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Records of the National Security Council, Directorate of European and Soviet Affairs (Reagan Administration)
Jack F. Matlock, Jr.'s Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) Subject Files
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: [Saturday Group Notes] (November-
December 1983)
Box: 34
To see more digitized collections visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection
Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected]
Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing
National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/
PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O 13233
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer CAS
Box Number
34
FOIA M02-005
File Folder
(SATURDAY GROUP - NOTES_ (NOV - DEC 1983)
DATE 3/21/2007
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
2 NOTES
RE MEETING (#2)
MVH 3/17/084 11/19/1983
4 BRIEFING
RE POLICY FRAMEWORK (#4)
MVH 3/17/08 ND
PAPER
5 NOTES
SAME TEXT AS ITEM #2 MVH 3/17/08, 11/19/1983
6 MEMO
MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE MVH 3/17/08, 12/3/1983
BREAKFAST MEETING (#5)
7 PAPER
RE US SOVIET RELATIONS (#6)
MVH 3/17/08 2 ND
8 MEMO
SAME TEXT AS ITEM 6
MVH 3/17/08 12/2/1983
9 PAPER
SAME TEXT AS 7
MVH 3/17/08 ND
10 PAPER
2 COPIES OF ITEM 7 AND P.1 OF MVH ITEM 8/17/08 7 5 ND
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
DOCUMENT
NO. AND TYPE
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
n.d.
P-1
I agenda
(1p)
R 11/20/03
moz-005
1/19/83
P-1
2
meeting notes
(4pp)
-
P-5
R
<
#2
h.d.
P-1
3 paper
IC: US Soviet relations (1p)
R
<
1
&3
h.d.
P-1
4 briefing paper
re: policy (1p)
R -
<
#4
P-5
n.d.
P-1
5. meeting notes copy of # 2 (4pp)
R -
&
# 2 (same text as)
P-5
6. memo
from Matlock to Robert MeFarlane re: meeting (2pp)
12/3/83
P-1
P-5
R 11/20/03 MOZ-005 5
policy paper
C. US Soviet Realations (2pp)
n.d.
P-1
P-5
R -
1
#6
12/3/83
P-1
memo
same as item #6 (2pp)
R
#5 (sametext as)
P-5
-
copy of item # 7 (2pp)
n.d.
P-1
policy paper
-
6 (SAME text as)
P-5
R
re: US/Soviet relations (5pp)
n.d.
P-1
10. draft policy
paper
R
\
#6
(a
<
)
P-5
>
(two COPIES OF DRAFT & 1 FIRST
PAbE OF DrAFT)
COLLECTION:
MATLOCK, JACK F.: Files
dlb
FILE FOLDER:
[Saturday Group - Notes] (Nov - Dec 1983) OA 92219
10/13/95
Box 34
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
the FOIA].
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial
F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors,
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA.
F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(B)(6)
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6)
of the FOIA]
of the PRA].
F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7)
of the FOIA].
C.
Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial
institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
"SMALL GROUP"
The Vice President
Secretary Shultz
Mr. McFarlane
Mr. Meese
NSC: Matlock
Fortier
State: Dam
Eagleburger
Burt
Hartman
Azrael
DOD:
Thayer
CIA: Gates
Gen. Scowcroft
SECRET SENSITIVE
Soviet Core Group
Agenda for September 3 Meeting
Communicating with the Soviets
I. What is the best way of communicating with the Soviets?
What has past experience taught us? How does the current
situation in Moscow affect our ability to communicate?
II. Different forms of communication
A.
Diplomatic Channels
Ambassadorial meetings in Washington and Moscow
o
Ministerial contacts
B.
Presidential Communications
C.
Private communications utilizing special emissary
D.
Public Diplomacy
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET/SENSITIVE
NLS M02-005
BY 11/00/03 NARA, DATE CXS
SMALL GROUP
Meeting of November 19, 1983
7:30 A.M., Secretary's Dining Room, Department of State
Present: The Vice President, The Secretary of State, Mr. Meese,
Mr. McFarlane, and the following representatives of agencies:
NSC: Matlock, Fortier; State: Dam, Eagleburger, Burt, Azrael;
DOD: Thayer; CIA: Gates. (Gen. Scowcroft and Amb. Hartman were
not in Washington.)
Two preliminary papers, "U.S.-Soviet Relations: The Next Twelve
Months," and "Suggested Policy Framework" were distributed before
and during breakfast.
Secretary Shultz opened the meeting by going over the following
topics:
Ground Rules: During a meeting with Shultz and McFarlane
November 16, the President had directed that a small group be
formed to work in complete confidentiality to review the state of
our relations with the Soviet Union and to consider appropriate
policy. Members had been chosen either because of their overall
responsibility for developing U.S. policy, or their expertise and
positions enabling them to request studies and information from
their organizational units in the normal course of their duties.
The group should not be mentioned to persons not members, although
discussion among members is encouraged. Matlock would serve as
executive secretary and would keep the sole copy of any papers
developed by the group.
Related Study: Secretary Shultz had earlier requested
Eagleburger and Bosworth to do a special study relevant to the
group's interests. It seemed in pretty good shape and would be
distributed to members soon for their consideration.
Pattern of Relations with Soviets: In the spring we initi-
ated a pattern of meetings: Shultz with Dobrynin and Hartman with
Gromyko, and the President had met with Dobrynin once for two
hours. He stressed his interest in the Pentacostalists at that
time, and their subsequent release was probably a result, although
we are careful not to claim credit publicly. We went on to
negotiate a grain agreement (which the Soviets are unlikely to
give us credit for since they understand the domestic pressures
here) and to start negotiations on bilateral matters such as
consulates and an exchanges agreement. We had intended that the
Shultz-Gromyko meeting in Madrid would be the first in a series,
with Gromyko coming here for meetings in New York and perhaps
with the President in Washington, followed perhaps by a Shultz
visit to Moscow. KAL had derailed these plans, and furthermore
DECLASSIFIED [RELOASED
NLS MOZ-005*2
BY CAS
NARA, DATE 11/20/03
- 2 -
the Soviets seemed to have welched on a deal we thought we had
for Shcharansky's release.
Recent meetings with Dobrynin: Shultz resumed meeting
Dobrynin a couple of weeks ago, but the latter seemed uninstructed
on any subject except INF. Two recent meetings by Hartman and
Gromyko also seemed unproductive. At the meeting with Dobrynin
yesterday (Nov. 18) attended by Eagleburger, Dobrynin seemed
totally uninstructed.
At that meeting, Shultz had told Dobrynin that we were
willing to have a totally private dialogue. He mentioned our
dismay in our experience with the Shcharansky deal and also with
the Soviet misrepresentation of our INF position to our allies.
He asked if the Soviets were interested in discussing START
conceptually, and stressed the explosiveness of the situation in
the Middle East and the dangers of their involvement with the
Syrians. Overall, his presentation was an attempt to stick to
our agenda, by making it clear that arms control cannot be dealt
with in isolation.
Mr. McFarlane pointed out that we can proceed on the foundation
of three years of work by the Administration, during which we
have been able to mend the disrepair in our defenses, get our
economy moving again, and shore up the Alliance. Now we are in a
position of strength in dealing with the Soviets.
Regarding the items on the agenda for the meeting, Matlock
observed (1) that we probably cannot expect major adjustments in
Soviet policy over the next 12 months because of the leadership
situation in the Soviet Union and other factors such as INF
deployments and the U.S. Presidential election; (2) that it is
nevertheless important to convey, both publicly and privately, a
clear message to the Soviets, since this could be a factor in the
leadership struggle and could prepare for significant changes in
1985; and (3) that we must have a credible and consistent negoti-
ating stance to ensure the sustainability of our policies with
our public and with our allies. He noted the paper headed
"Suggested Policy Framework" as an initial attempt to articulate
our policy.
The Vice President observed that there is a public perception
that we are not communicating with the Soviets, and this makes
the public uneasy. There is a need to convince the public that
we are in fact in communication.
Eagleburger observed that our dialogue is like ships passing in
the night. We must get into more discussion of fundamental
questions. We should structure the discussions so that we are
conveying to them clearly our views on various important issues
such as the Middle East and Cuba in some detail. He recalled
that studies had been done sometime back of the view from Moscow
and the view from Washington, in order to get a feel for the
- 3 -
difference in perspectives, and wondered whether it might not be
useful to commission updated studies on these topics at this
time.
Secretary Shultz agreed on the need for discussing regional
issues with the Soviets and noted that this does not mean formal
negotiations or formal consultation.
McFarlane observed that the Soviets are facing an abrupt change
in their expectations. Their expectation of a decline in the
West has been dashed. They have not decided how to react to this
and are uncertain regarding our global intentions.
Burt noted that the past year has been a difficult one for the
Soviets. The INF deployments will put great strain on the
relationship, but further out there may be opportunities. The
Soviets have painted themselves in a corner to a degree that it
may be impossible for them to do business for a while.
Secretary Shultz observed that we should turn around the Soviet
charge that they cannot do business with the Reagan Administra-
tion, by pointing out that in fact we cannot do business with
them.
Burt suggested that we (a) state a willingness to engage in a
dialogue on the issues; (b) point out to them that START has the
greatest potential if the Soviets are willing to bite; (c)
consider discussions of regional issues as a form of pre-crisis
management; and (d) examine the possibilities of trade-offs,
since the Soviets have more interest in some issues and we in
others.
Dam agreed that we should look for tradeoffs in the bilateral
area.
Matlock pointed out that we need to make a basic decision whether
to continue the suspension of negotiations on bilateral issues
because of KAL or whether to proceed at some point, and under
what conditions.
Secretary Shultz noted that he had suggested to Dobrynin yester-
day that, even if the Soviets were unwilling to pay compensation,
they could easily cooperate in providing navigation assistance to
planes flying the route in order to avert tragedies in the
future.
Gates observed that the prospects for an improvement in US-Soviet
relations are dismal over the next 12 months. The Soviets must
turn inward and look at their succession problem. It will be
hard for them to react to new initiatives. Furthermore, any
initiatives from us will be seen in the context of election-year
politics. The question is really how to use the next year to
put down building blocks for the second term. Indeed, the
- 4 -
election of the President to a second term will convey an impor-
tant message, that the U.S. has recovered from the vacillations
of the recent past and is on a steady course. Thus, we need to
convey our views for the role they can plan in the Soviet suc-
cession and in order to establish a basis for 1985.
Meese pointed out some of the political factors involved: many
are criticizing the President for excessive rhetoric and for not
being serious about negotiation, while the right feels he has not
taken enough punitive action, and indeed would like a policy
based on the "missing elements" in the paper suggesting a policy
framework. We thus need to articulate our policy more clearly
and develop a unique Reagan Administration view.
Azrael observed (1) that there were some areas where we might
desire to "push" the Soviets, and that this could cause
complications in relations, and (2) that at some point we must
come to grips with the fact that some proposals are
non-negotiable from the Soviet point of view.
Burt predicted that the Soviets would not come back to the INF
talks as such. A continuation will have to take another form.
We must consider what sort of forum we should seek.
Secretary Shultz noted that we need an authoritative statement,
and that work had been done on a speech. It could be by the
President, or he could make it. But we need a clear public
statement of our policy to build on.
Eagleburger pointed out that the Soviets could be dangerous when
they are in trouble and there is uncertainty in their leadership.
We must keep that in mind and take steps to reduce the potential
for miscalculation.
The meeting ended at approximately 9:30.
US-SOVIET RELATIONS: THE NEXT TWELVE MONTHS
Points to Consider
1. What specific objectives should we set for the next twelve
months, and what events may possibly influence the situation?
a. In bilateral relations
b. In regional conflicts
C. In arms control negotiations
d. In public diplomacy
2. What modalities should we employ to communicate with the
Soviets? Possibilities include:
a. Public statements
b. Formal diplomatic contacts
C. Informal contacts by officials
d. Contacts by members of Congress (how to utilize)
3. How should we articulate our policy to maximize success, both
in dealing directly with Soviets and with our and allied publics?
4. What specific steps should be taken, and in what sequence?
Possibilities include:
a. Speech by President on U.S.-Soviet relations;
b. Possible reply to Andropov's August letter on INF;
C. Steps to activate the dialogue on levels below that of
Foreign Minister to Foreign Minister;
d. More systematic use of informal and unofficial means of
communication;
e. Reconsider appropriate fora for renewed contact;
f. Analyze regional conflicts and problems for opportunities
to bring greater pressure to bear on Soviets;
g. Activate public diplomacy, particularly in Europe, to
convey more accurate view of our policy toward Soviets.
DECLASSIFIED (RELEASED
NLS MOZ-005 213
BY CA NARA, DATE 11/20/03
SUGGESTED POLICY FRAMEWORK
Our Agenda: Our principal objectives can be grouped in three
interdependent categories:
1. Reduce use and threat of force in international disputes;
2. Lower high levels of armaments by equitable and verifi-
able agreements; and
3. Establish minimal level of trust to facilitate the first
two objectives, including
a. Compliance with past agreements;
b. Human rights performance;
C. Specific confidence-building measures;
d. Bilateral ties when mutually beneficial.
Our Approach: We should attempt to make progress on the above
aims on the following basis:
a. Realism: We recognize that our competition with the
USSR is basic and there is no quick fix. We also recognize the
nature of the system with which we must deal.
b. Strength: We know that without adequate attention to
our strength: military, economic, alliance solidarity and politi-
cal will and cohesion, we cannot deal with the Soviet threat
effectively.
C. Negotiation: We are willing to negotiate differences
in an honest attempt to find ways to reduce tensions. But we must
insist on a real reduction of tension, not agreements which
simply cover up real problems and thus mislead the public.
Missing Elements: Some desirable objectives should not be part
of our explicit policy:
a. Challenging legitimacy of Soviet system;
b. Military superiority;
C. Forcing collapse of the Soviet system (as distinct
from exerting pressure on Soviets to live up to agreements and
abide by civilized standards of behavior).
Attempts to pursue such objectives openly make it much more
difficult to obtain other objectives and, indeed, to obtain these
desirable objectives. They must be approached in indirect ways.
DECLASSIFIED REGIEASED
NLS MOZ005
BY CVS
NARA,
DATE
11/01/03
SMALL GROUP
Meeting of November 19, 1983
7:30 A.M., Secretary's Dining Room, Department of State
Present: The Vice President, The Secretary of State, Mr. Meese,
Mr. McFarlane, and the following representatives of agencies:
NSC: Matlock, Fortier; State: Dam, Eagleburger, Burt, Azrael;
DOD: Thayer; CIA: Gates. (Gen. Scowcroft and Amb. Hartman were
not in Washington.)
Two preliminary papers, "U.S.-Soviet Relations: The Next Twelve
Months," and "Suggested Policy Framework" were distributed before
and during breakfast.
Secretary Shultz opened the meeting by going over the following
topics:
Ground Rules: During a meeting with Shultz and McFarlane
November 16, the President had directed that a small group be
formed to work in complete confidentiality to review the state of
our relations with the Soviet Union and to consider appropriate
policy. Members had been chosen either because of their overall
responsibility for developing U.S. policy, or their expertise and
positions enabling them to request studies and information from
their organizational units in the normal course of their duties.
The group should not be mentioned to persons not members, although
discussion among members is encouraged. Matlock would serve as
executive secretary and would keep the sole copy of any papers
developed by the group.
Related Study: Secretary Shultz had earlier requested
Eagleburger and Bosworth to do a special study relevant to the
group's interests. It seemed in pretty good shape and would be
distributed to members soon for their consideration.
Pattern of Relations with Soviets: In the spring we initi-
ated a pattern of meetings: Shultz with Dobrynin and Hartman with
Gromyko, and the President had met with Dobrynin once for two
hours. He stressed his interest in the Pentacostalists at that
time, and their subsequent release was probably a result, although
we are careful not to claim credit publicly. We went on to
negotiate a grain agreement (which the Soviets are unlikely to
give us credit for since they understand the domestic pressures
here) and to start negotiations on bilateral matters such as
consulates and an exchanges agreement. We had intended that the
Shultz-Gromyko meeting in Madrid would be the first in a series,
with Gromyko coming here for meetings in New York and perhaps
with the President in Washington, followed perhaps by a Shultz
visit to Moscow. KAL had derailed these plans, and furthermore
DECLASSIFIED /RE/EASED
AUTHORITY MUZ-OUS #2
BY
CIS
NARA,
DATE
11/20/03
- 2 -
the Soviets seemed to have welched on a deal we thought we had
for Shcharansky's release.
Recent meetings with Dobrynin: Shultz resumed meeting
Dobrynin a couple of weeks ago, but the latter seemed uninstructed
on any subject except INF. Two recent meetings by Hartman and
Gromyko also seemed unproductive. At the meeting with Dobrynin
yesterday (Nov. 18), attended by Eagleburger, Dobrynin seemed
totally uninstructed.
At that meeting, Shultz had told Dobrynin that we were
willing to have a totally private dialogue. He mentioned our
dismay in our experience with the Shcharansky deal and also with
the Soviet misrepresentation of our INF position to our allies.
He asked if the Soviets were interested in discussing START
conceptually, and stressed the explosiveness of the situation in
the Middle East and the dangers of their involvement with the
Syrians. Overall, his presentation was an attempt to stick to
our agenda, by making it clear that arms control cannot be dealt
with in isolation.
Mr. McFarlane pointed out that we can proceed on the foundation
of three years of work by the Administration, during which we
have been able to mend the disrepair in our defenses, get our
economy moving again, and shore up the Alliance. Now we are in a
position of strength in dealing with the Soviets.
Regarding the items on the agenda for the meeting, Matlock
observed (1) that we probably cannot expect major adjustments in
Soviet policy over the next 12 months because of the leadership
situation in the Soviet Union and other factors such as INF
deployments and the U.S. Presidential election; (2) that it is
nevertheless important to convey, both publicly and privately, a
clear message to the Soviets, since this could be a factor in the
leadership struggle and could prepare for significant changes in
1985; and (3) that we must have a credible and consistent negoti-
ating stance to ensure the sustainability of our policies with
our public and with our allies. He noted the paper headed
"Suggested Policy Framework" as an initial attempt to articulate
our policy.
The Vice President observed that there is a public perception
that we are not communicating with the Soviets, and this makes
the public uneasy. There is a need to convince the public that
we are in fact in communication.
Eagleburger observed that our dialogue is like ships passing in
the night. We must get into more discussion of fundamental
questions. We should structure the discussions so that we are
conveying to them clearly our views on various important issues
such as the Middle East and Cuba in some detail. He recalled
that studies had been done sometime back of the view from Moscow
and the view from Washington, in order to get a feel for the
- 3 -
difference in perspectives, and wondered whether it might not be
useful to commission updated studies on these topics at this
time.
Secretary Shultz agreed on the need for discussing regional
issues with the Soviets and noted that this does not mean formal
negotiations or formal consultation.
McFarlane observed that the Soviets are facing an abrupt change
in their expectations. Their expectation of a decline in the
West has been dashed. They have not decided how to react to this
and are uncertain regarding our global intentions.
Burt noted that the past year has been a difficult one for the
Soviets. The INF deployments will put great strain on the
relationship, but further out there may be opportunities. The
Soviets have painted themselves in a corner to a degree that it
may be impossible for them to do business for a while.
Secretary Shultz observed that we should turn around the Soviet
charge that they cannot do business with the Reagan Administra-
tion, by pointing out that in fact we cannot do business with
them.
Burt suggested that we (a) state a willingness to engage in a
dialogue on the issues; (b) point out to them that START has the
greatest potential if the Soviets are willing to bite; (c)
consider discussions of regional issues as a form of pre-crisis
management; and (d) examine the possibilities of trade-offs,
since the Soviets have more interest in some issues and we in
others.
Dam agreed that we should look for tradeoffs in the bilateral
area.
Matlock pointed out that we need to make a basic decision whether
to continue the suspension of negotiations on bilateral issues
because of KAL or whether to proceed at some point, and under
what conditions.
Secretary Shultz noted that he had suggested to Dobrynin yester-
day that, even if the Soviets were unwilling to pay compensation,
they could easily cooperate in providing navigation assistance to
planes flying the route in order to avert tragedies in the
future.
Gates observed that the prospects for an improvement in US-Soviet
relations are dismal over the next 12 months. The Soviets must
turn inward and look at their succession problem. It will be
hard for them to react to new initiatives. Furthermore, any
initiatives from us will be seen in the context of election-year
politics. The question is really how to use the next year to
put down building blocks for the second term. Indeed, the
- 4 -
election of the President to a second term will convey an impor-
tant message, that the U.S. has recovered from the vacillations
of the recent past and is on a steady course. Thus, we need to
convey our views for the role they can plan in the Soviet suc-
cession and in order to establish a basis for 1985.
Meese pointed out some of the political factors involved: many
are criticizing the President for excessive rhetoric and for not
being serious about negotiation, while the right feels he has not
taken enough punitive action, and indeed would like a policy
based on the "missing elements" in the paper suggesting a policy
framework. We thus need to articulate our policy more clearly
and develop a unique Reagan Administration view.
Azrael observed (1) that there were some areas where we might
desire to "push" the Soviets, and that this could cause
complications in relations, and (2) that at some point we must
come to grips with the fact that some proposals are
non-negotiable from the Soviet point of view.
Burt predicted that the Soviets would not come back to the INF
talks as such. A continuation will have to take another form.
We must consider what sort of forum we should seek.
Secretary Shultz noted that we need an authoritative statement,
and that work had been done on a speech. It could be by the
President, or he could make it. But we need a clear public
statement of our policy to build on.
Eagleburger pointed out that the Soviets could be dangerous when
they are in trouble and there is uncertainty in their leadership.
We must keep that in mind and take steps to reduce the potential
for miscalculation.
The meeting ended at approximately 9:30.
]
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
Burt-
/
Promit Pres. droft
speech (Tomorrow this weekend- morning) -
2
Tom get together
3
Discussion sometime
next what with Fres,
[Paper for Pres that
pulls together what
we discussed]
/
Communicating
2
speech sov attitudes
3
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
4
stockholm-
SECRET/SENSITIVE
AGENDA
I. Update on Current Status of US-Soviet Relations:
Shultz-Gromyko Meeting and Other Developments
II. Next Steps
A. Contacts
1. Diplomatic: Shultz/Dobrynin; Gromyko/Hartman
2. Ministerial Meetings
3. Military-to-Military
4. Parliamentary and Other
B. Substance
1. Arms Control
2. Regional
3. Human Rights
4. Bilateral
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
BY
White R House Guidalines, Fab. 24, 1983
# NABA, Date 10/10/95
GAILISNES/LTHOES
National Security Council
NON-SYS
The White House
EYES ONLY
System #
Package #
SEQUENCE TO
HAS SEEN
DISPOSITION
Executive Secretary
John Poindexter
/
&
Wilma Hall
2
3
Bud McFarlane
M
I
John Poindexter
4
Per
Executive
MATLOCK Situation NSC Secretariat Room Secretary 2
I= Information
A = Action
cc:
VP
Meese
Baker
DISTRIBUTION Deaver Should R = Retain be Other seen D= by: Dispatch (Date/Time) No further aloso Action
COMMENTS
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
Dec. 3, 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK
from
SUBJECT:
Today's Breakfast Meeting
Since I will be on a trip until Wednesday morning, I'd like to
pass on the following thoughts emerging from the meeting this
morning.
1. I believe that the President should deliver the speech on
U.S.-Soviet relations. This is important for both our public and
private diplomacy, since we need an enunciation of our policy at
the highest level. A speech by anyone else could lead to
speculation as to whether the policy really reflects the
President's views or not, and therefore could not have the same
impact. If possible, it should be delivered before Christmas, to
distance it a bit from the election year and to provide a basis
for our public and private diplomacy early next year.
2. In my view, the speech, while explaining where we are and how
we got there, should concentrate on policy for the future and
should cover the following points:
a. Reasons for the current tension: Soviet actions over more
than a decade and Soviet reaction to our success in arresting the
decline of U.S. and Western strength.
b. The fact that the world is not more but less dangerous in
terms of direct superpower military confrontation, because our
policies have our defenses under repair. The Soviets understand
that and are less likely to produce a confrontation by
miscalculation of our strength or will.
C. Our approach to the Soviets: the broad agenda (reducing
use and threat of force, lowering level of arms, building
confidence, including in human rights area), and the three
"pillars" of our approach: realism, strength, dialogue.
d. That we have told and will continue to tell the truth
about the Soviet Union, but this does not mean we are unwilling
to deal with them on a fair basis.
e. How our policies differ from detente and all-out military
confrontation.
f. A challenge to the Soviets to join us in a search for a
more peaceful world (not a flat prediction that they will do so).
DECLASSIFIED/REFEASC)
NLS MOZ-005 &5
BY Css NARA, DATE 11/20/03
-2-
Most of these elements are in the draft speech given you
yesterday, but it needs more persuasive language on points a, b
and e, as well as editing for style and conciseness.
3. Since we did not get very far last time in defining goals, I
have jotted down some rather laconic thoughts regarding the
framework in which our implicit goals might be cast (TAB A). If
you have time to look at it and note your reaction, that would be
helpful.
4. I will aim to do the paper Secretary Shultz requested by the
end of next week so that you can take a look at the draft over
next weekend. Please let me know if there are any other steps
you would like me to undertake.
DECLASSIFIED (RELEASD)
NLS MOCOOS 76
U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS
BY CU NARA, DATE 11/20/03
U.S. Goals
I. OVERALL GOAL
Given the long-term nature of the Soviet threat, we need a
policy which:
A. Provides adequate deterrence against Soviet military,
political or economic agression against the U.S. and its Allies;
B. Provides adequate military, political and economic means
to defeat attempts by the Soviets to tip the balance of power in
their favor, either regionally or globally; and
C. Is sustainable in a democratic society over the long
term.
Our principal goals, therefore, lie in sustaining and
increasing our own strength and cohesion and in maintaining the
health and political will of our Allies.
Negotiation and possible cooperation with the Soviets in
limited areas should be considered in that context: to the
extent that they contribute to the basic ends, they should be
pursued, but only so long as both the process and the results are
consistent with a deterrence posture.
Willingness to negotiate real differences, and a fair
negotiating posture, however, is an essential element in
maintaining broad public support for deterrence. They are
equally important in maintaining the health and political will of
allied nations, which constitute an essential element of our
strength in confronting Soviet expansionism.
II. GOALS FOR 1984
Background: Limiting factors on what achievements are possible:
A. Disarray in the Soviet leadership, which complicates the
decision-making process;
B. Soviet reluctance to offer confirmation that the Reagan
Administration policies work;
C. The U.S. election campaign, which will influence Soviet
decisions;
D. Soviet doubts that any significant deals are possible;
E. The nervousness of much West European public opinion,
which decreases the Soviet incentive to make major concessions.
- 2 -
There are, however, also a number of positive factors, which will
act to encourage the Soviets to come to terms:
A. The shift in the world-wide balance of power, which leads
logically to a Soviet retrenchment;
B. Soviet respect for the President's strength and his
ability to deliver if agreements are reached;
C. The prospect of a continuation of U.S. policy for at
least four more years, which makes early agreements advisable,
from their point of view.
Goals
Given these factors, particularly the disarray in the Soviet
leadership, our goals for 1984 must be modest, but should be
designed to maximize whatever opportunities may emerge, including
the possibility of a summit, if conditions should develop in such
a way to make one useful. Broadly speaking, they should be:
1. To maintain the domestic consensus behind our deterrence
posture and to strengthen Allied solidarity.
2. To maximize the chances of reaching sound agreements with
the Soviets without making fundamental concessions, while
recognizing that any significant agreements are likely to be
impossible.
3. To set the stage for more significant achievements in
1985 if progress is impossible in 1984, by articulating and
projecting a clear and consistent negotiating posture, and
simultaneously working to increase the pressures on the Soviets
to pursue less aggressive policies.
This requires moving simultaneously on several "tracks":
1. Articulate a clear policy line and project it
consistently, both publicly and privately.
2. Increase pressure on the Soviets when the actions are
not, on balance, counterproductive in terms of maintaining
domestic or Allied support.
3. Demonstrate the constancy of our basic policy.
4. Make clear to the Soviets that negotiations are possible
if they are directed at reducing the real causes of tension.
A
Dec. 3,1983 1983
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK
SUBJECT:
Today's Breakfast Meeting
Since I will be on a trip until Wednesday morning, I'd like to
pass on the following thoughts emerging from the meeting this
morning.
1. I believe that the President should deliver the speech on
U.S. -Soviet relations. This is important for both our public and
private diplomacy, since we need an enunciation of our policy at
the highest level. A speech by anyone else could lead to
speculation as to whether the policy really reflects the
President's views or not, and therefore could not have the same
impact. If possible, it should be delivered before Christmas, to
distance it a bit from the election year and to provide a basis
for our public and private diplomacy early next year.
2. In my view, the speech, while explaining where we are and how
we got there, should concentrate on policy for the future and
should cover the following points:
a. Reasons for the current tension: Soviet actions over more
than a decade and Soviet reaction to our success in arresting the
decline of U.S. and Western strength.
b. The fact that the world is not more but less dangerous in
terms of direct superpower military confrontation, because our
policies have our defenses under repair. The Soviets understand
that and are less likely to produce a confrontation by
miscalculation of our strength or will.
C. Our approach to the Soviets: the broad agenda (reducing
use and threat of force, lowering level of arms, building
confidence, including in human rights area), and the three
"pillars" of our approach: realism, strength, dialogue.
d. That we have told and will continue to tell the truth
about the Soviet Union, but this does not mean we are unwilling
to deal with them on a fair basis.
e. How our policies differ from detente and all-out military
confrontation.
f. A challenge to the Soviets to join us in a search for a
more peaceful world (not a flat prediction that they will do so).
DECLASSIFIED
Authority MOZ-005 #5
BY
Crs
NARA,
Date
11/20/03
- 2 -
There are, however, also a number of positive factors, which will
act to encourage the Soviets to come to terms:
A. The shift in the world-wide balance of power, which leads
logically to a Soviet retrenchment;
B. Soviet respect for the President's strength and his
ability to deliver if agreements are reached;
C. The prospect of a continuation of U.S. policy for at
least four more years, which makes early agreements advisable,
from their point of view.
Goals
Given these factors, particularly the disarray in the Soviet
leadership, our goals for 1984 must be modest, but should be
designed to maximize whatever opportunities may emerge, including
the possibility of a summit, if conditions should develop in such
a way to make one useful. Broadly speaking, they should be:
1. To maintain the domestic consensus behind our deterrence
posture and to strengthen Allied solidarity.
2. To maximize the chances of reaching sound agreements with
the Soviets without making fundamental concessions, while
recognizing that any significant agreements are likely to be
impossible.
3. To set the stage for more significant achievements in
1985 if progress is impossible in 1984, by articulating and
projecting a clear and consistent negotiating posture, and
simultaneously working to increase the pressures on the Soviets
to pursue less aggressive policies.
This requires moving simultaneously on several "tracks":
1. Articulate a clear policy line and project it
consistently, both publicly and privately.
2. Increase pressure on the Soviets when the actions are
not, on balance, counterproductive in terms of maintaining
domestic or Allied support.
3. Demonstrate the constancy of our basic policy.
4. Make clear to the Soviets that negotiations are possible
if they are directed at reducing the real causes of tension.
Authority MOZ-005 005 #6
DECLASSIFIED /RE/EAST
CAS
. NARA, Date 11/20/03
U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS
U.S. Goals
I. OVERALL GOAL
Given the long-term nature of the Soviet threat, we need a
policy which:
A. Provides adequate deterrence against Soviet military,
political or economic agression against the U.S. and its Allies;
B. Provides adequate military, political and economic means
to defeat attempts by the Soviets to tip the balance of power in
their favor, either regionally or globally; and
C. Is sustainable in a democratic society over the long
term.
Our principal goals, therefore, lie in sustaining and
increasing our own strength and cohesion and in maintaining the
health and political will of our Allies.
Negotiation and possible cooperation with the Soviets in
limited areas should be considered in that context: to the
extent that They contribute to the basic ends, they should be
pursued, but only so long as both the process and the results are
consistent with a deterrence posture.
Willingness to negotiate real differences, and a fair
negotiating posture, however, is an essential element in
maintaining broad public support for deterrence. They are
equally important in maintaining the health and political will of
allied nations, which constitute an essential element of our
strength in confronting Soviet expansionism.
II. GOALS FOR 1984
Background: Limiting factors on what achievements are possible:
A. Disarray in the Soviet leadership, which complicates the
decision-making process;
B. Soviet reluctance to offer confirmation that the Reagan
Administration policies work;
C. The U.S. election campaign, which will influence Soviet
decisions;
D. Soviet doubts that any significant deals are possible;
E. The nervousness of much West European public opinion
which decreases the Soviet incentive to make major concessions.
DECLARATED
/RE/EASO)
Authority MOZODS F6
U.S. -SOVIET RELATIONS
crs
NARA, Date 11/20/03
U.S. Goals
I. OVERALL GOAL
Given the long-term nature of the Soviet threat, we need a
policy which:
A. Provides adequate deterrence against Soviet military,
political or economic agression against the U.S. and its Allies;
B. Provides adequate military, political and economic means
to defeat attempts by the Soviets to tip the balance of power in
their favor, either regionally or globally; and
C. Is sustainable in a democratic society over the long
term.
Our principal goals, therefore, lie in sustaining and
increasing our own strength and cohesion and in maintaining the
health and political will of our Allies.
Negotiation and possible cooperation with the Soviets in
limited areas should be considered in that context: to the
extent that it contributes to the basic ends, it should be
pursued, but only so long as both the process and the results are
consistent with a deterrence posture.
Willingness to negotiate real differences, and a fair
negotiating posture, however, is an essential element in
maintaining broad public support for deterrence. The are equally
important in maintaining the health and political will of allied
nations, which constitute an essential element of our strength in
confronting Soviet expansionism.
GOALS FOR 1984
Background: Limiting factors on what achievements are possible:
A. Disarray in the Soviet leadership, which complicates the
decision-making process;
B. Soviet reluctance to offer confirmation that the Reagan
Administration policies work;
C. The U.S. election campaign, which will influence Soviet
decisions;
D. Soviet doubts that any significant deals are possible;
E. The nervousness of much West European public opinion,
which decreases the Soviet incentive to make major concessions.
- 2 -
There are, however, also a number of positive factors, which will
act to encourage the Soviets to come to terms:
A. The shift in the world-wide balance of power, which leads
logically to a Soviet retrenchment;
B. Soviet respect for the President's strength and his
ability to deliver if agreements are reached;
C. The prospect of a continuation of U.S. policy for at
least four more years, which makes early agreements advisable,
from their point of view.
Goals
Given these factors, particularly the disarray in the Soviet
leadership, our goals for 1984 must be modest, but maximize
whatever opportunities may emerge. Broadly speaking, they should
be:
1. To maintain the domestic consensus behind our deterrence
posture and to strengthen Allied solidarity.
2. To maximize the chances of reaching sound agreements with
the Soviets without making fundamental concessions, while
recognizing that any significant agreements are likely to be
impossible.
3. To set the stage for more significant achievements in
1985 if progress is impossible in 1984, by articulating and
projecting a clear and consistent negotiating posture, and
simultaneously working to increase the pressures on the Soviets
to pursue less aggressive policies.
This requires moving simultaneously on several "tracks":
1. Articulate a clear policy line and project it
consistently, both publicly and privately.
2. Increase pressure on the Soviets when the actions are not
counterproductive in terms of maintaining domestic or Allied
support.
3. Demonstrate the constancy of our basic policy.
4. Make clear to the Soviets that negotiations are possible
if they are directed at reducing the real causes of tension.
Authority MOZ005+6
RELEASE)
U.S. -SOVIET RELATIONS
NARA, Date 11/20/03
U.S. Goals
I. OVERALL GOAL
Given the long-term nature of the Soviet threat, we need a
policy which:
A. Provides adequate deterrence against Soviet military,
political or economic agression against the U.S. and its Allies;
B. Provides adequate military, political and economic means
to defeat attempts by the Soviets to tip the balance of power in
their favor, either regionally or globally; and
C. Is sustainable in a democratic society over the long
term.
Our principal goals, therefore, lie in sustaining and
increasing our own strength and cohesion and in maintaining the
health and political will of our Allies.
Negotiation and possible cooperation with the Soviets in
limited areas should be considered in that context: to the
extent that it contributes to the basic ends, it should be
pursued, but only so long as both the process and the results are
consistent with a deterrence posture.
Willingness to negotiate real differences, and a fair
negotiating posture, however, is an essential element in
maintaining broad public support for deterrence. The are equally
important in maintaining the health and political will of allied
nations, which constitute an essential element of our strength in
confronting Soviet expansionism.
GOALS FOR 1984
Background: Limiting factors on what achievements are possible:
A. Disarray in the Soviet leadership, which complicates the
decision-making process;
B. Soviet reluctance to offer confirmation that the Reagan
Administration policies work;
C. The U.S. election campaign, which will influence Soviet
decisions;
D. Soviet doubts that any significant deals are possible;
E. The nervousness of much West European public opinion,
which decreases the Soviet incentive to make major concessions.
- 2 -
There are, however, also a number of positive factors, which will
act to encourage the Soviets to come to terms:
A. The shift in the world-wide balance of power, which leads
logically to a Soviet retrenchment;
B. Soviet respect for the President's strength and his
ability to deliver if agreements are reached;
C. The prospect of a continuation of U.S. policy for at
least four more years, which makes early agreements advisable,
from their point of view.
Goals
Given these factors, particularly the disarray in the Soviet
leadership, our goals for 1984 must be modest, but maximize
whatever opportunities may emerge. Broadly speaking, they should
be:
1. To maintain the domestic consensus behind our deterrence
posture and to strengthen Allied solidarity.
2. To maximize the chances of reaching sound agreements with
the Soviets without making fundamental concessions, while
recognizing that any significant agreements are likely to be
impossible.
3. To set the stage for more significant achievements in
1985 if progress is impossible in 1984, by articulating and
projecting a clear and consistent negotiating posture, and
simultaneously working to increase the pressures on the Soviets
to pursue less aggressive policies.
This requires moving simultaneously on several "tracks":
1. Articulate a clear policy line and project it
consistently, both publicly and privately.
2. Increase pressure on the Soviets when the actions are not
counterproductive in terms of maintaining domestic or Allied
support.
3. Demonstrate the constancy of our basic policy.
4. Make clear to the Soviets that negotiations are possible
if they are directed at reducing the real causes of tension.