительствам ядерных держав руководителей
шести государств, представляющих четыре континента. Господин
президент, этот призыв - очень серьезное напоминание, B TOM
числе нашим cTpaHaM, 0 той огромной ответственности, которая ле-
жит Ha них 3a судьбы мира, человечества. Наша общая обязанность -
5.
откликнуться Ha этот призыв честно, незамедлительно, конкретными
действиями. Co своей стороны Советский Союз K этому ΓoToB.
Помимо уже излагавшихся нами предложений, хотел бы обратить
Ваше внимание И Ha дополнительные области возможного взаимодейст-
вия B интересах укрепления мира. Одна из них - ограничение BoeHHo-
морской деятельности И морских вооружений. Проблема эта весьма aK-
туальна, He случайно ей придала TaKoe значение И Организация
Объединенных Наций. y Hac есть конкретные идеи, что можно было
бы сделать для снижения растущей напряженности Ha морях, для
надежного обеспечения свободы мореплавания, безопасности между-
народных морских коммуникаций. Мы высказались 3a возможность DÓ-
суждения указанной проблемы B paMKax женевской конференции по
разоружению или Ha отдельных многосторонних переговорах. C учетом
роли наших cTpaH мы предлагаем обсудить комплекс этих вопросов
И B двустороннем плане. Хотелось бы узнать Ваше мнение Ha этот
счет.
Далее. Недавно страны Варшавского Договора предложили cTpaHaM
HATO приступить K многосторонным консультациям Ha предмет заключе-
ния договора 0 взаимном неприменении военной силы И поддержании OT
ношений мира. Существо И значение идеи TaKoΓo договора известны.
C MoMeHTa выдвижения этого предложения внимание K HeMy pacTeT. И
здесь наши две страны также могли бы сыграть большую роль. Мы
готовы изучить соображения, которые MoΓyT быть y американской
стороны по данному вопросу.
Советский Союз будет и дальше делать Bce OT HeΓo зависящее
для продвижения K договоренностям по проблеме запрещения химиче-
cKoΓo оружия, a также относительно сокращения вооруженных сил и
вооружений B Центральной Европе. Наши делегации B Женеве И BeHe
будут готовы сотрудничать C американскими представителями. Pa3y-
меется, B paMKax этих форумов мы детально выскажемся И по недавним
позициям, изложенным C американской стороны. Должен, однако, OT-
метить, что общее впечатление - и He только наше - TaKoBo, что
эти позиции He представляют собой конструктивного вклада B уже
проделанную Ha указанных форумах работу.
Советский Союз недавно выступил Ha стокгольмской конференции
C конкретным И тщательно сбалансированным документом, направленным
6.
Ha достижение действительно значимой договоренности, которая Ko-
ренным образом укрепила бы безопасность Ha ввропейском континенте.
При подготовке этого документа МЫ учитывали мнения, высказивавшие-
ся Ha первом раунде конференции, a также B ходе двусторонних KoH-
сультаций, B TOM числе C американскими представителями. Мы хотели
бы рассчитывать, что Соединенные Штаты займут B Стокгольме по зицию
которая позволит договориться 0 взаимоприемлемых решениях.
KaK уже указывалось C нашей стороны B переписке C Вами, мы 3a
двусторонний обмен мнениями по региональным проблемам. Нашему пос-
лу поручается изложить госсекретарю более конкретные соображения
ПО этим и некоторым другим вопросам. Здесь же я считаю необходи-
мым подчеркнуть главное - необходимость сдержанности и недопущения
действий, какими бы мотивами они ни диктовались, которые могли бы
лишь усиливать опасную напряженность B Tex или иных районах, 3a-
труднять достижение справедливого политического урегулирования.
Мир He pa3 убеждался, что гасить вспыхнувший пожар BO cTo KpaT
труднее, чем предотвратить eΓo. Помнить 00 этом - B интересах Bce:
y меня HeT желания заканчивать это послание Ha негативной
HOTE, HO C учетом некоторых высказываний, содержащихся B Вашем
письме, вынужден заметить, что привнесение B межгосударственные
отношения вопросов, касающихся сугубо внутренних дел нашей или
вашей страны, He отвечает задаче выправления этих отношений, если
TaKoBa наша цель. Хотелось бы, чтобы вопросы TaKoΓo рода He отяго
щали и нашу C Вами переписку, которую МЫ оба, KaK я понимаю, цени
C уважением,
K. ЧЕРНЕНКО
MocKBa
6 июня I984 года
talking points
First. I would like to draw your attention to the fact that
the solution of major questions, including new ones, set forth
in the message of K.U. Chernenko would be of principal importance
from the point of view of improving the Soviet-American relations
and the international situation in general. Thus we again confirm
in the practical way the line toward conducting a businesslike
exchange of views with the Government of the United States with
the aim of achieving constructive agreements on a wide range of
issues in the Soviet-American relations. It concerns both the
questions of strengthening security and ending the arms race as
well as the area of bilateral relations.
Up till now, however, the American side acts in such a way
that we do not see its readiness to go forward in practice to
improving our relations, though quite a few words about such
readiness have been said recently. The repeated promises to do
something positive are not followed by anything tangible as yet.
At the same time it is often said that the American side
allegedly introduces some concrete proposals, but the Soviet
side reacts to them negatively. It is stated even as if we
consciously counteract to some constuctive efforts by the
Administration and do not want progress in our relations. It is
obvious for us that the situation is just the opposite. It is not
clear, however, why a deliberately false impression is created,
if, indeed, there is a desire to find a common language.
It is known, by whose initiative the Soviet-American relation:
were brought to such a mediocre shape. If an unbiased approach
is used, there cannot be two opinions. Nevertheless, not once
we proposed to revive our relations and to fill them with
concrete contents. These questions have been discussed with the
Secretary of State many times.
If businesslike views in this regard were expressed by the
American side,-and promises of such nature were given many times,-
then, by all means, we would consider them with due attention.
We wish only that it could be something specific and not
simply symbolics presented as something positive in the way
of formal extention of some agreements which are in fact not
DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED DECLASSIFIED
NLS F95-074/2#43
BY LOJ NARA, DATE 7/18/00
2.
working. For example, we are told for some time already that a
question of allocating fishing quotas for us is being considered.
But at the same time, as we find out, measures of the opposite
nature are being taken. Is it not the decision on limiting the
activity of the joint Soviet-American fishing company on the
Pacific coast that speakes about it?
There are attempts to attribute to us the desire to curtail
the contacts and ties, including the area of scientific and
cultural exchanges. However, the situation here as well rests on
the position and acts of the American side. It rests on its
unreadiness to solve the question of providing security for
Soviet participants in such exchanges and normal conditions for
their presence in the US. It is a question of principle and it
cannot be avoided. It is again proven by recent hostile acts
against Soviet people in the US. The American side also avoids
the solution of the question concerning the practical side of
such exchanges, connected with the resumption of the flights
by the Aeroflot to the United States.
Now the American side keeps some kind of rosters of
questions, replies to which should be given by this or that side.
But even if to approach the situation with this formal point of
view, it still turns out that we constructively develop our
position and introduce concrete proposals, while the American side
limits itself to promises to think about something and to
consider something.
On the Soviet side there is no lack of desire and efforts
to really improve the situation in our relations. It is up to
the American side.
Second. Questions of security.
The Soviet position on the question of preventing the
militarization of outer space has been already presented quite
clearly to the Secretary of State. We proceed from the idea that
formal negotiations on this matter should start between especial-
ly appointed delegations. The organizational side of such
3.
negotiations should be discussed through the diplomatic channels.
In other words now the question is this: is the American side
prepared to solve this urgent problem, which long ago has already
gone because of its importance beyond the framework of the Soviet-
American relations only?
A proposal has been introduced by the Soviet side that both
sides should reject the very idea of developing and deploying
large-scale antiballistic missile defense systems. We would be
ready to discuss the means of realization of this proposal - for
example to discuss the substance and the form of appropriate
statements, the order of making them public, etc.
Our position with regard to the question of the treaties of
1974 and 1976 on the limitation of underground nuclear explosions
is also clear. The treaties were carefully worked out including
the part concerning control. They were signed and should be put
in force. There is no necessity in any additional interpretation
of any provisions of the treaties. The questions, should the sides
have them in the future as the treaties are in force, could be
considered and solved in accordance with relevant provisions of
those treaties themselves. The issue now is only whether the
American side is or is not willing to ratify these treaties.
We favor doing this and as far as possible without further delay.
The Soviet side attributes great significance to the banning
of chemical weapons, to the reduction of the armed forces and
the armaments in Central Europe. These questions must by solved.
Our specific considerations in connection with the latest
proposals of the United States concerning these questions will
by stated by the Soviet representatives at the appropriate forums.
However, it may be said even now that the American position,
unfortunately, does not give hope. We would like to think that the
American side will properly take into account those observations
and remarks which we and not only we shall express in Geneva and
Vienna. There the Soviet delegations will be ready to maintain
contact with the American side as before.
4.
As for discussing these questions in some other manner,
now there is no basis for that in view of the character of the
latest American proposals.
Third. Regional problems. We repeatedly expressed our
readiness to discuss with the American side regional problems
named by it and other ones.
In this connection we are prepared to listen to the possible
considerations of the American side in response to what has
already been said by us on the South of Africa, and also on the
situation in the Middle East and on the conflict between Iran and
Iraq. In the future, depending on the progress made, we could
agree to hold certain special meetings of our representatives
as well. We do not exclude this.
As we have already pointed out, it is especially important
that restraint be shown, no actions which could exacerbate the
situation be taken. This concerns the above mentioned as well
as other regions.
Fourth. The Soviet side intends in the nearest future to
propose the date of the next round of negotiations on the
convention line in the Bering sea. We expect that the American
side has analized the results of the previous round and could
take the position which would enable us to come to a just and
mutually acceptable solution of this question.
We also intend to convey in the near future our views
concerning the negotiations on cooperation in the search and
rescue operations in the Nothern part of the Pacific ocean.