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Matlock Chron November 1985 (8)
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
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This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: Matlock Chron November 1985 (8)
Box: 13
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET 4/13/2005
File Folder
MATLOCK CHRON NOVEMBER 1985 (8/10)
FOIA
F06-114/3
Box Number
13
YARHI-MILO
1306
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
8017 MEMCON
PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH SOVIET
6
ND
B1
FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE
R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3
8018 MEMO
MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE
1 11/17/1985 B1
SOVIET QUOTATIONS
R
3/8/2011
F2006-114/3
8019 MEMO
USSR QUOTES AND SOURCES
4
ND
B1
R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3
8020 MEMO
SAME TEXT AS DOC #8018
1 11/17/1985 B1
R
3/8/2011
F2006-114/3
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
JM-C'
9224
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
SECRET
INFORMATION
November 15, 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
FROM:
JACK F. MATLOCK
4m
SUBJECT:
President's October 24 Meeting with Shevardnadze
Attached at Tab I is the memorandum of conversation from the
President's October 24 meeting with Shevardnadze in New York.
attachment:
Tab I
Memorandum of conversation: the President and
Shevardnadze
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
By
White CVS House Guidelines, August 28
NARA, Date 7/2/02 1997
V
SECRET/SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister
Shevardnadze
TIME:
October 24, 1985 4:00 - 4:45 p.m.
PLACE:
Waldorf Astoria
PARTICIPANTS:
U.S.
Soviet Side
President Reagan
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
Secretary Shultz
Ambassador Dobrynin
Chief of Staff Regan
Deputy Foreign Minister Kompleklov
Assistant to the
Assistant to the FM Chernishev
President McFarlane
Assistant to the FM Tarasenko
Assistant Secretary Ridgway
Interpreter N. Uspenskiy
Ambassador Matlock
Interpreter P. Palaschenko
DAS Palmer
Interpreter Zarechnak
The President welcomed Shevardnadze and they chatted
together informally while two waves of press took pictures and
tried to get them to answer questions.
The President then opened the meeting proper by stating
that we had limited time today. We have been discussing a
variety of issues in advance, and hoped that we could reach
agreement on at least some of the lesser issues. We need to go
on to the more vital questions, but he regretted that we had
been unable so far to settle any of the lesser issues.
Shevardnadze said he would like first of all to thank the
President for this meeting. He knew how tight the President's
schedule was. They considered this meeting to be another
demonstration of the President's personal attitude toward the
meeting next month. There is little time left. In terms of
practical preparations, finalizing an agenda and final
positions, we need to work more intensively in the coming
weeks. There really is very little time left. He would be
SECRET/SENSITIVE
DECL: OADR
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/3 #8017
BY as NARA DATE 10/30/07
SECRET/SENSITIVE
3
- 2 -
speaking in purely practical terms the next day with Secretary
Shultz and other representatives of the United States. They
would review what has been done already on preparations
including the main documents and main positions. Also they
need to cover what General Secretary Gorbachev put forward in
his message to the President.
The President said yes, that he had received Gorbachev's
letter. We appreciate the arms control proposals which they
have made. We are giving them careful study in Geneva and
here; we are doing this with great care and we will be prepared
to respond to them. Some things in their proposals present
difficulties.
The President continued that we need to get at the overall
things which affect our relationship. We need to get on to
overall matter of peace. We need some understandings. Then
arms control will be a simple matter.
Shevardnadze said that he agreed with the President that
probably this was the main problem; this is the issue of
security or in a different form arms control. This needs to
play a decisive role in the Summit meeting and the Soviet side
is prepared in this regard. These are complex questions.
Problems have accumulated over many years. It is difficult at
one meeting to resolve all of them. But the Soviets do not
exclude the possibility of progress as far as fundamental
questions are concerned. They have some general ideas which
they would be prepared to discuss with the Secretary the next
day. This would include language with regard to security
problems and arms control.
Shevardnadze continued that the President knew the Soviet
proposals. They had been outlined in the Gorbachev message and
all of them were on the table in Geneva. They tried not only
to put forward proposals, but had also already taken practical
steps, unilateral steps. These included their moratorium on
nuclear explosions affective until January first; also the
ceasation of the deployment of medium range weapons in Europe
and their statement that they would not be the first to use
nuclear weapons. It was not a simple thing for them to take
these steps.
Shevardnadze said that both sides have an interest in
making progress on the major arms control questions. This
included banning of space strike weapons. They also had a
proposal for reductions of strategic nuclear weapons. The
third group was medium range weapons -- here they have several
SECRET/SENSITIVE
SECRET/SENSITIVE
4
- 3 -
compromise proposals. Speaking frankly they had difficultly in
understanding steps the United States had taken in response.
The U.S. position was not clear. He would repeat that they
understand these matters require careful study but with little
time left both sides should accelerate their efforts so that
the Summit can have a positive effect.
Shevardnadze continued that we also have bilateral,
regional, and Stockholm confidence matters to consider. In
this group of questions a certain convergence of views is
emerging. At the same time they had noted that some members of
the adminstration had been toughening their positions, for
example in Stockholm and in the cultural exchanges talks. He
mentioned this as there is very little time left and we need to
use it in the most effective way.
Shevardnadze noted that last time he had seen the President
he had said that all peoples and governments are looking
forward to this meeting in Geneva with Gorbachev. They have no
right to disappoint the world. Given mutual desires he
believes we can develop positive things for the Summit which
would make world public opinion more comfortable. However, he
could not avoid saying that they fail to understand some of the
statements of some in the administration with regard to a
so-called Soviet threat and statements that there is a need for
a new interpretation of past agreements which are the basis for
the present strategic stability. It appears to the Soviet side
that such actions are not conducive to preparations for a
successful Summit.
The President said that some of the things we have
suggested we would like to do even before Geneva. As a result
of his earlier meeting with Shevardnadze, Ambassador Hartman
had given Shevardnadze a list of things we could do. The main
thing the President wanted to say is that he stands fully
behind them. But the Soviet side seems to be dragging its
feet. If we could move on this thing it would be an indication
that boths sides are serious about making settlements.
Shevardnadze responded that he had met Ambassador Hartman
just a few days earlier. With regard to all of the matters
which Hartman had raised with him, the leadership of the Soviet
Union had same day been given instructions to do preparations.
These were important matters, though they were not the most
important. The next day he would have an opportunity to review
things with the Secretary. Maybe there would also be a need
for a second stage before the Summit. It would be good if
Secretary Shultz could come to Moscow. The Soviet side would
SECRET/SENSITIVE
SECRET SENSITIVE
- 4 -
be pleased to welcome him before the Summit to review both
organizational and substantive problems. We could also have
final discussions on language.
The President said that we were planning on the Secretary
making this trip.
The Secretary noted that he had told Dobrynin that we were
ready to go ahead.
The President said that with regard to dates, he understood
it would be early November.
Shevardnadze said yes, the first ten days of November.
The Secretary noted that Dobrynin had mentioned that
November 4 and 5 would be convenient.
Dobrynin noted that another possibility would be November
11-12.
The Secretary said that the 4th and 5th would be better
given everything that is underway here. The next day they had
a couple of hours to identify what needs to be done so that in
Moscow they can move things along as the President had said we
wanted to. We would be prepared to be responsive.
Shevardnadze said that we need initial impulses for the
various delegations. So far as the Soviets are concerned, they
will do this.
The Secretary said that the President already had been
giving impulses to him, Bud, Roz, Jack and others. They all
felt thoroughly prodded.
Shevardnadze said that they also were being given impulses.
The Secretary said there was one minor matter but it could
cause great consternation if not handled well. Their
invitation is a news item. So they needed to agree on how and
when to make this known publicly. He had suggested to Dobrynin
that they might do this the next day following his meeting with
Shevardnadze, but there might be other ways.
Shevardnadze said that this depended on all of us, and that
it was fine with him to do it the next day. He said in
conclusion that Gorbachev and the Soviet leadership had asked
him to give the President best greetings on behalf of the
SECRET/SENSITIVE
SECRET / SENSITIVE
- 5 -
Soviet government.
The President stated that he appreciated these greetings
and looked forward to his meeting with Gorbachev in Geneva.
The President then asked Shevardnadze to remain behind
alone for a few minutes. The rest of both sides delegations
left the room.
The tete-a-tete began at 4:30 and continued until 4:45.
D. Zarechnak was the interpreter on the U.S. side.
N. Uspenskiy was the interpreter for the Soviet side.
The mode of interpreting was consecutive.
The President indicated that he realized that the subject of
human rights was considered to be an internal affair by the
Soviet side, but he wished to point out that in the U.S. system
of government, anything that the two sides would agree to would
need to be ratified by the Congress, which in turn would need
to see if it had public support. This is an important part of
the structure of the U.S. Government.
The President continued that the U.S. side was not attempting
to interfere in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union, but
it would be easier for the Congress to ratify some matters if
it saw that there was movement on some humanitarian issues.
The President said that he was referring to those rights of
human beings which were agreed to in Helsinki, such as family
reunification. He indicated that he knew of one woman in the
U.S. whose husband was in the Soviet Union, and they had not
seen each other for four years.
The President indicated that the U.S. is unique in that
Americans come from every corner of the world - either they
themselves have come from other countries, or their parents or
grandparents have. Americans are of many different backgrounds
- Irish, Italian, Russian, etc. They have strong feelings for
the lands of their heritage and about the denial of rights
which they feel occurs for some people in those lands.
The President said that now, before the Summit, something ought
to be done in the area of humanitarian deeds. He stressed that
deeds were necessary, not just words. There were some people
who were not permitted to emigrate. Their names were both
SECRET/SENSITIVE
1
SECRET/SENSITIVE
- 6 -
nationally and internationally recognized.
The President indicated that his son is a free-lance journalist
and he had visited Moscow for the May Day celebration and had
met two Soviet men who were denied permission to emigrate. One
of them was the husband of the woman whom he had just mentioned.
The President said that if some action was taken on these
issues, in connection with names that had been transmitted by
Ambassador Hartman and perhaps would be mentioned tomorrow
morning, it would be easier to reach agreement on other issues.
Shevardnadze replied that the President had mentioned this
issue at their last meeting. He wished to assure the President
that everything which had been mentioned by the Secretary of
State, by the President and by Ambassador Hartman was being
given very serious study. Such issues were always seriously
studied, even without special request. The Soviet Government
places no barriers to such requests if they do not involve
security matters. That is the main thing. So the Soviet side
would see if the emigration of these individuals was legal, and
if it was, they would be permitted to leave. If it was not,
the Soviet side would explain why such permission was not
possible.
Shevardnadze said that he had explained to Ambassador Hartman
that the U.S. side should not think that people in the Soviet
Government had hearts of stone. All requests for emigration
were taken to heart.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
06
9M-C8
NATIONAL SECURTHICOUND
2091
November 16, 1985
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN
FROM:
JACK F. MATLOCK 45mg
SUBJECT:
Baldrige Request for Appointment with President
Secretary Baldrige has requested an appointment for 20-30 minutes
with the President to report on his trip to Moscow.
I believe that it would be desirable for the President to receive
Baldrige and hear first hand of his talks in Moscow.
Danzansky, Sestanovich, Mandel and Miller concur.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the Schedule Proposal at Tab I.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments:
Tab I
Schedule Proposal
Tab A
Note from Alfred H. Kingon and
Background Material
THE WHITE HOUSE
9900
: :
SCHEDULE PROPOSAL
TO:
FREDERICK J. RYAN, Director
Presidential Appointments and Scheduling
FROM:
WILLIAM F. MARTIN
REQUEST:
Meeting with Secretary of Commerce Malcolm
Baldrige.
PURPOSE:
To report on his meeting with Secretary
General Gorbachev on December 10, 1985
BACKGROUND:
Secretary Baldrige visited the Soviet Union
and was granted a meeting with Secretary
General Gorbachev on December 10, 1985.
PREVIOUS
PARTICIPATION:
The President has met before with Secretary
Baldrige.
DATE & TIME:
December 16 or 17.
Duration 20-30 minutes.
LOCATION:
Oval Office.
PARTICIPANTS:
The President, Donald T. Regan, Robert C.
McFarlane, Admiral John M. Poindexter,
Jack F. Matlock.
OUTLINE OF EVENTS:
Report on his meeting with Secretary General
Gorbachev.
REMARKS REQURED:
None required.
MEDIA COVERAGE
None.
PROPOSED "PHOTO":
The President and Secretary Baldrige sitting
across from each other.
RECOMMENDED BY:
ROBERT C. MCFARLANE.
MABHINGTO
December 13, 1985
NOTE FOR ROBERT MCFARLANE
FROM:
ALFRED H. KINGON
d
Would you please handle
the attached request from
Secretary Baldrige.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
December 13, 1985
NOTE FOR ALFRED H. KINGON
Helen Robbins called from
Embassy Brussels this morning to
request meeting with the President
for Secretary Baldrige. The
Secretary wants 20-30 minutes to
report to the President on his
Moscow meetings. Requests meeting
early in the week (Monday or Tuesday).
9:00 am
Mattocki
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Chan File
8402
ACTION
November 17, 1985
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
ROBERT C. MCFARLANE rein
SUBJECT:
Soviet Quotations
Issue
Whether to review the attached quotations attributed to Soviet
leaders.
Facts
You asked your staff to try to verify the authenticity of the
quotations attached at Tab A.
Discussion
We asked the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and
Research to check the authenticity of the quotations, which were
drawn from a secondary source by Professor Albert Weeks of New
York University. Following a thorough investigation the State
Department was able to verify only five of the sixteen
quotations. In the other 11 cases, the researchers were either
unable to locate the quotations in the sources referenced or
found them to be inaccurate. In dealing with the Soviets it is
probably more useful to cite Soviet actions, which speak volumes
in themselves, than to make references to quotations from past
Soviet leaders. In many cases the current Soviet leaders will be
unwilling to concede the accuracy of the quotations, and in
others they are likely to claim that the quotations were taken
out of context or misinterpreted. Their actions, however, cannot
be so easily denied.
Recommendation
RRR
OK
No
That you review the quotations cited above as
accurate.
-
Attachment:
Tab A
List of Quotations
DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
NLRR F06-114/3#8018
BY RW NARA DATE 3/8/11
DECLASSIFIED /RELEASO)
NLRR Fob -114/3 8019
13
BY CN NARA DATE 10/30/07
QUOTES AND SOURCES
1. Andropov: "Marxism-Leninism is the textbook for achieving
Socialist world revolution and the building of a new society
in every country of the world."
Source: Yuri Andropov, Izbranniye Rechi i Stat'i,
Politizdat, Moscow, 1979, p. 73.
2. Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky; Chief Soviet General Staff
1952-1961; "In the present era, the struggle for peace and
for gaining time presumes, above all, the steady
strengthening of the military might of the Soviet Union and
of the entire Socialist camp."
Source: Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky, Military Strategy, 1st
and 2nd eds, translated by Harriet F. Scott, Crane, Russak &
Company, Inc., N.Y., 1975, pp. 185 and 431.
3. Leonid Brezhnev 1970: "We seek to paralyze the forces of
imperialism in Europe and to smash their aggressive plans.
This means not only to contract the radius of activity of
imperialism, but to inflict on it such defeat that it will
be felt everywhere throughout the world."
Source: Leonid I. Brezhnev, op. cit. supra, Vol. 2, p. 9.
4. Leonid Brezhnev: " detente, in fact, creates favorable
conditions for the struggle between the two systems [and for
altering the correlation of forces in favor of Socialism.]"
Source: Leonid I. Brezhnev, Leninskim Kursom (Leninist
Course), Politizdat, Moscow, 1976, p. 485. The phrase in
brackets should have been bracketed originally to indicate a
different Soviet source: Radio Moscow lecture by S. S.
Vishnevsky, August 29, 1973. Moreover, the most extended
discussion by Brezhnev of the
"detente-creates-favorable-conditions" for global class
struggle and a Soviet victory in it can be found in
Brezhnev's political report to the 25th Party Congress,
February-March 1976.
5. Leonid Brezhnev; Prague, 1973: "Trust us comrades, for by
1985, as a consequence of what we are achieving by means of
detente, we will have achieved most of our objectives in
Western Europe
a decisive shift in the correlation of
forces will be such that by 1985, we will be able to exert
our will whenever we need to."
Page 2
Source: William Beecher (from British intelligence), The
Boston Globe, Feb. 11, 1977, quoted in Brian Crozier,
Strategy of Survival, Arlington House Publishers, New
Rochelle, N.Y., 1978, p. 76. There is a dispute among
specialists as to the authenticity of this quote. Yet
authentication has come from other sources than Mr. Beecher
or Mr. Crozier: e.g., Gen. Jan Sejna, We Will Bury You,
Sidgwick & Jackson, London, p. 112, has a similar quote from
Brezhnev that Gen. Sejna heard directly from the Soviet
leader when the former was on a high-level visit to Moscow
in 1966. Brezhnev is supposed to have made the observation
quoted by Beecher at a secret Pact leaders' meeting in
Prague in 1973.
6.
S. S. Lototsky, the armed forces, the population, the
whole Soviet nation, must be prepared for the eventuality of
nuclear rocket war."
Source: Soviet Army; Progress Publishers; Moscow 1971; p.
332.
7. Marshal A. A. Grechko; Soviet Minister of Defense 1967-1976;
1974: "Any war waged by the imperialists on the USSR or
other Socialist states will be unjust and reactionary. When
waged by the USSR or other Socialist states against
imperialism, any war is just and progressive, for it would
be the continuation of revolutionary policy.'
Source: Marshal A. A. Grechko, The Armed Forces of the
Soviet State, Soviet Military Thought No. 12 (USAF trans.),
pp. 100ff.
8. Marshal A. A. Grechko: "No compromise is possible between
the Communist and bourgeois ideologies, and conflict between
the two is inevitable."
Source: close approximation: In A. S. Milovidov, et al.,
The Philosophical Heritage of V. I. Lenin and Problems of
Contemporary War, Voyenizdat, Moscow, 1972, p. 216.
9.
Boris N. Ponomarev; Communist Party Secretary: "Violence in
itself is not an evil. It depends on what it's purpose is.
In the hands of Socialists, it is a progressive force."
Source: B. N. Ponomarev, Real Socialism and Its
International Significance, Progress Publishers, Moscow,
1979, pp. 14-15.
Page 3
10. Andrei Gromyko, 1978: "Detente in no way, however, means
the freezing of the objective processes of historical
development. In no way does it eliminate the existence of
class antagonisms within capitalist states, between the
people's interests and those of world imperialism, and
between the two social systems, nor does it reduce the
ideological confrontation."
Source: A. A. Gromyko, Vo Imya Torzhestva Leninskoi
Vneshnei Politiki Izbranniye Rechi i Stat'i (In the Name of
the Triumph of Leninist Foreign Policy Selected Speeches and
Articles), Politizdat, Moscow, 1978, p. 472.
11. Premier Alexei Kosygin, 1978: "Russia and its allies will
control the high seas, space, and most of the world's
landmass by the early 1980's."
Source: Premier Alexei Kosygin to Imelda Marcos of the
Philippines, quoted in Newsweek, July 24, 1978.
12. Marshal N. V. Ogarkov; Chief of the Soviet General Staff;
1979: "The Soviet Union has military superiority over the
U.S. Henceforth, the United States will be threatened. It
had better get used to it."
Source: Marshal N. V. Ogarkov, to visiting U.S. Congressmen
in 1979, quoted by Dr. Alvin J. Rubinstein, Soviet Foreign
Policy Since World War II, Winthrop Publishers, Cambridge,
1981, p. 166. In personal conversation with Rubinstein, Dr.
Weeks was told that several Congressmen heard this remark
and that it was reported in the U.S. press.
13. General Major A. S. Molovidov, 1980, to Dr. Y. A. Zhdanov in
"Questions of Philosophy," a Soviet Journal, October 1980:
"Marxist-Leninists decisively reject the assertions of
certain bourgeois theoreticians who consider nuclear missile
war unjust from any point of view."
Secondary Source: War and Peace: Soviet Russia Speaks.
Edited by Albert L. Weeks and William C. Bodie, 1983;
National Strategy Information Center, Inc., 111 East 58th
Street, New York, N.Y. 10022, p. 14.
14. Pravda, 1955: "We cannot be intimidated by fables that in
the event of a new world war, civilization will perish."
Source: Pravda, Mar. 27, 1955.
16
Page 4
15. Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky: "Under conditions where nuclear
rockets are used that side which manages during the first
days of the war to penetrate more deeply into enemy
territory naturally acquires the capability for more
effectively using the results of its nuclear attacks and
disrupting the mobilization of the enemy. This is
especially important with respect to European theatres of
operations with the relatively small operative depth."
Source: Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky, Military Strategy, 1st
and 2nd eds, trans. by Harriet F. Scott, Crane, Russak &
Company, Inc., N.Y., 1975, p. 312.
16. "On the Communist side, nuclear war will be lawful and just
-- the natural right and sacred duty of progressive mankind
to destroy imperialism. It will resolve not specific
limited political interests, but a crucial historical
problem, one that affects the fate of all mankinds."
Source: B. A. Byely, et al., eds, Marxism-Leninism on War
and Army, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1972 (based on
Russian 5th ed of 1968), p. 45.
8402
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
November 12, 1985
CONFIDENTIAL
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
FROM:
JACK F. MATLOCK
Soviet Quotations Gas
SIGNED
SUBJECT:
In a recent meeting the President asked his staff to try to
verify several quotes attributed to Soviet leaders. Attached at
Tab I is a memorandum to the President advising him which
quotations were successfully traced.
Speechwriters' research contacted Albert Weeks, author of the
book from which the quotes were taken, and was given the
references at Tab A. We forwarded this information to the
Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, which
attempted to verify each of the specific citations. State's
detailed findings are at Tab II.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I informing
him which quotations could be verified.
Approve
Disapprove
Ty Tob, Cobb, Walt Raymond, and Judy Mandel concur.
Attachments
Tab I
Memorandum to the President
Tab A
Original list of quotations with references from
Albert Weeks
Tab II
State Department findings
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/3#8020
BY RW NARA DATE 3/8/11
Soviet Quotation Verifications
18
1. The source could not be located.
O.K.
2. We did not find the quote in the Garthoff's first
edition of the book. We telephoned the editor of the Harriet
F. Scott, Crane, Russak & Company, Inc. edition of the book who
confirmed the inclusion of the quote in their third edition on
page 185.
3. The citation is located in Leninskim Kursom, volume 2, O.K.
in Russian.
4. The first source was located but the citation was not
present. The passage in Brezhnev's political report to the
25th Party Congress, February-March 1976, that is most likely
the one referred to reads: "Detente does not in the slightest
way abolish, and cannot abolish or change the laws of the class
struggle.
5. The citation appears in the secondary source Strategy
on Survival.
This frequently cited quotation has never been
authenticated. Soviet media have denied the quotation whenever
it has been used.
6. The source could not be located.
7. The source was located and the citation was not present.
8. The source was located and the citation was not present.
9. The source could not be located.
10. The source was located and the citation was present. O.K.
11. The source was located and the citation was present.
However, it is not a direct quotation of Kosygin but is what
Mrs. Imela Marcos is reported as stating what Kosygin said. It
would not have been likely that Kosygin said it in these terms.
12. The 1985 edition of the source was located but the
citation is incorrect. The citation in the 1985 edition of Dr.
Rubenstein's book is not a direct quotation. It reads:
"Ogarkov reiterated that the USSR was not seeking
nuclear superiority and noted that the United States
did not seem reconciled to the Soviet Union's
attainment of nuclear parity, but instead yearned for
the old days of its former nuclear superiority, which,
he added, was a thing of the past, as the United
States would have to learn to accept."
13. The citation is unsubstantiated because it cites itself
as a secondary source and fails to give a primary source.
14. The citation was found in "Current Digest of the Soviet
Press" in English. The citation was in the Pravda source in
O.K.
its correct form.
-2-
15. Garthoff's first edition of the source was located and
the citation was essentially correct; Garthoff's edition has a
O.K.
slightly different translation than the quote on your list.
16. The source was located. The first sentence of the
citation is out of context and inaccurate. The second sentence
is essentially correct and in context. The full paragraph from
which the first sentence is taken reads:
"The social, class content of nuclear missile war
and its aims will be determined by politics. The new
world war will be, on one side, the continuation,
weapon and instrument of criminal imperialist policies
being implemented with nuclear missiles. On the other
side, it will be the lawful and just counteraction to
aggression, the natural right and sacred duty of
progressive manking to destroy imperialism, its
bitterest enemy, the source of destructive wars.
"
Wang 3976S
JM-C
9459
20
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
November 25, 1985
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN
FROM:
JACK F. MATLOCK Air
SUBJECT:
Letter of Acknowledgment to Charles Wick
Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to Larry Speakes
forwarding a proposed letter to Charles Wick acknowledging the
services of VOA and America magazine staff in preparing the
Russian language version of the President's October 31 interview
with Soviet journalists.
RECOMMENDTION
That you forward the attached memo to Larry Speakes.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachment:
Tab I
Memorandum to Larry Speakes
Tab A
Proposed letter from Larry Speakes to Charles Wick
12
9459
22
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
MEMORANDUM FOR LARRY M. SPEAKES
FROM:
WILLIAM F. MARTIN
SUBJECT:
Letter of Acknowledgment to Charles Wick
Attached at Tab A is a proposed letter to Charles Wick
acknowledging the outstanding work of USIA staff in preparing
Russian language versions of the President's written and oral
interviews with Soviet journalists. On two successive nights the
USIA staffers worked until after 3 a.m. to prepare timely,
accurate translations of the President's comments. They have
truly earned the attached letter of thanks.
Attachment:
Tab A
Proposed letter to Charles Wick
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Dear Charlie:
I wanted to let you know that two offices in USIA provided
magnificent support for the President's October 31 interview
with Soviet journalists. When we decided to give the Soviets a
Russian language version of the President's written and oral
responses, VOA and America magazine took on the task with very
short notice and under considerable time pressure.
The written questions were initially translated by the State
Department, but we needed to edit the State draft and reproduce
it in professional fashion. VOA's USSR division head, Mark
Pomar, with Nataluiya Clarkson and Ivan Hrapunov, helped with the
editing. Then we turned to the America magazine staff, which
not only provided final editing but reproduced the entire text
on their A-Tec system. The final product was professionally
printed.
We were not surprised by the quality of the VOA and America
work, but when you consider that America did not get the text
until 8 p.m., and the final version had to be turned over to
the Soviets the following morning, we think their efforts
deserve special mention. America editor Bob Poteete, along
with Ilya Suslov, Edward Lyakovich, and Michael Mikkalo, worked
through the night to complete the task.
Not satisfied with that performance, the two staffs undertook
the next evening to translate, edit, and print the President's
oral answers to TASS questions. This was another all night
operation with an even shorter deadline. The transcript was
available at 5 p.m. and had to be in Soviet hands by 9 a.m.
The VOA staff, bolstered by Barbara Cummins, prepared the
translation and shuttled the answers to America, which edited,
typed and printed the final version. The America staff was
augmented by Leonard and Elena Cox and Michael Mackenzie, but
basically the same crew worked through another night.
-2-
Both written and oral responses were prepared in the highest
professional manner. Your staff pitched in to help with
exceptional good grace and humor, taking on an extremely
important task under very tight constraints. They saved the day,
and their performance should not go unnoted.
With best wishes.
Sincerely,
Larry M. Speakes
Principal Deputy Press Secretary
Charles Z. Wick, Director
United States Information Agency
400 C Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20547
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 26, 1985
Dear Mr. Corwin:
Thank you for your letter to the President
of November 15 and your interesting
account of experiences in the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe. You have
witnessed and participated in some truly
historic world events.
I would also like to thank you for your
words of support for the President on
the eve of his departure for Geneva and
his meeting with General Secretary
Gorbachev. It is support like yours
which has made our policy toward the
Soviets - based on realism, strength and
dialogue -- a successful one.
With best wishes,
Sincerely,
Jack F. Matlock
Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Mr. Edward J. Corwin,
200 Central Park South,
New York, N.Y. 10019
JP Da
letter - ub
from
meun-
Ich
corwin 26A
National Security Council IBMIRD
The White House
1
System #
Package #
SEQUENCE TO
HAS SEEN
DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson
/
P
William Martin
John Poindexter
Paul Thompson
Wilma Hall
Bud McFarlane
William Martin
NSC Secretariat
2
staff
Situation Room
I = Information
A = Action
R = Retain
D = Dispatch
N = No further Action
cc:
VP
Regan
Buchanan
Other
COMMENTS
Should be seen by:
(Date/Time)
Tnfo: Metlock
from Kathy ostome
21
Edward J. Corwin, 200 Central Park South, New York, NY 10019
(212)246-2982
1. Rem. ami
2. has mat lock
November 15, 1985
Mr. President:
I join all Americans wishing you maximum progress toward current
objectives. I pray in the enclosed electronic open we letter to
you, based on a lifetime of exposure to Russians, that your
initiative of on-going Summit dialogue will become a turning
point. It may open the historic epoch of
CO. - EVOLUTION
which will gradually reduce ideological and socio-economic
differences.
Ultimately, the co-evolution will bring to all mankind lasting
peace, human freedom and the pursuit of happiness.
God bless you.
Admiringly,
Edward J. Comin
The President of the United States
The White House
Washington, DC 20500
LETTER TO RONALD REAGAN, THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
I was born in what was then the Russian far east, now China. As an
eight year-old child, I witnessed the Russian revolution. Then I grew
up in Poland, watching closely the first three decades of the Soviet
neighbors' communist developments.
In 1938, I came to the U.S. and was enrolled in a sales class at IBM, of
which Tom Watson, Jr. was elected president. He became the builder of
IBM's greatness, then the U.S. Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. I am proud
and grateful for our continuing friendship.
In 1939, I went to work for IBM in Poland. As a reserve officer of the
Polish cavalry, I was literally on the frontier line when Hitler
attacked at dawn on September 1st. I remained in close quarters
fighting throughout the entire Polish campaign. Two weeks after Hitler
announced victory, the commander of the last still-fighting regular
Polish forces accepted honorable capitulation.
Fifty-two months of captivity in Germany gave me the time to compare and
think about the freedom of life in America, the Nazi dictatorship, and
even talk directly about contemporary conditions with Soviet soldiers
working across the barbed wire from my prison camp.
In February 1945, I escaped and after a recapture was thrown together
with other escapees including Soviets and G.I.'s We faced the same
uncertain fate.
- 2 -
is
Since I spoke fluent Russian, I talked a lot with Soviets, mostly about
life in America. Before we parted, their leader told me: "You think you
are a wise man, but you are stupid--none of us believe your fantasies
about your land of freedom and opportunity; we were warned at our army
schools that when we meet foriegn soldiers speaking Russian, passing for
privates, they will be in fact specially trained propaganda officers.
But you shared with us the food you stole from Germans. Don't
despair--one day we will come to America and we will liberate your
people from the yoke of capitalism."
These Russian soldiers were so thoroughly brainwashed that they let me
go on for two months and laughed openly when we parted. But they were
friendly, helpful, real comrades in arms and warm human beings. We
became true friends.
In a few short years, the dogmatic dictatorship of the Communist party
subjugated adjoining countries. Then came the Iron Curtain, the Berlin
Wall, the Cold War, the crushing of peoples' uprisings in Poland and
Hungary.
And yet in 1959, Kruschov visited the U.S. Tom Watson selected me to
tell Kruschov in Russian live on NBC and CBS the story of the first IBM
disc storage computer. Earlier that day at the open lunch in the IBM
cafeteria, Kruschov made the historic speech proposing that our two
nations c 0 - e X i S t, and I quote "in peace and without war." As
host, Tom Watson gave an historic, moving response. I sat next to a
young man, who I was sure was the closest confidant of Kruschov. We
30
- 3 -
talked intensely and in an open manner. He laughingly asked me never
to reveal his name, since the "aparatcziki" will prove me a liar and
convince everyone that our conversation is my fantasy. But we agreed,
and I surmise this reflected Kruschov's thoughts, that co-existence
could work if our divergent ideologies and systems will gradually
evolveto let plain human goodness dissipate suspicions and fears and
equalize the socio-economic patterns of our two different worlds.
And the same Kruschov later unleashed the arms race and the Cuban
crises. Then came the occupation of Czechoslovakia.
Yet detente went on. I traveled twenty five times into Iron Curtain
countries and talked to people of all levels, from prime ministers to
pedestrians. Many asked if the U.S., being stronger at that time, would
start another world war. But most were afraid to talk and be denounced
for associating with an American. However, they were eager for our
techonolgy and I sold them an earlier generation IBM computer, the first
behind the Iron Curtain.
On that weekend in Warsaw, I joined tourists visiting the former Summer
Royal Palace. The guide talked in English and completely ignored a
plainly dressed middle-aged Russian couple. I volunteered to interpret
for them. I wore a cheap, local coat. When we were leaving, I asked:
"What do the Russian people think--will Poland suffer a third world
war?" The man, taking me for a fearful Polish citizen, smiled
self-assuredly. "Don't worry, my brother. The Americans don't have the
guts to start a war. We don't need to start it. We need to become
stronger while America rots inside. American women will fight against
31
- 4 -
men. Young people will fight against any authority, American armed
forces will decay in numbers and morale. Our army will grow in strength
and discipline. Maybe in ten years, we shall serve Americans an
ultimatum and they will have to gently submit to our brotherly guidance
and ideology."
The next day, in the lobby of my hotel, I nearly bumped into my man. He
looked even more self-assured in his bemedalled tunic of a Soviet
general, flanked by two smartly attentive officers.
I was startled. The man, who the day before confirmed my fears that
Soviets rely on subversion to destroy the fabric of our nation, was in
fact a Soviet general. I realized that no amount of basic goodness of
the plain Russian people can stop the power-hungry Communist drive for
world domination.
As we all know, America rebounded from the malaise of the '60's, and
woke up to the subversive and well-orchestrated process of the
destruction of our society.
The long-range goals of communism were being cleverly disguised by
negotiations. Salt I and Helsinki were hailed as proof of Moscow
changing directions, only to become an opportunity to cheat and violate
the agreements.
The suspicions grew and the hate campaign intensified on both sides.
With the growing Soviet nuclear superiority came the fear of physical,
nuclear annihilation.
- 5 -
32
And so, after the initial cooperation which gave birth to the United
Nations, after the attempts at co-existence, after actual
confrontations, there is now a growing conflict of current objectives.
A conflict aggravated on both sides by a limited feel for philosphy,
history, psychology and sensitivity of the two adversary worlds.
The world will know in a few days if the Summit became merely a contest
between the negotiators, each claiming a victory. I met you, Sir, I
looked into your eyes on two occasions, and I strongly feel that the
driving force of President Reagan, his motive, is the love of his
people. He sacrifices his health and shortens his life not to earn a
place in history, but to serve America in the best way he can. What we
read about Gorbachev conveys the image of a dedicated Communist who has
a record of caring for his people and effectiveness in overcoming the
obstacles the bureaucracy creates for the well-being of the Soviet
nations.
This Summit may become an historic turning point offering to both leader
an opportunity to look into each other's eyes and examine their ultimate
motives, and hopefully find greater common goals than current adversary
targets.
Of course, to keep their power, the leaders will certainly convey to
theiconstituencies the images of hard negotiators, but in their personal
encounter, they may honestly pledge to seek a way for a better future.
Let us pray that the two men holding the destiny of the world in their
hands value the survival and lasting happiness of mankind more than the
- 6 -
33
passing glory of a victory in a current contest. Let us hope that these
two men will begin an on-going Summit dialogue, as suggested by you,
President Reagan.
Such dialogue will generate a desire to look for good features in the
adversary system. Such dialogue will permit us to learn more about the
soul of each nation. Based on the growing knowledge, the present and
future leaders of the two super powers may seek a mutual co- -
evoution conceived by love, hope and resolve to equalize the
differences and thus eliminate the roots of future conflicts among
nations. Co-evolution is a long road. It may take generations and time
to encompass all nations. But it is the only road for mankind to go on
toward a happier existence.
God bless you.
Admiringly,
Edward I. Comin
Edward J. Corwin
cc: His Excellency Thomas J. Watson, Jr.
Mallech
9459
34
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
FILE
November 26, 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR LARRY M. SPEAKES
FROM:
WILLIAM F. MARTIN Frie
SUBJECT:
Letter of Acknowledgment to Charles Wick
Attached at Tab A is a proposed letter to Charles Wick
acknowledging the outstanding work of USIA staff in preparing
Russian language versions of the President's written and oral
interviews with Soviet journalists. On two successive nights the
USIA staffers worked until after 3 a.m. to prepare timely,
accurate translations of the President's comments. They have
truly earned the attached letter of thanks.
Attachment:
Tab A
Proposed letter to Charles Wick
35
9459
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
November 25, 1985
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN
JACK F. MATLOCK Am
SIGNED
FROM:
SUBJECT:
Letter of Acknowledgment to Charles Wick
Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to Larry Speakes
forwarding a proposed letter to Charles Wick acknowledging the
services of VOA and America magazine staff in preparing the
Russian language version of the President's October 31 interview
with Soviet journalists.
RECOMMENDTION
That you forward the attached memo to Larry Speakes.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachment:
Tab I
Memorandum to Larry Speakes
Tab A
Proposed letter from Larry Speakes to Charles Wick
36
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Dear Charlie:
I wanted to let you know that two offices in USIA provided
magnificent support for the President's October 31 interview
with Soviet journalists. When we decided to give the Soviets a
Russian language version of the President's written and oral
responses, VOA and America magazine took on the task with very
short notice and under considerable time pressure.
The written questions were initially translated by the State
Department, but we needed to edit the State draft and reproduce
it in professional fashion. VOA's USSR division head, Mark
Pomar, with Nataluiya Clarkson and Ivan Hrapunov, helped with the
editing. Then we turned to the America magazine staff, which
not only provided final editing but reproduced the entire text
on their A-Tec system. The final product was professionally
printed.
We were not surprised by the quality of the VOA and America
work, but when you consider that America did not get the text
until 8 p.m., and the final version had to be turned over to
the Soviets the following morning, we think their efforts
deserve special mention. America editor Bob Poteete, along
with Ilya Suslov, Edward Lyakovich, and Michael Mikkalo, worked
through the night to complete the task.
Not satisfied with that performance, the two staffs undertook
the next evening to translate, edit, and print the President's
oral answers to TASS questions. This was another all night
operation with an even shorter deadline. The transcript was
available at 5 p.m. and had to be in Soviet hands by 9 a.m.
The VOA staff, bolstered by Barbara Cummins, prepared the
translation and shuttled the answers to America, which edited,
typed and printed the final version. The America staff was
augmented by Leonard and Elena Cox and Michael Mackenzie, but
basically the same crew worked through another night.
31
-2-
Both written and oral responses were prepared in the highest
professional manner. Your staff pitched in to help with
exceptional good grace and humor, taking on an extremely
important task under very tight constraints. They saved the day,
and their performance should not go unnoted.
With best wishes.
Sincerely,
Larry M. Speakes
Principal Deputy Press Secretary
Charles Z. Wick, Director
United States Information Agency
400 C Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20547
JMC
9361
38
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
November 26, 1985
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN
FROM:
JACK F. MATLOCK
from
SUBJECT:
Response to Organization for Rebirth of Ukraine
Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to Sally Kelley
forwarding a State Department draft response to Pawlo Dorozhynsky
of the Organization for the Rebirth of the Ukraine. We have
reviewed the draft and suggested some minor changes to reflect
that the Geneva meeting has already taken place. We recommend
that a copy of the President's November 21 address to Congress be
included among the suggested enclosures.
Steve Sestanovich, Judyt Mandel, Bob RS Linhard, Gerald am May, Steve
SS
Steiner, and Sven Kraemer concur.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memo at Tab I for Sally Kelley.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments:
Tab I
Memorandum to Sally Kelley
Tab A
State Department draft response
Tab B
State's suggested enclosures
Tab C
letter from Pawlo Dorozhynsky to Patrick Buchanan
Tab D
letter from Pawlo Dorozhynsky to the President
Tab E
tasking to State
39
9361
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
MEMORANDUM FOR SALLY KELLEY
FROM:
WILLIAM F. MARTIN
SUBJECT:
Response to Organization for Rebirth of Ukraine
Attached at Tab A is a State Department draft response to Pawlo
Dorozhynsky of the Organization for the Rebirth of Ukraine. We
have reviewed the draft and suggested some minor changes to
reflect that the Geneva meeting has already taken place. We
recommend that a copy of the President's November 21 address to
Congress be included among the suggested enclosures.
Attachments:
Tab A
State Department draft response
Tab B
State's suggested enclosures
Tab C
letter from Pawlo Dorozhynsky to Patrick Buchanan
Tab D
letter from Pawlo Dorozhynsky to the President
Tab E
tasking to State
9361 4°
UNCLASSIFIED
(CLASSIFICATION)
S/S # 8532253
DATE November 15, 1985
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
TRANSMITTAL FORM
FOR: Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
National Security Council
The White House
REFERENCE:
TO:
Mr. Patrick Buchanan FROM: Mr. P. Dorozhynsky
DATE: 10/4/85
SUBJECT: Reagan-Gorbachev
Meeting
4
WHITE HOUSE REFERRAL DATED: 10/31/85
NSC # 858145
THE ATTACHED ITEM WAS SENT DIRECTLY
TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ACTION TAKEN:
XX A draft reply is attached
A draft reply will be forwarded
A translation is attached
An information copy of a direct reply is attached
We believe no response is necessary for the reason
cited below
Other
REMARKS:
GloBan Executive Secretary
Nicholas Platt
UNCLASSIFIED
it
SUGGESTED RESPONSE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Dear Mr. Dorozhynsky:
I am replying to your October 4 letter to President Reagan
regarding preparations for the November 19-20 meeting between
President Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev in
Geneva.
The President's meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev
should be viewedas
[is] part of our continuing efforts to construct a more stable
and productive relationship with the Soviet Union. The Geneva
lead to new opportunities
meeting could [mark a moment of opportunity in our relations.
At the same time, we have no illusions about the difficulties
of this task or the continuing differences between our two
ultimate
countries. Above all, we recognize that the A success of the
meeting in Geneva depends on Soviet willingness to work re-
sponsibly with us. If they are ready to meet us halfway,
progress should be possible in all areas of our bilateral
relationship.
Our policy toward the Soviet Union is based on the three
principles of realism, strength, and dialogue. Over the past
five years, we have applied these principles in an effort to
Mr. Pawlo Dorozhynsky, Chairman,
Central Executive Committee,
Organization for the Rebirth of Ukraine, Inc.,
P.O. Box 4 Cooper Station,
New York, New York 10276.
42
2
build a more constructive relationship sustainable over the
long term. Fundamental U.S. interests vis-a-vis the Soviet
Union are addressed in our four-part agenda: arms control, re-
gional issues, economic and other bilateral issues, and human
rights.
The U.S. Government has consistently condemned Soviet
unwillingness to respect basic human rights. These measures
are contrary to the human rights provisions of the Helsinki
Final Act. We have strongly called for the Soviets to comply
with their commitments in that agreement. We have made it
unequivocally clear in virtually every high-level meeting with
Soviet officials that their human rights violations are a
serious obstacle to improved U.S.-Soviet relations. We will
continue to insist the Soviets live up to their international
commitments, including the Helsinki accords.
President Reagan [has announced his intention to discussed
the full range of issues affecting U.S.-Soviet relations, in-
cluding human rights, during his November meeting with
Mr. Gorbachev. As we prepare for that meeting, we welcome your
views.
I am sending the enclosed material in the belief that you
will find it of interest.
Sincerely,
Enclosures.
The President's
Strategic Defense
Initiative
March 1985
United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.
Secretary Shultz
Current
Policy
Arms Control,
No. 750
Strategic Stability,
and Global Security
United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.
Following is an address by Secretary
clap. But it's an important lesson. We
legislators, you know firsthand that
Shultz before the North Atlantic
have to be ready to act.
democracies love peace and really do not
Assembly, San Francisco, California,
And, third, it tells us that the
like spending money on defense. But
October 14, 1985.
democracies must stand together in our
you also know how precious freedom
own cause. Our nations are the founders
and democracy are and, therefore, how
My talk this morning is about our rela-
and the defenders of the rule of law.
important it is that we defend the
tions with the Soviet Union, a central
The terrorists know and seek to turn
values that we hold dear. We democra-
issue for the Western democracies. But
that against us. They insist that we be
cies know that freedom has enemies in
before I start on that, I want to say
rigorous in granting due process to the
this world. But we also know that the
something about terrorism, because ter-
enemies of the rule of law, and, as they
purpose of our defensive strength is
rorism is the war we're fighting right
do, they seek to instill fear-the fear
peace. Therefore, we all conduct foreign
now.
that anyone who captures and brings to
policies whose aim is a more positive
Terrorists and the regimes that sup-
justice a terrorist becomes a target of
and constructive relationship between
port them aim to shatter our ideals and
terrorism.
East and West.
our principles, undermine our demo-
Nearly 2 years ago, President Rea-
cratic life, and pull down civilization
We must stand for the rule of law,
gan offered the Soviet Union a challenge
itself. We've learned some lessons in the
but we must not let fear turn it into a
to begin building a more constructive
few days just past. The event isn't over,
key to the jailhouse door. If we of the
democracies stand together against this
relationship. He said:
but still while it's fresh in our minds, let
me tell you three points that stand out
scourge, we will defeat it, and our ideals
Our challenge is peaceful. It will bring
and values will thrive and be safe. I
out the best in us. It also calls for the best
in my own mind.
think we are now starting to do that.
from the Soviet Union
If the Soviet
First, it tells us something about
Government wants peace, then there will be
terrorists-that they're animals, cow-
peace.
Arms Control
ardly animals. These are not guerrillas.
Since that time, we have made a
These are not fighters for some libera-
I have a lengthy statement here that
start. The Geneva and other arms con-
tion movement. They select the helpless
deals principally with the arms control
trol negotiations are underway. We
to torture and murder. They lack the
matters being discussed in Geneva right
have initiated a process for discussing
guts to do battle, just as they lack the
now. I know it is too long, but it is an
ways to defuse regional tensions and
guts to seek justice and peace by negoti-
effort to pull together in one place
manage our competition peacefully. We
ation. That's the first lesson. [Applause]
where we are and they are, so we can
have urged the Soviet Union to take
It tells us that we must take ac-
see just what the issues are. So I ask
practical steps to fulfill its international
tion. If free peoples do not move against
you to bear with me and take it as a
commitments on human rights. We have
the terrorists, no one will stop them.
compliment, as you run out of patience,
advanced ideas for expanding contact
We must have the courage to act with-
that we have thought, the President has
and interchange between our two socie-
out violence, if possible, but recognizing
thought, that this audience was the ap-
ties, to fashion the network of bilateral
that violence sometimes cannot be
propriate one to lay out in a rather
ties that is a necessary feature of any
avoided. If our dedication to that princi-
painstaking way just what this is all
productive relationship between two
ple paralyzes us, all our principles will
about as we see it.
countries. These are steps forward, but
be in jeopardy. That's a little more
For 40 years, the Western democra-
much more needs to be done. One of
sobering lesson, so I notice you didn't
cies have wrestled with the problem of
President Reagan's major goals when he
with the Soviet Union As
meets next. month with General Secre-
35814505
Organization for the Rebirth of Ukraine (ODWU) Inc. USA
Office Address: 140-42 Second Ave., Room 23, New York, N.Y. 10003
Mail Address: Cooper Sta. P.O. Box 4, New York, N.Y. 10276 U.S.A.
8532253
CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
Mr. Patrick J. Buchanan
Assistant to the President
The White House Office
October 4, 1985
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500
or that re Our
Dear Mr. Buchanan:
In preparation for the upcoming summit between President Reagan
and Mr. Gorbachev, we believe your office may find the enclosed
letter to the President of interest.
Among the many concerns we share for the future welfare of the
United States and the world, we feel that sound defense policy
and human rights issues to be the most important. As we hope
our President will not compromise on SDI research, we
inherently trust President Reagan to dynamically defend the
rights of those unable to speak for themselves held captive by
Mr. Gorbachev, as he has so courageously done on the issue of
abortion.
We commend and applaud your continuing efforts in support of
human rights, and of our President. Keep up the good work!
With best regards,
Sincerely,
Pawlo Dotoxynsky
P. Dorozhynsky
Chairman, Central Executive Committee
Organization for the Rebirth of Ukraine
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8532253
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Organization for the Rebirth of Ukraine (ODWU) Inc. USA
Office Address: 140-42 Second Ave., Room 23, New York, N.Y. 10003
Mail Address: Cooper Sta. P.O. Box 4, New York, N.Y. 10276 U.S.A.
CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
The President
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500
October 4, 1985
Dear Mr. President:
We wish to share with you several most urgent considerations for
inclusion in the agenda of your summit meeting with General Secretary
Gorbachev. The executive board of ODWU, representing our branches
nation-wide, fully supports your "peace through strength" and strategic
defense initiatives. We also believe that arms reduction must be based
on verifiable agreements.
We respectfully ask you to share with Secretary Gorbachev the grave
concerns of Americans who pray daily not only for the welfare of these
United States of America, but also the welfare and freedom of the
captive nations and people of Central and Eastern Europe, who are our
natural allies. The following are among the vital concerns we request
you to share:
1. In discussing the establishment of a European nuclear-free
zone, we petition that the proposal be made that the territories of the
western Soviet republics -- Ukraine, Byelorussia and the Baltic
countries --- be included into this zone. This proposal would greatly
benefit the vital interests of the United States of America and those of
our NATO allies.
If accepted, nuclear weapons will be removed from the immediate
borders of European countries greatly decreasing risk of surprise
attack. If rejected, the people of the western Soviet republics and the
European countries dominated by the USSR would know that the U.S.A. and
not the USSR is defending their interests.
Whatever Secretary Gorbachev's response, one may consider
publicizing this proposal after the summit for its propaganda value to
our NATO allies and our own citizens.
2. We urge you to appropriate significant time to the questions
of human rights and non-compliance of the Helsinki Accords by the the
Soviet Union. Among the many violations, the most flagrant are:
a) The people of Ukraine and other enslaved republics are not
free to exercise their religious beliefs. Ukrainian has been banned as
a liturgical language. The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and
the Ukrainian Catholic Church were "banned" and forcibly included into
the Russian Orthodox Church, and the followers of the Ukrainian churches
are severely persecuted for their beliefs. Mr. J. Terelya and Rev. Y.
Budzijnowsky of the Ukrainian Catholic Church are but few among the
numerous examples of such persecution.
We implore you to request the immediate and general amnesty for
and release of all clergy and believers who are incarcerated for their
religious practices and beliefs, the return of children taken away from
their parents because of the latter raising them in accordance with
their religious beliefs, and the removal of the illegal and unjust
prohibition of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic (Uniate) Church, the
Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, and other denominations in the
Ukrainian SSR.
b) The continued Soviet government policy of "merging of nations"
to the attempt of bringing up the "soviet man" is, in reality, the
policy of russifying the people of national republics. This is the
liquidation of their culture, language and their separate, distinct
ethnic and historically national identities. The effect of such policy
is evident in the continued increase of schools and publications in the
Russian language at the expense of Ukrainians and other non-Russians.
Although 75% of Ukraine is Ukrainian, a mere 25% of available books are
in Ukrainian.
The official Soviet census of 1970 and 1979 revealed that the rate
of increase of the Russian population in the Ukrainian and other western
Soviet republics is three times higher than the rate of increase of
their native populations. This result is achieved by the deportation
and forced resettlement of the western non-Russian population into
Siberia and the USSR's northern regions. Such policy is nothing more
than ethnocide and cultural genocide, which are in violation of the U.N.
Declaration of Human Rights and the Helsinki Accords.
Please request the release of V. Chornovil, Yu. Badzio and others
who are illegally sentenced for opposing the policy of russification,
and those imprisoned who strive for human rights.
c) The government of the Soviet Union creates extreme
difficulties in maintaining contact between relatives who live in the
USSR and those living in the West, and blocks any emigration of
Ukrainians who would like to unite with their relatives in the West.
Please request that all restrictions be lifted on the reunion of
families, and on free emigration for all people regardless of
nationality, religion or political beliefs.
We respectfully urge you to raise the question of the sick
prisoners of conscience Yu. Shukhevych, D. Shumuk and others whose
relatives in the West requested these prisoners' release to their
2
custody for medical treatment, but their continued requests are denied
by Soviet authorities. If there is no intervention on their behalf,
they will meet their death in prisons, forced labor camps or internal
exile, as happened recently to V. Stus, 0. Tykhy, V. Sokolov, Yu. Lytvyn
and V. Marchenko.
We hope that you will keep these most urgent matters in mind
during the summit meeting with Secretary Gorbachev.
d) The members of the Ukrainian Helsinki Monitoring group, who
were honored by your proclamation of September 21, 1982, are all
imprisoned for their attempt to make the government of the Soviet Union
live up to the Helsinki agreements. For their peaceful action all
members of this group were sentenced to long terms of prison or internal
exile. Some of them, such as 80 year-old Oksana Meshko and the wounded
WW II veteran, and poet, M. Rudenko, are severely ill and need immediate
medical treatment not available in the remote labor camps or areas of
exile. Please request their expeditious release to their families' care
in the Ukrainian Republic or to the care of the Ukrainian community in
the West.
3. We also ask that you raise the issue of establishing an
American Consulate in Kiev, the capital of Ukraine. This would provide
needed protection for those Americans who wish to visit their relatives
in Ukraine. The Consulate would also provide counsel to those desiring
to travel to the West. This strategically-placed consulate would serve
United States interests in many beneficial ways.
4. Kindly consider also the illegal jamming of Voice of America
and Radio Liberty short and medium-wave broadcasts. This violates ITU
Conventions as well as the intent of the Helsinki Final Act to engender
more free dissemination and exchange of information. The inspiration,
encouragement and information provided by these broadcasts are
invaluable to those behind the iron curtain, and are perhaps the most
cost effective tool we have to offer in promulgating hope for freedom,
sharing truth, news and free thoughts otherwise proscribed by repressive
communist regimes.
If Secretary Gorbachev is so confident in his system of
government, then he should not feel threatened by alternative
information sources and be compelled to jam these broadcasts.
Mr. President, as you know, the United States is the world's last hope
for preserving and promulgating liberty and freedom. The Soviet Union
is dedicated to world conquest and oppresive domination, not just of
nations but of its peoples. It is at war with the world, even if some
choose not to acknowledge that war. It is indeed an evil empire
dedicated to the destruction of every individual's God-given rights,
which they would replace with Kremlin-given "rights" of privilege --
which they may or may not choose to grant.
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Those enslaved by Moscow's tyranny look to us to speak for them where
they cannot, to pray for them where they cannot, and to defend them
where they cannot. Those future generations that risk being born into
the fruits Secretary Gorbachev's labors will either come to bless us for
having had the courage to resist tyranny, or curse us along with
Secretary Gorbachev for having helped establish it.
Let us not disappoint those who depend on us. We call upon you, Mr.
President, to continue your courageous and highly moral convictions
without compromise. We implore you to remember to speak for and defend
those who cannot themselves act.
We pray that God will grant you the health, strength, wisdom, tools and
guidance that will both arm and shield you at the summit, and facilitate
your every success.
Please feel free to contact me, should you or your staff require any
further information, or if I can be of any service.
Sincerely,
Pawlo Dorozhypsky
P. Dorozhynsky
Chairman, Central Executive Committee
Organization for the Rebirth of Ukraine
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8532253
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
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