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Jack F. Matlock, Jr.'s Chronological Files
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: Matlock Chron November 1985 (10)
Box: 13
To see more digitized collections visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection
Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected]
Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing
National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/
mastock
9168
FILE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
November 27, 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR ANNE HIGGINS
FROM:
WILLIAM F. MARTIN
SUBJECT:
Letters of Support for the President in Geneva
The NSC has reviewed your draft response to letters of support
for the President's meeting with Gorbachev in Geneva. We have
suggested some changes to reflect the fact that the meeting is
now behind us. We also suggest enclosing with the responses a
copy of the President's November 21 address to Congress.
Attachments:
Tab A
Draft response to leters of support
Tab B
Suggested new draft
Tab C
The President's address to Congress
Tab D
Memo from Anne Higgins to Carol Cleveland
Tab E
Memo from David Chew to Anne Higgins
Tab F
Memo from Anne Higgins to David Chew
2
THE WHITE HOUSE
washington
November 7, 1985
ANNE HIGGINS:
NSC should clear the text of any such
letter. But given the nearness of the
Geneva meeting, you might want to wait
until it is over and do one response
for all such letters.
Let me know what you decide.
David Dil Chew
3
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
11-7-85
To: Date: David Chew
we haven't gone
with this get -
maybe we should
wait till the
next speech
+
include that
- we can hold
letters -
anne
ANNE HIGGINS
Special Assistant to the
President and Director
of Correspondence
Room 94, x7610
9168 4
ASH/cm/
AVH192D.851106
recently
consluded
Thank you for your message to President Reagan and for
offering him your thoughts and suggestions in connection
with the upcoming Geneva Summit. Your expression of
goodwill™ as these talks approach is much appreciated, and
the President welcomes your good wishes for the Summit's
success.
1/4
In his address to a commemorative session of the United
Nations celebrating the 40th anniversary of its founding,
the President described the hope of the United States for a
fresh start in our relations with the Soviet Union. He
discussed our desire to make progress on arms control, as
well as on issues of human rights and regional conflict.
The goal of U.S. efforts remains to free the entire world
from the nuclear threat. In light of your interest, I am
sending you a transcript of the President's address.4
1/4
With the President's best wishes,1
1/4
End. 10/24/85 ABTP
5
9168
Suggested New Draft
Thank you for your message to President Reagan and for offering
him your thoughts and suggestions in connection with the recently
concluded Geneva summit. Your expression of good will was much
appreciated and the President much appreciated your good wishes
for the summit's success.
In his November 21 address to a joint session of Congress the
President said that he went to Geneva for a fresh start in
relations with the Soviet Union. He discussed our desire to make
progress on arms control, as well as on issues of human rights
and regional conflict. The goal of U.S. efforts remains to free
the entire world from the nuclear threat. In light of your
interest, I am sending you a transcript of the President's
address.
With the President's best wishes.
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
November 21, 1985
REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT
TO A JOINT SESSION OF CONGRESS
U.S. Capitol
Washington, D.C.
9:20 P.M. EST
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Speaker, Mr. President, members of
the Congress, distinguished guests, my fellow Americans:
It's great to be home, and Nancy and I thank you for this
wonderful homecoming. And before I go on, I want to say a personal
thank you to Nancy. She was an outstanding ambassador of good will
for all of us. (Applause.) She didn't know I was going to say that.
Mr. Speaker, Senator Dole, I want you to know that your
statements of support here were greatly appreciated. You can't
imagine how much it means in dealing with the Soviets to have the
Congress, the allies, and the American people firmly behind you.
(Applause.)
I guess you know that I have just come from Geneva and
talks with General Secretary Gorbachev. In the past few days, we
spent over 15 hours in various meetings with the General Secretary
and the members of his official party. And approximately 5 of those
hours were talks between Mr. Gorbachev and myself, just one on one.
That was the best part -- our fireside summit.
There will be, I know, a great deal of commentary and
opinion as to what the meetings produced and what they were like.
There were over 3,000 reporters in Geneva, so it's possible there
will be 3,000 opinions on what happened, so -- (applause) -- maybe
it's the old broadcaster in me but I decided to file my own report
directly to you. (Applause.)
We met, as we had to meet. I called for a fresh start --
and we made that start. I can't claim we had a meeting of the minds
on such fundamentals as ideology or national purpose -- but we
understand each other better, and that's key to peace. I gained a
better perspective; I feel he did, too.
It was a constructive meeting. So constructive, in fact,
that I look forward to welcoming Mr. Gorbachev to the United States
next year. (Applause.) And I have accepted his invitation to go to
Moscow the following year. (Applause.) We arranged that out in the
parking lot. (Applause.)
I found Mr. Gorbachev to be an energetic defender of
Soviet policy. He was an eloquent speaker, and a good listener. Our
subject matter was shaped by the facts of this century.
These past 40 years have not been an easy time for the
West or for the world. You know the facts; there is no need to
recite the historical record. Suffice it to say that the United
States cannot afford illusions about the nature of the U.S.S.R. We
cannot assume that their ideology and purpose will change. This
implies enduring competition. Our task is to assure that this
competition remains peaceful. With all that divides us, we cannot
afford to let confusion complicate things further. We must be clear
with each other, and direct. We must pay each other the tribute of
cador.
MORE
1
- 2 -
When I took the oath of office for the first time, we
began dealing with the Soviet Union in a way that was more realistic
than in, say, the recent past. And so, in a very real sense,
preparations for the summit started not months ago but 5 years ago
when, with the help of Congress, we began strengthening our economy,
restoring our national will, and rebuilding our defenses and
alliances. America is once again strong -- and our strength has
given us the ability to speak with confidence and see that no true
opportunity to advance freedom and peace is lost. (Applause.) We
must not now abandon policies that work. I need your continued
support to keep America strong.
That is the history behind the Geneva summit, and that is
the context in which it occurred. And may I add that we were
especially eager that our meetings give a push to important talks
already under way on reducing nuclear weapons. On this subject it
would be foolish not to go the extra mile -- or in this case the
extra 4,000 miles.
We discussed the great issues of our time. I made clear
before the first meeting that no question would be swept aside, no
issue buried, just because either side found it uncomfortable or
inconvenient.
I brought these questions to the summit and put them
before Mr. Gorbachev.
We discussed nuclear arms and how to reduce them. I
explained our proposals for equitable, verifiable, and deep
reductions. I outlined my conviction that our proposals would make
not just for a world that feels safer but one that is really is
safer.
I am pleased to report tonight that General Secretary
Gorbachev and I did make a measure of progress here. (Applause.)
While we still have a long way to go, we're still heading in the
right direction. We moved arms control forward from where we were
last January, when the Soviets returned to the table. We are both
instructing our negotiators to hasten their vital work. The world is
waiting for results.
Specifically, we agreed in Geneva that each side should
move to cut offensive nuclear arms by 50 percent in appropriate
categories. In our joint statement we called for early progress on
this, turning the talks toward our chief goal, offensive reductions.
We called for an interim accord on intermediate-range nuclear forces,
leading, I hope, to the complete elimination of this class of
missiles. And all this with tough verification. (Applause.)
We also made progress in combatting together the spread
of nuclear weapons, an arms control area in which we've cooperated
effectively over the years. We are also opening a dialogue on
combatting the spread and use of chemical weapons, while moving to
ban them altogether. (Applause.) Other arms control dialogues -- in
Vienna on conventional forces, and in Stockholm on lessening the
chances for surprise attack in Europe -- also received a boost. And
finally, we agreed to begin work on risk reduction centers, a
decision that should give special satisfaction to Senators Nunn and
Warner who so ably promoted this idea. (Applause.)
I described our Strategic Defense Initiative -- our
research effort that envisions the possiblity of defensive systems
which could ultimately protect all national against the danger of
nuclear war. This discussion produced a very direct exchange of
views.
Mr. Gorbachev insisted that we might use a strategic
defense system to put offensive weapons into space and establish
nuclear superiority.
MORE
- 3
I made it clear that SDI has nothing to do with offensive
weapons; that, instead, we are investigating non-nuclear defense
systems that would only threaten offensive missiles, not people. If
-- (applause) -- our research succeeds, it will bring much closer the
safer, more stable world that we seek. Nations could defend
themselves against missile attack, and mankind, at long last, escape
the prison of mutual terror. And this is my dream.
So I welcomed the cnance to tell Mr. Gorpachev that we
are a nation that defends, rather than attacks, that our alliances
are defensive, not offensive. We don't seek nuclear superiority. We
do not seek a first strike advantage over the Soviet Union. Indeed,
one of my fundamental arms control objectives is to get rid of first
strike weapons altogether. And this is why -- (applause) -- this is
why we've proposed a 50-percent reduction in the most threatening
nuclear weapons, especially those that could carry out a first
strike.
I went further in expressing our peaceful intentions. I
described our proposal in the Geneva negotiations for a reciprocal
program of open laboratories in strategic defense research. We're
offering to permit Soviet experts to see first-hand that SDI does not
involve offensive weapons. American scientists would be allowed to
visit comparaole facilities of the Soviet strategic defense program,
which, in fact, has involved much more than research for many years.
Finally, I reassured Mr. Gorbachev on another point. I
promised that if our research reveals that a defense against nuclear
missiles is possiole, we would sit down with our allies and the
Soviet Union to see now together we could replace all strategic
ballistic missiles with such a defense, which threatens no one.
We discussed threats to the peace in several regions of
the world. I explained my proposals for a peace process to stop the
wars in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Ethiopia, Angola, and Cambodia --
(applause) -- those places where insurgencies that speak for the
people are pitted against regimes which obviously do not represent
the will or the approval of the people. I tried to be very clear
about where our sympathies lie; I believe I succeeded. (Applause.)
We discussed human rights. We Americans believe that
history teaches no clearer lesson than this: Those countries which
respect the rights of their own people tend, inevitably, to respect
the rights of their neighoors. (Applause.) Human rights, therefore,
is not an abstract moral issue -- it is a peace issue.
Finally, we discussed the barriers to communication
between our societies, and I elaborated on my proposals for real
people-to-people contacts on a wide scale.
Americans should know the people of the Soviet Union --
their hopes and fears and the facts of their lives. And citizens of
the Soviet Union need to know of America's deep desire for peace and
our unwavering attachment to freedom.
As you can see, our talks were wide ranging. And let me
at this point tell you what we agreed upon and what we didn't.
We remain far apart on a number of issues, as had to be
expected. However, we reached agreement on a number of matters, and,
as I mentioned, we agreed to continue meeting and this is important
and very good. (Applause.) There's always room for movement, action,
and progress when people are talking to each other instead of about
each other.
MORE
9
- 4 -
We've concluded a new agreement designed to bring the
best of America's artists and academics to the Soviet Union. The
exhibits that will be included in this exchange are one of the most
effective ways for the average Soviet citizen to learn about our way
of life. This agreement will also expand the opportunities for
Americans to experience the Soviet people's rich cultural heritage --
because their artists and academics will be coming here.
We've also decided to go forward with a number of
people-to-people initiatives that will go beyond greater contact not
only between the political leaders of our two countries, but our
respective students, teachers and others as well. We have emphasized
youth exchanges. And this will help break down stereotypes, build
friendships and, frankly, provide an alternative to propaganda.
We've agreed to establish a new Soviet Consulate in New
York and a new American Consulate in Kiev. And this will bring a
permanent U.S. presence to the Ukraine for the first time in decades.
(Applause.)
And we have also, together with the government of Japan,
concluded a Pacific Air Safety Agreement with the Soviet Union. This
is designed to set up cooperative measures to improve civil air
safety in that region of the Pacific. What happened before must
never be allowed to happen there again. (Applause.)
And as a potential way of dealing with the energy needs
of the world of the future, we have also advocated international
cooperation to explore the feasibility of developing fusion energy.
All of these steps are part of a long-term effort to
build a more stable relationship with the Soviet Union. No one ever
said it could be easy. But we've come a long way.
As for Soviet expansionism in a number of regions of the
world -- while there is little chance of immediate change, we will
continue to support the heroic efforts of those who fight for
freedom. But we have also agreed to continue -- and to intensify --
our meetings with the Soviets on this and other regional conflicts
and to work toward political solutions.
We know the limits as well as the promise of summit
meetings. This is, after all, the eleventh summit of the post-war
era -- and still the differences endure. But we believe continued
meetings between the leaders of the United States and the Soviet
Union can help bridge those differences.
The fact is, every new day begins with possibilities;
it's up to us to fill it with the things that move us toward progress
and peace. Hope, therefore, is a realistic attitude - and despair
an uninteresting little vice.
And so: was our journey worthwhile?
MORE
- 5 -
Well, thirty years ago, when Ike President Eisenhower
-- had just returned from a summit in Geneva, he said, the wide
gulf that separates so far East and West is wide and deep." Well,
today, three decades later, that is still true.
But, yes, this meeting was worthwhile for both sides.
(Applause.) A new realism spawned the summit, the summit itself was
a good start; and now our byword must be: Steady as we go.
I am, as you are, impatient for results. But goodwill
and good hopes do not always yield lasting results. And quick fixes
don't fix big problems.
Just as we must avoid illusions on our side, so we must
dispel them on the Soviet side. I have made it clear to Mr.
Gorbachev that we must reduce the mistrust and suspicions between us
if we are to do such things as reduce arms, and this will take deeds,
not words alone. And I believe he is in agreement.
Where do we go from here? Well, our desire for improved
relations is strong. We're ready and eager for step-by-step
progress. We know that peace is not just the absence of war. We
don't want a phony peace or a frail peace; we didn't go in pursuit of
some kind of illusory detente. We can't be satisfied with cosmetic
improvements that won't stand the test of time. We want real peace.
As I flew back this evening, I had many thoughts. In
just a few days families across America will gather to celebrate
Thanksgiving. And again, as oùr forefathers who voyaged to America,
we travelled to Geneva with peace as our goal and freedom as our
guide. For there can be no greater good than the quest for peace and
no finer purpose than the preservation of freedom. (Applause.)
It is 350 years since the first Thanksgiving, when
Pilgrims and Indians huddled together on the edge of an unknown
continent. And now here we are gathered together on the edge of an
unknown future -- but, like our forefathers, really not so much
afraid, but full of hope, and trusting in God, as ever.
Thank you for allowing me to talk to you this evening and
God bless you all. (Applause.)
END
9:40 P.M. EST
9168
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
November 26, 1985
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN
FROM:
JACK F. MATLOCK
Letters of Support Im for President in Geneva
SUBJECT:
Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to Anne Higgins
advising her that the NSC has reviewed her draft response to
letters of support for the President's meeting with Gorbachev.
We have suggested some adjustments to reflect the fact that the
meeting has already taken place. We think it would be
appropriate to enclose along with the responses a copy of the
President's November 21 address to Congress.
Steve S Sestanovich, Judyt Mandel, Sven Kraemer, Steve Steiner, and
n.a
SS clear new harft
Walt Raymond concur.
RECOMMENDATION
Thay you sign the memorandum at Tab I.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments:
Tab I
Memorandum to Anne Higgins
Tab A
Draft response to letters of support
Tab B
Suggested new draft
Tab C
The President's address to Congress
Tab D
Memo from Anne Higgins to Carol Cleveland
Tab E
Memo from David Chew to Anne Higgins
Tab F
Memo from Anne Higgins to David Chew
mastlock
FILE
9361
12
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
November 27, 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR SALLY KELLEY
FROM:
WILLIAM F. MARTIN
SUBJECT:
Response to Organization for Rebirth of Ukraine
Attached at Tab A is a State Department draft response to Pawlo
Dorozhynsky of the Organization for the Rebirth of Ukraine. We
have reviewed the draft and suggested some minor changes to
reflect that the Geneva meeting has already taken place. We
recommend that a copy of the President's November 21 address to
Congress be included among the suggested enclosures.
Attachments:
Tab A
State Department draft response
Tab B
State's suggested enclosures
Tab C
letter from Pawlo Dorozhynsky to Patrick Buchanan
Tab D
letter from Pawlo Dorozhynsky to the President
Tab E
tasking to State
9361
13
UNCLASSIFIED
(CLASSIFICATION)
S/S # 8532253
DATE November 15, 198!
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
TRANSMITTAL FORM
FOR: Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
National Security Council
The White House
REFERENCE:
TO:
Mr. Patrick Buchanan FROM: Mr. P. Dorozhynsky
DATE: 10/4/85
SUBJECT: Reagan-Gorbachev
Meeting
4
WHITE HOUSE REFERRAL DATED: 10/31/85
NSC # 858145
THE ATTACHED ITEM WAS SENT DIRECTLY
TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ACTION TAKEN:
XX A draft reply is attached
A draft reply will be forwarded
A translation is attached
An information copy of a direct reply is attached
We believe no response is necessary for the reason
cited below
Other
REMARKS:
Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary
UNCLASSIFIED
(CLASSIFICATION)
SUGGESTED RESPONSE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
it
Dear Mr. Dorozhynsky:
I am replying to your October 4 letter to President Reagan
regarding preparations for the November 19-20 meeting between
President Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev in
Geneva.
The President's meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev
should be viewedas
[is] part of our continuing efforts to construct a more stable
and productive relationship with the Soviet Union. The Geneva
lead t. new opportunities
meeting could [mark a moment of opportunity] in our relations.
At the same time, we have no illusions about the difficulties
of this task or the continuing differences between our two
ultimate
countries. Above all, we recognize that the ^ success of the
meeting in Geneva depends on Soviet willingness to work re-
sponsibly with us. If they are ready to meet us halfway,
progress should be possible in all areas of our bilateral
relationship.
Our policy toward the Soviet Union is based on the three
principles of realism, strength, and dialogue. Over the past
five years, we have applied these principles in an effort to
Mr. Pawlo Dorozhynsky, Chairman,
Central Executive Committee,
Organization for the Rebirth of Ukraine, Inc.,
P.O. Box 4 Cooper Station,
New York, New York 10276.
is
2
build a more constructive relationship sustainable over the
long term. Fundamental U.S. interests vis-a-vis the Soviet
Union are addressed in our four-part agenda: arms control, re-
gional issues, economic and other bilateral issues, and human
rights.
The U.S. Government has consistently condemned Soviet
unwillingness to respect basic human rights. These measures
are contrary to the human rights provisions of the Helsinki
Final Act. We have strongly called for the Soviets to comply
with their commitments in that agreement. We have made it
unequivocally clear in virtually every high-level meeting with
Soviet officials that their human rights violations are a
serious obstacle to improved U.S.-Soviet relations. We will
continue to insist the Soviets live up to their international
commitments, including the Helsinki accords.
President Reagan [has announced his intention to discuss
the full range of issues affecting U.S.-Soviet relations, in-
cluding human rights, during his November meeting with
Mr. Gorbachev. As we prepare for that meeting, we welcome your
views.
I am sending the enclosed material in the belief that you
will find it of interest.
Sincerely,
Enclosures.
Secretary Shultz
14
Current
Policy
Arms Control,
No. 750
Strategic Stability,
and Global Security
United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.
Following is an address by Secretary
clap. But it's an important lesson. We
legislators, you know firsthand that
Shultz before the North Atlantic
have to be ready to act.
democracies love peace and really do not
Assembly, San Francisco, California,
And, third, it tells us that the
like spending money on defense. But
October 14, 1985.
democracies must stand together in our
you also know how precious freedom
own cause. Our nations are the founders
and democracy are and, therefore, how
My talk this morning is about our rela-
and the defenders of the rule of law.
important it is that we defend the
tions with the Soviet Union, a central
The terrorists know and seek to turn
values that we hold dear. We democra-
issue for the Western democracies. But
that against us. They insist that we be
cies know that freedom has enemies in
before I start on that, I want to say
rigorous in granting due process to the
this world. But we also know that the
something about terrorism, because ter-
enemies of the rule of law, and, as they
purpose of our defensive strength is
rorism is the war we're fighting right
do, they seek to instill fear-the fear
peace. Therefore, we all conduct foreign
now.
that anyone who captures and brings to
policies whose aim is a more positive
Terrorists and the regimes that sup-
justice a terrorist becomes a target of
and constructive relationship between
port them aim to shatter our ideals and
terrorism.
East and West.
our principles, undermine our demo-
cratic life, and pull down civilization
We must stand for the rule of law,
Nearly 2 years ago, President Rea-
but we must not let fear turn it into a
gan offered the Soviet Union a challenge
itself. We've learned some lessons in the
key to the jailhouse door. If we of the
to begin building a more constructive
few days just past. The event isn't over,
but still while it's fresh in our minds, let
democracies stand together against this
relationship. He said:
me tell you three points that stand out
scourge, we will defeat it, and our ideals
Our challenge is peaceful. It will bring
and values will thrive and be safe. I
out the best in us. It also calls for the best
in my own mind.
think we are now starting to do that.
from the Soviet Union
If the Soviet
First, it tells us something about
Government wants peace, then there will be
terrorists-that they're animals, cow-
peace.
Arms Control
ardly animals. These are not guerrillas.
Since that time, we have made a
These are not fighters for some libera-
I have a lengthy statement here that
start. The Geneva and other arms con-
tion movement. They select the helpless
deals principally with the arms control
trol negotiations are underway. We
to torture and murder. They lack the
matters being discussed in Geneva right
have initiated a process for discussing
guts to do battle, just as they lack the
now. I know it is too long, but it is an
ways to defuse regional tensions and
guts to seek justice and peace by negoti-
effort to pull together in one place
manage our competition peacefully. We
ation. That's the first lesson. [Applause]
where we are and they are, so we can
have urged the Soviet Union to take
It tells us that we must take ac-
see just what the issues are. So I ask
practical steps to fulfill its international
tion. If free peoples do not move against
you to bear with me and take it as a
commitments on human rights. We have
the terrorists, no one will stop them.
compliment, as you run out of patience,
advanced ideas for expanding contact
We must have the courage to act with-
that we have thought, the President has
and interchange between our two socie-
out violence, if possible, but recognizing
thought, that this audience was the ap-
ties, to fashion the network of bilateral
that violence sometimes cannot be
propriate one to lay out in a rather
ties that is a necessary feature of any
avoided. If our dedication to that princi-
painstaking way just what this is all
productive relationship between two
ple paralyzes us, all our principles will
about as we see it.
countries. These are steps forward, but
be in jeopardy. That's a little more
For 40 years, the Western democra-
much more needs to be done. One of
sobering lesson, so I notice you didn't
cies have wrestled with the problem of
President Reagan's major goals when he
relations with the Soviet Union. As
meets next month with General Secre-
tary Gorbachev is to discuss this entire
agenda, giving new impetus to all of
In the nuclear age, even more than in
Soviet military power has cast its
these efforts.
the past, force structure can shape not
shadow over both Europe and Asia; this
Arms control, of course, is a key
only how a conflict might be fought but,
is a reality, as is the relentless buildup
part of this agenda. It has been a focal
more importantly, whether or not a con-
of Warsaw Pact forces, both nuclear and
point of our alliance deliberations for
flict would break out at all. President
conventional. The Western concept of
many years. Allied unity and support
Reagan's program to rebuild our mili-
security, which has kept the peace in
are a key to the success of our endeav-
tary strength is addressed to this
Europe for 40 years, is that of a close'
ors with the Soviet Union. And, indeed,
problem.
and permanent link between Western
Europe's security is one of the principal
The concept of strategic stability is a
Europe and the United States. The
objectives at stake.
fundamental one. At various periods in
American pledge to underwrite the
In Geneva today, American and
history, war was prevented by a balance
defense of Europe is given concrete ex-
Soviet negotiators are in the middle of a
of power. The balance was not always
pression in the presence of American
new round of talks. An American pro-
stable, but much of the time it worked,
forces and American weapons in
posal for radical reductions in offensive
deterring attack by denying the at-
Europe, which make it a certainty that
nuclear arms has been on the table for
tacker his confidence in victory and pos-
any Soviet attack on Europe engages
some time. The Soviet Union has re-
ing the risk of counterattack. In the age
us. Thus our strategic forces defend
cently come forward with-and exten-
of the ICBM-the intercontinental ballis-
Europe as much as they defend the
sively publicized-a new counterproposal.
tic missile with thermonuclear war-
United States. This is what deters war,
Let me review for you today where
heads-security has had to rest largely
and it has worked. Arms control must
we stand, the United States and the
on the threat of retaliation, since there
enhance, not weaken, this dimension of
Soviet Union, on the main issues in
has been no defense against these
deterrence.
arms control.
missiles. This form of deterrence-the
We have other criteria for judging
mutual threat of mass destruction-is
arms control proposals:
what Churchill called the balance of
Our Objectives in Arms Control
terror.
An arms control agreement, to
Let us start at the beginning. What is it
Is this balance stable? Will it remain
strengthen stability, should be based on
we are trying to accomplish?
stable in the face of the steady Soviet
equality, leaving both sides with equal
The purpose of arms control negotia-
buildup of weaponry with first-strike
or essentially equivalent levels of forces.
tions is not agreement for its own sake.
potential? Or is the balance in danger of
An agreement should emphasize
A bad agreement could do harm. Loop-
breaking down in crisis conditions? This
strategically significant reductions. Past
holes could be a source of new mistrust;
is one of the central issues-if not the
agreements only codified existing levels
the structure of limitations could leave
central issue-in arms control today. We
or rechanneled the competition. It is
one side with special advantages that
cannot afford-as we have been tempted
time, now, to reverse the pattern of con-
only leave the other less secure; loose
in the past-to assume that the balance
stant buildup; it is time to begin radical
reductions.
limits could only legitimize an intensify-
is automatically stable. We have come to
ing arms race in areas left open by the
recognize that the vulnerability of a
An arms control agreement must
be verifiable. The Soviets' selective
agreement. Saving money on weapons
country's retaliatory forces, in a crisis,
expenditure is, of course, a worthwhile
could put a premium on striking first, or
record of compliance with previous
goal, but it is not sufficient or even the
preemptively, and thus magnify the
agreements unfortunately makes this in-
main issue.
dangers. Or it could call into question
dispensable. Radical reductions, in fact,
What we really want, in short, are
America's commitment to effectively
can increase the incentive to cheat, since
measures that enhance security and
a balance at lower levels can more
support its allies against Soviet conven-
reduce the risk of war. Arms control is
tional attack.
easily be tipped.
not just a technical exercise; it has to be
This is why one of the key tests by
embedded in a policy and in an environ-
which we judge arms control proposals
The U.S. Proposal
ment that reduce our real dangers and
is whether they will enhance strategic
make the world safer. The rivalry be-
stability. The military balance that
The United States has serious proposals
tween East and West is not the result
now on the table at Geneva. We have
results from an agreement should be
of personalities or simple misunder-
one that reduces the incentive for a first
been criticized for our restraint in the
standings. It is grounded in fundamental
strike. It should enhance deterrence by
public relations field. But our proposals
moral differences about justice and free-
ensuring that no first strike can suc-
were not made for propaganda; they
dom; it is reflected in political differ-
ceed, that no one can be tempted by
were made to make progress toward
ences over a range of international prob-
illusions of "victory." A stable environ-
these central objectives. Our proposals
lems. Weapons are the symptom of this
ment reduces the incentive to build new
cover reductions in strategic offensive
struggle, not its cause. Arms reduction
weapons and enhances the incentive to
forces; reduction or elimination of U.S.
can help reduce tensions; yet expansion-
reduce the level of arms. It defuses the
and Soviet intermediate-range nuclear
ist Soviet behavior can so fuel insecurity
tension and danger of any crisis that
forces; and a serious dialogue on defen-
and mistrust that, at the very least, the
may occur. Thus an emphasis on stra-
sive weapons and the relationship be-
arms control process is undermined. Do
tegic stability goes to the heart of
tween offense and defense. These issues
not forget that it was Soviet geopolitical
reducing the danger of the outbreak of
are being discussed now in the Geneva
challenges-like intervention in Angola,
war.
negotiations in three separate but inter
Ethiopia, and most particularly Afghan-
related forums.
We must also remember that the
istan-that derailed detente and the
forces of history have cast the United
Strategic Arms Reduction. First, il
SALT II [Strategic Arms Limitation
States in the role of the most powerful
the talks on strategic arms reduction,
Talks] Treaty in the 1970s.
member of an alliance of democracies.
the United States has proposed radical
Preventing a war means addressing
Any agreement we reach with the
reductions down to 5,000 ballistic-missil
not only these political conflicts but also
Soviet Union must enhance our allies'
warheads on each side. This represents
the military postures of the two sides.
security as well as our own. Since 1945,
a cut of nearly 50% from the current
2
level. We have proposed substan-
allies in East Asia. Today, there are 441
of 13 years ago, and the hopes they
18
the number and
operational launchers deployed; with
engendered, were founded on certain
of ballistic missiles,
three warheads on a missile, that makes
assumptions. Developments since then
heavy bombers, on the
over 1,300 modern nuclear warheads
have called those assumptions into
missiles they carry.
aimed at the cities and defense facilities
question.
druise The strategic forces of the United
of our friends and allies.
First of all, when the ABM [Anti-
and the Soviet Union are very
In response-and, I repeat, in
Ballistic Missile] Treaty was signed, it
States different. The great majority of Soviet
response-the Atlantic alliance decided
was assumed that offensive weaponry
warheads and destructive power are
in 1979 that it had no choice but to
would be reduced by further negotia-
concentrated on their large, land-based
deploy weapons of its own in this cate-
tions. In fact, offensive weapons pro-
have a more balanced ap-
gory, as a deterrent, while seeking to
liferated. Each side now-and particu-
broach, with as much emphasis on
negotiate with the Soviet Union on a
larly the Soviet side-has vastly higher
albmarine-based missiles and bombers
formula for mutual restraint. The
numbers than in 1972-vastly higher.
$18 on ICBMs. The Soviet force is de-
Soviets agreed to talk but have not
We see the Soviet heavy ICBMs with a
signed for preemption, ours for retalia-
negotiated on the basis of mutuality.
first-strike potential. On both sides we
tion. These differences greatly compli-
They insisted on their right to a
see offensive weapons of astonishing ac-
cate the achievement of an equitable
monopoly of longer range INF missiles;
curacy and with multiple warheads. The
greement. We are prepared to explore
they waged an unprecedented cam-
Soviets are developing two new varieties
tradeoffs between areas of relative
paign of political warfare to intimidate
of ICBMs whose mobility makes them
advantage-such as our advantage in
our allies into retreating from the
harder to identify and count. If we fail
bombers versus their advantage in
NATO decision of 1979. Our allies-
to respond to these trends, at some
ICBMs-to establish an overall balance.
governments and legislatures-stood
point in the future they could undermine
Our proposal is comprehensive, but
firm; NATO Pershing II ballistic
the military balance on which deterrence
its core is a recognition that reductions
missiles and ground-launched cruise
is based.
should focus on the most destabilizing
missiles began to be deployed in several
Second, in the ABM Treaty we also
systems. Weapons like large, fixed, land-
allied countries in 1983-6 years after
assumed that we had set up critical bar-
based ICBMs with multiple warheads,
the SS-20 deployment began.
riers that would prevent any breakout,
capable of destroying missile silos-these
The United States proposed at
that is, any sudden and significant ex-
are the most powerful strategic
Geneva that we agree to eliminate both
pansion of ABM systems in violation of
weapons, the most rapid, the most pro-
sides' longer range land-based INF
the treaty. In fact, while the United
vocative, the most capable of carrying
missiles on a global basis-eliminate.
States has dismantled even the one
out a preemptive strike, the most likely
The Soviets refused. Then we proposed
ABM complex that was permitted, the
to tempt a hair-trigger response in a
that both sides reduce to the lowest
Soviets have taken full advantage of the
crisis.
possible equal number of warheads. The
deployments allowed by the treaty. And
The Soviets have over 300 heavy
Soviets still refuse. Our position is
some Soviet activities are clear viola-
ICBMs; we at present have none. (Our
based on the principle of equality be-
tions, such as the large radar at Kras-
first deployments of MX, a smaller
tween the United States and the Soviet
noyarsk, which raises a question of
missile but roughly comparable because
Union. And limits must be applied
whether the Soviets might be planning a
of its accuracy, will begin late next
globally, since the SS-20 is a mobile
nationwide ABM system, negating the
year.) With their accuracy, destructive
missile and it is not our objective simply
treaty entirely.
power, and multiple warheads, the
to shift the SS-20 threat from Europe
But technological advance, which
Soviet weapons are capable of destroy-
to Asia.
helps create these new problems, also
ing virtually the entire land-based por-
The threat of the SS-20 goes to the
offers other possibilities. Methods of
tion of our retaliatory force. For nearly
heart of our commitment to our allies.
defense against ballistic missiles, which
a decade this category of weapons has
These are weapons aimed at Europe-
were relatively rudimentary in 1972,
been, for us, one of the central issues of
although they could be aimed at
now offer new hope as a possible
arms control. One of the odd features of
America. Their purpose is to "decou-
counter to the growing offensive threat.
the current debate is that the Soviets
ple," that is, to separate you from us by
What if it were possible, even in this
would have us believe that this central
intimidating you. The alliance's response
age of ballistic missiles, to block an at-
issue has disappeared. It is as if the
is a united response, and a unifying
tack, rather than simply suffer the at-
threat from these powerful weapons,
response, in that it symbolizes once
tack and then retaliate? What if the
which already exist in the hundreds, is
again that our destinies are tied to-
balance of power could rest more on a
somehow less important than research
gether. The principle of collective secu-
mutual sense of security and less on a
into new categories of systems which do
rity is thus confirmed and reinforced.
mutual threat of annihilation? Thus the
not exist, will not exist for many years
Europe is safer, because deterrence is
President's Strategic Defense Initiative
at best, and will not come into being at
strengthened.
(or SDI), a research program to explore
all unless research is successful in
Defense and Space Arms. The third
promising new technologies. Effective
meeting stringent criteria we ourselves
area of negotiation is that of defense
strategic defenses, able to intercept and
have set.
and space arms. But the core issue is
destroy missiles before they reach their
Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces.
the same: the stability of deterrence.
targets, would strengthen security.
The second negotiation in Geneva is
The SALT I accords of 1972 limited
Even if far less than 100% perfect, such
about intermediate-range nuclear forces
antiballistic missile systems and were
a defensive system would vastly compli-
or INF. This negotiation is taking place
also a partial first step toward limiting
cate any aggressor's first-strike planning
because in 1977 the Soviet Union began
offensive weapons. We continue to com-
and frustrate any temptation to consider
deploying SS-20 intermediate-range
ply with them, provided the Soviet
launching an attack.
missiles in the western U.S.S.R., aimed
Union corrects its noncompliance and
In an age of anxieties about nuclear
our European allies, and in the Soviet
negotiates seriously in Geneva. We must
weapons, this should provide enormous
Far East, aimed at our friends and
remember, however, that those accords
hope for the future. As former Soviet
3
19
Premier Kosygin once eloquently stated,
is consistent with a restrictive interpre-
devoted their greatest effort to propa-
an antiballistic missile system "is in-
tation of our obligations under the ABM
ganda against SDI and held everything
tended not for killing people but for sav-
Treaty.
hostage to getting their way on SDI.
ing human lives."
Our judgment that the SDI pro-
Two weeks ago, the Soviets did begin
The last few decades' emphasis on
gram, provided that it is consistently
to offer specific and detailed ideas about
offensive strategies reflected the state
funded at the levels required, will be
deep cuts in offensive forces. We wel-
of technology, not a law of nature.
adequate to answer the question of
come this. While some of their ideas
Mutual vulnerability was a fact of life,
whether a cost-effective and survivable
may indicate progress, altogether the
not a positive virtue. A new strategic
defense against ballistic missiles is
new Soviet position, however, remains
equilibrium based on defensive technolo-
feasible.
deeply flawed and self-serving. It would
gies and sharply reduced offensive
In sharp contrast to Soviet behavior,
have a particularly dangerous impact on
deployments on both sides could be the
our policy of restraint with respect to
the security of our allies. Let me touch
most stable and secure arrangement of
the conduct of the SDI program demon-
on the highlights.
all. It cannot be fully achieved without
strates by deeds U.S. seriousness and
The Soviet proposal is a combination
negotiations, and, therefore, we have
sought the fullest dialogue on this sub-
sincerity in seeking a more stable inter-
of various bans, freezes, limitations, and
national environment.
reductions of some, but not all, offensive
ject with the Soviet Union-as well as
forces. Overall, the Soviets propose a re-
with our allies. In fact, General
The American proposals in Geneva
Abrahamson, director of our SDI office
are a comprehensive blueprint for reduc-
duction by 50% of each side's "delivery
ing nuclear weapons, for strengthening
vehicles which can reach the territory of
[Lt. Gen. James Abrahamson, Director
of the Strategic Defense Initiative
deterrence, and for making the world
the other side." It's their definition.
safer. They are paralleled by other pro-
The hooker is their definition of
Organization], traveled to Geneva to
take part in a briefing of the Soviet
posals in other forums:
what they consider "relevant" systems-
systems which can strike the territory
negotiators on our program, its potential
To strengthen safeguards and con-
of the other side. Under their definition
and its prospects.
trols against the proliferation of nuclear
American systems in Europe pointed
Our research program is and will
weapons capabilities;
toward the U.S.S.R. are constrained,
continue to be consistent with the ABM
To ban chemical weapons and to
while Soviet missiles and aircraft aimed
Treaty. The treaty can be variously in-
prevent chemical weapons proliferation;
at Europe are not. It would imply no
terpreted as to what kinds of develop-
To stabilize the conventional mili-
necessary reduction of the SS-20 threat
ment and testing are permitted, particu-
tary balance in Europe, by mutual and
(which, incidently, can reach Alaska) but
larly with respect to future systems and
balanced reductions of forces, and by
calls for a unilateral withdrawal of the
components based on new physical prin-
measures to reduce the risk of war by
U.S. counter to that threat. I can think
ciples. The treaty's text, the agreed
surprise attack, accident, or miscalcula-
of nothing that would more smack of a
statements accompanying it, the negoti-
tion, which would give concrete form to
U.S.-Soviet deal at Europe's expense,
ating record, and official statements
a reaffirmation of the principle of non-
and we won't do that.
made since that time are subject to dif-
use of force.
This one-sided definition is a step
fering interpretations.
Because of the great potential con-
This is President Reagan's arms con-
backward. It is the Soviet position of
trol agenda-the most comprehensive
1969, which the United States and its
tribution that SDI could make to our
security, and because of our interest in
arms control agenda of any president in
allies could not accept then or at any
time since. It is not reflected in the
a rigorous implementation of the ABM
our history.
SALT I accords or in SALT II or in
Treaty by both sides, we have devoted
the distinction between strategic and
much attention to the question of how
The Soviet Counterproposal
INF systems that was the basis of the
to interpret the treaty. It is our view,
Now we have, at long last, a Soviet
Geneva negotiations from 1981 to 1983.
based on a careful analysis of the treaty
counterproposal in Geneva. It could be a
The Soviets also propose to limit
text and the negotiating record, that a
broader interpretation of our authority
step forward and thus, in and of itself,
what they call "nuclear charges" (that
is fully justified. This is, however, a
represents a success for our alliance
is, warheads and bombs) on strategic
moot point; our SDI research program
policies. The very fact that the Soviets
forces to 6,000. Of these 6,000 weapons
has been structured and, as the Presi-
have offered a new proposal is directly
no more than 60% could be on any one
dent has reaffirmed last Friday, will
due to the patience, strength, and unity
component (that is, ICBMs, submarine-
of the Western democracies. We have
launched ballistic missiles, or aircraft).
continue to be conducted in accordance
This would limit the number of Soviet
with a restrictive interpretation of the
maintained our principles and our stand-
treaty's obligations. Furthermore, any
ards, and these, in turn, are carrying us
ICBM warheads to 3,600-but there is
no commitment to reduce their most
SDI deployment would be the subject of
farther than sceptics had believed
consultations with our allies and to
possible.
destabilizing heavy ICBMs, the SS-18s.
Remember that for over a year in
Thus the Soviet proposal does not
discussion and negotiation, as appropri-
ate, with the Soviets in accordance with
1983 and 1984, the Soviets boycotted
directly address the main problem of
the terms of the ABM Treaty.
any negotiation of these issues. That ef-
strategic stability. With deep reductions
Our policy thus reflects:
fort to intimidate the alliance failed, just
in U.S. systems, it would add to
as their earlier efforts to block INF
NATO's vulnerability and increase the
The President's commitment to
deployments failed. Continued alliance
significance of the Soviet advantage in
explore thoroughly the potential contri-
firmness and unity eventually brought
hard-target-killer ICBMs.
bution of strategic defenses to peace and
the Soviets back to the negotiating table
The Soviets also propose to ban or
stability and his vision of a "balance of
earlier this year. In these new talks, the
severely limit all "new" nuclear delivery
safety" replacing the "balance of
Soviets stated in the most general terms
systems, defining as "new" those sys-
terror."
that they agreed with us on the impor-
tems not tested as of an agreed date.
Our commitment to pursue the
tance of offensive reductions. But they
Assuming the agreed date would not be
program as currently structured, which
gave no specifics. Rather, they have
in the past, such a ban would preclude
4
our Midgetman missile-which was
up their efforts to keep a unilateral ad-
negotiations, secret preparations, and
20
recommended, as you remember, by the
vantage. They want to stop our program
the advantages gained from a long test
Scowcroft commission and which would
while they continue their own program
series never to offer again an un-
add to stability-D-5 Trident submarine
in the same field. Behind the curtain
inspected moratorium." We have
missile, and Stealth bomber. Oddly
that encloses Soviet society, free from
stressed over and over again the crucial
enough, it would allow the two new
the scrutiny or open debate we have in
importance of improving verification,
ICBMs (the SS-X-24 and the SS-25),
the West, a major Soviet strategic
whether with respect to the threshold
the new submarine-launched ballistic
defense program has proceeded for
test ban or any other more ambitious ef-
missile, and the new Blackjack bomber
decades. In the past 20 years, the
fort. We have on the table some precise
they are now testing or deploying. It's a
Soviets have spent about as much on
and practical ways to move forward on
hell of a deal.
strategic defense-missile defense, civil
verification. For example, we have pro-
The Soviet position on INF is not
defense, and air defense-as they have
posed that they send experts to our
totally clear. But to the extent that they
spent on strategic offense. They deploy
nuclear test site to measure the yield of
now agree that an acceptable INF ac-
the world's only operational ABM
a nuclear test in order to provide better
cord could be concluded separately-no
system and are continuing to modernize
calibration of their instruments and thus
longer held hostage to SDI and other
it. Their propaganda about the so-called
more accurate verification.
issues-we would regard it as construc-
militarization of space rings rather
The Soviets are also practitioners of
tive. And implicit in their new position
hollow when one considers that they
vague, superficially attractive proposals
may be a grudging acceptance of the
have the world's most active military
like non-use of force, no-first-use of
presence of some U.S. INF missiles in
space program; last year they conducted
nuclear weapons, or nuclear-free zones.
Europe defending our allies.
about 100 space launches and nearly
The problem with such ideas is that
However, they propose a stop to all
80% of them were military in nature,
they are a kind of escapism-evading
further deployments in Europe of
while the United States had only about
the reality of the political problems that
intermediate-range nuclear forces. This
20 total space launches. The Soviets also
give rise to conflict. Peace will ulti-
would halt NATO's INF deployment at
have the world's only extensively tested
mately depend on solving the political
about 200 warheads-while they have
and fully operational antisatellite system.
problems, not on high-sounding declara-
about seven times as many SS-20 war-
And their own research efforts into SDI
tions. We recall the basic principles of
heads already deployed. And it would
technologies-high-energy lasers,
U.S.-Soviet relations in 1972 and the
permit unlimited new SS-20 deploy-
particle-beam weapons, radio frequency
1973 agreement on the prevention of
ments against our allies and friends in
weapons, and kinetic energy weapons-
nuclear war. These accords stated the
Asia.
long antedate our own. Indeed, some of
right principles-particularly the need to
The Soviets also ask to be "compen-
the Soviet scientists most active in sign-
forswear the perpetual quest for uni-
sated" in these negotiations for the
ing declarations against our SDI pro-
lateral advantage. The problem was not
British and French strategic nuclear
gram are themselves the men leading
the principles but the performance.
deterrents. This is not only part of their
the Soviet military research in the same
Soviet calls for the non-use or threat of
effort to undercut NATO's decision of
technologies.
force look rather unimpressive against
1979; it is also an effort to undercut sup-
I said it at the United Nations, and
the background of events in Afghanistan
port for British and French nuclear
I will say it again: the Soviet leaders
or Poland.
forces. Yet those forces represent those
know full well their own programs in
countries' determination to maintain
these fields. Their propaganda against
Prospects
their independence and their control
American programs is blatantly one-
over their own destiny in the face of the
sided and not to be taken seriously.
In sum, the new Soviet positions on
nuclear danger. Those independent
Aside from the central issues of the
arms control could be a step forward
forces contribute to deterrence and to
Geneva nuclear and space talks, the
but do not meet the basic criteria of
Europe's security. Of course, in the con-
Soviets have taken constructive posi-
strengthened stability, equality, stra-
text of deep U.S. and Soviet reductions,
tions in some fields and less constructive
tegically significant reductions, and in-
British and French forces could become
positions in others.
creased verifiability. But we approach
a relatively larger part of the picture.
In the struggle against nuclear pro-
this positively. We are now in a new
And both countries have made clear
liferation, for example, they and we
phase of the negotiations in which, if the
that in that context they would consider
have worked together well. We welcome
Soviets are serious, real progress can be
discussions of their forces.
Mr. Gorbachev's expression of interest
made. The President has given our
The Soviet proposal tabled in
in working with us to check the spread
negotiators unprecedented authority to
Geneva, finally, indicates that all limita-
of chemical weapons.
explore ways of bridging differences.
tions on offensive forces are contingent
Their proposed moratorium on
Whether or not there is genuine prog-
on banning SDI-banning not only its
nuclear testing, however, was aimed
ress before the time of the President's
testing and deployment but also "scien-
more at invidiously publicizing the
meeting with Mr. Gorbachev, we at
tific research." This is rather sweeping.
Hiroshima anniversary than at serious
least are now both getting down to
Indeed, it flies in the face of the ABM
arms control. Let us remember that in
business.
Treaty, which puts no limits on
1962, after the Soviets had unilaterally
You hear from the Soviets a lot of
research.
broken an earlier joint moratorium on
talk about the "increasing danger of
The problem is that, just as with
nuclear tests, President Kennedy said:
war." This is propaganda designed to in-
SS-20s, the Soviets have not yet given
"We know now enough about broken
timidate. Deterrence has kept the peace,
5
21
certainly in the NATO area. With the
We have a complex task. As the
a world is attainable if the democracies
restoration of Western strength in the
President has put it: "We must both de-
are true to themselves and steadfast of
last few years, the world is really more
fend freedom and preserve the peace.
purpose.
stable and secure than it has been in a
We must stand true to our principles
long time. It is when the West is weak
and our friends while preventing a
Published by the United States Department
that the world is a more dangerous
holocaust."
of State . Bureau of Public Affairs
place.
There is no escape from this dual
Office of Public Communication . Editorial
So we will pursue arms reductions,
responsibility. The world we seek is a
Division Washington, D.C. October 1985
with seriousness and dedication, but also
world of both peace and freedom. Such
Editor: Colleen Sussman This material is in
with realism.
the public domain and may be reproduced
without permission; citation of this source is
appreciated.
6
22
Secretary Shultz
Current
Policy
Arms Control,
No. 750
Strategic Stability,
and Global Security
United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.
Following is an address by Secretary
clap. But it's an important lesson. We
legislators, you know firsthand that
Shultz before the North Atlantic
have to be ready to act.
democracies love peace and really do not
Assembly, San Francisco, California,
And, third, it tells us that the
like spending money on defense. But
October 14, 1985.
democracies must stand together in our
you also know how precious freedom
own cause. Our nations are the founders
and democracy are and, therefore, how
My talk this morning is about our rela-
and the defenders of the rule of law.
important it is that we defend the
tions with the Soviet Union, a central
The terrorists know and seek to turn
values that we hold dear. We democra-
issue for the Western democracies. But
that against us. They insist that we be
cies know that freedom has enemies in
before I start on that, I want to say
rigorous in granting due process to the
this world. But we also know that the
something about terrorism, because ter-
enemies of the rule of law, and, as they
purpose of our defensive strength is
rorism is the war we're fighting right
do, they seek to instill fear-the fear
peace. Therefore, we all conduct foreign
now.
that anyone who captures and brings to
policies whose aim is a more positive
Terrorists and the regimes that sup-
justice a terrorist becomes a target of
and constructive relationship between
port them aim to shatter our ideals and
terrorism.
East and West.
our principles, undermine our demo-
Nearly 2 years ago, President Rea-
cratic life, and pull down civilization
We must stand for the rule of law,
but we must not let fear turn it into a
gan offered the Soviet Union a challenge
itself. We've learned some lessons in the
key to the jailhouse door. If we of the
to begin building a more constructive
few days just past. The event isn't over,
but still while it's fresh in our minds, let
democracies stand together against this
relationship. He said:
me tell you three points that stand out
scourge, we will defeat it, and our ideals
Our challenge is peaceful. It will bring
and values will thrive and be safe. I
out the best in us. It also calls for the best
in my own mind.
think we are now starting to do that.
from the Soviet Union
If the Soviet
First, it tells us something about
Government wants peace, then there will be
terrorists-that they're animals, cow-
peace.
Arms Control
ardly animals. These are not guerrillas.
Since that time, we have made a
These are not fighters for some libera-
I have a lengthy statement here that
start. The Geneva and other arms con-
tion movement. They select the helpless
deals principally with the arms control
trol negotiations are underway. We
to torture and murder. They lack the
matters being discussed in Geneva right
have initiated a process for discussing
guts to do battle, just as they lack the
now. I know it is too long, but it is an
ways to defuse regional tensions and
guts to seek justice and peace by negoti-
effort to pull together in one place
manage our competition peacefully. We
ation. That's the first lesson. [Applause]
where we are and they are, so we can
have urged the Soviet Union to take
It tells us that we must take ac-
see just what the issues are. So I ask
practical steps to fulfill its international
tion. If free peoples do not move against
you to bear with me and take it as a
commitments on human rights. We have
the terrorists, no one will stop them.
compliment, as you run out of patience,
advanced ideas for expanding contact
We must have the courage to act with-
that we have thought, the President has
and interchange between our two socie-
out violence, if possible, but recognizing
thought, that this audience was the ap-
ties, to fashion the network of bilateral
that violence sometimes cannot be
propriate one to lay out in a rather
ties that is a necessary feature of any
avoided. If our dedication to that princi-
painstaking way just what this is all
productive relationship between two
ple paralyzes us, all our principles will
about as we see it.
countries. These are steps forward, but
be in jeopardy. That's a little more
For 40 years, the Western democra-
much more needs to be done. One of
sobering lesson, so I notice you didn't
cies have wrestled with the problem of
President Reagan's major goals when he
relations with the Soviet Union. As
meets next month with General Secre-
tary Gorbachev is to discuss this entire
3581.15
R/A
Organization for the Rebirth of Ukraine (ODWU) Inc. USA
23
Office Address: 140-42 Second Ave., Room 23, New York, N.Y. 10003
Mail Address: Cooper Sta. P.O. Box 4, New York, N.Y. 10276 U.S.A.
8532253
CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
Mr. Patrick J. Buchanan
Assistant to the President
The White House Office
Linnary
October 4, 1985
mc
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Mr. Buchanan:
In preparation for the upcoming summit between President Reagan
and Mr. Gorbachev, we believe your office may find the enclosed
letter to the President of interest.
Among the many concerns we share for the future welfare of the
United States and the world, we feel that sound defense policy
and human rights issues to be the most important. As we hope
our President will not compromise on SDI research. we
inherently trust President Reagan to dynamically defend the
rights of those unable to speak for themselves held captive by
Mr. Gorbachev, as he has so courageously done on the issue of
abortion.
We commend and applaud your continuing efforts in support of
human rights, and of our President. Keep up the good work!
With best regards,
Sincerely,
Pawlo Doroxynsky
P. Dorozhynsky
Chairman, Central Executive Committee
Organization for the Rebirth of Ukraine
24
15-A
8532253
Organization for the Rebirth of Ukraine (ODWU) Inc. USA
Office Address: 140-42 Second Ave., Room 23, New York, N.Y. 10003
Mail Address: Cooper Sta. P.O. Box 4, New York, N.Y. 10276 U.S.A.
CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
The President
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500
October 4, 1985
Dear Mr. President:
We wish to share with you several most urgent considerations for
inclusion in the agenda of your summit meeting with General Secretary
Gorbachev. The executive board of ODWU, representing our branches
nation-wide, fully supports your "peace through strength" and strategic
defense initiatives. We also believe that arms reduction must be based
on verifiable agreements.
We respectfully ask you to share with Secretary Gorbachev the grave
concerns of Americans who pray daily not only for the welfare of these
United States of America, but also the welfare and freedom of the
captive nations and people of Central and Eastern Europe, who are our
natural allies. The following are among the vital concerns we request
you to share:
1. In discussing the establishment of a European nuclear-free
zone, we petition that the proposal be made that the territories of the
western Soviet republics -- Ukraine, Byelorussia and the Baltic
countries -- be included into this zone. This proposal would greatly
benefit the vital interests of the United States of America and those of
our NATO allies.
If accepted, nuclear weapons will be removed from the immediate
borders of European countries greatly decreasing risk of surprise
attack. If rejected, the people of the western Soviet republics and the
European countries dominated by the USSR would know that the U.S.A. and
not the USSR is defending their interests.
Whatever Secretary Gorbachev's response, one may consider
publicizing this proposal after the summit for its propaganda value to
our NATO allies and our own citizens.
2. We urge you to appropriate significant time to the questions
of human rights and non-compliance of the Helsinki Accords by the the
Soviet Union. Among the many violations, the most flagrant are:
25
a) The people of Ukraine and other enslaved republics are not
free to exercise their religious beliefs. Ukrainian has been banned as
a liturgical language. The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and
the Ukrainian Catholic Church were "banned" and forcibly included into
the Russian Orthodox Church, and the followers of the Ukrainian churches
are severely persecuted for their beliefs. Mr. J. Terelya and Rev. Y.
Budzijnowsky of the Ukrainian Catholic Church are but few among the
numerous examples of such persecution.
We implore you to request the immediate and general amnesty for
and release of all clergy and believers who are incarcerated for their
religious practices and beliefs, the return of children taken away from
their parents because of the latter raising them in accordance with
their religious beliefs, and the removal of the illegal and unjust
prohibition of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic (Uniate) Church, the
Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, and other denominations in the
Ukrainian SSR.
b) The continued Soviet government policy of "merging of nations"
to the attempt of bringing up the "soviet man" is, in reality, the
policy of russifying the people of national republics. This is the
liquidation of their culture, language and their separate, distinct
ethnic and historically national identities. The effect of such policy
is evident in the continued increase of schools and publications in the
Russian language at the expense of Ukrainians and other non-Russians.
Although 75% of Ukraine is Ukrainian, a mere 25% of available books are
in Ukrainian.
The official Soviet census of 1970 and 1979 revealed that the rate
of increase of the Russian population in the Ukrainian and other western
Soviet republics is three times higher than the rate of increase of
their native populations. This result is achieved by the deportation
and forced resettlement of the western non-Russian population into
Siberia and the USSR's northern regions. Such policy is nothing more
than ethnocide and cultural genocide, which are in violation of the U.N.
Declaration of Human Rights and the Helsinki Accords.
Please request the release of V. Chornovil, Yu. Badzio and others
who are illegally sentenced for opposing the policy of russification,
and those imprisoned who strive for human rights.
c) The government of the Soviet Union creates extreme
difficulties in maintaining contact between relatives who live in the
USSR and those living in the West, and blocks any emigration of
Ukrainians who would like to unite with their relatives in the West.
Please request that all restrictions be lifted on the reunion of
families, and on free emigration for all people regardless of
nationality, religion or political beliefs.
We respectfully urge you to raise the question of the sick
prisoners of conscience Yu. Shukhevych, D. Shumuk and others whose
relatives in the West requested these prisoners' release to their
2
20
custody for medical treatment, but their continued requests are denied
by Soviet authorities. If there is no intervention on their behalf,
they will meet their death in prisons, forced labor camps or internal
exile, as happened recently to V. Stus, 0. Tykhy, V. Sokolov, Yu. Lytvyn
and V. Marchenko.
We hope that you will keep these most urgent matters in mind
during the summit meeting with Secretary Gorbachev.
d) The members of the Ukrainian Helsinki Monitoring group, who
were honored by your proclamation of September 21, 1982, are all
imprisoned for their attempt to make the government of the Soviet Union
live up to the Helsinki agreements. For their peaceful action all
members of this group were sentenced to long terms of prison or internal
exile. Some of them, such as 80 year-old Oksana Meshko and the wounded
WW II veteran, and poet, M. Rudenko, are severely ill and need immediate
medical treatment not available in the remote labor camps or areas of
exile. Please request their expeditious release to their families' care
in the Ukrainian Republic or to the care of the Ukrainian community in
the West.
3. We also ask that you raise the issue of establishing an
American Consulate in Kiev, the capital of Ukraine. This would provide
needed protection for those Americans who wish to visit their relatives
in Ukraine. The Consulate would also provide counsel to those desiring
to travel to the West. This strategically-placed consulate would serve
United States interests in many beneficial ways.
4. Kindly consider also the illegal jamming of Voice of America
and Radio Liberty short and medium-wave broadcasts. This violates ITU
Conventions as well as the intent of the Helsinki Final Act to engender
more free dissemination and exchange of information. The inspiration,
encouragement and information provided by these broadcasts are
invaluable to those behind the iron curtain, and are perhaps the most
cost effective tool we have to offer in promulgating hope for freedom,
sharing truth, news and free thoughts otherwise proscribed by repressive
communist regimes.
If Secretary Gorbachev is so confident in his system of
government, then he should not feel threatened by alternative
information sources and be compelled to jam these broadcasts.
Mr. President, as you know, the United States is the world's last hope
for preserving and promulgating liberty and freedom. The Soviet Union
is dedicated to world conquest and oppresive domination, not just of
nations but of its peoples. It is at war with the world, even if some
choose not to acknowledge that war. It is indeed an evil empire
dedicated to the destruction of every individual's God-given rights,
which they would replace with Kremlin-given "rights" of privilege --
which they may or may not choose to grant.
3
21
Those enslaved by Moscow's tyranny look to us to speak for them where
they cannot, to pray for them where they cannot, and to defend them
where they cannot. Those future generations that risk being born into
the fruits Secretary Gorbachev's labors will either come to bless us for
having had the courage to resist tyranny, or curse us along with
Secretary Gorbachev for having helped establish it.
Let us not disappoint those who depend on us. We call upon you, Mr.
President, to continue your courageous and highly moral convictions
without compromise. We implore you to remember to speak for and defend
those who cannot themselves act.
We pray that God will grant you the health, strength, wisdom, tools and
guidance that will both arm and shield you at the summit, and facilitate
your every success.
Please feel free to contact me, should you or your staff require any
further information, or if I can be of any service.
Sincerely,
Pawlo Dorozhypsky
P. Dorozhynsky
Chairman, Central Executive Committee
Organization for the Rebirth of Ukraine
4
28
8532253
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
REFERRAL
OCTOBER 31, 1985
TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ACTION REQUESTED:
DRAFT REPLY FOR SIGNATURE OF:
WHITE HOUSE STAFF MEMBER
DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:
ID:
858145
MEDIA: LETTER, DATED OCTOBER 4, 1985
TO:
PATRICK BUCHANAN
FROM:
MR. P. DOROZHYNSKY
CHAIRMAN
CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF
O. D. W. U.
POST OFFICE BOX 4 COOPER STATION
NEW YORK NY 10276
SUBJECT: SDI
PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.
RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE
(OR DRAFT) TO:
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE
SALLY KELLEY
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE
1615 needsis-I 10/30/85 CAS
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FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:
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Comments:
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Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOB).
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5/81
President Reagan,
Kenneth W. Dam,
vivable in the face of attack or else it could
March 23, 1983
Deputy Secretary of State,
invite an effort to overwhelm it regardless
January 14, 1985
of cost. The goal of strategic stability
I am directing a comprehensive and inten-
demands such high performance stand-
sive effort to define a long-term research
The SDI puts primary emphasis on
ards.
and development program to begin to
technologies that do not use nuclear
We are ready, if the technology
achieve our ultimate goal of eliminating the
weapons. This approach contrasts with the
proves feasible and cost effective, to con-
threat posed by strategic nuclear missiles.
present Soviet ABM system, which relies on
sider integration of defensive systems into
The President's
This could pave the way for arms control
nuclear-armed interceptors.
the mix of forces of both sides. This would
measures to eliminate the weapons
be in the context of a cooperative, balanced,
Strategic Defense
themselves. We seek neither military
and verifiable environment that reflects a
Initiative
superiority nor political advantage. Our only
Paul H. Nitze,
Special Adviser to the President
balance of offensive and defensive forces in
purpose-one all people share-is to search
and the Secretary of State
ways that reduce existing nuclear arsenals
for ways to reduce the danger of nuclear
on Arms Control Matters,
while enhancing security and stability. If
March 1985
war.
February 20, 1985
our research proves the feasibility of the
concepts, a negotiated transition period of
The present situation-in which the threat
many years with assurance of stability and
Secretary of State Shultz,
of massive nuclear retaliation is the
security throughout will be essential.
January 31, 1985
ultimate sanction, the key element of deter-
The last myth is that the Strategic
rence and, thus, the basis for security and
The pace of technological advance now
Defense Initiative will complicate the arms
opens possibilities for new ways of strategic
peace-is unsatisfactory. It has kept the
control process: The truth is that it was the
thinking-never an easy process. The
peace for 40 years, but the potential costs
Strategic Defense Initiative, combined with
of a breakdown are immense and, because
the demonstrated resolve of the Western
vehemence of some of the criticism of the
President's Strategic Defense Initiative
of continuing massive Soviet deployments of
allies to modernize their strategic deterrent,
both offensive and defensive weaponry, are
seems to come less from the argument over
which brought the Soviet Union back to the
not becoming less. If we can, we must find
technical feasibility-which future research
negotiating table.
a more reliable basis for security and for
will answer one way or another in an objec-
peace.
Public Information Series Published by the United
tive manner-than from the passionate
States Department of State Bureau of Public
defense of orthodox doctrine in the face of
Robert C. McFarlane,
Affairs Office of Public Communication
changing strategic realities. We are pro-
Assistant to the President
Editorial
Division
Washington. D.C.
March 1985
ceeding with SDI research because we see a
for National Security Affairs,
positive and. indeed, revolutionary poten-
March 7, 1985
tial: defensive measures may become
available that could render obsolete the
In practical terms, a strategic defensive op-
threat of an offensive first strike. A new
tion must be cost effective. That is, it must
strategic equilibrium based on defensive
be cheaper and easier to add defensive
technologies and sharply reduced offensive
capability than offensive capability. Other-
deployments is likely to be the most stable
wise, there would be incentive to expand
and secure arrangement of all.
the offensive arms we seek to reduce. In
addition, any defensive system must be sur-
United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.
Background
destroy attacking missiles during each
defense provided by the multiple layers
SDI and Arms Control
phase of their flight.
would not have to provide total protection
In his March 23, 1983 address to the nation,
in order to enhance deterrence significantly.
The SDI research program is fully consis-
President Reagan announced the Strategic
Some missiles might be destroyed in their
An aggressor would be much less likely to
tent with all U.S. treaty obligations, in-
Defense Initiative (SDI). Its purpose is to
boost phase-that is, shortly after their
initiate a nuclear conflict, even in a crisis, if
cluding the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile
explore the potential of newly emerging
launch as they burn their engines and
he lacked confidence in his ability to suc-
(ABM) Treaty. The ABM Treaty prohibits
technologies to support an effective defense
carry their payloads into space. Suc-
ceed.
the development, testing, and deployment
against ballistic missiles-one that would
cessful engagement in this phase also
The defensive system also must be
of ABM systems and components that are
strengthen deterrence and thereby increase
would destroy all the warheads carried by
survivable. To achieve the required level of
space based, air based, sea based; or mobile
our security and that of our allies. The pro-
the missile.
survivability, the system would not need to
land based. However, that agreement per-
gram is designed to answer a number of
Those nuclear warheads surviving the
be invulnerable but would have to be suffi-
mits research short of field testing on a pro-
basic scientific and engineering questions
boost phase could be attacked during the
ciently effective to fulfill its mission, even in
totype ABM system or component. This is
that must be addressed before the promise
post-boost phase. During this phase we
the face of determined attacks against it.
the type of research that will be conducted
would target the post-boost vehicle, the
Without this characteristic, a defensive
under the SDI program.
What if free people could live
device that sits on top of the missile and
system could be rendered ineffective and
At the U.S.-Soviet arms control talks
secure in the knowledge that
dispenses its warheads. If we were able
thus invite a preemptive attack.
in Geneva that began on March 12, we are
their security did not rest upon
to destroy this device, we could destroy
To discourage the proliferation of
discussing defensive and space arms as well
the threat of instant U.S.
all the warheads not yet released.
ballistic missile forces, the defensive system
as strategic and intermediate-range offen-
retaliation to deter a Soviet at-
must be able to maintain effectiveness
sive systems. We hope to engage the
Those warheads that were released and
tack, that we could intercept
against the offense at less than the cost of
Soviets in a constructive dialogue on
survived would travel for tens of minutes
and destroy strategic ballistic
developing offensive countermeasures
strategic defense, including existing Soviet
in space on their ballistic trajectories
missiles before they reached our
necessary to overcome it. ABM systems in
defenses.
toward their targets. Although we would
own soil or that of our allies?
the past have lacked this essential capabili-
have to identify and destroy the in-
President Reagan.
ty, but the newly emerging technologies
dividual warheads themselves, the
SDI and the Allies
March 23, 1983
being pursued under SDI have great poten-
relatively long mid-course phase of flight
tial in this regard.
could provide enough time for defenses
Because U.S. security is inextricably linked
of these new technologies can be fully
incorporating advanced technologies to
to that of our friends and allies, the SDI
assessed. The SDI research program will
do that.
Soviet Program
program will not be limited solely to an ex-
provide a future President and Congress
ploration of technologies with potential
Finally, those warheads surviving the
with the technical knowledge necessary for
outer layers of defense could be attacked
SDI is a prudent response to the very active
against intercontinental ballistic missiles
a decision in the early 1990s on whether to
Soviet research and development program
and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. It
during the terminal phase as they ap-
develop and deploy such advanced defensive
proached the end of their ballistic flight.
in strategic defenses; it provides insurance
also will examine technologies with poten-
systems. The focus of research is on non-
against a possible unilateral Soviet effort to
tial against shorter range ballistic missiles,
nuclear defensive technologies.
develop and deploy an advanced defensive
such as Soviet SS-20s and others that are
Strengthening Deterrence
system. A unilateral Soviet deployment,
capable of striking the territory of our
along with the Soviet Union's massive offen-
allies.
A Multilayered Defense
In order for advanced defenses to
sive forces and its already impressive air
During the next several years, we will
strengthen both deterrence and stability,
and passive defense capabilities, would
work closely with our allies to ensure that,
Technologies being investigated in the SDI
they must, at a minimum, be able to destroy
destroy the foundation on which deterrence
in the event of any future decision to deploy
program may offer the possibility of pro-
a sufficient portion of an aggressor's attack-
has rested for 20 years.
defensive systems, allied as well as U.S.
viding a layered defense-that is, a defense
ing forces to deny him confidence in the
security would be enhanced. Close consulta-
that would use various techniques to
outcome. The combined effectiveness of the
tion with our allies will play an important
part in any decision that is taken.
9361
32
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
November 26, 1985
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN
FROM:
JACK F. MATLOCK
Response to Organization from for Rebirth of Ukraine
SUBJECT:
Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to Sally Kelley
forwarding a State Department draft response to Pawlo Dorozhynsky
of the Organization for the Rebirth of the Ukraine. We have
reviewed the draft and suggested some minor changes to reflect
that the Geneva meeting has already taken place. We recommend
that a copy of the President's November 21 address to Congress be
included among the suggested enclosures.
Steve Sestanovich, Judyt Mandel, Bob 83 Linhard, Gerald May, Steve
SS
Steiner, and Sven Kraemer concur.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memo at Tab I for Sally Kelley.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments:
Tab I
Memorandum to Sally Kelley
Tab A
State Department draft response
Tab B
State's suggested enclosures
Tab C
letter from Pawlo Dorozhynsky to Patrick Buchanan
Tab D
letter from Pawlo Dorozhynsky to the President
Tab E
tasking to State
matlock
33
9169
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
November 27, 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR ANNE HIGGINS
FROM:
WILLIAM F. MARTIN
just
SUBJECT:
Draft Response to Human Rights Appeals
The NSC has reviewed the draft response to human rights appeals
attached at Tab A. As indicated in the draft we recommend
deleting a portion of paragraph three and making several minor
changes.
Attachments:
Tab A
Draft response to human rights appeals
Tab B
Letters concerning human rights abuses in the Soviet
Union
34
9366
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 12, 1985
SOVJEWRY
Thank you for your message to President Reagan requesting
that he raise the plight of Soviet Jews during his discus-
sions with General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva.
I can assure you that the President intends to keep human
rights issues at the forefront of U.S. efforts to achieve
progress in our relations with the Soviet Union. As he said
in his radio address to the nation on October 19, "We must
defend human rights everywhere, since countries which
respect human rights are unlikely to unleash war or impose
their will on others. And that's why we insist that the
Helsinki Accords and other international commitments be
observed. "
We recognize that the human rights situation in the Soviet
Union has deteriorated in recent years. Emigration of
Soviet Jews has decreased from a peak of 51,000 in 1979 to
below 900 in 1984. Soviet leaders have sanctioned renewed
manifestations of anti - Semitism, a campaign of arrest and
us lecture
conviction of Hebrew teachers and others has intensified,
&
and little progress has occurred in the cases of major human
will
p
is
undersine
ights figures. The United States has used
to demonstrate to the Soviets that their human rights
violations and persecution of religious groups are serious
obstacles to improved relations between our two countries.
35
You can be sure that the subjects you mentioned will be
among those raised in Geneva.
With the President's appreciation and best wishes,
34
Mush Oberman
POINT
NILES
ILLINOIS
60648
3605 Woodhead Drive, Northbrook, I1. 60062
Oct. 23, 1985
President Ronald Reagan
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500
Dear Mr. President:
When you meet Premier Gorbachev please remember the
plight of Soviet Jewry.
As the leader of the Free World you must speak out
for those whose minds and memories are free but whose
families are enslaved.
The future of the Jews of the Soviet Union and of
human rights is in your hands.
Sincerely
M. D. Oberman
31
Office of the President
518/442-5400
State University of New York at Albany
Administration 249, Albany, New York 12222
October 3, 1985
The Honorable Ronald Reagan
President of the United States
Washington, D.C.
Dear President Reagan:
Like millions of other Americans, we wish you well in your meeting with
Mr. Gorbachev in November. It is a great occasion and we all pray that you will be
successful in moving the world toward international peace.
Among many issues that involve the Soviet Union, one which gravely concerns all of
us is the persecution of Jews in the Soviet Union, including the refusal of the Soviet
government to grant permission for them to emigrate to the State of Israel.
I hope that in your meeting with Mr. Gorbachev you will raise the issue of freeing
the millions of Jews still held captive in the Soviet Union. This is a matter of deep
concern to all of us and to all of those who love freedom, and I know it is a concern of
yours.
Sincerely,
Vincent O'Leary
SECOND GENERATION
The Martyrs Memorial & Museum of the Holocaust
An Organization of Children of Holocaust Survivors
President Ronald Reagan
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20036
October 8, 1985
Dear President Reagan:
We, Second Generation of the Martyrs' Memorial and
Museum, are the largest of hundreds of worldwide groups
of children of Holocaust survivors. We understand and
recognize, more than most, the effects of restricting
and abrogating human rights.
We strongly urge you to impress upon Mr. Gorbachev.
in November at your summit meeting that Soviet Jews who
seek exit visas and those who chose to stay must not be
used as political pawns. Human rights of Jews and all
Russian people must remain foremost on your agenda as
must an accounting for the whereabouts of the second of
only two honorary citizens of the USA: Raoul Wallenberg.
There are very positive signs that, although immi-
gration of Soviet Jewry is at about its lowest point
since it began two decades ago, with only 700 exit visas
being granted so far this year, a turnabout in Soviet
policy is imminent. (This month, for the first time since
1967, Israeli citizens will be allowed to travel to the
Soviet Union--using a Spanish visa.)
THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT MUST KNOW THAT HUMAN RIGHTS
WILL REMAIN CENTRAL TO U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS.
Sincerely,
Rosalie Heller
ROSALIE HILLER
President
Second Generation
Jewish Federation Council of Greater Los Angeles, 6505 Wilshire Blvd., Los Angeles, CA 90048 852-1234
39
Sacramento Jewish Community Relations Council
2351 Wyda Way, Sacramento, California 95825
(916) 486-0906
P.O. Box 254589, Sacramento, California 95865
October 11, 1985
Chairman
ROBERT S DRESSER
Vice-Chairman
LINDA BRODT
Secretary
BEN SANDLER
AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS
President Ronald Reagan
ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE
The White House
B'NAI B'RITH
Washington, D. C. 20500
CONGREGATION BETH SHALOM
CONGREGATION B'NAI ISRAEL
HADASSAH
JEWISH FEDERATION OF SACRAMENTO
Dear President Reagan:
JEWISH FELLOWSHIP OF DAVIS
JEWISH WAR VETERANS
KENESSET ISRAEL TORAH CENTER
The Jewish Community of Sacramento. hopes that your meeting
MOSAIC LAW CONGREGATION
with Chairman Gorbachev will lead to an improvement in
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JEWISH WOMEN
SUNRISE JEWISH CONGREGATION
relations and lessening of tensions between this country and
WOMEN'S AMERICAN ORT
the Soviet Union.
ZIONIST ORGANIZATION OF AMERICA
STAFF
We believe that it is of the utmost importance that you
JCRC Director
ANNE EISENBERG
place the issue of human rights in the Soviet Union on the
agenda for the upcoming summit meeting in Geneva. Central
to the concept of human rights is the right to freely
emigrate. Thus we appeal to you to urge the Soviet Govern-
ment to stop their harrassment of the Jewish community in
that country and allow Jews and other ethnic and religious
minorities to freely emigrate. We also feel you should
express the concern of the American people about the
failure of the Soviet government to adhere to the human rights
provisions in the Helsinki Accords to which the Soviet Union
was a signatory.
We realize the importance of the upcoming summit meeting
and hope that you and the new Soviet leader will reach a
successful agreement that would improve human rights in the
Soviet Union and serve the cause of world peace.
Sincerely,
Bobert
Robert Dinsfriend, Chair
Oppressed Jewish Committee
CW
AFFILIATED WITH THE JEWISH FEDERATION OF SACRAMENTO
Member of the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council
and the Jewish Public Affairs Committee of California
40
ZIONIST CULTURAL SOCIETY OF MILL BASIN
n - by
6363 AVENUE U
BROOKLYN, N. Y. 11234
Hlckory 4-6868
October 16, 1985
HONORARY PRESIDENT
Rabbi David S. Halpern
PRESIDIUM
Alexander Schlesinger, Chairman
George S. Meissner
Rabbi David Spiegel
The Honorable Ronald Reagan
The White House
VICE PRESIDENTS
Bernard Deutsch
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Eugene Mermelstein
Leib Sultanik
Washington, D.C. 20500
TREASURER
Jacob Rozenberg
Dear Mr. Reagan,
SECRETARY
Moe Marvin
Twenty years ago, on May 11, 1965, some two hundred
ARRANGEMENTS CHAIRMAN
members of our congregation journeyed to Washington,
Louis Lefcourt
D.C. and submitted the attached petition to the late
MEMBERSHIP CHAIRMAN
President Lyndon B. Johnson. It was the deeply felt
Milton Dwoskin
Samuel Jackson
expression of our concern for our Jewish brethren
Abraham Kraushar
imprisoned behind the Iron Curtain. We like to think
PUBLIC RELATIONS CHAIRMAN
that we played some role in opening wide the tear in
Sol Glickstein
the Iron Curtain through which many tens of thousands
BOARD OF DIRECTORS
of Jews came to freedom.
Ben Goldstein, Chairman
Erwin Klinger, Co-Chairman
Joseph Berkower
Today, the curtain hangs tightly closed and again we
Sidney Birnbaum
Adolph Blank
must marshall every effort to bring new life, new
Kermit C. Blank
Irving Borenstein
hope for freedom to our fellow Jews who wish to be
Simon Ceder
reunited with us.
Hugh D'Angelo
David Feldhamer
Aaron D. Feldman
Dr. Mortimer Fisch
On the eve of your meeting with Secretary Gorbatchev,
Dr. Milton Gailboord
we call upon you, Mr. President, to reiterate your
Bernard Goldstein
Harry Gutwirth
oft-expressed concern for Soviet Jewry and to insist
Sydney Haimm
Dr. Leon Hankoff
firmly on the provisions of the Helsinki Agreement
Harry Kerschen
to which the Soviets are signators and to the basic
Harry A. Kornfeld
Samuel Kostman
human right of every person to be united with his
Jack Krinick
Rabbi Murray Levine
family.
Louis Markowitz
Harry Newman
Rabbi Ben-Zion Pitem
We are severly pained when we know of a Scharansky
Max Promitke
separated from his wife and in prison for over seven
Charles Rosenfeld
S. Gary Schiller
years for the "crime" 6f wishing to emigaate to Israel.
Irving Sloane
Eugene Steinberg
And there are far too many like him who waste their best
Julius Uncyk
years in Soviet prisons and mental hospitals.
Irwin Walman
Murray Wasserstrum
Solomon Weisleder
Mr. President, you are in the unique position to strike
Frank Weise
Henry Willner
a great blow for human freedom. Please do not fail us.
Respectfully,
Alex Schlesinger
Rabbi David S. Halpern
President, Zionist
Cultural Society
AS:DH:mp
700' N3 7870' ПЗЗ
41
May 11, 1965
President Lyndon B. Johnson
White House, Washington
He who are assembled here in Washington the 13th day of May, 1965, to present
you with a sacred MEZUZAH saved from the Nazis during years of persecution, believe
it is our duty to spenk out on the fate of our brothers in the Soviet Union.
Our Synagogue, the Flatbush Park Jewish Center, in conjunction with its affilate,
the Zionist Cultural Society of Mill Basin, held the first MASS RALLY to draw world
attention to the plight of our Jewish brethren. This MASS PROTEST RALLY held in our
Synagogue has since been repeated throughout the world.
In the name of humanity we denand of the Soviet government that it redress
these wrongs and restore the rights of Jews and the Jewish community and to grant
equality with other religious and nationality groups as required by Soviet consti-
tution and law.
We appeal to the President of the United States Government and to the Congress
of the United States to make the following demands upon the Government of the
Soviet Union.
1) Reaffirm its constitutional provisions that prohibits anti-Semition;
2) Eliminate discrimination against Jews in all areas of Soviet public life;
3) Outlaw the use of anti-Sonitic propaganda;
4) Permit the full use of synagogues and private prayer meetings and the
observance of sacred rites such as religious burial and circumsion;
5) Make possible the production and distribution of Bibles, prayer books and
the full use of religious necessities such as matzohs and kosher food;
6) Permit Jews to make religious pilgrimages to the holy places in Israel;
7) Enable rabbinical students to study at seninaries and provide schools and
other facilities for the study of Yiddush and Hebrew as well as Jewish
history, literature and culture;
8) Perrit writers, artists and other intelloctuals to create for the encourage-
ment of Jewish culture and artistic life such institutions as Yiddush news-
papers, publishing houses and theatres;
9) Halt the discriminatory application of maxinum penalties, including the
death sentence, against Jows for alleged economic crimès;
10) Make it possible for Soviet Jews, who are members of families, separated as
a result of the Nazi murders, to be rounited with their relatives abroad.
In conclusion we respectfully request that the Trade Negotiations between the
United States and the Soviet Union, now under study, should be conditional upon the
Soviet Union agreeing to live up to these basic human and religious rights.
FLATBUSH PARK JEWISH CENTER
Rabbi David S. Halpern
American League for
Russian Jews
President Solorion Wechsler
Morris Brafman, Chairman
ZIONIST CULTURAL SOCIETY
OF MILL BASIN
Student Struggle for Soviet Jewry
Alexander Schlesinger
Jacob Birnbaun
Member of Presidium
THE WHITE HOT SE
WASHENGION
June 11, 1965
Dear Mr. Schlesinger:
This is to thank you and those connected with the
Flatbush Park Jewish Center for the handsome
plaque, designed with the Mezuzah, that Dr.
Goldman accepted on my behalf. I am grateful
for the kind thought that prompted this symbolic
gift and accompanying statement, and hope you
will convey my warm appreciation to all who
participated in this presentation.
With' cordial good wishes,
Sincerely,
Mr. Alexander Schlesinger
2054 East 63rd Street
Brooklyn 34, New York
This run of the
is
only
weekly
B'nai Brith Messenger
67th
to
the Pacific Coast
FOUNDED
Year
is in a
by it.velf.
TITLE REGISTERED IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT OFFICE
"THE MIRROR OF SOUTHLAND JEWISH ACTIVITY SINCE LOCAL JEWRY BEGAN"
Year, No. 45
(32 SOUTH HOPE STREET, LOS ANGELES 17, CALIFORNIA, Friday. Nov. 1, 1963 - MAdison 7-2203
$5.00 per year, Single
Bitter Memories Spur Activity-
Tiue
Camp Survivor Plans Rally For Russian Jews
By DAVID HOROWITZ
religious freedom and the perse-
Baui Brith Messenger
The amazing thing evolving bilt.
cution of Jews behind the Iron
Exclusive WUP Report
of the interview with the middle
Curtain.
NEW YORK (WUP)-Alexander
aged Alexander Schlesinger at his
Schlesinger, a survivor of the Hit-
The anti-USSR rally will take
successful Brooklyn meat estab
ler death camps of Auschwitz and
place on Sunday afternoon, Nov. 3.
lishment was the fact that all
Birkenau and who had played an
at the Flatbush Jewish Center,
through the dark days of Ausch-
Brooklyn. The Zionist Cultural So-
inportant role in an "underground
witz and Birkenau, when life was
ciety of Mill Basin. a movement
railroad" which led to the redemp-
hanging in the balance, he never
created at the initiative of Mr.
tion of many Jews from the Nazi
once lost his faith in God and in
murderers, has stirred New Yor-
Schlesinger. is sponsoring the
the rebirth of Israel. He had been
kers into doing something about
event which will be addressed by
an ardent Zionist all through his
prominent Rabbis, Zionist leaders
the Jews in the Soviet Union.
youth in Rumania.
and Government officials.
WORKING FEVERISHLY days
INTRIGUED BY Schlesinger's
"FOR MANY years since my
and nights for several months, con-
deep concern for his Soviet breth-
demption," he told the writer,
tacting Jewish leaders all through
1en and his dynamic initiative to
have been doing a great deal of
Greater New York, survivor Schle-
organise the mass rally. this writer
succeeded in organizing a
soul-searching and planning as is
decided to interview the escapeojhow
mass rally to protest the dental of
best in go about helping the
of Hitler's de
S'NAI-B'RITH MESSENGER - Friday, November 1, 1963
Camp Survivor Plans Rally For Russian Jews
(Continued from Page 1)
United States. It contained several
stressed, "that the Russian Govern-
unfortunate Jews enslaved behind
recommendations proposing the oT-
ment is sensitive to American pub-
the Iron Curtain."
ganization of a public campaign on
lic opinion and 1 feel confident
His sparkling eyes betraying the
behalf of the Soviet Jews. More
that the mass protest rally to be
Gragedy he himself had lived
than four years have passed since
held by us here on Nov. 3 will
brough under Hitler, Schlesinger
this document was sent 'out,'
signal the beginning of many such
ent on to say that he had be-
Schlesinger added, "and the plight
rallies throughout the country
Pome especially concerned with the
of the Soviet Jews has worsened.
Only by mobilizing American pub
Dlight of the Russian Jews when
It is now evident that the Jewish
lic opinion," he concluded, "can
some time ago he had read a con-
leaders in the United States have
hope to save Russian Jewry from
fidential document on Soviet Jews
failed in their responsibility to our
cultural and religious genecide."
written by the militant Zionist
brethren in Russia."
Serving on the Presidium of the
leader Beinish Epstein, a member
FULLY SENSING the peril fac-
Zionist Cultural Society of Mill
of the Zionist Actions Committee.
ing the near 3,000.000 Jews in
Basin with Mr. Schlesinger are
THIS DOCUMENT." Schle-
Russia, Schlesinger said that "the
Rabbi David Spiegel, attorney
sipger said, "was sent to the
time for waiting and hoping is
George S. Meissner, and Jacob
Zionist leaders throughout the
over. Experient shown," he
Rozenbe
5
MARYLAND PUBLIC EMPLOYEES, COUNCIL 67
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES AFL-CIO
901 Russell Street
Baltimore, Maryland 21230
301/837-7278
Outside Metro Area
1-800/962-2700
Washington Area: 621-4025
Melvin O. Amos
October 21, 1985
President
Annie Hedgepeth
Vice-President
Darlene Strock
Secretary
Samuel Werner
President Ronald Reagan
Treasurer
The White House
EXECUTIVE BOARD
Washington, D.C. 20500
Charles W. Selander, Jr.
Leon Shorter
Dear President Reagan:
Nancy W. Speckman
Helen Bell Williams
Clorine Wills
As the world looks forward in hope to the U.S. -Soviet
Ernest B.Crofoot
Summit meeting in Geneva, we who have vehemently
Director
Raymond H. Clarke
called for the alleviation of the plight of Soviet Jews
Assistant Director
are encouraged by your commitment to raise this issue
in November when you meet with General Secretary Mikhail
Gorbachev.
As you know, since Gorbachev's election to power, the
condition of Soviet Jewry has continued to deteriorate.
Emigration has virtually ended. Harassment, imprisonment
and arrests of Jews seeking to emigrate or study their
language and heritage have become increasingly frequent.
Malicious acts of anti-Semitism are no longer isolated
incidents but appear to be sanctioned by the government.
The Summit meeting is clearly an opportunity which must
not be lost. Thousands of Jewish families in the Soviet
Union are dependent upon our nation's dedication to demo-
cratic ideals. We hope, Mr. President, that you will
do your utmost to seek an end to these people's undeserved
suffering and urge Mr. Gorbachev to abide by the interna-
tional agreements which bear his country's signature.
Sincerely,
in
Ernest B. Crofoot
Executive Director
Maryland Council 67
AFSCME, AFL-CIO
EBC:dc
AMERICAN FEDERATION
AFSCME®
MUNICIPAL
EMPLOYEES
in the public service
C-390
LAW OFFICES OF
ALSCHULER, GROSSMAN & PINES
OF COUNSEL
LEON ALSCHOLER
MARSHALL 9. GROSSMAN'
A PARTNERSHIP INCLUDING PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS
BENJAMIN SCHWARTZ
BURT PINES'
RICHARD MILLEN
MELVIN B. FLIEGEL
TWELFTH FLOOR, 1880 CENTURY PARK EAST
MAURICE MAC GOODSTEIN
BRUCE WARNER
RVING KELLOGG
MARCO F. WEISS'
LOS ANGELES. CALIFORNIA 90067-1694
HENRY S. ZANGWILL
FRANK KAPLAN
TELEPHONE (213) 277-1226
CABLE SAGELAW
MICHAEL J. BRILL
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TELEX: 910-490-2114
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TELECOPIER:
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(213) 552-6077
WILLIAM S. SMALL
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LINDA GACH RAY
October 18, 1985
SANDRA J. CHAN
LAWRENCE W. BERGER
OUR FILE NO
LINDA SUTTON
JEFFREY G. KICHAVEN
MICHAEL A. SHERMAN
SUSAN BRAUN RICE
MICHAEL L. CYPERS
JEFFREY A. MALDONADO
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MATTHEW D. NORMAN
JANET F. BEER
JOHN A. SCHWIMMER
SANDRA SLON
DEBRA A. STEGURA
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
President Ronald Reagan
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500
Dear President Reagan:
At your meeting with General Secretary Mikhail
Gorbachev in Geneva on November 19 and 20, you will have
a number of extremely important and vital issues on your
agenda. I trust that among these will be the matter of
respect for human rights within the Soviet Union and
particularly the issue of Soviet Jewry. I know that this
issue of human rights has been a concern of yours for many
years as well as the concern of thousands of Americans
who enjoy those rights in this country. I urge you in
your talks with Mr. Gorbachev to work toward a mutually
acceptable solution to this problem.
Respectfully yours,
LEON S. ALSCHULER
LSA/sb
46
GORDON S. BODEK
October 17, 1985
President Ronald Reagan
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Mr. President:
Ten years ago the Soviets signed the Helsinki Accords which
established certain human rights standards. Today we are
witnessing a campaign to eradicate Jewish culture and edu-
cation throughout the Soviet Union with a record number of
arrests of Hebrew teachers. Emigration is virtually closed
with only 700 leaving thus far this year and life for Soviet
Jewry activists is one of constant harrasment.
May I express my deep appreciation for your concern on the
Soviet Jewry issue and I hope you will continue to voice
your specific concern for the deteriorating conditions facing
Soviet Jews.
Peace can only be achieved when individual human rights are
respected. I trust you will keep the issue of Soviet Jewry
on the agenda in your discussions with Mr. Gorbachev and
work toward a mutually effective solution.
Sincerely,
Gordon S. Bodek
GSB:lc
148 South Bristol Avenue
Los Angeles, CA 90049
PACIFIC MUTUAL
PACIFIC MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
WILLIAM RICHARD BALKIN
LA SALLE BANK BUILDING
135 SOUTH LA SALLE STREET, SUITE 2360
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60603
TELEPHONE (312) 263-1700
CABLE: INSURIT NOW
October 18, 1985
President Ronald Reagan
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Mr. President:
I am writing you at this time because I believe you will go down in history
as one of the greatest Presidents the United States has ever had. You seem
to have the knack of getting out of very difficult situations. This makes
you a very admirable person.
Our Rabbi, William H. Lebeau, of North Suburban Synagogue Beth El has asked
every congregation member to write a letter to you SO that when you meet
with Premier Gorbachev you will please remember to talk with him about the
plight of Soviet Jewry.
I know you will handle this in your own unique way. As the leader of the
Free World you must speak out for those whose minds and memories are free
but whose families are enslaved.
The future of the Jews of the Soviet Union and of human rights is in your
hands. Please make the Soviet Union realize that they should once and for
all make a clean break and let the people go.
I wish you a very pleasant, safe and successful journey. I know you will
be able to relate to the Premier your thoughts about releasing the Jewish
people from the Soviet Union. I have all the confidence and faith that
you will do a great job.
Best wishes to you and your lovely wife, Nancy.
Sincerely,
William R. Balkin
WRB/rw
MEMBER, EXECUTIVE COUNCIL
20 YEARS WINNER, NATIONAL QUALITY AWARD
MEMBER, CHICAGO ASSOCIATION OF LIFE UNDERWRITERS
MEMBER, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF LIFE UNDERWRITERS
SENIOR CONSULTANT, PCC FINANCIAL SERVICES COMPANY
48
ID #
333637
by
WHITE HOUSE
F0006
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET
O OUTGOING
H INTERNAL
3:0
Y
I INCOMING
Received (YY/MM/DD)
Date Correspondence 85,07,22
Name of Correspondent:
Paul Trible
from ORM
MI Mail Report
User Codes: (A)
(B)
(C)
Subject: Urg you to take advantage of your upcoming summit
meeting with Mikhail Garbacheu to address the Souiets' persecut
of Jews, Christians and other religious believers,
ROUTE TO:
ACTION
DISPOSITION
Tracking
Type
Completion
Action
Date
of
Date
Office/Agency
(Staff Name)
Code
YY/MM/DD
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Code
YY/MM/DD
LAOGLE
ORIGINATOR 85,07,2% mo A830723
V99D05
Referral Note:
R Note: also 85/08/12
Referral
LAOgle
A 850815 A3
C85,08, 16.
Referral Note:
1
/
/
/ /
Referral Note:
/
/
/
/
-
Referral Note:
ACTION CODES:
DISPOSITION CODES:
A Appropriate Action
I . Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
A Answered
C Completed
C Comment/Recommendation
R - Direct Reply w/Copy
B - . Non-Special Referral
S Suspended
D Draft Response
S For Signature
F Furnish Fact Sheet
X Interim Reply
to be used as Enclosure
FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:
Type of Response = Initials of Signer
Code
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Completion Date = Date of Outgoing
Comments: Ocknowledgement sent tall Dignees
Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.
Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOB).
Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.
49
UNCLASSIFIED
(Classification)
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
TRANSMITTAL FORM
85 AGO 13 P9:01 PY s/s 8522833
Date August 14, 1985
For: Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
National Security Council
The White House
Reference:
To: President Reagan
From: Senator Trible
Date: July 19
Subject: US-Soviet Summit,
Issue of Religious Persecution in the Soviet Union
WH Referral Dated:
August 2, 1985
NSC ID# 333637
(if any)
The attached item was sent directly to the
Department of State
Action Taken:
A draft reply is attached.
A draft reply will be forwarded.
A translation is attached.
X
An information copy of a direct reply is attached.
We believe no response is necessary for the reason
cited below.
The Department of State has no objection to the
proposed travel.
Other.
Remarks:
Grarn
-pn Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary
so
AUG 12 085
Dear Senator Trible:
I am writing in response to your July 19 letter to
President Reagan requesting that he raise the plight of
religious believers in the Soviet Union during his discussions
with General Secretary Gorbachev in November.
As you know, the U.S. Government has consistently condemned
Soviet restrictions on the free practice of religion. Such
measures are contrary to the human rights provisions of the
Helsinki Final Act, and we have strongly called for Soviet
compliance with their own undertakings in that agreement. In
virtually every high-level bilateral exchange we have had with
the Soviets, we have made it unequivocally clear that their
persecution of Jews, Christians and other religious believers
is a serious obstacle to the improved relations with the Soviet
Union that the United States seeks. Secretary Shultz
underlined our deep concern over Soviet persecution of
religious believers in his recent speech on the occasion of the
10th Anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act.
I can assure you that in his meeting with General Secretary
Gorbachev, President Reagan intends to discuss the full range
of issues impacting on U.S.-Soviet relations, including human
rights. We welcome hearing your views and those of 19 of your
Senate colleagues. We encourage you to supplement our efforts
by bringing your own concerns over continuing Soviet
persecution of religious believers directly to the attention of
the Soviet authorities.
If we can be of assistance to you in this or any other
matter, please do not hesitate to contact us.
With best wishes,
Sincerely,
of
James M. Montgomery
Acting Assistant Secretary
Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs
The Honorable
Paul S. Trible, Jr.,
United States Senate.
8522833 51
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
REFERRAL
AUGUST 2, 1985
TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ATTN: WILL BALL
ACTION REQUESTED:
DIRECT REPLY, FURNISH INFO COPY
DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:
ID:
333637
MEDIA: LETTER, DATED JULY 19, 1985
TO:
PRESIDENT REAGAN
FROM:
THE HONORABLE PAUL TRIBLE
UNITED STATES SENATE
WASHINGTON DC 20510
SUBJECT: URGE YOU TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF YOUR UPCOMING
SUMMIT MEETING WITH MIKHAIL GORBACHEV TO
ADDRESS THE SOVIETS' PERSECUTION OF JEWS,
CHRISTIANS AND OTHER RELIGIOUS BELIEVERS.
PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL - IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.
RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE
(OR DRAFT) TO:
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE
SALLY KELLEY
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE
52
July 29, 1985
Dear Senator Trible:
Thank you for your July 19 letter to the President,
cosigned by 19 of your colleagues, urging that the issue
of religious freedom be placed on the agenda during talks
between President Reagan and Soviet leader Gorbachev.
As you know, the President shares your deep concern for
the human rights of individuals throughout the world.
On numerous occasions the United States Government has
encouraged Soviet authorities to adopt a more favorable
attitude in this respect. Unfortunately, the Soviets
have not been responsive to our efforts. However, let
me assure you that this issue continues to receive our
attention, and I have conveyed your recommendation to
the President's foreign policy advisers for further
review.
With best wishes,
Sincerely,
M. B. Oglesby, Jr.
Assistant to the President
The Honorable Paul S. Trible, Jr.
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
CC: w/copy of inc to Will Ball, Cong Affrs, State - for
DIRECT response
MBO:KRJ:jfc (7MBOG)
Lette hallpingues
53
United States Senate
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510
July 19, 1985
President Ronald Reagan
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Mr. President:
We urge you to take advantage of your upcoming summit
meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev to address the Soviets'
persecution of Jews, Christians, and other religious believers.
As you know, the Soviet Union's attempts to suppress
religious activities have been unrelenting. Despite its
participation in the Helsinki Accords and other international
human rights agreements, the U.S.S.R. steadfastly opposes most
expressions of religious faith.
Repression by Soviet authorities not only limits the
opportunity for worship, but also severely restricts access to
religious instruction and religious texts. Moreover, the Soviets
continue to imprison believers solely for practicing their
faith.
The upcoming Soviet-American summit offers an
opportunity to express America's outrage over the anti-religious
policies of the U.S.S.R. In this, his first meeting with an
American President, Mr. Gorbachev must be made aware that our
commitment to religious freedom for people everywhere remains
strong and steadfast.
The ongoing plight of Andrei Sakharov and Anatoly
Shcharansky bears witness to the Soviets' hostility toward
religion. So, too, does the persecution of Uli Edelshtein, Yosef
Bernstein, Balys Gajauskas, Anna Chertkova, and countless
others.
The release of these and other prisoners of conscience
would be a welcome step toward improving Soviet-American
relations. We urge you, during your meetings with Mr. Gorbachev,
to press vigorously for these and other prisoners' freedom, and
to argue for an end to Soviet persecution of all religious
believers.
We pledge you our support in this important task.
blick Lugar
Balleible
President Reagan
54
July 19, 1985
Page 2
Puren Barcheiste Jarimiah Denton
Warren B. andman
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Strom Thurmond That Cahran
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Paul Subana
Park Dane Deventing
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What Aone
55
ID# 340895
Ntsk
THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET
F0006-09
INCOMING
DATE RECEIVED: OCTOBER 09, 1985
10 OCT 1985
NAME OF COPPESPONDENT: MOST REVEREND JOSEPH CARD. BERNARDIN
SUBJECT: URGES ADDRESSING THE SOVIET PERSECUTION OF
à
CHRISTIANS, JEWS AND OTHERS DURING UPCOMING
U.S. -SOVIET SUMMIT MEETING
ACTION
DISPOSITION
ROUTE TO:
ACT
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YI
DOUG HOLLADAY
ORG 85/10/09
C 85/10/15
/Human Rights REFERRAL REFERRAL 1 NOTE: NOTE: State Dept. YI A
18
55/10/
a 85/10/29
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se
UNCLASSIMED
(Classification)
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
TRANSMITTAL FORM
S/S 8530859
Date October 29, 1985
For: Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
National Security Council
The White House
Reference:
To: President Reagan
From: Most Reverend Joseph Cardinal Bernardin
Date: 09/30/85
Subject: Urges addressing the Soviet persecution
of Christians, Jews and others during upcoming US-Soviet Summit meetir
WH Referral Dated: October 18, 1985 NSC ID#
340895
(if any)
The attached item was sent directly to the
Department of State.
Action Taken:
A draft reply is attached.
A draft reply will be forwarded.
A translation is attached.
X An information copy of a direct reply is attached.
We believe no response is necessary for the reason
cited below.
The Department of State has no objection to the
proposed travel.
Other.
Remarks:
Thank Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary
UNCLASSIFIED
(Classification)
Washington, D.C. 20520
Dear Cardinal Bernardin:
I have been asked to respond to your September 30 letter to
President Reagan urging him to raise human rights during his
meeting with Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva this
November.
The issue of religious freedom in the USSR, and the rights
and welfare of those who have been imprisoned for their
religious activities, remain matters of fundamental concern to
the United States Government.
President Reagan has announced his intention to raise all
subjects affecting U.S.-Soviet relations in his meeting with
General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva, including human rights.
As we continue our preparations for the November meeting, we
appreciate hearing your views.
If we can be of assistance to you in this or any other
matter, please do not hesitate to contact us.
With best wishes,
Sincerely,
Mark R. Parris
Director
Office of Soviet Union Affairs
His Eminence
Joseph Cardinal Bernardin,
Archibishop of Chicago,
Archdiocese of Chicago,
Post Office Box 1979,
Chicago, Illinois.
8530859 $
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
REFERRAL
OCTOBER 18, 1985
TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ATTN: HUMAN RIGHTS
ACTION REQUESTED:
APPROPRIATE ACTION
DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:
ID:
340895
MEDIA: LETTER, DATED SEPTEMBER 30, 1985
TO:
PRESIDENT REAGAN
FROM:
MOST REVEREND JOSEPH CARD. BERNARDIN
ARCHBISHOP OF CHICAGO
ARCHDIOCESE OF CHICAGO
POST OFFICE BOX 1979
CHICAGO IL 60690
SUBJECT: URGES ADDRESSING THE SOVIET PERSECUTION OF
CHRISTIANS, JEWS AND OTHERS DURING UPCOMING
U.S. SOVIET SUMMIT MEETING
PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.
RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE
(OR DRAFT) TO:
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE
SALLY KELLEY
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE
ARCHDIOCESE OF CHICAGO
POST OFFICE BOX 1979
8530879
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60690
8530859
Office of the Archbishop
September 30, 1985
Drugs
Dear Mr. President:
I urge you to use the opportunity of your upcoming summit
meeting with Premier Gorbachev to address the Soviet persecution
of Christians, Jews, prisoners of conscience and other religious
believers.
Repression by Soviet authorities not only limits the
opportunity for worship, but also severely restricts access to
religious instructions and religious texts. The Soviets imprison
believers solely for practicing their faith.
Many people in the Archdiocese of Chicago are of eastern
European descent. They have relatives and friends in their home-
lands who are under Soviet oppression. They continue to work and
pray for the restoration of human rights in the Soviet Union and
in their native lands.
The largest group of Lithuanians outside of Lithuania
live in our Archdiocese. They are particularly concerned about
religious oppression in Lithuania and the persecution of prisoners
of conscience and especially Mr. Balys Gajauskas. The health of
Mr. Gajauskas is deteriorating severely. There is great urgency
that every effort be made for his freedom.
I urge you to raise his cause and that of other prisoners
of conscience in your meeting with Mr. Gorbachev. I pray for you
and for God's blessing on your efforts in behalf of human and
religious rights.
With cordial good wishes, I remain
Sincerely yours,
Joseph Card. Bernardin
Archbishop of Chicago
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
is
Mush Oberman
POINT NILES ILLINOIS 60648
3605 Woodhead Drive, Northbrook, I1. 60062
Oct. 23, 1985
President Ronald Reagan
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500
Dear Mr. President:
When you meet Premier Gorbachev please remember the
plight of Soviet Jewry.
As the leader of the Free World you must speak out
for those whose minds and memories are free but whose
families are enslaved.
The future of the Jews of the Soviet Union and of
human rights is in your hands.
Sincerely
M. D. Oberman
$
THE WHITE HOT SE
WASHINGION
June 11, 1965
Dear Mr. Schlesinger:
This is to thank you and those connected with the
Flatbush Park Jewish Center for the handsome
plaque, designed with the Mezuzah, that Dr.
Goldman accepted on my behalf. I am grateful
for the kind thought that prompted this symbolic
gift and accompanying statement, and hope you
will convey my warm appreciation to all who
participated in this presentation.
With cordial good wishes,
Sincerely,
Mr. Alexander Schlesinger
2054 East 63rd Street
Brooklyn 34, New York
GORDON S. BODEK
October 17, 1985
President Ronald Reagan
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Mr. President:
Ten years ago the Soviets signed the Helsinki Accords which
established certain human rights standards. Today we are
witnessing a campaign to eradicate Jewish culture and edu-
cation throughout the Soviet Union with a record number of
arrests of Hebrew teachers. Emigration is virtually closed
with only 700 leaving thus far this year and life for Soviet
Jewry activists is one of constant harrasment.
May I express my deep appreciation for your concern on the
Soviet Jewry issue and I hope you will continue to voice
your specific concern for the deteriorating conditions facing
Soviet Jews.
Peace can only be achieved when individual human rights are
respected. I trust you will keep the issue of Soviet Jewry
on the agenda in your discussions with Mr. Gorbachev and
work toward a mutually effective solution.
Sincerely,
Gordon S. Bodek
GSB:1c
148 South Bristol Avenue
Los Angeles, CA 90049
9169
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
November 26, 1985
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN
FROM:
JACK F. MATLOCK
SUBJECT:
Draft Response to Human Rights Appeals
Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to Anne Higgins
informing her that the NSC has reviewed her draft response to
letters concerning human rights abuses in the Soviet Union (Tab
A). As indicated on the draft we have suggested deleting part of
paragraph three to avoid the appearance of lecturing the reader.
Steve Ses S tanovich, Judy 94 Mandel, Jock n.a. Covey, and WaltRaymond
concur.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memorandum at Tab I
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments:
Tab I
Memorandum to Anne Higgins
Tab A
Draft response to human rights appeals
Tab B
Letters concerning human rights abuses in the
Soviet Union.
9100
6t
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
Mattork
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
November 27, 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR ANNE HIGGINS
FROM:
WILLIAM F. MARTIN WR WRPfr
SUBJECT:
Russian Word for Peace
In response to a letter to the President from a private citizen
you asked whether it is true that the Russian words for peace and
world are identical - they are. It is not, however, correct to
say, as does the author of the letter, that when Russians say
they want peace they really mean they want the world. It is
perfectly clear to a Russian speaker from context and usage when
the word means peace and when it means world.
On a smaller scale there are examples of this phenomenon - one
word with two or more meanings - in English. It is clear only
from context, for example, when one person asks another for a
date whether he has in mind a fruit or a social engagement.
Among native speakers, however, confusion over the difference is
rare.
Attachments:
Tab A
Memo from Anne Higgins
Tab B
Letter from David Korn to the President
5n
9100
THE WHITE HOUSE
washington 11-4-85 NSC/S
Date:
To:
anyone know
Russian up
there - is this
true ? 7
a
ANNE HIGGINS
Special Assistant to the
President and Director
of Correspondence
Room 94, x7610
66
2932 DAVENPORT STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20008
9100
October 27, 1985
The President,
The White House
Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. President,
It was very good seeing you last week in the White House.
When in 1975 we met at Ted Cummings' home in Beverly Hills we
have all predicted that you will make a great President.
Our predictions came true and indeed you are not only a great
man but one of the few great Presidents our country had. You have
the courage, the dignity, sincerity, leadership and the humility
of a great man.
When I commented about the summit and the usage of Russian
language you suggested that I write you, so here it is.
In Russian language the words for peace and the world are
spelled and pronounced indentically, namely MIR and to pronounce
it in English would be MEER.
So in effect when the Soviets use the word MEER they mean
that they want the WORLD and not Peace. For example, the word
VLADIMIR (VLADEEMEER) means the ruler of the world and not the
ruler of the peace and that goes back to 11th century AD.
The Soviets always dominated and oppressed their people
and continue trying to take over the world.
When I mentioned this to you, you wanted it in writing, so
here it is.
Good luck in Geneva, and please remember, the Soviets need
us more than we need them.
With best wishes to you and Mrs. Reagan,
Sundr David Korn
61
9100
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
November 25, 1985
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN
FROM:
JACK F. MATLOCK
Russian Word for from Peace
SUBJECT:
Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to Anne Higgins
responding to her question over whether the Russian words for
peace and world are identical. In effect, they are, but it is
nonetheles clear to a Russian speaker from context and usage
which is the intended meaning.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memorandum to Anne Higgins at Tab I.
Approve hrit
Disapprove
Attachments:
Tab I
Memorandum to Anne Higgins
Tab A
Memorandum from Anne Higgins to Carol Cleveland
Tab B
Letter to the President from David Korn