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Matlock Chron December 1985 (5)
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Matlock Chron December 1985 (5)
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Records of the National Security Council, Directorate of European and Soviet Affairs (Reagan Administration)
Jack F. Matlock, Jr.'s Chronological Files
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: Matlock Chron December 1985 (5)
Box: 14
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matlock
12
10021
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
FILE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
December 24, 1985
MEMORANDUM TO SALLY KELLEY
MARTIN Bergren
FROM:
SUBJECT:
WILLIAM F. Jr
Letter to Albert Shanker re Case of Balys
Gajauskas
We have reviewed and concur in the proposed draft letter as
amended (Tab A) prepared by the Department of State to Mr. Albert
Shanker, President, American Federation of Teachers, Washington,
D.C., concerning the case of Balys Gajauskas.
Attachments:
Tab A
Proposed Draft Letter to Mr. Shanker
Tab B
Incoming Correspondence
UNCLASSIFIED
(CLASSIFICATION)
S/S # 8535436
DATE December 13, 1985
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
TRANSMITTAL FORM
FOR: Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
National Security Council
The White House
REFERENCE:
TO:
President Reagan
FROM: Mr. Albert Shanker
DATE: November 14, 1985
SUBJECT: Reagan-Gorbachev
Meeting: Human Rights
WHITE HOUSE REFERRAL DATED: Dec. 2, 1985 NSC # 352411
THE ATTACHED ITEM WAS SENT DIRECTLY
TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ACTION TAKEN:
X A draft reply is attached
A draft reply will be forwarded
A translation is attached
An information copy of a direct reply is attached
We believe no response is necessary for the reason
cited below
Other
REMARKS:
Joann G. alba
Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary
UNCLASSIFIED
ICLASSIFICATION)
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SUGGESTED REPLY
Dear Mr. Shanker:
I am replying to your November 14 letter to President
Reagan requesting that he raise the case of Balys Gajauskas
during his discussions with Soviet General Secretary
Gorbachev. The President appreciates your kind words of
support.
Mr. Gajauskas, a Lithuanian Catholic and Helsinki Monitor,
was first arrested in 1948 for anti-Soviet partisan activity.
He was sentenced to 25 years in prison and has spent most of
the intervening years in prison or labor camps for his nation-
alist and human rights activities. On April 14, 1978, he was
sentenced to ten years hard labor and five years internal exile
for collecting and preserving historical documents considered
by Soviet authorities to be anti-Soviet in nature.
The U.S. Government takes every opportunity to call for an
end to Soviet persecution of religious believers and to bring
these human rights abuses to international attention. Unfortu-
nately, the Soviet Government has been unresponsive to our
Mr. Albert Shanker,
President,
American Federation of Teachers,
555 New Jersey Avenue, N.W.,
Washington, D.C.
2
efforts and to those of concerned Western governments and inde-
pendent human rights organizations. The Soviets maintain the
incarceration of "criminals" on essentially religious grounds
is an internal policy matter. Although we condemn such arbi-
trary and inhumane behavior, we lack the ability to alleviate
the prisoners' circumstances or secure their release.
We will continue to exercise what influence we have. In
raising the subject of human rights at the Geneva meeting,
President Reagan stressed to Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev
that respect for the individual and the rule of law is as fun-
damental to peace as arms control. In this regard, the Presi-
dent pressed for greater Soviet adherence to international
agreements such as the Helsinki Accord. The Soviets agreed in
the Joint Statement to the importance of resolving humanitarian
cases in a cooperative spirit.
Sincerely,
16
8535436
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
REFERRAL
DECEMBER 2, 1985
TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ACTION REQUESTED:
DRAFT REPLY FOR SIGNATURE OF:
WHITE HOUSE STAFF MEMBER
DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:
ID:
352411
MEDIA: LETTER, DATED NOVEMBER 14, 1985
TO:
PRESIDENT REAGAN
FROM:
MR. ALBERT SHANKER
PRESIDENT
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS
AFL CIO
555 NEW JERSEY AVENUE, NW
WASHINGTON DC 20001
SUBJECT: URGES THE PRESIDENT TO RAISE THE CASE OF
MR. BALYS GAJAUSKAS DURING THE SUMMIT MEETING
WITH MR. GORBACHEV
PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.
RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE
(OR DRAFT) TO:
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE
SALLY KELLEY
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE
ID# 352411
THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET
8535436
INCOMING
DATE RECEIVED: NOVEMBER 18, 1985
NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: MR. ALBERT SHANKER
SUBJECT: URGES THE PRESIDENT TO RAISE THE CASE OF
MP. BALYS GAJAUSKAS DURING THE SUMMIT MEETING
WITH MR. GORBACHEV
ACTION
DISPOSITION
ROUTE TO:
ACT DATE TYPE C COMPLETED
OFFICF/AGENCY
(STAFF NAME)
CODE YY/MM/DD RESP D YY/MM/DD
LINDA CHAVEZ
ORG 85/11/18
C85111119
REFERRAL NOTE:
LINAS KOJELIS, OPL
A 85/11/20
/ /
REFERRAL NOTE:
99 DOS
D 85/18/08
/ /
REFERRAL NOTE:
CJ
/ /
/ /
REFERRAL NOTE:
/ /
/ /
REFERRAL NOTE:
COMMENTS:
ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS:
MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES:
PL MAIL
USER CODES: (A)
(B)
(C)
*ACTION CODES:
*DISPOSITION
*OUTGOING
*
*
*
*CORRESPONDENCE:
*
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION
*A-ANSWERED
*TYPE RESP=INITIALS
*
*C-COMMENT/RECOM
*B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL
*
OF SIGNEP
*
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE
*C-COMPLETED
*
CODE = A
*
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET
*S-SUSPENDED
*COMPLETED = DATE OF
*
*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC*
*
OUTGOING
*
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *
*
*
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE
*
*
*
*X-INTERIM REPLY
*
*
*
REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75,OEOB) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.
# 35 2411
18
AFT
AMERICAN
ALBERT SHANKER
President
FEDERATION OF
TEACHERS CIO AFL
8535436
555 NEW JERSEY AVENUE, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20001
202/879-4400
November 14, 1985
The President
Mr. Ronald Reagan
White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Mr. President:
I would like to take this opportunity to offer my support and best
wishes for your upcoming summit in Geneva with Soviet Premier Gorbachev. By
maintaining a clear understanding of the past failures and successes of
U.S. - Soviet summits, I hope that your administration will succeed in
achieving a real, and lasting disarmament.
I would also like to express my support of your pronouncement on
the occasion of the United Nations 40th Anniversary. I, too, agree that the
opportunity to meet with the Soviet Union's leader should be used to go
beyond arms control. In addition to the Soviet instigated regional conflicts
cited in your address at the U.N., I am concerned about the hundreds of
prisoners persecuted in the Soviet Union because of their political and
religous beliefs, or ethnic origins. I believe that every opportunity that
the free worlds' leaders have to press for the release of these victims must
be exercised.
I write you today at the request of the Christian Rescue Effort
for the Emancipation of Dissidents (CREED) to draw your attention to one
such victim. I would like to suggest that in your discussion with
Mr. Gorbachev you bring up the case of Mr. Balys Gajauskas as one example
of the hundreds of prisoners of conscience persecuted by the Soviet regime.
Mr. Gajauskas is a Lithuanian who has spent the last 33 years in a Soviet
concentration camp because of his unrelenting commitment to democracy, his
faith in God, and his support for human rights. His health is reportedly
deteriorating and he is unlikely to survive the remaining eight years of his
sentence. I urge you to petition the Soviet leader for Gajauskas' uncondi-
tional release. I believe this would be a strong demonstration to the
19
- 2 -
Soviet regime of your administration's concern for all the prisoners of
conscience struggling in the Soviet Union.
Once again, -I wish you success in your efforts with Mr. Gorbachev.
I also thank you in advance for considering Mr. Gajauskas continued persecution.
Sincerely,
albert should
ALBERT SHANKER
President
DND/mck
opeiu2
aflcio
20
10021
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
December 19, 1985
ACTION
SIGNED
MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN
FROM:
JACK F. MATLOCK
SUBJECT:
Letter to Albert Shanker re Case of Balys Gajauskas
I have reviewed and concur in the proposed draft response as
amended (Tab A) prepared by the Department of State to Mr. Albert
Shanker, President, American Federation of Teachers, Washington,
D.C., concerning the case of Balys Gajauskas. Attached at Tab I
is a memorandum to Sally Kelley for signature.
Sestatovich, a Mandel and Raymond concur.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the Memorandum to Sally Kelley.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments:
Tab I
Memorandum to Sally Kelley
Tab A
Draft Response to Mr. Shanker
Tab B
Incoming Correspondence
10141
21
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON DI 20506
SECRET/SENSITIVE
December 24, 1985
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK
SUBJECT:
Records of Geneva Summit Meetings
The edited records of the meetings in Geneva between the
President and Gorbachev and between the First Lady and Mrs.
Gorbacheva are at Tabs A through K.
I have supplied a Memorandum to the President (Tab I), in case
you wish to forward these memoranda for his review, with a
courtesy copy for the Vice President (Tab II). There are also
memoranda to Don Regan and George Shultz at Tabs III and IV.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you sign the Memoranda at Tabs I, II and III.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments:
Tab I
Memo to the President
Tab A
Memcon - First Private Mtg, Nov 19
Tab B
Memcon - First Plenary Mtg, Nov 19
Tab C
Memcon - Second Plenary Mtg, Nov 19
Tab D
Memcon - Second Private Mtg, Nov 19
Tab E
Memcon - Mrs. Reagan's Tea w/Mrs. Gorbachev
Tab F
Memcon - Dinner by the Gorbachev's, Nov 19
Tab G
Memcon - Third Private Mtg, Nov 20
Tab H
Memcon - Third Plenary Mtg, Nov 20
Tab I
Memcon - Fourth Plenary Mtg, Nov 20
Tab J
Memcon - Mrs. Gorbachev's Tea w/Mrs. Reagan
Tab K
Memcon - Dinner hosted by Reagans, Nov 20
Tab II
Memo to Vice President
Tabs A - K
Same as above
Tab III Memo to Mr. Regan
Tabs A - K
Same as above
Tab IV Memo to Secretary Shultz
Tabs A - K
Same as above
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET/SENSITIVE
By
White CA House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
NARA, Date 7/2/08
Declassify: OADR
10141
22
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET/ SENSITIVE
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
JOHN M. POINDEXTER
SUBJECT:
Geneva Summit Records
You may wish to review the records of your meetings with General
Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva. They are attached in
chronological order. I have also included the summary records of
the First Lady's teas with Mrs. Gorbachev (Tabs E and K).
Attachments:
Tab A
Memcon - First Private Mtg, Nov 19
Tab B
Memcon - First Plenary Mtg, Nov 19
Tab C
Memcon - Second Plenary Mtg, Nov 19
Tab D
Memcon - Second Private Mtg, Nov 19
Tab E
Memcon - Mrs. Reagan's Tea w/Mrs. Gorbachev
Tab F
Memcon - Dinner by the Gorbachev's, Nov 19
Tab G
Memcon - Third Private Mtg, Nov 20
Tab H
Memcon - Third Plenary Mtg, Nov 20
Tab I
Memcon - Fourth Plenary Mtg, Nov 20
Tab J
Memcon - Mrs. Gorbachev's Tea w/Mrs. Reagan
Tab K
Memcon - Dinner by Reagan's, Nov 20
Prepared by:
Jack Matlock
CC: Vice President
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Declassify on: OADR
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28
By
CAS
NARA, Date 7/2/02
10141
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON D.C 20506
SECRET/SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM FOR DONALD T. REGAN
FROM:
JOHN POINDEXTER
SUBJECT:
Geneva Summit Records
You may wish to review the records of the President's meetings
with General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva. They are attached in
chronological order. I have also included the summary records of
the First Lady's teas with Mrs. Gorbachev (Tabs E and K).
Attachments:
Tab A
Memcon - First Private Mtg, Nov 19
Tab B
Memcon - First Plenary Mtg, Nov 19
Tab C
Memcon - Second Plenary Mtg, Nov 19
Tab D
Memcon - Second Private Mtg, Nov 19
Tab E
Memcon - Mrs. Reagan's Tea w/Mrs. Gorbachev
Tab F
Memcon - Dinner by the Gorbachev's, Nov 19
Tab G
Memcon - Third Private Mtg, Nov 20
Tab H
Memcon - Third Plenary Mtg, Nov 20
Tab I
Memcon - Fourth Plenary Mtg, Nov 20
Tab J
Memcon - Mrs. Gorbachev's Tea w/Mrs. Reagan
Tab K
Memcon - Dinner by Reagan's, Nov 20
Prepared by:
Jack Matlock
SECRET/SENSITIVE
DECLASSIFY on: OADR
DECLASSIFIED
By Crs NARA, Date 7/2/02
White House Guidelines, August 1997
10141
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTOI.
SECRET SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
The Secretary of State
SUBJECT:
Geneva Summit Records
You may wish to review the records of the President's meetings
with General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva. They are attached in
chronological order. I have also included the summary records of
the First Lady's teas with Mrs. Gorbachev (Tabs E and K).
FOR THE PRESIDENT:
Attachments:
Tab A
Memcon - First Private Mtg, Nov 19
Tab B
Memcon - First Plenary Mtg, Nov 19
Tab C
Memcon - Second Plenary Mtg, Nov 19
Tab D
Memcon - Second Private Mtg, Nov 19
Tab E
Memcon - Mrs. Reagan's Tea w/Mrs. Gorbachev
Tab F
Memcon - Dinner by the Gorbachev's, Nov 19
Tab G
Memcon - Third Private Mtg, Nov 20
Tab H
Memcon - Third Plenary Mtg, Nov 20
Tab I
Memcon - Fourth Plenary Mtg, Nov 20
Tab J
Memcon - Mrs. Gorbachev's Tea w/Mrs. Reagan
Tab K
Memcon - Dinner by Reagan's, Nov 20
Prepared by:
Jack Matlock
SECRET/SENSITIVE
DECLASSIFY on: OADR
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By us
NARA, Date 7/2/02
THE WHITE HOUSE
SECRET SENSITIVE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
REAGAN-GORBACHEV MEETINGS IN GENEVA
November, 1985
First Private Meeting
DATE:
November 19, 1985
TIME:
10:20 - 11:20 A.M.
PLACE:
Maison Fleur d'Eau,
Geneva, Switzerland
PARTICIPANTS:
United States
President Ronald Reagan
Dimitri Zarechnak, Interpreter
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary, Central Committee,
Communist Party of the Soviet Union
Yuri D. Uspensky, Interpreter
*******
After the official photographers and the rest of the staff
left the room, President Reagan began the conversation by
telling the General Secretary that the two of them could really
talk now. The President indicated that he approached this
meeting with a very deep feeling and hoped that both of them
could realize its importance and the unique situation that they
were in.
The President indicated that both he and the General
Secretary had come from similar beginnings which were quite
different from their current positions. He, Reagan, was born
and began his life in a small farming community, and now the two
of them were here with the fate of the world in their hands, so
to speak. The U.S. and the Soviet Union were the two greatest
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Declassify: OADR
Authority CISF96-087*21 DECLASSIFIED DLB 5/15/00
7/2/02
SECRET SENSITIVE
- 2 -
countries on Earth, the superpowers. They were the only ones
who could start World War III, but also the only two countries
that could bring peace to the world.
The President said that the two of them would talk about
many things, including arms, in the main meeting, but he
wondered if the primary aim between them should not be to
eliminate the suspicions which each side had of the other. The
resolution of other questions would follow naturally after this.
To talk about arms while such suspicions exist is an empty
exercise as both sides are defensive at the various negotiations
because of these suspicions. Countries do not mistrust each
other because of arms, but rather countries build up their arms
because of the mistrust between them.
The President expressed the hope that in their meetings they
could get at the sources of the suspicions which exist. The
Soviet Union did not approve of the U.S. system of government,
and the U.S. did not approve of the Soviet system, and each
could follow its own way, but with peaceful competition.
General Secretary Gorbachev said that he would like to
return to the beginning, and thank the President for receiving
him. He agreed with the President that this meeting was im-
portant in itself and he was glad that it was taking place.
There had been no meetings between the U.S. President and the
General Secretary of the USSR for six years, and many problems
had developed in U.S.-Soviet relations and in the world in that
period. He would also speak of these issues at the larger
meeting, but would now like to avail himself of the opportunity
which such a private meeting affords. He had met with members
of the U.S. Congress and representatives of the U.S. Administra-
tion, but the Soviet side recognized the importance of a meeting
with the President, and he, Gorbachev, would like to talk
quietly, with respect for the United States and for the Presi-
dent, about many issues.
Gorbachev indicated that the Soviet side had prepared many
months for this meeting, and he had tried to get a better
understanding of the U.S. from Soviet and American sources. He
had familiarized himself with all of the President's statements,
and had paid special attention to the most recent ones. The
main conclusion he had come to was that he was convinced that he
and the President could not ignore each other. Nothing good
would happen if the two sides took a different approach. But he
was convinced that he could begin to change our relations for
the better This was his main theme, and the starting point for
the meeting. After he had come to this conclusion, he had
reviewed it a thousand times: perhaps it was too simplistic,
bearing in mind the tremendous differences between the two
SECRET/SENSITIVE
LCRPT/SENSITIVE
- 3 -
countries? This was, of course, so, but on the other hand the
two countries were SO interrelated.
Gorbachev continued that in the Soviet Union it was con-
sidered that serious measures ought to be undertaken to improve
U.S. -Soviet relations. This would demand political will at the
highest levels. A veritable avalanche of information was
descending upon Gorbachev and the President, both internally and
from all around the world. Gorbachev was convinced that there
was not only the fear of mutual destruction, although this did
exist, but a realistic evaluation showed that the U.S. and the
Soviet Union could cooperate, and they had done so in the past,
without changing their political systems, culture or ideologies.
They had cooperated in the area of economics, trade and culture
while respecting the choices made by the U.S. people, and,
obviously, the Soviet people as well.
Gorbachev said that there had sometimes been squalls in the
bilateral relationship which had been severe, perhaps extremely
so, but he could definitely state that in the USSR there was no
enmity toward the United States or its people. The Soviet Union
respected the U.S. and its people. The Soviet people and the
leadership of the Soviet Union recognized the role of the U.S.
in the world, and wished it no harm. They realized that inter-
national relations could not be built on a desire to harm
American interests.
At this point Gorbachev indicated that he would like to
pause to permit the President to speak, and then he would like
to say a few things about the Soviet side's understanding of the
present international situation and what he thought should be
changed in our policies in order to have a more constructive
relationship based on greater realism.
The President replied that there was no queston but that the
Soviet and American peoples, if they learned more about each
other, would find that they had many things in common, and that
friendship between them would grow. Unfortunately, it was not
people but governments that created arms.
The President continued that prior to this meeting there had
been a wave of good wishes from the people of the United States,
primarily expressing the desire to have peace. He knew some-
thing about the Soviet Union and its concern about war because
of the suffering which the country had undergone in the Second
World War -- the courage, the sacrifices and the fact that 20
million people had been lost. People do not like war. Ameri-
cans hate war. America is too good a place to be when there is
no war.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
SECRET
The President continued that people did not get into trouble
when they talked to each other, but rather when they talked
about each other. There has been too much of the latter on both
sides, and not enough of talking to each other. In the meeting
with the larger group, where he and Gorbachev should soon move,
the sides could explain why there is mistrust between them, but
could make a beginning to try to eliminate this mistrust.
Gorbachev replied that they would discuss specific questions
during their Geneva meetings, but he wished to give his evalua-
tion of the present international situation as the Soviet side
saw it, while they were still in their one-on-one meeting. He
thought that a new policy was needed which would be adequate for
the present international situation. The first thing that was
needed was a policy aimed at resolving the central issue of the
present time, that is, the question of war and peace. In the
Soviet Union, in the United States, and in the whole world this
was the question which was in the minds of everyone, even
ordinary people, not to mention those who were more familiar
with international processes.
Gorbachev continued that if the two sides reached a substan-
tive agreement in Geneva, which would increase people's hope and
would not destroy their view of the future with respect to the
question of war and peace, this would be a great accomplishment.
The question of ending the arms race was of critical importance
in international politics, and we needed to say something to the
world about this. The Soviet side is in favor of this. The
U.S. side says that nuclear war cannot be permitted, and that it
is for peace. We need to find a formula at this meeting which
would give impetus toward moving towards resolution of the more
important issues. This was the first thing.
Gorbachev continued that he would not like to seem irrespon-
sible vis-a-vis the President, vis-a-vis his own country and
vis-a-vis the world with regard to this main issue. Young
people were wondering about whether they would be alive or not,
and the older generation, that had suffered so much, was also
thinking about this. Yes, we have a meeting in Geneva, and we
need to create an impetus. If no such impetus is created, there
will be great disappointment, and no statements or press an-
nouncements will justify the meeting. People will say that we
are irresponsible. And the two sides should not subject them-
selves to such a fate.
Gorbachev said that he would like to say two brief things
about what realities Soviet and U.S. foreign policy should take
into account. There were many problems in the world, involving
capitalist countries and socialist countries, not to mention
third-world countries, where the problems were the greatest.
The problems involved questions of economics, structural change,
ecology, sociology, etc. All of these issues demanded our
SECRET SENSITIVE
attention and required solutions based on cooperation rather
than confrontation. This was the second thing that Gorbachev
wished to say.
Gorbachev continued that the third thing was that the two
countries had had conflicts, both openly and privately, with
regard to regional, third-world issues. But there was a great
number of developing countries, and dozens of newly-created
ones. They had great amounts of natural and human resources,
but they were not only behind the developed countries, but the
gap between them was growing greater. There was hunger, illit-
eracy and disease, causing a great deal of turmoil. We need to
take a new political approach to these issues in order to
resolve them. This was the basis for Gorbachev's approach to
foreign policy, as well as that of his colleagues.
Gorbachev indicated that the issue of national interests had
arisen. The Soviet Union had its national interests and the
U.S. had them as well. Other countries also had their
national interests. In the international context, we could not
speak of advancing some of these interests at the expense of
suppressing others. Without such an approach it would be
difficult to act in the international arena. He had spoken
sincerely about these three things. The Soviet Union was not
playing a two-faced game. If it were playing such a game with
regard to the United States, if it harbored secret intentions,
then there could be no improvement in the relationship. He was
sincere about this, and this applied to both countries.
Gorbachev apologized that he had taken so long, and said
that he would be ending shortly. Perhaps the President was
aware that a slogan had been used during the time of this
meeting in Geneva which said that Reagan and Gorbachev should
bear in mind that the world did not belong only to the two of
them.
The President replied that he had not heard about such a
slogan, but he wished to reply briefly to what Gorbachev had
said, and then he thought it would be better for them to join
with the rest of the group. He agreed that the two countries
could mutually help the developing countries, but one of the
things that created mistrust of the USSR by the U.S. was the
realization of the Marxist idea of helping socialist revolutions
throughout the world and the belief that the Marxist system
should prevail. The U.S. felt, however, that the most important
thing for a country was its right to self-determination. The
U.S. and USSR could help these countries, given our advanced
technologies. We could help them to improve their standards of
living. But the U.S. felt that the Soviet Union attempted to
use force to shape the developing countries to their own pat-
tern, and that such force was often used only by a minority of
SECRET/SENSITIVE
/
the people of the country. The U.S. believed that if the compet-
ing factions would settle their social and other differences them-
selves, the U.S. and USSR could then be ready to assist them in
improving their economies. Both our countries should eliminate
the mistrust which exists between them by discussing the causes
of this mistrust. The U.S. had a very firm belief that people in
all countries had the right of self-determination and the right
to choose their own form of government.
The President indicated that when he and Gorbachev would go
into the main meeting, he would greet the members of the Soviet
Delegation, and Gorbachev should greet the members of the U.S.
Delegation, after which there would be a photo opportunity next
to the fireplace before they sat down at the table.
Gorbachev replied that they would continue to discuss these
issues in the larger meeting, but he would like to say some more
before they left the room. There had been those who considered
that the American Revolution should have been crushed. The same
applied to the French Revolution and to the Soviet Revolution.
Over a long period of time millions of people had engaged in such
struggles -- in India, Indonesia, in Algeria (where one-and-a-half
million people had died in their struggle for freedom). The Sov-
iet Union did not consider that a way of life could be imposed if
a society were not ready for it. These were only empty phrases.
All these things which happen in the world have their national
roots. The U.S. should not think that Moscow was omnipotent and
that when he, Gorbachev, woke up every day he thought about which
country he would now like to arrange a revolution in. This was
simply not true. Gorbachev indicated that after his interpreter
had translated what he had just said, he would like to convey
some confidential information to Reagan, after which they could
move to the next room.
Gorbachev said that before leaving for Geneva he had re-
ceived some information from the Soviet Academy of Sciences,
specifically the Institute for Earth Studies, where the scien-
tists have become convinced that there would be a major earth-
quake in the area of California and Nevada within the next three
years. Soviet scientists had always worked with U.S. scientists
on these issues, and Reagan probably had knowledge of such
information already, but this information was in addition to
what had already been known. The Soviet scientists considered
that the probability of an earthquake of a magnitude of 7 or 7.5
on the Richter scale was two-thirds and the probability of one
of 6 or 6.5 was three-fourths. The Soviet side was ready to
have its scientists give all the details to U.S. scientists.
They have not yet been published.
The President replied that he realized that such an earth-
quake was considered to be overdue. He mentioned that an entire
SECRET/SENSITIVE
SICKET
31
area along the Pacific, Asia, South America, and North America
was considered to be a "ring of fire" because of the volcanoes
there. This had recently been demonstrated in Colombia, before
that in Mexico and in the U.S. with Mount St. Helen: these
volcanoes were showing greater activity. Because of faults in
the earth and shifting plates, we know that such an event is
overdue. A great deal of tension has been created along the San
Andreas fault, and this tension had not been released by little
quakes. The President indicated that he had not heard any
specific time frame mentioned of the type that Gorbachev had
spoken of, but all of our scientists knew that this was overdue
and could happen at any time.
Prepared by:
Dimitri Zarechnak,
Department of State
SECRET/SENSITIVE
32
THE WHITE HOUSE
SECRET SENSITIVE
WASHINGTO
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
REAGAN-GORBACHEV MEETINGS IN GENEVA
November, 1985
First Plenary Meeting
DATE:
November 19, 1985
TIME:
11:27 A.M. - 12:15 P.M.
PLACE:
Maison Fleur d'Eau,
Geneva, Switzerland
PARTICIPANTS:
United States
President Ronald Reagan
George Shultz, Secretary of State
Donald T. Regan, Chief of Staff, White House
Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Arthur Hartman, Ambassador to the USSR
Rozanne Ridgway, Assistant Secretary of State for European and
Canadian Affairs
Jack F. Matlock, Jr., Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Robie M. Palmer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Dimitri Zarechnak, Interpreter
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev
Eduard Shevardnadze, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Georgy M. Korniyenko, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
Anatoly F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the United States
Aleksandr Yakovlev, Chief, Propaganda Department, Central
Committee, CPSU
Leonid M. Zamyatin, Chief, International Information Department,
Central Committee, CPSU
Andrey M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, Assistant to General Secretary
Gorbachev
Sergey P. Tarasenko, Assistant to Minister of Foreign Affairs
Yury D. Uspensky, Interpreter
GALLISNGS/LIHOTS
Declassify: OADR
Authority CAS NLSF96-087 DECLASSIFIED DLB 5/15/00
BY
/ NARA, Date 7/2/02
SECRET SEKSITIVE
The President and the General Secretary emerged from their
private meeting and greeted each member of the others' delegation.
There was then a photo opportunity. The two delegations were
then seated.
The President opened the meeting by stating to the General
Secretary that he was pleased that the meeting is finally under-
way. He noted that the two of them had been talking about how
important their meetings are, and then turned the floor over to
the General Secretary.
Gorbachev thanked the President. He noted that he and the
President had agreed that it was important to have a constructive
exchange of views at this meeting. As he had already said during
their private meeting, the Soviet Union attaches a lot of impor-
tance to this meeting and to the fact that it is taking place
after almost seven years since the last summit. A lot of things
have changed in the world and in both of our countries. Many
problems have come up which are of concern to the American peo-
ple, to the Soviet people and to their leaders. We regard this
meeting as a positive event, he added.
Gorbachev then returned to the question of how to proceed and
at what level. He shared the view that we need to bolster confi-
dence in our relationship. We need to think together about a
mechanism for implementing this idea. This should include a po-
litical dialogue at various levels. It is not good when for ex-
tended periods our relationship is reduced to having our entire
dialogue take place via the press. He understood that this was
the President's idea about dialogue. The President had said that
he was for talking to each other rather than about each other.
The task before us is strengthening confidence. We should be
looking for opportunities in various areas, for example trade and
economic relations can be helpful.
Experience has shown that the Soviet Union and the United
States can live without each other in the area of trade and eco-
nomics. But they cannot hope that a strong peace and understand-
ing will emerge without active links and relationships. Economic
and commercial ties are important not only in themselves but also
as a political link. There needs to be a material basis for the
political process.
Some underestimate this fact, he continued. Sometimes these
relations are used in a way which is detrimental to the process
we want. This had happened in the past. He would note that the
President had seen that, and had lifted the grain embargo. But,
unfortunately, this action was not followed by other steps.
There is interest among U.S. businessmen and in Soviet economic
circles. Commercial ties can be part of the mechanism of trust.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
34
Gorbachev said that he welcomed the President's idea for a
broad based exchange of people in science, culture and other ar-
eas. He was pleased that American people are interested in a
greater understanding of the Soviet people and noted that Ameri-
can travel to the Soviet Union was going up and had reached some
50,000 annually. He also welcomed a more lively and dynamic set
of contacts between foreign ministries and embassies. High level
summits should fit in with this and be the centerpiece of our
mechanism for building trust.
The General Secretary said that he would build on this sub-
ject of dialogue in greater detail. He mentioned it now since he
understood that it is a subject of special importance to the
President.
He then returned to what he called the central point: that
after many years the two leaders are meeting at a time when re-
lations are at the lowest level ever. He did not know whether
the President and his Administration find this good. The Presi-
dent's recent statements seemed to indicate that he wants im-
proved relations. This is definitely the Soviet desire. They
feel that despite all the existing differences and without sim-
plifying difficulties, the two sides have to get down to steering
their relations into a normal channel. He had said in their pri-
vate meeting that the Soviet leadership as a whole is for this
improvement, that he did not see any opposition to this view.
The Soviet leadership is united in a desire to improve relations,
if that is the U.S. desire. The Soviet Union is willing to
accommodate the United States without preconditions. He stated
this because the U.S. has set conditions for an improvement in
relations. This has been unacceptable in the past, and continues
to be unacceptable.
He mentioned that in Moscow he had said to Secretary Shultz
and National Security Advisor McFarlane that he wanted our re-
lations and the process of making policies to be free of de-
lusions. There seem to be several delusions on the part of the
American ruling class, to judge by some studies put out by U.S.
"think tanks. These include such ideas as the contention that
the Soviet economy is in a perilous state and therefore it can be
subject to the pressure of an arms race to give more leverage to
U.S. foreign policy. Or that the Soviet Union is lagging behind
in high technology so that the United States can rush ahead and
achieve military superiority. Or that the Soviet Union seeks
military superiority.
He would note here what he had said to Shultz and McFarlane.
The Soviet Union is often accused of causing problems for the
United States in Europe and in the Third World. The two sides
may have differences on concrete situations and on specific
SECRET/SENSITIVE
bilateral and international matters. But the USSR proceeds from
a recognition of the role and weight of the United States in ir-
ternational affairs. The Soviets duly appreciate American
achievements in technology, service and other spheres -- the
fruits of labor of the American people. The Soviets greatly re-
spect the Americans. This is most important. Yes, there are
differences: political, ideological, and in terms of values.
But we have managed to stay alive for many years. And we have
never been at war with each other. Let us pray to God that this
never happens. The broad and fundamental approach he had de-
scribed would make an improvement in relations possible
He continued that it would be bad if instead of policy we
have only public reactions and pinpricks. This can happen on
occasion, but it is a different matter if this becomes the policy
itself. This would make both the United States and the Soviet
Union insecure. There needs to be a long-term prospect for the
future of our relations. The Soviet Union holds that it is nec-
essary to develop a new policy. Our countries should not be cap-
tive to outdated approaches. Life has changed and it is always
changing.
He continued that whatever the two sides try to do in setting
policies, the peoples of the world attach priority to the issue
of war and peace. If the two of them are unable to tackle this
issue, it is difficult to see how they can deal with others.
This would devalue the whole process. They must deal with the
critical, pivotal issue of peace and war. Their meeting must
conclude by giving an impulse to the negotiations in Geneva. Of
course they can send their negotiators back to Geneva. But if he
and the President go home without giving any greater hope or im-
pulse to the process, they will take a scolding in their coun-
tries and in the world. Isn't this precisely the issue which
must be at the center of their attention?
Gorbachev continued that there are people linked to military
affairs in both countries. He realized that there are people who
earn their living from these matters. But studies in both coun-
tries has shown, what for example, Japan and the FRG have been
able to do with little expenditure on the military. They have
experienced an economic upsurge. Soviet and American scholars
have shown that one job in the military sector is three times as
costly as in the civilian sector. More jobs can be created if
money is channeled into civilian areas. The situation is so
acute that if they returned without saying anything about arms
control, about the first priority issue, people will maintain
that this meeting gave birth to a mouse.
The United States has economic problems and the Soviet Union
has them. Each knows his own problems better. But both could do
better if they could release resources to the civilian economy.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
He knew what institutions like the Heritage Foundation -- which
advised the Administration particularly when the President was
running for office the first and second time -- were saying.
Before this meeting, they had been saying that the United States
should use the arms race to frustrate Gorbachev's plans, to weak-
en the Soviet Union. But history teaches that this was not pos-
sible earlier even when the Soviet Union was not SO strong. Now
that it is even stronger, this is a delusion. The Soviet Union
is an enormous country which will take care of its problems.
Gorbachev continued that of course there are many problems
which are particularly acute in the developing world. It makes
the United States and the Soviet Union selfish to devote so much
money to the military when the destiny of millions and billions
of people is at stake. It should not be a surprise that there
are protests against this in Latin America, Africa and elsewhere.
The military is devouring huge resources. The two of them must
take a realistic approach to this.
Gorbachev added that he believes there is a basis for move-
ment to meet each other's concerns. The President had recently
said that a nuclear war must never be fought. He agreed. The
President had said that they should proceed on an equal basis.
He agreed. The President had said he was for exchange
among our peoples. The Soviet side agreed with this as well, so
long as it was within a framework of respect for sovereignty and
the values each society had developed. There must be a respect
for the path each side has chosen.
He then said that they often hear the United States argue
that there should be no agreement signed, no document signed that
is not consistent with United States national interest. He would
not quarrel with this, but how is one to understand national in-
terests if there is no restraint in defining them? Can there be
a right to exploit others or to impinge on the security of others
in the name of one's security? He could say for himself that
this is not the way to define one's interests. He recalled a
conversation with Prime Minister Thatcher in which she quoted
Lord Palmerston that nations have no permanent enemies only per-
manent interests. He agrees with this and would say that the
Soviet Union is implementing its interests in the community of
nations. Both of us must take the interests of others into ac-
count.
However, what is the Soviet Union to think if the United
States asserts a vital interest in areas distant from it, areas
which often are very near the Soviet Union? Many zones are de-
clared vital interests of the United States. The Soviet Union
fails to understand how the United States cannot take account of
other countries' interests.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
SECRET SENSITIVE
Gorbachev stated that he was hopeful that when they came to
the afternoon discussion, both sides could express their views
about war and peace and disarmament. He would like in conclusion
of his overview of the world situation to state that the Soviet
Union believes that the central question is how to halt the arms
race and to disarm. For its part, the Soviet Union would not put
forward proposals which would be detrimental to the United
States. They are for equal security. If anything detrimental to
the United States was proposed, this would not be acceptable to
the Soviet Union because it would not make for stability. The
Soviet Union has no ulterior motives. What the President has
said about equal security, no superiority and movement toward
halting the arms race are the conditions for building a coopera-
tive relationship. The United States is losing a big market in
the Soviet Union; the Soviets have good economic cooperation with
other countries.
Gorbachev continued that we can live in this world only to-
gether, so both must think how to put relations on a new track.
If the United States thinks that by saying these things,
Gorbachev is showing weakness, that the Soviet Union is more in-
terested than the United States, then this will all come to noth-
ing. The Soviet Union will not permit an unequal approach but if
there is on the U.S. side a positive will, the United States will
find the Soviets an active participant in the process.
President Reagan then began his presentation. He said that
as he had noted earlier, if the two sides are to get down to the
business of reducing the mountains of weapons, then both must get
at the cause of the distrust which had led to building these
weapons. Why does the distrust and suspicion exist? We fought
together in two wars. Americans who had been bringing in sup-
plies to help the Soviet Union in the second world war are buried
near Murmansk. When that war ended, the Americans were the only
ones whose industry had not been bombed and who had not sustained
great losses. The Americans were the only ones who had a weapon
of great devastation, the nuclear weapon. They were the only
ones able to use it if they had wanted to. But they reduced
their armed forces from twelve million to a million and a half
and allowed their navy to go down from a thousand ships to less
than half that number. And the United States began making pro-
posals to the Soviet Union and the world about sharing nuclear
technology and doing away with the weapon. Eighteen times before
this meeting the United States had proposed meetings to discuss
arms reduction and for twelve of those times the United States
had nuclear superiority. The United States was willing to give
it up. Most of these times the United States did not get coop-
eration from Gorbachev's predecessors.
The President stated that this is the first meeting where we
have sat down to consider reducing arms. The other meetings
dealt only with regulating the increase in these weapons. In
SECRET
SENSITIVE
38
1980 he had said that he could not condone this approach, but
that he would stay at the regotiating table as long as it might
take to get real reductions. He recalled that the Soviet leaders
had talked about a one-world communist state and had been inspir-
ing revolutions around the world. The United States had watched
the Soviet military buildup, including in nuclear weapons. This
came after dozens of United States proposals. The United States
has fewer nuclear weapons than in 1969, but the Soviet buildup
since then has been the greatest in history. Yes, he had made a
promise to refurbish the American military and this has been
done, but the United States is still behind: The Soviet Union
has 5.4 million men in their armed forces: The U.S. has 2.4
million men. The United States also sees an expansionist Soviet
Union. It has a satellite in Cuba just 90 miles off our shores.
We had problems there with nuclear missiles but this was settled.
Now we see Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Angola and Yemen -- with for
example 35,000 Cubans in Angola.
The President stated that he was setting out all of this to
explain the basis for American concern and distrust. With regard
to our military industry having a policy effect, he noted that
our budget for humanitarian affairs -- for the elderly and handi-
capped and for other social needs -- is greater than our total
military budget. Two thirds of our military spending pays for
manpower; only a small percentage is spent on equipment. The
total military budget is a very small percentage of our GNP; of
course we would be better off without it. The basic interest of
our industry is consumer products, for example the automobile and
airplane industry. The United States has no economic interest in
continuing a military buildup.
The President said that now the two sides have come to this
meeting he had said frankly why the American people had fears.
Maybe not fears of war, but that the Soviet Union could acquire
such an imbalance of strength that it could deliver an ultimatum.
The United States has seen violations of arms control agreements
already signed. The United States is ready to try to meet the
Soviet Union's concerns if the Soviet Union is ready to meet
ours. But more than words are needed. We need to get on to
deeds. If we just get in bargaining over the numbers of particu-
lar types of weapons we are likely go on trying to keep advan-
tages. But deeds can relieve mistrust, if we can go on the basis
of trust, then those mountains of weapons will shrink quickly as
we will be confident that they are not needed.
The President continued by saying that we are the two super-
powers. No other nations in the world can do what the Soviet
Union and the United States can. They are the only ones which
can bring about a world war. The only ones. That is a measure
of their responsibility. The two must remove the causes of dis-
trust. History since World War II has shown that if the United
SECRET/SENSITIVE
39
- C -
States had any hostile designs it was in a position to impose its
will with little dancer to itself. Indeed the United States had
set out to reduce its superiority.
The President then said that today he wanted to talk about
one specific question. Gorbachev had said that the United States
was interested in achieving a first strike capability by having
an anti-missile shield which would destroy missiles before they
hit the target. The United States did not know whether this
would be possible. The United States had a research program.
The Soviet Union had the same kind of program. The United States
has some hope that it might be possible. If both sides continue
their research and if one or both come up with such a system then
they should sit down and make it available to everyone so no one
would have a fear of a nuclear strike. A mad man might come
along with a nuclear weapon. If we could come up with a shield
and share it, then nobody would worry about the mad man. He
didn't even want to call this a weapon; it was a defensive sys-
tem.
The President said that he hoped he had made clear that it is
the sincerest desire of the United States to eliminate these sus-
picions. When he thinks of our two great powers, and of how many
areas we could cooperate in helping the world, he thinks about
how we must do this with deeds. This is the best way for
both of us to assure the other that they have no hostile intent.
Gorbachev asked whether there was any more time. Should the
they stick to their schedule?
The President responded that he thoucht they should stick to
the schedule as it calls next for lunch.
Gorbachev said this was fine and he would respond when they
resumed after lunch if the President would give him the floor.
The President said that the floor was Gorbachev's.
Gorbachev said that he understood they would get into more
specific discussion in the afternoon.
The President agreed, and the meeting ended at 12:15 P.M.
Prepared by:
R. M. Palmer and
J. F. Matlock
SECRET SENSITIVE
40
THEVRPEHOUSE
SECRET SPNS ITIVE
WASHINGT
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
REAGAN-GORBACHEV MEETINGS IN GENEVA
November, 1985
Second Plenary Meeting
DATE:
November 19, 1985
TIME:
2:30 - 3:40 P.M.
PLACE:
Maison Fleur d'Eau
Geneva, Switzerland
PARTICIPANTS:
United States
President Ronald Reagan
George Shultz, Secretary of State
Donald T. Regan, Chief of Staff, White House
Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Arthur Hartman, Ambassador to the USSR
Paul Nitze, Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of
State on Arms Control Matters
Jack F. Matlock, Jr., Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Robert E. Linhard, Senior Director, National Security Council
Staff
William Krimer, Interpreter
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev
Eduard Shevardnadze, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Georgy M. Korniyenko, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
Anatoly F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the United States
Aleksandr Yakovlev, Chief, Propaganda Department, Central
Committee, CPSU
Leonid M. Zamyatin, Chief, International Information Department,
Central Committee, CPSU
Andrey M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, Assistant to General Secretary
Gorbachev
Sergey P. Tarasenko, Assistant to Minister of Foreign Affairs
Soviet Interpreter
SECRET/SENSITIVE
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The President offered Gorbachev the floor to comment on the
President's presentation during the morning session.
Gorbachev said that they both had discussed how to conduct
their meetings and during the preparations had discussed whether
to focus on the causes of tensions or on solutions. Both sides
had said a lot about causes. He is convinced that if they start
making up a list of objections, they will not get far toward nor-
malization, more trust and more respect -- and most importantly,
toward giving some impulse to the Geneva process, which is at a
crucial stage now.
He will be reasonable in what he proposes. He does not plan
an extensive debate over what President said. But, as he said
during the private meeting this morning, the Soviets reject a
"primitive approach" toward the world around us -- that is that
everything can be traced to some Soviet plan for supremacy or
world domination. We have discussed this many times, and when it
raises regional issues, the U.S. frequently charges the Soviet
Union with expansionism -- in Afghanistan, Angola, even South
Yemen.
Hotbeds of international conflict do sour international re-
lations, Gorbachev continued, but the Soviets cannot share U.S.
views of the causes of regional conflict. You say that the Sov-
iet Union and Soviet expansionism is responsible. But that is
either a mistake or a deliberate distortion. If U.S. policies
are based on this mistaken view, it is difficult to see the way
out of these problems. An assessment of Soviet policy in the
Third World on the basis of such a misconception can lead only to
undermining international security.
Let me give you our view, Gorbachev said. We take a "prin-
cipled approach" to the developing countries and their problems.
First, we have no monopolies in these countries which exploit
their manpower and resources. We seek no commercial concessions,
but rely on our own resources one hundred percent. Therefore, we
have no selfish interests or expansionist aims, and desire no
military bases.
Second, if you look at the developing world in an unbiased
way, you will see that there is a long-term objective process
which began after World War II. It is a natural one of third-
world countries first pressing for political independence and
then striving to gain control over their own resources and labor.
This is the root cause of what is happening.
You overestimate the power of the Soviet Union, Gorbachev
observed. The U.S. attributes to USSR the power and capability
to upset the whole world, but we are realistic pragmatists who
categorically oppose attempts to dominate other countries from
SECRET/SENSITIVE
SECRE SENSITIVE
the outside. We do oppose the export of counterrevolution. At-
tempts have been made to crush revolutions in the past. This
happened with the American revolution, with the French Revolution
and with the October Revolution. But the idea that that small
numbers of people from outside a country can turn it to revolu-
tion is not realistic. India, Indonesia, Korea -- these are all
countries with millions of people.
The U.S. speaks of Afghanistan and Ethiopia as if it were
the Soviet Union that stirred the pot there. But we first heard
of revolutions there on the radio. We had good relations with
Haile Selassie and were not the cause of the revolution there.
It is wrong to think we are plotting; this is just not right.
But people want freedom and we do support "progressive move-
ments. We make no secret of this and it is in the Party program.
But we have no secret plans for world domination.
The U.S. has its values and the Soviet Union has its own.
Regional problems are caused by a social struggle evolving over
many stages. Sometimes you support one faction and we another,
but both of us can play a role together to solve problems, and in
some areas we already do so.
In Afghanistan, the Soviet Union supports a "regularizing
process" around that country, a political settlement under the
United Nations, and you could help. The U.S. however does not
help. You say the USSR should withdraw its troops, but actually
you want them there, and the longer the better.
Gorbachev continued, saying that the Soviets are ready to
promote a package solution involving a non-aligned Afghanistan,
Soviet troop withdrawal, the return of refugees, and international
guarantees of no outside interference. There are possibilities
for a political reconciliation, he added, and said that Afghani-
stan is already ready to cooperate, but requires the cooperation
of all groups.
He then asserted that the Soviet Union has no plan for using
Afghanistan to gain access to a warm water port, to extend its
influence to the Persian Gulf, or to impinge on U.S. interests in
any way. It is a situation which could be used to improve our
overall relationship, by fostering cooperation by the conflicting
sides and abstaining from interference. It is an area we should
explore, he concluded.
Gorbachev then stated that these are just examples to illus-
trate the Soviet policy toward the Third World. Basically the
issues are internal problems for the states involved. We can
continue to work on these issues with our discussions by special-
ists on regional matters.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
SENSITIVE
Gorbachev then noted that the President had charged that it
is the Soviet Union which had been building up its arms while the
U.S. acted with restraint. This is a major question. Much de-
pends on the character of the present strategic situation and how
it will develop in the future. It is the central question of our
relations.
Gorbachev continued by saying that twenty years ago there
was no strategic balance; U.S. had four times as many strategic
delivery systems than the USSR and also forward-based systems.
He then asked rhetorically what the U.S. would have done if the
Soviet Union had possessed four times as much? The U.S. would
have had to take steps, just as the Soviet Union did, to establish
parity.
In fact, Gorbachev asserted, the U.S. has tripled the number
of its nuclear weapons and has more nuclear weapons than the Sov-
iet Union. Negotiations began as we approached parity, and the
Soviets have not violated the nuclear balance and are not trying
to surpass the U.S., since superiority cannot be the basis for
normal relations. All institutes which study the problem, in-
cluding the ISS in London, conclude that there is strategic pari-
ty. Force structures are different, but they support different
strategies.
The Soviet Union wants parity at a lower level, he continued.
We are for equal security and agreed to embark upon the negotia-
tions in Geneva. We must meet each other half way if we are to
find a way to reduce strategic weapons. The time has come for us
both to muster the political will and realism to make progress
and to end efforts to outsmart or overrun the other side. Even
now, due to computer technology, one side could get ahead in
space. But we can match any challenge, though you might not think
SO. We know that the U.S. can meet any challenge from us and we
can meet any challenge from you. But why not make a step which
would permit lowering the arms level?
Gorbachev then said that they, the Soviets, think SDI can
lead to an arms race in space, and not just a defensive arms race
but an offensive arms race with space weapons. Space weapons
will be harder to verify and will feed suspicions and mistrust.
Scientists say any shield can be pierced, so SDI cannot save us.
So why create it? It only makes sense if it is to defend against
a retaliatory strike. What would the West think if the Soviet
Union was developing these weapons? You would react with horror.
Weinberger has said that if the USSR had such a defense first, it
would be bad. If we go first, you feel it would be bad for the
world, feeding mistrust. We cannot accept the rationale which
says it is good if you do it and bad if we do it.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
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44
Gorbachev then said that he knows President is attached to
the program, and for that reason the Soviets have analyzed it
seriously. The Soviet conclusion is that if the U.S. implements
its plan, the Soviet Union will not cooperate in an effort to
gain superiority over it. We will have to frustrate this plan,
and we will build up in order to smash your shield.
You say the Soviet Union is doing the same, he continued,
but asserted that this is not the case. Both of us do research
in space of course, but Soviet research is for peaceful purposes.
The U.S. in contrast has military aims, and that is an important
difference. The U.S. goal violates the ABM Treaty, which is of
fundamental importance. Testing is also inconsistent with the
Treaty, and can only exacerbate mistrust.
If the U.S. embarks on SDI, the following will happen: (1)
no reduction of offensive weapons; and (2) Soviet Union will re-
spond. This response will not be a mirror image of your program,
but a simpler, more effective system. What will happen if you
put in your "seven layers" of defense in space and we put in ours?
It will just destabilize the situation, generate mistrust, and
waste resources. It will require automatization which will place
important decisions in the hands of computers and political lead-
ers will just be in bunkers with computers making the decisions.
This could unleash an uncontrollable process. You haven't thought
this through; it will be a waste of money, and also will cause
more distrust and more weapons.
Gorbachev then referred to the President's remarks regarding
the need for a defense against some madman in the future who might
get his hands on nuclear weapons. He observed that they should
remember that they will have sufficient retaliatory force for a
long time to deter such use.
Gorbachev then concluded by saying that verification will
not be a problem if the basic question is solved. The Soviets are
prepared for full verification of a ban on space weapons. If
such a ban is agreed upon, then the two countries could negotiate
on their respective proposals for offensive weapons reduction.
The Soviets are ready to compromise. If space weapons are banned,
the situation would be completely different; it would create a
new attitude on the Soviet side. The process would be different,
however, if they leave Geneva without any agreements. If agree-
ment on this point is not possible, they the Soviets would have
to rethink the current situation.
The President then made the following points:
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- 6 -
-- Gorbachev's presentation illustrates the lack of trust be-
tween us. It is difficult for us to understand the level of sus-
picion which the Soviet Union holds.
-- Even when we were allies in World War II we encountered in-
explicable Soviet suspicion. For example, permission was not
given for U.S. bombers to land on Soviet territory in order to
reduce the dangers of bombing our common enemy. We cannot under-
stand this kind of suspicion.
-- Gorbachev spoke of parity, but there is none today. True
that U.S. once had nuclear superiority, but in June, 1946, of-
fered to place all nuclear weapons under international control.
It has also made numerous other offers, and the President listed
twelve such between 1953 and 1969.
-- Since SALT-I was signed, the Soviet Union has added 6,000
nuclear warheads. Since SALT-II, 3,850 have been added. Mean-
while, the U.S. removed 2400 warheads from Europe, while the Sov-
iet Union threatened Europe with its SS-20's. Our Allies requested
protection and it fell to President to implement their request
when Soviets refused to conclude an agreement to remove the
threat.
-- Now we are locked in a Mutual Assured Destruction policy.
The U.S. does not have as many ICBM's as Soviet Union, but has
enough to retaliate. But there is something uncivilized about
this. Laws of war were developed over the centuries to protect
civilians, but civilians are the targets of our vast arsenals
today.
-- The Strategic Defense Initiative is the President's idea.
History teaches that a defense is found for every offensive weap-
on. We don't know if strategic defensive weapons will be possi-
ble, but if they are, they should not be coupled with an offen-
sive force. Latter must be reduced SO it will not be a threat.
And if strategic defenses prove possible, we would prefer to sit
down and get rid of nuclear weapons, and with them, the threat of
war.
-- Regarding Afghanistan: Their "leader" was supplied by the
Soviet Union. Actually he was their second choice, since the
first one did not work out as they wished. The Soviet invasion
has created three milliion refugees. He made suggestion for so-
lution at UN. Specifically, how about bringing about the mutual
withdrawal of all outside forces, then forming a coalition of
Islamic states to supervise the installation of a government cho-
sen by the people of Afghanistan?
--
Regarding Cambodia: We signed an agreement with North Viet-
nam. It was violated and the North Vietnamese took over South
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Vietnam and also Laos and Cambodia. It now rules Cambodia. We
should put an end to this and together supervise establishment of
a government chosen by the Cambodian people.
-- Regarding Nicaragua: The Soviets have advisers there. The
Sandinistas have built a tremendous military machine, far more
than they need for defense. They have declared an aim of spread-
ing revolution elsewhere. The President then reviewed the history
of Somoza's removal -- the appeal to the OAS, and the Sandinista
promise of free elections and a free press. But then when Somoza
was removed, the Sandinistas forced other groups out of the coali-
tion and are trying to establish totalitarian control. The Contras
are only trying to reinstate the goals of the original revolution.
--
Such things as those noted are behind our suspicion and mis-
trust.
-- Every military judgment has it that Soviet forces are de-
signed for offensive operations.
--
The U.S. willing to work on an agreement to move away from
mutual threats. SDI would never be used by U.S. to improve its
offensive capability or to launch a first strike. SDI should not
lead to an arms race; we can both decide to reduce and eliminate
offensive weapons.
-- These are things we could do to remove mistrust. Our goal
is not an arms race. We can return to parity in one of two ways:
either we both reduce offensive weapons, or we can build them up
and use defensive systems to offset them. The U.S. does not seek
superiority, but will do what is necessary to protect its free-
doms.
Gorbachev then asked what they should tell their negotiators
in Geneva.
The President replied that they could be given guidelines to
reduce nuclear weapons, say by 50%. We could negotiate on the
structure of forces, since we know the structure of our forces is
different.
Gorbachev asked about the U.S. goal of SDI and how this re-
lates to our January agreement to prevent an arms race in space.
The President said that he did not see a defensive shield as
an arms race in space. He then recounted a conversation between
a Chinese official and Ambassador Walters, in which Walters was
asked what happens when a man with a spear that can penetrate
anything meets a man with a shield that is impenetrable. Walters
responded that he did not know, but that he did know what happens
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{
when a man with no shield meets that same opponent who has the
spear. Neither of us wants to be in the position of having no
shield.
Gorbachev then asked whether the President considered
developing SDI weapons as the militarization of space.
The President replied that he did not. If the technology
was developed, it should be shared. Neither side should deploy
until the other did. It should be done in combination with lower-
ing offensive weapons so that neither could gain a first-strike
advantage.
The President then invited Gorbachev to take a walk for an-
other private conversation and the two departed at 3:40 p.m.
Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock
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48
THE WHITE HOUSE
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WABHINGTE
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
REAGAN-GORBACHEV MEETINGS IN GENEVA
November, 1985
Second Private Meeting
DATE:
November 19, 1985
TIME:
3:40 P.M. - 4:45 P.M.
PLACE:
Pool House, Maison Fleur d'Eau
Geneva, Switzerland
PARTICIPANTS:
United States
President Reagan
William D. Krimer, Interpreter
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
General Secretary Gorbachev
N. Uspensky, Interpreter
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
During their brief walk from the villa at Fleur d'Eau to the
pool house, the President and General Secretary Gorbachev did not
discuss substance, confining their conversation to the Presi-
dent's old movies. In the course of that conversation the Presi-
dent suggested to Mr. Gorbachev that he inform Mr. Arbatov that
he had made not only grade-B movies, but also a few good ones.
Gorbachev mentioned that he had recently seen "Kings" Row" and
had liked it very much.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Declassify on: OADR
Authority CXS NCSF96-0F7 DECLASSIFIED #6 DLB 5/15/00
BY
, NARA, Date 7/2/02
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- 2 -
INF and SDI
Seated in front of a fireplace at the pool house the Presi-
dent handed Gorbachev some papers and suggested that they might
contain the seed of something the two of them could agree upon.
He added that he had one copy done in Russian.
Gorbachev devoted a few minutes to reading through the sepa-
rate documents.
Gorbachev prefaced his reaction by saying that, of course,
what he would present now was based on his first impression of
what was contained in the formulations. He thought that some of
the issues dealt with did contain some substance that merited
serious discussion with a view to bringing the positions of the
sides closer together.
With reference to space weapons he had some questions to ask
and, on the basis of his first reading, some considerations and
objections to state. He would first refer to something that
could be left for further discussions.
The President interjected to the effect that the material set
forth in these papers should be viewed as a seed for possible
instructions to the arms negotiators of both sides.
Gorbachev said he understood the President's idea, but still
had some objections to state.
With reference to paragraph 1 of the first paper, concerning
50 percent reductions in strategic offensive arms, that was ac-
ceptable and he was prepared here to discuss this matter in terms
of seeking a mutually acceptable solution. However, he would
have to note that during the meeting between Foreign Ministers in
Geneva last January agreement had been reached that such re-
ductions would be negotiated together with an agreement halting
an arms race in space. In other words, arms reductions must be
viewed in their interrelationship with space weapons. That idea
had been agreed upon in Geneva in January, but he had to note
that here it seems to have evaporated.
The President said that he did not see these defensive weap-
ons as constituting a part of the arms race in view of what he
had said just a few moments ago at the table, to the effect that
if and when such arms were developed, they would be shared with
everyone involved in nuclear weapons. Why could this matter not
be set aside in order to see what could be agreed upon regarding
the sharing of such things? This would enable the two sides to
determine what policies were available that could help all of us
to get rid of nuclear weapons.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
STORT
Without reacting to the President's latter remark, Gorbachev
said that that was his first comment. His second comment regard-
ing the same section of the document he had just read was to note
the suggestion that a separate interim agreement be concluded
limiting land-based INF missiles with a view to eventual complete
elimination of such missiles. This, too, required further clari-
fication. What weapons would be covered in such an agreement,
taking into account the existence of not only U.S. but also
British and French missiles of that type? This had not been made
clear.
Secondly, in the paper mentioning the possible interim agree-
ment only land-based medium-range missiles were mentioned; what
about medium-range cruise missiles launched from aircraft or from
aircraft carriers? One had to note immediately that under the
language contained in the document some nuclear weapons would
clearly remain outside limitations; nevertheless, they did exist,
they could be fired and naturally should also be covered by any
agreement.
Moving on to paragraph 3 of the same document concerning re-
search conducted by each side in the area of strategic ABM de-
fense, Gorbachev wanted to ask precisely what the President had
in mind when speaking of such research. He understood that basic
research in laboratories was underway (he meant scientific labo-
ratories, of course) but would also note that such research
should not include the construction of prototypes or samples, or
their testing. He emphasized that it was necessary to clarify
the precise meaning of that research. The reason he was asking
this question was that he knew that in the President's White
House today two different interpretations of the ABM Treaty's
provisions were in existence. One was a narrow interpretation
which had been contained in a number of documents of the U.S.
Congress and of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
That narrow interpretation was always limited to research not
going beyond the threshold of laboratory work. Now, however, he
was also aware of a broader interpretation, under which the con-
struction of prototypes and samples would be permitted. Under
that interpretation one could in no way speak about complying
with the provisions of the ABM Treaty. Thus, further clarifica-
tion was needed here as well.
The President said that we did indeed have more than one in-
terpretation of the ABM Treaty. Under one such interpretation
testing would be included in order to know that in practice we
did have such a weapon. Just to have a laboratory theory would
not be enough. It was his thought that all this could be covered
by an agreement under which we as well as others could agree that
no country would have a monopoly of such weapons. They would be
shared by all. The worst thing that he could imagine was for any
one country to acquire a first-strike capability.
SECRET SENSITIVE
Gorbachev noted that the Soviet Union had declared for all
the world to hear, and was now declaring to the United States as
well, that the Soviet Union would not be the first to use nuclear
weapons. Was this not sufficient if this matter were taken seri-
ously? However, he had to note that the United States did not
believe him.
The President interjected that he and Gorbachev might not
always be here.
Gorbachev said that when he spoke of not being believed he
meant that the United States did not believe the Soviet Union's
statement he had just mentioned. In that case, why should the
Soviet Union believe the President's statement about sharing re-
sults of the research in question, and that the United States
would not take advantage of having developed a strategic defense?
The President replied that that was because the negotiators
of both sides could set down in a specific agreement that both
governments had agreed not to retain a monopoly of defensive
weapons, an agreement that he and Gorbachev would sign. He would
also point out that our two countries were not alone in the
world. There were others, such as Qaddhafi, for example, and
people of that kind, who would not at all be averse to dropping a
nuclear weapon on the White House. He believed in the idea of
both our governments agreeing that both conduct relevant research
and that both share the results of such research; if one country
produced a defensive shield before the other, it would make it
available to all.
As for believing the Soviet Union's commitment not to be the
first to use nuclear weapons, the President would remind Gorbachev
that in Stockholm we had subscribed to the doctrine that coun-
tries must not use force against each other.
With some emotion Gorbachev appealed to the President as fol-
lows: if the two sides were indeed searching for a way to halt
the arms race and to begin to deal seriously with disarmament,
then what would be the purpose of deploying a weapon that is as
yet unknown and unpredictable? Where was the logic of starting
an arms race in a new sphere? It must clearly be understood that
verification of such weapons would be totally unreliable because
of their maneuverability and mobility even if they were classified
as defensive. People would not be in a position to determine
what it was that would be placed into space and would surely re-
gard it as an additional threat, thereby creating crisis situa-
tions. If the goal was to get rid of nuclear weapons, why start
an arms race in another sphere?
The President asked Gorbachev to remember that these were not
weapons that kill people or destroy cities, these were weapons
that destroy nuclear missiles. If there were agreement that
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52
there would be no need for nuclear missiles, then one might agree
that there would also be no need for defenses against them. But
he would also urge Gorbachev to remember that we were talking
about something that was not yet known, and that if it were known,
that would still be years away. Why then should we sit here in
the meanwhile with mountains of weapons on each side?
Gorbachev countered by suggesting that they announce to the
world that President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev had
declared firmly in official statements that both countries would
refrain from research, development, testing and deployment of
space weapons and that such agreement would be subject to appro-
priate verification. Thus they could implement the idea of open
laboratories and at the same time begin the process of 50-percent
reductions in offensive arms.
The President asked if Gorbachev had in mind that Soviet lab-
oratories would be open to visits by our experts and that their
experts would be free to visit our laboratories.
Gorbachev replied that the Soviet Union would agree to open
its laboratories provided they were used for the purpose of veri-
fying how the agreement on banning and non-use of space weapons
was being complied with.
The President said he did not know why Gorbachev kept on
speaking of space weapons. We had no idea of precisely what the
nature of these weapons would be; however, we certainly had no
intention of putting something into space that would threaten
people on Earth. Some years ago there had been some talk about
putting nuclear missiles into orbit in space, weapons that could
be dropped on any point on Earth. This was not what he was talk-
inc about. He would recall that in 1925 in this city of Geneva
all of the countries that had participated in World War I had met
and had reached agreement not to use poison gas warfare. Never-
theless, all had kept their gas masks. What he was saying now
was that we should go forward to rid the world of the threat of
nuclear weapons, but at the same time retain something like that
gas mask, i.e., a shield that would protect our countries should
there be an unforeseeable return to nuclear missiles.
Gorbachev wanted to repeat something he had said at the plen-
ary meeting. He had pointed out that the Soviet Government had
really carefully considered everything that had been said by the
President with regard to SDI, especially all his arguments in
favor of SDI. To a certain extent he could understand the Presi-
dent on a human level; he could understand that the idea of stra-
tegic defense had captivated the President's imagination. Howev-
er, as a political leader he could not possibly agree with the
President with regard to this concept. He would assure the Pres-
ident that this was not the result of some merely capricious at-
titude. He was not saying this for some sort of petty reasons.
SENSITIVE
On the basis of profound analysis by scientists, Soviet as well
as American, he had to conclude that if the Soviet Union were to
agree to proceed along the direction of SDI, and this was con-
firmed by almost all authoritative people, if it were dragged
into this new dimension of the arms race, the other side would be
bound to lose confidence and would seek to counter SDI in any
possible way, including by increasing the numbers of its offen-
sive arms. Thus, it would not make any sense at all for the Sov-
iet Union to help the U.S. in the development of a strategic de-
fense. In addition, he would point out that a defense against
one certain level of strategic missiles was one thing, but a de-
fense against a much larger number of such missiles would not be
reliable at all. This could only lead to the conclusion that the
only possible use of a strategic defense was to defend against a
weakened retaliatory strike not against a first strike. It should
certainly be realized by the President as well that the great
majority of people throughout the world, including scientists,
were extremely concerned over the development of space weapons,
whatever their avowed purpose. Among such people were a number
of U.S. Secretaries of Defense and such experts as Ambassadors
Smith and Warnke. Gorbachev knew what they had said about it, he
had read their statements and it was clear that strategic defense
would only be useful after a first strike by the side deploying
such defense. This was a very serious problem today and he would
ask the President to reflect on it seriously. The Soviet Union
had no desire to harm him as President or to harm the United
States as a country. He firmly believed it necessary to do all
in his power to prevent this from happening. He would urge the
President jointly with him to find a way of formulating guidelines
for their negotiators with a view to stopping SDI.
The President thought they had used up a considerable amount
of time at this meeting. He thought the plenary meeting was about
to conclude in any event, but he would say one thing. He would
ask Gorbachev to consider this matter once again. He recognized
that both of them had made some strong statements and that it
would be difficult for either of them to reverse direction. How-
ever, it seemed to him that in his idea of ultimately sharing the
results of research there was something that might be of interest
to both of them. He had to tell Gorbachev that our people over-
whelmingly wanted this defense. They look at the sky and think
what might happen if missiles suddenly appear and blow up every-
thing in our country. We believe that the idea of having a de-
fense against nuclear missiles involved a great deal of faith and
belief. When he said we, he meant most of mankind.
Gorbachev pointed out that missiles were not yet flying, and
whether or not they would fly would depend on how he and the Pre-
sident conducted their respective policies. But if SDI were ac-
tually implemented, then layer after layer of offensive weapons,
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Soviet as well as U.S. weapons, would appear in outer space and
only God himself would know what they were. In this connection
he would note that God provides information only very selectively
and rarely. He appealed to the President to recognize the true
signal he was conveying to him as President and to the U.S. Admin-
istration as a whole that the Soviet Union did indeed wish to
establish a new relationship with the United States and deliver
our two nations from the increasing fear of nuclear weapons. The
Soviet Union had conducted a deep analysis of the entire situa-
tion and had come to the conclusion that it was necessary precise-
ly now to proceed on the basis of the actual situation; later it
would be too late. This was why the Soviet Union had tabled ser-
ious and comprehensive proposals concerning strategic weapons,
medium-range weapons and others. This had been the result of a
thorough assessment and profound understanding of where the two
countries stood today. They now had a chance which they must not
fail to take advantage of. He would ask the President not to
regard this as weakness on the part of Gorbachev and the Soviet
leadership.
During the walk back to the villa Gorbachev noted that this
would not be their last meeting. The President expressed the
hope that their next meeting would take place on U.S. soil, and
said that he would be pleased to accept an invitation to visit
the Soviet Union in return. Gorbachev agreed and suggested that
dates and modalities be worked out by their respective staffs.
Prepared by:
William D. Krimer
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