NSDD 11 Munitions/Technology Transfer to the People's Republic of China
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OCR Page 1 of 2SYSTEM II
90004
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
September 22, 1981
SECRET
I
NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 11
MUNITIONS/TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
1. The case-by-case consideration of requests by the People's
Republic of China for munitions/technology transfers should be
conducted on the basis of the following general principles:
U. S. munitions/technology transfers to China should
minimize the national security risks in special mission areas of
nuclear weapons or their delivery systems, anti-submarine warfare
capabilities, electronic warfare capabilities, or intelligence-
gathering capabilities.
-- U. S. munitions/technology transfers should not contribute
significantly to improvements in Chinese offensive and power-
projection capabilities.
-- For requests which would enhance China's conventional
defensive capabilities, the U. S. will be willing to consider
the transfer of weapons, components, technical assistance and
weapons technology (including some coproduction/licensed
production where sensitive technologies are not involved)
-- For requests which fall into less clearly defensive
categories, the U. S. will look first to the selective transfer
of components and technical assistance rather than the transfer
of complete weapons systems or their production technology.
U. S. classified military information will be disclosed
in accordance with the criteria and procedures established by the
National Disclosure Policy (NDP-1).
2. In implementing these general guidelines, the existing
mechanism and process established for munitions/technology
transfers will be applied by the Departments of State, Defense,
and Commerce, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and
any other concerned organization that a specific case may warrant.
Consultations should be undertaken as appropriate with key
Congressional leaders and with Allies and friends during the
process of review.
SBCRET
Review on September 23, 2001
Ronald Reagan
Extended by RVAllen
Reason NSC 1.13 (f)
UNCLASSIFIED
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