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Matlock Chron October 1985 (11)
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Matlock Chron October 1985 (11)
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Records of the National Security Council, Directorate of European and Soviet Affairs (Reagan Administration)
Jack F. Matlock, Jr.'s Chronological Files
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: Matlock Chron October 1985 (11)
Box: 12
To see more digitized collections visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection
Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected]
Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing
National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET 4/12/2005
File Folder
MATLOCK CHRON OCTOBER 1985 (11/12)
FOIA
F06-114/3
Box Number
12
YARHI-MILO
1209
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
7930 MEMO
KATHY OSBORNE TO MCFARLANE RE ROY
1 10/11/1985 B6
BREWER
7931 MEMO
TRANSCRIPT OF ROY BREWER TAPE SENT
6
ND
B6
TO PRESIDENT REAGAN
7932 MEMO
PURNELL TO MARTIN RE BACKGROUND
1 10/25/1985 B1 B3
TAPES FOR THE FIRST LADY
D
4/13/2011
F06-114/3; R 8/17/2011 M08-
125/2 #7932
7933 MEMO
MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE
2
ND
B1
PAPERS ON THE SOVIET UNION: THE
SOVIET VIEW OF NATIONAL SECURITY
R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3
7934 PAPER
SOVIET STRATEGY AND STRATEGIC
4
ND
B3
THINKING
PAR 4/13/2011 F2006-114/3
7935 PAPER
SOVIET NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION-
7
ND
B1
MAKING
R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
Marlock
8507
JHC
FILE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
October 23, 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive Secretary
Department of State
SUBJECT:
Presidential Interview with BBC Radio
The President has agreed to do an interview on October 29 with
a BBC Radio journalist to allay fears in Britain that we are not
serious in seeking arms reductions. To prepare for this
interview, which will be given extraordinary prominence both in
the United Kingdom and worldwide, we need a list of talking
points that would be useful to make during the 15-20 minute
interview. We need this by noon, October 25.
We also expect to receive in the near future written questions
which the BBC has agreed to provide in advance, although the
interview will be oral. As soon as those are received, we will
forward them to you with a request for draft replies.
When mati
William F. Martin
Executive Secretary
Attachment:
Letter from Ambassador Price
V
EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
LONDON, ENGLAND
September 30, 1985
CHARLES H. PRICE II
AMBASSADOR
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Mr. President:
Last May my Embassy sent a request to the White House
asking that you take part in an interview with BBC radio.
The interview was to have dealt with your aspirations for
a more peaceful world and how you seek to lower the level
of East-West tensions. The broadcast would have been heard
throughout the United Kingdom as well as worldwide. For
whatever reason the request was turned down.
I believe that such an interview would provide you with
an opportunity to share with BBC listeners around the world
what you hope to achieve in the arms control arena and how you
believe US-USSR relations can be most effectively approached.
As I have mentioned on previous occasions, there is here
in the U.K. and Europe a mood of suspicion and anxiety about our
commitment to meaningful arms reductions and our willingness to
engage in productive talks with the Soviets both at the arms
control negotiations and at your forthcoming November meeting
with General Secretary Gorbachev. A statement from you in
your own words would, I believe, go far to easing these con-
cerns and dispelling mistrust. So far, the pre-Summit limelight
has shone mostly on Moscow's new leadership. The BBC request
offers us a unique opportunity to shift that focus in your
direction with words aimed directly at our European partners.
I therefore urge that you reconsider the BBC request.
Should you agree, the BBC would like the interview to take
place at the earliest possible occasion, preferably this
week or next. It would last no longer than 15 or 20 minutes,
and they assure us that they would give the interview extra-
ordinary prominence to assure maximum possible exposure.
3
-2-
I was with Bud this past Saturday when he briefed the
Prime Minister on your meeting with Shevardnadze and the
contents of the Gorbachev proposal. We obviously have our
work cut out for us, and this BBC radio interview I believe
will be most helpful.
Carol joins me in sending you and Nancy our love and
very best.
Sincerely,
Charles
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
8507
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
October 23, 1985
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM A. MARTIN
SIGNED
FROM:
JACK F. MATLOCK
fam
SUBJECT:
Presidential Interview with BBC Radio
The President has agreed to do a taped interview with a
journalist from BBC Radio to allay fears in Britain that we are
not serious in seeking arms reductions. Although this will be an
oral interview, the BBC has agreed to send written questions in
advance. The interview will be given extraordinary prominence
both in the United Kingdom and worldwide. Prompt and careful
back-up support from the State Department will be essential.
RECOMMENDATION
That you send the memorandum at Tab I to the State Department.
Approve
lm
Disapprove
Ed Djerej ian and Robert Korengold concur.
Attachment:
Tab I
Memo to Platt
Tab II
Letter from Ambassador Price
8247
The
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
October 24, 1985
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
FROM:
JACK F. MATLOCK 5PM
SUBJECT:
President's Letter to Roy Brewer
Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to Kathy Osborne
forwarding a suggested response from the President to Mr. Roy
Brewer (Tab A). Brewer is an old friend of the President's, and
Kathy asked NSC (Tab II) to prepare a response.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the attached memo to Kathleen Osborne.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments
Tab I
Memo to Kathleen Osborne
Tab A
Response to Roy Brewer
Tab B
Kathleen Osborne's memo to you
Tab C
Mr. Brewer's correspondence
X
I
8247
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM TO KATHLEEN OSBORNE
FROM:
ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
SUBJECT:
Letter to Roy Brewer
As you requested in your note of October 11, attached at Tab A is
a letter to Mr. Roy Brewer for the President's signature.
Attachment
Tab A
Suggested response to Roy Brewer
Tab B
Your note of October 11
Tab C
Mr. Brewer's correspondence
8
-
-
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Dear Roy:
Good to hear from you, and thanks for the tape.
Between going to meetings and preparing the tape
itself I know you put in a lot of time. I
appreciate your effort.
I think the meeting you attended on the 29th was
particularly interesting, and I'm glad you were
able to be there.
With best wishes.
Sincerely,
Mr. Roy M. Brewer
4230 Jubilo Drive
Tarzana, California 91356
V
Roy M. Brewer
4230 Jubilo Drive
Tarzana, California 91356
7
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
October 3, 1985
Ms. Kathy Osborne
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Kathy:
I am enclosing herewith a tape which I prepared. I hope
it reaches you in time. I do not have a copy of it so
if the President wants to keep it, perhaps you could
have it copied. If not, just send it back at his conve-
nience.
Thank you for your co-operation, as always.
With best wishes.
Sincerely,
Roy M Brewer
RMB/eh
Enclosure
7932
8596
20
JM-C
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C 20506
October 25, 1985
CONFIDENTIAL
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN
FROM:
JON R. PURNELL 1P.
SUBJECT:
Background Tapes for the First Lady
Attached are the CIA background tapes on Mrs. Gorbachev prepared
for the First Lady. The three tapes are identical in content,
but each is for a different type of video system. We received no
written background material with the tapes, and CIA tells us none
was prepared.
Kathy Reed of Don Regan's office called just after you did and
indicated that the First Lady is really interested in written
background material, not the tapes. I am sending along the
tapes, however, per our earlier conversation.
Ambassador Matlock has been in New York since the tapes were
received and has not had an opportunity to view them.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memorandum at Tab I forwarding the tapes to Mr.
Rosebush.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments
Tab I
Memorandum to James G. Rosebush
Tab A
Background Tapes
CONF IDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR M08-125/247932
BY RW NARA DATE 8/17/11
8596
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON D.C. 20506
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES G. ROSEBUSH
FROM:
WILLIAM F. MARTIN
SUBJECT:
Background Tapes for the First Lady
Attached at Tab A are three video tapes on Mrs. Gorbachev for the
First Lady. They are identical in content, but each is designed
for a different type of video system. We did not receive any
written background material with the tapes.
Attachment
Tab A
Video tapes on Mrs. Gorbachev
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
DECLASSIFIED
By
as House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
NARA, Date 7/1/02
8581
Juy-C
22
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
TOP SECRET
October 25, 1985
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
FROM:
JACK F. MATLOCK
from
SUBJECT:
Papers on the Soviet Union: Soviet view of
National Security
Attached is the next group of background papers for the President
on the Soviet Union. It deals with the Soviet view of national
security.
RECOMMENDATION
Taht you sign the memorandum at Tab I forwarding the papers to
the-President.
Approve
Disapprove
That you approve Bill Martin's sending copies of the papers to
Secretary Shultz and Don Regan.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments
Tab I
Memorandum to the President
Tab A
Soviet Strategy and Strategic Thinking
Tab B
Soviet National Security Decision-Making
Tab II
Memorandum Martin to Platt
Tab III Memorandum - Martin to Chew
TOP SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
Declassify on: OADR
By
White CVJ House Guidelines, NARA, Date August 7/1/02 1997
G
8581
24
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
SUBJECT:
Papers on the Soviet Union: The Soviet View of
National Security
You have previously read five groups of papers on the Soviet
Union. They dealt with the sources of Soviet behavior, the
problems of Soviet society, the instruments of control,
Gorbachev's domestic agenda, and the USSR's international
position. The attached group discusses the Soviet view of
national security.
The first paper (Tab A) deals with Soviet strategic thinking. It
points out that Americans have a common tendency to attribute
their own views and values to other peoples, and have often made
the mistake of assuming that Soviet strategic thinking is like
their our own. The Soviets, they would reason, face the same
overwhelming nuclear threat as the United States and, as rational
people, presumably see that threat much as Americans do.
The Soviets, however, come from a vastly different historical
tradition, in which the princes of tiny Muscovy built a
powerful autocratic state through centuries of military
expansion. While Americans see military power as an unpleasant
but necessary means of preserving freedom, the Soviets view it as
the way to maintain and expand their authority. The basic aims of
Soviet military power are to ensure the survival of the political
system and enhance its ability to project power abroad.
The Soviets appreciate full well the tremendous destruction that
would accompany any nuclear exchange. At the same time they
continue to believe in the possibility of victory in nuclear war,
and through the 1970's believed that the trend of worldwide
political and military forces was moving in their favor.
Recent developments, however, particularly SDI research and the
new non-nuclear technologies for conventional defense, are
worrisome factors for the Soviets. They have the potential to
undermine the offensive pillars of Soviet strategy.
TOP SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
Declassify on: OADR
NLRR fob-114/3 #7933
BY Cr NARA DATE 10/30/07
25
TOP SECRET
Actual national security decision-making in the Soviet Union
(paper at Tab B) is in the hands of a small circle of top
leaders. The Politburo itself is the top forum in which all
national security decisions are discussed and decided. It is,
however, in one of the Politburo's committees, the Soviet Defense
Council, that most of the detailed discussion of national
security decisions is thought to take place.
The Defense Council is comprised of both civilian and military
leaders who deal with political or military and technical policy.
Gorbachev, like his predecessors, is its chairman. We do not
know its exact composition, but likely members include the heads
of the KGB, State Planning Committee, and Military-Industrial
Commission and the Commander of Warsaw Pact forces. The Soviet
General Staff acts as its secretariat, coordinating the flow of
information to the Council.
The Defense Ministry, particularly the General Staff, seems to
exercise predominant influence over the formulation of defense
policy - to a degree unparalleled in the West. Military
information is not shared with civilian agencies, and there is no
nucleus of civilian specialists who can offer alternative views
to those of military planners.
Rumors of civilian dissatisfaction with the military's near
monopoly on technical expertise occasionally surface. This
dissatisfaction is undoubtedly fed by the system's inability
since the late Brezhnev years to come to grips with serious
security-related questions like U.S. arms control proposals.
Instead, an aging leadership has been locked in a transition
power struggle which nearly paralyzed its ability to act
decisively.
Gorbachev has moved quickly to remove members of the old guard
to help reinvigorate the Soviet system. It remains to be seen,
however, whether he wants to challenge seriously the traditional
system of national security decision-making, with its heavy
emphasis on the military and tightly controlled channels of
information, or make available to the leadership a greater
variety of informed civilian opinion
TOP SECRET
A
I
24
I
7954
21
SOVIET STRATEGY AND STRATEGIC THINKING
Underlying all the destructive weapons and forces are ideas about
strategy. From the mid-1960's well into the 1970's, many influential
Americans believed--despite persuasive evidence to the contrary
from Soviet military writings and agent sources such as Colonel
Penkovsky--that soviet strategic thinking had to be very much like
our own. In our familiar American tendency to attribute our own
views and values to other peoples and their leaders, we tended to
believe that, because we and the Soviets both faced the awesome
problem of nuclear weapons, and we were both basically sensible
peoples, we had to think about management of this problem in roughly
the same way. Maybe the Soviets weren't quite as sophisticated
as we with all our think tanks and academic journals, but they
would more or less follow our lead in strategic thinking.
Today, while this mistaken "mirror imaging" of our views on the
Soviets persists in some circles, we know a lot better. The manner
and size of the Soviet strategic and other force buildups of the
last twenty years showed that the Soviets thought differently than
we about strategy and military power, including nuclear power.
Study of the Soviet buildup, of Soviet military exercises and
command structures, of their military writings (including very
sensitive documents collected clandestinely) has taught us a great
deal about Soviet strategy and military thinking. It underscores
some important differences from our own.
This shouldn't have been surprising to us. After all, the Soviets
are coming from a different place in geography, in history, and in
political culture. Although now a global military superpower, at
least in nuclear terms, Soviet Russia remains a continental superpower
and, like Tsarist Russia, places a high store on dominating its
continental periphery. The influence of history and political
culture is often misunderstood as follows: Having been frequently
invaded by Europeans and Asiatics over the centuries, Russians are
seen as pathologically insecure; hence they feel the need for
massive military power. There is some truth in this, but the essence
is different. First of all, growing from a small principality in
Muscovy, Russia has spent much more time invading and conquering
than being invaded and conquered. The Russian state was built by
the autocratic princes of Moscow, not by the merchants of the more
westward-looking cities, such as Novgorod. For this reason, Kremlin
rulers have from Medieval times to the present seen their security,
indeed the legitimacy of their rule, to rest upon as much control
over people, their own and those around them, as they could get.
These attitudes toward political power have also shaped Russian
and Soviet thinking about strategy and military power.
Americans tend to think of military power as an unpleasant but
necessary means of preserving live-and-let-live conditions in a
sometimes dangerous world. The Soviets think of military power as
a means of preserving and expanding their authority. This makes
their strategy both very denfensive and very offensive at the same
time.
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
SECRET
NLRR 806-114/3#7934
BY RW NARA DATE 4/13/11
is
SECRET
2
The structure, or architecture, of their strategy and their overall
military forces displays this quality. The basic aims of Soviet
military power in war, and also in peace, are to assure the survival
of the political system at home and to enhance the projection of
its power in the surrounding world. Hence the Soviets have been
engaged in strategic, air, civil, and ABM defense from the beginning
of the nuclear era. We had strategic defenses in the 1950's, but
gave them up in the 1960's, in favor of the deterrent "balance of
terror" concept based on nuclear offensive forces.
The second basic mission of Soviet military strength is to project
power into the surrounding regions of Eurasia, especially Europe,
but also in East Asia and southward toward the Middle East and
Persian Gulf. Hence the enormous land combat forces, with their
accompanying air and nuclear power, far more than they would need
to retain control of East Europe or to deter attacks. By contrast,
the US and NATO have seen our general purpose forces as a heavy
trip wire to releae the nuclear deterrent or as a means of dealing
with very limited contingencies outside of Europe.
The Soviets see their long-range nuclear offensive forces as a
deterrent, as we do. But to a much greater extent, they have also
regarded these forces as long-range artillery support for backing
up the other two primary missions of their forces: strategic
defense of the homeland, through counterforce attacks on US nuclear
forces and their command and control; and dominance of the Eurasian
periphery, through attacks on nearby enemy forces and their bases.
In their thinking about nuclear weapons and nuclear war, the Soviets
have never made the distinction between deterrence and warfighting
capabilities that have been characteristic of US thinking. Nor
have they discarded the notion of victory in nuclear war despite
the assertion of Soviet leaders that nuclear war should not occur
(which they believe) and cannot be won (which they do not believe).
Even when, in the 1950's and early 1960's, they had too little
nuclear force to implement their view, the Soviets developed and
held to the notion that real deterrent power had to be real
warfighting power as well. This is because they believed that they
had not only to deter attacks on them, but as far as they could, to
encourage acceptance of their aims around the world short of a
major war. This required nuclear warfighting strength. Moveover,
they believed that nuclear war could actually occur, and, if it
did, it would have to be fought for rational political and military
aims, despite the awesome destructiveness of nuclear weapons. This
is why they have developed a comprehensive array of counterforce
nuclear weapons, such as the SS-18 against our silos and SS-20s
against Eurasian military targets, and homeland defenses, including
civil defense.
Soviet political and military leaders appreciate full well that
any large nuclear war would be horribly destructive for their country
and potentially lethal for their system. This has not, however,
nullified their belief in the possibility of victory in nuclear
war. For one thing, the ideology on which their system rests
prevents that belief from being discarded. For them to really
SECRET
or
SECRET
3
believe that the handiwork of humans, such as nucelar weapons,
could write the end to Soviet and even human history would mean
that Marx and Lenin were wrong in a fundamental respect. More
important, however, the Soviets have never believed. that nuclear
war, even a very large scale war, was likely to take the form of a
mindless exchange of massive attacks on cities. Rather they have
tended to believe that a major nuclear war would involve attacks of
varying intensity and timing on a wide range of military targets,
after which one side or the other would quit or collapse, but
societies as such could survive, especially if they provided for
active and civil defense.
Over the years they have built up offensive and defensive capabilities
for this kind of nuclear war. Moreover, as their capabilities have
grown, their concept of a major war between the superpowers has
evolved as has their concept of victory. This evolution continues,
and we are trying to track it in their military exercises and
literature. What appears to be happening is a growing Soviet belief
that their powerful nuclear forces, along with their general purposes
forces, can enforce a different kind of victory by deterring US use
of nuclear weapons at least on a large scale, while general purpose
forces, supported if necessary by the required nuclear strikes, can
conquer Europe and perhaps other regions nearby. The US would have
to accept the result rather than be destroyed in a massive exchange.
But the US would be reduced to a secondary power, while the USSR
would emerge preeminent.
The key to this kind of thinking lies in the combination of all
Soviet forces: strategic nuclear, general purpose and homeland
defense. The Soviets do not separate them into distinct categories
quite the way we do. In combination, they could allow victory in a
large scale, general, but still not absolutely allout nuclear
conflict. The Soviets do not see this outcome as certain by any
means; but it is a possibility that the design of their forces and
strategies can make more probable if it ever comes to a war.
In the meantime, the Soviets believe that this overall force
combination, along with increasing ability to project power at a
distance, e.g., into the Third World, enhances the image of the
USSR as a superpower and enhances their "persuasiveness" (i.e.,
ability to intimidate) vis-a-vis neighboring countries. Power
projection into the Third World, which includes military deliveries,
insurgency and counterinsurgency operations, as well as military
bases and forces, has become a fourth pillar of the Soviet strategic
architecture, along with strategic defense, Eurasian dominance, and
long-range nuclear strike.
From another perspective one can say that Soviet strategy has been
designed over the past forty years to defeat American strategy in
war and also in peacetime power politics. Historically, the US has
relied on long-range nuclear sanctions plus relatively weaker
forward forces to protect its exposed allies near the USSR. The
USSR has built forces to dominate over the regions where US allies
are located while also negating the credibility of US long-range
nuclear guarantees. Desiring to avoid any war or major test of
SECRET
30
SECRET
4
strength, the Soviets have hoped that this combination would
gradually demoralize the US and its allies in peacetime, leading to
the erosion of our security commitments, the collapse of our alliances
and the replacement of the US by the USSR as the predominant world
power.
In the late 1970's the Soviets developed a detectable confidence
that trends in the "correlation of forces", by which they mean
political as well as military forces, were moving in a direction
favorable to this prognosis. In the 1980's, however, the US and
its allies have been more determined to resist these trends,
undermining Soviet confidence that this is the way things will go.
On the contrary, they now see factors that could--not necessarily
will--turn these trends around.
From a strictly military point of view, the most worrisome new
factors, other than the increase of US defense efforts and renewed
commitment to global security, lie in the combination of SDI and
the new non-nuclear technologies for conventional defense the US is
pursuing. All sources of information indicate how concerned the
Soviets are about SDI. Interestingly, Soviet marshals write even
more eloquently about their concern over the new conventional
defense technologies. Toegether they challenge the primacy of the
twin darlings of Soviet. military power: the long-range ballistic
missile and the tank. If the US and NATO actually devleop and
deploy such capabilities, they will undermine the offensive pillars
of the Soviet strategic architecture. The USSR may be no less
secure in the strictly military sense, as a result, but it will be
less capable of casting an intimidating shadow over its neighbors.
This is why Soviet propaganda, diplomacy, and arms control policy
are trying to stop SDI and other US defense programs and, more
generally, to encourage the US to return to the behavior and
strategic doctrines we exhibited in the 1970's, which the Soviets
found quite comfortable. Because Soviet superpower status rests so
heavily on offensive military power combinations, the loss of this
edge, so the Kremlin fears, will negate Soviet superpower status
and ultimately undermine the legitimacy of Kremlin rule itself.
In the end, the challenge of the USSR to Western security and values
stems more from the nature of its system than from the content of
its strategies and military thought. If the rulers of the Soviet
Union could somehow be brought to relent in their determination to
control everybody they can reach, at home and abroad, their marshals
and generals--who are intelligent and rational men-could readilly
come up with military strategies and force postures which would
allow the USSR to be a secure and constructive participant in the
world community. For that to happen, however, they have to be
shown that the strategies they have followed patiently for thirty
years will not work.
Prepared by:
CIA
FOIA(b) (3)
SECRET
B
32
TOP SECRET
Soviet National Security Decision-Making
Introduction
Decision-making in the USSR is the prerogative of a small
circle of leaders, who act largely in private and who generally
focus on discrete issues rather than on broad debates over
priorities or strategies. Indeed, the absence in the USSR of
independent players--such as the press and Congress--or public
debate creates a situation more akin to that in a large American
corporation.
Mikhail Gorbachev, as General Secretary and de facto head
of the Politburo, is "primus inter pares" in the decision-making
hierarchy. However, as compared with Stalin's day, when the
Politburo served primarily as an enforcer of the dictator's
will, power has become more deeply and evenly balanced within
the leadership. Today, the Politburo in many ways represents
a collective, oligarchic body.
-- Stalin dominated the Party and State bureaucracies in a
ruthless fashion. His authority was unquestioned, and he
intervened in a detailed way in all aspects of defense
policy.
-- However, by the time Leonid Brezhnev assumed the mantle
of the top Party position, the authority of the General
Secretary had been considerably diluted. Brezhnev sought to
solidify his power by "buying off" the imperial potentates
-heading the major institutions in Soviet society. This gave
rise to a more collegial, consensus style of leadership.
Under Brezhnev, the Politburo was transformed from a group
of personal associates and sycophants to the dictator, to a
supreme "executive committee" representing all the principal
power groups--the Central Party apparatus, the military,
the KGB, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the
military-industrial complex.
-- This strategy of providing each of the claimants more of
the resources and authority they desired worked well in
Brezhnev's early years. However, as economic conditions
became more stringent and resource constraints more
pronounced, this strategy became more difficult to
implement. Further, the dispersion of authority from
the General Secretary to the bureaucratic chieftains led
to a certain immobil in Soviet society, particularly
in decision making. Bold initiatives gave way to
*
At the seeming apex of his power, Brezhnev's physical
strength was waning. By 1977 his declining health led to periods
of lackluster leadership, and it apparently affected his role as
decision maker during the crises in Afghanistan and Poland. When
Andropov was General Secretary, his illness and weakness appeared
to contribute to the inept handling of the Soviet shootdown of
the KAL.
DECLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
NLRR
BY CH NARA DATE 10 /30/07
33
TOP SECRET
2
incrementalism; caution and aversion to risk-taking came
more and more to characterize the leadership's approach.
The propensity of Soviet leaders to stress the maintenance
of their personal positions promoted a "fear of the
alternative" and produced a tendency to "muddle through."
-- This conservatism led to an inability to deal imaginatively
with a number of issues confronting the leadership,
including reform of the domestic economic management
structure and responses to your numerous arms control
initiatives.
The Politburo. Organizationally, the Politburo is the top
forum in which all national security questions are discussed and
decided and serves as the highest policy-making organ in the
USSR. Under Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko it resembled a
board of directors or parliamentary-style cabinet in that the
interests of all key Soviet institutions were represented.
(Politburo members wear at least two hats, holding other
important jobs in the central or regional party and government
apparatuses.) The Politburo meets every Thursday to hear
presentations and adopt decisions on the agenda topics selected
by the Party's permanent staff, the Secretariat.
The General Secretary has a significant degree of leeway
in presenting an issue and formulating a consensus. During
Brezhnev's tenure, votes were seldom taken. Brezhnev's style
seemed to be to wait for a consensus to develop, then declare
that a decision had been reached. The net effect of these
procedures was to concentrate enough authority in the presiding
officer's hands to move most Politburo business fairly
expeditiously, though not enough to allow the General Secretary
to override the wishes of a Politburo majority on an important
matter.
Defense Council. By far the most important of the
permanent Politburo committees is the Soviet Defense Council.
In practice, this is believed to be where most of the detailed
discussions on national security questions--including key
decisions on arms control--take place.
The Defense Council's present form was apparently devised
to ensure access by the senior military leadership to high-level
political/military policy deliberations; to provide a top command
unit capable of timely and coordinated response on strategic
decisions in a crisis; and to serve in peacetime as a standing
body which can be quickly and easily transformed into an agency
for national command and control in wartime.
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3
34
The Defense Council is made up of both civilian and military
leaders who deal with questions of political or military and -
technical policy. Each of the General Secretaries--Brezhnev,
Andropov, Chernenko, and now Gorbachev--has been identified as
its Chairman. Other possible Defense Council members include the
heads of the KGB, the Chairman of the State Planning Committee
(Gosplan), the head of the Military-Industrial Commission, and
the Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact joint forces.
While the military thus does not dominate the Defense
Council, the General Staff (in particular, its Main Operations
Directorate) apparently acts as its executive secretariat,
coordinating information for presentation to the Defense Council.
Even if the Chief of the General Staff is not actually a member
of the Defense Council, he is in effect its executive secretary.
Secretariat: The most important and direct supporting role
in the Politburo decision-making system belongs to the Central
Committee Secretariat, the body charged with the day-to-day
administration of the party apparatus. This executive staff of
the Party not only formulates recommendations on policy issues
within the competence of its approximately 20 departments, but
also coordinates and channels much of the input of other
agencies, such as the Foreign Ministry and KGB. Headed by the
"General Secretary," the nine other Secretaries oversee virtually
every aspect of Soviet domestic and foreign policy (ironically,
except defense policy). The Central Committee apparatus also
serves as a primary source of the staff aides who assist in
formulating policy statements, memoranda, information briefs,
and the like.
During Times of Crisis
The Politburo can, of course, meet any time and any place
with less than full membership when pressing issues or crises
arise. For instance, during the 1973 Middle East crisis there
were at least seven and probably eight Politburo-level meetings
called during October 4-27. The Politburo also met several times
in lengthy sessions between Brezhnev's summit meetings with
foreign leaders. And when Brezhnev returned to Moscow from trips
abroad, the Politburo often went into session at the airport or
the next day to hear the General Secretary's report.
The Pivotal Role of the Military in Soviet National Security
Policy Making
In the Soviet Union the Ministry of Defense, in particular
the General Staff, seems to exercise a predominant influence over
the formulation of defense policy. To a degree unprecedented in
the West, the uniformed military controls the mechanisms through
TOP SECRET
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4
which defense spending is supervised, strategy developed, for-ce
deployment patterns analyzed and developed, and operational
planning implemented.
In a system that is so highly compartmentalized, defense
plans and policies tend to be developed in relative isolation
from other centers of power. Several factors contribute to this
inordinate military influence:
-- Monopoly on Information: Military information is tightly
controlled in the USSR and coordination with civilian
agencies is generally prohibited. Only the Defense Ministry
maintains a data base on weapon characteristics, force
deployment schemes and doctrinal intricacies. While specific
agencies--weapons design bureaus, for example--will have
access to certain highly restricted data, no other agency
will have control over the full range of intelligence and
operational information.
-- Expertise: Only the uniformed military possesses the
expertise to undertake complex examinations of weapons
systems and to define "threat" scenarios. Unlike the United
States, in the USSR there is no group of "civilian defense
intellectuals" resident at leading academic centers or think
tanks with the expertise to challenge assumptions produced
by the General Staff. Further, there are no civilians in
the Defense Ministry; strategy formulation and management
of the armed forces is in the hands of the military. This
contrasts with the situation in this country, where the
concept of "civilian control" places considerable authority
in the Office of the Secretary of Defense rather than in the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
-- Power of the First Draft: The General Staff is composed of
a large, highly professional officer corps with years of
experience in the national security field. No other agency
maintains a staff anywhere near as large or expert as the
General Staff. This staff has control of the manner in
which national security issues are selected and planned and
alternatives developed. In effect, with the "choices"
circumscribed by alternatives conceived by one institution,
the "options" considered by the national command authorities
in the USSR will be much narrower, much less comprehensive
and more parochial than those presented to you. Finally,
the absence of an interagency review process and a central
coordinating mechanism, such as our NSC, gives undue
influence to the views of the General Staff.
TOP SECRET
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5
-- Congruence of Views between Political and Military Leaders:
The views of the General Staff likely find fertile ground
in the minds of the USSR's top leadership. Unlike Western
societies, where conflict between military and civilian
viewpoints is common, these groups in the USSR share a
common domestic and foreign policy perspective. Further,
Soviet society has itself become increasingly militaristic,
with the economy run essentially on a war-mobilization basis
and enormous preferences accorded to the "military-industrial
complex." As one observer stresed, "It's not a question of
whether or not there is a military-industrial complex in the
USSR; the Soviet Union is a military-industrial complex."
That is not to say that debates over investment, for
example, do not exist. What is different, however, is that
rather than a "guns versus butter" trade-off, in the USSR
the competing factions argue over "guns versus oil drilling
rigs."
-- One-Dimensional Power: The Soviet Union's superpower
status is primarily a reflection of its military strength.
Given the USSR's relative weakness in other areas, the
unusual historical reliance on and fascination with military
power should be no surprise. It is not the universal appeal
of a Marxist ideology, not the attractiveness of the Soviet
model of development, and definitely not the quality and
scope of economic aid that permits Moscow to enjoy the
status of a globał power. The military tool seems to be
the only thing that has worked among the Kremlin's foreign
policy instruments. Further, in a society characterized
by inefficiency and corruption, the military stands as one
sector that has remained relatively unscathed by charges
of malfeasance and nonproductivity (the KGB is another
noteworthy example). As the poet Max Hayward noted, perhaps
with some overstatement, "In the Soviet Union, nothing
works--except the military, and it works damn well." The
point is that as long as the ruling stratum perceives that
advances domestically and in the international arena are the
product of the military machine, the view of the uniformed
military is likely to get more than a sympathetic hearing.
Significance of the Military Influence:
The pivotal role of the military has major implications for
Soviet national security programs, particularly on arms control.
-- On Arms Control
Most of the detailed discussion on arms control probably
takes place in the Defense Council which, as already noted,
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6
is made up of probably half a dozen top party and government
officials with national security responsibilities. While the
civilian component is clearly larger, the General Staff's
role as secretariat for the Council offers the military an
institutional advantage in shaping arms control policy. The
General Staff arranges Council meetings and keeps the roster
of officials who attend. It also has de facto control of
coordination for the actual negotiations and, in effect, acts
as gatekeeper.
The Soviets systematically examine arms control issues
on political, military, economic, and diplomatic grounds, but
most of the interagency haggling on this score probably occurs
within the Defense Council. Considerable expertise by now has
been built up within a select group in the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, of course, but the military jealously guards its
prerogatives here. You may have heard the anecdote from the
SALT I negotiations regarding a highly technical, informal
discussion between an American official and a group of Soviet
military and civilian representatives. When the discussion
touched on sensitive weapons characteristics, the Soviet General
drew the American aside and stated that this was a subject with
which the Soviet civilians present really didn't need to become
involved!
This dominant role of the military also produces security
analyses based on "worst-case" threat perceptions. Given the
lack of alternative threat scenarios, those arguing for a
reallocation of investment away from the defense sector have
to make their case in the face of the military's most dire
predictions. On arms control it ensures that the definition of
an acceptable compromise will be one that would leave the Soviet
Union in an indisputable position of advantage. President Ford
drew attention to this key factor when he noted that in his
discussions in Vladivostok with Brezhnev, no progress was made
until they agreed to meet in a smaller session--and thereby
excluded two Soviet Generals from the meeting.
National Security Decision-Making under Gorbachev: A Prognosis
Under Andropov there were rumors of civilian dissatisfaction
with the General Staff's near monopoly of technical expertise,
and reports that the party leader wanted to increase the input of
civilian technical experts into the arms control process. "Think
tanks," such as Arbatov's USA-Canada Institute, will probably
undertake more sensitive politico-military analyses as Gorbachev
seeks to expand his sources of national security advice. We can
expect that the General Secretary will expand his own limited
staff of foreign and defense policy experts and call more
often on the Central Committee's International Department for
independent advice. He may also look more to the KGB. (Gorbachev
quickly promoted the head °of the KGB to full Politburo membership
after he came to power.)
TOP SECRET
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7
There are indications that Gorbachev is prepared to deal-
decisively with the "immobilism" in Soviet policy making. He
has bounced many of the "Old Guard" from their positions of
power and prestige--including Foreign Minister Gromyko, Premier
Tikhonov, Defense Industry tsar Romanov, State Planning
Committee head Baybakov, and others. In their place Gorbachev has
promoted younger, more technically competent individuals. More
importantly, for the most part they are loyal to the new General
Secretary and possess only modest power bases of their own. For
example, four men allied with Gorbachev have been promoted to
full membership in the Politburo since his accession to the
General Secretaryship. Perhaps significantly, the Minister
.of Defense, Marshal Sokolov, has been awarded only candidate
Politburo membership.
Gorbachev is off to a fast start. It remains to be seen,
however, whether personnel changes alone will be sufficient to
reinvigorate Soviet policy making, or whether Gorbachev will have
to consider serious reforms in the system itself. If he opts
for reform, he is sure to spur the opposition of entrenched
bureaucratic elements that would stand to lose power or prestige
as a result of change. Their opposition could well derail, or
at least effectively slow, even the best intended efforts for
change.
Prepared by:
Tyrus Cobb, NSC
TOP SECRET
40
8581
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
TOP SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive Secretary
Department of State
SUBJECT:
Background Papers for the President's Meeting with
Gorbachev
Attached for Secretary Shultz is a copy of the latest group of
background papers for the President on the Soviet Union. It
deals with the Soviet view of national security.
William F. Martin
Executive Secretary
Attachments
Tab A
Soviet Strategy and Strategic Thinking
Tab B
Soviet National Security Decision-Making
TOP SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
DECLASSIFIED
By White CAS House Guidelines, NARA, Date August 7/1/02 28, 1997
42
8581
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
TOP SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DAVID L. CHEW
SUBJECT:
Background Papers for the President's Meeting with
Gorbachev
Attached for Mr. Regan is a copy of the latest group of
background papers for the President on the Soviet Union. It
deals with the Soviet view of national security.
William F. Martin
Executive Secretary
Attachments
Tab A
Soviet Strategy and Strategic Thinking
Tab B
Soviet National Security Decision-Making
TOP SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
Declassify on: OADR
By
White us House Guidelines, August
NARA, Date 7/1/02 1997
me
8567
43
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
October 28, 1985
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THROUGH:
WILLIAM F. MARTIN Amy
FROM:
JACK F. MATLOCK
SUBJECT:
Request to Travel to Speak at Davidson College, N.C.
on December 12, 1985
I have been invited to a speak on U.S. -Soviet Relations at
Davidson College in North Carolina on December 12, 1985.
All costs will be covered by the College.
RECOMMENDATION
That you approve my travel.
Approve
Disapprove
CC: Administrative Office
NOUL
Annex II
NSC STAFF TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION
44
DATE:
10/25/85
1.
TRAVELER'S NAME:
JACK F. MATLOCK
2.
PURPOSE (S), EVENT (S), DATE(S):
To Speak at Davidson College, NC
on December 12, 1985
3.
ITINERARY (Please Attach Copy of Proposed Itinerary):
Washington/Davidson/Washington
DEPARTURE DATE o/a 12/11/85
RETURN DATE 12/13/85
TIME
TIME
4.
MODE OF TRANSPORTATION:
GOV AIR
COMMERCIAL AIR
XX POV
RAIL
OTHER
5.
ESTIMATED EXPENSES:
TRANSPORTATION
PER DIEM
OTHER
TOTAL TRIP COST
6.
WHO PAYS EXPENSES:
NSC
OTHER Davidson College
7.
IF NOT NSC, DESCRIBE SOURCE AND ARRANGEMENTS:
Davidson College would pay for transportation costs.
8.
WILL FAMILY MEMBER ACCOMPANY YOU: YES
NO
9.
IF so, WHO PAYS FOR FAMILY MEMBER (If Travel Not Paid by Traveler,
Describe Source and Arrangements):
10. TRAVEL ADVANCE REQUESTED:
$
11. REMARKS : (Use This Space to Indicate Any Additional Items You Would
Like to Appear on Your Travel Orders):
12. TRAVELER'S SIGNATURE:
13. APPROVALS:
JM-
8538
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
October 28, 1985
ACTION
MEMORANDUM TO ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
FROM:
JACK F. MATLOCKY As
SUBJECT:
Presidential Note to Shevardnadze
Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from Bill Martin to John
Hilbold transmitting NSC approval of a draft letter from the
President to Shevardnadze thanking him for the gifts he presented
during his September visit. We made some minor adjustments to
the text, as indicated at Tab A, primarily to reflect the
President's recent meeting with Shevardnadze in New York.
Judyt Mandel concurs.
RECOMMENDATION
That you approve the attached Martin to Hilbold memorandum
forwarding the draft letter to Shevardnadze.
Approve Real
Disapprove
Attachments
Tab I
Martin to Hilbold memorandum
Tab A
Approved text for Presidential letter
Tab B
Original draft
at
47
8538
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JOHN E. HILBOLD
FROM:
WILLIAM F. MARTIN
SUBJECT:
Letter from the President to Shevardnadze
The NSC has reviewed the draft text of a letter from the
President to Shevardnadze thanking him for the gifts he presented
during his September visit. We have made some minor suggestions,
included in the draft at Tab A, primarily to reflect the
President's recent meeting with Shevardnadze in New York.
Attachments
Tab A
NSC suggested text for Presidential letter
Tab B
Original draft
48
8538
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
NSC Draft Letter to Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
Dear Mr. Minister:
I truly appreciated the opportunity to meet with you at the White
House and in New York to discuss a broad range of issues of
mutual concern to our two countries. I look forward to meeting
with General Secretary Gorbachev in November and establishing a
bilateral dialogue to bring about a more stable future for both
of our peoples.
Nancy and I want to thank you and Mrs. Shevardnadze for the
handsome gifts you brought for us. We are pleased to have the
samovar and matching tray and the lacquered box as remembrances
of the exquisite artistry of your fellow countrymen.
With our best wishes to you, Mrs. Shevardnadze, and to your
collegues as we approach our meeting in Geneva,
Sincerely,
S
S
8538
October 18, 1985
Dear Mr. Minister:
I truly appreciated meeting with you at
the White House on a broad range of issues of
mutual concern to our two countries, an I look
forward to my upcoming conference with General
Secretary Gorbachev and establishing a bilateral
dialogue to bring about a more stable future for
both of our peoples.
Nancy and I want to thank you and Mrs. Shevardnadze
for the handsome gifts you brought for us. We
are pleased to have the samovar and matching tray
and the lacquered box as remembrances of the
exquisite artistry of your fellow countrymen.
With our best wishes to you, Mrs. Shevardnadze, and
to your colleagues as we approach our meeting in
Geneva,
Sincerely,
RR
His Excellency Eduard A. Shevardnadze
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Moscow
RR:CMF:JEH:AVH
DISPATCH THRU STATE VIA NSC.
gHt
52
ID #.
357149
Ag
WHITE HOUSE
GI003
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET
0 OUTGOING
H - INTERNAL
I - INCOMING
Date Correspondence
Received (YY/MM/DD)
/
/
Name
of Correspondent: Eduard a. Shevardaradye
MI Mail Report
User Codes: (A)
(B)
(C)
Subject: visit Thank with occasion of his
ROUTE TO:
ACTION
DISPOSITION
Tracking
Type
Completion
Action
Date
of
Date
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(Staff Name)
Code
YY/MM/DD
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ORIGINATOR $85110/18
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Referral Note:
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Referral Note:
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-
Referral Note:
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Referral Note:
ACTION CODES:
DISPOSITION CODES:
A . Appropriate Action
I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
A Answered
C Completed
C - Comment/Recommendation
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B - Non-Special Referral
S Suspended
D - Draft Response
S. For Signature
F - Furnish Fact Sheet
X Interim Reply
to be used as Enclosure
FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:
Type of Response = Initials of Signer
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Completion Date = Date of Outgoing
Comments:
Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.
Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOB).
Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.
Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.
50
WHITE HOUSE GIFT UNIT
307149
ID 8501023 A
INITIALS JEH
LOGGED 850930
ARRIVAL 850930
PRESENT 850927
ARRIVAL FORM P PRESENTED PERSONALLY
DONOR H FOREIGN OFFICIAL
PREF HIS EXCELLENCY AND MRS.
NAME EDUARD A. SHEVARDNADZE
TITLE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
CITY MOSCOW
CNTRY UNI UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
SPOUSE NANULI RAZHDENOVNA
ACKNOWLEDGE BY RR
FORM DFT
INTEND B PRESIDENT AND FIRST LADY
CATEGORY 9999
MISCELLANEOUS - N.E.C.
DESCRIP A SAMOVAR, 10" WIDE X 14" TALL, AND MATCHING TRAY, 12" X 16", BOTH
WITH A LACQUERED FLORAL AND FRUIT DESIGN.
FLAG RARE
DISP AF ARCHIVES, FOREIGN
COMMENT ON THE OCCASION OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S WORKING VISIT WITH THE
PRESIDENT.
TOTVALU RARE
GIFTS B
WHITE HOUSE GIFT UNIT
ID 8501023 B
INITIALS JEH
LOGGED 850930
ARRIVAL 850930
PRESENT 850927
ARRIVAL FORM P PRESENTED PERSONALLY
DONOR H FOREIGN OFFICIAL
PREF HIS EXCELLENCY AND MRS.
NAME EDUARD A. SHEVARDNADZE
TITLE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
CITY MOSCOW
CNTRY UNI UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
SPOUSE NANULI RAZHDENOVNA
ACKNOWLEDGE BY RR
FORM DFT
INTEND B PRESIDENT AND FIRST LADY
CATEGORY 0999
HOUSEHOLD - N.E.C.
DESCRIP A LACQUERED BOX, 6 1/2" X 4" X 1 1/2" DEEP, MEDIEVAL SCENE PICTURED
ON TOP, BLACK SIDES WITH DECORATIVE PAINTED GOLD BORDER AND SOLID
RED INTERIOR.
VALUE 000400
APPR SIAMESE IMPORTS, MANHASSET, NY.
DISP WH RESIDENCE; FOR OFFICIAL USE/DISPLAY
DESIG AF ARCHIVES, FOREIGN
COMMENT ON THE OCCASION OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S WORKING VISIT WITH THE
PRESIDENT.
TOTVALU RARE
GIFTS B
Week Ending Friday, October 4, 1985
National Historically Black Colleges
priate ceremonies and activities to express
Week, 1985
our respect and appreciation for the out-
standing academic and social accomplish-
Proclamation 5370. September 27, 1985
ments of the Nation's black institutions of
higher learning.
By the President of the United States
In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set
of America
my hand this twenty-seventh day of Sep-
tember, in the year of our Lord nineteen
A Proclamation
hundred and eighty-five, and of the Inde-
The one hundred and two historically
pendence of the United States of America
black colleges and universities in the United
the two hundred and tenth.
States have contributed substantially to the
Ronald Reagan
growth and enrichment of the Nation.
These institutions have a rich heritage and
[Filed with the Office of the Federal Regis-
tradition of providing high quality academic
ter, 11 a.m., September 30, 1985]
and professional training, and their gradu-
ates have made countless contributions to
Note: The text of the proclamation was re-
the progress of our complex technological
leased by the Office of the Press Secretary
society.
on September 28.
Historically black colleges and universities
bestow forty percent of all degrees earned
by black students in the United States. They
have awarded degrees to sixty percent of
the black physicians, sixty percent of the
Meeting With Soviet Foreign Minister
Eduard Shevardnadze
pharmacists, forty percent of the attorneys,
fifty percent of the engineers, seventy-five
percent of the military officers, and eighty
Radio Address to the Nation.
percent of the members of the judiciary.
September 28, 1985
Throughout the years, these institutions
have helped many underprivileged students
My fellow Americans:
to develop their full talents through higher
During the past week we've been work-
education.
ing hard to advance the Middle East peace
Recognizing that the achievements and
process and to try to improve U.S.-Soviet
aspirations of historically black colleges and
relations. I met with our good friend Presi-
universities deserve national attention, the
dent Mubarak of Egypt, and I'll be holding
Congress of the United States, by Senate
discussions this coming week with another
Joint Resolution 186, has designated the
longtime friend of the United States, King
week of September 23 through September
Hussein of Jordan. I hope to talk to you
29, 1985, as "National Historically Black
more about the Middle East next week. But
Colleges Week" and authorized and re-
today let me speak about our efforts to
quested the President to issue a proclama-
build a more constructive and stable long-
tion in observance of this event.
term relationship with the Soviet Union.
Now, Therefore, I, Ronald Reagan, Presi-
Both Secretary Shultz and I met with the
dent of the United States of America, do
new Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard She-
hereby proclaim the week of September 23
vardnadze this past week. These meetings
through September 29, 1985, as National
covered a broad global agenda, including
Historically Black Colleges Week. I ask all
the four major areas of the U.S.-Soviet
Americans to observe this week with appro-
dialog: human rights, regional and bilateral
1153
Sept. 28 / Administration of Ronald Reagan, 1985
issues, and security and arms control mat-
All too often in the past, political and
ters. They enabled us to discuss at the most
public opinion, and sometimes government
senior levels the key issues facing our two
policy as well, have taken on extreme views
nations. I told the Foreign Minister I'm
of the U.S.-Soviet relationship. We have wit-
hopeful about my upcoming meeting with
nessed sometimes a near euphoria over a
General Secretary Gorbachev, and I put
supposed coming together, at other times a
forward some new ideas as well as my plans
feeling that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. may
and expectations for that meeting.
somehow be at the brink of conflict.
The Soviet Foreign Minister indicated
that Mr. Gorbachev also is looking forward
By holding to the firm and steady course
to these discussions. Furthermore, we
we set out on 5 years ago, we've shown that
agreed to set up a series of senior level
there is no longer any reason for such
discussions between our experts in prepara-
abrupt swings in assessing this relationship.
tion for the Geneva meeting. Let's be clear,
Our differences are indeed profound and it
however, that success will not come from
is inevitable that our two countries will
one meeting. It must come from a genuine,
have opposing views on many key issues.
long-term effort by the leadership of the
But we've intensified our bilateral dialog
Soviet Union as well as ourselves. The dif-
and taken measures, such as the recent up-
ferences between us are fundamental in po-
grading of the crisis hotline, to ensure fast
litical systems, values, and ideology as well
and reliable communications between our
as in the way we conduct our relations with
leaders at all times.
other countries.
The United States must and will be forth-
Above all, I emphasized to the Foreign
right and firm in explaining and defending
Minister, and will do so with Mr. Gorba-
our interests and those of our allies. I went
chev, that the overriding responsibility of
over with Mr. Shevardnadze Soviet actions
the leaders of our two countries is to work
in various parts of the world which we feel
for peaceful relations between us. So, what
undermine the prospects for a stable peace,
we're engaged in is a long-term process to
and I discussed with him the need for the
solve problems where they're solvable,
Soviet Union to work with us seriously to
bridge differences where they can be
reduce offensive nuclear arms. These weap-
bridged, and recognize those areas where
ons exist today, and there's no reason why
there are no realistic solutions, and, where
real reductions cannot begin promptly.
they're lacking, manage our differences in a
Finally, I emphasized the need for a
way that protects Western freedoms and
more productive Soviet response to our ef-
preserves the peace. The United States
forts in Geneva to begin a U.S.-Soviet dialog
now on how to fashion a more stable future
stands ready to accomplish this.
for all humanity if the research in strategic
Much more must be done, but the proc-
defense technologies, which both the U.S.
ess is underway, and we will take further
and the U.S.S.R. are conducting, bears fruit.
steps to show our readiness to do our part.
Mr. Shevardnadze indicated that the Soviet
With equal determination by the Soviets,
negotiators will present a counterproposal
progress can be made. We will judge the
in Geneva to the initiatives we've taken
results as Soviet actions unfold in each of
there. We welcome this. It is important that
the four key areas of our relations. And I
the counterproposal address our concerns
will be reporting to you further as prepara-
about reductions and stability just as we've
tions for the November meeting proceed.
sought to address Soviet concerns. And we
hope it'll be free of preconditions and other
Until next week, thanks for listening, and
obstacles to progress. We're ready for tough
God bless you.
but fair negotiating. You, the people, can
distinguish diplomatic progress from mere
propaganda designed to influence public
Note: The President spoke at 12:06 p.m.
opinion in the democracies.
from the Oval Office at the White House.
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