NSDD 86 United States Approach to Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Negotiations

CLISSIFIED WASHINGTON March 28, 1983 NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION DIRECTIVE NUMBER 86 U.S. APPROACH TO INF NEGOTIATIONS The U.S. Delegation to the INF negotiations is directed to make a proposal based upon the following elements to the Soviet Union before the end of the current round of negotiations: (X) - The U.S. continues to believe that the zero-zero outcome is the optimal outcome. - Without an agreement which satisfies the criteria we have previously identified, however, the U.S. will deploy LRINF land based missiles as planned by NATO. - While maintaining the other elements of the U.S. INF position, and, as an interim step towards the ultimate elimination of all LRINF land based missiles, the U.S. could agree to accept a limit at one of a number of certain discrete levels provided that the level would satisfy the criteria cited above and provided the Soviet Union is prepared to agree to reduce its corresponding LRINF land based missile forces to an equal level. - Therefore, the U.S. INF Delegation should notify the Soviet Delegation that the U.S. is prepared to enter into an interim agreement under which the United States would accept a limit at some finite, agreed number of warheads on longer-range, land based INF missile launchers if the Soviet Union reduces the number of warheads on its LRINF land based missile force to an equal level on a global basis. - The J.S. views such an agreement as an interim step to the total elimination of weapons of this class. It hopes the Soviet Union will recognize the wisdom of this and join us in this view, but it does not make a commitment by the Soviet Union tc ultimately negotiate a zero-zero outcome a precondition for the negotiation of what we would view to be an interim solution. R onald Bagan UNCLASSIFIED Declassified/Released on 5-17-91 OADR under provisions of E.0. 12356 by S. Tilley, National Security Council Iron-In28)