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Jack F. Matlock, Jr.'s Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) Subject Files
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: Treaties & Agreements - USSR
[Atomic Energy Agreement] (6)
Box: 37
To see more digitized collections visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection
Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected]
Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET
5/26/2005
File Folder
USSR-TREATIES/AGREEMENTS 6/24 [ATOMIC ENERGY FOIA
AGREEMENT 2/2]
F06-114/11
Box Number
37
YARHI-MILO
3709
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
11839 MEMO
CLARK TO SHULTZ RE RENEWAL OF U.S.-
1 6/23/1983 B1
USSR ATOMIC ENERGY AGREEMENT
R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11
11840 MEMO
SAME TEXT AS DOC #11839
1 6/23/1983 B1
R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11
11841 MEMO
CLARK TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE
2
ND
B1
RENEWAL OF U.S.-SOVIET ATOMIC
ENERGY AGREEMENT
R
4/14/2011
F2006-114/11
11842 MEMO
LENCZOWSKI TO CLARK RE RENEWAL OF
3 6/20/1983 B1
U.S.-USSR ATOMIC ENERGY EXCHANGE
AGREEMENT
R
4/14/2011
F2006-114/11
11846 MEMO
HILL TO CLARK RE RENEWAL OF US-USSR
4 6/16/1983 B1
AGREEMENT ON SCIENTIFIC AND
TECHNICAL COOPERATION IN THE FIELD
OF PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY
R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11
11847 MEMO
EUR/IG REPORT ON THE EXTENSION OF
4
ND
B1
THE US-USSR AGREEMENT ON
COOPERATION FOR PEACEFUL USES OF
ATOMIC ENERGY
R
4/14/2011
F2006-114/11
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET
5/26/2005
File Folder
USSR-TREATIES/AGREEMENTS 6/24 [ATOMIC ENERGY
FOIA
AGREEMENT 2/2]
F06-114/11
Box Number
37
YARHI-MILO
3709
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
11843 MEMO
GJELDE TO BURT RE RENEWAL OF THE US-
12 6/10/1983 B1
USSR AGREEMENT ON COOPERATION IN
THE PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY
R
3/7/2008
NLRRF06-114/11
11844 REPORT
ASSESSMENT OF THE RESULTS OF
18 3/4/1983 B1
MAGNETIC FUSION ENERGY
COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION 1974
THROUGH 1982
R
3/7/2008
NLRRF06-114/11
11845 MEMO
MARCUM TO SCHNEIDER RE US-USSR
1 6/13/1983 B1
ATOMIC ENERGY AGREEMENT
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
4170 11839
THE WHITE HOUSE
Zenczowskri
WASHINGTON
June 23, 1983
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
The Secretary of State
SUBJECT:
Renewal of U.S.-USSR Atomic Energy Agreement (C)
The President concurs with your recommendation to renew the
U.S.-USSR Agreement on Scientific and Technical Cooperation in
the Field of Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, and to make a
demarche to the Soviets on Sakharov. He also shares the concerns
of the intelligence community that all proper safeguards against
technology transfer be implemented. He recommends therefore,
that each exchange be carefully reviewed by an interagency group
to ensure that sensitive technologies be properly protected.
Finally, he has expressed concern that in conformity with
NSDD-75, appropriate measures be developed to ensure substantive
and ideological reciprocity, especially in the context of
private exchanges that may be an outgrowth of the official
exchanges that result from this agreement. (S)
FOR THE PRESIDENT:
William P. Clark
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
NLRR F06-114/11 #11839
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BY KML NARA DATE 4/21/11
WASHFAX RECEIPT
TAI WHITE HOUSED
its 18
C
JUN 1983 1023
URGENT
MESSAGE NO 394
CLASSIFICATION SECRET
PAGES 1
FROM NSC'S
(NAME)
(EXTENSION)
(ROOM WOMBER)
MESSAGE DESCRIPTION
TO (AGENCY)
DELIVER TO:
DEPT/ROOM NO.
ATEMION
A
Secretarist
REMARKS:
5,515,3/5-5
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By as
NARA, Date 8/8/02
4170
THE WHITE HOUSE
11840
WASHINGTON
June 23, 1983
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
The Secretary of State
SUBJECT:
Renewal of U.S.-USSR Atomic Energy Agreement (C)
The President concurs with your recommendation to renew the
U.S.-USSR Agreement on Scientific and Technical Cooperation in
the Field of Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, and to make a
demarche to the Soviets on Sakharov. He also shares the concerns
of the intelligence community that all proper safeguards against
technology transfer be implemented. He recommends therefore,
that each exchange be carefully reviewed by an interagency group
to ensure that sensitive technologies be properly protected.
Finally, he has expressed concern that in conformity with
NSDD-75, appropriate measures be developed to ensure substantive
and ideological reciprocity, especially in the context of
private exchanges that may be an outgrowth of the official
exchanges that result from this agreement. (S)
FOR THE PRESIDENT:
William P. Clark
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
NLRRF06-114/11 #11840 11840
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BY KML NARA DATE 4/21/11
4
4170
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
wpo
FROM:
William P. Clark
SUBJECT:
Renewal of U.S.-Soviet Atomic Energy Agreement
Issue: Whether to renew the U.S.-USSR Agreement on Scientific
and Technical Cooperation in the Field of Peaceful Uses of
Atomic Energy and to accompany it with a demarche to the Soviets
urging that Sakharov be moved to Moscow for humanitarian reasons.
Facts: This agreement is one of several U.S. -Soviet agreements
that are up for renewal this year. Pursuant to your directive,
NSDD-75, which recommends maintaining an ideological component
to U.S.-Soviet relations to help the process of evolutionary
change in the USSR and directs that existing exchanges not be
further dismantled, State is recommending that we renew this
agreement (Tab A). The intelligence community, however, recommends
that it be restricted to theoretical investigations and data
analysis so as to avoid the dangers of technology transfer.
Discussion: There are various costs and benefits in renewing
this agreement. The benefits are scientific and political. Not
only can you show the world your willingness to engage in
mutually beneficial cooperation with the Soviets, but we can use
such exchanges to expose the USSR to alternative political and
ideological influences.
The costs, however, involve the dangers of technology transfer,
the risks of an increased hostile intelligence and disinfor-
mation presence in the U.S., and the appearance of a return to
detente-style business as usual and the lifting of a Poland
sanction.
On balance, renewing the agreement would appear to be the most
advantageous course, so long as the full letter and spirit of
your directive NSDD-75 are met: specifically its requirement to
protect against technology transfer, to utilize the exchanges
for ideological influence and to ensure full reciprocity --
especially in any "spillover" private exchanges that grow out of
the official exchanges.
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
DECLASSIFIED
NLRRF06-114/11 #11841
11841
BY KML NARA DATE 4/21/11
SECRET
2
Currently our capability to ensure reciprocity in private
exchanges is severely handicapped by our lack of a more
effective visa control system. Although this is not the place
to make conclusions on this issue, it is a problem that needs
further work and decisionmaking. The process of renewing such
agreements as this and the transportation cooperation agreement
provide a helpful context for stimulating fresh thinking on
possible ways -- such as visa control -- to ensure full
reciprocity.
RECOMMENDATIONS
OK
No
1. That you authorize me to convey your concurrence
-
with State Department's recommendation to renew the
U.S. -Soviet Atomic Energy agreement with the
appropriate safeguards against technology transfer,
and to accompany this with a demarche urging that
Sakharov be moved to Moscow for humanitarian reasons.
2. That you authorize me to convey your concern that
-
effective measures be developed to ensure full
compliance with NSDD-75's requirement for full
reciprocity in private exchanges.
and Matlock burget Print and
approved both accommendations at 0930 6/82/83
Attachments:
F
Tab A
State's memorandum, June 16, 1983
Tab B
OSTP's memorandum, June 16, 1983
SECRET
nuck
4170
11842
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET
June 20, 1983
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK
FROM:
JOHN LENCZOWSKI
SUBJECT:
Renewal of U.S.-USSR Atomic Energy Exchange
Agreement
The State Department has transmitted to you a recommendation
that we renew the U.S.-USSR Agreement on Scientific and Technical
Cooperation in the Field of Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy that
expires June 21 (Tab A). On the basis of an interagency review
of the costs and benefits of the agreement, which has been in
effect since 1973, State recommends that the agreement be
extended for three years with a further automatic extension
(with termination option) for an additional two years. Because
exchanges conducted under this agreement have provided U.S.
scientists the opportunity to raise with the Soviets the plight
of Andrei Sakharov and the repression of many Soviet scientists,
State also recommends that renewal of this agreement be
accompanied by a demarche to the Soviets to urge that Sakharov
be returned to Moscow for humanitarian reasons.
Scientific-Technical Costs and Benefits
The Department of Energy has been the primary promoter of this
agreement based on its assessment that it has resulted in
substantial benefits to American scientific advancement. Its
report on these benefits is attached at Tab A-2. The National
Science Foundation concurs with DOE.
There are, however, reservations to DOE's sanguine analysis.
The Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) has expressed
concern that the adverse effects of this agreement have not been
adequately aired (see Tab B). Specifically it is concerned
about how exchanges conducted under this agreement provide a
significant conduit for technology transfer. OSTP also questions
the scientific value we have gained from these exchanges.
The intelligence community is also concerned about the technology
transfer problem and has recommended that all future activities
under this agreement be restricted to theoretical investigations
and data analysis. On this score, the State Department concurs.
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
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NLRRF06-114/11 #11842
BY KML NARA DATE 4/21/11
1
SECRET
2
Political Costs and Benefits
State says that the key political benefit in renewal of this
agreement is that it would serve our political interests by
affording us the flexibility to relax or tighten our exchanges
policy according to shifts in the political situation.
A year and a half ago, non-renewal of such exchange agreements
was one of the Polish martial law sanctions against the USSR.
NSDD-75 effectively revised this sanctions policy by directing
that exchanges not be further dismantled. The logic behind this
directive was that such exchanges serve as a vehicle of ideological
influence in the USSR and thus as a means of promoting evolutionary
change in the Soviet system. State does address this ideological
dimension in referring to the human rights appeals made by U.S.
scientists. However, the NSDD also refers to the necessity of
"full reciprocity" in such exchanges and the desirability of
using exchange agreements as a way of precluding private exchanges
that auger mostly to the benefit of the USSR.
Here is where problems may arise. The fact is that the signing
or renewal of any exchange agreement results in "spillover"
effects that extend beyond the boundaries of the agreement
itself. Primary among these effects are the whole range of
private exchanges that grow out of the official ones -- ostensibly
the very private exchanges that we hope to control. So far
State has not come up with any means of either controlling
these, assuring full reciprocity or even addressing the question
of the hostile intelligence presence that is invariably involved.
Such an agreement also amounts to an encouragement of other
segments of the private sector to conduct their own exchanges
with the Soviets. Thus, although it may not make front-page
news, it still serves as a signal of a revival of detente-style
relations with Moscow. Needless to say, the interests of most
of these groups are not the same as those the NSDD seeks to
serve -- namely to "maintain a strong ideological component" in
U.S.-Soviet relations.
In conclusion, if the framework of exchanges, of which the
Atomic Energy agreement is a part, is to serve the letter and
spirit of the President's directive and not the "interdependence"
logic of the detente period which Secretary Shultz just rejected
in his SFRC testimony, then State should come up with some kind
of mechanism whereby the detente-style "spillover" effects of
such agreements are mitigated and controlled. Some form of visa
control would be the best method. Today, we have no effective
way of keeping KGB agents, disinformation agents and propagandists
out of our country. It is this handicap that is the chief
source of our inability to maintain the kind of ideological and
substantive reciprocity that the NSDD seeks to ensure.
SECRET
8
SECRET
3
We already have a law on the books to exercise this kind of visa
control -- the Baker Amendement. As USIA Director Wick has
recommended, this should be invoked to be able to begin visa
controls. To do so, all that is necessary is for the Secretary
of State to consider that the Soviets are "not in substantial
compliance" with the Helsinki Accords. Although, ideally I
would like to see that renewal of the Atomic Energy agreement be
made conditional on some sort of visa control, I recognize that
such a move should be part of a much broader set of decisions on
U.S.-Soviet relations. Nevertheless, until such decisions are
made, I feel that the near-automatic extension of agreements
that not only produce detente-type effects but help to confer
legitimacy on the Soviet regime does not serve the long-term
security interests of the United States.
At Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President recommending
that he concur with State's recommendation to renew the Atomic
Energy agreement. It also recommends that he authorize you to
express concern to State that effective measures be developed to
ensure full reciprocity in private exchanges.
At Tab II is a memorandum to George Shultz concurring with
State's recommendation to renew the Atomic Energy agreement.
The memo emphasizes that the President shares the technology
transfer concerns of the intelligence community and encourages
that all proper safeguards be implemented. It reminds State of
the intent of the NSDD to ensure full reciprocity and the
limitation of unreciprocal private exchanges that may grow out
of the official exchanges, and recommends that State explore
ways of ensuring that this intent be fully satisfied.
JL for WM JL for JM JL for RP JL For Gw
Martin, Matlock, Pollock and Weiss concur.
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. That you sign the memorandum at Tab I to the President.
Approve
Disapprove
2.
That, conditional on the President's concurrence, you sign
the memorandum at Tab II to Secretary of State Shultz.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments:
Tab I
Memorandum to the President
Tab A
State's memorandum, June 16, 1983
Tab B
OSTP memorandum, June 16, 1983
Tab II
Proposed memorandum, Clark to Shultz
SECRET
S/S 8318466
11846
9
4170
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520
June 16, 1983
CONF DENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE
SUBJECT: Renewal of US-USSR Agreement on Scientific and
Technical Cooperation in the Field of Peaceful
Uses of Atomic Energy
The 1973 US-USSR Agreement on Scientific and Technical
Cooperation in the Field of Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy will
expire automatically on June 21, 1983. A new agreement
extending or amending the current agreement will be required if
we are to continue cooperation in this area.
BACKGROUND
Official science and technology exchange activities with
the Soviet Union have been cut back substantially on two
occasions - in 1980 at the time of the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan and in December 1981 when, as part of the sanctions
taken against the Soviet Union for its actions in Poland, the
President announced that three agreements (space, energy, and
science and technology) would be allowed to expire in 1982.
Since then, consistent with our policy (made explicit in
NSDD-75) not to dismantle further the framework of exchanges,
the USG decided in December 1982 to allow the automatic renewal
of the Agriculture Agreement to take place.
As the attached report indicates, it is the assessment of
the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) that the Atomic Energy
Agreement has resulted in tangible benefits to the U.S. and
should be extended. The intelligence community continues to
see possibilities for substantial U.S. intelligence gain
through cooperative activities. At the same time, the
community considers that there exists a potential for the
"loss" of U.S. technology through Soviet access to equipment
and diagnostics. To allay this concern, the intelligence
community recommends that the agreement be renewed for three
years with an option for a two-year extension and that the
exchanges be limited to theoretical investigations and data
analysis.
DECLASSIFIED
CONFI DENTIAL
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CONFI DENT IAL
-2-
STATE'S VIEWS
The exchange program carried out by the Department of
Energy is the third most active area of scientific and
technical exchange with the Soviet Union (the two most active
being environmental protection and health). State concurs in
DOE's assessment that the U.S. benefits from these activities
scientifically and that, from a technical perspective, they
should continue.
Given the controls which can be exercised under a
Government exchange program, we consider that technology
transfer concerns can be adequately addressed through existing
procedures. All activities would continue to be subject to a
case-by-case review on an interagency basis, which assures that
the intelligence community and FBI have opportunities to make
their views known.
Since allowing three exchange agreements (space, energy,
and science and technology) to lapse in 1982, as part of the
sanctions against the Soviet Union for its heavy and direct
responsibility for repression in Poland, in December 1982, the
NSC (acting on the Department's recommendation) decided that
the Agriculture Agreement would be allowed to extend
automatically. This was in line with the policy formally
enunciated in NSDD-75 in January 1983. On political grounds,
consistent with the policy of NSDD-75 that the "U.S. should not
further dismantle the framework of exchanges," it also would be
in the U.S. interest to extend the Atomic Energy Agreement.
In terms of our overall relationship with the Soviet Union,
an extension of the agreement would provide us some flexibility
to adjust the tightening or relaxing of our exchanges policy to
future shifts in the political situation. We follow this
approach under other agreements where we are continuing with
certain routine exchanges, particularly in areas relating to
health, pollution control, and safety.
For their part, the Soviets have indicated at senior levels
a clear interest in extending the agreement -- most recently
the Soviet Minister-Counselor at a meeting at State's Office of
Soviet Union Affairs and earlier this spring, a high official
CONFI DENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
-3-
of the USSR State Committee for Atomic Energy during a meeting
with Ambasador-at-Large Kennedy. These approaches are in line
with the importance the Soviets attach to cooperation with the
U.S. in the nuclear field and with their view of the exchanges
framework as an important aspect of our overall bilateral
relationship.
As in our other science and technology exchange programs,
the activities conducted pursuant to the Atomic Energy
Agreement afford our visiting American specialists with
opportunities not otherwise possible to gain access to Soviet
scientists and facilities and to keep abreast of Soviet
developments and efforts in this key scientific area. This is
of clear benefit scientifically to the U.S. The agreement's
framework also provides opportunities for our visiting
scientists to engage in informal dialog with their Soviet
colleagues on U.S. positions on a wide range of topics,
paramount among them the American displeasure at the continuing
repression of many Soviet scientists.
In this regard, the access provided under the Atomic Energy
Agreement has provided unique opportunities for visiting
American physicists to raise the plight of Andrei Sakharov with
their Soviet collegues. Sakharov's wife, in a recent
conversation with officers from our Embassy in Moscow, urged
that the agreement be extended so that U.S. physicists can
continue to voice their concerns in the context of their
exchange visits. Indeed, this would be a valuable use of the
agreement, particularly in light of the President's personal
concern with the case and his recent proclamation of National
Sakharov Day. We would plan to pair our informing the Soviets
of our decision to extend the agreement with a demarche to the
Soviets to allow Sakharov to return to Moscow for humanitarian
reasons.
Although DOE recommends a five-year extension term, State
considers that a shorter period affords us more flexibility to
review the agreement in the context of the overall political
situation. Accordingly, we would prefer an exchange of notes
providing for an extension for an initial three-year period
and, unless we choose to exercise a termination option at that
time, a subsequent automatic two-year renewal. This
CONFIDENTIAL
12
CONFI DENTIAL
-4-
arrangement would provide a mechanism for reviewing the
agreement at the end of three years and again two years later
in light of the overall political situation.
STATE'S RECOMMENDATION
State recommends that we propose to the Soviets that the
agreement be extended by an exchange of notes for a three-year
period with a further automatic extension (with termination
option) at that time for an additional two year period. In
informing the Soviets of our decision, State also recommends we
make a demarche to the Soviets to allow Sakharov to return to
Moscow for humanitarian reasons.
Charles
Executive Secretary
Attachments:
1. EUR/IG Report on the Extension of the
US/USSR Agreement on Scientific and Technical
Cooperation on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy
2. DOE Evaluation
3. US-USSR Agreement on Scientific and Technical
Cooperation on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy
CONF I DENTIAL
11847
EUR/IG REPORT ON THE EXTENSION OF THE US-USSR
AGREEMENT ON COOPERATION FOR PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY
The 1973 US-USSR Agreement on Scientific and Technical
Cooperation in the Field of Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy will
expire automatically on June 21, 1983. A new agreement
extending or amending the current agreement will be required if
we are to continue cooperation in this area.
The Agreement on Scientific and Technical Cooperation in
the Field of Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy was signed in
Washington by President Nixon and Soviet President Brezhnev
during the Nixon-Brezhnev Summit. It was one of the eleven
such agreements concluded at three summits between 1972 and
1974. Of the others, five have been renewed successively for
five year terms, and two others for reduced terms. Three
agreements, (space, energy, and science and technology) were
allowed to expire in 1982 in accordance with the President's
December 1981 announcement of sanctions against the Soviet
Union.
Over the life of the agreement, activities have taken place
under the Atomic Energy Agreement in the following areas:
1. Controlled Thermonuclear Fusion - to demonstrate
jointly the scientific and technical feasibility of fusion
through the eventual development of prototype and demonstration-
scale thermonuclear reactors.
2. Fundamental Properties of Matter - to conduct joint
theoretical and experimental studies on mutually-agreed
subjects with emphasis on high, medium, and low energy physics.
3. Fast Breeder Reactors - to find solutions to mutually
agreed basic and applied problems connected with the design,
development, construction and operation of nuclear power
stations utilizing fast breeder reactors.
As one of the sanctions imposed on the Soviet Union
following their invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, support and
funding for exchange activities under all eleven science and
technology agreements were reduced significantly. While
activities under the Atomic Energy Agreement also declined to a
low level (with cooperation in Fast Breeder Reactors ceasing
entirely), exchanges continued and the framework of cooperation
in this area remained intact.
CONF DENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED
NLRRE06-114/11 #11847
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14
CONF DENTIAL
-2-
The Soviets clearly are interested in the access the
agreement gives them to U.S. developments in atomic energy
research. DOE and other USG elements believe the cooperation
is carried out with proper safeguards on the transfer of
critical technology. However, the intelligence community has
recommended that should the agreement be extended, exchanges in
this area be limited to to theoretical investigations and data
analysis.
SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS AND AGENCY RECOMMENDATIONS
DOE's evaluation comments indicated:
The three areas of cooperation under the agreement have
also been recognized by this Administration as the special
responsibility of the Federal Government to develop. Fiscal
Year 1984 budget requests total approximately a half billion
dollars for each of these programs, which are tackling some of
the most difficult scientific challenges ever undertaken.
The activities carried out pursuant to the agreement have
been vital to achieving the objectives of gaining better access
to the scarce scientific talent necessary for progress in these
areas, to see first-hand heretofore-inaccessible Soviet
facilities and to understand better the Soviet scientific
system and its institutions.
The agreement provides a highly effective channel for the
views of the American scientific community to be expressed to
leaders of the Soviet scientific establishment and a window to
monitor the state-of-the-art of key Soviet technologies with
potential military applications.
DOE, as set forth in its report (attached), recommends the
agreeement be renewed for a period of five years, with an
automatic renewal (with termination option) for an additional
five year period. DOE does not recommend any modification in
the existing language of the agreement to change implementation
of cooperative activities under it.
State recommends proposing an exchange of notes with the
Soviets providing for a three-year extension with a further
automatic extension (with termination option) at that time for
CONF I DENTIAL
is
CONFI DENTIAL
-3-
an additional two year period. State agrees with DOE that
there is no need to modify otherwise the existing language of
the Atomic Energy Agreement.
Consistent with the policy directive in NSDD-75, State
believes that while we should continue to limit and monitor the
overall level of exchanges in response to Soviet actions, we
should not further dismantle the framework of exchanges which
now exists. As in our other science and technology exchange
programs, the activities conducted pursuant to the Atomic
Energy Agreement afford our visiting American specialists with
opportunities not otherwise possible to gain access to Soviet
scientists and facilities and to keep abreast of Soviet
developments and efforts in this key scientific area. This is
of clear benefit scientifically to the U.S. The agreement's
framework also provides opportunities for our visiting
scientists to engage in informal dialog with their Soviet
colleagues on U.S. positions on a wide range of topics,
paramount among them the American displeasure at the continuing
repression of many Soviet scientists.
In this regard, the access provided under the Atomic Energy
Agreement has provided unique opportunities for visiting
American physicists to raise the plight of Andrei Sakharov with
their Soviet collegues. Sakharov's wife, in a recent
conversation with officers from our Embassy in Moscow, urged
that the agreement be extended so that U.S. physicists can
continue to voice their concerns in the context of their
exchange visits. Indeed, this would be a valuable use of the
agreement, particularly in light of the President's personal
concern with the case and his recent proclamation of National
Sakharov Day. State recommends that we pair our informing the
Soviets of our decision to extend the agreement with a demarche
to the Soviets to allow Sakharov to return to Moscow for
humanitarian reasons.
In favoring the extension of the agreement, State agrees
with the assessment from the intelligence community that
activities be restricted to theoretical investigations and data
analysis so as to minimize the loss of important U.S.
technology.
CONFI DENTIAL
CONFI DENTIAL
-4-
DOD made no recommendation on the extension of the
agreement.
Committee on Exchanges (COMEX) concurs in DOE's
recommendation to extend the agreement, but favors a three-year
renewal followed by an optional two-year extension. COMEX also
recommends that activities in the future be restricted to
theoretical investigations and data analysis, so as to minimize
the transfer of technology.
National Science Foundation concurs in DOE's recommendation
and commented that DOE had prepared a balanced assessment and
convincing argument for continuing activities in this area.
Other Agencies offered no comment.
CONFI I DENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
PRETMENT
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/11 #11843
Department of Energy
BY as NARADATE 3/7/08
Washington, D.C. 20585
June 10, 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR Richard Burt
Chairman, Interagency Coordinating
Committee for US-Soviet Affairs
Department of State
FROM:
Special Assistant to the Secretary
for Policy and Programs
SUBJECT:
Renewal of the US-USSR Agreement on
Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of
Atomic Energy
The three areas specified for cooperation under the US-USSR
Agreement on Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy
have also been recognized by this Administration as the special
responsibility of the Federal Government to develop; they are
Magnetic Fusion, High Energy and Nuclear Physics, and Fast
Breeder Reactors. The Administration has requested FY 84 budgets
of approximately a half billion dollars for each of these programs
which are tackling some of the most difficult scientific challenges
ever undertaken. A US objective in establishing the Atomic Energy
Agreement was to gain better access to the scarce scientific talent
necessary for progress in these areas, particularly in magnetic
fusion and high energy and nuclear physics, to see first-hand
heretofore inaccessible Soviet facilities to better evaluate Soviet
scientific claims and achievements, and to understand better the
Soviet scientific system and its institutions. The Agreement has
been vital to achieving these objectives for the three high priority
programs of the Department of Energy (DOE).
During the early years of the Agreement, DOE explored many topics
for possible cooperation and some proved to be much more beneficial
than others. Through this experience, DOE has learned to maximize
the benefits for the US from the exchanges with the Soviets. Partic-
ularly in the areas of magnetic fusion and high energy and nuclear
physics, the benefits have been primarily in the form of innovation
in both theoretical and experimental physics; the resulting advances
in the US programs have more than paid for the costs of the exchanges.
While the Soviets do publish their scientific results, the publica-
tions are generally delayed and are of poor quality. Therefore, the
scientist-to-scientist contacts are often crucial for transferring
information. The Agreement has been particularly helpful in gain-
ing access to some of the Soviet laboratories, allowing US scientists
to examine personally Soviet research experiments and technology.
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized disclosure subject to criminal and administrative sanctions
Originally Classified by: Harold Jaffe
Acting DAS for IEC/NNP
(TH)
Declassity on:
OADR
CONFIDENTIAL
(Date Exent/DADR)
CONFIDENTIAL
2
While cooperation in Fast Breeder Reactors is currently dormant,
DOE is interested in reviving a small level of activity to help
it monitor more effectively Soviet progress in operating two of
the world's largest Fast Breeder Reactors, the BN-350 and the
BN-600.
With or without the Agreement, DOE's Visitor Access and
Control system would control access to US facilities for
Soviet visitors as for other nationalities. However, the
Agreement enables us to better coordinate and centralize
control over Soviet visitors and to better monitor both
Soviet and DOE-contractor travel to each other's organizations,
to better ensure that US technology is not being inadvertently
transferred to the Soviets, and to press the Soviets for
access to their facilities, experimental results and personnel
as required to meet program objectives.
The Department of Energy recognizes that the renewal will be
made at a high level within the context of overall US-USSR
relationships and that US foreign and national security
policy needs are the primary factors in the decision.
However, it should be noted that DOE can always constrict
the level of activity under the Agreement. For its part,
DOE recommends that the US-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in
the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy be renewed. While many
experimental projects in the area of Fundamental Properties
of Matter require years to organize, build, operate and
analyze results, renewal for another ten years would appear
to be appropriate from a technical point of view. However,
at this time, DOE recommends that the renewal be for only
five years to provide for more frequent, senior level ex-
amination of activities and relations.
The Department of Energy has found no reason to modify the
existing language of the Agreement to improve implementation
of cooperative activities under it. Although the Agreement
calls for a Joint Coordinating Committee to meet annually,
the Committee has not met since 1978, and the cooperative
activities have continued successfully without it. The Department
does not foresee any reason for the Joint Coordinating Committee,
composed of senior members of the Department, to meet to resolve
programmatic and implementation issues. The Soviets, who have
been represented by the State Committee for the Utilization of
Atomic Energy, have not pressed over the past five years for the
Joint Coordinating Committee to meet.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
19
3
In consideration of renewal of the Agreement, it should be
kept in mind that the cooperative activities provide a
highly effective channel for the views of the American
scientific community to be expressed to leaders of the
Soviet scientific establishment, and a window to monitor the
state-of-the-art of key Soviet technologies with potential
military applications. If the Agreement is not to be
extended, DOE urges that other mechanisms be established to
ensure that this valuable window on Soviet activities
remains open.
Attached is a summary review and assessment of the activities
under the Agreement which support the Department's recommendation
of renewal, and separate, more detailed appendices by the DOE
Program organizations. We will be happy to provide any additional
information you may require.
Earl Bjeble
Earl Gjelde
Attachment
CONFIDENTIAL
20
Review and Assessment of
The US-USSR Agreement in The
Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy
Background
The US-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of
Atomic Energy was signed by President Nixon and General Secretary
Brezhnev on June 21, 1973, and is one of 11 bilateral cooperative
agreements concluded with the USSR in the early 1970's. The Agreement
was preceded by a one-year Memorandum of Understanding between the
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and the USSR State Committee for the
Utilization of Atomic Energy, signed September 28, 1972.
The Agreement is in force from June 1973 to June 1983 and may be
modified or extended by mutual agreement. Cooperation is to be
carried out under the Agreement on the basis of equality, mutual
benefit, and reciprocity. Termination of the Agreement would not
necessarily affect the validity of active implementing protocols
and contracts as the Agreement allows these to be carried to
completion.
The Agreement provides for cooperation in three major areas:
1) Controlled Thermonuclear Fusion, 2) Fast Breeder Reactors,
and 3) Research in the Fundamental Properties of Matter.
The purpose of cooperation in Controlled Thermonuclear Fusion,
is to demonstrate jointly the scientific and technical feasibility
of fusion through the eventual development of prototype and demon-
stration-scale thermonuclear reactors.
The purpose of cooperation in Fundamental Properties of Matter is
to conduct joint theoretical and experimental studies on mutually
agreed subjects with emphasis on high, medium, and low energy
physics.
Cooperation in Fast Breeder Reactors is directed toward finding
solutions to mutually agreed basic and applied problems connected
with the design, development, construction and operation of nuclear
power stations utilizing fast breeder reactors.
A Joint Committee on Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy
was established in February 1974 to review annually past cooperation,
approve new proposals, and address important issues as they arose. The
Joint Committee has met five times, in February 1974, October 1974,
December 1975, December 1976 and April 1978. Prior to the establish-
ment of the Department of Energy, the U.S. side of the Joint Committee
was headed by the Administrator of the Energy Research and Development
Administration (ERDA). The last meeting was chaired by the US side
by the Deputy Secretary of Energy. The DOE Office of International
Affairs serves as the Executive Secretary for the Agreement.
21
2
Magnetic Fusion
Program Description
Activities conducted under the Magnetic Fusion exchange program are
joint meetings, workshops, symposia, etc., and long-term assignments
of scientists to each other's facilities.
The topics under the Magnetic Fusion exchange originally covered
all aspects of magnetic fusion (as opposed to inertial confinement
fusion, whose subject matter is mostly classified), from the
science of plasma confinement research to the technology of
power reactors. In 1981, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,
both countries agreed to a U.S. initiative to limit the scope of
the exchange only to topics on plasma theory, experimental
physics, and technology related to physics experiments. This was in
response to a new policy directed by State of pursuing only those
activities of substantial interest to DOE.
A ten-year Protocol on Joint Projects in Controlled Thermonuclear
Fusion and Plasma Physics of February 6, 1974, established the
US-USSR Joint Fusion Power Coordinating Committee (JFPCC) to review
the status of each other's program, address issues resulting from
past actions and make recommendations for new activities. The
JFPCC has met every year since 1974 except for 1980.
The level of effort in fusion is given in Table 1. As can be
seen, the level of exchange activity increased through 1976 as
the participants on both sides took advantage of their initial
opportunity to learn in detail about the activities of the other
country. After 1976, the level of activity began to drop as the
exchange participants became more familiar with each other's
programs. This reduction coincided with a slowdown in the momen-
tum of the Soviet fusion program, in part due to the death of its
leader, Lev Artsimovich. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in
late 1979 resulted in a hiatus of nearly two years. By mid-1981,
agreement had been reached in principle to resume the exchanges on
a modest, more selective basis.
Dollar costs of the exchanges with the USSR are minimal. The
exchange operates on the principle that the "sending side pays" the
expenses of their traveling delegation, such as transportation
costs, per diem, and telephone calls. For the DOE fusion program,
the manpower cost of time spent preparing for and participating in
exchanges in the USSR and hosting exchanges in the U.S. are integrated
into the program's general budget. This expense is generally in
direct support of priority program activities and is not considered
as a special cost against program resources.
3
Assessment
The Soviet fusion program is slightly larger than the US program,
and until the mid-1970's, was considered the world's leader. It is
still quite competitive with the US program, but recently has been
hampered by its shortcomings in support technology, some of which
has been compensated by theoretical resourcefulness and experimental
creativity.
Over the past 15 years, the Soviet fusion program has achieved
major discoveries and successes which have profoundly affected the
US fusion program. Soviet achievements cover every major aspect of
fusion science. The Soviets invented the Tokamak confinement
concept on which DOE has expended the majority of its program funds
over the past ten years. The Soviets were coinventors of the
magnetic well for mirror machines, did the original work on the
concepts which led to the development of the plasma-stream stabili-
zation process for mirrors, and simultaneously with the US, invented
the tandem mirror concept; next to tokamaks, the DOE fusion program
is spending the largest amount of its funds to develop the mirror
confinement concept. The Soviets are the world leaders in developing
compact toroids, a highly promising concept as a relatively small and
inexpensive fusion reactor. The Soviets were the first to operate a
tokamak with superconducting magnets and pioneered the development
of negative-ion neutral-beam sources and gyrotrons for plasma
heating. The Soviets are world leaders in fusion theory which is
the analytic underpinning for all fusion design work. The Soviets
are also placing more emphasis in certain areas than the US, such
as stellarators, fusion/fission hybrid reactor designs, adiabatic
compressional heating, and electromagnetic traps. It is advances
such as these which the DOE fusion program has tried to exploit
through the Atomic Energy Agreement.
Essentially all of the detailed information obtained from the
Soviet magnetic fusion program is through the fusion exchange
program. In contrast to US practice, the Soviets have access to
almost all DOE-sponsored work through the open literature. More-
over, due to travel restrictions and foreign exchange limitations,
Soviets are not well represented at international conferences and
their papers seldom provide the details needed to understand fully
their work. This severely limits the utility of conferences as a
means of acquiring Soviet information. Soviets are also reticent
to discuss their failures or problems unless they know and trust
their counterparts. Thus, DOE needs the exchange to gain this
information while the Soviets do not rely on the exchange nearly as
much. Since the cost of the exchange is low, the exchange program
is a major asset to the DOE fusion program.
Another measure of value of the exchange is the attitude of scien-
tists participating in the exchanges. While the number of exchanges
reached a high point in 1976-77, by 1979 the attitude of most US
4
scientists was that the exchange was a burden to be tolerated.
Without any exchanges in 1980 and 1981, this attitude prevailed
at the resumption of activities in 1982. By the end of the 11
exchanges conducted in 1982, the attitude had shifted to one of
support and appreciation of the exchanges due to the programmatic
value of the interactions of US scientists with their Soviet
counterparts.
For the future, if the US-USSR Atomic Energy Agreement is renewed,
DOE expects that the fusion exchanges would continue to be of
substantial benefit to DOE, not only because of the experience
gained over the past ten years on how to work and communicate
with the Soviets, but also because the Soviet fusion program is
expected to continue at about the same level and pace as the US
program. The exchange would continue to be focused on plasma
theory, experimental physics, and technology related to physics
experiments.
Fundamental Properties of Matter
Program Description
Exchanges between the US and USSR have been underway since 1959.
In December 1975, the Joint Committee established the US-USSR
Joint Committee on Cooperation in the Fundamental Properties of
Matter (JCCFPM) to guide the cooperative program in this area.
Cooperative activities in the field of high energy physics, nuclear
(i.e. medium energy) physics, and accelerator sciences include
visits by individual scientists and groups to laboratories and
universities; conferences and workshops on specialized topics by
theorists and experimentalists; experiments, principally at major
accelerator laboratories; and research and development activities
on accelerator physics and detectors. This exchange program is the
most extensive under the Atomic Energy Agreement and involves
multi-year experimental programs, usually at US facilities, with
the transport of expensive Soviet hardware to US laboratories.
The normal mode of operation of the JCCFPM since 1975 has been to
meet alternately in the US and USSR at intervals of about a year.
Signed records of the meeting always included an agreed-upon program
of cooperation for the coming year. New programs arising during the
year were agreed upon by communications between the US and USSR
cochairmen. Since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the
subsequent new guideline of pursuing only activities of substantial
benefit to DOE, there have been fewer cooperative activities.
The fifth JCCFPM was held in February 1982 shortly after the
imposition of martial law in Poland. Under revised US guidelines,
DOE was able to discuss proposed plans for 1982 and to have each
activity continue on a case-by-case basis, but was not allowed to
sign an agreed-upon plan. The Soviets expressed unhappiness with
this new US position and pointed out their difficulties in committing
resources to projects subject to subsequent US review and possible
cancellation. Nevertheless, since this meeting, the Soviet have
continued their past practice of building and exporting special
equipment to the US for cooperative experiments.
5
Soviet scientists participating in experiments in the US make up
the majority of the exchanges in Fundamental Properties of Matter,
in a ratio of about 5 to 1 in man-weeks. This is due to the
superior US facilities in which experiments can be conducted.
Soviet research proposals compete with those from other countries
in high energy physics and are judged on the basis of scientific
merit, not national origin.
Assessment
The exchange program in the Fundamental Properties of Matter
has served to keep open valuable channels of communication with
the Soviet high-energy and nuclear-physics community. Although
exchanges were conducted prior to the the US-USSR Atomic Energy
Agreement, the formal program has helped very much to pave the
way for reciprocal exchanges. The JCCFPM meetings have served
to coordinate and regulate these exchanges and have greatly helped
US scientists to gain access to Soviet laboratories and institutes.
The JCCFPM is also an official channel through which the US and
USSR can communicate policy and operational concerns relative to
the exchange. Because a number of USSR and US high energy physi-
cists tend to be prominent in advising their governments, these
channels have had added importance.
Technical benefits to the US have been substantial in the areas
where the Soviets excel, such as accelerator R&D, instrumentation
(i.e. detector) R&D, and theoretical physics. These areas are
generally conceptual in nature and indeed Soviet scientists have
created and shared some very innovative ideas. For example, the
Soviets did the original theoretical and experimental work on the
Radio Frequency Quadrupole, which was then fully developed by
the Los Alamos National Laboratory for use as the accelerator
on the proposed, $200 million Fusion Materials Irradiation Test
Facility. The Soviets also developed the negative ion source
which has become the standard source used in the US for injecting
high brightness beams into circular accelerators as well as the
source for the development of high energy neutral beam injectors
used in magnetic fusion research. The US is also developing
detectors originated at Novosibirsk which promise to achieve the
best time resolution of any detector now available for tracking
subatomic particles. These conceptual ideas are the most important
long term benefits of the exchange in the Fundamental Properties of
Matter.
When the Soviets come to the US to conduct experiments, they
usually bring accelerator detectors and other components designed
and built in the USSR. These contributions are valuable to accel-
erator R&D and experimentation, and have saved the US several
million dollars. DOE has not transported instrumentation of any
significance to the USSR under this exchange program.
The Soviets are currently supplying accelerator/detector components
for four major experiments at the Fermi National Accelerator
Laboratory. This Soviet equipment will save DOE over $8.5 million
6
dollars and allow some experiments to take place one or two years
earlier than otherwise possible. In these programs, the Soviet
investment is considered to be substantial, and the US stands to
profit considerably from their contribution. Details of these
programs are given in Appendix 2.
In the future, if the Agreement is renewed, more US scientists are
likely to go to the USSR than they have in the past. The USSR has
initiated construction of a very big superconducting proton acceler-
ator, UNK, which will be capable of reaching record energies of 3
TeV by about 1990. Access to the unique capabilities of this fixed
target accelerator will probably be sought by US scientists desiring
to do experiments in this energy range, and additional physics
benefits to the US are anticipated, including new discoveries.
Fast Breeder Reactors
Program Description
The Fast Breeder Reactor cooperation was based upon a Protocol on
Cooperation in the Field of Fast Neutron Breeder Reactors between
the US Atomic Energy Commission and the USSR State Committee for
the Utilization of Atomic Energy. The Protocol was signed October 4,
1974, and expires ten years hence. The Protocol established a
Joint Coordinating Committee which has met five times.
Under the guidance of the Joint Coordinating Committee, exchanges
of papers and their discussion were conducted on a relatively ad
hoc basis. There has been no assignment of personnel. The few
seminars held focused on the development of steam generators for
Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactors. Some US cladding materials were
tested in the Soviet BOR-60 breeder reactor and some USSR cladding
materials were tested in the EBR-II. The final experimental
results have yet to be exchanged, in part due to the absence of a
pressing DOE demand for the data. The results of other tests on
steam generator and other materials were discussed at the Tampa
Steam Generator Seminar in October 1978. Exploratory talks on the
possiblity of testing a US steam generator in the Soviet BN-350
breeder were terminated in 1978 because of the major cost required
to rectify the technical incompatibilities between the Soviet
reactor and the US steam generator, which was designed for use on
the Clinch River Breeder Reactor.
The level of activities during the 1974-1979 period was modest,
consisting primarily of technical information exchanged by means of
seminars. Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December
1979, the cooperative program came to a virtual standstill from
which it has never recovered.
Each side paid its own expenses (primarily associated with seminar
preparation, travel and translation costs) which were estimated
at less than $100,000 per year during the five years of activity.
26
7
Assessment
The Fast Breeder Reactor exchange during its active period led to a
large increase in the US awareness, understanding, appreciation and
personal knowledge of the Soviet LMFBR program. Most scientists
and engineers who participated in FBR exchanges reported that their
contacts with the USSR were beneficial.
However, the exchange was not balanced and favored the Soviets.
The FBR exchange was considered a high priority by the Soviets,
providing them, among other things, access to US high quality
assurance practices in the design, development, construction
and operation of LMFBRs, an area of weakness in the Soviet program.
Although on a one-to-one basis the Soviets appeared willing to
exchange information and materials, governmental procedures concerning
the release of technological information to foreigners severely
limited the quality and quantity of information and materials
actually received by DOE.
Nevertheless, the DOE nuclear program would like to maintain the
option for future Fast Breeder Reactor exchanges under a renewed
Atomic Energy Agreement. The Soviets are now operating the
world's largest LMFBR, the BN600. The Atomic Energy Agreement may
provide DOE an avenue by which useful information on this program
could be obtained. This could be achieved by carefully and rigorously
structuring the scope and agenda of each exchange in advance to
ensure that the topics of interest to DOE are covered and that the
exchange is balanced.
Other Topics
Cooperative activities in the areas of Thermionics, Spent-Fuel
Storage, and Light Water Reactor (LWR) Safety were also explored.
The decline in the DOE thermionics program frustrated the efforts
of a proposed program put together by the two delegations exchanged
in 1976 and 1977. Delegations were exchanged in LWR Safety in 1978,
and the topic was approved by the Joint Committee in April 1978.
However, the program was dropped when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan.
The exchange in Spent Fuel Storage was never initiated because of a
lack of sufficient mutual interest.
Recommendation
On the basis of the foregoing discussion DOE considers the technical
benefits accruing to its programs, particularly in the areas of
Magnetic Fusion and Fundamental Properties of Matters, to warrant
extension of the Atomic Energy Agreement. We recommend that the
Agreement be renewed without modification. Experience has shown
that the work under the Agreement has been highly beneficial, and
the activities can readily and effectively be expanded or curtailed
2
8
as conditions warrant. While the area of Fast Breeder Reactors is
currently dormant, we recommend that the topic not be deleted as it
may at some point in the future provide us with valuable insight
into the significant USSR LMFBR program. We recommend that the
Agreement be renewed for ten years, since progress in the program
areas is dependent upon large experimental projects, which require
time frames on the order of a decade to build, operate and analyze
the results.
TABLE 1
STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF EFFORT FOR VISITS AND ASSIGNMENTS TO
IMPLEMENT ACTIVITIES UNDER THE US-USSR ATOMIC ENERGY AGREEMENT
Calendar
Man-Weeks
Man-Weeks
Year
from US
from USSR
Controlled Thermonuclear Fusion
1974
68
44
1975
129
127
1976
191
142
1977
132
130
1978
98
63
1979
33
51
1980
0
0
1981
0
0
1982
24
42
Fundamental Properties of Matter
1976
1977
110
430
1978
43
210
1979
6
309
1980
66
238
1981
39
240
1982
24
303
Fast Breeder Reactors
1974
18
10
1975
22
9
1976
21
12
1977
0
8
1978
5
19
1979
24
6
1980
0
0
1981
0
0
1982
0
0
Assessment of the Results
of
Magnetic Fusion Energy Cooperation
between the
United States and the Soviet Union
1974 through 1982
March 4, 1983
DECLASSIFIED /RE/0450)
APPENDIX I
NLRR F06-114/11+11844
BY CH NARA DATE 3/7/08
I. Objectives
The objective of the magnetic fusion energy programs in both the United
States and the Soviet Union is to develop the understanding of magnetically
confined nuclear fusion to the point where this process can be used as a
controlled source of energy. The objective of the bilateral exchange
between the U.S. and Soviet magnetic fusion programs under the US/USSR
Atomic Energy Agreement is to share the information developed separately by
the two programs to assist in their independent activities.
The scope of the magnetic fusion exchange covered all magnetic confinement
development activities when it was initiated, including both scientific
and technological aspects extending from basic confinement research to
power reactor applications. After the invasion of Afghanistan, both
countries agreed to a U.S. initiative to reduce the scope of the exchange
to science topics (1.e., plasma theory and experimental physics) and tech-
nology directly related to science experiments. This reduction was arranged
for two reasons; first, because the U.S. had not benefitted equitably from
past technology exchanges other than those directly related to science
experiments, and second, to avoid questions concerning the transfer of
sensitive technology information.
II. Program Description
A formal agreement providing for the exchange of information on fusion
development has existed between the U.S. and the Soviet Union since 1958.
This was renewed and broadened in mid-1973 as part of the Nixon-Brezhnev
accord. The exchange activities reached a peak of more than 100 man weeks
in 1976-1977. Based on an assessment in the U.S. that the amount of new
information to be obtained through the exchange was declining, the U.S.
reduced the exchange level by a factor of two by 1980. However, before the
1980 program could be implemented, the USSR invaded Afghanistan. The U.S.
policy response dictated a severe cutback in the exchange which, for various
reasons, resulted in a complete hiatus for two years while policy issues
were clarified. By mid-1981, agreement had been reached with all parties
to restart the exchange on a modest, selected scale.
The level of effort of the fusion exchanges scheduled under this agreement
in 1982 was nominally six exchange trips in each direction totaling
approximately 80 man weeks. The activities were principally limited to the
topics of plasma theory and experimental physics. Experience with the
exchanges in 1982 was very encouraging in that the Soviet scientists and
program officials were fully cooperative in providing the desired detailed
technical information during the exchanges and in providing access to the
Soviet facilities and scientists. (11 of the 13 planned exchanges took
place in 1982, the other two were rescheduled by mutual consent for the
first quarter of 1983.)
The activities conducted under the magnetic fusion exchange program currently
include the following:
3
2
A. Meetings and Workshops - These activities comprise the bulk of the
exchange activities. They consist of both formal and informal
presentations by the U.S. and Soviet exchange participants on the
activities and developments in their programs. These presentations are
routinely followed by question and answer and discussion pe-iods.
B. Joint Work - These activities occur in both the experimental physics
and theoretical physics areas. In the experimental physics area,
visiting scientists from either the Soviet Union or the U.S. are
incorporated as visiting scientists into the experimental staffs of the
host country for periods of a few weeks. This provides the visiting
scientists with a direct opportunity to observe the techniques and
equipment being used by the host country. No joint or coordinated
experimental programs are currently being conducted.
In the theoretical physics area, researchers periodically meet to
discuss topics of mutual interest and attempt to develop improved
understanding of these topics by pooling their knowledge and through
the benefits of their combined talents. The results of these sessions
are normally used separately by the participants rather than being
published as joint papers.
C. Facility Tours - These activities are conducted as part of visits
arranged for other purposes and are simply intended to acquaint the
visiting party with the types of facilities being built or used. The
information gained is used primarily to monitor progress in the program
and to identify topics for potential future exchanges of the types
discussed in A and B above.
All of the magnetic fusion exchanges currently being conducted are stand
alone activities. There are no series of coordinated exchanges specifically
established to monitor or conduct joint activities extending between exchange
visits. However, since the programs being conducted in both countries are
multi-year efforts, it is common for exchanges on various topics to be
arranged periodically to allow researchers to exchange information as
their independent programs progress.
3
III. Level of Effort
The approximate level of effort for the US/Soviet magnetic fusion bilateral
exchange program, in relation to the overall U.S. magnetic fusion program
level of effort is shown below:
Approximate U.S. Level
Calendar
of Effort for US/Soviet Exchanges
Overall U.S. Program
Year
(Incremental Travel Costs - US to USSR)
Level of Effort
73
This exchange started in 1974.
74
$106K
$ 63M
75
124
118
76
198
219
77
164
316
78
148
332
79
104
355
80
0
350
81
0
394
82
34
451
Au indicated by the preceeding data, the travel cost of the US/Soviet
bilateral has run from a maximum of 0.17 percent of the overall U.S. magnetic
fusion energy program budget in 1974 to a low of 0.007 percent in 1982. Accord-
ingly, the exchange is considered to represent a minimal additional expense
to the program.
The exchange operates on the principle that the "sending side pays" the
expenses of their traveling delegation. The only identifiable expenses
associated with the exchange other than travel costs, are for periodic
telephone calls at the rate of about one call per month for a total of
approximately $300 per year. All other expenses, specifically the manpower
cost of time spent preparing for and participating in exchanges in the
USSR and hosting exchanges in the U.S., are integrated into the program's
general expenses and are estimated to involve about one additional day
for every day of an exchange. This expense is conservatively estimated to
be less than $300,000 for calendar year 1982. Since this expense is
generally in direct support of priority program activities, it is not
properly counted as a cost against program resources.
The major expense involved with the US/Soviet fusion exchanges is the
administrative effort involved in planning them and obtaining clearance for
them to occur. These problems stem primarily from the difficulty of
communicating through formal channels; including reviews and clearances
involving at least the U.S. fusion laboratories, the DOE Office of Fusion
Energy, the DOE Office of Energy Research, DOE International Affairs,
several different offices within the State Department, and the National
Security Council. It took approximately 1/3 of one person's time
within the Office of Fusion Energy to prepare the documentation associated
with the 11 US/Soviet fusion exchanges which took place in 1982, plus
4
substantial additional time spent by supervisory staff within the Office of
Fusion Energy and on through the concurrence chain. This is more effort
than it took to conduct the 56 US/Japan fusion bilateral exchanges that
occurred during the same period. The time delays in this cumbersome system
have routinely led to last minute approvals and misunderstandings in arrang-
ing the most straightforward and harmless exchanges, despite the best
efforts and intentions of all parties involved.
IV. Benefits
A. In the past, the benefits to the U.S. program from cooperation with the
Soviets have been significant and wide ranging as demonstrated by the
following specific examples:
1. The tokamak confinement concept was developed by the late head of
the Soviet program, L. A. Artsimovich, based on a concept originated
by another Soviet, A. Sakarov. The basic ideas and detailed experi-
ence were openly and willingly provided to scientists in the U.S.
and other countries by the Soviets. The tokamak concept is currently
the most advanced in the world, largely due to advances made indepen-
dently by the U.S., building on the initial Soviet invention. The
tokamak concept is being used by the U.S. in the device with which
we expect to become the first nation to demonstrate fusion's
scientific feasibility.
It is significant to note here that the initial, promising Soviet
tokamak data were not believed when they were initially published.
It took direct observation during an exchange, in this case a
visit by British scientists, to convince the Western nations that
the Soviets were correct.
It is further significant to note that the ability of the U.S. to
initiate work rapidly on the tokamak concept and reproduce the Soviet
results rapidly stems largely from the fact that the Soviets allowed
Dr. Artsimovich to travel to the U.S. and discuss his work with
U.S. fusion researchers. Thus the Soviets, to some degree, coached
the teams which built the first U.S. tokamaks.
2. The mirror confinement program has benefitted similarly from
exchanges of information with the Soviet program. The earliest
example was the independent proposal on the use of open trap confine-
ment, i.e. "magnetic mirrors", by G. I. Budker of the Soviet
Union. This concept was further refined by the Soviet team led by
M. S. Ioffe through their invention of the stable, "minimum B"
configuration and the concepts which led to the "stream stabiliza-
tion process". Both of these concepts were incorporated into the
2XIIB experiment in the U.S. which reached record ion temperatures
and kept the mirror concept in contention as a reactor concept.
5
Next, news of the independent invention of the tandem mirror concept
by G. I. Dimov in the Soviet Union led U.S. scientists to expedite
their work on our TMX machine. TMX then became the first operating
tandem mirror experiment within 18 months, much earlier than would
have occurred without the Soviet competition and confirmation of
our theoretical predictions.
Most recently, Dr. Ioffe's group provided U.S. mirror researchers
with information which led to the "sloshing ion" approach to stabi-
lization of loss cone instabilities and thus to an acceptable
design for the MFTF-B end cells. This development was a key element
in the U.S. decision to proceed with the MFTF-B project and with
tandem mirrors as our second "main line" confinement concept.
3. In the compact toroid area, the most advanced of the three
configurations being studied in the U.S. is based on work done by
R. Kh. Kurtmullaev. His group has developed techniques for forma-
tion, translation and compression of field reversed configurations
which are unrivaled outside the Soviet Union. The compact toroid
concept is one of the most promising for a long range, fundamental
improvement in the size and cost of fusion power reactors.
Although the Soviet compact toroid experimental apparatus is
apparently located in a classified area to which we cannot gain
access, our scientists have been given full access to the Soviet
scientists and their work, specifically including laboratory note-
books, experimental techniques, and raw data.
4. On the topic of plasma theory, the analytic underpinning for all
fusion design work, the Soviet program has an unsurpassed reputation.
For example, V. D. Shafranov is recognized world wide as the dean
of MHD theory; B. B. Kadomtsev was a motivating force and contributed
much of the basis for our current theory of plasma turbulence and
instabilities; N. N. Bogoloubov, S. I. Braginskii, A. A. Galeev,
and R. z. Sagdeev provided much of the body of kinetic and transport
theory; L. Landau and A. A. Vlasov developed the basis of our
understanding of wave phenomena in plasmas; D. D. Ryutov did the
initial analysis of collisionality in open systems; V. P. Pastukhov
developed the theory of ion transport in mirror systems; V. N.
Tsytovich provided innovations on the topic of nonlinear plasma
physics and L. M. Kovrizhnykh developed transport coefficients for
the EBT concept.
Besides their long standing expertise, the Soviet theoreticians
invariably offer a different perspective and methodology for the
solution of fundamental fusion problems. Among the reasons for
this different perspective are their severe limitations in computa-
tional facilities which force them to develop approaches unique to
those taken in the U.S. Another contributing factor is the Soviet
tradition of extensive mathematical and analytic education.
6
B. Over this last year in particular, ten exchanges were held that resulted
in specific contributions that introduced new Soviet ideas, confirmed
U.S. hypotheses, saved valuable time in our experimental programs, and
supported our advanced design efforts. Some of these contributions are
the following:
1. A correspondence between U.S. experimental results in Ion Cyclotron
Resonance Heating and the directly applicable Soviet theory was
developed.
2. Soviet experience in controlling gas recycling and flow in tandem
mirrors was incorporated into the new U.S. TARA experiment.
3. New insights and constructive criticism were obtained in the theory
of plasma stability and transport in three major types of toroidal
devices (tokamak, bumpy tori, and stellarators).
4. Information leading to the optimization of our advanced toroidal
facility design was obtained.
5. We gained access to the Soviet's decade-long experience on compact
stellarator configurations, including two state-of-the-art fabrica-
tion techniques for RF antennas and complex magnetic field coils.
6. Information was obtained concerning a new Soviet technique for
"sawtooth" instability control. This technique has favorable
implications for the feasibility of low q tokamaks and has led to
a reordering of the U.S. electron cyclotron heating program on the
PLT facility.
7. Specific concepts in the analytic theory of alpha particle stability,
new techniques for the calculation of transport coefficients, and
new models for calculation of anomalous electron transport were
learned.
One exchange produced only mixed results, but even it proved valuable
by leading to an improved method of preparing for the current year's
exchanges.
C. Essentially all detailed information concerning the Soviet program
comes from the U.S./Soviet exchange activities. There are several
reasons for this:
1. Due to travel restrictions and foreign exchange limitations, the
Soviets are not well represented at international conferences, thus
severely limiting the utility of such conferences for information
transfer. Even when they do attend international conferences, they
seldom provide printed copies or present the details needed to
fully understand their work. They also hardly ever discuss their
failures or problems in these formal settings. This reticence
7
seems to be part of the scientific tradition in the Soviet Union
wherein only the most complete work is discussed outside the local
scientific working groups. It has taken establishment of a sense
of professional comradery and face to face contact through the
exchange program to obtain this valuable information and allow us
to avoid any mistakes the Soviets may have made.
2. Without the existence of the formal Agreement, few U.S. scientists
would be able to visit Soviet laboratories other than those leading
scientists invited personally by Soviet leaders. Even in this
case, it is the USSR who is solely taking the initiative while the
U.S. can only accept or refuse the invitation. As a result, the
visits would concentrate on their interests rather than on ours.
3. The Soviets do not publish widely in international journals, and
when they do, their papers tend to be late and lacking in the
technical details which are necessary to directly use or reproduce
their work.
4. As a practical matter, most U.S. scientists are not able to read
the original Soviet papers when they are available since they are
generally printed in Russian and our routine translation capability
is limited. However, as a result of contacts and discussions
conducted face to face during the exchanges, our scientists become
aware of important documents and then invest the time and money to
have them translated.
5. It is also pertinent to note that, as a result of interactions
during the exchanges, the Soviets act as a powerful goad and quality
control check for the U.S. program. This function would almost
totally disappear without the exchange.
V. Assessment
The magnetic fusion energy research program in the Soviet Union is roughly
the same size as the U.S. program and is in general as advanced. The Soviet
program is primarily focused on development of the tokamak confinement
concept; however, parallel efforts on the tandem mirror and stellarator
concepts are also under way. Their program is particularly strong in its
theory innovativeness and its large personnel resources. Its main weaknesses
are its limitations in computing capability and its lack of focus toward
development of a practical application. To the degree that a fusion
application focus exists, it appears to be toward development of fusion/
fission hybrids in support of the Soviet fission program.
Although the U.S. program is generally considered to be the world leader,
the Soviet fusion program has contributed substantially to the U.S. fusion
development effort in the past and continues to do so. The personnel
exchange between the U.S. and the USSR is the primary mechanism through
which the U.S. obtains benefits from the Soviet program due to the travel,
access and document availability problems discussed above. A renewal of
8
the US/Soviet Atomic Energy Agreement would allow the U.S. fusion program
to continue to obtain information from the Soviet fusion program as we have
in the past.
The degree of cooperativeness of the Soviets in conducting this exchange
has varied through the life of the exchange. In general, the technical
representatives of the Soviet program have been open and cooperative through-
out. However, in a few instances prior to the invasion of Afghanistan, the
administrative representatives were unwilling to freely share information
in certain areas, all relating to technology. Since the restart of the
exchange in 1982, the Soviet and U.S. fusion programs have, at U.S. initia-
tive, limited the exchange to science topics and that technology directly
related to science experiments. The result has been open and cooperative
relations with all of the Soviets involved in the exchange process.
As stated previously, the US/Soviet bilateral exchanges are the primary
mechanism whereby the U.S. fusion program obtains information concerning
the Soviet program. The information transfer occurs both directly during
the exchanges and as informal sharing of information during follow-up
correspondence with contacts made during the exchanges.
While we have no direct statements from the Soviets to establish the
importance they place on the exchange, there are several indirect indications
that they find it valuable. First, they regularly send senior technical
members of their program on the exchanges, and while in the U.S., these
individuals expend far more energy in conducting exchange activities than
they would if they didn't find the exchanges useful. Second, the Soviets
have routinely proposed more exchanges than the U.S. and seem genuinely
disappointed when we hold the number of exchanges down. Last, as a measure
of an increasing sense of importance, the number of instances of administrative
problems with the exchanges has dropped to essentially zero in 1982.
VI. Recommendation
The Soviet fusion program is a large, vigorous, centralized effort with
capable personnel and experimental devices which can significantly add to
or complement the information available from our own program. The US/Soviet
fusion personnel exchange is the primary mechanism with which we can obtain
this valuable information.
An objective measure of the value of the US/Soviet fusion exchange is given
by the examples listed earlier in this paper of information made available
to our program by the Soviets. An equally important, subjective measure of
the value is the change in the attitudes of the U.S. scientists toward the
exchange. On a technical basis, interest in the Soviet exchange was high
in the mid-to-late 1970's, but had dropped significantly by 1980 when the
hiatus in the exchange occurred. As a result, when the exchange was
restarted in 1982, U.S. scientists were somewhat skeptical of the value of
their participation. Their attitudes after conducting the exchanges have,
with rare exception, been that the exchanges were worthwhile and should be
continued.
9
It is the position of the Office of Fusion Energy that failure to continue
the exchange would definitely be a detriment to the U.S. fusion program.
We recommend that the parts of the US/USSR Atomic Energy Agreement that
are applicable to the magnetic fusion program be renewed or extended
for an aditional ten years.
VII. Statistical Summary
A.
Visits and Assignments
1. Short Term and Long Term -
Calendar
No. of Trips
Man-Weeks
No. of Trips
Man-Weeks
Year
from US
from US
from USSR
from USSR
1973
This exchange started in 1974.
1974
36
68
14
44
1975
30
129
27
127
1976
51
191
29
142
1977
49
132
45
130
1978
52
83*
28
72*
1979
33
76*
31
119*
1980
0
0
0
0
1981
0
0
0
0
1982
15
24
21
42
*Estimates from incomplete files.
2. Long Term - The long term exchanges are listed above with the short
term exchanges since our records are not complete enough to separate
them. In general, no more than one long term exchange per year
occurred.
3.
Project - None.
B. Publications - There may be a few jointly authored papers which resulted
from this exchange activity, but we have not kept any record of them.
We know of no papers authored by either U.S. or Soviet personnel which
are attributed to the exchange, although doubtlessly information from
the exchange has influenced and contributed to papers written in the U.S.
C. Major Meetings - No major meetings have been organized through this
exchange.
Background and Recommendation
US/USSR Atomic Energy Agreement Extension
US/USSR Joint Committee on Cooperation - Fundamental Properties of Matter (JCC-FPM)
I.
Objective
Objectives pursued under the JCC-FPM are exchanges of experience and coopera-
tive efforts in basic physics research. The rationale is that maintaining
contact with Soviet scientists and jointly pursuing basic knowledge is of
benefit to the U.S. Exchanges between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have pro-
ceeded since 1959. The US/USSR Joint Committee on Cooperation - Fundamental
Properties of Matter (JCC-FPM) was established on December 5, 1975, during
the third meeting of the US/USSR Joint Committee on Cooperation in The Field
of Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. This Agreement remains in force until
June 1983. However, its possible nonrenewal need not affect the validity of
implementing protocols and existing contracts between interested organizations
and institutions of the two countries as the Agreement permits their survival
beyond its expiration.
II.
Program Description
Under the guidance of the US/USSR JCC-FPM, cooperative projects have covered
the following kinds of activities in the fields of high energy physics, nuclear
physics, and accelerator-related materials sciences: visits by individual
scientists and groups to laboratories and universities; conferences and work-
shops on specialized topics by theorists and experimentalists; experiments,
principally at major accelerator laboratories; and research and development
activities on accelerator physics and detectors.
The normal mode of operation of the US/USSR JCC-FPM has been to meet alternat-
ley in the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. at intervals of about a year. A signed
record of the meeting has included an agreed-upon Program of Cooperation for
the coming year. New programs arising during the year were agreed upon by
communication between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. Cochairmen. Since the Soviets
move into Afghanistan and the subsequent development of a new State Department
initiated U.S. guidelines, there have been fewer cooperative activities.
However, the framework of cooperation has been intentionally maintained for
exchange activities of substantial benefit to the U.S. The 1981 and 1982
cooperative efforts have proceeded according to the agreed-upon program of
December 1980.
The fifth planning meeting for the CY 1982 joint program was held at Stanford
Linear Accelerator Center (SLAC) in February 1982 with the U.S. delegation
operating under Post-Afghanistan and Post-Poland guidelines. Under U.S.
guidelines the U.S. was able to discuss proposed plans for 1982 but was not
able to sign an agreed-upon plan, and was able to have each activity continue
on a case-by-case basis. The Soviets expressed unhappiness with this new
U.S. position and pointed out its difficulties in committing resources to
projects subject to U.S. review and cancellation. However, since that meeting,
the Soviet Union has exported equipment to the U.S. for cooperative experiments.
APPENDIX II
2
The sixth planning meeting for the CY 1983 joint program is being planned by
both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. Governments to be held in Russia during April
1983. This time, the U.S. delegation is expected to be authorized to sign
an agreed-upon Program of Cooperation, again restricted to the continuation
of ongoing activities, with the provision that individual items are subject
to U.S. Government approval on a case-by-case basis.
III. Level of Effort
The majority of the 21 CY 1981 programs were active with 4 items postponed
and 2 inactive. Of the 18 items continuing into CY 1982, 10 were active, 3
postponed, and 5 inactive. Funding arrangements are: for exchanges involving
Soviet Academy of Science institutions, receiving side pays local costs on
a reciprocal basis; for exchanges involving the Soviet State Committee on
Atomic Energy institutions, sending side pays. Estimated costs to the U.S.
for JCC-FPM activities is $80,000 per year.
IV. Benefits
The US/USSR Cooperative Exchange Program on Fundamental Properties of Matter
has served to keep open valuable channels of communication with the Soviet
High-Energy and Nuclear-Physics communities. It should be noted that exchanges
are possible without any such program; however, the formal program has helped
very much to pave the way for reciprocal exchanges. The Committee meetings
serve both to coordinate and regulate these exchanges and have greatly helped
U.S. scientists gain access to Soviet laboratories. They are also an official
channel through which the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. can communicate policy and
operational concerns. Because a number of the U.S.S.R. high-energy physicists
tend to be prominent, these channels may have added importance.
Technical benefits to the U.S. under this program are substantial in areas
where the Soviets excel. These areas include accelerator R&D, instrumentation
(detector) R&D, and theoretical physics. These areas are generally conceptual
in nature; and, indeed, Soviet scientists are very capable of having very
good and innovative ideas. In addition, the U.S.S.R. has initiated construc-
tion of a very big superconducting proton accelerator, UNK, which will be
capable of reaching energies of 3 TeV by about 1990. Access to the unique
capabilities of this fixed target accelerator may be sought by U.S. scientists
who wish to do experiments in this energy range, and some physics benefits
to the U.S. would be anticipated, including new discoveries.
Soviet scientists participating in experiments in the U.S. make up the vast
bulk of the US/USSR exchanges, there being very little traffic the other
way at this time (the ratio is about 5/1 in man-weeks). They bring with
them on occasion instruments (accelerator and detector components) designed
and built in the U.S.S.R. These contributions have been valuable to accel-
erator R&D and experimentation, but it should be noted that the U.S. accel-
erator and experimental program are not dependent on this input. The U.S.
in recent years has not transported instrumentation of any signficance to
the U.S.S.R. for the purposes of this program.
4
3
Specific benefits to the U.S. program include those major responsibilities
actually assumed by U.S.S.R. collaborators on accelerator/detector components.
At Fermilab, for example, there are four projects of particular interest
which come under the US/USSR agreements. Each of these was initiated in
1981 or earlier and each has come to a critical point in which the Soviet
side must make major new commitments of equipment and effort if these
cooperative research projects are to keep to a reasonable schedule. In
appropriate order of priority, insofar as scientific benefit to the U.S.
side is concerned, these are as follows:
1. Joint effort in creating an antiproton source. This program dates back
to 1978 and is a collaboration of Fermilab, Institute of Nuclear Physics
(Siberian Academy of Sciences), LBL and U. of Wisconsin. The group in
Novosibirsk in 1958 invented the concept of "electron cooling" of charged
particle beams in order to decrease phase space and increase beam storage
and accumulation capability. They are very much on top of the theory of
beam cooling even though the Fermilab project will make use of the CERN
version, stochastic cooling. INP is also contributing to the theory of
non-linear beam-beam interactions. The INP group has also pioneered in the
development of a strong, axially focusing beam optical device, i.e. the
lithium lens. Novosibirsk developed, constructed, and delivered a prototype
lens and power-supply which has been undergoing tests at Fermilab. The
design of a final version of this lens for the Tevatron I antiproton source
is complete, and this is being constructed in Novosibirsk. This and other
equipment is to be provided by INP. Fermilab estimates the U.S. cost of
replicating these devices at $1,500,000. The collaboration is clearly of
benefit to the U.S. program in that the Soviets are contributing unique
devices and very capable scientists to the TeV I program.
2. Tevatron Experiment E-672: A study of Hadronic Final States produced
in association with high transverse momentum jets and high mass di-muons.
This is a collaboration of the Institute of High Energy Physics, Serpukhov
(IHEP) with scientists from Fermilab, Florida State, George Mason U.,
U. of Illinois, Indiana U., U. of Maryland and Rutgers U. In accordance
with a division of effort worked out by the scientists, IHEP was assigned
the task of constructing a large Cerenkov electromagnetic shower detector.
The fabrication of lead glass counters is not unique to the Soviet Union
but they have developed this technique to a high degree. A great deal of
effort will have been devoted to the construction of this large lead glass
array. If this were to be built in the U.S., the cost would be approximately
$4 million, and the delivery would be such as to extend the date for
completion of the detector by at least two years.
3. Research on Polarization Effects - Tevatron experiment E-704, a collab-
oration with Northwestern U., Rice U., Saclay (Paris), Kyoto (Japan),
- Argonne National Lab., Lawrence Berkeley Lab., LAPP (France), INFN (Trieste),
and IHEP (Serpukhov). Here again this large multinational consortium has
been approved to mount a very incisive set of experiments based upon the
new polarized proton facility. The Soviet assignment is to produce a lead
glass system of 800 pieces complete with photomultipliers, bases, and
mechanical support systems. In the U.S., such a system is priced (1980 $)
at about $2500 per unit or $2M for the entire array.
4
4. Studies of Rare Decays and Properties of Charged Hyperons - A
collaboration of Fermilab, Yale U., Iowa State and LNPI - Gatchina
(Leningrad). The Soviet group is building a transition radiation detector
and associated large proportional wire counter system. The utilization of
transition radiation is a detection technique which has been developed
in the Soviet Union. They are also contributing integrated circuit ampli-
fiers and discriminators which are to be tested at Fermilab. The overall
system is major - about 10,000 wires and, in the U.S., this would cost
upwards of $1M.
In each of the above programs the Soviet investment is substantial, and the
U.S. stands to profit considerably from the activity. There are, of
course, several other collaborative programs but these are near completion
and do not have the urgency of the above listed four items.
At BNL, the U.S. and Soviet Academy of Sciences Institute for Nuclear Physics-
Moscow programs on solar neutrinos have involved only visits and consultations
to date. There has been some discussion of the U.S.S.R. supplying some tonnage
of pure Chromium and Gallium for future experiments, but this has not
reached any decision stage as yet.
At SLAC, cooperation with the Siberian Academy of Sciences - Novobibirsk
on electromagnetic radiation experiments and related detector developments
has been of benefit to the U.S. program. In particular, the work on
detectors originated by Pestov at Novosibirsk, but developed at SLAC, has
the promising goal of achieving the best time resolution of any detector.
Of additional technical benefit to the U.S. program are the following
accelerator associated items:
1. Radio Frequency Quadrupole (RFQ) - Theoretical and experimental
development has proceeded in the U.S.S.R. and has been brought to full practical
fruition in the U.S. by LANL. The RFQ represents a major development in
low energy accelerator structures.
2. H ion source, developed in the U.S.S.R., has become a standard feature
in U.S. accelerator technology for injecting high brightness beams into
circular accelerators. H- ion sources also have important application in
neutral beam injectors for magnetic fusion energy systems.
Finally, in theoretical physics, the exchange of ideas between top U.S.
and Soviet theorists is clearly of benefit to the U.S. program. Okun and
Polyakov in particular are much sought featured speakers at large interna-
tional conferences in high energy physics.
V.
Assessment
The U.S. program in Fundamental Properties of Matter does derive direct
benefit from cooperative exchanges with the U.S.S.K. The most important
long term benefits include the conceptual ideas obtained through those ex-
changes, and keeping open the formal channels of communication.
5
VI.
Recommendation
It is recommended that the JCC-FPM exchanges be allowed to continue.
VII. Statistical Summary (Estimated)
Scientists
Scientists
From U.S.
Man Weeks
From USSR
Man Weeks
A.
Short Term
1976
NA
NA
NA
NA
1977
NA
NA
NA
NA
1978
NA
NA
NA
NA
1979
NA
NA
NA
NA
1980
8
8
6
23
1981
5
13
32
130
1982
3
6
36
55
Long Term
1976
NA
NA
NA
NA
1977
NA
NA
NA
NA
1978
NA
NA
NA
NA
1979
NA
NA
NA
NA
1980
2
58
6
215
1981
2
26
7
110
1982
2
18
10
248
B.
Joint Publications
1976
NA
1977
NA
1978
NA
1979
NA
1980
NA
1981
20
1982
8
C.
Workshops & Conferences
1976
NA
1977
1
1978
0
1979
2
1980
1
1981
1
1982
0
DOE F 1325 8
(7-79)
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
DATE: MAR 24 1983
memorandum
REPLY TO
ATTN OF: NE-75
SUBJECT: USDOE/USSR Cooperation in the Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor (LMFBR)
TO: John Metzler, Program Analyst
International Energy Cooperation, IA-22
The following is a review of, and recommendation on, the subject cooperative
agreement:
I. Objective
The objective as stated in the Protocol on Cooperation is "Cooperation in the
development of fast breeder reactors will be directed toward finding solutions
to mutually agreed upon basic and applied problems connected with the design,
development, construction, and operation of nuclear powerplants utilizing
fast breeder reactors."
II. Program Description
The cooperative agreement originally enacted by a Protocol signed October 8,
1974, based on the June 21, 1973 Nixon/Brezhnev Agreement, was coordinated by
a Joint Coordinating Committee.
Joint activities were in five areas:
(1) Joint seminars.
(2) Specialists meetings.
(3) Exchange and test of structural materials.
(4) Direct exchange of information.
(5) Exploratory exchanges on the test of a U.S. Steam Generator in the USSR
BN-350 reactor plant.
The first two were ad hoc exchanges of papers and discussions of papers.
Seminar emphasis was on the development of the LMFBR Steam Generators. Fuel
clad materials were exchanged for test of U.S. clad in the Soviet BOR-60
and the USSR clad in EBR-II. Final tests are yet to be exchanged--now in
abeyance.
The results of tests of exchanged steam generators materials and other materials
were discussed at the Tampa Steam Generator Seminar in October 1978.
The exploratory exchanges on the possibility of testing a U.S. Steam Generator
in BN-350 were terminated in 1978.
There has been no exchange of personnel.
APPENDIX III
2
III. Level of Effort
The level of activities during the 1974-1979 period consisted primarily of
technical information exchanged by means of the seminars. Cooperative
efforts came to a virtual standstill following the Soviet invasion of
Afhganistan in 1979.
The LMFBR agreement calls for each party to pay its own expenses. Expenses
are primarily associated with seminar preparation and translation costs,
estimated at about $100,000 per year during the 5-year period of activity.
IV. Benefits
There have been no apparent direct monies saved in the United States LMFBR
development program as a result of the exchange agreement and no apparent
direct impacts on U.S. programmatic decisions. Soviet seminar papers,
though general in nature, provided an exploratory base on which to pursue
more specific interchanges. The principal benefit has been to maintain
an awareness of technological advances in the Soviet Union. The nonscientific/
technical benefits are difficult to assess. We are not aware of any semi-
official channels of communication that have been established.
V. Assessment
U.S. awareness, understanding, appreciation, and knowledge of Soviet LMFBR
program increased by a large order from 1974 to 1980, based mainly on the
exchange program.
The LMFBR exchange was considered a top priority by the Soviets. It gave them
access to U.S. design, development, construction, and operation practices
that contain high quality assurance as compared to Soviet quality assurance
practices.
VI. Recommendations
Inasmuch as the Soviets now operate two of the world's largest LMFBR's
(BN-350 and BN-600), access to which could benefit the U.S. LMFBR program,
we would, in the absence of foreign policy considerations, recommend renewing
the cooperative agreement and continuing the exchange. A renegotiated
agreement should, however, contain precise terms and conditions that would
ensure an equitable exchange of information.
VII. Statistical Summary
Since 1974 there have been nine seminars with the USSR. These 1-week meetings
have been equally divided between the United States and the USSR.
46
3
Short term visits - man-weeks
From U.S.
From USSR
1974
18
10
1975
22
9
1976
21
12
1977
-
8
1978
5
19
1979
24
6
90
64
Publications
Exchanged about 100 papers each, none jointly authored - mainly at seminars.
Freedy (Acting)
Sol Rosen, Director
Division of International Programs
Office of Support Programs
Office of Nuclear Energy
47
TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS series 7655
ATOMIC ENERGY
Scientific and Technical Cooperation
for Peaceful Uses
Agreement Between the
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
and the UNION OF
SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
Signed at Washington June 21, 1973
DEPARTMENT UNITED STATES OF STATE
OF
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
Atomic Energy: Scientific and Technical Cooperation
for Peaceful Uses
Agreement signed at Washington June 21, 1973;
Entered into force June 21, 1973.
98-479 0-73
(1)
TIAS 7653
2
AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND
THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
ON SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION
IN THE FIELD OF PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY
The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics;
Attaching great importance to the problem of satisfying the
rapidly growing energy demands in both countries as well as in
other countries of the world;
Desiring to combine the efforts of both countries toward
the solution of this problem through the development of highly
efficient energy sources;
Recognizing that solutions to this problem may be found
in more rapid development of certain nuclear technologies
already under study, such as controlled thermonuclear fusion
and fast breeder reactors, as well as in additional basic
research on the fundamental properties of matter;
Nating with satisfaction the successful results of
previous cooperation between the Parties in the field of
peaceful uses of atomic energy;
Wishing to establish a more stable and long-term basis for
cooperation in this field for the benefit of both their peoples
and of all mankind;
TIAS 7655
3
In accordance with and in further development of the
Agreement between the Government of the United States of America
and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
on Cooperation in the Fields of Science and Technology of
[']
May 24, 1972; the Memorandum on Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses
of Atomic Energy of September 28, 1972 between the U. S.
Atomic Energy Commission and the USSR State Committee for
[*]
the Utilization of Atomic Energy: and the General Agreement
between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on Contacts, Exchanges and Cooperation of
June 19, 1973; [³]
Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE 1
The Parties will expand and strengthen their cooperation
in research, development and utilization of nuclear energy,
having as a primary objective the development of new energy
sources. This cooperation will be carried out on the basis of
mutual benefit, equality and reciprocity.
ARTICLE 2
1.
Cooperation will be concentrated in the following
three areas:
a.
Controlled thermonuclear fusion.
The aim of cooperation in this area is the eventual
development of prototype and demonstration-scale thermo-
nuclear reactors. Cooperation may include theoretical,
calculational, experimental and design-construction
studies at all stages up to industrial-scale operations.
1 TIAS 7346 ; 23 UST 856.
8 Not printed.
TIAS 7649 ; 24 UST.
TIAS 7655
4
b.
Fast breeder reactors.
Cooperation in this area will be directed toward
finding solutions to mutually agreed basic and applied
problems connected with the design, development,
construction and operation of nuclear power plants
utilizing fast breeder reactors.
c. Research on the fundamental properties of matter.
Cooperation in this area will include joint theoretical
and experimental studies on mutually agreed subjects, and
particularly in high, medium and low energy physics,
through utilization of accelerators, data processing
equipment and other facilities of the two countries.
Cooperation may also be undertaken on the design, planning
and construction of joint facilities to be used in this
area of research.
2. Further details of cooperation in each of these three
areas will be arranged through individual implementing protocols.
3. Other areas of cooperation may be added by mutual
agreement.
4. Cooperation under this Agreement shall be in
accordance with the laws of the respective countries.
ARTICLE 3
1.
Cooperation provided for in the preceding Articles
may take the following forms:
a. Establishment of working groups of scientists
and engineers for design and execution of joint projects;
TIAS 7655
5
b. Joint development and construction of experiments,
pilot installations and equipment;
c. Joint work by theoretical and experimental
scientists in appropriate research centers of the two
countries;
d. Organization of joint consultations, seminars
and panels;
e. Exchanges of appropriate instrumentation,
equipment and construction materials;
f. Exchanges of scientists and specialists; and
g. Exchanges of scientific and technical informa-
tion, documentation and results of research.
2. Other forms of cooperation may be added by mutual
agreement.
ARTICLE 4
In furtherance of the aims of this Agreement, the Parties
will, as appropriate, encourage, facilitate and monitor the
development of cooperation and direct contacts between
organizations and institutions of the two countries, including
the conclusion, as appropriate, of implementing protocols and
contracts for carrying out cooperative activities under this
Agreement.
TIAS 7655
6
ARTICLE 5
1. For the implementation of this Agreement, there shall
be established a US-USSR Joint Committee on Cooperation in the
Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. Meetings will be convened once
a year in the United States and the Soviet Union alternately,
unless otherwise mutually agreed.
2. The Joint Committee shall take such action as is necessary
for effective implementation of this Agreement including, but
not limited to, approval of specific projects and programs of
cooperation; designation of appropriate participating organizations
and institutions responsible for carrying out cooperative activities;
and making recommendations, as appropriate, to the two Governments.
3. The Executive Agents of this Agreement shall be, for
the United States of America, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission,
and for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the USSR State
Committee for the Utilization of Atomic Energy. The Executive
Agents, on their respective sides, shall be responsible for the
operation of the Joint Committee and shall coordinate and supervise
the development and implementation of cooperative activities
conducted under this Agreement.
ARTICLE 6
Nothing in this Agreement shall be interpreted to prejudice
other agreements concluded between the Parties.
TIAS 7655
54
7
ARTICLE 7
1. This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature
and shall remain in force for ten years. It may be modified or
extended by mutual agreement of the Parties.
2. The termination of this Agreement shall not affect the
validity of implementing protocols and contracts concluded
under this Agreement between interested organizations and
institutions of the two countries.
DONE at Washington, this 21st day of June, 1973, in
duplicate, in the English and Russian languages, both texts
being equally authentic.
FOR THE
FOR THE UNION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:
[']
[2]
RAHY
President of the
General Secretary of the
United States of America
Central Committee, CPSU
1 Richard Nixon
2 L. I. Brezhnev
TIAS 7655