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Rev. 12/11/2003
REVIVING THE WINNING COALITION
The Strategy for Conservatives
Morton C. Blackwell
January 17, 1983
CONTENTS
Executive Summary
1
Overview
3
Developments Among Conservatives
3
The Ignored Issues
5
Congressional Action
Record Votes
7
Discharge Petitions
8
Advance Notice
8
Fear of Losing
8
Congressional GOP Leadership
9
Bill Sponsors
9
Executive Branch Action
Public Statements
10
Administrative Actions
10
Personnel Decisions
11
Statewide Initiatives and Referenda
12
Some States with Provision for Ballot Measures14
Policy Initiatives
15
Franklin Roosevelt Analogy
16
Conservative Policy Sentiments
17
Liberal Policy Sentiments
18
Evaluating Administration Options
19
Actions for Reagan Administration
20
Appendix
Christian School Coalition
23
Right to Keep and Bear Arms Coalition
27
Right to Work Coalition
30
Pro Defense Coalition
35
Right to Life Coalition
43
Conservative Election and Lobbying Coalition
47
Tax Limitation Coalition
50
National Public Radio Commentary by Connie Marshner 55
1
REVIVING THE WINNING COALITION
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The 1984 election will be the grade given the Reagan Ad-
ministration. Our major political test is going on now.
The Reagan winning coalition of 1980, for many reasons, was
largely dormant in 1982, but the elements of that coalition
are still available to repeat the 1980 Republican sweep in
1984. Actions taken by this Administration in 1983 and 1984
can reassemble and revive our 1980 coalition.
During the 97th Congress, the only major Reagan Adminis-
tration efforts on issues of paramount importance to ele-
ments of our 1980 winning coalition were in the economic
area. The President did not himself retreat from those
views on essentially non-economic issues, views which
attracted to his coalition millions of Americans who have
not normally voted for Republicans. But his sincere words
were not backed up by enough actions by the Reagan Adminis-
tration.
In sum, both the Administration and the liberal Democrats
chose to do battle for two years on the economic issues.
The Democrats won in 1982, as they usually have won since
Franklin Roosevelt put together his winning coalition.
Roosevelt based his coalition on pitting the always more
numerous "have-nots" in economic/political battles against
the "haves".
The major sources of 1980 Reagan coalition activism missing
or reduced in GOP campaigns of 1982 were these issues: gun
control, right to life, union abuses, national defense,
Christian schools, and the traditional morality of home and
family.
Through the 1970's hundreds of organizations, large and
small, grew up around these issues. Literally millions of
new activists were organized into politics.
The Roosevelt coalition split in 1980 because, for a change,
the demagogy of "have-not" VS. "have" did not work. One or
more of a wide variety of high intensity, non-economic
issues brought many normally Democratic voters to the
Republicans. These voters found they could not stomach the
actions and aims of the liberal Democratic leadership. The
Reagan campaign and the actions of newly dynamic conservative
organizations opened their eyes.
2
Many surely didn't want to elect liberal Democrats who would
take their children away from home and neighborhood by
forced busing on Soviet tanks into the clutches of counter-
culture teachers who would fill their heads with porno-
graphy, abortion, and gun control, and prevent them from
praying.
In 1981 and 1982 these high intensity "social" issues were
not fought over in the Congress as in recent years. They
were largely ignored in actions of both parties, by fear-
ful Democrats and by disdainful Republicans. As a result,
the newly activated conservative groups could not split
nearly as many traditional Democrats away from the liberal
Democratic leadership. The Roosevelt coalition reassembled
in 1982 and won 62% of the 435 U. S. House races, 64%
of the 34 U.S. Senate races, and 74% of the 35 gubernatorial
races.
In my judgment, these results will be repeated in 1984, and
we will probably lose the White House as well, unless we take
actions promptly to renew the national attention to these
non-economic issues.
A fundamental change is required. The Administration must
change its attitude. We must take legislative and adminis-
trative actions in accord with the President's own views on
issues the Administration has shoved into the background for
the past two years.
The path toward victory must be marked by confrontations
which isolate our opposition from many of their previous
voters. The good old Republican issues of fiscal respon-
sibility, capital formation, and the work ethic are neces-
sary, even central to our coalition, but not sufficient for
us to win national elections in the 1980's.
If we take the actions necessary to reactivate all the
elements of the Reagan winning coalition, it can become
the new, normal governing majority in American politics.
3
REVIVING THE WINNING COALITION
OVERVIEW
In one important respect the American political system is unique.
In every other democracy, political party organizations, labor
unions, and, in some countries, the Church, usually enjoy a
virtual monopoly in the area of political activity.
In the United States, a wide variety of other organizations have
long been sources of political activism. Perhaps it has to do
with what de Tocqueville found to be our American penchant for
forming organizations for every purpose. Abolition societies,
the Anti-Saloon League, and the National Rifle Association show
the range in time and topic of citizen groups which have had
great power at the polls and in the halls of our government.
The Reagan winning coalition in 1980 was composed of three main
elements:
1.
The Republican Party activists.
2.
The majority of the growing business and association
political community, most notably the business and
association political action committees (PACs).
3.
The spectrum of citizen groups broadly described as
conservatives.
All three groups in the 1970's grew dramatically in money, activists,
and expertise. Conservative groups, the subject of this paper,
have changed the most since the 1960's.
The "old Right", self-identified conservative movement activists
from the Goldwater era, believed that being right, in the sense of
being correct, was sufficient to win in politics. They believed
in the Sir Galahad theory: "I will win because my heart is pure.
Years of defeat persuaded many conservatives that victory would not
fall into their hands like a ripe fruit from a tree. At different
rates and to differing degrees they decided they owed it to their
philosophy to study how to win. Effective political technology,
not just being right, turned out to be the key to victories. Some
of the signficant developments were:
1.
Dozens of both multi-issue and focused issue (single issue)
conservative groups were formed at the national level,
many with sub units at state and local Levels..
4
2.
Existing conservative groups grew rapidly. The
established National Right to Work Committee, for
instance, grew from 25,000 members to 1.6 million
members in the past decade.
3.
Most leaders of successful groups soon had clustered
around them their own, related, PACs, lobbies, and
foundations.
4.
Conservative consultants and organizations blazed
the path to effective political direct mail. Most
of the income of the RNC, the NRCC, and the NRSC in
the past decade was raised by people who learned
direct mail while working for Richard Viguerie.
5.
Conservatives developed techniques for self-funding
television programming. Programs on the Panama
Canal treaties and President Carter's SALT II treaty
were examples, but the greatest success is the massive
resources now contributed to broadcast the programs of
conservative religious leaders.
6.
Conservatives overcame the notion that all news media
were the enemy. Many studied how to benefit from
media opportunities. For example, a Phyllis Schlafly
rule: Choose your spokesman for a debate so that, if
the TV sound were cut off, you would win the debate on
appearance alone.
7.
Conservatives gathered and used youth campaign technology.
Now conservative Republican candidates who have trained
youth coordinators invariably dominate their liberal
Democratic counterparts on campus.
8.
Conservative groups of almost every description co-
operated on unprecedented, thorough programs to train
new political activists. It is not at all unusual for
a Right to Work specialist to give a direct mail lecture
to a right to life workshop or for a right-to-keep-and-
bear-arms leader to discuss precinct organization at a
seminar for conservative religious leaders.
The accumulated weight of these conservative citizen groups coalesced
in 1980 behind Ronald Reagan and the GOP opponents of targeted
liberal Democrats. Candidate Reagan was a veteran advocate of
all they stood for. The increments of support each of these groups
of activists brought into politics provided the winning margins in
1980 for many narrow winners in the Republican column.
After the 1980 elections, leaders Of every major conservative group
feared their contributors would reduce their giving. The reverse
proved true. Virtually every conservative group continued to grow
rapidly in income and members in 1981 and 1982. It became reason-
able to expect a much better than usual mid-term election.
5
Unfortunately, greater resources did not translate into greater
conservative group activism in the 1982 elections. In fact,
most of these groups spent far less on grassroots activism in
1982 than in 1980. Such figures as long distance telephone bills,
travel budgets to targeted races, and numbers of voter letters
mailed tell the story.
Much of the 1980 Reagan winning coalition was largely dormant in
the 1982 elections. Conservative activists did have someplace else
to go. Home. The tragic defeats of many GOP candidates at every
level were in large measure due to this decline in activism.
Many conservative organization leaders place the entire blame for
the 1982 defeats on failures of the Reagan Administration to make
good on the 1980 Reagan promises. Many in the Administration blame
conservatives for carping and say that the election results prove
that the conservative movement was overrated. There is plenty of
blame to go around.
Because both the Administration and the liberal Democratic leader-
ship chose deliberately to concentrate on economic battles, prior
to the elections, in the 97th Congress there were:
1.
No votes in either House on gun control.
2.
Virtually no votes on right to life.
3.
Virtually no votes on school prayer.
4.
No votes on pornography.
5.
No votes on the death penalty.
6.
No votes on tuition tax credits.
7.
No votes on busing.
8.
No hard-fought up or down votes on defense preparedness.
9. No vote on eliminating Hobbs Act exemption from
prosecution of union violence.
10. Virtually no votes on political use of compulsory
union dues.
11. Only one, short, fight in both Houses on the Balanced
Budget - Tax Limitation Amendment, too soon before
the elections to have much impact.
Thus most of the conservative issues on which millions of people
had been identified and activated were virtually absent from the
headlines and absent from the TV news programs. For ten years
the Congressional Record had been for conservatives a gold mine
of record votes on most of these issues. Not in 1981 and 1982.
6
How could groups organized around these issues fire up their
grassroots supporters to hold Democrats accountable last
November for their liberal stands? They couldn't.
In the protracted fight against President Carter's Panama Canal
treaties, conservative groups identified and activated hundreds
of thousands of people, all the while fully expecting for their
efforts to get many liberal Senators' votes or their seats. By
choice of the leaders of both parties, there were no protracted
fights useful in this way to conservative organizations in the
97th Congress.
Without legislative battles, there remained the possibility that
administrative steps on the high intensity conservative issue
agenda would motivate these groups and keep their grassroots
members active. In practice, virtually every adminstrative
decision which these groups would applaud has been taken with
a view to minimizing public attention.
For example, right to life activist Dr. Everett Koop was named
Surgeon General of the U.S., but he is instructed to make no public
statements regarding abortion. That is as if President Carter had
appointed Elly Peterson to a consumer-related post but forbidden
her to speak to consumer groups.
Another typical example is a letter quietly sent in early October,
1982 by the Attorney General to all U. S. Attorneys directing
them to tighten up enforcement of Federal anti-pornography laws.
NO public statement, no news coverage, and therefore, little
chance for anti-pornography groups to excite their supporters
with achievements of the Reagan Administration.
Conservative groups made their full share of mistakes in the past
two years. After the 1980 election victories, many naively expected
the Reagan Administration instantly to roll back all the damage
done by liberals since the start of the New Deal. That was impossible.
Rather than devote their resources to attacking liberal Democrats,
as in the past, the conservative groups concentrated their attention
far too much on the Reagan Administration. Many talented staffers
of these organizations have worked diligently for two years lobby-
ing the Administration with detailed proposals for action in areas
of keen interest to them. They pressed us, not Democrats.
Hope, while flagging, still suffices. Last fall conservative groups
rolled into the Old Executive Office Building hand trucks laden with
petitions urging the President, for instance, really to abolish
the Department of Education. This did the liberal Democrats no
damage.
And, of course, a slowly growing portion of conservative organiza-
tion effort has been spent on public criticism of what they see as
failures of the Administration to keep the faith with the 1980
mandate. Some conservative journals and journalists for two years
have taken more shots at the Administration than at all liberal
Democrats combined.
7
Excuses can be made on either hand. The Administration felt
obliged to concentrate on solving the economic mess inherited
from Jimmy Carter. Conservative groups became understandably
frustrated as most of their grassroots issues got short shrift.
The fact remains that liberal Democrats got a free ride in 1982
on many, if not most, of the issues which defeated Jimmy Carter,
George McGovern, Frank Church, Birch Bayh, et al.
This situation need not, must not, be repeated in 1984. The
Reagan winning coalition can be revived.
From this analysis, the steps needed are obvious, but none the
less difficult.
Most important, the Administration must decide to confront squarely
those conservative, largely non-economic issues which divide
millions of normally Democratic voters from the liberal Democratic
leadership.
Yes, there are people well placed in the Reagan Administration who
turn faintly green at mention of these issues. Yes, a typical
staffer at the major, national Republican organizations considers
it a day well spent if he has done nothing to offend either Senator
Helms or Senator Weicker. Yes, on all of these issues there are
well organized groups in opposition to the conservative position.
Yes, the Washington Post and others will heap ridicule on any
vigorous Reagan Administration actions in these areas.
But the Washington Post and many others heaped ridicule on the
President while he ran and won on these very issues. And the
conservative groups, certainly in aggregate if not on each issue
in every area, can muster more activism on these policy questions
than the respective liberal opposition groups. And leaders of the
liberal groups are already certain to do all they can against us
in 1984 elections. And the Democrats have proved partisan majorities
can be quite stable despite internal divisions on many issues. And
it is better for President Reagan to have a few green-faced staffers
walking around than for liberal Democrats to repeat in 1984 their
recent trouncing of us in the congressional and gubernatorial
elections and, perhaps, to win the White House from us.
In the next section, this paper will discuss specific legislative
and administrative actions. Here we cover general principles
applicable to these conservative issues:
Record Votes.
Congressional roll call votes are needed on all these
issues. Repeated votes in both Houses in each issue
category. Inevitable news coverage will prove to
those interested that their battles are being fought.
Record votes will enable our grassroots activists to
8
pin the tails on the right donkeys. If we can't force
the needed votes, the President should go on television
and condemn the liberal Democratic leadership for not
allowing the Congress to act. A flood of mail may change
Tip's mind.
Discharge Petitions.
If all efforts to get record votes fail, go the discharge
petition route. In the hands of an experienced grassroots
organization, a Representative's failure to sign a discharge
petition can be a useful issue.
Advance Notice.
Lead time is vital. The House fight on "Dense Pack" was a
classic example of how not to get grassroots support. On
November 22, the President announced his support for Dense
Pack. We promptly held a well-attended briefing by Tom Reed
for the pro-defense groups.
The time before the fight in the House was impossibly
short. One half hour before the Appropriations Committee
began its markup, the VFW Executive Director delivered to
pro-defense Rep. Bill Chappell (D-Fla.) the hot-off-the-press
news release from the VFW strongly endorsing the President's
position. Chappell's reading of the press release to the
committee was the sum total of pro-defense citizen organization
lobbying before the committee vote.
Dense Pack survived that day on a tie vote in committee,
but was promptly defeated on the House floor. Virtually
none of the 1.9 million VFW members knew of their group's
decision to fight for the President on this issue. Therefore,
none could be organized by VFW in time to lobby their House
members. The capper is that Members who voted against
us on Dense Pack got off virtually scot-free because
real anger at a "wrong" vote is minimal unless grassroots
interest is organized beforehand.
Advance notice for a major grassroots effort should be at
least three months. Six months lead time is better. Thus
the Administration should decide now on a legislative
agenda in each conservative issue area. Let our groups
know exactly what we are committed to fight for. Turn
them loose to organize grassroots activism.
Fear of Losing.
Our constitutional system is wisely designed to make it
difficult to make changes. And the 1982 election
results make it certain we will lose many battles in
this Congress. We can help revive the Reagan winning
coalition by fighting, even losing battles, provided
we wisely pick our battles.. King Pyrrhus beat the
Romans in every battle, but the wear and tear on his
forces was so great that he lost the war: and had to
flee Italy.
9
The President himself built his national coalition
through two losing Presidential bids. Very often
fighting the good but losing fight is far wiser than
avoiding confrontations.
Congressional GOP Leadership
Whether or not confrontations in the Congress on these
issues would help the President and do significant
damage to liberal Democratic candidates in 1984, it
is a safe bet that the GOP leaders in both Houses will
prefer not to have fights on most of the high intensity
conservative issues. They stand ready, typically, to
do battle on any issue which hurts the Democrats,
provided no Republican colleague is offended.
Since there are divided views in both parties on
these conservative issues, the instinctive resistance
of our congressional leadership to the idea of such
confrontations must be patiently worn down or ignored.
Actions can prove the dtermination of the President. Grass-
roots groups can be focused carefully. After some months of
of "heat", as Ev Dirksen once said, GOP leaders may "see the
light" and resign themselves to record votes on these issues.
Bill Sponsors
To have much chance of bringing legislative vehicles
to votes in both Houses, the principal sponsors of
Administration bills must be enthusiastic on these
issues and willing to rattle a few GOP cages on the
Hill.
On tuition tax credits last year, Senate Finance Com-
mittee Chairman Dole sponsored the President's tuition
tax credit bill as a favor to the President. In the
critical first days after the President's bill was sent
to the Hill, the broad-based coalition of groups for
tuition tax credits were told, even by Senator Dole's
staff, that he had introduced the bill only as a
courtesy and would not lead a fight for it.
By the time the uncertainty was cleared up, much momentum
was lost. The bill was mangled in committee and never
reached the Senate floor.
In all cases of high intensity issues, tough, committed
principal sponsors in both Houses are essential. A
vigorous junior member, aided by White House persuasion
of senior Republican members, will often be the best
sponsor of Administration bills on these issues.
10
Although protracted conflicts in the Congress resulting in
record votes on a wide variety of conservative issues are
the most effective means available of reviving the Reagan
winning coalition for the 1984 elections, Executive Branch
actions can be almost as useful. Public statements and policy
actions, properly chosen, can strongly motivate grassroots
activists on our side.
Public Statements
Many officials of the Reagan Administration had long
histories of Reagan support and of leadership in
conservative organizations. Many did not. The
perception among current leaders of active conserva-
tive groups is that the Administration is operating
on a "lowest common denominator" basis.
Conservative leaders outside of government say many
of their old friends now inside the Administration
are chafing under an unspoken premise: Any policy
or issue which was, is, or could be a subject of
dispute in the GOP is, for them, a forbidden topic
now.
The muzzling of Surgeon General Koop on abortion is
often cited. So are Dick Allen's and Lyn Nofziger's
experiences while on the White House staff. Supply
side economists Norman Ture and Paul Craig Roberts
while they were at Treasury were constrained not
to speak out in support of the President's views
while "leaks" were claiming that all the President's
advisors were working to change his mind.
Few changes would activate conservative groups
more than for the White House systematically to
encourage ranking Administration officials to
seek out opportunities to reaffirm the President's
personal commitments to action on the issues vital
to these groups. If pending conservative actions
really were on the front burner, they would be
stressed by high Reagan staffers in interviews to
the general media, not just in communications to
conservative groups.
Administrative Actions
This Administration has taken many forward steps
on the sorts of issues we are discussing here,
issues which at the grassroots divide millions of
11
Democrats from the liberal Democratic leader-
ship. Unfortunately, these steps almost in-
variably have been timed and taken in such
ways as to minimize possible public controversy.
"Controversial" conservative steps tend to be taken
deliberately on Friday evening, considered a poor
time to make news. Announcements of the steps are
often made by printed statements rather than by
live spokesmen. And our printed statements (for
instance, noting the President's pleasure at the
release from jail of fundamentalist Pastor Sileven)
have often been carefully bland.
The statement regarding Pastor Sileven did not
include any words directly attributable to the
President, thus limiting both its newsworthiness
and its good effect among Christian school activists
who were later given copies of the statement by
the White House.
To conservative organization leaders, this practice
of minimizing the public's attention to our conser-
vative actions is evidence that the Administration
disdains these issues and considers them political
liabilities.
For administrative actions to achieve the best
results through grassroots activism in any con-
servative issue area, we must call in leaders of
the supportive groups for briefings as our actions
are announced. Better still, advance indications
of coming decisions would enable citizens groups
to plan ahead and thus get the most mileage for our
actions. On the issue of parental notification, for
example, we got excellent results from an OPL-
organized briefing of pro-life groups by Marjorie
Mecklenburg of HHS.
Personnel Decisions
Frankly, conservative citizen groups got more of
their adherents in this Administration than I expected.
This topic, however, for two years has been a sore
spot for conservative groups.
The "Reagan Revolution" brought in a number of
appointees without prior government service. It
ought not be surprising that many did not find
12
Federal employment to their liking. However, con-
servative activist leaders frequently claim to see
a pattern in filling openings: When a strong
conservative leaves the Administration, the vacancy
often is not filled by another strong conservative,
but when a 'non-Reaganite' leaves, another 'non-
Reaganite' almost invariably gets the slot. " This
observation has some validity, but there are obvious
exceptions. These concerns could be quieted by fill-
ing some of the second category of vacancies with
early Reagan supporters from outside or inside the
Administration.
Beyond legislative initiatives and administrative actions, there
is another category of activity relevant to this dicussion.
Statewide initiatives and referenda have not previously been a
notable concern of any presidential administration. But
statewide ballots on issues can have dramatic impact on
voter turnout. Moreover, the types of voter most likely to
vote on a given election day are affected by the nature of
the issues on the ballot.
Most observers have said our narrow capture in 1982 of the
California governorship was largely due to the extra voters
turned out in the crushing (64%) defeat of an anti-gun ballot
initiative.
Less widely noted were the 1982 referendum results in the
two states where pro-gun groups fought to insert the right
to keep and bear arms into their state constitutions. In
Nevada the pro-gun ballot measure passed with 71% of the
vote. A similar measure won 72% of the statewide vote in
New Hampshire.
It is not purely coincidence that the only Democratic U.S.
Senator to fail to win reelection was in Nevada. Likewise,
the only Democratic governor to lose his reelection bid was
in New Hampshire.
Statewide ballot issues usually are not fought out between
the two party organizations. A non-partisan citizen group
or a coalition of groups generally gets a proposal on the
ballot and then slugs it out until election day with a
rival coalition.
In 1978 and 1980, conservative groups were on the offensive
with exciting tax limitation ballot initiatives such as
California's Proposition 13 and Massachusetts' Proposition
2½. Tax cutting and less government became dominant issues,
to the great surprise of many, including Governor Jerry Brown.
In 1982 the dominant ballot issue was the nuclear freeze,
clearly useful as a voter turnout issue for liberals.
13
Well crafted and targeted ballot measures on tax cutting,
gun control, death penalty, forced busing, school prayer,
tuition tax credits, infanticide, and pornography could
in 1984 drive wedges between millions of traditionally
Democratic voters and liberal Democratic candidates.
Many large, conservative citizen groups are already
experienced in ballot initiative battles. Other groups
have massive, enthusiastic membership they could easily
recruit into such battles on the right issues.
Careful political analysis and informal discussion of
possible ballot measures with leaders of major conserva-
tive organizations might produce some very helpful voter
turn out in 1984.
At the conclusion of this section is a table of data on
eleven of the many states which have established processes
to get issues on the ballot.
14
SOME STATES WITH PROVISION FOR BALLOT MEASURES
1980
# of Cong.
Electoral
State
Vote %
Districts
Votes
California
Reagan
53%
45
47
Carter
36%
29D
Anderson
9%
16R
Colorado*
R.
55%
6
8
C.
31%
3D
A.
11%
3R
Florida
R.
56%
19
21
C.
39%
13D
A.
5%
6R
Illinois *
R.
50%
22
24
C.
42%
12D
A.
7%
10R
Ohio
R.
52%
21
23
C.
41%
10D
A.
6%
11R
Michigan *
R.
49%
18
20
C.
42%
12D
A.
7%
6R
Massachusetts* R.
42%
11
13
C.
42%
10D
A.
15%
1R
Oklahoma *
R.
60%
6
8
C.
35%
5D
A.
3%
1R
Texas *
R.
55%
27
29
C.
41%
21D
A.
2%
6R
Washington **
R.
50%
8
10
C.
37%
5D
A.
11%
3R
Missouri**
R.
51%
9
11
C.
44%
6D
A.
4%
3R
Totals
R.
192
214
C.
126D
A.
66R
*
1984 Senate Race
**
1984 Governor's Race
15
POLICY INITIATIVES
The key to reviving fully the Reagan winning coalition in
time for the 1984 election is Administration action on
neglected elements of the President's 1980 issue agenda.
Not access, not State Dinner invitations, not advisory
commission appointments, not personal friendship, not
stirring written or spoken reaffirmations of principles,
but action.
Many leaders of conservative organizations can rattle off
lists of Members of Congress they recruited to run, Members
whom they trained in politics, Members who credit them with
their elections, and legislation they conceived and passed or
fought and defeated. Most of their groups are relatively
new or are newly large. Many of their budgets are in the
millions. Their clusters of foundations, lobbys and polit-
ical action committees are financially independent and
politically independent of the national political parties.
Their leaders typically are pragmatic but not opportunist.
They believe in the causes around which they have built
their lives. Most groups are not run by committees but by
the single organizers who created them. Their respective
leaders are independent of each other, but they have worked
in coalition for years on many endeavors, including 1980
Reagan campaign.
They share a keen disappointment in the lack of effort by
the Reagan Administration on the issues central to their
organizations.
In the minds of many major conservative organization leaders
has crystallized the thought that the Reagan Administration
is incapable of taking the actions which would renew the
winning coalition of 1980. From that hypothesis springs
the tentative conclusion that the Administration is largely
irrelevant to them.
This line of reasoning is best expressed in a December 30,
1982 National Public Radio commentary by Connie Marshner,
chairman of the main pro-family coalition, the Library Court
group. Her commentary is printed as the last item in the
Appendix of this paper.
Recently heads of two major conservative groups have called
friends inside the Administration urging them to resign.
One well known leader says that now when he meets by chance
with any of the White House "Big Three," he talks about in-
consequential matters, because so many discussions of policy
have availed nothing.
16
Another has sworn off spending time trying to affect any
White House decisions whatsoever.
One conservative U. S. Senator not much in the news told a
conservative organization leader this week, "Going along with
those people (the Administration) against my judgment has
destroyed my base back home. I'm on the verge of a press
counterblast at them you wouldn't believe."
This week several activist leaders quietly discussed the
possibility of a conservative U. S. Senator's mounting a
1984 challenge to the President, obtaining matching funds,
running an independent presidential candidacy in the fall as
John Anderson did last time, and thereafter qualifying (again
similar to Anderson) for a fat Federal payment for use in 1988.
We can emulate the Franklin Roosevelt Administration or the
Eisenhower Administration. FDR was, politically, the most
successful president of the 20th century. He built a new
governing majority which lasted through his lifetime and
beyond.
President Eisenhower quickly lost his early strength in
Congress. He remained personally popular, but he struggled
with hostile Democratic majorities for his last six years
in the White House. And his vice president lost the ensuing
attempt to succeed him.
FDR retained his winning coalition by:
1.
Keeping the issue initiative by launching and
fighting hard for a steady stream of policy
proposals, even though he knew many of them
would lose in the Congress.
2.
Keeping his coalition together by giving each
element of it frequent, solid reasons to stay
aboard.
3.
Rerunning each ensuing election on the central
themes of his 1932 success, particularly pitting
the always more numerous "have nots" against the
"haves."
4.
Using legislation, his administrative powers,
and the prestige of his office to build the
political power of the key elements of his
coalition, particularly organized labor.
17
5.
Cheerfully using confrontation with opponents
of his policies to motivate his coalition.
6.
Accepting the most intense unpopularity with a
minority to achieve unique popularity with the
majority of Americans.
We should not forget that FDR built a stable winning coalition
while the Great Depression raged all during the 1930s.
Economic prosperity, or its lack, proved largely irrelevant
to his success.
This Administration is at a crossroads. By shouldering the
whole burden of the issues on which he ran and won and by
taking unmistakable actions to confront his opponents on these
issues, President Reagan could revive his winning coalition in
three months.
If we fail to take decided actions on these issues early in
this new Congress, the President's opportunity to systemat-
ically build a new, normal governing majority will be lost.
We will come increasingly to resemble the Eisenhower Adminis-
tration, if not the Carter Administration. Eisenhower,
after all, began as a national hero and Carter took office as
the leader of a majority party.
If the President does not revive his winning coalition, we
will have to depend for reelection on the Democrats nominating
a brazen McGovernite in 1984, which they are highly unlikely
to do.
Before moving to consideration of specific policy initiatives
some discussion of the nature of the appeal of non-economic or
"social" issues is necessary. At root, they get their strength
from moral outrage. Sample sentiments:
1.
"They will take my gun only by prying it from
my cold, dead fingers. God made man, but Winchester
made men equal.'
2.
"Abortion is murder of tiny babies."
3.
"Union goons beat up innocent workers and force
people to pay them tribute for the simple right
to work."
4.
"I won"t send my kids to drug-filled schools which
denigrate God and can't even teach the three R's. "
5.
"Rampant pornography is stamping out all vestiges
of morality in our country."
18
6.
"The commies want to destroy America, and we ve
got to be strong so that won't happen."
In these and other such high-intensity issues, most of the
liberal Democratic leadership is firmly locked into the
wrong political position. And millions of traditional
Democrats vote Republican when organized around these issues.
The President states each position more graciously, and he
is clearly on the right side in each case.
Unfortunately all six of the above issues and their kin are
now pale shadows of their intensity in 1980. We have indulged
in unilateral moral disarmament. In rhetoric and, more
importantly, in action the Reagan Administration behaves as
if these issues were skunks at our garden party.
But moral outrage, in my judgment the most powerful motivator
in politics, is alive and well in American today. We have
granted a monopoly to our opposition in the use of moral
outrage. Liberal Democrats and most major, national news
media are systematically and successfully directing it at us.
Sample sentiments:
1.
"They are spending more money on bombs and
rockets while people are losing their homes
and starving. "
2.
"The rich are getting richer and the poor are
getting poorer. It isn't fair."
3.
"They are raping the environment for private greed. "
4.
"They want to make your home ground zero in an
insane nuclear exchange with the Soviets. "
5.
"They are deliberately destroying your jobs in
order to increase the profits of a privileged few. "
Yes, the liberal Democratic leadership understands the political
use of moral outrage.
If the public sees the national political contest as primarily
between those who will give help to the "have nots" and those
whose policies enable capital formation so that productive
businesses can make profits SO that employers can offer jobs
so that all who want to work can work, perhaps a solid 45%
will vote Republican.
But a Republican majority forms if, as in 1980, the public
sees the national political contest as primarily between
19
those who have a difficult-to-grasp but clearly well-
meaning economic policy and those who say they want to
help the poor but really want to take children away from
home and neighborhood by forced busing on Soviet tanks
into the clutches of counterculture teachers who would fill
their heads with pornography, abortion, and gun control, and
prevent them from praying.
In late October and early November, 1982, I held in the
Old Executive Office Building a series of OPL meetings with
seven coalitions of leading conservative activists. With the
help of Bill Barr and Steve Galebach, I asked each group to
discuss their most important policy requests and suggestions
for the Reagan Administration.
The 153 requests and suggestions generated by participants
in these seven meetings, updated by their subsequent thoughts,
are contained in the Appendix to this paper.
To take action in accord with all 153 items is clearly impos-
sible. To do none of them would be foolish. A very few are
contrary to currently expressed Adminstration policy.
The overwhelming majority of items are right in line with the
President's own strongly expressed convictions. Virtually
every one of them would be controversial.
All items should be studied. Many which could not pass the
Congress should be fought over anyhow.
I do not propose to rank the requests and suggestions within
each category. Nor can this already lengthy paper be expanded
in an attempt to evaluate the merit of each item. I suggest
judging each item for potential action by the following
standards:
1.
Is it consistent with the President's philosophy?
2.
Will it help revive the Reagan winning coalition?
At the risk of being repetitive, I add this: If it will
provoke controversy, that should commend an item, provided
the controvery leaves lots of their traditional voters
arguing with the liberal Democratic leadership.
Finally, at the core of any action plan to revive the Reagan
winning coalition should be the following items:
20
1.
Make good on the President's pledge to fight
for a pro-life constitutional amendment.
2.
Fight for a statute to prohibit Federal funding
of abortions. With the recent change in House
rules, the former appropriations riders may prove
impossible to pass.
3.
Fight for prompt passage of the McClure Volkmer
Bill to amend the 1968 Gun Control Act. It can
pass, and votes against its provisions will end
the careers of many liberal Democrats.
4.
Fight to remove the Hobbs Act exemption covering
union violence. This will force the union hacks
in the Congress on record in a virtually indefen-
sible position.
5.
Fight to prohibit any use of compulsory union dues
in politics. Another indefensible position for
Big Labor's politicans.
6.
Fight to remove all regulatory power from the
hopelessly politicized Federal Election Commission
to the Justice Department. Few achievements would
more encourage conservative activists.
7.
Fight to prohibit any expenditure of Federal funds
for political advocacy. Conservatives don't want
tax dollars for this purpose, and liberals should
not get taxpayer funds for politics.
8.
Veto any spending bill which funds the Legal
Services Corporation. If the Congress again
tries to circumvent the constitutional process
by funding LSC through a continuing resolution,
veto that. Liberals are making the President look
impotent, unable to close down LSC.
9.
Adopt and fight for the "High Frontier" strategic
nuclear defense proposal.
10. Get surface to air weapons one way or another to
the Afghan freedom fighters. The Soviets supported
the North Vietnamese.
11. Arrange for up and down votes on many defense
preparedness issues in both Houses.
21
12. Don't take no for an answer on Radio Marti.
Bolster our other foreign broadcast agencies
now and put people who think like U. N. Ambassador
Kirkpatrick in charge of all our foreign broad-
casting services.
13. Fight for levels of spending the President would
want if he could get them. Far better to lose
such fights and put the blame for deficits where
it really belongs: on the liberal Democratic
leadership.
14. Fight again immediately to pass the Balanced
Budget - Tax Limitation Amendment in both Houses.
15. Call in the Attorney General and the anti-porno-
graphy coalition to meet with the President.
Order immediate, vigorous enforcement of all
Federal anti-pornography statutes. Devise and
fight for passage of bills to plus current loop-
holes.
16. Fight for prompt passage of the President's original
tuition tax credit bill introduced last year.
17. Fight promptly for passage of the President's
Voluntary Prayer Amendment. Adopt and fight for
Senator Denton's bill to end Federal funds to school
districts which discriminate against groups of
students seeking to meet during extracurricular
periods for the purpose of engaging in religious
activities.
As each issue for action is picked, throw the whole weight of
the Administration into the effort: Meetings of outside
activists with the President, briefings. by high government
officials, fact sheets, issue updates, public speeches
Saturday radio broadcasts, meeting with Members of Congress
and so on. Discipline anyone in the Administration who
sends out contrary signals. An effort limited to a handful
of personal letters and phone calls from the Oval Office
will not produce the needed groundswell on these issues at
the grassroots.
The coalition which coalesced in the 1970's and won in 1980
is available for 1984 if the Reagan Administration chooses to
revive it. If not, the conservative organizations will more
and more separate their fortunes from those of the President.
And their leaders will continue to recruit and build, intending
to revive the winning coalition in some future year under
someone else's banner.
22
APPENDIX
23
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 10, 1983
CHRISTIAN SCHOOL COALITION MEETING
October 20, 1982
PARTICIPANTS:
Bob Billings
National Christian Action Coalition
Roy Jones
The Moral Majority
Bob Baldwin
Learn, Inc.
Ed McAteer
The Religious Roundtable
Jack Clayton
American Association of Christian Schools
Forest Montgomery
National Association of Evangelicals
Larry Uzzell
Learn, Inc.
Phil Lawler
The Heritage Foundation
Bill Barr
Office of Policy Development
Steve Galebach
Office of Policy Development
24
CHRISTIAN SCHOOL COALITION MEETING
October 20, 1982
Requests and Suggestions
1.
The Administration should in general vigorously oppose
government regulation of church affiliated schools, at
both the state and Federal levels, as a violation of
religious liberties under the First Amendment.
2.
The Administration should vigorously support the Religious
Schools Act as proposed by Attorney William Ball of
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.
3.
The Administration should revoke the 1978 and 1979 Carter
Administration racial quota rules which candidate Reagan
specifically attacked in 1980 and support the Ashbrook
and Dornan Amendments which would block any similar
regulations like IRS Ruling 79 - 99 which attempted to
prohibit tax deductions for parental contributions to
tuition-free church affiliated schools.
4.
The Administration should strongly back Mickey Edwards'
proposed Church Audit Act.
5.
If Bob Jones University wins its current Supreme Court
case, the Administration should not support any statutory
changes in the tax code which would deprive Christian schools
of the fruits of that victory. If Bob Jones loses the case,
the Administration should construe the decision as narrowly
as possible, and make it clear that schools accused of
discrimination must not be forced to bear the burden of
proving themselves innocent.
6.
The Administration should direct the Department of Labor
to retract its interpretation that church affiliated schools
are secular institutions subject to state level unemployment
taxes and labor regulations.
7.
Administration should withhold all Federal aid from Nebraska
State Education agency for violating the First Amendment
rights of religious schools, and fire Nebraska State School
Chief Anne Campbell from Secretary of Education Terrell Bell's
Commission on Excellence in Education.
8.
The Administration should make sure that any Federal tuition
tax credit or voucher proposal follows the model of the
excellent White House bill proposed in 1982, but seriously
compromised by the Senate Finance Committee, in its provisions
for protecting private schools from government regulation.
Senate and House members solidly committed to that model
(unlike Moynihan and Packwood) should be the principal
sponsors of tax credits or vouchers.
25
9.
The Administration should make sure that EEOC ends its
unauthorized and unwarranted fishing expeditions target-
ing Southwestern Theological Seminary, and other
Christian institutions of higher learning.
10. Religious civil rights should be a priority of the U. S.
Civil Rights Commission equal to racial civl rights.
Investigate "sweetheart law suits" like the Wright Case
and the Green Case (relating to IRS regulations and
Christian schools) whereby radical activist lawyers on
the Federal payroll illegally and unethically conspired
with radical activist lawyers outside government to manipulate
the courts toward systematic erosion of the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment.
11. The Justice Department should file amicus briefs on behalf of
voluntary school prayer in the Lubbock, Texas case. This is
winnable and would be a major setback for opponents of school
prayer.
12. The Administration should make tuition tax credits its major
education-related priority for the next two years. The
President should engage the full resources of the Administra-
tion and use the same tactics, such as personal phone calls
and television speeches, on behalf of this proposal as he
did for high priority items like 1981's Gramm-Latta budget
resolutions. This would be a political bonanza for Reagan
among Catholics and the rapidly growing Christian school
movement. Orthodox Jewish groups are on board, too.
13. The Administration should draft, introduce, and vigorously
promote a bill to turn Chapter I of the 1982 Education
Consolidation and Improvement Act into a voucher system for
lower income children, thus transforming this $3 billion
program from a tool for statism into a tool for parental
choice. This is another winner at the grassroots.
14. In moving to dismantle the Department of Education, the
Administration must give priority to real reductions in
the power of the Department, not just its symbolic status
or its location on the Federal organization chart. Dis-
mantlement legislation must include not just declarations
of intent, but specific, concrete, airtight provisions.
15. Immediately and concretely gut the major regulatory powers
of the Education Department, such as the enforcement of
quotas, goals, and timetables based on race or gender.
16. Immediately and concretely eliminate (not transfer to
other Federal agencies) the "discretionary grant" programs
which by their very nature are subject to ideological abuse.
The principal criterion for deciding how soon to destroy a
Federal education program should not be the amount of money
it spends, but rather the amount of power it gives to Federal
employees to steer tax dollars toward their friends and
away from their enemies.
26
17. Irreversibly and concretely substitute "New Federalism"
mechanisms like "revenue source returning", as proposed
by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
and the President's Advisory Panel for Elementary -
Secondary School Finance, for categorical grant programs
and block grant programs in education. As the social
service which by its very nature is the most locally
oriented, education should rank ahead of health and
welfare as a candidate for fundamental decentralization.
18. The Administration should revoke, by purely administrative
means without new legislation, the microscopically detailed
regulations which now go far beyond the intent of Congress or
the letter of the law. For example, Title IX on gender
discrimination formal and informal, regulatory guidelines
mandating bilingual education, and racial quotas in both
schools and colleges.
19. Use the Education Department and the White House as a "bully
pulpit" to press for education reforms at the state and local
levels, such as repeal of state laws which bar liberal arts
graduates from teaching in government (public) schools.
20. Stop justifying Federal education cuts on budgetary grounds
and start justifying them on the ground that Federal activism
in education is the role which is most truly anti-education
This is what millions of concerned parents expected when the
President pledged to abolish the Education Department.
The 16 year experiment which started with passage of the 1965
Elementary and Secondary Education Act has proved conclusively
(to paraphrase a former Moynihan aide*) that Washington has
very little ability to help teachers and students, but an
almost unlimited capacity to foul things up. The cause of
educational excellence and the cause of fundamental decentraliza-
tion are one and the same.
21. Challenge the appointment of Judge Abner Mikva as unconstitutional
on the ground that his office was created while he was still in
Congress.
22. As long as a Federal research role in education exists, use
it to study successes of Christian schools, negative effects
of Federal regulations and techniques like "values clarification"
whereby government schools engage in ideological indoctrination.
23. Do not fear to antagonize the teachers unions. Their massive
resources will in 1984 as in 1980 be 100% against the President.
The millions of parents who oppose the NEA and AFT are
looking to the President for leadership and not seeing much
action.
*
Dr. Chester Finn of Vanderbilt University in Life Magazine in
January, 1981.
27
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 10, 1983
RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS COALITION MEETING
October 21, 1982
PARTICIPANTS:
Larry Pratt
Gun Owners of America
John Snyder
Citizens Committee for the Right
to Keep and Bear Arms
Wayne LaPierre
National Rifle Association
Bill Barr
Office of Policy Development
Morgan Norval
Citizens Committee for the Right
to Keep and Bear Arms
29
8.
The President should open six million acres for
hunting in Alaska. This is a step supported by NRA
and National Wildlife Federation but opposed by the
Fund for Animals and Sierra Club.
9.
The Adminsitration should encourage the revival of
militia as "state defense forces". Perhaps militia
members should provide their own weapons. Federal
government could help set up state agencies. Militia
would provide services when National Guard is called
up on other business. Defense Department should open
a division of civilian marksmanship.
10. Pell grants (education) are operating at cross purposes
with a voluntary army by discouraging enlistment. The
Administration should propose making such grants available
only to National Guard members.
11. The Administration should propose lifting tax exemption
from schools which either prohibit ROTC or restrict
recruitment by armed services. Some schools have pro-
hibited recruitment by employers who discriminate on the
basis of sexual orientation, thus excluding from campus
all recruiters for the armed services.
12. The Administration should open up to private use more
shooting ranges on military bases. There is a growing
shortage of target ranges, particularly in metropolitan
areas. Target ranges on military bases are usually very
underutilized. Gun safety programs could appropriately
use military facilities. User fees would be a source
of some needed revenue. Such programs would facilitate
military recruitment.
13. The Administration should open up more shooting ranges
on public lands.
14. The Administration should reopen to the public the indoor
shooting range at Quantico. It was closed by the EPA for the
almost humorous reason that excessive lead was emitted.
15. The Administration should make sure that there is no
repeat of the Attorney General's Task Force on Crime.
This study was led by Griffin Bell and Governor
Jim Thompson, both of whom are anti-gun. Thus the
report was predictably anti-gun.
30
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 10, 1983
RIGHT TO WORK COALITION MEETING
October 22, 1982
PARTICIPANTS:
Reed Larson
National Right to Work Committee
Bill Wilson
National Right to Work Committee
Dave Denholm
Public Service Research Council
Steve Antosh
Center on National Labor Policy
Steve Galebach
Office of Policy Development
Mike Avakian
Center on National Labor Policy
31
RIGHT TO WORK COALITION MEETING
October 22, 1982
Requests and Suggestions
1.
The Labor Department has made, probably for the first
time, some progress on protecting the rights of retirees
in their pension funds. This represents hundreds of
billions of dollars. More protection is needed to
benefit the retirees. For instance, ERISA regulations
are not applied equally to union pensions and to small
concerns.
2.
Greater protection is needed against use of union pension
funds to finance projects of special benefit to union
officials. Union pension funds are too often placed
in non-interest-bearing accounts.
3.
We must stop the growing abuse of union pension funds
for "social purposes" such as lending only to union
shop projects. This subsidizes union organizing and
forecloses investment opportunities which would earn
retirees more.
4.
Changes are needed in written regulations for pension
funds.
5.
OMB was on the verge of issuing a revised circular A-76
but was stopped, and a study is being made. We
should not have to make a new study of cost every time
such clearly desirable changes are proposed.
6.
OPM proposed in the Federal Register desirable regulation
changes with respect to reductions in force. The
Administration pulled this at the request of Congressman
Wolf, a local congressman with more concern for the
interests of Federal employees for job security than
for the public interest in reform of government. OPM
should be allowed to issue the regulations as drafted.
7.
The Administration should support Senator Nickles' bill
S.R. 2929 which would have raised the Davis Bacon
threshold from $2,000. to $100,000. Nickles got 48
votes. This would not repeal Davis Bacon but would
save a lot of funds for the government.
8.
The Administration should support proposals by Senator
Armstrong to Walsh-Healy. The proposals would permit
Federal contractors to convert to ten hour days and
four day weeks. From the emplyeees' standpoint this
would help a lot in child care and transportation costs.
It would save the government money.
32
9.
The Administration should fight harder for Civil
service reform and stop paying travel and per diem
as "official time" for union negotiators. Current
system makes extended negotiations too attractive
and is slowing down discussions.
10.
Administration should change certain Department of
Labor regulations which prohibit some kinds of work
in the home. 29 CFR Section 530 was cited. Home
work creates jobs in depressed employment areas,
allows single parents and homemakers to care for
children while working, and allows the elderly to
supplement Social Security with extra income.
Following agency hearings in 1981, the Labor Depart-
ment opened up home work for knitted outerwear but
acceded to union pressure and retained the ban in
six other crafts. The Administration should amend
29 CFR part 530 by eliminating all restrictions on
home work.
11. Union officials' relentless demands for artificially
high wages and lowered productivity measures have
brought heavy unemployment to union dominated indus-
tries. The exclusive representation privilege
transfers substantial power from workers to a union
elite. International union officials have used
this power in refusing to accept employee votes for
wage concessions, opting instead to sacrifice the
workers' jobs.
Legislative priorities include lessening union
immunities for federal prosecution of violence,
giving increased control to local rather than to
international unions, and amending the Davis Bacon
Act. The Davis Bacon Act should be amended to
(a) provide for a weighted average wage rather than
a fixed prevailing wage; and, (b) to prohibit the
importation of higher urban wage scales into rural
projects.
12. The scope and power of the office of the Solicitor
of Labor needs to be narrowed and the staff over-
hauled. Authority should be returned to program
officials. The current Solicitor of Labor Tim Ryan
33
should be fired. Rumor has it Ryan is looking for
private employment.
13. The rising power of federal sector unionism has
dangerously transferred control of policy and
procedure away from elected officials to union
officials. Taxpayers end up financing the increased
costs of bargaining and union prompted inefficiency,
and bear the brunt of public employee strikes.
Budgetary and legislative reform is essential to
returning control of government to elected officials.
An immediate priority is to eliminate wage bargaining
for the U.S. Postal Service and the Government
Printing Office.
14. The Administration should get the Congress to repeal
13 (c) of the Urban Mass Transit Act: (UMTA) That
section gives unions veto power over contracts and
inflates labor costs on federally funded mass transit
projects. The Administration should coopt the theme
of "Workers Rights" by proposing legislation to
permit local workers to approve their own contracts
whether or not approved by the overall union.
Repeatedly, as in the case of the Bunker Hill Mine
in Idaho, national unions veto contracts approved
by vote of local workers, thus shutting down work
sites and permanently destroying jobs of local
workers who voted in the majority to accept management
contract offers. (The act was reauthorized by the
"Highway User Fee" bill SO it will now take separate
legislation to address the problem of 13 (c).
15. The Administration should take advantage of its
opportunity to fill vacant positions on the NLRB
with people who support workers rights as opposed
to the special interests of union bosses.
16. NLRB's jurisdictional standards are outdated. 85%
of regulations involve businesses with less than
100 employees. There is a good Federalism issue
here. The states rather than the Federal government
should have jurisdiction of essentially local- matters.
The NLRB should not exercise jurisdiction over
businesses which have a negligible impact on inter-
state commerce.
34
17.
The government is doing a poor job of enforcing
Landrum-Griffin Act requirements concerning union
disclosure of its donations. Tighter regs should
be written.
18.
Appeasing union leaders is a losing proposition,
but an aggressive concern aimed at workers rights
can win a significant workers vote. If the contest
is seen in terms of "union versus management", we
lose. If we seem to be aggressively pursuing pro-
tection of individual workers rights against the
union bosses, we win.
19.
The Administration has done an admirable job in
cutting down the dollar volume of federal grants
to unions. This success can be fortified by replac-
ing sole source grants with competitive bidding
for awards; by eliminating all provisions which
expressly favor unions over other groups (such as
the union preference clause found in CETA demonstra-
tion projects) ; and by vetoing any legislation
naming (or legislation accompanied by conference
reports naming) specific groups to receive the funds.
20.
The current exemption granted labor unions under an
interpretation of the Hobbs Act is indefensible.
It is also potentially disastrous politically for
Congressional puppets of organized labor. The
Administration should fight hard to force repeated
votes in Congress on a repeal of those provisions
relating to extortion and violence which apply to
everyone except unions involved in labor disputes.
21.
Perhaps most important of all is legislative action
against the use of compulsory union dues in politics.
Again this is virtually indefensible, but union
puppets in Congress have no choice but to vote
against reforms which would protect the rights of
union members against having their compulsory
union dues used for political causes they oppose.
35
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 10, 1983
PRO-DEFENSE COALITION MEETING
October 28, 1982
PARTICIPANTS
Henry Walther
U.S. Defense Committee
Col. Phelps Jones
Veterans of Foreign Wars
Andy Messing
The Conservative Caucus
General Al Knight
The Conservative Caucus
General Dan Graham
High Frontier
Colonel Judson Lively
Reserve Officers Association
Jeffrey Berman
National Strategy Information Center
Robert Foelber
Heritage Foundation
Henry Palau
Retired Officers Association
G. Michael Schlee
The American Legion
Kenneth Coskey
Association of Naval Aviation
Greg Mumford
Steven Winchell & Associates
Admiral Mark Hill
Association of Naval Aviation
36
PRO-DEFENSE COALITION MEETING
October 28, 1982
Requests and Suggestions
1.
Organize an effective coalition to counteract
nuclear freeze movement. Major support has been
given by the Administration to coalitions support-
ing economic initiatives. The State Department,
the Defense Department, and White House should work
closely with outside groups naturally supportive of
strong national defense. Leaders of coalition should
be high level civilians rather than retired military.
2.
The Administration should give support to specific
pro-defense projects such as the American Security
Council's film "Count Down for America", the Conser-
vative Caucus's film "Can Soviet Imperialism be
Halted?", and the soon-to-be released British film
"Who Dares Wins". The President should, for instance,
endorse these films personally.
3.
The Administration should vigorously support General
Graham's "High Frontier" proposal for strategic
nuclear defense. It is low cost and innovative.
There is no other weapons system which has as
strong support in the pro-defense community.
Americans can be defended by High Frontier. It is
the best way to change the argument on defense
away from issues where the left has preconditioned
the public.
4.
The President should get the Federal Communications
Commission off the back of the clandestine anti-Castro
exile stations which broadcast anti-communist infor-
mation to Cuba. It is ridiculous for this Administra-
tion to make exertions to protect Castro's monopoly
of news to the Cuban people.
5.
The Administration should play hard ball in the
Congress and insist on Congressional passage of the
Radio Marti legislation which has been blocked in
the Senate.
37
6.
The Administration should publish the full text of
the Kennedy-Kruschev agreements at the time of the
1962 Cuban missile crisis. The Administration
should also release a detailed analysis of the many
Soviet breaches of that agreement.
7.
The President should initiate a complete reassessment
of the 1947 National Security Act. The Joint
Chiefs of Staff serve the interest of protecting
every existing defense program. We have no official
organization for giving the President and the Congress
professional military advice. One possibility would
be to make the Joint Chiefs of Staff principal
advisors to the Congress as well as to the President.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff should be made advisors,
under a revised law, to the Congressional committees
(a) Budget; (b) Armed Services; and (c) Appropriations.
Currently, the JCS, under the law, advises the
President, the NSC, and the Secretary of Defense.
When they "level" with the Congress, they are properly
accused of "legalized insubordination" -- Eisenhower's
words. Our current system results in ridiculous
delays in acquisition. Despite the famous ineffi-
ciencies of the Soviet bureaucracy, they have proved
able to put on line major new weapons systems in
a fraction of the time the U.S. can. A possible
blue ribbon defense advisory panel, a "Team B"
for the President, would be Tom Moorer, Dan Graham,
Russ Dougherty, Mark Hill, and Alton Slay. The
President must get ahead of the Congress in the
military reform movément. Otherwise reforms will
weaken rather than strengthen our defense.
8.
The President must fight hard in Congress for the
military budget. He must make anti-defense members
of Congress vote that way repeatedly and thus make
them accountable to their pro-defense constituents.
He should veto insufficient military spending
bills rather than make dangerous compromises to win
votes of anti-defense members. At the grassroots,
there is still a hard core pro-defense constituency
which, if aroused, will defeat many of the anti-
defense politicians.
38
9.
The Administration should place more emphasis on
developing U.S. capability in "low intensity"
conflicts, i.e. insurgencies, guerilla actions,
etc. Of the last 23 wars around the world, 20 were
non-conventional wars. The Soviets have carefully
built a massive capability for low intensity wars.
10. U.S. treatment of the Republic of China on Taiwan
has been disgraceful. Free China Premier Sung
should be encouraged to visit the United States and
be given at least a cordial, unofficial welcome.
Leaders in Taiwan expect that instead of a welcome
there would be opposition through the back door by
U.S. State Department officials.
11. The President should invite Alexander Solzhenitsyn
to a one-on-one meeting in the White House. The
last invitation was badly botched. Prior to the
Solzhenitsyn visit, the President should read through
Solzhenitsyn's Taiwan speech.
12. The Administration should talk more about the need
for redundancy in defense. Trying to fine tune our
defense preparedness is both dangerous and politically
unintelligible to the public. President Kennedy
didn't stress the budget when he set a national
goal of getting a man on the m on.
13. The President should make use of the March 5, 1982,
letter he received from Senator Goldwater, who said,
"We are not just a little bit second to the Russians,
we are very far behind them." The President should
insist on the House and the Senate being given full
briefings from DIA on the Soviet threat. The Presi-
dent should go on television to define the threat in
unmistakable terms.
14. Pursuant to a similar letter to the President from
Congressman Dornan, the President should invite the
"media elite" to hear a DIA Soviet threat briefing.
The President should ask the media to support his
efforts to keep the Soviets from achieving superior-
ity over us in all areas.
15. As the Soviets helped the North Vietnamese, we should
now give aid directly to the Afghan freedom fighters.
A good supply, for instance, of hand-held surface-to-
air missiles would further destablize Soviet occupying
forces in Afghanistan. The assymetry between U.S. and
40
23.
One solution to the problems of early voluntary
retirement after twenty years of service would be to
change the system as follows: Let a person retire
from the military after 20 years of service but not
start his pension until ten years later. Thus
there would be less incentive for early retirements.
24.
The Administration, particularly the OMB, should make
a much more clear distinction between earned entitle-
ments and unearned entitlements. Few things are
more aggravating to military personnel than to link
unfairly such programs as veterans benefits and military
retirement pay with programs like food stamps.
Clarifying and emphasizing the distinction between
earned entitlements and unearned entitlements will
ease that problem.
25.
The Administration should change its emphasis on arms
control. Currently we are behaving much like the
Carter Administration. The pro-defense community
now distrusts the Administration on this issue.
Many people who opposed Carter's SALT II draft treaty
with the Soviets are certain to go out and oppose
any likely START agreement this Administration
negotiates with the Soviets. Given the grisly record
of the Soviet Union's non-compliance with past
agreements, it is dangerous to hold out unrealistic
hopes to our citizens that current negotiations
will produce worthwhile results. The technical
problems of verification are insurmountable. The
President should tell the American people, "I can't
give you a safe agreement with the Soviets."
26.
After withdrawing the Gray and Terrell appointments
from Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the
President should appoint Bob Dornan or other articulate
hard liners.
27.
The President should explicitly change our nuclear
deterrent strategy. Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD)
simply equals a balance of terror in which the Soviets,
who do not fear Russian public opinion, have a great
advantage. We should change to mutually assured.
survival and push programs like High Frontier and
civil defense.
28.
The President should unclassify much intelligence
data from the Soviet Union. Available pictures will
dramatize to the American people the extent of the
Soviet threat.
41
29.
We should modernize Radio Free Europe and Radio
Liberty. They need new transmitters and a crash
program now instead of fiscal 1985.
30.
The President should make more speeches on the themes
he developed in his speech to the British Parliament.
31.
The President has not made clear to the U.S. or our
allies our national objectives regarding defense.
One observer said, "Europeans will follow if you are
going anywhere."
32.
We should develop a new strategy for 20 - 35 year
olds. More than other age groups, they understand
technological possibilities. We should show them how
and why we are in danger. The Administration should
develop young spokesmen and send them out on the
on the speaking circuit.
33.
The President should use the Presidency to boost
his friends, not enemies of his policies. He should
invite more than Andy Warhol and Armand Hammer to
White House State dinners.
34.
The President should commend the VFW Political Action
Committee, which has had a good impact overall.
Other pro-defense groups should be encouraged to
form political action organizations.
35.
The President should send encouraging responses to
people who send the White House post cards on pro-
defense issues. These cards are currently discarded
or filed and forgotten. This Administration had
done virtually nothing to strengthen the resources
of outside organizations friendly to it.
36.
Encourage pro-defense Congressmen and Senators to
attack the defense budget by proposing amendments
to increase expenditures in key categories. It is
foolish for pro-defense forces always to be on the
defensive. The Reagan budget need not be perceived
in a bargaining position from which defense expenditures
are always compromised downward.
42
37.
The President should strongly make the case that current
Soviet military superiority is why freedom is being
crushed in Poland and Afghanistan. It is why non-
communist countries in Central America are in mortal
danger. The Soviet military superiority creates an
umbrella which makes possible the advance of Marxist
insurgence and invasions. If we do not make this
argument, anti-defense spokesmen will remain free to
claim, falsely, that no one can use military superiority
in the modern era.
43
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 10, 1983
RIGHT TO LIFE COALITION
October 27, 1982
PARTICIPANTS:
Judie Brown
American Life Lobby
Paul Brown
Life Amendment PAC
Gary Curran
American Life Lobby
Douglas Johnson
National Right to Life Committee
Janet Carrol
National Right to Life Committee
Peter Gemma
National Pro-Life PAC
John Mackey
Ad Hoc Committee in Defense of Life
Mark Gallagher
National Committee for a Human Life Amendment
Steve Galebach
Office of Policy Development
Rick Valentine
Americans United for Life
44
RIGHT TO LIFE COALITION MEETING
October 27, 1982
1.
The ACLU is going to court to stop the California
District Attorney from sharing information with HHS
related to the 17,000 fetuses discovered there recently.
HHS should tell the U. S. Attorney they want continued
access to data. The U. S. Attorney or HHS should take
possession of documents related to these abortions to
check to see if fraud is involved or if Federal laws
or regulations have been broken.
2.
The Administration should pay more than lip service in
its support of the Ashbrook Amendment which has, in
continuing resolutions, limited the use of Federal
employees insurance policies to pay for abortions. A
strong White House statement is needed, particularly
to Senators Hatfield, Abdnor, DeConcini, and Proxmire,
insisting that as soon as current contracts expire, no
more abortion-related insurance is to be issued through
the Federal system except to save the life of a mother.
3.
The Administration should strongly back a Dannemyer
Amendment to the National Institute of Health authoriza-
tion prohibiting fetal experimentation.
4.
The Administration should support a proposal by Congress-
man Chris Smith to prohibit small business loans to
abortion providers.
5.
The Administration should insist on regulations to
prohibit funding for abortion related services through
HUD in community development grants. Apparently a
Planned Parenthood clinic in Columbia, Pennsylvania
is now being so funded.
6.
The White House should insist that HHS answer its mail.
For instance, eight letters to HHS since July 4 from
Judie Brown and Garry Curran of American Life Lobby have
not been answered except for a single form letter from
the HHS Inspector General.
7.
The Administration should give more than token support
to Congressman Erlenborn's bill, H.R. 6492, which had
87 co-sponsors in the last Congress. This is an anti-
infanticide bill to confer standing on third parties
who can go to court and get quick action despite apathy
of Federal prosecutors who are not screened for their
agreement with the President's opposition to abortion.
The Administration should help get co-sponsors or perhaps
come up with a bill for the President along these lines.
Surgeon General Koop did testify for H.R. 6492 but the
effort is clearly a low priority for the Administration.
45
8.
HHS should be directed to institute a thorough investi-
gation of the Yale, New Haven hospital which is notorious
for infanticide, publicly known to many in media and
elsewhere.
9.
The Administration is doing a poor job of screening
U. S. District Court nominees with respect to right
to life.
10. The Administration should stick with Robert Destro, a
Reagan Democratic appointee to the U. S. Civil Rights
Commission. Destro was outstanding in hearings, and
is probably the best of the three Democratic nominees.
11. The Administraton should rewrite regulations to tighten up
Title X enforcement. We have not stopped money to programs
where abortion is used as planned parenthood. There have
been ten years of misapplication of legislative intent.
12. The Administration should back up Don Devine in his
efforts to clean up the combined Federal Appeal. The
Administration should insist on strict regulations which
would knock out all advocacy groups from participating
in what ought to be a charitable program.
13. Secretary Schweicker should appoint a panel of physicians
to determine when fetal pain is possible. This will
clearly put the pro-abortionists on the defensive. George
Will wrote that an unborn infanct could feel pain from
8 - 10 weeks. An Illinois statute already requires
pregnant women considering abortion to be given notice
of possibilities for pain by the fetus and even requires
the use of analgesics for the fetus during an abortion.
14. The Administration should order those compiling govern-
ment statistics on infant mortality to include abortions.
The Administration should open up Food and Drug Adminis-
tration hearings on Depo Provera. It appears that only
previous witnesses may be allowed to testify.
15. HHS should specifically designate someone at the Depart-
ment as a principal contact for right-to-life organizations,
so that so many items do not continue to go unanswered.
16. The Administration should change the Peace Corps statute
to ban use of Federal money for transportation for
abortions. Reportedly last year the Peace Corps paid
for seventy round trips to D.C. from overseas for
abortions for women in the Peace Corps.
17. The Administration should require annual rather than
the current biennial reports on abortion statistics
from the Center for Disease Control. Pro-abortionists
are now handing out the statistics.
46
18. The HHS grant system should be opened up to provide
grants for pro-life researchers who are now almost
entirely shut out by the structure of the system.
19. The White House should take steps to encourage
Secretary Schweicker when he takes pro-life actions.
He can't be expected to take all the heat when he
tries to implement the pro-life policy expressed by
the President.
20. We need to have a counter study to the Global 2000
program which was a Carter Office of Technology world-
wide population study. Perhaps the White House could
get Herman Kahn of the Hudson Institute to conduct such
a study with Federal funds.
21. More pro-lifers should get positions at HHS. The
situation there is analagous to the Justice and
Education Departments where a few top appointees are
sympathetic to the President's views but the structure,
including many political appointees, is not in agree-
ment with, and sides against, the President's policy.
22. The Administration should direct someone in the policy
area to develop data on pro-life steps already taken
by the Administration. There is no reason not to get
credit for what progress has been made in this area.
23. The Administration should put on a first class effort in
behalf of the Hatch Amendment, to which amendment the
President is committed.
24. The Administration should put on a first class effort
with respect to a statutory change like the Helms
Amendment to prohibit Federal funding of abortions.
This is currently in place only as riders to appropria-
tions bills, and this process is now virtually eliminated
by Tip O'Neill's changes in the House rules.
25. The President himself should be involved earlier in
Congressional pro-life fights. He should insist that
all the resources of his Administration should actually
put heat on Congressmen and Senators in pro-life debates
as they do on economic issues. There is no indication
that the President's well meaning personal contacts
swung a single vote in the one successful fight for
passage of the Helms pro-life amendment last fall.
26. The President will appoint three of sixteen members to a
commission to celebrate the bicentennial of the Constitu-
tion. The President should take care to appoint the right
people and to make sure the right staff are hired. Other-
wise, we may wind up with a commission which will celebrate
the pro-abortion Roe vs. Wade Supreme Court decision as a
great constitutional achievement.
47
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 10, 1983
CONSERVATIVE ELECTION AND LOBBYING COALITION
October 29, 1982
PARTICIPANTS:
Huck Walther
U. S. Defense Committee
Steve Antosh
Center on National Labor Policy
Paul Weyrich
Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress
Bob McAdam
Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress
Paul Kamenar
Washington Legal Foundation
Marshall Breger
Heritage Foundation
Terry Dolan
National Conservative Political Action Committee
Andy Messing
The Conservative Caucus
Bill Wilson
National Right to Work Committee
John Houston
The Fairness Committee
Peter Gemma
Pro-Life PAC
Pat Collins
National Association of Home Builders
Bill Anderson
Independent Petroleum Association
48
CONSERVATIVE ELECTION AND LOBBYING COALITION
October 29, 1982
Requests and Suggestions
1.
The Administration should fight to change the Federal
Election Law so that it could do nothing more than
refer cases to the Justice Department for prosecution.
2.
We should standardize the penalties for violations of
the Federal Election Law. There is a very pronounced
discrimination against conservatives by the FEC. When
the mother of Jeff Bell gave him part of his inheritance
from his father, the Bells were fined $10,000. When the
father of Josephine Ferraro (a liberal Democrat) gave
her substantial sums, the Ferraros were fined only $3000.
3.
We should shorten the system during which the statute
of limitations runs. This will prevent the Federal
Election bureaucrats from harrassing political partici-
pants, particularly Members of Congress who are reluctant
to move against the FEC for fear of being targets of
harrassment by the liberal-dominated FEC.
4.
The Administration should oppose pending legislation
which purports to be protecting elderly people from
mail fraud but which could be used by the bureaucracy
to shut down virtually all conservative direct mail.
5.
It is absolutely vital that the President appoint hard
core conservatives to the FEC. Another appointment is
up in April, 1983. Recommended Republicans are Bob
Dornan, Bill Olson, or Bob D'Agostino. No "moderate"
Democrats should be appointed either to fill Democratic
vacancies; the Administration should appoint people as
solid as Harry Byrd or Larry McDonald.
6.
The Administration should look for opportunities to break
up the liberal lobbying coalition. For instance, the
President could propose to dedicate revenues from leases
and royalties on Federal lands to, say, Social Security
or Medicare. This would be politically attractive. This
would pit the no-growth environmentalists against the old
people's lobby. Almost certainly, if passed, this dedica-
tion of funds would tip the balance in favor of more job
creation and economic activity by freeing up more resources
for use.
7.
The Federal government should resist by every means
establishment of checkoffs for business or union PACs,
particularly public employees union PACs. Pennsylvania
had a state law against this but was preempted by the
Federal government. If all contributions are voluntary,
the system is truly free and the union bosses, who are
the most abusive, would lose much of their political
clout. Don Devine has done good work on this.
49
8.
The Administration should abolish the teacher center
programs. They are largely controlled by the NEA and
AFT unions. They currently receive about $8.9 million
per year and are funded now through the Education block
grants passed last year.
9. Abolish the National Institute of Education within DOE
and all discretionary spending which is supporting opera-
tions such as the National Diffusion Network. Abolish
WEEA in Department of Education.
10. Abolish HUD Community Development block grant 42 USC
5301, etc. which is being used to force communities to
take low income housing.
11. Direct the relevant Presidential appointees to change
administrative procedures to tighten up Federal grant
and contract procedures in order to reduce the flow of
taxpayers' funds to political advocacy organizations.
50
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 10, 1983
TAX LIMITATION COALITION MEETING
November 1, 1982
PARTICIPANTS
John Albertine
American Business Conference
Mark Bloomfield
American Council for Capital Formation
Bill Shaker
National Tax Limitation Committee
John Lynch
Citizens Choice
Grace Ellen Rice
American Farm Bureau Federation
John Motley
National Federation of Independent Business
David Franasiak
Ron Utt
U.S. Chamber of Commerce
Tom Cook
National Cattlemen's Association
Andre Le Tendre
American Lobby for the Balanced Budget
David Keating
National Taxpayers Union
Dr. Norman Ture
David Raboy
Institute on the Research of the Economics of Taxation
Dirk Van Donegan
National Association of Wholesalers
Tom Humbert
Heritage Foundation
51
TAX LIMITATION COALITION MEETING
November 1, 1982
Requests and Suggestions
1.
Take up Balanced Budget-Tax Limitation Amendment again.
Trent Lott has filed a discharge petition in the
last Congress and could do so again. Administration
should work more closely with outside coalition on
this.
2.
Resolve Social Security as soon as possible. Don't
accelerate Social Security tax increases.
3.
Don't have Congress take up Social Security and the
Balanced Budget-Tax Limitation at the same time.
4.
Take positions based on reality. Make OMB bite
bullets to come up with balanced budget with no tax
increases. Propose draconian spending cuts, and go
down fighting for them if necessary. Then the deficit
would be clearly understood as the fault of the liberals.
5.
Hold Administration discussions with leading conservative
Senators. Ask them not to undermine the Administration"s
position by claiming that no more cuts are possible.
6.
Stop talking about balancing the budget as opposed
to reducing spending. Focus the whole deficit debate on
expenditure issues. Discussion of balanced budget
today results in more emphasis on tax increases than
on expenditure reductions. Tax increases will drive
the economy down.
7.
Bring in leading businessmen. Ask them to concentrate
their lobbying on cuts in spending across the board.
They are usually too concerned about tax policy to
understand that those powerful spending lobbies
generate often irresistable pressure for higher
taxation. If the businessmen would lobby hard against
spending proposals, they would have less oppressive taxes.
8.
Involve Bob Brown of the Tax Foundation to a greater
extent in Administration discussions. It is a very
knowledgable group on spending cuts.
52
9.
Push state legislatures for additional calls for a
Constitutional Convention to provide for a balanced
budget-tax limitation amendment. A little more
success in state legislatures would force the
Congress to submit an amendment to the states.
10.
Stop playing Orwelian word games. Accelerated taxes
are clearly tax increases. Revenue enhancements are
clearly tax increases. User fees are clearly tax
increases. The Administration is fooling no one
and making a laughing stock of itself.
11.
All agree there should be no tax increases. If
we have to raise revenues, the Administration should
go toward a flat tax, but should describe it as "the
least bad way to raise revenue." Don't try to
disguise it as more loophole closing or "due to other
considerations." Trying to sell a flat rate tax
as a simplification and not as a revenue raiser would
destroy the credibility of the Administration.
Describing it as the least bad way to raise revenue
would permit the issue to be honestly joined without
hiding behind subterfuge.
12.
Push Congress to adopt rules to govern a constitutional
convention called by the states. Just urging the
Congress to devise those rules would move us closer
to eventual passage of a Balanced Budget-Tax Limitation
Amendment. Passage of these rules is clearly doable
in the Senate early in the session.
13.
The Administration must develop better techniques
with respect to proposing spending reductions.
Propose a substitute rather than have the beneficiaries
feel as though they have been cut off at the knees.
With social security, rather than increase taxes or
cut payments to current beneficiaries, it is far more
politically palatable. to alter materially benefits
for future beneficiaries. We should point out that
the private sector ought to be able to provide
better benefits. This may require tax incentives.
Any private sector substitute for any element of
social security would have to be more than voluntary.
Peter Ferrara of the Office of Policy Development has:
the most promising long-term solution.
53
14.
The FCC fairness doctrine inhibited national tax
limitation ads. Tax limitation message is somewhat
more difficult to get out because broadcasters are
afraid they will be held responsible under the fairness
doctrine. Better to do away with the fairness doctrine.
15.
Funding by Health and Human Services of state health
care planning bodies prevents private group entry
into the health care area. These state central
planning groups are anti-competition and anti-free
enterprise.
16.
Some thought the President should get behind a
Constitutional Amendment to give him a line item
veto. This would be highly consequential. The
appropriation process is currently a balled up mess
in which spending interests have most of the cards.
The line item veto is badly needed.
17.
The President should insist on a serious rethinking
of the 1974 Budget Reform Act, which has turned out
to be the ultimate fiscal hocum. Congress is not
equipped to make fiscal policy. Currently the
President gives his idea of a budget. Then it is
ignored by the Congress. Congress begins de novo.
This clearly unworkable process came from an effort
to keep Richard Nixon from impounding funds. It
must be revised.
18.
Taxpayers need increased protection from IRS. IRS
must be made to specify which regulations are
appropriate to implement last fall's tax bill.
Unfortunately, it now paralyzes much economic activity.
With respect to financial accounts of the poor and
the elderly, many exemption certificates will not be
filed because the situation is unclear. That is good
news only for the IRS.
19.
Administration is not doing enough to push enterprise
zones. The original concept has already been badly
diluted. Enterprise zones would set examples of
prosperity as the tax burden is reduced. This would
give the Administration a badly needed urban policy.
54
Initial success would be followed by establishment
of more enterprise zones or by extending some benefits
nationally.
20.
There was unanimous opposition to any additional tax
increases! Spending must be brought down to match
existing revenues.
55
NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO COMMENTARY BY: CONNIE MARSHNER
TOPIC:
1982 Wrap Up
TAPED:
December 30, 1982
1982, for the conservative movement known as the New Right,
was a mixture of theoretical pleasure and real displeasure.
The year began with lots of conservatives still believing
in Ronald Reagan. The signs were not good as 1981 petered
out, but the desire to hope was still stronger than the
incipient awareness of reality. That hope was nurtured by
such things as Secretary of Health and Human Services Richard
Schweiker's regulation to require parental notification
before teenagers receive federally-funded contraceptives --
contraceptives to protect them from their own promiscuity.
But the reality of the unbalanced budget proposed by Reagan
and the sheer trauma, to conservatives, of Reagan's tax
increases and sellout of Taiwan finally outweighed the
theoretical pleasure of hope.
For a while then in 1982, the conservative movement wandered
in a desert: frustration and disappointment were all there
was to show for the past year and a half. The November
elections came on relentlessly. The results were not good
for conservatives. But even the most brutal analyst had to
admit that - somehow -- for some reason -- the results
weren't as bad as they could have, or, some argued, should
have been. Something had saved conservatism from utter
repudiation. It gradually became clear: we had not been
building conservatism during 1981 and 1982 -- we had been
too busy trying to futilely influence an Administration
which did not want our help, thank you very much. But
despite our neglect of our primary task, the American
people had clung to some of what we had proselytised
back before we had caught White House fever.
As 1982 ends, there is a sense of new direction just barely
emerging among the collective intuition of the New Right.
The consensus has been reached that in 1983 we must return
to doing what we can: making the case to the American
public that our system needs reform. We must return our
energies to building our conservative movement. Let Jim
Baker run the White House how he wishes; we have our own
fish to fry. The task remains to design the reforms that the
country needs, and to build anew the political coalition that
might make those reforms possible.
1982 will not be a golden year in any New Right leader's diary.
It began sour and it ends somber. But 1983 begins with a
tentatively positive note: we are renewing our sense of
our own identity. Knowing who we are, is essential to discern
the path we must follow. Now in 1983, we can begin to feel
our way along that path.
In Washington, this is Connie Marshner.