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Matlock Chron July 1984 [07/01/1984-07/14/1984]
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Matlock Chron July 1984 [07/01/1984-07/14/1984]
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Records of the National Security Council, Directorate of European and Soviet Affairs (Reagan Administration)
Jack F. Matlock, Jr.'s Chronological Files
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: Matlock Chron July 1984
[07/01/1984-07/14/1984]
Box: 5
To see more digitized collections visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection
Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected]
Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing
National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection: MATLOCK, JACK: Files
Archivist: lov
File Folder: Matlock Chron July 1984 [7/1-7/14]
Date: July 29, 1999
Box 908875
DOCUMENT
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
NO. AND TYPE
1. Memo
Robert Kimmitt to Charles Hill, re fishing [4877], 1p
7/3/84
P1/F1
R 9/13/00 NLSF95-074/2 #44
2. Memo
"A Reordering ?", 3p
nd
P1/F1
R
7/7/00 VLSF95-074/2 # 45
3. Memo
Robert McFarlane to the President, re Jesse Jackson
nd
P1/F1
and Sakharov [5190], 2p
R 9/13/00 NLSF95-074/2 #46
4. Memo
Walt Raymond to Matlock, re Jackson-Sakharov, 1p
7/5/84
PS
5. Talking
draft, re Jackson and Sakharov, 1p
nd
D5
points
6. Memo
Matlock to McFarlane, re the Soviets, 3p
7/6/84
P1/F1
R 10/17/05 M02-011 #26
P5
7. Memo
for Assistant to the President for NSA, re ship visit, 1p
7/11/84
P1/F1
R 11/5/99 NLSF95-07412#47
8. Routing slip
with comments and notations, re item #9, 1p
nd
P5
P5
9. Memo
Matlock to McFarlane, re establishing contact, 2p
7/13/84
P1/F1
R 10/17/05 M02-011 #27
P5
10. Note
re Anderson proposal, 1p
nd
P1/F1
R 10/17/05 M02-011#28
P5
H. Memo
Matlock to McFarlane, re status of negotiations
7/14/84
P1/F1
[5434], 1p
R 9/13/00 NLSF95-074/2#48
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
FOIA].
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information
F-3 Release would violate a Federal statue [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
[(a)(4) of the PRA].
F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or
[(b)(4) of the FOIA].
between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of
FOIA].
the PRA].
F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of
the FOIA].
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
F-8 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(8) of
the FOIA].
F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of
the FOIA].
PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O 13233
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer CAS
Box Number
5
FOIA M02-011
File Folder
MATLOCK CHRON JULY 1984 (7/1-7/14)
DATE 3/22/2007
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
MVH 3/17/08
6 MEMO
MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE SOVIETS
3 7/6/1984
(#26)
MVH 3/17/08
9 MEMO
MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE
2 7/13/1984
ESTABLISHING CONTACT (#27)
MVN 3/17/08
10 NOTE
RE ANDERSON PROPOSAL (#28)
1
ND
CUN IDENTIAL
4877
file
assR-
Trentor
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
Ambine
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
VIA LDX
July 3, 1984
CONFIDENTIAL
File-
chron
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State
SUBJECT:
U.S.-USSR Fishing Relationship TC)
The recommendations of the Departments of State and Commerce in
the memorandum from Mr. Hill to Mr. McFarlane of April 28, 1984,
have been approved. These steps are:
1.
Restoration of a directed allocation of 50,000 metric tons,
conditioned on a Soviet commitment to increase the existing
joint venture with an American firm commensurately; and
2.
Permission for further joint ventures providing there are no
overriding security problems. Tex
Any steps taken should be coordinated in normal fashion with the
appropriate internal security agencies. tc)
The proposed press release should be submitted to the NSC for
approval. TC)
Robert M. Kimmitt
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary
DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED
NLS F95-074/2 #44
BY LOI NARA, DATE 11/6/00
CONF IDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
T.CONFIRENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Press Release on
US-USSR Fishing Relationship
The President has decided to grant the USSR a directed
fishing allocation in the U.S. exclusive economic zone of
approximately 50,000 tons and we have so informed the Soviets.
This decision is taken in the framework of continuing
cooperation between the two countries in the fisheries area,
and will directly benefit U.S. fishermen involved in an
existing joint fishing venture. It will also provide them with
enhanced opportunities to benefit from Soviet technology and
expertise in fishing.
This decision is consistent with the President's policy of
promoting a constructive dialogue with the Soviet Union and
facilitating non-strategic trade exchanges.
CONFIDENTIAL
DECL: OADR
DECLASSIFIED
Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By L.Vitt NARA, Date 6/22/99
10v6/22/99
C
UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)
NSC/S PROFILE
CONFIDENTIAL
ID 8405041
RECEIVED 03 JUL 84 08
TO
MCFARLANE
FROM SHULTZ, G
DOCDATE 02 JUL 84
KEYWORDS: USSR
CM
OGARKOV, MARSHAL N
SUBJECT: ANALYSIS OF OGARKOV INTERVIEW RE REORDERING OF SOVIET MILITARY
PRIORITIES
ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE
DUE: 05 JUL 84 STATUS S FILES PA
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
MATLOCK
LENCZOWSKI
SESTANOVICH
ROBINSON
KIMMITT
THOMPSON
COMMENTS Sent to MCFarlane earlier - Am 7/3/84
REF# 8418467
LOG
NSCIFID
( CM
ACTION OFFICER (S)
ASSIGNED
ACTION REQUIRED
DUE
COPIES TO
NSC/S
C 3 July NFAR person nate
/
CONFIDENTIAL
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
July 2, 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Mr. Caspar W. Weinberger
----
8418465
Secretary
Department of Defense
Mr. William J. Casey
8418466
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
----
8418467
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
FROM:
George P. Shultz yes
SUBJECT:
A Reordering of Soviet Military Priorities
The attached analysis of Ogarkov's views of current and
emergent Soviet military priorities caught my attention. I
would be interested in your reactions.
Attachment:
As stated.
DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By L.Vitt NARA, Date 6/22/99
CONFIDENTIAL
DECL: QADR
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM: A Reordering of Soviet Military Priorities?
On May 9 (Victory Day), the Soviet military newspaper, Red
Star, published a lengthy and authoritative interview with
Marshal N.V. Ogarkov, Chief of the Soviet General Staff (rele-
vant section attached). U.S. commentary on this interview has
focused on the relative moderation of Ogarkov's anti-American
rhetoric. A not unrelated, but much more distinctive and note-
worthy feature of the interview is its implicit questioning of
some long-established Soviet military priorities.
Unlike most other recent Soviet commentaries on defense
matters (including those by other Soviet marshals), the Ogarkov
interview does not dwell on the threat posed by the deployment
of Pershings and GLCM's and the modernization of U.S. strategic
nuclear forces. On the contrary, Ogarkov describes our contin-
uing nuclear buildup as "senseless," since the already existing
"overkill" capacity on both sides has made it "impossible to
destroy the enemy's systems with a single strike." No matter
how destructive an initial attack, the victim will "inevitably"
retain enough weapons for "a crushing retaliatory strike -- a
strike inflicting unacceptable damage."
In the absence of corroborating evidence, it would clearly
be unwarranted to conclude that Ogarkov has been converted from
a proponent of nuclear war-fighting (the long-established
Soviet military doctrine) to a proponent of mutual assured
destruction. But he has gone out of his way to discount the
military significance of the alleged U.S. quest for nuclear
superiority. One can infer from his argument that there is no
urgent need either to cap the U.S. nuclear buildup through
early arms-control agreements or to respond to that buildup
through matching nuclear countermeasures. Despite new U.S.
programs, a continuing nuclear standoff can be taken for
granted so long as the Soviet Union maintains a survivable
retaliatory ("second-strike") force and the U.S. lacks reliable
strategic defenses. (Notably, Ogarkov says nothing whatever
about the SDI.)
Ogarkov's disparagement of a U.S. first-strike threat is
accompanied by obvious concern about an adverse shift in the
conventional balance. He argues at length that conventional
weaponry is on the threshold of a technological revolution that
will radically transform current methods of waging war.
Furthermore, he clearly implies that the U.S. has built a
considerable lead in conventional modernization, thereby
threatening to deprive the Soviets of a long-standing and
potentially decisive competitive advantage. In Ogarkov's
judgment, this is a threat that must be addressed "right now"
-- with such urgency and concentration that other established
priorities are bound to suffer in the absence of a sizeable
increase in military spending.
DECLASSIFIED
NLS 595-074/2 #45
CONFIDENTIAL
BY LOJ NARA, DATE 7/18/00
DECL: OADR
CONFIDENTIAL
- 2 -
Although Ogarkov may well be a proponent of such an
increase, in this interview he seems to take it as a given that
the Soviet military can not afford both a crash program in
conventional weaponry and an accelerating buildup of its
nuclear capabilities. If this is regrettable, it is none-
theless a fact of life, a reflection of what Ogarkov describes
as "an objective law discovered in his time by Frederick
Engels" -- to wit, that "nothing depends on economic
conditions as much as the Army and Navy. Fortunately,
however, the unattainable is unlikely to prove indispensable.
While Ogarkov clearly does not view the existence of a stable
nuclear balance as a guarantee against the outbreak of a
conventional war (the gravamen of his entire argument is
precisely the contrary), his case nonetheless rests on an
assumption that the current period is a period of relative
security.
Ogarkov has been a leading contributor to Soviet efforts to
generate a war-scare (something he probably finds useful, among
other things, in pressing his overall budgetary claims). But
in this interview he argues that it is possible to concentrate
resources on the development and testing of necessarily uncer-
tain emergent technologies and weapons systems because there is
no clear and present danger of war. Attempts to argue the
contrary within military circles are nothing more than poorly
disguised expressions of illegitimate inter-service rivalry.
More generally, they reflect precisely the sort of "conser-
vatism and inertia" that must be "resolutely overcome" by
leaders who appreciate Engels' further "discovery" that inno-
vations in military affairs often have to be imposed "almost
forcibly and against the will of the military command."
If this reading of Ogarkov's interview is correct, there
are a number of implications that are worth bearing in mind and
exploring further:
-- The Soviet military is far from monolithic and
traditional inter-service rivalries may have been
considerably intensified as a result of work on the
new Soviet Five Year Plan.
-- Soviet economic stringencies are such that the Soviet
high command faces -- and is more-or-less resigned to
facing -- hard choices among competing weapons systems
and mission priorities.
-- The Soviet high command does not believe that the risk
of war (let alone of a U.S. first strike) is
particularly high.
CONFIDENTIAL
- 3 -
--
The Soviet high command may not be as eager to cap the
U.S. strategic buildup through a START agreement as we
often suppose.
--
Within the Soviet high command support for nuclear
arms control may be strongest among conventional force
commanders who feel it is more important to increase
spending on conventional modernization than to match
us nuclear missile for nuclear missile in a continuing
cycle of deployments and counterdeployments.
--
Pressing ahead with our conventional arms
modernization programs may be one of our most
effective means for limiting the modernization of
Soviet strategic and threatre nuclear forces.
---
The Soviets may be on the verge of launching
conventional force modernization programs that will
tip the conventional balance even further in their
favor unless we in fact justify their apprehension and
exploit our technological advantages in the field of
conventional weaponry.
Attachment:
Relevant Section of Ogarkov Interview
Ogarkov Interview
PM081625 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 May 84 First Edition PP 2-3
[Interview with MSU N.V. Ogarkov, chief of General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces and
USSR first deputy defense minister: "The Defense of Socialism: Experience of History
and the Present Day" -- first paragraph is editorial introduction]
[Text] The Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-45 is being cele-
brated widely and solemnly in our country today. On the eve of this great and resplen-
dent holiday, the editorial office of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA asked Marshal of the Soviet Union
N.V. Ogarkov, chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces and USSR first deputy defense
minister, to answer a number of questions connected with the defense of socialism's
gains.
Question: It is nearly 40 years since the Great Patriotic War. What changes have
taken place in military matters in that time, and how are they taken into account in our
military building, in the training of troops and fleets?
Answer: In his time, F. Engels discovered an objective law: "Nothing depends on economic
conditions as much as the Army and Navy. Armaments, personnel, organization, tactics,
and strategy depend, above all, on the level of production achieved at a given moment
and on the means of communication," and "successes of technology, the moment they have
become usable and have been applied in practice in military matters, have immediately --
almost forcibly, and often against the will of the military command - caused changes
and even revolutions in the methods of waging war."
In present-day conditions, this law is manifested with particular force. In the postwar
years, several generations of weapons systems and combat hardware have already suc-
ceeded one another.
What do the basic changes in military matters consist of today?
First, the quantitative accumulation of nuclear weapons, which has continued over
several decades, has led to radical qualitative changes in the conditions and potential
for the use of these weapons. The stockpiles of nuclear ammunition and various means
of delivery that the sides created have reached such a size and quality that they are
sufficient to destroy all the important targets on enemy territory many times over in
a short space of time.
III. 9 May 84
R 19
USSR NATIONAL AFFAIRS
POLITICAL & SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTS
For instance, in just one salvo (launch) of strategic (not counting battlefield)
nuclear forces, the United States could today use about 12,000 nuclear charges with
a total yield hundreds of times greater than the yield of all the explosives and
ammunition used by all states throughout the 6 years of Wcrld War II. With the
deployment of American medium-range missiles in Europe, this potential of U.S.
strategic nuclear forces will further increase. You do not have to be a military man
or a scientist to realize that a further buildup is becoming senseless. Nonetheless,
this buildup is continuing, through the fault of the United States.
As a result, a paradox arises: On the one hand, it would seem, a process of steadily
increasing potential for the nuclear powers to destroy the enemy is taking place, while
on the other there is an equally steady and, I would say, even steeper reduction in
the potential for an aggressor to inflict a so-called "disarming strike" on his main
enemy. The point is, with the quantity and diversity of nuclear missiles aiready
achieved, it becomes impossible to destroy the enemy's systems with a single strike.
A crushing retaliatory strike against the aggressor, even by the limited quantity of
nuclear charges remaining to the defender -- a strike inflicting unacceptable damage -
becomes inevitable in present conditions. The calculation of the strategists across
the ocean, based on the possibility of waging a so-called "limited" nuclear war, now
has no foundation whatever. It is utopian: Any so-called limited use of nuclear facili-
ties will inevitably lead to the immediate use of the whole of the sides' nuclear
arsenal. That is the terrible logic of war. Their arguments about the possibility
of a so-called "limited nuclear strike without retaliation" against the enemy's main
centers and control points are even more groundless. Such arguments are pure fantasy.
Put together, all this substantially changes both the conditions for the outbreak
of modern warfare and the potential for waging it.
Second, rapid changes in the development of conventional means of destruction and the
emergence in the developed countries of automated reconnaissance-and-strike complexes,
long-range high-accuracy terminally guided combat systems, unmanned flying machines,
and qualitatively new electronic control systems make many types of weapons global
and make it possible to sharply increase (by at least an order of magnitude) the des-
tructive potential of conventional weapons, bringing them closer, so to speak, to weapons
of mass destruction in terms of effectiveness. The sharply increased range of conven-
tional weapons makes it possible to immediately extend active combat operations not just
to the border regions, but to the whole country's territory, which was not possible
in past wars. This qualitative leap in the development of conventional means of
destruction will inevitably entail a change in the nature of the preparation and
conduct of operations, which will in turn predetermine the possibility of conducting
military operations using conventional systems in qualitatively new, incomparably
more destructive forms than before.
There is a sharp expansion in the zone of possible combat operations, and the role and
significance of the initial period of the war and its initial operations become incom-
parably greater. A new war, should imperialism unleash it, will certainly be strikingly
different in nature from the last war.
Third, the rapid development of science and technology in recent years creates real
preconditions for the emergence in the very near future of even more destructive and
previously unknown types of weapons based on new physical principles.
III. 9 May 84
R 20
USSR NATIONAL AFFAIRS
POLITICAL & SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTS
Work on these new types of weapons is already in progress in a number of countries,
for example, in the United States. Their development is a reality of the very near
future, and it would be a serious mistake not to consider it right now. This, in turn,
cannot fail to change established notions of the methods and forms of armed struggle
and even of the military might of the state.
This is a short list of only the basic changes currently taking place in the means of
armed struggle. They are inevitably exerting their influence on the nature of war and
the role and place of the branches of the Armed Forces in resolving operational and
strategic tasks and on the further development and improvement of forms and methods of
conducting military operations and military affairs as a whole.
All this must unconditionally be the subject of constant and in-depth analysis and
must be generalized and taken into account in the practical building of our Armed
Forces.
In consideration of this, the technical equipping, organizational building, and manage-
ment of our Armed Forces are effected in such a way that they are always ready under
any conditions to deal an immediate counterstrike against any aggressor. This
capability must be guaranteed in all instances. The main component of the combat might
of the Army and Navy and the basic factor in curbing the aggressor are our strategic
nuclear forces, which are in a state of constant high combat readiness. All branches
of the Armed Forces and categories of troops are developing harmoniously with them and
are being equipped with the most modern weapons and combat hardware.
There is also a simultaneous process of honing and improving the system of operational,
combat, and political training of troops and fleets; the procedure for mobilizing and
provisioning them; troop and weapon control systems, and forms and methods of political-
educational and party political work.
The Soviet Armed Forces' might is determined by not only the quantity but also the
quality of their weapons and combat hardware. Our main strength is the Soviet people,
who have an expert mastery of the awe-inspiring weapons entrusted to them by the
motherland. Today, over 93 percent of our servicemen have secondary and higher
education. Almost 90 percent of the servicemen are Communists and Komsomol members,
who are transforming our Army and Navy into an invincible force.
The resolution of the tasks of military building and training of our Armed Forces is
effected on the basis of comprehensive, in-depth analysis of the military-political
situation and the development of the means of armed struggle. Therefore, our military
cadres do not merely copy past experience, they use it creatively and enrich it. They
must constantly improve the training and organizational structure of troops and naval
forces and conduct scientific quests to this end, taking into account the continuous
changes in military affairs and, if necessary, taking justified risks. It is better
to test new forms in peacetime than to seek them in the course of a war. Furthermore,
there would now be no time for this. We military men must, as Comrade K.U. Chernenko,
general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet
Presidium, points out, "resolutely overcome any conservatism and inertia"; for us in
the military "the slogan of the day must be: From a correct idea, fully armed with
experience, to bold actions!"
III. 9 May 84
R 21
USSR NATIONAL AFFAIRS
POLITICAL & SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTS
I would like to emphasize that the defense of the socialist motherland is the concern of
every Soviet person, a concern of the entire people. In this connection, work to educate
the Soviet people in accordance with revolutionary, combat, and labor traditions and train
reliable and skillful defenders of the motherland, and the active participation in this
work of our party, labor, war, and Army veterans, are of great importance.
The main source of the Soviet Armed Forces' strength and invincibility and an important
condition of their further strengthening and development has always been and remains the
leadership of the Communist Party and the unbreakable unity between the Army and the
people. The CPSU, its Leninist Central Committee, and our government are doing every-
thing necessary to ensure that the Soviet state's defense potential and its Armed Forces'
combat might are abreast of present-day demands and that no eventuality can take us by
surprise.
Thegrim years of the Great Patriotic War are receding further and further into the depths
of history. A great deal has changed in the world in the almost 40 years since then.
However, time cannot wipe out from the memory of grateful mankind the unparalleled feat
of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces who, in an unprecedentedly fierce confronta-
tion with a perfidious enemy, not only defended the socialist fatherland, but also saved
the peoples of many countries from fascist enslavement. The memory of the millions of
people who gave their lives for the great victory makes it imperative today to rally
the forces of the world's peoples in the struggle against the perfidious designs of the
forces of imperialism and reaction, against the instigators of a new war. The imperialist
pretenders to world domination should not forget that history savagely punishes those
who ignore its lessons.
5136
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
July 3, 1984
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M KIMMITT
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK As
SUBJECT:
Proposed Response to Ms. Cathy Marshall
I have reviewed and have no objection to the proposed response
prepared by the Department of State to Ms. Cathy Marshall
(Tab A). Ms. Marshall wrote the President on behalf of Mrs.
Bernice Gajauskas regarding the plight of Mrs. Gajauskas' nephew,
Balys Gajauskas -- a Lithuanian who has been in Soviet prisons
most of his life.
Walt Raymond concurs.
RECOMMENDATION
That you forward the memorandum at Tab I to Sally Kelley.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments:
Tab I
Kimmitt to Kelly memorandum
Tab A
Incoming correspondence
5136
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MEMORANDUM FOR SALLY KELLEY
FROM:
ROBERT M. KIMMITT
SUBJECT:
Proposed Response to Ms. Cathy Marshall
We have reviewed and have no objection to the attached proposed
response prepared by the Department of State to Ms. Cathy
Marshall regarding the plight of an imprisoned Lithuanian in the
Soviet Union -- Balys Gajauskas.
Attachments
UNCLASSIFIED
5/36
(Classification)
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
TRANSMITTAL FORM
s/s 8416580
Date June 30, 1984
For: Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
National Security Council
The White House
Reference:
To: President Reagan
From: Ms. Cathy Marshall
Date:
Subject: WRITES ON BEHALF OF MRS. BERNICE
GAJAUSKAS, AUNT OF LITHUANIAN BALYS GAJAUSKAS, WHO HAS BEEN IN
SOVIET PRISONS FOR MOST OF HIS LIFE
WH Referral Dated: June 7, 1984
NSC ID# 230338
(if any)
The attached item was sent directly to the
Department of State.
Action Taken:
...
XX A draft reply is attached.
A draft reply will be forwarded.
A translation is attached.
An information copy of a direct reply is attached.
We believe no response is necessary for the reason
cited below.
The Department of State has no objection to the
proposed travel.
Other.
Remarks:
Janes Charles w Bar Hill
Executive Secretary
UNCLASSIFIED
(Classification)
Dear Mrs. Gajauskas:
Ms. Cathy Marshall has written to the White House
on your behalf concerning the tragic situation of
your imprisoned nephew, Balys Gajauskas.
We have read the report on the "Case of Balys
Gajauskas Human Rights Advocate and Prisoner of
Conscience" and have been deeply moved by the sad
plight of this brave man. I have informed the
Department of State of our interest in this case and
am certain that they will continue to give their full
support to all the efforts to secure freedom for
Mr. Gajauskas.
I wish that it would be possible to offer some
concrete assurances that the Soviets will be
responsive to the appeals on your nephew's behalf,
but so far they have not taken any positive actions
in this regard. Nevertheless, we will continue to
seek ways to keep this case before the Soviet
authorities.
Sincerely,
Mrs. Bernice Gajauskas
942 10th Street,
Santa Monica, California.
230338
Dear Chuck:
I promised Mrs. Bernice Gajauskas, the aunt of
Lithuanian, Balys Gajauskas, who has been in
Soviet prisons for most of his life, that I
would see that a copy of the enclosed reached
our friend in the White House.
I hope you don't mind. This woman, probably
in her seventies by now, stormed capitol hill
for many years on her nephew's behalf, and I
worked with her when in Dornan's office. She
now has parkinsons disease, but continues to
call me about this case, and I just wish that
there were something I could do for her.
If you have any ideas, it would be wonderful,
but I realize dealing with the Russians is
next to impossible. However, perhaps you could
send a note to her?
Thanks Cathyn: Chuck
Cathy Marshall
Mrs. Bernice Gajauskas
6151 Occoquan Forest Dr.
942 10th St.
Manassas, VA 22111
Santa Monica, CA 90403
8416580
CASE OF
BALYS GAJAUSKAS
HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCATE
AND
SOVIET PRISONER OF CONSCIENCE
Project Direction: James Platler Group, Santa Monica, CA
3010 Santa Monica Blvd., Suite 290
Santa Monica, CA 90404
213-393-1040
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
July 3, 1984
Kay, Here is the list: (left to right)
Secretary Shultz
Dr. Herbert J. Ellison
Secretary, The Kennan Institute
Mr. David Hamburg
President, The Carnegie Corporation
of New York
President
Dr. James H. Billington
Director, The Wilson Center
Mr. Bradford Johnson
Research Associate, The Kennan Institute
Mr. William J. Baroody
Chairman of the Board, The Wilson Cente
Amb. Matlock said he would be glad to forward
the photos to Dr. Billington. However, if
you want to do it the address is:
Dr. James H. Billington
Director
Woodrow Wilson International
Center for Scholars
1000 Jefferson Drive, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20560
Tran
1
NITED
12
OF
THE
*********
(b)
THE
SEAL
5190
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
CONFIDENTIAL
July 5, 1984
Dissidents
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL POINDEXTER
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK
14m
SUBJECT:
Jesse Jackson and Sakharov
Attached at TAB I is a memorandum to the President on this
subject, with suggested talking points at TAB A.
I have discussed the matter with Mark Palmer at State and he
agrees that this would be an appropriate course to take.
Walt Raymond, Karna es Small and Bob Sims concur.
we
unavailable.
Recommendation:
That you sign the Memorandum to the President at TAB I.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments:
Tab I
-
Memorandum to the President
Tab A
-
Suggested Talking Points
CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED
Declassify on: OADR
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By R.Vett
NARA, Date 6/22/99
CONFIDENTIAL
5190
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED
NLS F95-074/2#46
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
BY LOJ , NARA, DATE 11/6/00
FROM:
ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
SUBJECT:
Jesse Jackson and Sakharov
Issue
Should you clarify your comments in the interview released
yesterday regarding Jesse Jackson's proposal to seek the release
of Sakharov?
Facts
The press has interpreted your remarks as suggesting that Jackson
may be violating the law if he seeks the release of Sakharov.
Members of the Sakharov family have publicly encouraged his
efforts and are likely to demand that you assume the responsibility
for securing his release if you appear to discourage efforts by
private individuals.
Discussion
Since we are unable to make public our private efforts on behalf
of Sakharov, and have no assurance that they will be successful,
it is important to keep the onus for Sakharov's condition on the
Soviet authorities and not allow public attention to be distracted
by a debate on who does what. The Soviets have given no indication
that there is any "give" in their position, and they would likely
deny Jackson a visa to go to Moscow to discuss Sakharov. Therefore,
any efforts Jackson would make are most unlikely to be successful.
We cannot totally exclude the possibility (though it seems
remote) that the Soviets would in fact release Sakharov in an
effort to embarrass you. In the unlikely event this should
occur, however, we believe the fall-out would be manageable. And
it would remove a major irritant in the U.S.-Soviet relationship.
In any case, the situation will be more difficult to manage if
Jackson can claim that he is prevented from attempting to secure
Sakharov's release by your disapproval of his efforts. This
could be interpreted as your assumption of responsibility for
securing Sakharov's release, and if you failed some could reproach
you.
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
2
For these reasons, it seems desirable to clarify your position by
indicating that you have no objection to Jackson making efforts
to free Sakharov, so long as he does not involve himself in
negotiation of matters which are the responsibility of the
government.
Recommendation
OK
No
That you respond along the lines of the attached
-
I
talking points when asked again by the press regarding
your attitude toward Jackson and Sakharov.
Attachment:
TAB A -- Suggested talking points
Prepared by:
Jack Matlock
CC: Vice President
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS
Q.
Why do you oppose Jesse Jackson's idea of approaching the
Soviets regarding the release of Andrei Sakharov?
A. I do not oppose any efforts he, or any other private
individuals, may make to persuade the Soviet authorities to
resolve this tragic situation in a humane way.
--
What is important is that such private efforts be conducted
in such a way that they do not confuse humanitarian issues
such as this one with matters which are properly subject to
negotiation between governments.
--
That is what I had in mind when I mentioned the Logan Act.
Of course, I am as interested as anyone else in seeing this
particular problem solved, and if it can be done without
involving other matters, no one would be happier than I.
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
July 5, 1984
TO:
JACK MATLOCK
FROM:
WALT RAYMOND
SUBJ:
Jackson-Sakarov
I concur but believe that if you restrict your proposed Q&A to
include the introductory statement and the 1st and 3rd ticks
that that would be sufficient. In other words, I would delete
ticks 2 and 4.
Ed Kline called. He indicated that one of the "downsides" of
the President's statement, if taken literally, will lead other
countries or parties to stand down. He indicated that the
Yankelevichs report from France that there seems to be a sense
in France the United States was working on the problem and
that they (the French) would not have to take the lead. He is
hopeful that there are diplomatic efforts underway but feared
that the press today indicated that there was more activity
than there really is.
SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS
Q.
Why do you oppose Jesse Jackson's idea of approaching the
Soviets regarding the release of Andrei Sakharov?
A. I do not oppose any efforts he, or any other private
individuals, may make to persuade the Soviet authorities to
resolve this tragic situation in a humane way.
-- What is important is that such private efforts be conducted
in such a way that they do not confuse humanitarian issues
such as this one with matters which are properly subject to
negotiation between governments.
I don't believe any of us should allow foreign governments
to exploit our deep interest in finding humanitarian solutions
to problems such as this by interfering in our election
process or involving other, unrelated issues.
That is what I had in mind when I mentioned the Logan Act.
Of course I am as interested as anyone else in seeing this
particular problem solved, and if it can be done without
involving other matters, no one would be happier than I.
-- So I was just pointing out some pitfalls. I didn't mean
that I would disapprove of an effort done the right way.
July 6, 1984
Q:
What is going on now in terms of arms control talks in
September? Will you send a delegation even if the Soviets
say they will ONLY discuss ASAT?
A:
We have accepted the proposal for a conference without
preconditions. We are continuing discussions in diplomatic
channels as to how to organize it.
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
July 6, 1984
TO:
KARNA SMALL
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK
Asm
SUBJECT:
QS&As for Regional
Editors and Broadcast-
ers Presidential
Luncheon
Attached.
July 6, 1984
Q:
How do you assess the current mood in the Soviet Union? On
the one hand they talk about possible talks, but on the
other hand they detain our diplomats, won't discuss
Sakharov, keep our Ambassador off the air, refuse to let NBC
satellite its news reports -- what's going on?
A:
They certainly are not being cooperative in creating an
atmosphere for talks. But we have experienced this sort of
thing before, and it illustrates the sort of problems we
have in dealing with them. But we will be patient.
July 6, 1984
Q:
What's wrong with Jesse Jackson going to the Soviet Union to
try and free Andrei Sakharov or anyone else? If you can't
do it, why don't you let somebody else try?
A:
I have no problem with Reverend Jackson or any other
American citizen making appeals on humanitarian causes. I
think it is important, however, not to let these efforts
involve areas in which it is the government's responsibility
to negotiate. But if the effort avoids these pitfalls, I'm
all for it.
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION
July 5, 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR JACK MATLOCK
FROM:
KARNA SMALL
SUBJECT:
Presidential Luncheon with Regional
Editors and Broadcasters
The President will host a luncheon for regional editors and
broadcasters on Monday, July 9. Some 20 camera crews are expected.
While it is difficult to predict question areas, following are a
few to which I would appreciate your providing answers. If you
can think of any other questions that might come up, please
include them. Since Bud will be briefing this same group prior
to the President's luncheon, this material will also be given to
him.
In order to be considered by the President, please submit your
material to me no later than 10:00 a.m., tomorrow morning,
Friday, July 6.
Many thanks.
Q:
What is going on now in terms of arms control talks in
September? Will you send a delegation even if the Soviets
/
say they will ONLY discuss ASAT?
Q:
How do you assess the current mood in the Soviet Union? On
the one hand they talk about possible talks, but on the
other hand they detain our diplomats, won't discuss
2
Sakharov, keep our Ambassador off the air, refuse to let NBC
satellite its news reports -- what's going on?
Q:
What's wrong with Jesse Jackson going to the Soviet Union to
try and free Andrei Sakharov or anyone else? If you can't
3
do it, why don't you let somebody else try?
POINDEXTER
THE WHITE HOUSE
CLASSIFIED
WASHINGTON
5/84
Robert McFarlane
GFL/WW
HAND DELIVER
JACK MATLOCK
EYES ONLY
PRESERVATION COPY
National Security Council
The White House
System #
Package #
SEQUENCE TO
HAS SEEN
DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y
Bob Kimmitt
John Poindexter
/
&
Tom Shull
Wilma Hall
Bud McFarlane
2
M
I
Bob Kimmitt
NSC Secretariat
Situation Room
JP
3
D = Dispatch of
I = Information
A = Action
R = Retain
N = No further Action
CC: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other
COMMENTS
Should be seen by:
(Date/Time)
Bud,
Jack has some very thoughtful
points here. The three of us
should discuss. of
July 6, 1984
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
To: Adm. Poindexter
John-
A very preliminary draft with
Some thoughts we might discuss
with Bud when he comes hach
next week.
more detailed thoughts an how to
J an also putting together some
which we could was you
organize for the sept comperence, Sept.
have time -
Jack
DECLASSIFIED
NLS M02-011#26
BY hos NARA, DATE 10/17/05
MEMORANDUM
with
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY McFARLANE AND POINDEXTER
July d 6, 1984 in re
INFORMATION
your
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK
they
SUBJECT:
The Soviets: Where We Stand
I have the following miscellaneous (but interconnected) thoughts
on the current state of play in our Soviet relations and how we
might handle some of the issues tactically.
The September Meeting
way
The June 29 Soviet proposal and our quick response has put us in
a very strong tactical position, both publicly and privately
We
must move carefully to exploit our current advantages.
The Soviet response shows clearly that Gromyko has no intention
of allowing a meeting to materialize in September unless we buy
we
the Soviet position in full. However, he is coming on
increasingly defensive, and may not be able to hew to this rigid
position as the time approaches. Evidence is accumulating that
his critics in Moscow may be becoming more assertive. If we play
Belo
our cards right we may be able to achieve a breakthrough, and if
not, undermine the Soviet position even further, with useful
implications for 1985.
Publically, we should stick right where we are: we are placing
no preconditions on the meeting, therefore assume it will take
place, and are pursuing arrangements in diplomatic channels.
This forces the Soviets to growl and concentrate on their
preconditions, which are looking less and less tenable.
Meanwhile, this relieves us of the immediate pressure to define
our ASAT position, which is desirable tactically, since we need
to squeeze the Soviets as much as we can in advance. Since they
have proposed a conference, there is no rational argument in
favor of our communicating in advance what our position is. To
do so would only give Gromyko the ammunition to say it is
inadequate and to shift attention from their intransigence to the
alleged shortcomings of our substantive position.
This thought should also lie at the basis of our private
communications with the Soviets. We should make our proposals
Right
general enough and ambiguous enough to provide no logical grounds
on
for complaint (the diplomatic equivalent of a stealth design).
One way to do this would be to propose an agenda whereby the
first item would be the Soviet exposition of their proposals, and
the second item the U.S. commentary and proposals, followed by a
- 2 -
Soviet commentary, etc. If we do not define the subjects
precisely, it will be exceedingly difficult for the Soviets to
argue that there are any preconditions, or that we are refusing
to discuss their agenda.
As for the timing, if the conference begins September 18, we need
to handle it so as to minimize the opportunity for the Soviets to
break it off before November claiming U.S. intransigence.
Therefore, there is an advantage in letting them go first, and
instructing our delegation to ask frequent questions in order to
maximize the amount of time necessary to get their position on
the table. We could then take our time in commenting in detail
and putting forth our thoughts. This process, if handled
adroitly, could easily carry us into November without giving the
Soviets ammunition to cry foul and break off. Such tactics would
also drive home the point implicitly that they should expect
little in the ASAT area until they start talking turkey on
nuclear arms.
Gromyko's Role
The above is predicated on the assumption that Gromyko will
retain his stranglehold on Soviet policy throughout this period,
and that therefore our object should be to demonstrate the
weakness of that policy while not damaging our own public image.
With every move on the U.S.-Soviet chessboard, my conviction
deepens that Gromyko is in fact our principal problem, and that
we are likely to make no significant progress until sufficient
pressure is brought to bear on him from within the system to
modify his approach.
Two recent straws in the wind support this interpretation.
First, Strobe Talbot informed me that during his recent visit to
Moscow, his interlocutors (mainly from the Institutes) put the
finger on Gromyko quite explicitly. This came up in a discussion
of the treatment given Scowcroft; all the Soviets said privately
that the problem was the effort to secure a private audience with
Chernenko, which caused Gromyko to "hit the ceiling." So far,
nothing new, but what was surprising was that the Insitute types
added (when they were out of the office and walking in the park),
that our analysis was quite correct; it is necessary to bypass
Gromyko, and the only thing wrong with our effort was the way it
was done, since it gave Gromyko the opportunity to block it. A
quieter effort at a lower level might have worked, they observed.
Second, Robert Anderson informed me today that Velikhov had
telephoned his assistant Hirsch twice since their visit to
inquire about the fate of "point three" of Anderson's "Bering
Straits" proposal. You will recall that Anderson had given them
an off-the-cuff idea for a declaration regarding the Bering
Straits, which included a proposal for a high-level binational
commission to discuss this an other matters (TAB). The idea has
many potential problems and probably is not worth pursuing on its
merits, but I am struck by Velikhov's obvious and
uncharacteristic interest. Could it be that a "commission" of
some sort would provide a structure for those outside the MFA to
interact with us on behalf of the Party and/or KGB? No other
explanation comes readily to mind.
- 3 -
In sum, while it will be necessary for us to continue to play out
the game with Gromyko, I am convinced that we are unlikely to
find any real opening for a breakthrough, this year or next,
unless we can get something going, very quietly, with other
elements in the Soviet hierarchy. It should be obvious by now
that we cannot do this with officials in the State Department,
because Gromyko will always have the perfectly sound bureaucratic
argument that it is his responsibility to deal with them. He is
on much weaker ground in fending off counterpart-to-counterpart
meetings, even if he should know about them in advance (which he
will), and gets reports on what transpires.
The fact is that every senior official puts more credence in what
his own staff produces than in what comes from others.
Therefore, it makes a real difference bureaucratically whose
staff does the initial work. So long as the Central Committee
apparat, for example, has no direct contact with us, they have
little means of reaching conclusions other than those Gromyko is
pushing. With direct contacts, they are better able to activate
their boss to their own ultimate advantage, provided political
conditions permit.
The argument that we should continue to try to communicate with
various elements in the Soviet hierarchy is not based on a "good
guy, bad guy" presumption. There are no "good guys," and we
should never act as if there were. But we should not pass up any
feasible opportunity to utilize normal and natural bureaucratic
rivalries in the Soviet system to our own advantage.
The Danger of Leaks
Few things can be more damaging to our ability to maximize our
current tactical advantage than a further succession of leaked
stories about the progress of our interagency consideration,
possible positions on specific issues and the like. We need
either to achieve much greater discipline than we have managed in
the past, or else simply keep the bureaucracy (including the
SACPG) ignorant of the President's decisions until we have had
time to act upon them and can time our public disclosures.
5268
MORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
July 9, 1984
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE
THROUGH:
ROBERT M. KIMMITT
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK
PAULA DOBRIANSKY $17
SUBJECT:
Conference: Grenada, Lessons and Impact on
Soviet/Cuban Strategy"
We have been invited to attend a conference, "Grenada, Lessons
and Impact on Soviet/Cuban Strategy," co-sponsored by the Office
of the Secretary of Defense and the Kennan Institute, August
15 - 18 at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California
(Tab I). Specifically, we have been asked to be discussants in
the panels -- "Grenada and the WTO: Lessons and Impact" and
"Impact Upon the Soviet Alliance System." Our comments would be
on the record and would be published in a monograph to be edited
by the Wilson Center. As these topics are primarily of an
historical nature and do not directly impinge on U.S. policies
toward Eastern Europe and the USSR, we foresee no problems with
making our comments on the record. Moreover, we will clear our
five-to-seven page draft remarks prior to the conference. There
will be no expense to NSC.
RECOMMENDATION
That our participation in this conference to be held in Monterey,
California be approved
Approve
A
Disapprove
Attachment:
Tab I
Conference Schedule
CC:
Pat Blauth
Administration Office
C-JM
5268
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
July 9, 1984
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE
THROUGH:
ROBERT M. KIMMITT
FROM:
PAULA DOBRIANSKY
JACK MATLOCK
SUBJECT:
Conference: (Grenada, Lessons and Impact on
Soviet/Cuban Strategy"
We have been invited to attend a conference, "Grenada, Lessons
and Impact on Soviet/Cuban Strategy," co-sponsored by the Office
of the Secretary of Defense and the Kennan Institute, August
15 - 18 at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California
(Tab I). Specifically, we have been asked to be discussants in
the panels -- "Grenada and the WTO: Lessons and Impact" and
"Impact Upon the Soviet Alliance System." Our comments would be
on the record and would be published in a monograph to be edited
by the Wilson Center. As these topics are primarily of an
historical nature and do not directly impinge on U.S. policies
toward Eastern Europe and the USSR, we foresee no problems with
making our comments on the record. Moreover, we will clear our
five-to-seven page draft remarks prior to the conference. There
will be no expense to NSC.
RECOMMENDATION
That our participation in this conference to be held in Monterey,
California be approved.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachment:
Tab I
Conference Schedule
CC:
Pat Blauth
Administration Office
NSCI 742
Annex II
NSC STAFF TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION
DATE July 9, 1984
1. TRAVELER'S NAME:
Jack F. Matlock
2. PURPOSE (S), EVENT (S), DATE (S) : Discussant in Conference in Monterey,
California, August 15-18.
3. ITINERARY (Please Attach Copy. of Proposed Itinerary).
Travel will be from Knoxville, Tn. to Monterey, California;
and return to Washington, D.C.
DEPARTURE DATE 8/16/84
RETURN DATE 8/20/84
TIME p.m.
TIME p.m.
4. MODE OF TRANSPORTATION:
GOV AIR
COMMERCIAL AIRXX POV
RAIL
OTHER
5. ESTIMATED EXPENSES:
TRANSPORTATION
PER DIEM
OTHER
TOTAL TRIP COST
6. WHO PAYS EXPENSES:
NSC
OTHER XX
7. IF NOT NSC, DESCRIBE SOURCE AND ARRANGEMENTS:
Office of the Secretary of Defense & the Kennan Institute (Wilson Ctr)
8. WILL FAMILY MEMBER ACCOMPANY YOU: YES
NO XX
9. IF so, WHO PAYS FOR FAMILY MEMBER (If Travel Not Paid by Traveler,
Describe Source and Arrangements) :
10. TRAVEL ADVANCE REQUESTED:
$xx
11. REMARKS (Use This Space to Indicate Any Additional Items You Would
Like to Appear on Your Travel Orders): :
13. 12. APPROVALS: TRAVELER'S SIGNATURE: Asmathah
NSCI 742
Annex II
NSC STAFF TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION
DATE:
July 9, 1984
Paula Dobriansky
1. TRAVELER'S NAME:
2. PURPOSE (S), EVENT (S), DATE (S) : Discussant in Conference in Monterey,
California August 15-18.
3. ITINERARY (Please Attach Copy of Proposed Itinerary) :
DEPARTURE DATE 8/14/84
RETURN DATE 8/19/84
TIME p.m.
TIME
p.m.
4. MODE OF TRANSPORTATION:
GOV AIR
COMMERCIAL AIRXX POV
RAIL
OTHER
5. ESTIMATED EXPENSES:
TRANSPORTATION
PER DIEM
OTHER
TOTAL TRIP COST
6. WHO PAYS EXPENSES:
NSC
OTHER XX
7. IF NOT NSC, DESCRIBE SOURCE AND ARRANGEMENTS:
Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Kennan Institute
8. WILL FAMILY MEMBER ACCOMPANY YOU: YES
NO XX
9. IF so, WHO PAYS FOR FAMILY MEMBER (If Travel Not Paid by Traveler,
Describe Source and Arrangements) :
10. TRAVEL ADVANCE REQUESTED:
$ XX
11. REMARKS (Use This Space to Indicate Any Additional Items You Would
Like to Appear on Your Travel Orders) :
12. TRAVELER'S SIGNATURE: Taula Dobrianshy
13. APPROVALS:
Soviet/Cuban Strategy In The Third World After Grenada
Naval Postgraduate
School
Monterey, California
15-18 August 1984
General Chairman
Dr. Jiri Valenta
Cosponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense
and
The Kennan Institute of the Woodrow Wilson Center
Washington, D.C.
Chairman
Dr. Herbert Ellison
Coordinator
LT Fred Shaheen, USN
SCHEDULE FOR THE CONFERENCE ON
"SOVIET/CUBAN STRATEGY IN THE THIRD WORLD AFTER GRENADA"
August 15-18, 1984
WEDNESDAY, 15 AUGUST:
5:00 pm - 6:00 pm
Reception and Cocktails,
La Novia Terrace, Herrmann Hall.
6:00 pm - 7:30 pm
Dinner, La Novia Room, Herrmann Hall.
7:30 pm - 8:00 pm
Opening Session:
Chairman, Jiri Valenta.
Introductory Remarks: Dr. Sherman Blandin
Opening Remarks:
Commodore Robert Shumaker.
THURSDAY, 16 AUGUST:
8:30 am - 11:30 am
PANEL 1-"Grenada: Linkages and Impact on
Central America, the Caribbean, and Africa."
Chairman: Dr. Susan Purcell, Council on
Foreign Relations.
Papers
Discussants
Dr. Howard Wiarda, American
Dr. Richard Millet, Southern
Enterprise Institute, "Grenada:
Illinois University.
Linkages and Impact on Central
America."
Dr. Anthony Maingot, Florida
Ambassador Sally Shelton,
International University, "Grenada:
International-Business
Linkages and Impact on the
Government Counsellors.
Caribbean Basin.'
Mr. Colin Legum, Observer,
Dr. Michael Clough, Naval
(London), "Grenada: Linkages
Postgraduate School.
and Impact on Africa."
12:00 m - 1:30 pm
Mr. Winston Lord, President of the
Council on Foreign Relations, Luncheon
Speaker, La Novia Room, Herrmann Hall.
2:00 pm - 5:00 pm
PANEL 2-"Grenada and the Soviet Allies:
Cuba and the WTO Members." Chairman,
Dr. Herbert Ellison, Kennan Institute.
2
Papers
Commentators
Dr. Mark Falcoff, American
Dr. Jorge Dominguez,
Enterprise Institute, "Grenada
Harvard University.
and Cuba: Lessons and Impact".
Dr. Melvin Croan, University of
Dr. Paula Dobriansky,
Wisconsin, "Grenada and the WTO:
National Security Council.
Lessons and Impact".
5:30 pm - 6:00 pm
Cocktails, La Novia Terrace, Herrmann Hall.
6:00 pm - 7:00 pm
Dinner, La Novia Room, Herrmann Hall.
FRIDAY, 17 AUGUST:
9:00 am - 1:00 pm
PANEL 3-"Grenada and East-West Relations",
Chairman, Jiri Valenta, Naval Postgraduate
School.
Papers
Commentators
Dr. Edward Luttwak, Consultant
TBA
"Impact on Superpower Relations".
Professor George Liska, Johns
Mr. W. Bruce Weinrod, The
Hopkins University, "Impact on
Heritage Foundation.
Superpower Relations".
1:30 pm - 2:30 pm
Buffet Lunch, Ballroom, Herrmann Hall.
3:00 pm - 6:00 pm
PANEL 4-"Lessons and Impact of Grenada
on Soviet Alliance System." Chairman,
Dr. Herbert Ellison, Kennan Institute.
Papers
Commentators
Jiri and Virginia Valenta,
Dr. Richard Pipes,
Naval Postgraduate School,
Harvard University.
"USSR and Grenada: Lessons".
Professor Vernon Aspaturian,
Ambassador Jack F. Matlock,
Pennsylvania State University
National Security Council.
and Naval Postgraduate School,
"Impact upon the Soviet Alliance System."
SATURDAY, 18 AUGUST:
8:30 am - 9:30 am
Breakfast, El Rancho Room, Herrmann Hall.
10:00 am - 12:00 m
Wrap up discussion.
Paper
Commentator
Dr. Margaret Daly Hayes, United
Dr. Charles H. Fairbanks,
States Senate, "Recommendations
Department of State.
and Options for the Region".
3
National Security Council
The White House
System #
Package #
84 JUL 13 P 4: 53
SEQUENCE TO
HAS SEEN
DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson
Bob Kimmitt
I
K
John Poindexter
2
f
I
Tom Shull
Wilma Hall
Bud McFarlane
Bob Kimmitt
NSC Secretariat
3
B
Pass to
Situation Room
Matlock
MATLOCK
4
I
I = Information
A = Action
R = Retain
D = Dispatch
N = No further Action
CC: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other
COMMENTS
Should be seen by:
(Date/Time)
National Security Council
The White House
System #
Package #
SEQUENCE TO
HAS SEEN
DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson
Bob Kimmitt
\
2
John Poindexter
F
Tom Shull
Wilma Hall
3
Bud McFarlane
4
m
Advace
Bob Kimmitt
S
NSC Secretariat
Situation Room
0 I = Information
A = Action
R = Retain
D = Dispatch
N = No further Action
cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other
COMMENTS
Should be seen by:
(Date/Time)
SECRET
TOTAL DEPARTMENT
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
COPY
ORINO AMERICA
34 JUL P2:47
11 JUL 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT Bud FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS
SUBJECT: US-Soviet Reciprocal Ship Visit Proposal (C)
(C) As you know, at the May 28 - June 2 US-Soviet annual
review in Moscow of the Incidents at Sea Agreement, Soviet
Admiral Navoytsev spoke favorably of an exchange of ship visits
by the United States and the USSR similar to that which occurred
in 1975. The US Navy envisions that the exchange could occur at
Vladivostok and San Francisco. I think there is merit in this
proposal. If arranged properly, such an exchange could yield
both diplomatic and intelligence benefits to the United States.
(S) I understand that John Poindexter informed Fred Ikle
that you are supporting the idea of such a ship visit, as is
State, and want us to explore it. If we don't hear from you to
the contrary, I will ask the Navy to contact the Soviet side
to us for an exchange visit. DoD ISP will work with the Navy
very informally, to see whether they want to make Good the proposal
to follow up.
Sp
CC: Secretary of the Navy
Chief of Naval Operations
DECLASSIFIED
CLASSIFIED BY: SEC DEF
NLS 895-074/2#47
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR
BY LOT NARA, DATE 7/18/00
SEC DEF CONTR
X31363
SECRET
5297
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
July 11, 1984
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK
SUBJECT:
Response to Dr. and Mrs. George J. Meyer
I have reviewed and concur in the proposed response prepared by
the Department of State to Dr. and Mrs. George J. Meyer's letter
to the President regarding his remarks on nuclear weapons.
RECOMMENDATION
That you forward the memorandum at Tab I with its attachments to
Sally Kelley.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments:
Tab I
Proposed response and attachments.
5297
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MEMORANDUM FOR SALLY KELLEY
FROM:
ROBERT M. KIMMITT
SUBJECT:
Proposed Response to Dr. and Mrs. George J. Meyer
We have reviewed and concur in the proposed response prepared by
the Department of State to a letter from Dr. and Mrs. Meyer
regarding the President's remarks concerning nuclear weapons.
Attachments
UNCLASSIFIED
(Classification)
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
TRANSMITTAL FORM
s/s 8418714
Date July 9, 1984
For: Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
National Security Council
The White House
Reference:
To: President Reagan
From: Dr. George J. Meyer
Date:
June 23, 1984
Subject: President's Statement - "They
are not demonstrating in the nation that has the most nuclear weapons".
WH Referral Dated: -- June 29, 1984
NSC ID# 238964
(if any)
The attached item was sent directly to the
Department of State.
Action Taken:
X
A draft reply is attached.
A draft reply will be forwarded.
A translation is attached.
An information copy of a direct reply is attached.
We believe no response is necessary for the reason
cited below.
The Department of State has no objection to the
proposed travel.
Other.
Remarks:
Charles and Hill
Executive Secretary
UNCLASSIFIED
(Classification)
Department of State
Draft Reply
Dear Dr. and Mrs. Meyer:
I have received your letter of June 23 responding to mine of
June 19. I regret that my first letter did not answer all of
your questions, and hope that this letter will succeed.
The President was referring to the Soviet Union when he
stated that, "No one is demonstrating
in the nation that has
the most nuclear weapons of all." Although the Soviet Union
often makes much ado about arms control demonstrations in
Western countries, inside the USSR demonstrators are severely
harassed and arrested. No Soviet citizen has the possibility of
publicly objecting to Soviet military or arms control policy.
Efforts to found an "unofficial" peace group have been quickly
repressed. The members of the "Group to Establish Trust Between
the USSR and the US" have been arrested, exiled, or harassed
into silence.
Regarding numbers of nuclear weapons, the Soviets now lead
the United States in numbers of intercontinental ballistic
missiles, both land-based and sea-based, as well as in ballistic
missile warheads (about 7700 to 7300). This is in addition to
the USSR's enormous advantage over the United States and its
NATO allies in intermediate range nuclear weapons, including
more than 1100 warheads on its SS-20's alone. I hope that this
answers your questions. I have enclosed two pamphlets on this
Administration's arms control policy and on Soviet military
power that you might find interesting.
With the President's best wishes,
Sincerely,
White House Staff
Enclosures:
Soviet Military Power, 1984
Arms Control
8418714
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
REFERRAL
JUNE 29, 1984
TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ACTION REQUESTED:
DRAFT REPLY FOR SIGNATURE OF WHITE HOUSE STAFF MEMBER
DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:
ID:
238964
MEDIA: LETTER, DATED JUNE 23, 1984
TO:
PRESIDENT REAGAN
FROM:
DR. GEORGE J. MEYER
THE WITTINGTON, APARTMENT 10F
1390 SOUTH OCEAN BOULEVARD
POMPANO BEACH FL 33062
SUBJECT: WANTS TO KNOW WHO THE PRESIDENT WAS
REFERRING TO WHEN HE SAID "THEY ARE NOT
DEMONSTRATING IN THE NATION THAT HAS THE
MOST NUCLEAR WEAPONS"
PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.
RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE
(OR DRAFT) TO:
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE
SALLY KELLEY
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE
Receive ed in 4st
6/8/84-
238964
Dr. & Mrs. George J. Meyer
The Wittington, Apt. 10F
1390 South Ocean Blvd.
Pompano Beach, FL 33062
8418714
23 June 1984
1104m
Ronald Reagan, President
Attn: Anne Higgins
The White House
Washington, D.C.
Dear Anne Higgins:
Thank you for responding so promptly to our letter of 11 June.
We are disappointed that you did not answer our questions.
So that you can properly anser our questions, we are enclosing
a copy of the original letter, a copy of the artcle in the Ft.
Lauderdale News, and a copy of your letter of June 19.
We send our best wishes to you and the President.
PEACE,
Geof Mayer MD
Dr. & Mrs. George J. Meyer
The Wittington, Apt. 10F
1390 South Ocean Blvd.
Pompano Beach, FL 33062
11 June 1984
Ronald Reagan, President
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C.
Dear Sir:
Will you please explain to us which "nation" you are
referring to in the final paragraph of the enclosed news
clipping (q.v.).
The United States "has the most nuclear weapons of
all," and there have been many anti-nuclear demonstrations
in this country. For example, nearly a million of our
fellow citizens demonstrated in New York City in June, 1982.
And smaller demonstrations occur often.
What do you mean? Please clarify.
PEACE,
4A HF
Fort Lauderdale News, Monday, June 11, 1984
Reagan
belittles
effect of
protests
The Associated Press
WASHINGTON - President Rea-
gan says the anti-nuclear demon-
strators who dogged his 10-day trip
in Europe do not speak for a major-
ity and are advocating policies that
could lead to "the peace of the
grave."
The president was back at the
White House on Sunday, with a re-
laxed schedule today, after the
8,000-mile journey to his ancestral
AP photo
home in Ireland, the D-Day beaches
of Normandy and a seven-nation
President Reagan is embraced by his daughter, Maureen, on his
economic summit.
return to Washington Sunday as the First Lady looks on.
In a post-summit news conference
on the lawn of Winfield House, the
"He (Trudeau) felt the United
ern Europe.
residence of the U.S. ambassador in
States was wrong, (that) we should
The demonstrators in Ireland and
London, the president was asked
be more forthcoming," the official
in London, where an estimated
why he believed the anti-nuclear
said Sunday.
50,000 turned out Saturday, also
dissidents who rallied and marched
in Ireland and London disagreed
When Reagan heard that, the offi-
were protesting the deployment
cial said, he "took his glasses off and
decision.
with his policies.
They seem to think they have a
said, 'Damn it, Pierre I have said
Reagan said he didn't believe all
everything. What the hell more can I
demonstrators on Saturday were
simple answer to warfare, that if we
against him alone. "I don't think
just lay down our weapons and stand
do to get those guys back to the
back empty-handed, somehow
table? You are telling me we
yesterday picked out any single indi-
haven't done it?''
vidual," he said. " Demonstrations
peace will come to the world," he
have become a fact of life," he
replied. "They haven't stopped to
U.S. officials said other summit
added. "Somehow people have felt
figure that it might be the peace of
participants - the leaders of Brit-
that that's the way to express their
the grave."
ain, Germany, Italy, France, and Ja-
ideas in a democracy in spite of all
The state of U.S.-Soviet relations,
pan - supported the administra-
the legitimate channels that are
particularly Moscow's refusal to re-
tion's refusal to offer any
open to them.'
sume nuclear arms reduction talks,
concessions to get the Soviets back
But I don't think they're speak
was a topic that arose repeatedly on
to the table.
ing for a majority," he continued.
the president's trip, often by Reagan
The summit leaders issued a joint
And I think sometimes they are
himself.
statement Saturday calling for the
unreasoning in that as yesterday,
A senior American official said
speedy resumption of nuclear arms
have any of them ever stopped to
Reagan was pressed at the eco-
talks, which the Soviets broke off
think that no one is demonstrating
homic summit by Canadian Prime
last December in the wake of
and they are not demonstrating in
Minister Pierre Trudeau to adopt a
NATO's decision to deploy 572 Per
the nation that has the most nuclear
new approach toward the Soviets.
shing 2 and cruise missiles in West-
weapons of all?"
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 19, 1984
Dear Dr. and Mrs. Meyer:
President Reagan has asked me to thank you for your message
expressing concern about nuclear arms. I can assure you that
the President understands and shares your desire for the
achievement of a true and lasting peace.
The President has expressed his deep regret that the Soviet
Union has chosen to discontinue the present round of
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces negotiations in Geneva. We
are hopeful that the Soviet Union will recognize that a resumption
of these negotiations is in its own best interest. We are also
hopeful that the Soviets will agree to resumption of the separate
Strategic Arms Reduction Talks. We believe that it is of
paramount interest to the entire world that these talks continue.
As President Reagan remarked in a major address on U.S.-Soviet
relations on January 16, 1984, "Our negotiators are ready to
return to the negotiating table
we will negotiate in good
faith. Whenever the Soviet Union is ready to do likewise, we will
meet them halfway." In light of your concern, I am enclosing for
you a copy of this address which I know you will find of interest.
With the President's best wishes,
Sincerely,
Anne Higgins
Anne Higgins
Special Assistant to the President
and Director of Correspondence
Dr. and Mrs. George J. Meyer
Apartment 10F
1390 South Ocean Boulevard
Pompano Beach, FL 33062
Enclosure: 1/16/84 Address by the President
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SIDENTIAL RESPONSE
July 10, 1984
TO: JACK MATLOCK
re familiar with who share
have you ever worked with
FROM: KARNA SMALL
ason the Soviets boycotted
Attached is a copy of a questionnaire
from Runner's World magazine for
Presidential response. I would
dermine the intent of the
appreciate if you would take a cut
at questions 2, 3, 8 & 9. Due to
a tight publication deadline, I would
role of politics in inter-
be grateful for your answers by
e kept separate? CAN THEY
Thursday 12:00 pm.
Thanks.
es would have died had not
a in and made a bid for the
E the countries around the
ssociated with the LA Games.
I wrong with industry picking
.ympic Games in Seoul will
ea be able to properly
real and Moscow -- excuse the
e that the Los Angeles Games
Games become both financially
political standpoint was the
tive? And if so, on whom
x9. Although hindsight is almost always 20/20, how would you have
handled the Afghanistan situation of 1980?
QUESTIONNAIRE FROM RUNNER'S WORLD FOR PRESIDENTIAL RESPONSE
1. Are there any other world leaders you're familiar with who share
your burning interest in fitness? If so, have you ever worked with
them?
2. What is your interpretation of the reason the Soviets boycotted
the 1984 Games?
3. Do you feel their actions served to undermine the intent of the
Games?
4. What are your feelings as far as the role of politics in inter-
national sports? Should the two arenas be kept separate? CAN THEY
BE KEPT SEPARATE?
5. Many people feel that the Olympic Games would have died had not
the Los Angleles Olympic Committee stepped in and made a bid for the
Games as a private enterprise, yet many of the countries around the
world have criticized the commercialism associated with the LA Games.
What are your feelings? Is there anything wrong with industry picking
up the bill for international sports?
6. How successful do you feel the 1988 Olympic Games in Seoul will
be? Will a country the size of South Korea be able to properly
finance an enterprise that, still has Montreal and Moscow -- excuse the
pun -- in the red?
7. From your observations, is it possible that the Los Angeles Games
will be the last Olympic Games? Have the Games become both financially
and politically impossible?
8. It's well after the fact, but from a political standpoint was the
Soviet boycott of this year's Games effective? And if so, on whom
did it have its most profound effect?
x9. Although hindsight is almost always 20/20, how would you have
handled the Afghanistan situation of 1980?
July 12, 1984
Q:
What is your interpretation of the reason the Soviets
boycotted the 1984 Games?
A:
The only thing we can be sure of is that it was not for
the reason they gave. We had gone to great lengths to meet
all their requests and make clear that their athletes,
officials and spectators would be welcome and protected. I
can only speculate on their real reasons. they may have
thought that having their athletes in Los Angeles in July
would undermine their propaganda claims that our defense
modernization is a threat to them. They may have worried
that some of their people would defect. And revenge for
1980 could have played a role.
July 12, 1984
Q:
Do you feel their actions served to undermine the intent of
the Games?
A:
Certainly it hurts the Olympic movement when one
country refuses to participate without good reason -- and
not only refuses but requires countries under its control to
do the same.
July 12, 1984
Q:
It's well after the fact, but from a political standpoint
was the Soviet boycott of this year's Games effective? And
if so, on whom did it have its most profound effect?
A:
I don't believe the Soviet boycott was very effective,
because the Los Angeles Games had more participants than
ever in history. Those most hurt were the Soviet athletes
and the athletes from the other countries forced to join in
the boycott.
July 12, 1984
Q:
Although hindsight is almost always 20/20, how would you
have handled the Afghanistan situation of 1980?
A:
First of all, I think we should have done more in
advance to dissuade the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. We
shouldn't have let it take us by surprise. And we should
have planned our reaction more carefully and made sure we
had solid international support for the steps we took. But,
if the Soviets invaded anyway, we did have to react and if I
had been in office then I certainly would have. But, I'm
not certain I would have insisted on a boycott of the
Olympics unless most of our Allies supported us.
Matloch
for 6/22/99
THE WHITE HOUSE
UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
Chron
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)
WASHINGTON
Jly 84
Sevent/Smitive
ADM. POINDEXTER
MR. MCFARLANE
EYES ONLY
PRESERVATION COPY
-
National Security Council
The White House
EYES
System #
Package # ONLY
SEQUENCE TO
HAS SEEN
DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson
Bob Kimmitt
John Poindexter
/
&
Tom Shull
Wilma Hall
Bud McFarlane
2
Bob Kimmitt
NSC Secretariat
June buriet well r
Situation Room
MATLOCK
3
JR
Dispatch Action lodin)
I = Information
A = Action
R = Retain
D =
CC:
VP
Meese Baker Deaver Other
Seer Mathin N= No further
COMMENTS
Should be seen by:
2.
Bud,
(if (Date/Time) ld see see
1 opt for Jack trying
mut with Z agladins
May Codey out
interest.
DECLASSIFIED
NLS M02-011#27
BY LOT NARA, DATE 10/17/05
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
July 13, 1984
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
FROM:
JACK MATLOCKI
sm
SUBJECT:
Establishing Contact outside Gromyko's Staff
You asked for my thoughts on how we might go about establishing a
contact outside Gromyko's staff. Several possibilities come to
mind, which are not mutually exclusive. Tactically, I believe we
should not show too much eagerness, but simply let it be known
that we would have something to say if they wish to listen.
Our principal target, in my opinion, should be the CC CPSU
Secretariat staff. These are the people who work directly for
Chernenko and presumably Gorbachev, since the latter seems to be
acting as Chernenko's number two in running the Secretariat. He
may actually be the more active of the two; if he aims for the
top spot -- as he doubtless does -- he is probably eager to get
his finger in the foreign affairs field, where he has little
prior experience. The most valuable interlocutor here is probably
Zagladin. He runs the International Department (although
Ponomarev is the titular head), is a Central Committee member in
his own right, and clearly has a vested interest in building up
his organization's influence, as compared with Gromyko's MFA.
In the past, however, this channel has not been used (except for
my two meetings this year, the second with Stanislav Menshikov,
Zagladin's "desk officer" for the U.S.). In the past, private
channels have either been through Dobrynin (who seems to have had
a direct line to Brezhnev's office, but this may not exist any
more), or through KGB contacts who acted merely as message
bearers. There are dangers in using Dobrynin, since we don't
know how direct his own lines of communication are, and since we
should not subject our messages to whatever spin he chooses to
put on them. The use of KGB contacts would be feasible -- and
should be done if that is the Soviet preferance -- but has the
disadvantage of dealing with a person who is only a message
bearer and who plays no personal role in the policy making
process. For some types of subjects, this is preferable -- for
example in arranging a prisoner exchange, or some other limited,
concrete deal which the Soviets want off the record. It has its
limitations, however, if our objective is a broader discussion of
how disparate issues might be put together to form a package.
The following specific possibilities come to mind:
SECRET/SENSITIVE
- 2 -
1. We could have Hartman pass a message to Zagladin that another
meeting might be useful to review informally what might be
possible for the balance of this year and next year. If he
agrees, we could offer to meet quietly in Washington, Moscow or a
third country, as he suggests. If we decide to follow this
course, the best way to get the message to Hartman would be to
call him on the secure line. Nothing should be done in
telegraphic traffic, because it is too difficult to control
distribution.
2. Ty Cobb has an outstanding invitation from the USA Institute
to visit Moscow in connection with a research project initiated
before he came on the NSC staff. It has been renewed verbally
since he bacame a staff member, but he of course has done nothing
about it. We could have him pick up the invitation (if the
Soviets are still willing). When he was there in 1981 he was
given excellent access to a variety of senior officials,
including Zagladin. Ty would not have to go with any particular
message (and probably should not), but his Soviet interlocutors
would know that they could get messages back to us by him if they
desired.
3. Robert O. Anderson's suggestion (TAB I) could provide an
avenue to Academician Velikhov (who has gone out of his way to
express an interest in it). I am not sure just how influential
Velikhov is (aside from his prominent role in Soviet space, SDI,
and ASAT programs), or on whose behalf he may be speaking. He is
not himself a member of the Central Committee, which would
indicate that his personal status in the Party is not very high.
On the other hand, he may be a channel to someone else, and the
matter might be worth exploring.
There are several ways this might be done:
(1) Hartman or his Deputy might ask for an appointment with
Velikhov, in the course of which inquiries could be made about
the Soviet view of Anderson's proposal.
(2) A USG official from Washington could do the same, and
perhaps with greater success than the Embassy can. For example,
Alvin Trivelpiece of DOE has an invitation from Velikhov which he
is willing to accept if we want him to. He could be briefed to
raise the Anderson proposal and attempt to smoke out just what
the Soviets find appealing about it.
(3) Finally, we could ask a reliable private citizen with
ties to Velikhov to raise the matter. Anderson and his assistant
Hirsch, for example, could be encouraged to follow up on our
behalf. There are dangers here, however, because, as I mentioned
before, I don't find the idea attractive as it stands, and its
main utility would be as a vehicle for smoking out possible
Soviet interest in establishing a special channel. Therefore, I
believe it would be better to use a USG official to inquire, if
we decide to do SO.
Attachment:
Tab I - Anderson "proposal"
1
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
This is the proposal Anderson gave
Velikhou during his trip in late Mayl
early June.
it was the third point that
Velikhov asked about specifically
in two subsequent telep Love calls
to Hinsch, An clerson's assistant.
As I mentioned in my earlier
oral Cerifing, J don 't think me
need a private commission
But we mis at think Thout a
meeting with Soviet officials.
"commission" from within the US6
(and perhaps with a few reliable
"outsiders") as a vehicle to maintain
contact MFA. with Soviet officials antide
It is the latter aspect which
may explain Velibhou's interest-
DECLASSIFIED IRELEASED Jack
NLS M02-011 #28
BY LOT NARA, DATE 10/17/05
ROA Draft
5/24/84
MEMO RE: BERING STRAITS
The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. hereby agree to the following concepts as being
in the long term interests of the two countries and the world community:
1) Both nations agree that the Bering Straits shall be open to
peaceful navigation for all nations of the world in the belief
that the concept of open sea lanes are a major need for world
commerce.
2) Both nations agree to set up a joint organization to explore
long range problems that are of mutual concern. Environmental
problems, meteorological phenomena, mineral development in
the Bering Sea, and others shall constitute the initial agenda for
discussion.
3) A joint commission shall be constituted to put the foregoing into
effect and to pursue any and all other matters of any nature what-
soever that may be of importance to the long term interests of both
countries. The commission shall consist of 14 members, equally
divided between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.
(a) It shall meet not less than three times per year at a site
to be designated by the Co-Chairmen.
(b) It shall be chaired by co-chairmen consisting of a U.S.
and a Soviet member of the committee to be so designated.
(c) The Chairman and the committee shall report directly to their
respective Chiefs of State. The U. S. membership shall be
bi-partisan and advisory in nature.
4) The first meeting of commission shall be within 90 days of this
agreement, dated
.
5434
Chown
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
CONFIDENTIAL
July 14, 1984
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK
SUBJECT:
Status of Negotiation of Cultural Exchange
Agreement with Soviets
Art Hartman presented our draft agreement to Gromyko when they
met July 5. Subsequently, the Soviets notified us of their
negotiator (one Churlin, a decent type as Soviets go, who has
worked on cultural affairs for MFA -- and on the UN Secretariat
staff -- for many years). They have indicated that they will be
prepared to begin negotiations shortly, but have not yet set a
date.
At present, our PAO in Moscow, Ray Benson, is on leave. He will
be Hartman's principal deputy for the negotiations, and will do
the day-to-day stuff. Benson is prepared to return to Moscow
immediately, however, to accomodate any date the Soviets suggest.
DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED
NLS F95-074/2#48
BY LOT NARA, DATE 11/6/00
CONF IDENTIAL