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Matlock Chron April 1985 (1)
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Records of the National Security Council, Directorate of European and Soviet Affairs (Reagan Administration)
Jack F. Matlock, Jr.'s Chronological Files
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: Matlock Chron April 1985 (1)
Box: 8
To see more digitized collections visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection
Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected]
Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing
National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET
4/4/2005
File Folder
MATLOCK CHRON APRIL 1985 (1/6)
FOIA
F06-114/2
Box Number
8
YARHI-MILO
810
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
7001 TALKING
SATURDAY BREAKFAST RE BALDRIGE
3
ND
B1
POINTS
VISIT TO MOSCOW
R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2
7003 TALKING
SAME TEXT AS DOC #7001
3
ND
B1
POINTS
R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2
7006 MEMO
MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE
1 4/1/1985 B1
R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2
7017 MEMO
PLATT TO MCFARLANE RE PROPOSAL FOR
9 3/30/1985 B1
U.S.-USSR JOINT DEVELOPMENT OF OIL
RESOURCES IN THE NAVARIN BASIN
R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2
7008 MEMO
KIMMITT TO PLATT RE U.S.-USSR FISHING
1 4/1/1985 B1
RELATIONSHIP
R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2
7009 MEMO
LEVINE TO MCFARLANE RE U.S.-USSR
1 3/20/1985 B1
FISHING RELATIONSHIP
R 3/27/2012 M266/1
7019 MEMO
PLATT TO MCFARLANE RE U.S.-USSR
2 2/16/1985 B1
FISHING RELATIONSHIP
R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET
4/4/2005
File Folder
MATLOCK CHRON APRIL 1985 (1/6)
FOIA
F06-114/2
Box Number
8
YARHI-MILO
810
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
7011 MEMO
MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE
2 4/2/1985 B1
R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2
DOCUMENT PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233
7021 MEMO
PRIORITIES/OPPORTUNITIES FOR 1985 U.S.-
3 3/28/1985 B1
USSR RELATIONS
R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2
7014 MEMO
MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE MEETING
3 4/18/1985 B1
WITH AMBASSADOR HARTMAN
R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2
7016 MEMO
MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE STATE
2 4/2/1985 B1
PAPER ON U.S.-USSR RELATIONS
R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2
DOCUMENT PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233
7023 MEMO
SAME TEXT AS DOC #7021
3 3/28/1985 B1
R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
Chron
SECRET
TALKING POINTS FOR SATURDAY BREAKFAST
Baldrige Visit to Moscow
-- The first question we should address is whether, in light of
the Soviet handling of the Nicholson killing, the meeting should
be postponed. What are your views?
-- [In commenting, note as appropriate, pros and cons attached,
then: Though emotionally I frankly would like to delay the JCC
meeting, I believe a delay would not serve our long-term
interests, and actually would diminish the potential leverage
these trade issues provide us in managing the overall U.S. -Soviet
relationship.
-- However, I think it important for Mac to make clear that any
improvement of the trade atmosphere beyond the very limited
issues in the position he takes with him will be dependent on an
improved political atmosphere. He should make the point that the
Soviet reaction to the Nicholson shooting has damaged the
atmosphere, and -- privately -- let the Soviets know that we are
looking for improvements in the human rights situation before
moving on any of the larger issues they are interested in.
-- If the meeting is held on schedule, the question will arise as
to whether Mac should carry a substantive letter from the
President, to present in case he gets an appointment with
Gorbachev. Are there any views on this?
[If there is a consensus for proceeding with the meeting:]
-- I'll take this up with the President, and believe he will
agree.
[If there are divided views:]
-- I'll let the President know how you feel about this and will
let you know early next week what he decided.
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
NLS DECLASSIFIED F06-114/2#700
BY LOJ NARA, DATE 11/21/07
SECRET
OPTIONS RE BALDRIGE VISIT
1. Ask for delay in JCC Meeting to show displeasure with the
Soviet handling of the Nicholson killing.
PRO:
a. Would convey our view that the Soviet reaction is
totally unsatisfactory.
b. Would make clear to the Soviets that their behavior
can affect unrelated areas of importance to them.
CON:
a. Would seem inconsistent with a policy of trying to
expand communication.
b. Would undermine effort to use Soviet desire for
better trade relations to achieve goals in other areas
(e.g., human rights).
C. Would be interpreted by some as backing off stated
long-term policy for short-term reasons.
d. Would offend some influential U.S. business circles,
including strong supporters of the President.
e. Not likely to encourage a Soviet effort to avoid
such incidents in the future.
2. Hold meeting as scheduled, but use occasion to point out the
damage that the Soviet handling of the Nicholson killing has done
to bilateral relations, and stress the point that substantial
improvements in our trading relationship will be dependent on an
improvement in political relations.
PRO:
a. Appropriate means of retaliating for Nicholson are
available in more directly related areas (restrictions
on Soviets, possible PNG action, letter from President,
etc.)
b. The obverse of the "cons" noted under Option 1.
CON:
Will leave impression with some that we have not
reacted with sufficient vigor to the Nicholson tragedy
and affront.
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
3
SECRET
GIFFEN "MESSAGE" TO MATLOCK
Jim Giffen, President of the U.S.-USSR Trade and Economic
Council, called me to say that his Soviet contacts had indicated
that Gorbachev would respond positively to the request for a
Baldrige meeting if one of the following three conditions are
met:
1. The JCC Meeting makes progress on a "major" issue (see
below) ;
2. Baldrige has a "substantive" letter from the President;
or
3. The U.S. proposes a "major" project of economic
cooperation.
As for the "major" issues in Soviet eyes, the following were
named:
1. Contract sanctity;
2. MFN; and
3. Support for energy-related projects.
Matlock told Giffen that we would take note of this, but that he
was certain that we would make no decisions on the basis of
whether it would foster a meeting with Gorbachev. Such a meeting
would be welcome, but the decision is entirely up to the Soviets;
we would certainly not pay a price for one.
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
Baldrise File' Visit 4
SECRET
TALKING POINTS FOR SATURDAY BREAKFAST
Baldrige Visit to Moscow
-- The first question we should address is whether, in light of
the Soviet handling of the Nicholson killing, the meeting should
be postponed. What are your views?
-- [In commenting, note as appropriate, pros and cons attached,
then:] Though emotionally I frankly would like to delay the JCC
meeting, I believe a delay would not serve our long-term
interests, and actually would diminish the potential leverage
these trade issues provide us in managing the overall U.S.-Soviet
relationship.
-- However, I think it important for Mac to make clear that any
improvement of the trade atmosphere beyond the very limited
issues in the position he takes with him will be dependent on an
improved political atmosphere. He should make the point that the
Soviet reaction to the Nicholson shooting has damaged the
atmosphere, and -- privately -- let the Soviets know that we are
looking for improvements in the human rights situation before
moving on any of the larger issues they are interested in.
-- If the meeting is held on schedule, the question will arise as
to whether Mac should carry a substantive letter from the
President, to present in case he gets an appointment with
Gorbachev. Are there any views on this?
[If there is a consensus for proceeding with the meeting:]
-- I'll take this up with the President, and believe he will
agree.
[If there are divided views:]
-- I'll let the President know how you feel about this and will
let you know early next week what he decided.
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
DECLASSIFIED
NLS F06-114/2#7003 F06-114/2 #7003
BY LOJ NARA, DATE 11/21/07
5
SECRET
OPTIONS RE BALDRIGE VISIT
1. Ask for delay in JCC Meeting to show displeasure with the
Soviet handling of the Nicholson killing.
PRO:
a. Would convey our view that the Soviet reaction is
totally unsatisfactory.
b. Would make clear to the Soviets that their behavior
can affect unrelated areas of importance to them.
CON:
a. Would seem inconsistent with a policy of trying to
expand communication.
b. Would undermine effort to use Soviet desire for
better trade relations to achieve goals in other areas
(e.g., human rights).
C. Would be interpreted by some as backing off stated
long-term policy for short-term reasons.
d. Would offend some influential U.S. business circles,
including strong supporters of the President.
e. Not likely to encourage a Soviet effort to avoid
such incidents in the future.
2. Hold meeting as scheduled, but use occasion to point out the
damage that the Soviet handling of the Nicholson killing has done
to bilateral relations, and stress the point that substantial
improvements in our trading relationship will be dependent on an
improvement in political relations.
PRO:
a. Appropriate means of retaliating for Nicholson are
available in more directly related areas (restrictions
on Soviets, possible PNG action, letter from President,
etc.)
b. The obverse of the "cons" noted under Option 1.
CON:
Will leave impression with some that we have not
reacted with sufficient vigor to the Nicholson tragedy
and affront.
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
SECRET
GIFFEN "MESSAGE" TO MATLOCK
Jim Giffen, President of the U.S.-USSR Trade and Economic
Council, called me to say that his Soviet contacts had indicated
that Gorbachev would respond positively to the request for a
Baldrige meeting if one of the following three conditions are
met:
1. The JCC Meeting makes progress on a "major" issue (see
below);
2. Baldrige has a "substantive" letter from the President;
or
3. The U.S. proposes a "major" project of economic
cooperation.
As for the "major" issues in Soviet eyes, the following were
named:
1. Contract sanctity;
2. MFN; and
3. Support for energy-related projects.
Matlock told Giffen that we would take note of this, but that he
was certain that we would make no decisions on the basis of
whether it would foster a meeting with Gorbachev. Such a meeting
would be welcome, but the decision is entirely up to the Soviets;
we would certainly not pay a price for one.
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
thathock
2604 JH-C
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET
April NOTED 985
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE
FROM:
JACK F. MATLOCKA
m5
SUBJECT:
Proposal for U.S.-Soviet Joint Development of Oil
Resources in the Navarin Basin
State has forwarded a report (Tab I) on a detailed interagency
evaluation of a suggestion by Mr. Michel J. Halbouty that the
U.S. propose to the Soviet Union joint exploitation of the
Navarin Basin hydrocarbon deposits.
Mr. Halbouty had approached the Vice President with his idea, and
the interagency evaluation was undertaken at the Vice President's
request.
All agencies concluded that it would not be in the U.S. interest
to act on Mr. Halbouty's proposal. This conclusion is based on a
number of economic, political, legal and technological considera-
tions. Ken Dam has written Mr. Halbouty to inform him of this
judgment, but it is possible that Mr. Halbouty will continue to
interest senior members of the Administration in his idea.
I believe that the interagency judgment of this idea is sound and
that Ken Dam's letter to Halbouty was appropriate.
Martin, Rohinson Q.P and Sestanovich concur.
Attachments:
Tab I
Platt-McFarlane Memorandum with Attachments
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
NLS F06-114/2*7006
Declassify on: OADR
BY LRJ NARA, DATE 11/21/07
United States Department of State
8
SECRET
Washington, D.C. 20520
March 30, 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. McFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE
SUBJECT: Proposal for U.S.-Soviet Joint Development of Oil
Resources in the Navarin Basin
Attached is a study responding to a proposal by Michel J.
Halbouty to jointly develop certain hydrocarbon resources with
the Soviets in that part of the Navarin Basin area of the Bering
Sea which is currently under dispute by both countries. Mr.
Halbouty has argued that the that such a project would serve as
an outstanding example of U.S.-Soviet cooperation, and could
make an important contribution to the cause of world peace.
We, and the other four agencies that have reviewed Mr.
Halbouty's proposal (Commerce, Energy, Interior and Defense),
have serious problems with it. We have concluded that it would
undercut our efforts to avoid allied overdependence on the
U.S.S.R. as an energy source, would make the Soviets less
interested in settling our maritime boundary dispute, and would
be an inappropriate, one-sided gesture given the current state
of U.S.-Soviet relations.
As was agreed in a March 8 interagency meeting called to
discuss these proposals and chaired by Jack Matlock, Deputy
Secretary Dam has sent the enclosed letter to Mr. Halbouty
informing him of the Administration's problems with his
proposal. We understand that Halbouty plans to be in Washington
during the week of April 1 and expect that he will appeal our
finding to Vice-President Bush and possibly to the President as
well. Talking points for their possible use are attached to our
study.
Nicholas Bmckmilly Platt
Executive Secretary
Attachments:
1. Evaluation of Halbouty Proposal
2. Dam-Halbouty letter
SECRET
DECL:OADR
NLS DECLASSIFIED 506-114/24706
BY LOJ NARA, DATE 11/21/07
United States Department of State
9
Washington, D.C. 20520
SECRET
Evaluation of a Proposal for Joint U.S.-Soviet Development of
Off-Shore Oil Resources in the Navarin Basin Area of the
Bering Sea
We have examined the proposal of Mr. Michael Halbouty for
joint U.S.-Soviet development of oil resources in the Navarin
Basin area. Mr. Halbouty has recommended that a special area in
the disputed part of the Bering Sea between the U.S. and Soviet
interpretations of the 1867 Convention line ceding Alaska to the
U.S. be designated a neutral zone (see attached map) and that we
propose to the Soviets that petroleum resources in this zone be
jointly developed and shared between us. He believes strongly
that such a joint project would serve as an outstanding example
of U.S.-Soviet cooperation, and would make an important
contribution to improved mutual understanding and the cause of
world peace.
In considering the feasibility of this proposal we believe
it is necessary to take into account our overall approach to
relations with the Soviet Union as well as specific aspects of
this policy. Among the specific aspects which have been
considered are the proposal's consistency with the U.S. approach
to Soviet energy development, whether the proposal would help or
hinder our efforts to resolve our maritime boundary dispute, the
consistency of the proposal with international law, and the
advantages and disadvantages to the U.S. flowing from such a
proposal at this time.
When looking at the proposal in terms of our overall
relations with the Soviets, we believe it is useful to keep in
mind that we are engaged in a long-term strategic competition
with the U.S.S.R. This global competition with the Soviets
takes place across military, economic, ideological, and
diplomatic dimensions. The key to managing the U.S.-Soviet
relationship is to have an overall, cohesive, global strategy
that brings into play all of these elements. The goal of such a
strategy is to create incentives for the Soviets to show
restraint and to seek cooperative approaches in our mutual
interest.
Consistency with U.S. Policy on Soviet Energy Development
Status of the Soviet Energy Sector
The Soviet Union today produces more oil and gas than any
other country in the world. In 1984, Soviet production of crude
oil was 12.23 million b/d compared to 1983's record output of
12.32 million b/d. Total Soviet production of natural
SECRET
-2>
gas was 20.7 trillion cubic feet in 1984, compared to 18.9
trillion cubic feet produced in 1983. Soviet oil and gas
exports, including those to Western Europe, reflect its immense
energy production capacity as well as pressing need for foreign
exchange. Soviet oil exports have grown from 1.9 million b/d in
1970 to 3,590 million b/d in 1984. Soviet oil exports to
Western Europe have shown a concomitant increase - up from .7
million b/d in 1973 to 1.5 million b/d in 1984. Soviet gas
exports have shown an even more dramatic increase - up from 53.8
million cubic meters/day in 1975 to 172.6 million cubic
meters/day in 1983. Exports to Western Europe are a sizable
proportion of Soviet gas exports, having risen from 22.7 million
cubic meters/day in 1975 to 78.4 million cubic meters/day in
1983.
We expect, however, that Soviet energy production,
particularly of oil, will be under pressure during the second
half of the decade. Oil production has continued to fall during
the first two months of 1985. Soviet energy output and energy
mix in the 1986-1990 period will depend largely on the level of
investment and on the priorities the leadership establishes
within the energy sector. From the information released so far
about the USSR's Long-Term Energy Program, it appears that the
leadership has accepted a plateau in oil output during the
second half of the 1980's and is willing to commit the resources
necessary to ensure an adequate level of energy production. The
program calls for continued high levels of investment through
the year 2000 to maintain oil production as high as possible
while rapidly increasing gas extraction, further development of
nuclear power, and greater energy efficiency through
conservation. Energy development costs, however, will increase
as the Soviets turn to more remote areas and more difficult
geological structures to maintain production. These continued
high costs have possible implications not only for overall
economic growth, but also for military programs.
Soviet willingness to pay for rapidly increasing costs of
energy development - particularly oil - in order to cover
domestic and export requirements is reflected in the increasing
share of total investment allocated to the energy sector. In
the past, the USSR has held down energy's share of total
investment by meeting the needs of the high priority items in
the sector at the expense of others, but this strategy is no
longer possible since investment costs are increasing in all
areas of energy production.
Oil and gas exports account for approximately 80% of all
Soviet hard-currency exports, estimated at $18-19 billion of
about $24 billion in total hard currency earnings in 1983.
Soviet earnings from energy exports will, however, be under
pressure because of falling domestic oil production and
declining world energy prices. The key for the USSR in being
SECRET
SECRET
-3-
able to offset a continued soft world oil pricing environment
will be its ability to maintain high levels of crude oil to the
West and increase natural gas exports.
The picture with regard to natural gas is much brighter than
for oil. Soviet gas reserves are the largest in the world and
their expanding pipeline network will make increased amounts
available for export. Natural gas production has increased at a
brisk pace and has exceeded plan targets for the last three
years. Soft energy prices will, of course, affect gas as well
as oil. Furthermore, it is questionable whether the Soviets
will be able to export sufficient quantities of gas to make up
completely for the expected decline in hard currency oil
deliveries.
U.S. Policy toward Soviet Energy Development
In part because of our concerns over energy security in
Western Europe, the Administration has adopted a policy of not
encouraging development of Soviet energy resources. We have
sought, in cooperation with our NATO allies and other countries,
to ensure that Western Europe does not have an undue reliance on
Soviet energy because of the potential unreliability of this
source. We have strongly encouraged our allies in Western
Europe to take steps to ensure the developmemt of indigenous
resources, particularly in the North Sea and the Norwegian Sea,
in an effort to avoid overdependence on Soviet sources. The
vulnerability problem is particularly acute in regard to imports
of natural gas because of the inherent inflexibility of pipeline
systems.
Our interest in not encouraging development of the Soviet
energy sector is reflected in U.S. export control policy -- we
generally approve licenses for exploration and production
equipment but deny commodities multilaterally controlled by
COCOM as well as equipment for the manufacture of oil and gas
exploration or production equipment. The general policy is to
deny license applications for oil and gas exploration and
production related technical data and high technology items -
primarily sophisticated computers capable of processing seismic
data. These controls reflect full interagency consideration of
the potential benefits to the Soviets of such equipment and
technology while recognizing the availability of comparable
equipment from other Western suppliers. Our reservations on the
question of Soviet energy development have led to a policy of
not extending official USG support to trade promotion activities
involving oil and gas equipment in the USSR.
Proposing joint development of the Navarin Basin to the
Soviets would be totally at odds with the Administration's
SECRET
2
SECRET
-4-
policy of restraint with respect to Soviet energy development.
Our allies in Western Europe and Japan could view such a project
as a sign that our concerns regarding their potential
overdependence on Soviet energy had abated. It would, at a
minimum, undercut our efforts to pursuade them to develop
alternative sources of energy and, in the case of Japan, to
forego development of the Sakhalin oil and gas deposits. It
would also probably encourage the Europeans to propose similar
joint development projects, especially in the Barents Sea, where
Norway and the USSR have an outstanding boundary dispute.
Consistency with our Political Strategy towards the USSR
A key principle in our relations with the Soviet Union is
that of reciprocity. It would be contrary to this principle for
the United States to make a one-sided political gesture given
the over-all state of our bilateral relationship. While we are
prepared to pursue with the Soviet Union a dialogue based on a
search for mutually beneficial approaches to the problems facing
us, we do not seek agreement for its own sake. The Soviets have
done little to warrant a one-sided, goodwill gesture from us and
based on past experience would be likely to regard this as a
sign of weakness on our part. We must keep in mind that the
Soviets are now in their fifth year in Afghanistan. Internal
repression continues to rise as emigration numbers fall.
Although we have begun arms control negotiations, which we hope
will eventually result in a more stable relationship, we must
guard against the buildup of unrealistic expectations which the
Soviets will surely seek to manipulate.
The proposal for a joint development project in the Navarin
Basin would be an essentially one-sided gesture on our part.
Off-shore oil exploration is an area in which Soviet technology
lags badly and in which U.S. firms are leaders. Although the
USSR has achieved its present status as the world's leading
producer of crude oil and natural gas largely through the use of
domestically manufactured equipment, its dependence on imports
of Western equipment and technology will probably increase as
exploration and development shift to deeper and more complex
deposits. Exploration of Arctic offshore developments in the
Barents and Kara Seas will require large amounts of Western
equipment and technology as would the Navarin Basin. The CIA
has stated that the Soviets will probably continue to pursue
approaches other than outright purchases for acquiring Western
technology. The Soviets regularly collect information on
Western-developed technology and equipment through legal and
illegal means. They also use joint-development projects such as
the Sakhalin offshore exploration and development agreement with
Japan to obtain Western know-how and equipment.
SECRET
13
SECRET
-5-
Maritime Boundary Implications
Given the disparity in our technologies and the advanced
stage of US hydrocarbon development plans in the Bering Sea (the
Soviets have none of which we are aware), the Soviets would reap
immediate benefits from a joint development arrangement. The
Soviets would stand to benefit economically, politically, and if
the arrangement called for shared technology, from technology
transfer. If the arrangement is not part of an overall boundary
settlement, it could reduce or eliminate Soviet incentive to
settle the boundary position, despite efforts to avoid that
result. The only likely tangible benefit to the U.S. in that
event would be the development of that portion of the disputed
area covered by the joint activity. This would leave us open to
charges of giving benefits to the Soviets in areas now claimed
by the U.S. without achieving the desirable certainty of an
overall boundary resolution.
In some of the examples cited below, joint development
arrangements have been part of maritime boundary settlements.
It is possible that a joint resource development arrangement
ultimately could be incorporated into the boundary negotiating
package and might even be used as an incentive to the Soviets to
reach our agreement, if proposed at the right time. We should
caution, however, that since the Soviets have claimed two
maritime areas on the U.S. side of the 1867 Convention Line,
such a proposal might not be sufficient to prompt the Soviets to
accept our 1983 proposal (to resolve the boundary on the basis
of a common depiction of the 1867 Convention Line that would
split equally the difference between the U.S. and Soviet
depictions of the Convention Line).
If we were to try and use the promise of joint resources
development as a carrot in our maritime boundary discussions
timing and other tactical considerations would have to be
considered beforehand. Given that the Soviets have already told
Halbouty that joint development would not be possible because of
the boundary, our tabling of such a proposal could give the
Soviets a mistaken impression that the USG is extremely eager to
reach agreement and result in a hardening of their position.
Finally, we would also have to revise substantially the current
USG policy on Soviet energy development before a joint
development proposal could be made.
International Law: Precedents
There are many complex legal issues involved in establishing
joint development arrangements, including the strong likelihood
possiblity that domestic laws on oil leasing would have to be
amended. International law, however, poses no absolute bar to
joint development as such. The more prominent examples of joint
development arrangements, summarized below, may be classified
SECRET
SECRET
-6
into three categories: (1) resource sharing, (2) revenue and
resource sharing, and (3) condominiums. The majority of these
arrangements do not involve joint "ownership" of the resource or
joint exploitation, but rather revenue or resource sharing. (An
arrangement sharing only revenues could serve to ease concern on
technology transfer.)
Resource sharing. Czecholovakia and Austria in 1960
concluded an agreement to share a common oil deposit. Each
country is entitled to a share of total production in proportion
to the amount of reserves in its territory in 1962. Each
country separately exploits the deposit in its own territory,
subject to oversight and allocation by a joint commission.
Netherlands and the FRG agreed in 1962 to share equally the
petroleum and gas extracted from an estuary claimed by both
countries. Each exercises jurisdiction on its side of a
preliminary dividing line, established pending resoultion of the
boundary dispute. The concessionaires of each cooperate on
calculation of reserves, output, revenue sharing, risk bonuses
and dispute settlement.
Revenue and resource sharing. Japan and Korea in 1974
negotiated two agreements. The first demarcated their
continental shelf boundary; the second established a joint
development zone (comprising about 20 million acres) south of
the terminus of the continental shelf boundary. The latter
agreement essentially divides the resource and the costs of
exploration. It creates nine subzones, each subject to separate
sets of regulations set by the concessionaires of both
countries. These regulations provide for designation of an
operator for each subzone, sharing resources and expenses,
handling sole risk operations and settling disputes. The
agreement was ratified in May 1978, and exploration has begun in
the 20.5 million acre joint development area. Great Britain and
Norway in 1976 concluded an agreement to share the Frigg Field
natural gas reserves in the North Sea, in an area that straddles
their maritime boundary. Norway is entitled to 60% of the
production and Great Britain gets 40%, subject to adjustment for
changing conditions. Licensees are to cooperate on development
and the selection of a single unit operator. Each side
exercises jurisdiction on its side of the boundary. There are
extensive provisions for conservation, access, taxation and
matters of common concern.
Condominiums. Saudi Arabia has concluded two
condominium-like arrangements. In 1965, it established a
neutral zone with Kuwait to share oil production in a 2500
square mile land and sea area that is essentially a condominium
administered by both. Revenues from production are shared
equally.
SECRET
SECRET
In 1974, Saudi Arabia concluded an agreement with Sudan to
share mineral resources in the Red Sea. They share soveriegn
rights, and have expressly committed to protect and defend the
resource against third parties.
Abu Dhabi and Qatar in 1969 concluded a maritime boundary
agreement, which established sharing arrangements of the
al-Bundug field in the Persian Gulf. The Parties purport to
exercise joint sovereign rights in the field. They share
royalties, profits and fees.
Conclusion
We have reviewed with the Departments of Interior, Defense,
Energy, and Commerce, the proposal for possible joint
development, including the establishment of a neutral zone, in
one or more areas in the Navarin Basin. We have concluded that
implementation of such proposals would not be appropriate at
this time. Before we could recommend such a venture, several
conditions would need to be satisfied. First, we would need to
see a substantial improvement in U.S.-Soviet bilateral
relations. If this relationship improves, we would expect to
see a number of areas in which mutually beneficial U.S.-Soviet
cooperation might be increased. In this context, a politically
symbolic gesture on the part of the United States in regard to
the establishment of joint development or a neutral zone might
be appropriate. Secondly, any such political gesture should be
made in a context in which the U.S. received commensurate
benefits, such as part of an advantageous resolution of our
maritime boundary. Finally, we would need to develop a
situation in which our concerns over energy security in Western
Europe were alleviated by the development of reliable sources of
energy other than the Soviet Union.
Interior dissents from parts of the above conclusion on the
grounds that it does not see joint U.S.-Soviet development
activity in the Navarin Basin being in the U.S. interest in any
foreseeable circumstances.
Enclosures:
A: Maps of Navarin Basin Area
B: Possible Talking Points
SECRET
SECRET
167 E
180
172 W
CHUKCHI
SEA
Strait
U.S.S.R.
Bering
65 30.0'N 168 58'22.587"W
65 N
65 N
Mys Chaplina
64 12.3'N 172 00'W
Mys Chukotski
64 05.2'N 172 00'W
Approxinat
Lawrence
Island
1867
Area
of
possible
UNITED
"Neutral
zone
STATES
OF CLAIM
St. Matthew
Island
60 N
Nunivak
Island
Pribilof
BERING SEA
Islands
Ostrov
Beringa
55 N
Ostrov
Komandorskiye
Mednyy
Ostrova
Attu
Island
51 25.7'N
167 00'E
ALEUTIAN
L
ISLANDS
50 36.4'N
167 00'E
167 E
180
172 W
SECRET
UNCLASSIFIED
160°E
180°
160°W
140°W
140°E
75°N
Bennett
Island
Henrietta Island
Jeannette Island
East Sea Sibe rian
Beaufort
Sea
A r c t i c
Ocean
Wrangel
Herald
:
Island
Island
Chukchi
Sea
United (Alaska) States
65°N
U.S.S.R.
Strait
Rerin
Lease
Convention Line
Sale
Planning
Area
Area
Bristol
Bay
55°N
United State Russis (1867)
55°N
Islands
160°W
180°
5816 10-84 STATE(GE)
UNCLASSIFIED
Possible Talking Points:
--Given overall state of U.S.-Soviet relations and U.S. policy
regarding Soviet energy development, joint development
arrangement proposal from us would not be appropriate now or to
our advantage.
-This initiative would be totally at odds with our approach to
Soviet energy development in which we encourage our allies to
develop their own or other resources to avoid overdependence on
Soviet energy.
--Suddenly changing this policy would be a signal to our allies
that our concerns regarding overdependence had evaporated and
would undercut our efforts to get them to develop alternative
sources.
--The Soviets have done little to warrant what would be
one-sided, goodwill gesture from us and could regard this as
sign of weakness on our part. Soviets have not moderated basic
policies; their troops remain in Afghanistan, they maintain
intense repression domestically and continue their military
build-up.
--Although we have begun arms control negotiations, which we
hope will result in more stable relationship, we must guard
against creating unrealistic expectations which Soviets will
seek to manipulate.
--Proposing joint development prior to overall settlement of the
U.S.-Soviet maritime boundary question would reduce Soviet
interest in boundary agreement and futher complicate that
problem.
For the above reasons do not believe that pursuit of your
proposals at this time would be helpful to the President's
policy vis-à-vis the Soviets.
19
THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
Dear Mr. Halbouty:
We have reviewed with members of the National Security
Council and concerned agencies the proposal for possible joint
development with the Soviet Union, including potential joint
ownership, of one or more areas in the Navarin Basin which you
presented to Department officials in January at the suggestion
of the Vice President.
We appreciate your bringing this proposal to our attention.
While it is an interesting idea, we cannot now give
encouragement or endorsement to a U.S.-Soviet joint energy
development scheme in the Navarin Basin. This proposal would be
in direct conflict with our present policy regarding Soviet
energy development where we have strongly favored the
exploitation of energy reserves outside the Soviet Union to
reduce the possibility of allied overdependence on Soviet
energy. It could also raise potential complications for our
outer continental shelf program and would be inappropriate in
light of our differences with the U.S.S.R. over our maritime
boundary in the Bering Sea. Taking into account all of these
considerations, as well as the current overall state of
U.S.-Soviet relations, we do not believe that it would be in our
national interest to see the idea of joint development further
pursued at this time.
Sincerely,
Kenneth W. Dam
Mr. Michel T. Halbouty
Chairman of the Board,
Michel T. Halbouty Energy Co.,
c/o Capitol Hilton Hotel
Washington, D.C.
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ID 8502604
REFERRAL
DATE: 08 APR 85
MEMORANDUM FOR: DONALD GREGG
20
OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:
TO: MCFARLANE
SOURCE: PLATT, N
DATE. 30 MAR 85
KEYWORDS: USSR
OIL
HALBOUTY, MICHEL J
AP
AVP
SUBJ: PROPOSAL FOR US SOVIET JOINT DEVELOPMENT OF OIL RESOURCES IN NAVARIN
REQUIRED ACTION. FOR INFORMATION
DUEDATE:
COMMENTS:
JAMES
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
to
21
National Security Council
13
The White House
System #
I
Package # 2604
AP
11602
-
SEQUENCE TO
HAS SEEN
DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson
/
P
Bob Kimmitt
2
K
John Poindexter
3
ff.
Paul Thompson
Wilma Hall
Bud McFarlane
Bob Kimmitt LMP
4
P
5
8
AP:
1985
NSC Secretariat
A gugg
copy to
Situation Room
Jmp mote
I = Information
A = Action
R = Retain
D = Dispatch
N = No further Action
cc:
VP
Meese Regan
Deaver Other
COMMENTS
Should be seen by:
(Date/Time)
Please and eyes I Us to
Con Lugg in my / aller
J.
NS45
Pls send of to
Don Grey g
Kins
CONFIDENTIAL
22
1311
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
chron
CONF IDENTIAL
April 1, 1985
Matterb
MEMORANDUM FOR NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive Secretary
Department of State
SUBJECT:
US-USSR Fishing Relationship
(U)
Concerning the Department's memo of February 16, we are in full
agreement with the benefits of resuming negotiations with the
USSR concerning the reciprocal G.IFA fishing agreements. We are
concerned, however, as to the timing of these negotiations, as
the USSR continues its whaling activities.
(C)
Before such fishing negotiations commence, it is important that
the Soviet authorities understand clearly what the impact on any
GIFA reached would be if they are not in conformity with IWC
regulations. Our willingness to negotiate mutually beneficial
GIFAs should be made clear to the USSR, but it should also be
clear that US law would mandate us to restrain severely the USSR's
catch, if it were found to be involved in whaling contrary to the
IWC regulations. To avoid difficult complications in our fishing
relationship with the Soviet Union developing at a later date, it
is important at this critical juncture, before we begin fishing
negotiations, that we fully understand the status of its whaling
activities--both now and in the future. If the Soviet Union
indicates a lack of willingness to come into line with the IWC
regulations, we should reassess the advisability of proceeding
with the fishing negotiations. (C)
Please keep the NSC advised on this matter as you continue to
coordinate with the Department of Commerce.
(U)
Rebertal. Knunit
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary
CC: Mrs. Helen Robbins
Executive Assistant to the Secretary
Department of Commerce
CONFIDENTIAL
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NLS F06 -114/2#7008
CONFIDENTIAL
LOJ NARA, DATE 11/21/07
7009
CON: IDENTIAL
23
1311
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
CONF IDENTIAL
March 20, 1985
ACTION
SIGNED
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE
FROM:
RICHARD LEVINE
R
SUBJECT:
U.S.-USSR Fishing Relationship
State last month wrote seeking your concurrence to negotiate
a new fishing agreement with the USSR wherein our fishermen
would gain access to their waters in exchange for the USSR
having access to fisheries in our waters. Such fishing
rights negotiations were broken off at the time of the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan.
What appears to be a simple matter of restarting fishing
access negotiations--which could yield great benefits to U.S.
fishing interests--is gravely complicated by Soviet whaling.
As has recently been the case with Japan, if a nation does
not cease its whaling activities, U.S. law requires that
their fishing catch (in U.S. waters) be cut back 50 percent.
This is done after the Secretary of Commerce certifies the
country to be in violation of the International Whaling
Commission (IWC) limits. After receiving the State memo
requesting a resumption of the U.S.-USSR fishing
relationship, it became clear that the USSR may indeed be in
violation of the IWC regulations and might have to be
certified as such by the Secretary of Commerce. After
talks with both Jim Malone and Ed Derwinski, both agree that
gaining a new fishing agreement now with the Soviets, before
the status of its whaling policy is known, could lead to
great problems for us later-- for we could be bound by law to
cut back the Soviet? fishing take. Although Secretary of
State Shultz, according to Malone, has already brought the
whaling issue up with Dobrynin, Jack Matlock and I agree that
we need more information concerning the Soviet position on
the fishing agreement and future whaling activities before
the talks should resume. The memo back to State explains
this position.
RECOMMENDATION
Messrs. Matlock, Jan Stark, Wright and Sestanovich EARS concur.
That Robert Kimmitt sign the attached memo to Nicholas Platt.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments
TAB I
Memo to Platt
DECLASSIFIED
TAB II
Incoming from State
NLRR M266 # 7009
CONF IDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
BY KML NARA DATE 3/27/12
S/S 8504757
United States Department of State
1311
Washington, D.C. 20520
24
February 16, 1985
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. McFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE
SUBJECT: US-USSR Fishing Relationship
We plan to propose to the Soviets that we begin talks this
spring on renegotiating the current Governing International
Fishing Agreement (GIFA) to bring it into conformity with US
fishing policy and US law as reflected in the Magnuson Fishery
Conservation and Management Act. In addition, we plan to use
this opportunity to negotiate access for US fishermen to the
Soviet 200-mile zone, for Soviet fish, especially king crab.
We believe that this is an appropriate time to begin
discussions with the Soviets on these issues. Last summer, we
extended the existing GIFA until December 1985. In addition,
we granted the Soviets a directed allocation of 50,000 MT off
the US west coast. This year's allocation to the Soviets off
the west coast may reach as high as 70,000 MT. (To date, about
12,000 MT have been allocated to the Soviets.) In addition, the
Soviets are pursuing with US fisheries interests the possibility
of an additional joint venture off the east coast.
Soviet whaling activities could complicate these
negotiations. The USSR has objected to International Whaling
Commission (IWC) regulations, which limit Antarctic whaling for
this current season and call for an end to all commercial
whaling beginning next season. If the USSR exceeds current
limits or refuses to accept the overall cessation, the Secretary
of Commerce is required under US fisheries legislation to
determine whether such actions diminish the effectiveness of the
IWC regime and, if so, to apply fisheries sanctions. We have
identified this potential problem to the Soviets both in Moscow
and in Washington. At the same time, we believe that we should
proceed with our discussions to renegotiate the GIFA and
negotiate a reverse GIFA. Hopefully, our willingness to proceed
in this area will serve as an additional incentive to the
Soviets to conform to internationally agreed standards in the
whaling area, and we should continue to draw this linkage to
their attention.
While the Soviet and Polish GIFAs are the only existing
agreements which do not explicitly reflect US fishing policy as
reflected in the Magnuson Act, we have in effect carried out
this policy by requiring cooperation with US fishermen in return
for access to US marine resources. The formalization of this
CONF IDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
- 2 -
policy in a new GIFA, however, has been strongly urged by key
members of Congress. We have agreed already to begin
negotiations with the Poles on a new GIFA in early 1985.
Preliminary exchanges on a reverse GIFA to gain access to
Soviet waters for US fishermen were broken off after the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan. The interest of the US fishing
community in obtaining such access has intensified, however,
because US stocks of Alaskan king crab are severely depleted,
causing financial hardship to the Alaskan fishing industry.
Both Senator Stevens of Alaska and Congressman Breaux, Chairman
of the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Subcommittee, as well
as other congressmen, have been pushing for negotiation of
access to Soviet marine resources for US fishermen. In
addition, we have discussed renegotiation of the GIFA as well as
negotiation of a reverse GIFA with the Department of Commerce,
and they support this objective.
We would like your concurrence in taking this step. Should
you concur, we would proceed to develop specific negotiating
instructions with the Department of Commerce and in consultation
with congressional and other interests involved. We intend to
link renegotiation of our GIFA to US access to Soviet resources
because of the possibility of obtaining significant reciprocal
benefits in the Soviet zone of major interest to segments of the
US fishing industry.
for Nicholas Brickenley Platt
Executive Secretary
CONFIDENTIAL
27
MSG FROM: NSJMP
--CPUA
TO: Jack Matlock
+04/29/85 10:40:40
To: Jack Matlock
-- EYES ONLY- SECRET --
NOTE FROM: JOHN POINDEXTER
SUBJECT: Meeting with Z.
Bud thinks that is a good idea. Go ahead with your plans.
DECLASSIFIED
By House CAS
C adelines, August 28/ 1997
NARA, Date 6/10/02
Chron 24.8528
)
A ACK MAROCK
Eyes Only
Suru
seasideve
UNCLASSIFIED UPON
OP CLASSIFIED ENCLOS
CAS 6/14/02
PRESERVATION COPY
National Security Council
29
The White House
SEQUENCE
Paul Thompson
/ TO Serger ona HAS Package System SEEN # # beil me DISPOSITION
Bob Kimmitt
John Poindexter
Tom Shull
Thurs.
Wilma Hall
2
Bud McFarlane
NSC Secretariat
Situation Room
JP
3
I = Information
R = Retain
of D= Dispatch N= No further Action
THE (Date/Time) m
m
Bob Kimmitt
pool
A = Action
CC:
VP Meese Baker Deaver Other
q
COMMENTS
Should be seen by:
Bud,
I totally of with Jack, De is
working on paper listing theisues
we should be considering I hope
George hasn't discussed thiswitt of
resident yet. .
30
NOT FOR SYSTEM
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
April 2, 1985
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THROUGH:
FROM:
JOHN M. POINDEXTER A
JACK MATLOCKS
SUBJECT:
State Paper on U.S.-Soviet Relations
I have looked over the paper Rick Burt gave you. It seems to be
very thin, almost totally devoid of substance, mistaken in some
particulars, and in sum totally inadequate for a fruitful meeting
with the President.
Although the paper does identify some of the principal problems
we face in our public diplomacy and alliance management, and
lists some occasions which can be useful in dealing with them, it
does not even identify, must less discuss, the hard substantive
decisions facing us.
On the tactical side, the implication is that our immediate task
is to arrange for a summit. This is an important issue, and it
is desirable to have one this year, but the way the paper would
have us go about it is not the best way. We must avoid
strengthening the impression (which we have unfortunately already
given), that the President is desperate for a summit meeting.
The focus of the tactical suggestions unfortunately have just
this effect. The likely Soviet reaction is to try to wait us out
in order to find out how much we will pay for one. This can only
delay arrangements for a productive summit, since I assume that
the President is not willing to pay a price for one.
For this reason, I think it important that, from now on, we play
it cool in our diplomatic contacts with the Soviets. Gorbachev
kept the ball in his court in his letter, and we should calmly
leave it there until he decides to come to grips with the issue.
Meanwhile, we should talk substance, in accord with our own
agenda -- not with the avowed aim of preparing for a summit, but
on the merits of the issues themselves.
The second tactical flaw in the scenario is its handling of the
question of a Presidential channel. I believe it would be a
mistake to "take the initiative to use Dobrynin." Have we not
learned the dangers of that particular one-way street?
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31
- 2 -
This is not to say that we do not need some sort of "Presidential
channel.' We do. But to be of real use, several conditions must
be met. First, we must be clear in our own minds what we want to
say, and the channel will be of no utility if what we say is
simply a replay of what we say elsewhere. Second, it should be
reciprocal, providing us with approximately the same level and
quality of access to Soviet decision makers as we grant them.
Third, if we really want to explore innovative ideas without
worrying about premature leaks, it should be so structured as to
be publicly deniable, in case the Soviets are tempted at some
point to spread a distorted version of the communications to our
allies. What the President, Shultz or Bud tell Dobrynin does not
meet that criterion, and this would inevitably hamper real
candor, particularly in the early stages.
The other points in the "game plan" are so self-evident that I
wonder why discussion with the President is considered useful.
If we are to lay out a "schedule for progress" with Dobrynin,
then what should be discussed is the content of that schedule.
The mode of doing so is a secondary question, and I would think
that letting Hartman do it with Gromyko (in advance of the Vienna
meeting in May) should be seriously considered. If we are going
to deal with Gromyko, then it is better to do so directly to the
extent we can.
In sum, I believe that we should all go back to the drawing board
before we take the President's time.
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
United States Department of State
Assistant Secretary of State
for European and Canadian Affairs
March 28, 1985
Bud:
Here is the memo we discussed on
US-Soviet relations for the rest of
1985. It's part of a larger package for
the Secretary to use with the President.
He particularly asked for your views.
Please let me know when you are ready to
discuss.
Rick
Richard Burt
33
SECRET/SENSITIVE
3/28/85
Priorities/Opportunities for 1985
-- This year we see ferment and diplomatic movement in a
number of areas. This is very much a product of the strength-
ened US position in the world, and it presents us with oppor-
tunities in 1985 to shape events in accordance with our goals.
We have tried to develop a game plan that sketches out how we
will want to handle these issues over the rest of the year,
including initiatives we may want to take and problems that
are likely to confront us.
-- The obvious major issues are US-Soviet relations,
Central America, the Middle East, and Southern Africa.
US-Soviet Relations/Arms Control
-- Gorbachev is bound to be more active and more formid-
able than his predecessors. He will present a superficial
image of flexibility, as part of an aggressive strategy of
wooing our allies and the Chinese while possibly confronting
us boldly in Afghanistan/Pakistan, the Middle East, and even
Central America. He may at the same time be willing to engage
us and meet with you before the end of the year.
-- We need a firm and imaginative strategy of our own to
protect our interests whatever course Gorbachev selects.
Indeed, an effective US strategy can influence his basic
decisions:
We should make clear our willingness to deal
constructively.
We should make equally clear that we are
prepared to resist Soviet challenges.
-- Our strategic objective should be to get across two
messages to Gorbachev:
First, Gorbachev needs to hear loud and clear early on
about the need for him to assert political control over their
military and the overall Soviet tendency to use force. Whether
it's their propensity to shoot first and ask questions later
as with Major Nicholson and KAL, or their escalation of
military action and supplies in Afghanistan, Nicaragua and
elsewhere over this past year, they need to understand that
greater restraint is required. In some respects, their handling
of Major Nicholson's case is a test case for Gorbachev's
willingness to work with us.
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET/SENSITIVE
NLS F06-114/2*7021
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BY
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34
SECRET SENSITIVE
-2-
Second, Gorbachev must understand that we will not
play ball with any effort just to improve style and atmos-
pherics. There must be concrete progress across the four
areas on our agenda: arms control, regional restraint, human
rights and bilateral cooperation. We've got to keep Western
expectations under control for this to succeed.
-- The key to our success will be to maintain a solid
base here and to keep the Alliance solidly together. We will
need to be nimble in the negotiations -- having defensible
positions always on the table -- in order to maintain this
domestic and allied solidarity.
-- Our game plan would be the following:
We should take the initiative to use
Dobrynin as a Presidential channel to
Gorbachev, perhaps meeting with him in a
White House setting.
We should lay out for Dobrynin a schedule
for progress over the coming year, aiming
at a well-prepared summit.
We will continue our all-out effort in the
Congress to maintain support for the MX,
SDI, and overall defense spending.
Your trip to Europe in May will be a
crucial event in Alliance management.
We will have to blunt European concerns
over SDI and the key may be how constructive
and credible we appear to be in INF and
START, the other two fora in Geneva. We
want Bonn (and the NATO meetings that will
follow in June) to be a powerful display
of Western solidarity.
I will see Gromyko in Vienna in mid-May.
If the Soviets have shown a willingness to
engage us by then, we could use this to
begin preparing for a summit.
At the end of July is the 10th anniversary
of CSCE in Helsinki. Gromyko probed
Hartman on the level at which we will
attend -- perhaps indicating they are
considering this as a summit venue. This
isn't ideal for us. Alternatively, if
SECRET SENSITIVE
SECRET/SENSITIVE
-3-
all foreign ministers go to Helsinki --
which I hope they won't -- Gromyko and
I will be there.
The Soviets also may see the UNGA in
September (and the 40th anniversary of
the UN in October) as the right context
for Gorbachev to come to the U.S. to
meet with you. Or they may send Gromyko,
and you may want to meet with him your-
self to do preparatroy work.
Other events: Ottawa Human Rights Experts
meeting (May 7) ; Baldrige visit to Moscow
(May 20-21) ; decision point in our interim
restraints/no-undercut policy re Trident
sea trials (summer/fall) : Decisions to be
made in light of circumstances; opportunities
to keep the pressure on the Soviets.
-- Wild card: (Mid-summer:) Possible guilty verdict in
Antonov papal assassination trial.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
36
2653
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
Mattert
April 2, 1985
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THROUGH:
ROBERT M. KIMMITT
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK As
SUBJECT:
Ambassador Hartman Appointment Request
Art Hartman will be in town on consultation April 15-19, and I
believe it would be useful for him to have a brief meeting with
the President and to meet with you.
Bill Martin Rata concurs.
Recommendations
1. That you authorize the Scheduling Request at TAB I.
Approve 3cm
Disapprove
2. That you schedule an appointment with Hartman (preferably
before or after his meeting with the President).
Approve Date and pcme: Time:
Disapprove
Attachments:
Tab I - Schedule Request
MEMORANDUM
2653
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SCHEDULE PROPOSAL
TO:
FREDERICK J. RYAN, Director
Presidential Appointments and Scheduling
FROM:
ROBERT M. KIMMITT
REQUEST:
Meeting with Ambassador Hartman
PURPOSE:
To review recent developments in U.S.-Soviet
Relations.
BACKGROUND:
Ambassador Hartman will be in Washington
April 15-19, and this will provide an
opportunity for the President to hear his
views on current developments in Moscow and
provide any instructions he may have for
contacts with Soviet officials.
PREVIOUS
PARTICIPATION:
Ambassador Hartman met with the President
during his earlier visits to Washington.
DATE & TIME:
April 16, 18 or 19
DURATION: 30 minutes
LOCATION:
Oval Office
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
The Vice President
Secretary Shultz
Mr. McFarlane
Ambassador Hartman
Jack F. Matlock
OUTLINE OF EVENTS: The President greets Ambassador Hartman,
solicits his views on the current situation
in Moscow, and discusses the issues as
appropriate.
REMARKS REQUIRED:
None
MEDIA COVERAGE:
None; White House Staff Photographer
RECOMMENDED BY:
Robert C. McFarlane
OPPOSED BY:
None
PROJECT OFFICER:
Robert M. Kimmitt/Jack F. Matlock
Matlock 38
THE WHITE HOUSE
JM-C
WASHINGTON
4/16/85
MEMORANDUM
TO:
ROBERT MCFARLANE
FROM:
FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR. 7th
SUBJECT:
APPROVED PRESIDENTIAL ACTIVITY
MEETING:
with Ambassador Hartman
DATE:
April 19, 1985
TIME:
1:00 pm
DURATION:
30 minutes
LOCATION:
Oval Office
REMARKS REQUIRED:
Talking points to be covered in briefing paper
MEDIA COVERAGE:
Coordinate with Press Office
FIRST LADY
PARTICIPATION:
No
NOTE: PROJECT OFFICER, SEE ATTACHED CHECKLIST
cc: K. Barun
A. Kingon
R. Kimmitt
P. Buchanan
C. McCain
D. Chew
B. Oglesby
T. Dawson
E. Rollins
R. Deprospero
J. Rosebush
B. Elliott
R. Scouten
D. Fischer
B. Shaddix
M. Friedersdorf
W. Sittmann
C. Fuller
L. Speakes
W. Henkel
WHCA Audio/Visual
E. Hickey
WHCA Operations
J. Hirshberg
Nell Yates
G. Hodges
39
JFM02
3115
JM-C
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET
April 18, 1985
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
FROM:
Your Meeting Jan with Ambassador Hartman
JACK MATLOCK
SUBJECT:
April 18, 1985, 4:30 P.M.
Art considers his meeting with you as preparatory to his meeting
with the President tomorrow. He has indicated to me that, in
addition, he wants to discuss the following topics:
-- The telephone call you made to him a couple of weeks ago;
-- His recommendations regarding replacement of some Soviet local
employees at the Embassy with Americans;
-- The situation facing us in arms control negotiations.
Regarding the second topic, you should be aware that Hartman has
opposed the proposals by PFIAB and others to replace Soviet
employees at the Embassy with Americans. I have not yet had the
opportunity to discuss the matter in detail with him, but I
believe that he exaggerates the difficulties of arranging for the
replacement, over time, of a large number of the Soviets. I
would recommend, therefore, that you make clear to him the
desirability, if practical means can be found, to move toward the
greater utilization of Americans in these positions at the
Embassy.
You may also wish to have Art fill you in on his impressions of
Gorbachev as a person, and get his views on the best tactical
approach for us to follow for the next year or SO.
DECLASSIFIED
NLS F06-114/2#7014
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
BY LOT NARA, DATE 11/21/07
2229
The President has seen
40
3002
THE WHITE HOUSE
Mutlock:
WASHINGTON
UNCLASSIFIED
April 18, 1985
WITH CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT
RR
A.
MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR ARTHUR W. HARTMAN
DATE:
April 19, 1985
LOCATION:
Oval Office
TIME:
1:00 p.m. - 1:30 p.m.
FROM:
ROBERT C. McFARLANE Top jor
I. PURPOSE:
To review recent developments in U.S.-Soviet relations.
II. BACKGROUND:
Will provide an opportunity to hear his views on current
developments in Moscow and any instructions he may have for
contacts with Soviet officials.
III. PARTICIPANTS
The President
The Vice President
Secretary Shultz
Mr. Donald T. Regan
Mr. Michael K. Deaver (at his discretion)
Mr. McFarlane
Ambassador Hartman
Jack F. Matlock
IV. PRESS PLAN
None; staff photographer.
V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
Greet Hartman and initiate discussion of U.S. Soviet
relations.
Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock
Attachment
Tab A
Talking Points (CONFIDENTIAL)
CC Vice President
Don Regan
UNCLASSIFIED
Mike Deaver
WITH CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT
Bob Sims
UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)
15/21/05
CONFIDENTIAL
3002
41
CONFIDENTIAL
TALKING POINTS
--
Glad to see you back. How's the atmosphere in Moscow?
--
Do you think Gorbachev will be able or willing to change
Soviet policies?
:
What do you make of their "moratorium" proposal? Is it
anything more than playing to the galleries?
--
Is there any way we can encourage them to get serious on
reducing offensive weapons? Of, course, we won't give up
SDI, and they must know this.
--
Do you think Gorbachev is going to be willing to meet me
here?
--
Appreciate the fine job you and your staff are doing. I know
it's tough there. Please let your people know I appreciate
their fine work.
CONF IDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
CONFIDENTIAL
MTG WITH AMB HARTMAN, APRIL 19, 1:00 PM
-- GLAD TO SEE YOU BACK. HOW'S THE
ATMOSPHERE IN MOSCOW?
-- DO YOU THINK GORBACHEV WILL BE ABLE
OR WILLING TO CHANGE SOVIET POLICIES?
-- WHAT DO YOU MAKE OF THEIR
"MORATORIUM" PROPOSAL? IS IT ANYTHING
MORE THAN PLAYING TO THE GALLERIES?
2
-- IS THERE ANY WAY WE CAN ENCOURAGE
THEM TO GET SERIOUS ON REDUCING
OFFENSIVE WEAPONS? OF COURSE, WE WON'T
GIVE UP SDI, AND THEY MUST KNOW THIS.
-- DO YOU THINK GORBACHEV IS GOING TO BE
WILLING TO MEET ME HERE?
-- APPRECIATE THE FINE JOB YOU AND YOUR
STAFF ARE DOING. I KNOW IT'S TOUGH
THERE. PLEASE LET YOUR PEOPLE KNOW I
APPRECIATE THEIR FINE WORK.
43
3002
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
UNCLASSIFIED
April 15, 1985
WITH CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENT
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARMANE
SIGNED
FROM:
JACK F. MATLOCK
SUBJECT:
Meeting Memorandum for Ambassador Hartman
Attached at Tab I and Tab A are the Meeting Memorandum and
Talking Points for the President's meeting with Ambassador
Hartman.
Bill Martin concurs.
RECOMMENTATION
That you approve the Meeting Memorandum at Tab I and the Talking
Points at Tab A.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments:
Tab I
Meeting Memorandum
Tab A Talking Points (CONFIDENTIAL)
Tab II
Clearance List
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
WITH CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENT
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)
12/11/05
44
REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS
To:
Officer-in-charge
Appointments Center
Room 060, OEOB
April 19
Please admit the following appointments on
, 19 85
for
THE PRESIDENT
of
:
(NAME OF PERSON TO BE VISITED)
(AGENCY)
The Vice President
Secretary George Shultz
Mr. Ronald T. Regan
Mr. Michael K. Deaver (at his discretion)
Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
Ambassador Arthur W. Hartman
Ambassador Jack F. Matlock
MEETING LOCATION
Building WHITE HOUSE-WEST WING
Requested by JACK F. MATLOCK
Room No. OVAL OFFICE
Room No. 368
Telephone
X5112
1:00 PM
Time of Meeting
Date of request
April 15, 1985
Additions and/or changes made by telephone should be limited to five (5) names or less.
APPOINTMENTS CENTER: SIG/OEOB - 395-6046 or WHITE HOUSE - 456-6742
UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE
SSF 2037 (03-81)
45
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
4/16/85
MEMORANDUM
TO:
ROBERT MCFARLANE
FROM:
FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR. 7th
SUBJECT:
APPROVED PRESIDENTIAL ACTIVITY
MEETING:
with Ambassador Hartman
DATE:
April 19, 1985
TIME:
1:00 pm
DURATION:
30 minutes
LOCATION:
Oval Office
REMARKS REQUIRED:
Talking points to be covered in briefing paper
MEDIA COVERAGE: Coordinate with Press Office
FIRST LADY
PARTICIPATION:
No
NOTE: PROJECT OFFICER, SEE ATTACHED CHECKLIST
cc:
K. Barun
A. Kingon
R. Kimmitt
P. Buchanan
C. McCain
D. Chew
B. Oglesby
T. Dawson
E. Rollins
R. Deprospero
J. Rosebush
B. Elliott
R. Scouten
D. Fischer
B. Shaddix
M. Friedersdorf
W. Sittmann
C. Fuller
L. Speakes
W. Henkel
WHCA Audio/Visual
E. Hickey
WHCA Operations
J. Hirshberg
Nell Yates
G. Hodges
VIA LDX
2653
JM-C
16
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
April 16, 1985
Mattor
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive Secretary
Department of State
SUBJECT:
Meeting with Ambassdor Arthur A. Hartman, Friday,
April 19, 1985
Ambassador Hartman's meeting with the President has been
scheduled for Friday, April 19 at 1:00 p.m. for 30 minutes in
the Oval Office. Please notify us whether the Secretary intends
to accompany him.
RdentM. Kummith
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary
ADD-ON
47
MEMORANDUM
2653
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
April 15, 1985
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT
SIGNED
FROM:
JACK F. MATLOCK
SUBJECT:
Meeting with Ambassador Hartman
Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to Mr. Nicholas Platt informing
him of Ambassador Hartman's appointment with the President.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memorandum to Mr. Platt.
Approve
K
Disapprove
Attachment:
Tab I
Kimmitt-Platt Memorandum
HE WHITE HOUSE
48 JMC
WASHINGTON
Secut Jeuselwis
Matbak
Eye Oaly
UNCLASSIFIED
PRESERVATION COPY
CLASSIFIED CVS UPON REMO 6/14/02
3/2850
Forms matlock,
7:30pm
Eyes only to you
for coment from
adm. Poindexter
Rosie
51
NOT FOR. SYSTEM
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
April 2, 1985
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THROUGH:
JOHN M. POINDEXTER
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK
SUBJECT:
State Paper on U.S.-Soviet Relations
I have looked over the paper Rick Burt gave you. It seems to be
very thin, almost totally devoid of substance, mistaken in some
particulars, and in sum totally inadequate for a fruitful meeting
with the President.
Although the paper does identify some of the principal problems
we face in our public diplomacy and alliance management, and
lists some occasions which can be useful in dealing with them, it
does not even identify, must less discuss, the hard substantive
decisions facing us.
On the tactical side, the implication is that our immediate task
is to arrange for a summit. This is an important issue, and it
is desirable to have one this year, but the way the paper would
have us go about it is not the best way. We must avoid
strengthening the impression (which we have unfortunately already
given), that the President is desperate for a summit meeting.
The focus of the tactical suggestions unfortunately have just
this effect. The likely Soviet reaction is to try to wait us out
in order to find out how much we will pay for one. This can only
delay arrangements for a productive summit, since I assume that
the President is not willing to pay a price for one.
For this reason, I think it important that, from now on, we play
it cool in our diplomatic contacts with the Soviets. Gorbachev
kept the ball in his court in his letter, and we should calmly
leave it there until he decides to come to grips with the issue.
Meanwhile, we should talk substance, in accord with our own
agenda -- not with the avowed aim of preparing for a summit, but
on the merits of the issues themselves.
The second tactical flaw in the scenario is its handling of the
question of a Presidential channel. I believe it would be a
mistake to "take the initiative to use Dobrynin." Have we not
learned the dangers of that particular one-way street?
DECLASSIFIED
NLS F06-114/2#7016
SECRET SENSITIVE EYES ONLY
NOJ NARA, DATE 11/21/07
SECRET SENSITIVE EYES ONLY
- 2 -
52
This is not to say that we do not need some sort of "Presidential
channel.' We do. But to be of real use, several conditions must
be met. First, we must be clear in our own minds what we want to
say, and the channel will be of no utility if what we say is
simply a replay of what we say elsewhere. Second, it should be
reciprocal, providing us with approximately the same level and
quality of access to Soviet decision makers as we grant them.
Third, if we really want to explore innovative ideas without
worrying about premature leaks, it should be so structured as to
be publicly deniable, in case the Soviets are tempted at some
point to spread a distorted version of the communications to our
allies. What the President, Shultz or Bud tell Dobrynin does not
meet that criterion, and this would inevitably hamper real
candor, particularly in the early stages.
The other points in the "game plan" are so self-evident that I
wonder why discussion with the President is considered useful.
If we are to lay out a "schedule for progress" with Dobrynin,
then what should be discussed is the content of that schedule.
The mode of doing so is a secondary question, and I would think
that letting Hartman do it with Gromyko (in advance of the Vienna
meeting in May) should be seriously considered. If we are going
to deal with Gromyko, then it is better to do so directly to the
extent we can.
In sum, I believe that we should all go back to the drawing board
before we take the President's time.
SECRET SENSITIVE EYES ONLY
54
SECRET/SENSITIVE
3/28/85
Priorities/Opportunities for 1985
-- This year we see ferment and diplomatic movement in a
number of areas. This is very much a product of the strength-
ened US position in the world, and it presents us with oppor-
tunities in 1985 to shape events in accordance with our goals.
We have tried to develop a game plan that sketches out how we
will want to handle these issues over the rest of the year,
including initiatives we may want to take and problems that
are likely to confront us.
-- The obvious major issues are US-Soviet relations,
Central America, the Middle East, and Southern Africa.
US-Soviet Relations/Arms Control
-- Gorbachev is bound to be more active and more formid-
able than his predecessors. He will present a superficial
image of flexibility, as part of an aggressive strategy of
wooing our allies and the Chinese while possibly confronting
us boldly in Afghanistan/Pakistan, the Middle East, and even
Central America. He may at the same time be willing to engage
us and meet with you before the end of the year.
-- We need a firm and imaginative strategy of our own to
protect our interests whatever course Gorbachev selects.
Indeed, an effective US strategy can influence his basic
decisions:
We should make clear our willingness to deal
constructively.
We should make equally clear that we are
prepared to resist Soviet challenges.
-- Our strategic objective should be to get across two
messages to Gorbachev:
First, Gorbachev needs to hear loud and clear early on
about the need for him to assert political control over their
military and the overall Soviet tendency to use force. Whether
it's their propensity to shoot first and ask questions later
as with Major Nicholson and KAL, or their escalation of
military action and supplies in Afghanistan, Nicaragua and
elsewhere over this past year, they need to understand that
greater restraint is required. In some respects, their handling
of Major Nicholson's case is a test case for Gorbachev's
willingness to work with us.
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET/SENSITIVE
NLS F06-114/2#7023
DECL OADR
BY hos NARA, DATE 11/21/07
55
SECRET/SENSITIVE
-2-
Second, Gorbachev must understand that we will not
play ball with any effort just to improve style and atmos-
pherics. There must be concrete progress across the four
areas on our agenda: arms control, regional restraint, human
rights and bilateral cooperation. We've got to keep Western
expectations under control for this to succeed.
-- The key to our success will be to maintain a solid
base here and to keep the Alliance solidly together. We will
need to be nimble in the negotiations -- having defensible
positions always on the table -- in order to maintain this
domestic and allied solidarity.
-- Our game plan would be the following:
We should take the initiative to use
Dobrynin as a Presidential channel to
Gorbachev, perhaps meeting with him in a
White House setting.
We should lay out for Dobrynin a schedule
for progress over the coming year, aiming
at a well-prepared summit.
We will continue our all-out effort in the
Congress to maintain support for the MX,
SDI, and overall defense spending.
Your trip to Europe in May will be a
crucial event in Alliance management.
We will have to blunt European concerns
over SDI and the key may be how constructive
and credible we appear to be in INF and
START, the other two fora in Geneva. We
want Bonn (and the NATO meetings that will
follow in June) to be a powerful display
of Western solidarity.
I will see Gromyko in Vienna in mid-May.
If the Soviets have shown a willingness to
engage us by then, we could use this to
begin preparing for a summit.
At the end of July is the 10th anniversary
of CSCE in Helsinki. Gromyko probed
Hartman on the level at which we will
attend -- perhaps indicating they are
considering this as a summit venue. This
isn't ideal for us. Alternatively, if
SECRET/SENSITIVE
56
SECRET/SENSITIVE
- -3-
all foreign ministers go to Helsinki --
which I hope they won't -- Gromyko and
I will be there.
The Soviets also may see the UNGA in
September (and the 40th anniversary of
the UN in October) as the right context
for Gorbachev to come to the U.S. to
meet with you. Or they may send Gromyko,
and you may want to meet with him your-
self to do preparatroy work.
Other events: Ottawa Human Rights Experts
meeting (May 7) ; Baldrige visit to Moscow
(May 20-21) ; decision point in our interim
restraints/no-undercut policy re Trident
sea trials (summer/fall) : Decisions to be
made in light of circumstances; opportunities
to keep the pressure on the Soviets.
-- Wild card: (Mid-summer:) Possible guilty verdict in
Antonov papal assassination trial.
SECRETYSENSITIVE
53
United States Department of State
Assistant Secretary of State
for European and Canadian Affairs
March 28, 1985
Bud:
Here is the memo we discussed on
US-Soviet relations for the rest of
1985. It's part of a larger package for
the Secretary to use with the President.
He particularly asked for your views.
Please let me know when you are ready to
discuss.
Rick
Richard Burt