Extracted text

OCR Page 1 of 19
% occurs TOP SECRET - -17- - D. Economic/Financial Viability of Key U.S. Allies and Friendly Nations. Although measures may be successful in assuring the provision of adequate supplies to the Armed Forces of U.S. allies and friends, for some of these allies and friends the impact of a major energy emergency may impose severe strain on their economic and financial well-being. This can have deleterious effects on U.S. security interests. United States policy is to seek to minimize such effects since they can significantly burden U.S. defense resources at the potential expense of other security priorities. As a first step, the United States should encourage its allies and friends to take actions and develop plans to minimize these effects. However, there may arise a need for possible U.S. steps to assist friends and allies. The means and costs of such steps are not well defined. State, with assistance from DOD, should continue to chair the study of the general macro-micro economic and security implications of energy shortages for key U.S. allies and friendly nations. As a first step, this examination should include at least the following key countries: Turkey, Israel, Portugal (others to be decided in conjunction with State) . Primary issues to be addressed include: 1. The degree of economic vulnerability to energy disruptions. 2. Adequacy of local measures to deal with this vulnerability, including pre-crisis measures which the foreign nation could adopt to decrease the impact of an emergency. 3. Possible U.S. or international policy alternatives, including at least a discussion of limited economic and security assistance, to address the identified vulnerabilities and to deal with their consequences in a crisis. The analysis and recommendations in this section should be completed and forwarded (through the SIG-IEP) to the NSC for decision no later than December 31, 1983. (s) E. Energy Emergency Preparedness for Mobilization and War Energy emergency circumstances which occur in conjunction with defense-related civilian economic mobilization introduce problems and considerations of a nature and magnitude which are distinct from those expected to prevail during an energy emergency in a non-mobilization situation. Emergency Mobilization Preparedness policy is enunciated in National Security Decision Directive 47. The potential impacts of an energy emergency during mobilization and/or armed conflict must receive additional attention. Accordingly, the Emergency Mobilization Planning Board is directed to establish TOP SECRET 15 TOP SECRET