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Matlock Chron April 1985 (2)
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Jack F. Matlock, Jr.'s Chronological Files
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: Matlock Chron April 1985 (2)
Box: 8
To see more digitized collections visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection
Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected]
Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing
National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET
4/4/2005
File Folder
MATLOCK CHRON APRIL 1985 (2/6)
FOIA
F06-114/2
Box Number
8
YARHI-MILO
811
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
7028 MEMO
MATLOCK TO KIMMITT AND PEARSON RE
1 4/2/1985 B1
SOVIET WHALING
R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2
7030 MEMO
MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE SOVIET
1 4/1/1985 B1
WHALING
R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2
7033 E-MAIL
E-MAIL PROFS PEARSON TO MCFARLANE;
1 3/29/1985 B1
POINDEXTER TO MATLOCK AND SIMS RE
WHALES AND SOVIET UNION
R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2
7035 E-MAIL
E-MAIL PROFS POINDEXTER TO MATLOCK
1 3/29/1985 B1
AND SIMS
R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2
7036 MEMO
KIMMITT TO PLATT RE U.S.-POLAND AIR
1 4/4/1985 B1
TRANSPORT AGREEMENT
R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2
7050 MEMO
PLATT TO MCFARLANE RE U.S.-POLAND
2 3/25/1985 B1
AIR TRANSPORT AGREEMENT
R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2
7038 MEMO
MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE U.S.-
1 3/26/1985 B1
POLAND AIR TRANSPORT AGREEMENT
R 3/27/2012 M266/1
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET
4/4/2005
File Folder
MATLOCK CHRON APRIL 1985 (2/6)
FOIA
F06-114/2
Box Number
8
YARHI-MILO
811
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
7040 MEMO
MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE SDI AND
3 4/5/1985 B1
ALLIANCE
R
1/11/2012
M125/2
7043 MEMO
MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE
1 4/16/1985 B1
PRESIDENT'S REPLY TO GORBACHEV
LETTER OF MARCH 24
R
3/27/2012
M266/1
7045 MEMO
SAME TEXT AS DOC #7040
3 4/5/1985 B1
R 1/11/2012 M125/2
7047 MEMO
MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE U.S.-USSR
5 4/8/1985 B1
B3
RELATIONS: PLANNING FOR 1985
PAR 5/26/2011 F2006-114/2
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
2607 ADD-ON mattock
MEMORANDUM
JM-C
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET
April 2, 1985
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT
ROBERT W. PEARSON
FROM:
JACK Soviet F. Whaling MATLOCK 45
SUBJECT:
I believe our action should be announced when it is formally
taken and the Soviets notified officially.
As of this afternoon, State had not received the determination
regarding Soviet whaling from Commerce. I have asked State to
work with Commerce to develop appropriate talking points for the
press.
The situation with the Soviet fishing quota is that the Soviets
were earlier given a 22,000 ton "partial" quota for this year,
with the intent to increase this to something in the 70,000 to
100,000 ton range if cooperation with U.S. fishing interests is
productive.
The impact of the determination of whaling violations will
require (in State's opinion) cutting any additional quota allo-
cation to half of what it would have been otherwise. Therefore,
the prospect is for a total annual quota in the range of 46-61
thousand tons instead of 70-100 thousand tons.
Thanks, Jach.
Bob
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
NES F06-114/2#7028
Declassify on: OADR
LOT NARA, DATE 11/21/07
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
2
National Security Council
The White House
I
System #
Package # 2607
1680
SEQUENCE TO
HAS SEEN
DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson
/
p
Bob Kimmitt
&
John Poindexter
Paul Thompson
Wilma Hall
Bud McFarlane
Bob Kimmitt
NSC Secretariat
Situation Room
Matloch
2
redo
= Information
A = Action
R = Retain
D = Dispatch
N = No further Action
CC:
VP Meese Regan Deaver Other
COMMENTS
Should be seen by:
(Date/Time)
Sma A&C apparently planned to act 4/1,
could we state that DDC has actually
involved Dx. the statute against the fores?
2607
3
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET
April 1, 1985
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER
FROM:
JACK Soviet F. Whaling MATLOCK Ass
SUBJECT:
The Soviets have been notified that we have no choice but
to invoke U.S. law if they exceed their whaling quota.
Obviously, if this has happened, Commerce should enfore
the law.
Richard Rf E Levine and Douglas McMinn concur.
n.a.
Attachment:
Tab A
Prof Note
CC: Robert Sims
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
Declassify on: OADR
NLS F06-114/2#7030
BY LOT NARA, DATE 11/21/07
MSG FROM: NSWRP --CPUA TO: NSGVE --CPUA
03/30/85 09:10:49
To: NSGVE
--CPUA
GEORGE VAN ERON
URGENT
NOTE FROM: BOB PEARSON
Subject: Forwarding Note 03/29/85 19:06 Whales and the Soviet Union
staff to matlock, levine and mcminn to concur. sys I, due COB 4/1. tx.
***FORWARDED NOTE***
To: NSRCM --CPUA
BUD MCFARLANE
-- SECRET --
NOTE FROM: JOHN POINDEXTER
SUBJECT: Whales and the Soviet Union
Mac Baldridge called. We have a problem with the Soviets taking too many
whales. The Packwood-Magnusson Act stipulates that quotas are established for
the taking of Minke (sp?) whales down around Antartica. The Japanese and
Soviet quotas are each 1900. About 3 weeks ago we detected that both countries
would exceed their quotas if they kept up at the same rate. Warning notices
were sent ou to each country. If a country exceeds the quota, Commerce in
coordination with State must certify that fact. Then the punishment that
Commerce must mete out is a reduction by 50% in the quota for fish that the
country can take from US waters. If Commerce doesn't certify, then Mac says
the environmentalists will sue. Japan stopped at their quota of 1900; however
the Soviets have continued and are now up to about 2300 whales. I ask him how
we counted them. I thought there might be some new verification method we
sould use in arms control. Mac didn't know but said he would find out. Anyway
it is Mac's intention to certify them on Monday and cut their quota by 50%. I
told him I didn't see a problem, but would pass it on to you. With the killing
of Major Nicholson, I don't see how we can do anything else. In fact without
that, I think we should enforce the law.
copy to: Jack Matlock, Bob Sims
cc: NSRMK --CPUA
BOB KIMMITT
NSWRP --CPUA
BOB PEARSON
NSGVE --CPUA
GEORGE VAN ERON
DECLASSIFIED
NLS F06-114/2* 7033
BY LOT NARA, DATE 11/21/07
5
MSG FROM: NSJMP
--CPUA
TO: NSGVE
--CPUA
03/29/85 19:06:46
To: NSRCM
--CPUA
BUD MCFARLANE
-- SECRET --
NOTE FROM: JOHN POINDEXTER
SUBJECT: Whales and the Soviet Union
Mac Baldridge called. We have a problem with the Soviets taking too many
whales. The Packwood-Magnusson Act stipulates that quotas are established for
the taking of Minke (sp?) whales down around Antartica. The Japanese and
Soviet quotas are each 1900. About 3 weeks ago we detected that both countries
would exceed their quotas if they kept up at the same rate. Warning notices
were sent ou to each country. If a country exceeds the quota, Commerce in
coordination with State must certify that fact. Then the punishment that
Commerce must mete out is a reduction by 50% in the quota for fish that the
country can take from US waters. If Commerce doesn't certify, then Mac says
the environmentalists will sue. Japan stopped at their quota of 1900; however
the Soviets have continued and are now up to about 2300 whales. I ask him how
we counted them. I thought there might be some new verification method we
sould use in arms control. Mac didn't know but said he would find out. Anyway
it is Mac's intention to certify them on Monday and cut their quota by 50%. I
told him I didn't see a problem, but would pass it on to you. With the killing
of Major Nicholson, I don't see how we can do anything else. In fact without
that, I think we should enforce the law.
copy to: Jack Matlock Bob Sims
CC: NSRMK --CPUA
BOB KIMMITT
NSWRP
--CPUA
BOB PEARSON
NSGVE
--CPUA
GEORGE VAN ERON
DECLASSIFIED
NLS F06-114/2 47035
LOT NARA, DATE 11/21/07
Matlocky
chron
MEMORANDUM
2680
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION
April 3, 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT
FROM:
KARNA SMALL KS,-
SUBJECT:
Presidential Radio Talk: Easter
We have reviewed the Presidential Radio Talk and have made a
number of substantive changes. Because of the urgency, Ben
Elliott's office was advised by telephone.
Matlock 2M provided changes; Dobriansky and Steiner concur. Covey
PD
$5
IC
concurred in the original text. Burghardt and Ringdahl were not
available.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memo to Ben Elliott at Tab I.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachment
TAB I
Memo to Ben Elliott with attached edited
Presidential Radio Talk
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
2680
MEMORANDUM FOR BEN ELLIOTT
FROM:
ROBERT M. KIMMITT
SUBJECT:
Presidential Radio Talk: Easter
The NSC has reviewed the attached Presidential Radio Talk and has
made a number of important changes. These edits reflect strongly-
held NSC views.
Attachment
As stated
CC: David L. Chew
2680
8
Document No.
URGENT
WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM
DATE:
4/3/85
ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 5:00 P.M. TODAY
SUBJECT:
RADIO TALK: EASTER
ACTION FYI
ACTION FYI
VICE PRESIDENT
OGLESBY
REGAN
ROLLINS
DEAVER
SPEAKES
R
STOCKMAN
SVAHN
BUCHANAN
TUTTLE
CHEW
P
SS
VERSTANDIG
FIELDING
WHITTLESEY
FRIEDERSDORF
DANIELS
RYAN
HICKEY
HICKS
ELLIOTT
KINGON
McFARLANE
X
REMARKS:
Please provide any edits directly to Ben Elliott by 5:00 p.m. today,
April 3rd, with an information copy to my office. Thank you.
RESPONSE:
David L. Chew
Staff Secretary
Ext. 2702
9
(Elliott)
April 3, 1985
Received SS
Noon
195 APR -3 PM 12 2S-
PRESIDENTIAL RADIO TALK: EASTER
SATURDAY, APRIL 6, 1985
My fellow Americans, this weekend, Jews the world over begin
celebrating the festival of Passover, which each Spring
commemorates the miraculous delivery -- the Exodus -- of their
people from slavery. The message of Passover speaks to Jew and
non-Jew alike. It resounds with bitter cries of slaves suffering
inhumanity. And it rings forth with joyful cheers of a people
set free, courageously undertaking the long journey to freedom
and independence.
Tomorrow is Easter, a deeply holy day when Christians
celebrate the victory of faith in a triumph of hope over despair
and life over death. Through one magnificent act of pure and
perfect love, Jesus left the promise sought since the beginning
of time -- that there will never be a dark night that does not
end. As it is said in John 3:16, "For God so loved the world,
that He gave His only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in
Him shall not perish but have everlasting life."
America was born and grew from a faith that has bound us in
a communion of spirit, ever since our ancestors crossed the
Atlantic, not to find soil for their ploughs, but liberty for
their souls. When Daniel Webster visited the site at Plymouth
Rock in 1820, he said, " let us not forget the religious
character of our origin. Our fathers brought hither their high
veneration for religion. They journeyed by its light and labored
Page 2
by
its
hope.
They
sought
to
diffuse its influence through all
their institutions, civil, political, and literary."
When we speak of faith and its importance today, it is not
to impose our beliefs on others, but to ensure freedom of worship
for all, so that America may remain one Nation under God, and in
our institutions and daily lives, we may be the vessels of His
wisdom, truth, and love.
All we have been and hope to be, all our power for good to
make this world better, begin in the miracles of freedom and
faith that God has placed in the human mind and heart. But these
great gifts are not ours to enjoy in splendid isolation; they are
the birthright of all His children.
We can be heartened by the great outpouring of generosity
across our land from citizens sharing the bread of life with
others in great need at home and in faraway lands. Charitable
giving has surpassed $65 billion, an all-time high and a sum
greater than the national budgets of two-thirds of the world's
countries. There has also been a sharp upsurge in contributions
and voluntary activities in the last 4 years.
The response of our people to the crisis in Ethiopia has
been miraculous. Almost $75 million has been sent in donations
for food by private individuals, with thousands of church groups
donating time and resources. But millions of people remain
desperately hungry, and they need our continued support.
I have spoken about our responsibility to help others'
material needs. But can we commemorate Passover and Easter, can
we celebrate this message of freedom and hope, and not remember,
Page 3
as well, the great spiritual needs of God's children who have no
freedom and little
We must not hope? forget God's believers who try valiantly
There are over 100 million Christians, Jews, and Muslims in
to preserve their faith under communist domination
the Soviet Empire. But they are forbidden to give religious
instruction to their children, forbidden to study the Bible, or
the Torah, or to worship Allah, or even to wear crosses on their
necks
In Lenin's words, "Religion and communism are
incompatible in theory and in practice. We must fight religion. "
And fight it they do with persecution ranging from intolerance,
to ostracism, to imprisonment and torture in their infamous labor
and prison camps and so-called psychiatric hospitals.
Dr. Ernest Gordon, President of an organization named CREED,
Christian Rescue Effort for the Emancipation of Dissidents, noted
that on a recent trip to Eastern Europe he spoke with a priest
who had spent 10 years in prison. The priest asked him to
deliver a message to the West: there is a war going on; it is
not nuclear, but spiritual. The fall-out of the atheistic
explosion is everywhere. But Dr. Gordon added, "Although the
fall-out may be everywhere, God, too, is everywhere and not even
tyrannies can keep Him out."
My friends, the cause of freedom is the cause of God. The
United States will do everything humanly possible to work with
the Soviets for a safer world. But to betray our deepest values
is to betray ourselves; to ignore the prophet Isaiah's words,
"bind up the broken-hearted proclaim liberty to the captives of
the world," is to make our own freedom a sham.
Page 4
It is time for believers of all faiths to unite [in in a crusade
to help our brothers and sisters who cry out for freedom -- from
the Mujhadin under fire in Afghanistan, to brave heroes like
Scharansky, Sakharov, and Father Yakunin inside the U.S.S.R., to
oppressed by totalitarian rulers,
embattled churches [from Poland to Nicaragua Let us join hands,
lift up our voices, and ask for God's help, remembering always
that where the spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty.
Until next week, thanks for listening and God bless you.
shattock
CONFIDENTIAL
che JMC
VIA LDX
13
2416 JFM06
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
R
April 4, 1985
you
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive Secretary
Department of State
SUBJECT:
U.S. -Poland Air Transport Agreement (U)
Your memorandum to Mr. McFarlane of March 25, 1985, re-
quested concurrence to signing a new U.S. -Poland Air
Transport Agreement. (C)
Although we are concerned by recent negative developments in
U.S. Polish relations, we concur that signature of this par-
ticular agreement is appropriate at this time, particularly in
view of the U.S. economic interest involved. (C)
RohatM. Kinnett
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary
Attachment:
TAB A
U.S. -Poland Air Transport Agreement
DECLASSIFIED
NLS F06-114/247036
BY LOI NARA, DATE 11/21/07
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
CONFIDENTIAL
S/S 8509149
14
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
March 25, 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. McFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE
SUBJECT: Granting of Circular 175 Authority to Conclude a
New United States-Poland Air Transport Agreement
In December 1981, the United States suspended the Air
Transport Agreement between the United States and Poland as
part of our response to the imposition of martial law in
Poland. Although the U.S. informed Poland that we regarded
operation of the 1972 bilateral Agreement as suspended, the
Agreement contained no provision for suspension, required
notice of one year for early termination, and was not due to
expire by its own terms until March 31, 1982. In May 1982,
Poland requested arbitration under the Agreement. Thus far the
Polish side has not pushed this process, but would probably do
so if the new agreement falls through.
In response to the large-scale release of political
prisoners in Poland, President Reagan stated publicly in July
1984 that he was prepared to renew full civil aviation rela-
tions with Poland, subject to Warsaw's agreement not to pursue
any claims under the 1972 Agreement, and to withdraw its arbi-
tration request subject to the negotiation of a new bilateral
agreement. In late 1984, both sides were able to agree, ad
referendum, to an Air Transport Agreement and a Memorandum of
Understanding. This agreement provides more favorable terms
for U.S. carriers than in previous air transport agreements.
By a related exchange of notes, Poland declares that it will
not pursue any issues and claims it might have under the 1972
Agreement, including those related to its arbitration request,
and withdraws that request, effective on the date the new
agreement enters into force.
We have delayed final action on this agreement by almost
two months, in response to Polish refusal to accept a U.S.
ambassador and Polish mistreatment of Col. and Mrs. Myer. We
have taken a number of other actions in this regard, including
expulsion of the Polish military attache, restrictions in the
Polish Embassy's access to USG officials, and postponement of
negotiations on a new bilateral science and technology agree-
ment.
CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED
DECL:
OADR
NLS F06-114/2#7050
BY LOT NARA, DATE 11/21/07
CONF IDENTIAL
- & -
The current political situation in Poland is not encour-
aging, and we will be sending you a separate memorandum on
possible USG responses to Polish backsliding. But we do not
think the time has come to reverse the Presidential decision of
last July to lift our sanction on LOT flights, particularly
since the proposed agreement is to our economic advantage and
requires the Poles to forego their very strong claim against us.
The Secretary has approved Circular 175 authority, recom-
mending signature of the United States-Poland Air Transport
Agreement, but has requested NSC concurrence before pro-
ceeding. Prompt action is required, for we are now at the
point where further delay risks unraveling the agreement, as
Embassy Warsaw has recently pointed out. The Polish Government
could then pursue its outstanding arbitration request against
the United States Government. Moreover, delay will adversely
affect U.S. business interests. LOT, the Polish carrier,
expects to start flying March 31, and Pan Am April 28. Both
Pan Am (desperately looking for a moneymaker) and the U.S. tour
operator working with LOT (American Travel Abroad) are likely
to raise their concerns at a political level.
for
Nicholas Bmckmley Platt
Executive Secretary
CONFIDENTIAL
7038
16
2416
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
CONFIDENTIAL
March 26, 1985
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MOFARLANE
S SIGNED
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK
SUBJECT:
U.S. Poland Air Transport Agreement
State recommends that we proceed to implement the President's
decision of last July to renew civil aviation relations with
Poland by concluding a new U.S. -Poland Air Transport Agreement
(TAB A). The negotiated agreement provides for service by Pan Am
and the Polish carrier LOT, and if the agreement is signed,
service would begin March 31.
It is recognized that relations with Poland are not good at
present, but State feels that we have taken sufficient steps to
indicate our concern over the Polish failure to grant agrement
for an American Ambassador and for the Polish mistreatment of
Col. and Mrs. Meyer. The decision is a matter of some urgency
since tickets have already been sold by American tour operators
and by Pan Am for the anticipated resumption of service.
Under the circumstances, which include the public announcement by
the President last year that we would renew civil air relations
and the economic stake of American firms, I believe that the
State recommendation is justified and recommend approval.
Paula Dobriansky and Richard RS Levine concur.
not avarlably
Recommendation:
That you approve transmittal of the Kimmitt-Platt Memorandum at
Tab I.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments:
dont send your memo und JHurs for
TAB I
Kimmitt-Platt Memorandum
TAB A
U.S.-Poland Air Transport Agreement Good
Friday.
CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED
Declassify on: OADR
NLRR M266 7038
BY KML NARA DATE 3/27/12
17
WASHFAX RECEIPT
041501L
THE WHITE HOUSE
NSCIS
F
C
MESSAGE NO. 779
CLASSIFICATION Confidential PAGES 3
FROM ROBERT KIMMITT
456-2224
Gfl/WW
(NAME)
(EXTENSION)
(ROOM NUMBER)
MESSAGE DESCRIPTION
U.S. Poland Air Transport
Agreement NSC LOG # 2416
TO (AGENCY)
DELIVER TO:
DEPT/ROOM NO.
EXTENSION
B
Nicholes Platt
REMARKS
DECLASSIFIED
By CAS
White House Guidalines, August 28, 1997
NARA, Date 6/14/02
7040 Chron
NOT FOR SYSTEM
18
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
April 5, 1985
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THROUGH:
JOHN M. POINDEXTER
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK
SUBJECT:
SDI and the Alliance
Yesterday's message from Mulroney regarding the problems caused
by the public announcement of the invitation to participate in
SDI research without advance consultation and coordination is but
the tip of one of the icebergs floating in Alliance waters on
this issue. If we cannot find the means to deal with the
problem, all of our careful efforts to preserve Alliance unity
are likely to go the way of the Titanic.
So far, the Canadians have been by far the most outspoken to us
(fortunately in private), but they may have done us a service by
stating directly and vigorously -- indeed, hyperbolically --
feelings which are to a significant degree shared by the other
Allies.
Last weekend, I attended a German-American conference in Dallas
where Woerner, Teltschik, and assorted senior political figures
from the CDU, SPD and FDP were present. CDU and FDP officials
went to considerable lengths to maintain solidarity on SDI in
their public pronouncements (though Telschik's speech was
slightly reminiscent of Howe's, with too much hectoring on the
dangers ahead), while Ehmke made clear the SPD opposition to the
whole concept, and to the SPD intent to make the question of
joint research a major political issue. (In a private moment of
either candor or bluff, Ehmke boasted to me, "This idea we will
BY RW NARA DATE
kill, make no mistake about it.")
NLRR MO4-125/2#7040
In the corridors, the CDU types were less reticent than in
DECLASSIFIED
public. Their usual refrain was, "Don't you guys realize that we
have a mammoth political problem on our hands? We want to be
helpful. We want to be part of the research. But when you
suddenly go public with proposals before we have our ducks in a
row, you make this impossible. And every week some senior U.S.
official makes a public statement which seems at variance with
what the President, Shultz and McFarlane are saying, and this
really keeps the pot boiling."
It is ironic that the latest flap is over joint research, since
this potentially is (or was) one of our strongest cards, had we
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
5
- 2 -
played it right. It is also deeply discouraging that, having
gained the high ground in January and February with careful
statements by the President, yourself, Shultz and Paul Nitze, we
now see alarm spreading in the Alliance in more acute (though
less public) forms than we had earlier.
Joint research, of course, is not really the fundamental issue.
Fundamental for the Allies are such questions as (1) Is SDI a
research program to determine options for the future (as the
President has said repeatedly), or is the U.S. in fact hell-bent
to develop and deploy strategic defense systems regardless of
other considerations? (2) Will the U.S. consult and keep Allied
governments informed as the program evolves? and (3) Won't the
talk of the immorality of nuclear weapons weaken support for the
nuclear deterrence which will still be required for decades at
least?
Our answer to the first of these questions is clear, unequivocal
and persuasive. Unfortunately, however, when senior officials
say (or even imply) that our minds are already made up on the
deployment issue, doubts are created. Frankly, Ikle and Keyworth
can hardly open their mouths without at least implying this. And
though Richard Perle is usually more careful with his wording,
his remarks often suggest the same. But it seems to me that,
even if our minds are already made up, we must make every effort
not to convey that impression, because if we do we are simply
adding fuel to the flames of opposition, particularly in Europe.
The second question is, for governments like the Canadian and
German, perhaps the most important of all. That is why we get
such a negative reaction even when we do something they want, if
we do it without consultation and advance preparation. I see no
reason whatever for the premature public announcement of the
Weinberger letter (naming countries which had not even received
it), unless the intent was to force allied governments to reject
the offer and thus save us some difficult technology-transfer
decisions. I do not believe that such a Machiavellian ploy was
the President's intent.
The third question is inherently a more difficult one, since we
must recognize that, however clearly we explain the continued
need for an adequate offensive deterrence for a long time to
come, emphasizing the moral superiority of defense over offense
does to a degree strengthen the hand of the "no-nuke" clique.
Still, I believe this one is fully manageable with valid,
straightforward answers provided a general atmosphere of distrust
is not created by mishandling other issues, preeminently the
sensitive one of consultation.
The damage done by ill-considered statements or hasty public
gestures, therefore, far surpasses the importance of the
individual issues themselves. Such incidents feed a climate of
public questioning and distrust which makes it much more
difficult for friendly governments to cooperate with us. It is
easy to blame Howe for setting the current negative trends in
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
20
- 3 -
motion (and he is in fact partly culpable), but we must recognize
that some of our own people have contributed to the mood. It is
simply not in our interest to debate senior officials of friendly
governments in public or to make it harder for our friends to
stay in step with us by confronting them with surprises.
I know that you are aware of much -- perhaps all -- of this. I
hope you will have the opportunity to discuss the problem frankly
and in detail with the President. It would be a tragedy if,
through the indicipline and thoughtlessness of some of his
subordinates, we undermine the best hope we have for the security
of our country in coming decades.
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
THE WHITE HOUSE
90382a 21
WASHINGTON
System II
EYES ONLY
Amb. Jack matlock
System II
EYES ONLY
PRESERVATION COPY
UNCLASSIFIED UPON
CLASSIFIED CVS ENCLOSURE(S) REMOVAL
6/14/02
22
WASHFAX RECEIPT
THE WHITE HOUSE
MAtlock
C
CONFIDENTIAL
MESSAGE NO.
CLASSIFICATION
PAGES two
FROM ROBERT KIMMITT
456-2224
Gfl/WW
(NAME)
(EXTENSION)
(ROOM NUMBER)
MESSAGE DESCRIPTION PRES LTR TO GORBACHEV
NSC LOG # 90382
TO (AGENCY)
DELIVER TO:
DEPT/ROOM NO.
EXTENSION
STATE
NICK PLATT
EXEC SECRETARY
REMARKS ORIGINAL GIVEN TO JAMES F. SCHUMAKER OF THE DEPT OF STATE FOR
DELIVERY
DECLASSIFIED
By us
Guidelines, August 28 1997
NARA, Date 6/14/02
23
mathock
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 4, 1985
Dear Mr. General Secretary:
The visit to Moscow of a congressional delegation
headed by the distinguished Speaker of our House
of Representatives provides an important, new
opportunity for a high-level exchange of views
between our two countries. I hope your meeting
with the Speaker and his colleagues will result in
a serious and useful discussion.
I believe meetings at the political level are
vitally important if we are to build a more
constructive relationship between our two
countries. I believe my meetings in Washington
with First Deputy Premier Gromyko and Mr.
Shcherbitsky and your discussion in Moscow with
Vice President Bush and Secretary Shultz both
served this purpose. As you know, I look forward
to meeting with you personally at a mutually
convenient time. Together, I am confident that we
can provide the important political impetus you
mentioned in your last letter for moving toward a
more constructive and stable relationship between
our two countries.
I believe that new opportunities are now opening
up in U.S. -Soviet relations. We must take
advantage of them. You know my view that there
are such opportunities in every area of our
relations, including humanitarian, regional,
bilateral and arms control issues. In improving
stability there is no more important issue than
the arms control talks we have jointly undertaken
in Geneva. Our negotiators have very flexible
instructions to work with your negotiators in
drafting agreements which can lead to radical
reductions, and toward our common goal, the
elimination of nuclear weapons.
DECLASSIFIED (RELEASED)
BY Authority CVS NLSF99-051 #325 SMF 10/16/00
NARA, Date 6/14/02
24
2
In seizing new opportunities, we must also take
care to avoid situations which can seriously
damage our relations. I and all Americans were
appalled recently at the senseless killing of
Major Nicholson in East Germany. In addition to
the personal tragedy of this brave officer, this
act seemed to many in our country to be only the
latest example of a Soviet military action which
threatens to undo our best efforts to fashion a
sustainable, more constructive relationship for
the long term. I want you to know it is also a
matter of personal importance to me that we take
steps to prevent the reoccurrence of this tragedy
and I hope you will do all in your power to
prevent such actions in the future.
Let me close by reaffirming the value I place in
our correspondence. I will be replying in greater
detail to your last letter. I hope we can con-
tinue to speak frankly in future letters, as we
attempt to build stronger relations between
ourselves and between our two countries.
Sincerely,
Ronald Reagan
His Excellency
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev,
General Secretary, Central Committee,
Communist Party of the Soviet Union
Moscow, U.S.S.R.
SECRET
SYSTEM II
90382
THE WHITE HOUSE
Rec
WASHINGTON
1085 APR
2
46
SECRET/SENSITIVE
April 4, 1985
SIGNED
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
SUBJECT:
Letter to General Secretary Gorbachev
Issue
Letter to Gorbachev.
Facts
You indicated to Speaker O'Neill and Bob Michel yesterday that
you would give them a letter to Gorbachev for delivery on their
upcoming visit.
Discussion
Your letter encourages Gorbachev to move the current negotiations
ahead, refers to the shooting of Major Nicholson and promises a
more detailed reply to his last letter.
Recommendation
OK
No
PR
That you sign the letter at Tab A to
Gorbachev.
Attachments:
Tab A
Letter to General Secretary Gorbachev
Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock
CC Vice President
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CAJ
NARA, Date 6/14/02
SECRET SENSITIVE
SECRET
24
SYSTEM II
MEMORANDUM
90382
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET SENSITIVE
April 4, 1985
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
JACK F. MATLOCK 150
SIGNED
FROM:
SUBJECT:
Presidential Letter to Gorbachev
A letter from the President to Gorbachev, for the O'Neill
delegation to carry with them, is at TAB A.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the Memorandum to the President at TAB I.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments:
TAB I
Memorandum to the President
Tab A
Letter to Gorbachev
Tab B
Platt-McFarlane Memorandum
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines,
SECRET SENSITIVE
By CVS
NARA, Date 6/14/02
Declassify on: OADR
27
WASHFAX RECEIPT
WHSR
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
PB
032041MARE
Eas
S/S #
MI SSAGE NO 001230
CLASSIFICATION SECRET/SENSITIVE
No. Pages 3
FROM B. McKinley
S/S
632-3126
7224
(Officer name)
(Office symboll
(Extension)
(Room number)
MESSAGE DESCRIPTION ilutt/McFarlane - SUBJECT: Draft Presidential
letter to Gorbachev
TO (Agency)
DELIVER TO
Extension
Room No.
NSC
EYES ONLY Robert Kimmitt
456-2224
NSC
EYES ONLY Robert Pearson
395-3044
NSC
395-5112
FOR
CLEARANCE
INFORMATION
XX
PER REQUEST
COMMENT
REMARKS
ADVANCE COPY
S/S Officer: Coloman for 8
DECLASSIFIED
of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
Department By CAS NARA, Date 6/14/62
FORM
Ds - 1100
ES SENSITIVE 8510149
United States Department of State
28
Washington, D.C. 20520
SECRET/SENSITIVE
April 3, 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT c. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE
SUBJECT: Draft Presidential Letter to Gorbachev
In e meeting with Speaker O'Neill April 3, the President
agreed to provide the Speaker with a letter to present to Soviet
General Secretary Gorbachev during the Speaker's upcoming trip
to the Soviet Union.
The attached draft stresses the importance of high-level
dialogue in building a more constructive relationship with the
Soviet Union. It emphasizes the importance we attach to the
arms control negotiations in Geneva and the President's outrage
over the killing of Major Nicholson. The draft letter calls on
Gorbachev to take steps to prevent such tragedies in the future,
but does not request an apology. This would be inappropriate in
Presidential correspondence, since the Soviets have already
expressed regret on several occasions.
Nicholas Bomekinly Platt
Executive Secretary
Authority BY NISF99-05 DECLASSIFIED #328 as
7/25/06 SECRET/SENSITIVE
DECL:OADR
NARA, Date 6/14/02
in
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Dear Mr. General Secretary:
The visit to Moscow of a congressional delegation headed by the
distinguished Speaker of our House of Representatives provides
an important, new opportunity for a high-level exchange of views
between our two countries. I hope your meeting with the Speaker
and his colleagues will result in a serious and useful
discussion.
I believe meetings at the political level are vitally important
if we are to build a more constructive relationship between our
two countries. I believe my meetings in Washington with First
Deputy Premier Gromyko and Mr. Shcherbitskiy and your discussion
in Moscow with Vice President Bush and Secretary Shultz both
served this purpose. As you know, I look forward to meeting
with you personally at a mutually convenient time. Together, I
an confident that we can provide the important political impetus
you mentioned in your last letter for moving toward a more
constructive and stable relationship between our two countries.
I believe that new opportunities are now opening up in US-Soviet
relations. We must take advantage of them. You know my view
that there are such opportunities in every area of our
relations, including humanitarian, regional, bilateral and arms
control issues. In improving stability there is no more
important issue than the arms control talks we have jointly
undertaken in Geneva. Cur negotiators have very flexible
instructions to work with your negotiators in drafting
agreements which can lead to radical reductions, and toward our
common goal, the elimination of nuclear weapons.
Ir. seizing new opportunities, we must also take care to avoid
situations which can seriously damage our relations. I and all
Americans were appalled recently at the senseless killing of
Major Nicholson in East Germany. In addition to the personal
tragedy of this brave officer, this act seemed to many in our
country to be only the latest example of a Soviet military
action which threatens to undo our best efforts to fashion a
sustainable, more constructive relationship for the long term.
I want you to know it is also a matter of personal importance to
me that we take steps to prevent the reoccurence of this tragedy
and I hope you will do all in your power to prevent such actions
in the future.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
DECL: OADR
BY Authority NLSF99 DECLASSIFIED #329 Smf 10/16/60
NARA, Date 6/14/00
30
SECRET/SENSITIVE
- 2 -
Let me close by reaffirming the value I place in our
correspondence. I will be replying in greater detail to your
last letter. I hope we can continue to speak frankly in future
letters, as we attempt to build stronger relations between
ourselves and between our two countries.
Sincerely,
Ronald Reagan
SECRET/SENSITIVE
7043 Matdock
31
SYSTEM II
JM-C
MEMORANDUM
90419
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SB
April 16, (sa 1985
Subacher
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Fill
letter
ACTION
DECLASSIFIED
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
NLRR M266 7043
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK
Asm
BY KML NARA DATE 3/27/12
SUBJECT:
President's Reply to Gorbachev Letter of March 24
I have reviewed State's draft reply to Gorbachev, and I believe
that it is not an effective response to the Gorbachev letter.
Not that I object to any of the substance per se, but rather to
the pedestrian approach, which is devoid of personality and reeks
of being staff-written. We can do better, and I believe we
should try before asking the President to approve it.
Specifically, my objections are the following:
-- It does not really engage Gorbachev in a dialogue. Now that
there is a Soviet leader who reads his mail and who seems to
enjoy a spirited debate, I believe that the President should
engage him on some key issues. His letter provides several
openings, and we should exploit them.
-- Although it was written to include items from each element on
our agenda, it really comes through as a grab-bag of disparate
issues. It should be tightened, made more selective, and given a
focus on some of the key issues.
Although I understand that Secretary Shultz would like to provide
the letter to Dobrynin tomorrow, I believe we should take more
time with it and make sure it is the best we can do. (Shultz has
a number of other agenda items to take up with Dobrynin, so the
letter is not really necessary for the meeting.) In principle, I
think it would be better to have Hartman deliver it anyway. He
will be going back to Moscow next week and it would be useful to
give him the opportunity to schedule a discussion with Gromyko on
the basis of his consultations here.
I am working on a redraft, and hope that we can avoid undue haste
in making final decisions on the text.
Recommendation:
That you suggest to Secretary Shultz that we work on the text
further, with the goal of having something ready for the
President by the end of the week.
Approve ICM
Disapprove
SECRET/SENSITIVE
32
SUPER SENSITIVE
8511287
SYSTEM II
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
90419
WASHINGTON
April 15, 1985
SECRET/SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
George P. Shultz ups
SUBJECT:
Reply to Gorbachev
Attached for your consideration is a draft reply to
Gorbachev's March 24 letter. The letter sets forth in
considerable detail our views on the main issues on the
US-Soviet agenda, and closes with an invitation to
Washington for a meeting in September or October.
Ambassador Dobrynin will be meeting with me Wednesday
afternoon, just prior to his return to Moscow for consul-
tations. If you agree with the approach reflected in the
attached draft, I would like to be able to give Dobrynin your
reply to Gorbachev at that time.
Attachment: Draft Letter to Gorbachev
Authority NLS-99-051 DECLASSIFIED 4334 us 7/25/00
BY CVS
NARA, Date 6/14/02
OFCRET/SENSITIVE
33
SYSTEM II PROFILE
SECRET/SENSITIVE
ID 8590419
RECEIVED 15 APR 85 20
TO
PRESIDENT
FROM SHULTZ, G
DOCDATE 15 APR 85
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, 6/6/14/02 1997
NARA, Date
By
KEYWORDS USSR
ARMS CONTROL
GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S
HS
SUBJECT: DRAFT REPLY TO GORBACHEV 24 MAR LTR
ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR PRES
DUE: 16 APR 85 STATUS S FILES SII
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
MATLOCK
LINHARD
URGENT
COMMENTS ** URGENT ACTION; DUE BACK IN WEST WING BY 1500 ON 16 APRIL
REF# 8511287
LOG 8590336
NSCIFID
(B/ )
ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED
ACTION REQUIRED
DUE
COPIES TO
DISPATCH
W/ATTCH FILE
(C)
SUPER SENSITIVE 34
8511287
SYSTEM II
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
90419
WASHINGTON
April 15, 1985
SECRET/SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
George P. Shultz ups
SUBJECT:
Reply to Gorbachev
Attached for your consideration is a draft reply to
Gorbachev's March 24 letter. The letter sets forth in
considerable detail our views on the main issues on the
US-Soviet agenda, and closes with an invitation to
Washington for a meeting in September or October.
Ambassador Dobrynin will be meeting with me Wednesday
afternoon, just prior to his return to Moscow for consul-
tations. If you agree with the approach reflected in the
attached draft, I would like to be able to give Dobrynin your
reply to Gorbachev at that time.
Attachment: Draft Letter to Gorbachev
Authority NLSF99-051 DECLASSIFIED #334 as 7/25/02
BY
CAS
. NARA, Date 6/14/02
DECL: OADR
SYSTEM II
90419
SECRET/SENSITIVE
4/15/85
Draft Presidential Letter to Gorbachev
Dear Mr. General Secretary:
I appreciated receiving your letter of March 24 and believe
the heightened pace of our high-level dialogue in recent weeks
has been useful. Vice President Bush has reported to me on your
good discussion on the occasion of Chairman Chernenko's funeral.
I have reviewed the records of the most recent exchanges between
Secretary Shultz and Ambassador Dobrynin in Washington and
Foreign Minister Gromyko and Ambassador Hartman in Moscow. I
have also had reports from Congressman O'Neill on his
discussions with you and Mr. Gromyko during his visit to Moscow.
I welcome the agreement that Secretary Shultz and Foreign
Minister Gromyko will meet in Vienna on May 14. I am hopeful
that they will be able to work out specific steps to move our
relationship forward. As promised in the letter Speaker O'Neill
passed to you, I would now like to reply to your March 24 letter
at some length.
I agree with you that the task before us is to provide
impetus to our relations through concerted action at the
political level, and that we should focus on issues where a
practical, businesslike approach can lead us forward on
substantive matters. It would be a mistake to underestimate our
differences and to invite needless disappointment by ignoring
the difficulties before us. I hope I have made it clear in my
previous correspondence with the leaders of your country that I
have a strong preference for serious, quiet diplomacy as the
best approach to making progress on hard issues. I welcome the
willingness to pursue the same approach which you expressed in
your letter.
Authority NCSF99-051 DECLASSIFIED #335 CVS 7/25/00
BY
CVS
NARA, Date 6/14/2 SECRET/SENSITIVE
36
SECRET/SENSITIVE
- 2 -
I hope that the response to the tragic killing of Major
Nicholson will turn out to be an example of this approach in
action. I hardly need to tell you that I and all Americans were
appalled at that senseless act. It makes absolutely clear the
necessity to end the pattern of Soviet military actions which
threaten to undo our best efforts to put our relations on a
stable and constructive basis for the long term. I understand
from the exchanges between our military commanders that your
troops in Germany are taking measures to prevent further tragic
incidents of this kind; this is a constructive first step.
In any discussion of how to avoid threats to the prospects
for constructive progress in our relations, I think it is fair
to point out that in recent years such threats have arisen most
frequently and most seriously from various regional tensions in
the world. In general, as I have stated on a number of
occasions, our concern is over the pattern of threatening or
using force to impose outside solutions in regional situations.
At this moment in particular, I would like to discuss an issue I
find particularly troubling: Afghanistan.
I believe the time has more than come to move to a political
resolution of this tragic affair, one that would enable the
Afghan people to live in peace without the presence of foreign
troops. We support the United Nations Secretary General's
effort to achieve a peaceful, negotiated settlement among the
parties. We remain committed to a political solution that will
deal equitably with the related issues of withdrawal of your
troops to their homeland and guarantees of non-interference.
Your present course will only lead to more bloodshed. We are
prepared to work with you in a different direction.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
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- 3 -
I am confident that the Government of Pakistan shares this
approach. I want to make it very clear to you personally that
Pakistan is a trusted ally of the United States. It must be
completely understood that political or military threats against
Pakistan are a matter of special concern to me.
As you know, I have stressed the importance of dialogue
between our two governments on regional issues as a means of
avoiding miscalculation, reducing the dangers of confrontation,
and encouraging peaceful solutions. It was for this reason that
I proposed in my UNGA speech last September that our two
countries agree to periodic consultations at the policy level
about regional problems. Secretary Shultz has informed me of
your recent proposals for a possible series of regional
discussions. We are prepared to move forward, and will be
providing a detailed reply.
In addition to avoiding and managing negative developments
that threaten the prospects for progress, I believe we should
focus our energies also on issues where mutually beneficial
forward movement could and should be possible. We have made
progress in certain areas, thereby demonstrating that we can
work together on specific issues despite our differences on
other issues. As I mentioned in the letter Speaker O'Neill
carried, I see opportunities in every area of our relationship,
and I would like to suggest some of them for your consideration.
The interrelated issues under negotiation at Geneva provide
us with our greatest challenge and our greatest opportunity.
These negotiations have just begun. I would like to believe
that the Soviet side, like the American side, is committed to
serious, substantive exchanges, with full respect for the
confidentiality so necessary for the talks to be successful.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
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SECRET/SENSITIVE
- 4 -
Our negotiators have very flexible instructions to work with
your negotiators in drafting agreements that can lead to radical
reductions in nuclear weapons and, ultimately, toward their
complete elimination. This is why, to be absolutely frank, we
were disappointed in your public espousal April 8 of a proposal
that we had earlier made clear was one-sided and unacceptable.
I could not agree more with the point in your letter about
conducting business in a manner not aimed at deepening
differences and making policies to revitalize the situation.
With regard to defensive and space weapons and strategic
stability, I want to point out some facts. The Soviet Union
already has deployed ABM and anti-satellite systems. Judging by
your research programs in the defensive field, you also
appreciate the potential further contribution that defensive
systems could make toward the establishment of a more stable
balance. The research being done as part of my Strategic
Defense Initiative holds great promise for enhancing the
security not just of our two countries but of all mankind. It
is my hope that we will be able to discuss these issues and
their interrelationships in a frank and thoughtful manner in
Geneva. Direct, personal involvement at our level will be
needed if we are to be successful.
I suggest that we also give new attention to other negotia-
tions and discussions underway between us in the security and
arms control field. We know that some progress has been made in
the Stockholm Conference toward narrowing our differences.
Meaningful progress toward an agreement should be possible even
this year on the basis of the framework which I have already
suggested both privately in this channel and publicly in Dublin
last June. Specifically, the United States will consider the
SECRET/SENSITIVE
29
SECRET/SENSITIVE
- 5 -
Soviet proposal for a declaration on the non-use of force as
long as the Soviet Union is prepared to consider the concrete
measures needed to put that principle into action. Unfortu-
nately, the response of your representatives to date to this
offer has not been encouraging. I hope that we may soon see a
more favorable attitude toward this idea and toward the
confidence-building measures that we and our allies have
introduced.
One area where our two countries have been able to work
together for mutual advantage has been the area of nuclear non-
proliferation. Our consultations in this area have been
constructive and useful. I think that we ought to recognize
their good work and seek to build upon it in order to strengthen
the non-proliferation regime.
One pressing issue of concern to us both is the use of
chemical weaponry in the Iran-Iraq War. This situation
illustrates the importance of curbing the spread of chemical
weapons, and I suggest that it might be useful in the near
future for our experts to meet and examine ways in which we
might cooperate on this topic. Of course, the lasting solution
to this problem will be achievement of a complete global ban on
these terrible weapons, and I ask you also to consider carefully
the proposed treaty we have advanced in the Conference on
Disarmament in Geneva.
We continue to feel that it would be in both our interests
to arrive at an equitable and balanced agreement in the MBFR
talks in Vienna which would reduce the level of conventional
forces in central Europe.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
40
SECRET/SENSITIVE
- 6 -
In addition to the implementation of our agreement on
upgrading the Direct Communications Link, which is proceeding on
schedule, we hope we can expand our ability to communicate
rapidly during the time of crisis into other areas. We remain
ready to discuss with you a number of concrete proposals in this
field.
There are several important bilateral issues on which we can
make progress relatively quickly if we seize the opportunities
now before us. We should be able to conclude an agreement on
improving safety measures in the North Pacific at an early
meeting and move to discussions of civil aviation issues. Our
efforts to negotiate a new cultural exchanges agreement have,
after six months, reached the point where only a handful of
issues remain to be resolved. And we are ready to move forward
at the earliest possible date to open our respective consulates
in New York and Kiev. I am also hopeful that the meeting of our
Joint Commercial Commision in May will succeed in identifying
areas of non-strategic trade that could be substantially
increased.
Finally, let me turn to an issue of great importance to me
and to all Americans. As the Vice President informed you in
Moscow, we believe strongly that human rights are an important
element of our bilateral relationship. While we recognize your
sensitivities on this question, human rights is an issue that
must be addressed. Last year we suggested that Ambassador
Hartman meet periodically with Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko
to discuss confidentially our mutual concerns. I am also
prepared to appoint rapporteurs as you suggested to the Vice
President, perhaps someone to join Ambassador Hartman in such a
meeting. Whatever procedures we ultimately establish, I hope we
can agree that this channel will be used for trying seriously to
SECRET/SENSITIVE
SECRET/SENSITIVE
- 7 -
resolve human rights problems and not for exchanging
propaganda. Progress in this field will create a positive
environment for progress in a number of other areas.
I have taken the liberty of speaking candidly in this
letter. I take it that you agree with me that is the best
approach, and I hope we can continue to speak frankly in our
future correspondence. Let me close by reaffirming the value I
place in these letters and my desire to use this correspondence
to build stronger relations between the two of us and between
our two countries.
Finally, I was glad to receive your views on a meeting
between the two of us. In the spirit of your suggestion that we
return to the question of time and place of such a meeting, let
me suggest that we meet in Washington this fall, in either
September or October. We also look forward to the meeting
between Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko in Vienna
in May, which we hope will provide an opportunity for us to move
forward across the agenda I have discussed in this letter.
Sincerely,
Ronald Reagan
1580M
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HE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
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36820B
Eyes Ouly 4/5/85 -SDI
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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE
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MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
April 5, 1985
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THROUGH:
JOHN M. POINDEXTER
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK
SUBJECT:
SDI and the Alliance
Yesterday's message from Mulroney regarding the problems caused
by the public announcement of the invitation to participate in
SDI research without advance consultation and coordination is but
the tip of one of the icebergs floating in Alliance waters on
this issue. If we cannot find the means to deal with the
problem, all of our careful efforts to preserve Alliance unity
are likely to go the way of the Titanic.
So far, the Canadians have been by far the most outspoken to us
(fortunately in private), but they may have done us a service by
stating directly and vigorously -- indeed, hyperbolically --
feelings which are to a significant degree shared by the other
Allies.
Last weekend, I attended a German-American conference in Dallas
where Woerner, Teltschik, and assorted senior political figures
from the CDU, SPD and FDP were present. CDU and FDP officials
went to considerable lengths to maintain solidarity on SDI in
their public pronouncements (though Telschik's speech was
slightly reminiscent of Howe's, with too much hectoring on the
dangers ahead), while Ehmke made clear the SPD opposition to the
whole concept, and to the SPD intent to make the question of
joint research a major political issue, (In a private moment
of either candor or bluff, Ehmke boasted to me, "This idea we
will kill, make no mistake about it.")
BY RW NARA DATE
In the corridors, the CDU types were less reticent than in
public. Their usual refrain was, "Don't you guys realize that we
have a mammouth political problem on our hands? We want to be
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helpful. We want to be part of the research. But when you
suddenly go public with proposals before we have our ducks in a
row, you make this impossible. And every week some senior U.S.
official makes a public statement which seems at variance with
what the President, Shultz and McFarlane are saying, and this
really keeps the pot boiling."
It is ironic that the latest flap is over joint research, since
this potentially is (or was) one of our strongest cards, had we
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played it right. It is also deeply discouraging that, having
gained the high ground in January and February with careful
statements by the President, yourself, Shultz and Paul Nitze, we
now see alarm spreading in the Alliance in more acute (though
less public) forms than we had earlier.
Joint research, of course, is not really the fundamental issue.
Fundamental for the Allies are such questions as (1) Is SDI a
research program to determine options for the future (as the
President has said repeatedly), or is the U.S. in fact hell-bent
to develop and deploy strategic defense systems regardless of
other considerations? (2) Will the U.S. consult and keep Allied
governments informed as the program evolves? and (3) Won't the
talk of the immorality of nuclear weapons weaken support for the
nuclear deterrence which will still be required for decades at
least?
Our answer to the first of these questions is clear, unequivocal
and persuasive. Unfortunately, however, when senior officials
say (or even imply) that our minds are already made up on the
deployment issue, doubts are created. Frankly, Ikle and Keyworth
can hardly open their mouths without at least implying this. And
though Richard Perle is usually more careful with his wording,
his remarks often suggest the same. But is seems to me that,
even if our minds are already made up, we must make every effort
not to convey that impression, because if we do we are simply
adding fuel to the flames of opposition, particularly in Europe.
The second question is, for governments like the Canadian and
German, perhaps the most important of all. That is why we get
such a negative reaction even when we do something they want, if
we do it without consultation and advance preparation. I see no
reason whatever for the premature public announcement of the
Weinberger letter (naming countries which had not even received
it), unless the intent was to force allied governments to reject
the offer and thus save us some difficult technology-transfer
decisions. I do not believe that such a Machiavellian ploy was
the President's intent.
The third question is inherently a more difficult one, since we
must recognize that, however clearly we explain the continued
need for an adequate offensive deterrence for a long time to
come, emphasizing the moral superiority of defense over offense
does to a degree strengthen the hand of the "no-nuke" clique.
Still, I believe this one is fully manageable with valid,
straightforward answers provided a general atmosphere of distrust
is not created by mishandling other issues, preeminently the
sensitive one of consultation.
The damage done by ill-considered statements or hasty public
gestures, therefore, far surpasses the importance of the
individual issues themselves. Such incidents feed a climate of
public questioning and distrust which makes it much more
difficult for friendly governments to cooperate with us. It is
easy to blame Howe for setting the current negative trends in
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motion (and he is in fact partly culpable), but we must recognize
that some of our own people have contributed to the mood. It is
simply not in our interest to debate senior officials of friendly
governments in public or to make it harder for our friends to
stay in step with us by confronting them with surprises.
I know that you are aware of much -- perhaps all -- of this. I
hope you will have the opportunity to discuss the problem frankly
and in detail with the President. It would be a tragedy if,
through the indicipline and thoughtlessness of some of his
subordinates, we undermine the best hope we have for the security
of our country in coming decades.
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JM-CHROW
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NOT FOR SYSTEM
MEMORANDUM
1047
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
April 8, 1985
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THROUGH:
JOHN M. POINDEXTER
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK
SUBJECT:
U.S.-Soviet Relations: Planning for 1985
In a previous memorandum commenting on an informal paper passed
to you by Rick Burt, I expressed the view that the paper is
inadequate for the basis of discussion with the President since
it failed to address the real substantive issues on which the
President's attention should be focused. At this time, I would
like to set forth these issues as I see them.
Fundamental Issue
The most basic tactical decision the President faces at this time
is:
(a) whether to assume that Gorbachev is unable or unwilling
to make significant changes in Soviet policy this year, and
therefore to concentrate his attention almost exclusively on
public diplomacy and alliance management; OR
(b) to decide that, even though the prospects for success
may be slight, a careful and private attempt should be made to
see whether Gorbachev is interested in arranging a real
breakthrough in one or more of the key areas under contention.
There are powerful arguments for each of these alternatives.
Regarding the first, it is clear that Gorbachev's first priority
in 1985 is to consolidate his own power, and in this process he
may not be able to introduce major changes in traditional Soviet
policy. Therefore, we should not be sanguine that he has the
authority to move in a decisive way to meet our concerns. We
also should not assume that he has the desire to to so, even if
his authority were well established. For these reasons, we
should be cautious about raising public expectations or expending
valuable negotiating capital prematurely. However, we also must
recognize that, without public and allied perception of new
initiatives on our part, a "stand-pat" position will come under
increasing pressure and could militate against effective public
diplomacy and Alliance management.
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Regarding the second approach, it seems to me that there is an
outside chance that Gorbachev could be attracted by the right
package of proposals. Among other things, this could give him
ammunition to move toward consolidation of his authority, using
the argument that an acceptable deal with the U.S. is possible
and that this would relieve pressure on the system and give it
time to work on getting its economy in better shape. (One can
make a devastating critique of the Soviet policies of the 70's on
Leninist grounds: it amounted to "infantile Marxism" -- in
Lenin's words -- since it underestimated the strength of the
"imperialists" and represented a premature move to challenge the
West before "socialism" was consolidated.)
In particular, Gorbachev will have his own reasons for moving to
get the Soviet military under more solid Party (meaning his own)
control. There is some interesting evidence that this process
may in fact have started, when we look at the series of events
beginning with Ogarkov's ouster, the appointment of the political
lightweight Sokolov as Defense Minister, and the exclusion of any
military representatives from the Chernenko funeral commission.
Furthermore, I doubt that anyone as smart as Gorbachev seems to
be could have failed to understand the high price the Soviet
Union has paid (in their image abroad, which is important to
them) by the KAL affair and the Nicholson shooting. We can also
assume that the failure to deal effectively with Afghanistan has
not enhanced the prestige of the Soviet military establishment
with the political leadership.
These are, of course, no more than straws in the wind, and one
should not base policy on inferences drawn from them. But they
provide some evidence that Gorbachev could conceivably judge it
to be in his political interest to respond positively to a U.S.
initiative which provides the prospect for eased relations -- at
least for a few years -- and some assistance in gaining mastery
over the Soviet military behemoth.
If the President decides to follow the second tactical approach,
it will be most important to avoid making initiatives out of the
blue either publicly or -- in the early stages -- in official
channels. In either case, even an attractive proposal will be
doomed to failure if it is presented in the wrong way. In order
to attract Gorbachev, we must give him the chance to maneuver
behind the scenes to set the stage for acceptance. Furthermore,
for our own protection, we would need to float ideas which could
not be attributed to us publicly, or misused to our disadvantage
in formal negotiations.
Nature of Informal Proposal
A private, informal "channel" is of limited utility unless we
have something to say which is not appropriate for our official
discourse. This is why it is desirable to decide first whether
we have anything to say, and only then (depending on the nature
of what we want to convey) to decide how to convey it.
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I do not profess to have in my head a "magic formula" which just
might lure Gorbachev to real negotiations. However, I believe
that if the President decides he wants to test the water
informally, it is best to present something comprehensive and not
limited to one element or another. It is also best, in the early
stages, not to be specific with numbers and other concrete
details which could interfere with negotiations.
To illustrate the sort of things I have in mind as possible
elements in a comprehensive package, I offer the following. They
are not proposals on my part. (All would have to be thought
through carefully.) I mean it only to illustrate the manner in
which a package might be assembled. The package should include
important elements of all the areas on our agenda, in keeping
with our policy of not giving exclusive priority to any one.
(a) Regional issues: Propose a clear understanding (not to
be formulated in a formal document) that neither side will
act to exacerbate local conflicts by direct or indirect in-
troduction of significant military force in places where
neither side is currently involved. (This should be a pre-
condition to the rest of the package; it would leave us free
to help the mujahedin -- and would not solve the problem of
Nicaragua -- but would serve as clear notice that all bets
are off if the Soviets, for example, increase military
pressure on Pakistan or try some form of armed intervention
in Iran.)
Additionally, we might consider making a suggestion which
goes further in regard to some specific situation, such as,
for example, assistance in obtaining "no-intervention"
commitments from interested parties as part of a negotiated
withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan or, perhaps,
some understanding in regard to parallel action to end the
Iran-Iraq war.
(b) Arms Control: Here we will need to offer enough to be
interesting -- and to provide a basis for arguing that we
have taken Soviet SDI concerns into account -- without, of
course either selling the store or crippling SDI. This may
turn out to be a suggestion to square the circle, but it
probably is worth a try.
Informal arms control proposals can take one of two forms,
or can be a mixture of the two: (1) a mutual statement of
general principles and goals; and (2) a concrete framework
for future negotiation.
A proposal of the first type might contain a selection and
rewording of some of the principles Chernenko proposed,
along with some of our own, plus a commitment to reduce
offensive nuclear weapons by a certain percentage not later
than a certain year, plus a commitment by both sides to
"strengthen" the ABM Treaty to the satisfaction of both.
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A proposal of the second type might contain:
(1) Re START: a proposal similar to (though not
necessarily with the same content as) the one State was
promoting last year;
(2) Re INF: "Walk-in-the-Woods" with some
modifications.
(3) Re defensive arms: No limits on SDI research, but
commitment on both sides to strengthen ABM Treaty and commit
selves to no "surprise" testing and deployment -- i.e.,
without advance consultation and negotiation.
(c) Human Rights/Trade The Soviets remain intensely
interested (though they often profess indifference for
tactical reasons) in the trade relationship. It is,
practically speaking, the only effective lever we have to
induce more acceptable human rights practices.
Nevertheless, their sensitivity toward being seen making
deals in this area is so great that we can only use the
lever effectively in private and informally. We need to
decide concretely what we want and what we responsibly can
offer for it, and then make this clear in some informal
fashion. Such an informal "deal" could look roughly like
this:
(1) If Jewish emigration reaches 10,000 and some
political prisoners are released, the U.S. will give its
blessing to the sale of licensable energy technology;
(2) If Jewish emigration reaches the rate of 25,000 per
year and most political prisoners are released, we will
review U.S. export controls with the goal of making them no
more stringent than Cocom controls in general;
(3) If Jewish emigration reaches 50,000 and all
prominent political prisoners are allowed to leave, we will
take steps to grant MFN under the terms of existing U.S.
legislation, but without referring to formal assurances on
the Soviet part.
(4) The suggestions above are valid only if new
negative elements are not introduced into the picture (e.g.,
a wave of arrests; imposition of an "education tax" or the
like).
It is possible, of course, to think of other elements which might
go into a package. I would reiterate that the above is intended
only to illustrate the sort of proposal the President might wish
to consider.
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Modalities
If the President decides that he wishes to have some sort of
proposal floated unofficially, there are various ways of doing
SO.
FOIA(b) (1)
-- There are a number of other Americans who travel periodically
to the Soviet Union and have appropriate contacts there. Several
are reliable and could float "deniable" suggestions, presenting
them as their "personal" ideas, based on contacts with senior
Administration officials.
-- We could try to establish a more direct form of contact such
as that discussed several times last year.
-- It is not desirable to use Dobrynin, unless and until we have
reciprocity in Moscow.
Recommendation:
1. That you discuss with the President his desires regarding the
tactical approach he prefers for 1985.
Approve
Disapprove
2. That you let me know if I should give any further thought to
any of the ideas expressed above.
Approve
Disapprove
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