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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: Matlock Chron May 1985 (1)
Box: 9
To see more digitized collections visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection
Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected]
Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing
National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/
JM.C'
3291
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
May 1, 1985
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT
FROM:
JACK F. MATLOCK As
SUBJECT:
Proposed Presidential Thank you Letter to Dobrynin
for the book "The Great Patriotic War 1941-1945"
I have reviewed the proposed draft thank you letter to Ambassador
Dobrynin. However, given the thrust of the "history" as presented
in this book, I think it would not be appropriate to acknowledge
the gift. Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to Mr. Hilboldt for
your signature with above recommendation.
Steve Sestanovich concurs.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the Memorandum at Tab I to Mr. Hilboldt.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments:
Tab I
Kimmitt-Hilboldt Memorandum
Tab A
Proposed Draft Letter and Incoming Correspondence
2
3291
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN E. HILBOLDT
FROM:
ROBERT M. KIMMITT
SUBJECT:
Proposed Presidential Thank you Letter to
Ambassador Dobrynin for the Book "The Great
Patriotic War 1941-1945"
We have reviewed the proposed thank you letter to Ambassador
Dobrynin. Given the thrust of the "history" as presented in this
book, we think it would not be appropriate to acknowledge the
gift.
Attachment:
Tab A
Proposed Draft Letter and Incoming Correspondence
32913
312112
ID #
Ag
WHITE HOUSE
GI002
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET
o - OUTGOING
H INTERNAL
I . INCOMING
Date Correspondence
Received (YY/MM/DD)
/
/
Name of Correspondent: anatoly F. Dobuynin
MI Mail Report
User Codes: (A)
(B)
(C)
Subject: 1941-1945). Thank you for hook (The Great Patriotic Was
ROUTE TO:
ACTION
DISPOSITION
Tracking
Type
Completion
Action
Date
of
Date
Office/Agency
(Staff Name)
Code
YY/MM/DD
Response
Code
YY/MM/DD
Gu HILB
ORIGINA
FOR
85/04/24
/
/
INS NS Kimm
Referral Note:
C 85/04/25
/
/
Referral Note:
/
/
/ /
-
Referral Note:
/
/
/
/
-
Referral Note:
/
/
/ /
-
Referral Note:
ACTION CODES:
DISPOSITION CODES:
A - Appropriate Action
1. - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
A Answered
C Completed
C - Comment/Recommendation
R - Direct Reply w/Copy
B - - Non-Special Referral
S Suspended
D - Draft Response
S - For Signature
F - Furnish Fact Sheet
X - Interim Reply
to be used as Enclosure
FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:
Type of Response = Initials of Signer
Code = "A"
Completion Date = Date of Outgoing
Comments:
Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.
Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOB).
Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.
Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.
5/81
April 22, 1985
Dear Mr. Ambassador:
Thank you very much for the copy of
The Great Patriotic War 1941-1945 which
you gave to Commander Paul Thompson for me
during his visit to the Soviet Embassy. I
am pleased to share in this newly released
history on the struggle of the Soviet
people during World War II and your
thoughtfulness is indeed appreciated.
Nancy joins me in sending you and
Mrs. Dobrynin our best wishes.
Sincerely,
RR
His Excellency Anatoly F. Dobrynin
Ambassador of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics
Add to envelope:
1125 16th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
RR: CMF: JEH: AVH
DISPATCH THRU STATE VIA NSC.
g#
5
312112
WHITE HOUSE GIFT UNIT
ID 8500371 A
INITIALS CMF
LOGGED 850422
ARRIVAL 850418
PRESENT 850417
ARRIVAL FORM S STAFF OTHER THAN CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON
DONOR H FOREIGN OFFICIAL
PREF HIS EXCELLENCY
NAME ANATOLY F. DOBRYNIN
TITLE AMBASSADOR OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
ADDR 1125 16TH STREET, N.W.
CITY WASHINGTON
ST DC ZIP 20036
CNTRY UNI UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
SALUT DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR
ACKNOWLEDGE BY RR
FORM DFT
INTEND P PRESIDENT
CATEGORY 0498
BOOK GENERAL HISTORY OF OTHER AREAS
DESCRIP "THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR 1941-1945", BY VASILY CHUIKOV AND VASILY
RYABOV, TRANSLATED FROM THE RUSSIAN BY SERGEI ESS; PUBL BY
PLANETA PUBLISHERS, MOSCOW, 1985.
VALUE 000020
APPR I. BAUM, ASA, DC.
DISP AF ARCHIVES, FOREIGN
COMMENT PRESENTED TO CMDR PAUL B. THOMPSON, MIL. ASST. TO MR. MCFARLANE, BY
AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN AT SOVIET EMBASSY.
TOTVALU 0000020
GIFTS A
from the Soviet Ambassador
With compliments
Anatoly F.Dobrynin
Ambassador ofthe the Union of Soviet Locialist Republics
Dean of the Diplomatic Corps
Washington, D.C.
WHITE HOUSE GIFT REGISTER
(For President/First Lady)
Please Complete as Thoroughly as Possible
April 17, 1985
Send Gift and Register to: White House Gift Unit, Room 494, OEOB (456-7133)
Date:
Date Gift Received: April 17, 85 Accepted By or Presented to: Paul B. Thompson
Title: Military Assistant to Mr. McFarlane
Assistant to the President for National
Office: Security Affairs
INTENDED
President:
X
GIFT
First Lady:
President & First Lady:
FOR
Other First Family Member (Name):
Name of Donor: Anatol Dobrynin
Title of Donor: Soviet Ambassador
DONOR INFORMATION
Address of Donor: Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist RepublicsC
1125 16th St NW, Washington, DC 20036 Country
USSR
PRESENTED BY:
Donor:
Other (Name):
Address:
Circumstances of Presentation: (including date; location, and purpose of event)
Amb Dobrynin presented two books to Cdr Thompson while he was
GIFT INFORMATION
at Soviet Embassy on business -- one book for the President and
one book for Mr. McFarlane.
Description of Gift: Book entitled The Great Patriotic War published
in Moscow, 1985
ACKNOWL-
EDGMENT
Copy Attached:
To be Handled by Gift Unit: Please
for the President's book only
Coordinate acknowledgment with other office:
(ie, Hospitality, NSC, State)
REPORT
PREPARED
Name: Dona Proctor
Tel: 2255
BY
Office: Mr. McFarlane's
Room No.: 1st Fl WW
OTHER
COMMENTS
For Gift Unit Use:
Date received:
Through:
8
AMBASSADOR OF THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
DEAN OF THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS
WASHINGTON, D.C.
April 17, 1985
Bnd
Dear Robert,
It was nice to talk to you again on the
phone this afternoon.
I am sending you a book which has just
come out of print in the Soviet Union.
I am sending an extra copy for the President
in case he would like to look through it
personally.
With best wishes,
Anatal
The Honorable
Robert McFARLANE
The White House
THE GREAT
PATRIOTIC WAR
This book is dedicated to the
heroic deeds of the Soviet people
in tthe:bloody.battles against the
Nazi invaders
THE
GREAT
PATRIOTIC WAR
1941-1945
June
3529
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
May 1, 1985
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT
Isem
FROM:
JACK F. MATLOCK
SUBJECT:
Weinberger May 3 Speech to Regional Councils on
Foreign Relations
Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to Colonel Affourtit
concurring in Secretary Weinberger's May 3 speech with the
changes indicated.
Sestanovich, ss Fortier, North, Donley, Small, Kraemer,
M.
on
n.e.
SK
Burghardt, Menges and Dobriansky PD concur.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memorndum at Tab I.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments:
Tab I
Kimmitt-Affourtit Memorandum
Tab A
Weinberger May 3 Speech
3529
12
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL R.J. AFFOURTIT
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ROOM 3E880, THE PENTAGON
SUBJECT:
SecDef Address to the Regional Council on Foreign
Relations, May 3, 1985
The draft text of Secretary Weinberger's May 3 speech has been
approved with the suggested minor changes as indicated.
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary
Attachment:
Tab A
Secretary Weinberger's May 3 Speech
McCONNELL
13
29APR85
3:00PM
REMARKS BY SECRETARY WEINBERGER
TO THE
NASHVILLE, LOUISVILLE, AND BIRMINGHAM COUNCILS ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS
3 MAY 1985
I WISH TO THANK THE COUNCILS ON FOREIGN RELATIONS NOT ONLY
FOR INVITING ME HERE TODAY, BUT ALSO FOR SPONSORING THIS VALUABLE
AND TIMELY SYMPOSIUM ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS.
AMERICANS, OF COURSE, DIFFER WIDELY IN THEIR PERSPECTIVES
ON THIS SUBJECT.
YOU HAVE HEARD SOME OF THESE DIFFERENCES
TODAY.
BUT IN DEBATING OUR DIFFERENCES WE SHOULD ALWAYS
KEEP IN MIND THAT A FAR WIDER GULF EXISTS BETWEEN AMERICAN, AND
SOVIET, PERSPECTIVES ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS.
DIFFERENCES IN PERSPECTIVES ARE ILLUSTRATED BY A STORY
PRESIDENT REAGAN LOVES TO TELL, ABOUT A MINISTER'S SON WHO WAS
TAKEN OUT CAMPING ONE DAY.
HIS COMPANIONS WARNED HIM NOT TO
it
-2-
STRAY TOO FAR FROM THE CAMPFIRE, BECAUSE THE WOODS WERE FULL OF
WILD BEASTS.
BEING YOUNG, THE BOY OF COURSE IGNORED THIS
GOOD ADVICE, AND WANDERED OFF TO EXPLORE. SUDDENLY HE FOUND
HIMSELF FACE TO FACE WITH A VERY LARGE AND NOT VERY FRIENDLY
LOOKING BEAR.
SEEING NO MEANS OF ESCAPE, THE MINISTER'S SON did AS HE HAD
BEEN TAUGHT.
HE KNELT DOWN TO PRAY FOR DELIVERANCE.
AND
WHEN HE OPENED HIS EYES A FEW MOMENTS LATER, HE WAS DELIGHTED
TO DISCOVER THAT THE BEAR, TOO, WAS KNEELING IN PRAYER RIGHT
IN FRONT OF HIM.
"OH BEAR." HE SAID, "ISN'T THIS WONDERFUL.
HERE WE
ARE, WITH SUCH DIFFERENT LIVES AND SUCH DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES,
BUT WE'RE BOTH PRAYING TO THE SAME LORD."
THE BEAR REPLIED EVENLY, "I DON'T KNOW ABOUT YOU, SON,
BUT I'M SAYING GRACE."
-3-
15
IT IS REVEALING OF OUR DIFFERENCE IN PERSPECTIVES THAT
AMERICANS, WHEN THEY SPEAK OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS, LOVE TO
BORROW METAPHORS FROM METEOROLOGY.
WE SPEAK OF COLD WAR,
HEATED RHETORIC, AND STORMY EXCHANGES.
TOO OFTEN OUR FAVORITE
INSTRUMENT OF ANALYSIS IS THE THERMOMETER: OUR FAVORITE SUBJECT
OF ANALYSIS, THE ATMOSPHERE.
SOVIET RHETORIC OFFERS A STRIKING CONTRAST. FROM LENIN
TO GORBACHEV, SOVIET LEADERS HAVE FOCUSED THEIR ATTENTION ON
WHAT MARXIST-LENINST DOCTRINE CALLS "OBJECTIVE" FACTORS.
THE
SOVIETS DO NOT MEASURE THE TEMPERATURE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS.
THEY MEASURE WHAT THEY CALL THE "CORRELATION OF FORCES:" THE
BALANCE OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND ABOVE ALL MILITARY POWER.
IN LENIN'S FAMOUS PHRASE, THEY ASK "KTO KOVO?" (KAH-TOE', KAH-
VOE') -- ROUGHLY, AND POLITELY, TRANSLATED AS WHO IS DOING
WHAT, TO WHOM?
16
-4-
TODAY IT IS A COMMONPLACE OBSERVATION AMONG AMERICAN
PUNDITS THAT THE "ATMOSPHERE" OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS HAS
WORSENED OVER THE PAST FOUR AND A HALF YEARS.
THE BLAME IS
PUT SQUARELY ON PRESIDENT REAGAN, OR MORE PRECISELY, ON WHAT IS
COMMONLY TERMED HIS "HARSH, ANTI-SOVIET RHETORIC."
LEAVING ASIDE THE QUESTION OF WHY THE SOVIETS' CONSISTENTLY
HARSH ANTI-AMERICAN RHETORIC IS NEVER THOUGHT TO POISON THE
ATMOSPHERE BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES, I THINK IT A USEFUL
EXERCISE TO TRY TO LOOK AT RECENT EAST-WEST RELATIONS FROM
THE BEAR'S PERSPECTIVE.
WHAT HAS HAPPENED, NOT TO THE
ATMOSPHERE, BUT TO THE "CORRELATION OF FORCES?"
TODAY THE CRUCIAL FACT ABOUT EAST-WEST RELATIONS IS
THAT THE U.S. AND ITS ALLIES ARE STRONGER, MORE CONFIDENT,
AND MORE UNITED THAN THEY HAVE BEEN AT ANY TIME IN RECENT
HISTORY.
SINCE 1980 NO NEW NATIONS HAVE ENTERED THE
SOVIET CAMP, AND GRENADA HAS LEFT -- DEALING AS IT WENT A
-5-
FATAL BLOW TO THE NOTION THAT THE MARCH OF COMMUNISM COULD 60
ONLY FORWARD, NEVER BACKWARD.
THE UNITED STATES IS AT LAST
MODERNIZING ITS STRATEGIC AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES: AND TOGETHER
WITH OUR ALLIES WE HAVE ENDED THE SOVIET MONOPOLY OF INTERMEDIATE
INLATe1983
RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE.
JUST THIS PAST YEAR THE
SOVIETS TOOK A MAJOR GAMBLE BY WALKING OUT OF THE ARMS REDUCTION
NEGOTIATIONS, AND TRYING TO CONVINCE THE AMERICAN PEOPLE THAT
IT WAS PRESIDENT REAGAN'S FAULT.
THEY LOST.
THE SOVIETS, OF COURSE, ARE NOT VERY HAPPY ABOUT THESE
DEVELOPMENTS. AND THEY HAVE MADE NO SECRET OF THEIR DISPLEASURE.
DOES THEIR PUBLIC GRUMBLING MEAN, THEN, THAT OUR RENEWED STRENGTH
HAS ACTUALLY WEAKENED THE PROSPECTS FOR DETERRING AGGRESSION,
OR PERSUADING THE SOVIETS TO NEGOTIATE GENUINE ARMS REDUCTIONS?
COMMON SENSE AND POSTWAR HISTORY WOULD SURELY ADVISE
US THAT THE SOVIETS RESPECT STRENGTH, HOWEVER GRUDGINGLY, AND
ARE FAR MORE LIKELY TO COME TO TERMS WITH A STRONG THAN A WEAK
is
-6-
AMERICA. THE DISAPPOINTING EXPERIENCE OF THE PAST FIFTEEN
YEARS OF ARMS REDUCTION NEGOTIATIONS WOULD ALSO SUGGEST, HOWEVER,
THAT FOR NEGOTIATIONS TO SUCCEED THE UNITED STATES AND THE
SOVIET UNION MUST DISCOVER CERTAIN COMMON GROUND.
MORE
SPECIFICALLY, I BELIEVE THAT TO ARRIVE AT A GOOD AGREEMENT,
THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION MUST FIRST ARRIVE AT:
1) COMMON FACTS:
2) A COMMON PURPOSE: AND
3) A COMMON RESPONSIBILITY.
FACTS ARE NOT ALWAYS EASY TO COME BY IN THE SOVIET UNION.
NEW YORK TIMES REPORTER DAVID SHIPLER TELLS THE STORY OF A
COLLEAGUE WHO WAS WRITING ABOUT THE RUSSIAN NEW YEARS
CELEBRATION. HE CALLED THE METEOROLOGICAL SERVICE TO FIND
OUT HOW MUCH SNOW HAD FALLEN ON NEW YEARS DAY.
HE WAS TOLD
THAT THIS WAS CLASSIFIED SECURITY INFORMATION!
5
-7-
ARMS REDUCTION AGREEMENTS, HOWEVER, MUST BE BUILT ON A
SOLID FOUNDATION OF FACTS: FACTS SUCH AS HOW MANY WEAPONS EACH
SIDE HAS, OR HOW NEW WEAPONS WILL BE COUNTED AND DEFINED.
TOO OFTEN WE HAVE GLOSSED OVER A FAILURE TO AGREE ON
COMMON FACTS.
PERHAPS THE CLASSIC EXAMPLE IS THE DEFINITION
OF "HEAVY MISSILES" IN THE SALT I TREATY.
THE AGREEMENT
FORBADE CONVERSION OF LIGHT ICBMs TO "HEAVY" ICBMs
BUT
THE SOVIETS REFUSED TO AGREE TO A DEFINITION OF THE TERM
"HEAVY."
AND LITTLE WONDER.
ALMOST IMMEDIATELY AFTER
RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY THE SOVIETS DEPLOYED THE SS-19,
CLEARLY A. HEAVY MISSILE BY ANY DEFINITION THE UNITED STATES HAD
PROPOSED.
OUR RESPONSE? WE CONCLUDED THAT THE SOVIET DEPLOYMENT
DID NOT CONSTITUTE A TECHNICAL VIOLATION BECAUSE THE SOVIETS
HAD NOT, AFTER ALL, AGREED TO OUR DEFINITION OF "HEAVY MISSILE."
20
-8-
YOU PROBABLY HAVE NOT HEARD MUCH ABOUT THEM, BUT IN
STOCKHOLM THE UNITED STATES IS NOW PARTICIPATING IN NEGOTIATIONS
DESIGNED PRECISELY TO DEVELOP A COMMON SET OF FACTS ABOUT
MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE.
TOGETHER WITH OUR NATO
ALLIES, WE HAVE PROPOSED WHAT ARE CALLED CONFIDENCE-BUILDING
MEASURES: MEASURES THAT WILL INCREASE THE OPENNESS AND THE
PREDICTABILITY OF PEACETIME MILITARY MANEUVERS AND EXERCISES
IN EUROPE.
THOUGH SUCH ACTIVITIES USUALLY SERVE LEGITIMATE
TRAINING PURPOSES, THEY CAN ALSO BE EMPLOYED FOR POLITICAL
INTIMIDATION -- AS IN. POLAND IN
-- OR TO CONCEAL PREPARATIONS
FOR A SURPRISE ATTACK -- AS IN THE SINAI IN 1973.
UNDER A GOOD
AGREEMENT, IF A PARTY CONDUCTED CERTAIN UNANNOUNCED THREATENING
OR UNEXPECTED MILITARY ACTIVITIES, IT WOULD VIOLATE THE AGREEMENT
AND THEREBY HELP SOUND THE ALARM AGAINST AGGRESSION.
OUR PROPOSALS INCLUDE: 1) THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION
ON THE ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION OF MILITARY FORCES: 2) ANNUAL
-9-
21
FORECASTS OF MILITARY EXERCISES: 3) ADVANCE NOTICE OF SIGNIFICANT
MILITARY ACTIVITIES; 4) THE INVITATION OF OBSERVERS TO THOSE
MILITARY ACTIVITIES, AND 5) MEANS OF VERIFYING COMPLIANCE WITH
THE MEASURES AGREED TO AT THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE.
so FAR THE SOVIET RESPONSE HAS BEEN TO CALL FOR HIGH-SOUNDING
DECLARATIONS OF PEACEFUL INTENT -- WITHOUT ANY EXCHANGE OF
INFORMATION, VERIFICATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES, OR ENFORCEMENT
CLAUSES.
BUT THIS ADMINISTRATION IS NOT WILLING TO SUBSTITUTE
RHETORIC FOR SOLID AGREEMENT, AND WE WILL CONTINUE TO WORK
FOR GENUINE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES IN STOCKHOLM. AND CONSIDER
REAFFIRMING DECLARATIONS OF INTENT ONLY THE IN
THE NEED FOR A COMMON SET OF FACTS ON WHICH TO BASE AN CONTEXT
AGREEMENT IS RELATIVELY STRAIGHTFORWARD.
THE NEED FOR A COMMON
PURPOSE, HOWEVER, IS SOMETIMES MISUNDERSTOOD.
PUT BLUNTLY, IN THE BROADEST AND MOST IMPORTANT SENSE
THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION DO NOT HAVE A COMMON
PURPOSE.
DURING THE PAST DECADE WE SOMETIMES EMBRACED THE
OF CONCRETE MEASURES
WHICH GIVE REAL MEANING
TO SUCH DECLARATIONS.
22
-10-
THEORY THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS BECOMING A "STATUS QUO POWER:"
A NATION THAT WOULD SHARE WITH US THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR MAINTAINING
WORLD PEACE AND STABILITY.
SOVIET PRESIDENT BREZHNEV WARNED
OTHERWISE. "DETENTE, HE DECLARED, "IN NO WAY RESCINDS, OR
CAN RESCIND, THE LAWS OF THE CLASS STRUGGLE." AND INDEED THE
STRUGGLE WENT ON IN POLAND, AFGHANISTAN, CAMBODIA, NICARAGUA,
ANGOLA
...
BACKED BY SOVIET AND SOVIET-SURROGATE FORCES.
ANOTHER ILLUSION OF THE 1970s WAS THE BELIEF THAT THE
SOVIETS COULD BE PERSUADED TO ADOPT AMERICA'S STRATEGIC DOCTRINES,
IN PARTICULAR WHAT HENRY KISSINGER HAS CALLED "THE HISTORICALLY
AMAZING THEORY THAT VULNERABILITY CONTRIBUTED TO PEACE, AND
INVULNERABILITY CONTRIBUTED TO THE RISKS OF WAR."
DURING THE 1970s THE UNITED STATES UNILATERALLY
RESTRICTED ITS OWN NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENTS, AND DISMANTLED
ITS ONLY ABM SYSTEM, HOPING THE SOVIETS WOULD IMITATE THIS
RESTRAINT, THEY DID NOT. INSTEAD, THE SOVIETS PURSUED A
23
-11-
MAJOR RESEARCH EFFORT INTO DEFENSE TECHNOLOGIES: AN EFFORT
THAT CONTINUES EVEN AS THEY CONDEMN THE PRESIDENT'S OWN RESEARCH
INITIATIVE AS THE START OF A NEW ARMS RACE. LIKEWISE, THE
SOVIETS DEVELOPED AN ICBM FORCE WHOSE NUMBERS, EXPLOSIVE POWER,
AND ACCURACY WERE FAR GREATER THAN WOULD BE NEEDED SIMPLY TO
ASSURE EFFECTIVE RETALIATION.
THE EXPERIENCE OF THE PAST DECADE, THEN, SHOULD MAKE US
CAUTIOUS ABOUT ATTRIBUTING A BROAD COMMON PURPOSE, OR A SHARED
STRATEGIC CONSENSUS, TO THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION.
IN A NARROWER SENSE, HOWEVER, THE BASIS FOR A COMMON PURPOSE
CLEARLY EXISTS.
THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS so DEVASTATING
THAT WHATEVER THE DIFFERENCE IN OUR AIMS AND DOCTRINES, THE
UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION MUST SHARE AN INTEREST IN
PREVENTING NUCLEAR WAR.
AND IN FACT THE SOVIETS HAVE COOPERATED WITH US IN CERTAIN
AREAS TO REDUCE THE RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR.
WE HAVE AGREED TO
24
-12-
UPGRADE THE HOTLINE.
WE ARE IN ESSENTIAL AGREEMENT ON
NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY.
WE BOTH EXERCISE IN MANY IMPORTANT
WAYS GREAT CAUTION ABOUT NUCLEAR ARMS.
TODAY'S CONVENTIONAL WISDOM HAS IT THAT THE PRESIDENT'S
STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE, IF IT CONTINUES TO MOVE FORWARD,
WILL SOUND THE DEATH-KNELL FOR ARMS REDUCTION AGREEMENTS.
I CERTAINLY AGREE THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD FAR PREFER A WORLD IN
WHICH THEY ALONE WERE DEVELOPING STRATEGIC DEFENSES, WHILE WE
REMAINED WHOLLY VULNERABLE TO ATTACK.
I EXPECT THE SOVIETS
WILL CONTINUE SEEKING SUCH A WORLD, AND SEEKING IT VIGOROUSLY.
BUT ONCE THE SOVIETS ARE CONVINCED -- IF THEY ARE CONVINCED
-- THAT WE WILL NOT CONCEDE THEM A UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE, I
WORKING, WITH US IN CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH OUR ALLIES,
BELIEVE OUR TWO NATIONS CAN WORK TOGETHER TO MANAGE THE TRANSITION
TO A NEW DEFENSIVE ARRANGEMENT.
SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT, AFTER
ALL, ULTIMATELY OFFERS FAR MORE SAFETY TO BOTH OUR SOCIETIES,
AND THOSE OF OUR ALLIES.
-13-
ONCE WE HAVE PERSUADED THE SOVIETS TO ACCEPT COMMON FACTS AND
A COMMON PURPOSE, HOWEVER, WE FACE THE MOST DIFFICULT CHALLENGE
OF ALL. AND THAT IS THE CHALLENGE OF PERSUADING THE SOVIETS,
WHO DO NOT SHARE OUR RESPECT FOR THE RULE OF LAW, TO ACCEPT
COMMON RESPONSIBILITY FOR MAKING NEGOTIATED AGREEMENTS WORK.
A FEW WEEKS AGO WE WITNESSED THE SPECTACLE OF AN AMERICAN
ARMY MAJOR SHOT BY A SOVIET SENTRY AND LEFT TO BLEED AND DIE
ON EAST GERMAN SOIL. HIS MURDER INFORMED MILLIONS OF AMERICANS
THAT WE HAVE A NEGOTIATED AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION:TO
EXCHANGE MILITARY OBSERVERS IN GERMANY: AN AGREEMENT DATING
FROM 1947.
I WAS FRANKLY DISMAYED BY MUCH OF THE REACTION TO THIS
OUTRAGE.
THERMOMETERS POPPED OUT ALL OVER WASHINGTON, AS
OUR SO-CALLED OPINION LEADERS SOUGHT TO MEASURE THE EFFECT OF
MAJOR NICHOLSON'S MURDER ON THE "ATMOSPHERE" OF EAST-WEST
RELATIONS.
v
-14-
DO NOT MISTAKE ME.
I STRONGLY SUPPORT PRESIDENT REAGAN'S
DECISION TO CONTINUE NEGOTIATING WITH THE SOVIETS, JUST AS I
SUPPORTED THE SAME DECISION AFTER 269 INNOCENT CIVILIANS MET
THEIR DEATH ON KAL FLIGHT 007.
WHAT DISMAYED ME WAS THE
ALMOST TOTAL FAILURE OF THE PRESS, IN THE MIDST OF ALL THEIR
TEMPERATURE-TAKING, TO ASK A VERY BASIC QUESTION. WHAT IS
THE VALUE OF AGREEING TO EXCHANGE OBSERVERS IF THE OBSERVERS
ARE GOING TO BE SHOT? OR, PUT MORE BROADLY, WHAT IS THE
VALUE. OF AGREEMENTS WITH THE SOVIETS IF THEY WILL NOT SHARE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENFORCING THEM?
OF COURSE, IN MANY CIRCLES IT IS CONSIDERED BAD MANNERS
TO RAISE THE ISSUE OF TREATY COMPLIANCE.
WHEN PRESIDENT REAGAN
SUBMITTED A LIST OF VIOLATIONS TO THE SENATE HE WAS ROUNDLY
CONDEMNED IN THE PRESS FOR ENDANGERING THE ARMS REDUCTION
"PROCESS."
COMPLIANCE HAS INDEED BECOME A KIND OF LITMUS
TEST FOR INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED WITH NATIONAL SECURITY.
IF
21
-15-
THEY EXPRESS CONCERN ABOUT COMPLIANCE, THEY ARE IMMEDIATELY
LABELLED AS UNREGENERATE OPPONENTS OF ARMS REDUCTION, WHO
BELIEVE IN BRUTE MILITARY STRENGTH, CONFRONTATION, AND THE
FUTILITY OF NEGOTIATING GENUINE ARMS REDUCTION AGREEMENTS WITH
THE SOVIET UNION.
IN FACT, IT IS PRECISELY BECAUSE THIS ADMINISTRATION
DOES BELIEVE IN THE PROMISE OF ARMS REDUCTION NEGOTIATIONS --
ESPECIALLY AT A TIME WHEN AMERICA HAS RECOVERED HER STRENGTH
AND STRENGTH OF PURPOSE -- THAT WE ARE TAKING COMPLIANCE
SO SERIOUSLY.
TO ARGUE THAT BREAKING TREATIES IS UNIMPORTANT
IS TO ARGUE THAT THE TREATIES THEMSELVES ARE FRIVOLOUS.
SURELY WE CAN DEMAND MORE OF ARMS REDUCTION NEGOTIATIONS THAN
THAT.
DURING THE DECADE OF THE 1970s WE IN EFFECT OFFERED THE
SOVIETS TWO CHOICES.
:
THEY COULD AGREE TO GENUINE, MUTUAL,
VERIFIABLE ARMS REDUCTION AGREEMENTS -- NOT JUST AGREEMENTS
28
-16-
THAT CODIFIED A MILITARY BUILDUP.
OR, WITH THE FULL
SANCTION OF SO-CALLED ARMS "CONTROL" AGREEMENTS, THEY COULD
SIMPLY CONTINUE EXPANDING THEIR MILITARY POWER
...
SECURE
IN THE KNOWLEDGE THAT WE WERE UNWILLING TO PAY THE PRICE FOR
RESTORING THE MILITARY BALANCE.
THE CHOICE WAS EASY.
THE CHOICES OF THE 1980s ARE PROVING HARDER FOR THE SOVIETS.
THE CHOICE OF GENUINE, MUTUAL, VERIFIABLE ARMS REDUCTION AGREEMENTS
REMAINS OPEN.
AND, AS PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS DEMONSTRATED, WE
ARE WILLING TO BE FLEXIBLE ABOUT HOW THESE REDUCTIONS CAN BEST
AND MOST FAIRLY BE ACHIEVED.
BUT FOR NOW AT LEAST THAT SECOND
CHOICE -- UNILATERAL AMERICAN RESTRAINT -- HAS BEEN REPLACED BY
A DETERMINATION TO PRESERVE THE MILITARY BALANCE.
THE SOVIETS ARE OF COURSE HOPING THAT WE WILL LOSE
PATIENCE WITH OUR PROGRAM TO RESTORE AMERICA'S MILITARY STRENGTH.
29
-17-
AND THEY HAVE SOME CAUSE FOR HOPE.
BUT IF WE CAN MAINTAIN A
STEADY COURSE AND A STRONG SENSE OF PURPOSE, I BELIEVE THIS
DECADE COULD AT LAST WITNESS THE ARMS REDUCTION BREAKTHROUGH WE
HAVE BEEN SEEKING, WITHOUT SUCCESS, SINCE THE DAWN OF THE
NUCLEAR AGE.
ABOVE ALL, WE AS A NATION NEED TO KEEP OUR ULTIMATE GOALS
IN SIGHT.
STRONG DEFENSES ARE NOT A GOAL.
AGREEMENTS WITH
THE SOVIET UNION ARE NOT A GOAL. THEY ARE MEANS TO ACHIEVE OUR
GOALS: PRESERVING PEACE, PROTECTING FREEDOM. AND PROMOTING
DEMOCRACY AND PROSPERITY THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. AND THEY
SHOULD BE JUDGED ACCORDING TO HOW WELL THEY SUCCEED IN THAT
PURPOSE,
NOW LET ME TAKE YOUR QUESTIONS.
MEMORANDUM
30
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 1, 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR FRED RYAN
FROM:
ROBERT C. McFARLANE Bud
SUBJECT:
Oval Office Meeting with Harold Willens
We have received your Presidential Activity package for an
approved Oval Office meeting with Harold Willens. This meeting
is to take place May 15 at 1:15 p.m. Upon some investigation, my
staff has learned that Willens is an active supporter and funder
of the nuclear freeze, and other similar "peace" movements, in
California.
This already-scheduled meeting was approved by Mike Deaver.
Unless there is some overriding reason why the President should
see Willens (e.g., he's a personal friend), I recommend that this
meeting be canceled.
31
MEMORANDUM
2429
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
April 25, 1985
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE
FROM:
JACK F. MATLOCKA for
SUBJECT:
Oval Office Meeting with Mr. Harold Willens
Mike Deaver approved scheduling a 15-minute Oval Office meeting
with Harold Willens. I have learned that Willens is a big
supporter and funder of the nuclear freeze movement in
California, and he is active in other causes contrary to the
Administration's policies. The purpose of this meeting is to
lobby the President to agree to a summit meeting in Hiroshima.
Am Hiroshima summit meeting is something we should not seriously
consider.
Unless Willens is the President's personal friend, I recommend
that the President not see Willens a second time.
Sven Kraemer, Steve SRS Sestanovich, John JL Lencczowski, and
SK
Bill Martin concur.
RECOMMENDATION
1. That you sign the memo to Fred Ryan (Tab I) outlining the
reasons why the meeting should be canceled.
Disapprove
OR
Approve m
2. That you approve the Meeting Memorandum at Tab II and the
anyway, Talking Points at Tab A, if it is decided to hold the meeting
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments:
Tab I
Memo to Ryan
Tab II
Meeting Memorandum
Tab A
Talking Points
Tab III
Clearance List
Tab IV
Background papers
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
2429
3V
WASHINGTON
MEETING WITH MR. HAROLD WILLENS
DATE:
May 15, 1985
LOCATION:
Oval Office
TIME:
1:15 p.m. - 1:30 p.m.
FROM:
ROBERT C. McFARLANE
I. PURPOSE:
To discuss Mr. Willens's suggestions on holding a potential
summit meeting at Hiroshima.
II. BACKGROUND:
Will provide opportunity to hear his views on why he
suggests your having a summit meeting with Soviet Leader
Gorbachev at Hiroshima. This is at least your second meeting
with Willens; you have corresponded with him once earlier this
year, in which you replied that you would give his suggestion
"careful thought." (The idea is not a good one and should not be
encouraged.)
III. PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Michael K. Deaver
Robert C. McFarlane
Jack F. Matlock
IV. PRESS PLAN:
None
V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS:
Greet Willens and initiate discussion of his suggestion.
Prepared by:
Nicholas S. Klissas
Attachment:
Tab A
Talking Points
33
TALKING POINTS
Meeting with Harold Willens
May 15, 1985
-- Welcome to Washington. How is the weather back in
California?
-- Your suggestion is a very interesting one. How did this
idea come about?
-- I'd like to meet with Gorbachev, under the right
conditions. But, you know, it's the Soviet turn to come
here. A summit meeting at Hiroshima could look like an
artificial event for the media, and this is certainly not
what we want.
-- I'm also not sure how the Japanese would feel about it,
whether they would want a Soviet leader to come given the
lack of a peace treaty and the problem of the Northern
Islands.
FOR END OF MEETING
-- Appreciate your ideas on this subject. It still is too
early to tell under what conditions a meeting may take
place, but we will keep your suggestion in mind.
34
REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS
To:
Officer-in-charge
Appointments Center
Room 060, OEOB
Please admit the following appointments on
Wednesday, May 15,
, 19 85
THE PRESIDENT
for
of
:
(NAME OF PERSON TO BE VISITED)
(AGENCY)
PARTICIPANTS
Michael K. Deaver
Robert C. McFarlane
Jack F. Matlock
Harold Willens
MEETING LOCATION
Building WHITE HOUSE
Requested by JACK F. MATLOCK
Room No. OVAL OFFICE
Room No. 368 Telephone
X5112
Time of Meeting
1:15 PM
Date of request
April 30, 1985
Additions and/or changes made by telephone should be limited to five (5) names or less.
APPOINTMENTS CENTER: SIG/OEOB - 395-6046 or WHITE HOUSE - 456-6742
UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE
SSF 2037 (03-81)
35
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
3/29/85
MEMORANDUM
TO:
ROBERT MCFARLANE
FROM:
FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR. tyn
SUBJECT:
APPROVED PRESIDENTIAL ACTIVITY
MEETING:
with Harold Willens
DATE:
May 15, 1985
TIME:
1:15 pm
DURATION:
15 minutes
LOCATION:
Oval Office
REMARKS REQUIRED: Talking points to be covered in briefing paper
MEDIA COVERAGE:
If any, coordinate with Press Office
FIRST LADY
PARTICIPATION: No
NOTE: PROJECT OFFICER, SEE ATTACHED CHECKLIST
cc: K. Barun
A. Kingon
R. Kimmitt
P. Buchanan
C. McCain
D. Chew
B. Oglesby
T. Dawson
E. Rollins
R. Deprospero
J. Rosebush
B. Elliott
R. Scouten
D. Fischer
B. Shaddix
M. Friedersdorf
W. Sittmann
C. Fuller
L. Speakes
W. Henkel
WHCA Audio/Visual
E. Hickey
WHCA Operations
J. Hirshberg
Nell Yates
G. Hodges
30
HAROLD WILLENS
PRESIDENT AND CHAIRMAN (RETIRED) FACTORY EQUIPMENT CORPORATION AND WILSHOP CO
Biel sel-up with RR
15 minutes
March 18, 1985
President Ronald Reagan
The White House
Dear Mr. President,
I am grateful for your January 23rd letter
and especially appreciate your willingness to
give "careful thought" to the idea of a Hiroshima
Summit.
In this particular year, that would be an
unprecedented event bound to capture the attention,
imagination and respect of all the world.
In that connection, I would like to share with
you a further suggestion which I believe would inter-
est you.
I am scheduled to be in Washington the week
of May 13th and wonder whether you would be willing
to meet with me for 15 or 20 minutes so that I can
explain it in a way that would do justice to some-
thing which I believe would benefit your Adminis-
tration, our country and the world.
Sincerely,
Harold Willens
HW:kk
5-15-85
1:15
15 min
3/28/85
31
TO:
PROJECT OFFICERS
FROM:
FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR.
SUBJECT:
Checklist for Presidential Events
General Responsiblities
The Presidential Advance Office has responsibility for all logistical arrangements
for any event involving press coverage. Please coordinate with them from the time
your event is approved in order to avoid the need for last-minute modification.
Notify and clear all participants. (Full name, social security number, date of
birth).
Prepare and submit briefing paper to David Chew's Office by 3:00 p.m. of the
preceding day. (14 copies)
Coordinate with James Kuhn (x2168) on Presidential involvement.
Coordinate with the Press Office (x2100) regarding Press Coverage.
Indicate hometowns of participants.
If remarks are required, coordinate with the Speechwriters Office (x6266) well in
advance.
For Rose Garden events, clear and reserve a backup location in case of inclement
weather.
If participant brings a gift, contact the White House Gift Unit (x7133) for
handling.
If any foreign visitor or dignitary is to be involved, please coordinate with Robert
Kimmitt of the NSC (x2224).
If any Department of Defense or Military personnel are to be involved, please
coordinate in advance with the White House Military Office (x2150).
If press coverage is expected, please provide all pertinent information concerning
this event (guests, scenario, backdrop, etc.,) to the Presidential Advance Office
at least 72 hours prior to the event.
Submit a complete, confirmed list of staff and attendees, identified by title, as well
as the actual starting and completion times, to the President's Diarist, Office of
Presidential Appointments and Scheduling (x7560) within five (5) days after the
event.
If tent name cards are needed, send a list of names to Social Secretary's office
(x7064) at least 48 hours in advance.
For West Wing Meetings all room arrangements (chairs, notepads, pencils, etc.)
should be made through Carl Jones (x2275) or Nell Yates (x2605).
Residence Events
Coordinate with the Social Secretary's office (x7064) for all arrangements.
Send guest list to Social Secretary's office, preferably three weeks prior to the
event.
38
1111 WHITE 1101 51
CHRON FILE
WASHINGTON
January 23, 1985
Dear Mr. Willens:
Thank you for your letter of January 7 with the
suggestion that I consider the possibility of a
summit meeting in Hiroshima.
I am determined to do all I can to try to
negotiate fair and equitable agreements with the
Soviet Union to bring down the high levels of
nuclear weapons and to set the world on a course
toward their complete elimination.
In that connection, I want you to know that I will
bear in mind your very interesting suggestion and
will give it careful thought.
With warm regards,
Sincerely,
Ronald Rayan
Mr. Harold Willens
President and Chairman
Factory Equipment Corporation
and Wilshop Corporation
1122 Maple Avenue,
Los Angeles, California 90015
39
0390
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 18, 1985
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
SIGNED
FROM:
ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
Hope
SUBJECT:
Letter to Mr. Harold Willens
A suggested reply to the letter from Harold Willens -- which you
handed me earlier this week -- is at Tab A.
Recommendation
OK
No
-RR
That you sign the letter at Tab A.
Attachment:
Tab A
Letter to Mr. Harold Willens
Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock
CC: Vice President
40
0390
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
January 16, 1985
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
SIGNED
FROM:
JACK F. MATLOCK
R
SUBJECT:
Letter to the President from Harold Willens
A suggested reply to Mr. Willen's letter is at Tab A.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.
Attachments:
Tab I Memo to the President
Tab A Letter for President's Signature
Tab B Mr. H. Willens Letter to the President
HAROED WIELENS
CHAIRMAN
FACTORY
41
0390
January 7, 1985
President Ronald Reagan
The White House
Dear Mr. President,
Perhaps you will recall that when we met
in the Oval Office, you indicated willingness
to consider the idea of a Summit Meeting ("at
some appropriate time") which would be made
unique by the fact of its being held in Hiro-
shima. And perhaps you will recall our reasons
for believing that such a meeting would justi-
fiably yield not only worldwide respect and
attention, but also a place of distinction in
the annals of history.
There are a number of reasons -- beyond
those which are obvious -- for which August 6
of this year might be particularly "appropriate"
for this unprecedented event -- reasons which
would benefit your Administration as well as
our country and the world. I hope that you
will grant me the privilege of bringing these
reasons to your personal attention in a brief
discussion sometime soon.
As a person trained by many years of busi-
ness experience, I am keenly aware of the demands
upon your time, Mr. President. But I am also
aware of your deep desire to make the world a
safer place while keeping our country strong.
It is this knowledge that encourages me to make
the request which Patti has generously offered
to bring to your personal attention.
Sincerely,
Haroldwillow
Harold Willens
HW:kk
1122 MAPLE AVENUE. LOS ANGELES. CALIFORNIA 90015. 213 748-5465
matlock JM-C
42
3529
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
May 2, 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL R.J. AFFOURTIT
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ROOM 3E880, THE PENTAGON
SUBJECT:
SecDef Address to the Regional Council on Foreign
Relations, May 3, 1985
The draft text of Secretary Weinberger's May 3 speech has been
approved with the suggested minor changes as indicated.
RohertM. KummAt
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary
Attachment:
Tab A
Secretary Weinberger's May 3 Speech
McCONNELL
43
29APR85
3:00PM
REMARKS BY SECRETARY WEINBERGER
TO THE
NASHVILLE, LOUISVILLE, AND BIRMINGHAM COUNCILS ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS
3 MAY 1985
I WISH TO THANK THE COUNCILS ON FOREIGN RELATIONS NOT ONLY
FOR INVITING ME HERE TODAY, BUT ALSO FOR SPONSORING THIS VALUABLE
AND TIMELY SYMPOSIUM ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS.
AMERICANS, OF COURSE, DIFFER WIDELY IN THEIR PERSPECTIVES
ON THIS SUBJECT. YOU HAVE HEARD SOME OF THESE DIFFERENCES
TODAY.
BUT IN DEBATING OUR DIFFERENCES WE SHOULD ALWAYS
KEEP IN MIND THAT A FAR WIDER GULF EXISTS BETWEEN AMERICAN, AND
SOVIET, PERSPECTIVES ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS.
DIFFERENCES IN PERSPECTIVES ARE ILLUSTRATED BY A STORY
PRESIDENT REAGAN LOVES TO TELL, ABOUT A MINISTER'S SON WHO WAS
TAKEN OUT CAMPING ONE DAY.
HIS COMPANIONS WARNED HIM NOT TO
44
-2-
STRAY TOO FAR FROM THE CAMPFIRE, BECAUSE THE WOODS WERE FULL OF
WILD BEASTS.
BEING YOUNG, THE BOY OF COURSE IGNORED THIS
GOOD ADVICE, AND WANDERED OFF TO EXPLORE. SUDDENLY HE FOUND
HIMSELF FACE TO FACE WITH A VERY LARGE AND NOT VERY FRIENDLY
LOOKING BEAR.
SEEING NO MEANS OF ESCAPE, THE MINISTER'S SON DID AS HE HAD
BEEN TAUGHT. HE KNELT DOWN TO PRAY FOR DELIVERANCE.
AND
WHEN HE OPENED HIS EYES A FEW MOMENTS LATER, HE WAS DELIGHTED
TO DISCOVER THAT THE BEAR, TOO, WAS KNEELING IN PRAYER RIGHT
IN FRONT OF HIM.
"OH BEAR." HE SAID, "ISN'T THIS WONDERFUL.
HERE WE
ARE, WITH SUCH DIFFERENT LIVES AND SUCH DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES,
BUT WE'RE BOTH PRAYING TO THE SAME LORD."
THE BEAR REPLIED EVENLY, "I DON'T KNOW ABOUT YOU, SON,
BUT I'M SAYING GRACE."
45
-3-
IT IS REVEALING OF OUR DIFFERENCE IN PERSPECTIVES THAT
AMERICANS, WHEN THEY SPEAK OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS, LOVE TO
BORROW METAPHORS FROM METEOROLOGY.
WE SPEAK OF COLD WAR,
HEATED RHETORIC, AND STORMY EXCHANGES.
TOO OFTEN OUR FAVORITE
INSTRUMENT OF ANALYSIS IS THE THERMOMETER: OUR FAVORITE SUBJECT
OF ANALYSIS, THE ATMOSPHERE.
SOVIET RHETORIC OFFERS A STRIKING CONTRAST. FROM LENIN
TO GORBACHEV, SOVIET LEADERS HAVE FOCUSED THEIR ATTENTION ON
WHAT MARXIST-LENINST DOCTRINE CALLS "OBJECTIVE" FACTORS.
THE
SOVIETS DO NOT MEASURE THE TEMPERATURE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS.
THEY MEASURE WHAT THEY CALL THE "CORRELATION OF FORCES:" THE
BALANCE OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND ABOVE ALL MILITARY POWER.
IN LENIN'S FAMOUS PHRASE, THEY ASK "KTO KOVO?" (KAH-TOE', KAH-
VOE') -- ROUGHLY, AND POLITELY, TRANSLATED AS WHO IS DOING
WHAT, TO WHOM?
the
-4-
TODAY IT IS A COMMONPLACE OBSERVATION AMONG AMERICAN
PUNDITS THAT THE "ATMOSPHERE" OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS HAS
WORSENED OVER THE PAST FOUR AND A HALF YEARS.
THE BLAME IS
PUT SQUARELY ON PRESIDENT REAGAN, OR MORE PRECISELY, ON WHAT IS
COMMONLY TERMED HIS "HARSH, ANTI-SOVIET RHETORIC."
LEAVING ASIDE THE QUESTION OF WHY THE SOVIETS' CONSISTENTLY
HARSH ANTI-AMERICAN RHETORIC IS NEVER THOUGHT TO POISON THE
ATMOSPHERE BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES, I THINK IT A USEFUL
EXERCISE TO TRY TO LOOK AT RECENT EAST-WEST RELATIONS FROM
THE BEAR'S PERSPECTIVE.
WHAT HAS HAPPENED, NOT TO THE
ATMOSPHERE, BUT TO THE "CORRELATION OF FORCES?"
TODAY THE CRUCIAL FACT ABOUT EAST-WEST RELATIONS IS
THAT THE U.S. AND ITS ALLIES ARE STRONGER, MORE CONFIDENT,
AND MORE UNITED THAN THEY HAVE BEEN AT ANY TIME IN RECENT
HISTORY.
SINCE 1980 NO NEW NATIONS HAVE ENTERED THE
SOVIET CAMP, AND GRENADA HAS LEFT -- DEALING AS IT WENT A
47
-5-
FATAL BLOW TO THE NOTION THAT THE MARCH OF COMMUNISM COULD 60
ONLY FORWARD, NEVER BACKWARD.
THE UNITED STATES IS AT LAST
MODERNIZING ITS STRATEGIC AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES: AND TOGETHER
WITH OUR ALLIES WE HAVE ENDED THE SOVIET MONOPOLY OF INTERMEDIATE
INCate1983
RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE.
JUST THIS PAST YEAR THE
SOVIETS TOOK A MAJOR GAMBLE BY WALKING OUT OF THE ARMS REDUCTION
NEGOTIATIONS, AND TRYING TO CONVINCE THE AMERICAN PEOPLE THAT
IT WAS PRESIDENT REAGAN'S FAULT.
THEY LOST.
THE SOVIETS, OF COURSE, ARE NOT VERY HAPPY ABOUT THESE
DEVELOPMENTS.
AND THEY HAVE MADE NO SECRET OF THEIR DISPLEASURE.
DOES THEIR PUBLIC GRUMBLING MEAN, THEN, THAT OUR RENEWED STRENGTH
HAS ACTUALLY WEAKENED THE PROSPECTS FOR DETERRING AGGRESSION,
OR PERSUADING THE SOVIETS TO NEGOTIATE GENUINE ARMS REDUCTIONS?
COMMON SENSE AND POSTWAR HISTORY WOULD SURELY ADVISE
US THAT THE SOVIETS RESPECT STRENGTH, HOWEVER GRUDGINGLY, AND
ARE FAR MORE LIKELY TO COME TO TERMS WITH A STRONG THAN A WEAK
48
-6-
AMERICA. THE DISAPPOINTING EXPERIENCE OF THE PAST FIFTEEN
YEARS OF ARMS REDUCTION NEGOTIATIONS WOULD ALSO SUGGEST, HOWEVER,
THAT FOR NEGOTIATIONS TO SUCCEED THE UNITED STATES AND THE
SOVIET UNION MUST DISCOVER CERTAIN COMMON GROUND.
MORE
SPECIFICALLY, I BELIEVE THAT TO ARRIVE AT A GOOD AGREEMENT,
THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION MUST FIRST ARRIVE AT:
1) COMMON FACTS:
2) A COMMON PURPOSE: AND
3) A COMMON RESPONSIBILITY.
FACTS ARE NOT ALWAYS EASY TO COME BY IN THE SOVIET UNION.
NEW YORK TIMES REPORTER DAVID SHIPLER TELLS THE STORY OF A
COLLEAGUE WHO WAS WRITING ABOUT THE RUSSIAN NEW YEARS
CELEBRATION. HE CALLED THE METEOROLOGICAL SERVICE TO FIND
OUT HOW MUCH SNOW HAD FALLEN ON NEW YEARS DAY.
HE WAS TOLD
THAT THIS WAS CLASSIFIED SECURITY INFORMATION!
49
-7-
ARMS REDUCTION AGREEMENTS, HOWEVER, MUST BE BUILT ON A
SOLID FOUNDATION OF FACTS: FACTS SUCH AS HOW MANY WEAPONS EACH
SIDE HAS, OR HOW NEW WEAPONS WILL BE COUNTED AND DEFINED.
TOO OFTEN WE HAVE GLOSSED OVER A FAILURE TO AGREE ON
COMMON FACTS.
PERHAPS THE CLASSIC EXAMPLE IS THE DEFINITION
OF "HEAVY MISSILES" IN THE SALT I TREATY.
THE AGREEMENT
FORBADE CONVERSION OF LIGHT ICBMs TO "HEAVY" ICBMs
BUT
THE SOVIETS REFUSED TO AGREE TO A DEFINITION OF THE TERM
"HEAVY."
AND LITTLE WONDER.
ALMOST IMMEDIATELY AFTER
RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY THE SOVIETS DEPLOYED THE SS-19,
CLEARLY A. HEAVY MISSILE BY ANY DEFINITION THE UNITED STATES HAD
PROPOSED.
OUR RESPONSE? WE CONCLUDED THAT THE SOVIET DEPLOYMENT
DID NOT CONSTITUTE A TECHNICAL VIOLATION BECAUSE THE SOVIETS
HAD NOT, AFTER ALL, AGREED TO OUR DEFINITION OF "HEAVY MISSILE."
50
-8-
YOU PROBABLY HAVE NOT HEARD MUCH ABOUT THEM, BUT IN
STOCKHOLM THE UNITED STATES IS NOW PARTICIPATING IN NEGOTIATIONS
DESIGNED PRECISELY TO DEVELOP A COMMON SET OF FACTS ABOUT
MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE.
TOGETHER WITH OUR NATO
ALLIES, WE HAVE PROPOSED WHAT ARE CALLED CONFIDENCE-BUILDING
MEASURES: MEASURES THAT WILL INCREASE THE OPENNESS AND THE
PREDICTABILITY OF PEACETIME MILITARY MANEUVERS AND EXERCISES
IN EUROPE.
THOUGH SUCH ACTIVITIES USUALLY SERVE LEGITIMATE
TRAINING PURPOSES, THEY CAN ALSO BE EMPLOYED FOR POLITICAL
INTIMIDATION -- AS IN POLAND IN
-- OR TO CONCEAL PREPARATIONS
FOR A SURPRISE ATTACK -- AS IN THE SINAI IN 1973.
UNDER A GOOD
AGREEMENT, IF A PARTY CONDUCTED CERTAIN UNANNOUNCED THREATENING
OR UNEXPECTED MILITARY ACTIVITIES, IT WOULD VIOLATE THE AGREEMENT
AND THEREBY HELP SOUND THE ALARM AGAINST AGGRESSION.
OUR PROPOSALS INCLUDE: 1) THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION
ON THE ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION OF MILITARY FORCES; 2) ANNUAL
51
-9-
FORECASTS OF MILITARY EXERCISES: 3) ADVANCE NOTICE OF SIGNIFICANT
MILITARY ACTIVITIES; 4) THE INVITATION OF OBSERVERS TO THOSE
MILITARY ACTIVITIES, AND 5) MEANS OF VERIFYING COMPLIANCE WITH
THE MEASURES AGREED TO AT THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE.
SO FAR THE SOVIET RESPONSE HAS BEEN TO CALL FOR HIGH-SOUNDING
DECLARATIONS OF PEACEFUL INTENT -- WITHOUT ANY EXCHANGE OF
INFORMATION, VERIFICATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES, OR ENFORCEMENT
CLAUSES. BUT THIS ADMINISTRATION IS NOT WILLING TO SUBSTITUTE
RHETORIC FOR SOLID AGREEMENT, AND WE WILL CONTINUE TO WORK
FOR GENUINE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES IN STOCKHOLM. AND CONSIDER
REAFFIRMING DECLARATIONS OF INTENT ONLY THE IN
THE NEED FOR A COMMON SET OF FACTS ON WHICH TO BASE AN CONTEXT
AGREEMENT IS RELATIVELY STRAIGHTFORWARD.
THE NEED FOR A COMMON
PURPOSE, HOWEVER, IS SOMETIMES MISUNDERSTOOD.
PUT BLUNTLY, IN THE BROADEST AND MOST IMPORTANT SENSE
THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION DO NOT HAVE A COMMON
PURPOSE.
DURING THE PAST DECADE WE SOMETIMES EMBRACED THE
OF CONCRETE MEASURES
WHICH GIVE REAL MEANING
TO SUCH DECLARATIONS.
52
-10-
THEORY THAT
THE
SOVIET UNION WAS BECOMING A "STATUS QUO POWER:"
A NATION THAT WOULD SHARE WITH US THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR MAINTAINING
WORLD PEACE AND STABILITY.
SOVIET PRESIDENT BREZHNEV WARNED
OTHERWISE. "DETENTE, HE DECLARED. "IN NO WAY RESCINDS, OR
CAN RESCIND, THE LAWS OF THE CLASS STRUGGLE." AND INDEED THE
STRUGGLE WENT ON IN POLAND, AFGHANISTAN, CAMBODIA, NICARAGUA,
ANGOLA
BACKED BY SOVIET AND SOVIET-SURROGATE FORCES.
ANOTHER ILLUSION OF THE 1970s WAS THE BELIEF THAT THE
SOVIETS COULD BE PERSUADED TO ADOPT AMERICA'S STRATEGIC DOCTRINES,
IN PARTICULAR WHAT HENRY KISSINGER HAS CALLED "THE HISTORICALLY
AMAZING THEORY THAT VULNERABILITY CONTRIBUTED TO PEACE, AND
INVULNERABILITY CONTRIBUTED TO THE RISKS OF WAR."
DURING THE 1970s THE UNITED STATES UNILATERALLY
RESTRICTED ITS OWN NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENTS, AND DISMANTLED
ITS ONLY ABM SYSTEM, HOPING THE SOVIETS WOULD IMITATE THIS
RESTRAINT. THEY DID NOT. INSTEAD, THE SOVIETS PURSUED A
53
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MAJOR RESEARCH EFFORT INTO DEFENSE TECHNOLOGIES: AN EFFORT
THAT CONTINUES EVEN AS THEY CONDEMN THE PRESIDENT'S OWN RESEARCH
INITIATIVE AS THE START OF A NEW ARMS RACE. LIKEWISE, THE
SOVIETS DEVELOPED AN ICBM FORCE WHOSE NUMBERS, EXPLOSIVE POWER,
AND ACCURACY WERE FAR GREATER THAN WOULD BE NEEDED SIMPLY TO
ASSURE EFFECTIVE RETALIATION.
THE EXPERIENCE OF THE PAST DECADE, THEN, SHOULD MAKE US
CAUTIOUS ABOUT ATTRIBUTING A BROAD COMMON PURPOSE, OR A SHARED
STRATEGIC CONSENSUS, TO THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION.
IN A NARROWER SENSE, HOWEVER, THE BASIS FOR A COMMON PURPOSE
CLEARLY EXISTS.
THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS SO DEVASTATING
THAT WHATEVER THE DIFFERENCE IN OUR AIMS AND DOCTRINES, THE
UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION MUST SHARE AN INTEREST IN
PREVENTING NUCLEAR WAR.
AND IN FACT THE SOVIETS HAVE COOPERATED WITH US IN CERTAIN
AREAS TO REDUCE THE RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR. WE HAVE AGREED TO
54
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UPGRADE THE HOTLINE.
WE ARE IN ESSENTIAL AGREEMENT ON
NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY.
WE BOTH EXERCISE IN MANY IMPORTANT
WAYS GREAT CAUTION ABOUT NUCLEAR ARMS.
TODAY'S CONVENTIONAL WISDOM HAS IT THAT THE PRESIDENT'S
STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE, IF IT CONTINUES TO MOVE FORWARD,
WILL SOUND THE DEATH-KNELL FOR ARMS REDUCTION AGREEMENTS.
I CERTAINLY AGREE THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD FAR PREFER A WORLD IN
WHICH THEY ALONE WERE DEVELOPING STRATEGIC DEFENSES, WHILE WE
REMAINED WHOLLY VULNERABLE TO ATTACK.
I EXPECT THE SOVIETS
will CONTINUE SEEKING SUCH A WORLD, AND SEEKING IT VIGOROUSLY.
BUT ONCE THE SOVIETS ARE CONVINCED -- IF THEY ARE CONVINCED
-- THAT WE WILL NOT CONCEDE THEM A UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE, I
WORKING, WITHUS IN CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH OUR ALLIES,
BELIEVE OUR TWO NATIONS CAN WORK TOGETHER TO MANAGE THE TRANSITION
TO A NEW DEFENSIVE ARRANGEMENT. SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT, AFTER
ALL. ULTIMATELY OFFERS FAR MORE SAFETY TO BOTH OUR SOCIETIES,
AND THOSE OF OUR ALLIES.
I
55
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ONCE WE HAVE PERSUADED THE SOVIETS TO ACCEPT COMMON FACTS AND
A COMMON PURPOSE, HOWEVER, WE FACE THE MOST DIFFICULT CHALLENGE
OF ALL. AND THAT IS THE CHALLENGE OF PERSUADING THE SOVIETS,
WHO DO NOT SHARE OUR RESPECT FOR THE RULE OF LAW, TO ACCEPT
COMMON RESPONSIBILITY FOR MAKING NEGOTIATED AGREEMENTS WORK.
A FEW WEEKS AGO WE WITNESSED THE SPECTACLE OF AN AMERICAN
ARMY MAJOR SHOT BY A SOVIET SENTRY AND LEFT TO BLEED AND DIE
ON EAST GERMAN SOIL. HIS MURDER INFORMED MILLIONS OF AMERICANS
THAT WE HAVE A NEGOTIATED AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION TO
EXCHANGE MILITARY OBSERVERS IN GERMANY: AN AGREEMENT DATING
FROM 1947.
I WAS FRANKLY DISMAYED BY MUCH OF THE REACTION TO THIS
OUTRAGE.
THERMOMETERS POPPED OUT ALL OVER WASHINGTON, AS
OUR SO-CALLED OPINION LEADERS SOUGHT TO MEASURE THE EFFECT OF
MAJOR NICHOLSON'S MURDER ON THE "ATMOSPHERE" OF EAST-WEST
RELATIONS.
50
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DO NOT MISTAKE ME.
I STRONGLY SUPPORT PRESIDENT REAGAN'S
DECISION TO CONTINUE NEGOTIATING WITH THE SOVIETS, JUST AS I
SUPPORTED THE SAME DECISION AFTER 269 INNOCENT CIVILIANS MET
THEIR DEATH ON KAL FLIGHT 007.
WHAT DISMAYED ME WAS THE
ALMOST TOTAL FAILURE OF THE PRESS, IN THE MIDST OF ALL THEIR
TEMPERATURE-TAKING, TO ASK A VERY BASIC QUESTION.
WHAT IS
THE VALUE OF AGREEING TO EXCHANGE OBSERVERS IF THE OBSERVERS
ARE GOING TO BE SHOT? OR, PUT MORE BROADLY, WHAT IS THE
VALUE. OF AGREEMENTS WITH THE SOVIETS IF THEY WILL NOT SHARE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENFORCING THEM?
OF -COURSE, IN MANY CIRCLES IT IS CONSIDERED BAD MANNERS
TO RAISE THE ISSUE OF TREATY COMPLIANCE.
WHEN PRESIDENT REAGAN
SUBMITTED A LIST OF VIOLATIONS TO THE SENATE HE WAS ROUNDLY
CONDEMNED IN THE PRESS FOR ENDANGERING THE ARMS REDUCTION
"PROCESS." COMPLIANCE HAS INDEED BECOME A KIND OF LITMUS
TEST FOR INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED WITH NATIONAL SECURITY.
IF
-15-
THEY EXPRESS ONCERN ABOUT COMPLIANCE, THEY ARE IMMEDIATELY
LABELLED AS UNREGENERATE OPPONENTS OF ARMS REDUCTION, WHO
BELIEVE IN BRUTE MILITARY STRENGTH, CONFRONTATION, AND THE
FUTILITY OF NEGOTIATING GENUINE ARMS REDUCTION AGREEMENTS WITH
THE SOVIET UNION.
IN FACT, IT IS PRECISELY BECAUSE THIS ADMINISTRATION
DOES BELIEVE IN THE PROMISE OF ARMS REDUCTION NEGOTIATIONS --
ESPECIALLY AT A TIME WHEN AMERICA HAS RECOVERED HER STRENGTH
AND STRENGTH OF PURPOSE -- THAT WE ARE TAKING COMPLIANCE
SO SERIOUSLY.
TO ARGUE THAT BREAKING TREATIES IS UNIMPORTANT
IS TO ARGUE THAT THE TREATIES THEMSELVES ARE FRIVOLOUS.
SURELY WE CAN DEMAND MORE OF ARMS REDUCTION NEGOTIATIONS THAN
THAT.
DURING THE DECADE OF THE 1970s WE IN EFFECT OFFERED THE
SOVIETS TWO CHOICES.
THEY COULD AGREE TO GENUINE, MUTUAL,
VERIFIABLE ARMS REDUCTION AGREEMENTS -- NOT JUST AGREEMENTS
58
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THAT CODIFIED A MILITARY BUILDUP.
OR, WITH THE FULL
SANCTION OF SO-CALLED ARMS "CONTROL" AGREEMENTS, THEY COULD
SIMPLY CONTINUE EXPANDING THEIR MILITARY POWER
...
SECURE
IN THE KNOWLEDGE THAT WE WERE UNWILLING TO PAY THE PRICE FOR
RESTORING THE MILITARY BALANCE.
THE CHOICE WAS EASY.
THE CHOICES OF THE 1980s ARE PROVING HARDER FOR THE SOVIETS.
THE CHOICE OF GENUINE, MUTUAL, VERIFIABLE ARMS REDUCTION AGREEMENTS
REMAINS OPEN. AND, AS PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS DEMONSTRATED, WE
ARE WILLING TO BE FLEXIBLE ABOUT HOW THESE REDUCTIONS CAN BEST
AND MOST FAIRLY BE ACHIEVED. BUT FOR NOW AT LEAST THAT SECOND
CHOICE -- UNILATERAL AMERICAN RESTRAINT -- HAS BEEN REPLACED BY
A DETERMINATION TO PRESERVE THE MILITARY BALANCE.
THE SOVIETS ARE OF COURSE HOPING THAT WE WILL LOSE
PATIENCE WITH OUR PROGRAM TO RESTORE AMERICA'S MILITARY STRENGTH.
51
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AND THEY HAVE SOME CAUSE FOR HOPE.
BUT IF WE CAN MAINTAIN A
STEADY COURSE AND A STRONG SENSE OF PURPOSE, I BELIEVE THIS
DECADE COULD AT LAST WITNESS THE ARMS REDUCTION BREAKTHROUGH WE
HAVE BEEN SEEKING, WITHOUT SUCCESS, SINCE THE DAWN OF THE
NUCLEAR AGE.
ABOVE ALL, WE AS A NATION NEED TO KEEP OUR ULTIMATE GOALS
IN SIGHT. STRONG DEFENSES ARE NOT A GOAL. AGREEMENTS WITH
THE SOVIET UNION ARE NOT A GOAL. THEY ARE MEANS TO ACHIEVE OUR
GOALS: PRESERVING PEACE, PROTECTING FREEDOM, AND PROMOTING
DEMOCRACY AND PROSPERITY THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. AND THEY
SHOULD BE JUDGED ACCORDING TO HOW WELL THEY SUCCEED IN THAT
PURPOSE.
NOW LET ME TAKE YOUR QUESTIONS.
3529
60
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
May 1, 1985
SIGNED
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT
FROM:
JACK F. MATLOCK
from
SUBJECT:
Weinberger May 3 Speech to Regional Councils on
Foreign Relations
Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to Colonel Affourtit
concurring in Secretary Weinberger's May 3 speech with the
changes indicated.
B.
on
Sestanovich, ss Fortier, North, PD Donley, Small, Kraemer, SK
n.a.
Burghardt, Menges and Dobriansky concur.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memorndum at Tab I.
Approve
K
Disapprove
Attachments:
Tab I
Kimmitt-Affourtit Memorandum
Tab A
Weinberger May 3 Speech
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
29 April 1985
MEMO FOR MR. ROBERT KIMMITT
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ROOM 372, OEOB
SUBJECT: SecDef Remarks for Review
and Comment
The attached draft remarks were
prepared for Secretary Weinberger's
address to the Regional Council on
Foreign Relations, 3 May 1985.
Request that you review these draft
remarks and provide comments/concurrence
to Mary McConnell (697-8191) by NLT
1500 hours, Wednesday 1 May.
If we have not heard from you by
then, we will assume your concurrence
in these draft remarks as written.
R. J. Affourtit
Colonel, USA
Executive Secretary
Attachment
OR PRINT CLASSIFICATION/CODEWORD
VITAMA 39 UNCLASSIFIED 291742 62
SITE
DI
672
DATE & TIME TRANSMITTED
MSG NBR
DATE & TIME RECEIVED
TO BE COMPLETED BY REQUESTOR
FROM SPEECHWRITER OFFICE/DESK Mary Me Conneil PHONE NBR 697-5191
SUBJECT SECDEF REMARKS FOR REVIEW AND COMMENT
PAGES 18
DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS:
HOLD FOR NORMAL DUTY HOURS
X
IMMEDIATELY
NOTE: FURNISH AFTER DUTY HOUR CONTACT TELEPHONE NUMBER
FOR EACH ADDEE REQUIRING AFTER DUTY HOUR DELIVERY
TRANSMIT TO
AGENCY
INDIVIDUAL (NAME)
OFFICE
ROOM NBR
PHONE NBR
NSC
MR ROBERT KIMMITT
EXELSED
Ru 372
456-2224
Executive Secretary
REMARKS:
JCS J-3 FORM 6
REQUEST/RECEIPT FOR TRANSMISSION
JAN 84
UNCLASSIFIED
STAMP OR PRINT CLASSIFICATION/CODEWORD