NSDD 270 Afghanistan

SECRET -SECRET 24731 SYSTEM II 90204 THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION May 1, 1987 DIRECTIVE NUMBER 270 AFGHANISTAN (C) ASSESSMENT After seven years of military stalemate in Afghanistan, the Soviet Union has engaged in a more comprehensive approach to the issue of its future involvement in Afghanistan It has embarked on a sophisticated political strategy which has captured head- lines and generated hopes for a settlement. However, Soviet proposals have been accompanied by stepped-up military activity, particularly along (and across) the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. We remain skeptical that Moscow has made the hard political decisions necessary to a settlement. At the last Geneva round of negotiations in February-Marci 1987, the Soviets reduced the withdrawal timetable for their forces from Afghanistan to 18 months (from an initial offer of four years) . The Soviet move is designed to persuade the world that Moscow is serious in searching for a solution in Afghanistan, vet Tearly aimed to allow Soviet military operations against the resistance with decreased external support (S) Attempts at appearing reasonable toward political settlement have been coupled with a tepped-ur Soviet campaign of air raids, sabotage, and terrorist bombings m Pakistán which has begun to exacerbate relations between resident Afghan refugees and their Pakistani hosts. Ethnic violence in southern Pakistan also worries the Pakistani leadership. While President Zia remains committed to a strong stand on Afghanistan and believes that Pakistan must resist Soviet pressure, he faces growing domestic pressures to adopt a less confrontational approach on Afghanistan. Such pressures may have been responsible for Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan's too-hasty willingness to make a seven-month withdrawal timetable counter-proposal at the recent proximity talks in Geneva. (S) Thus, we are entering a critical period and need to maintain strong pressure on the Soviets if we are to have a chance of a suitable negotiated settlement. We must renew our efforts to encourage more active Anternational support for both the Afghan resistance and for Pafistan. At the sameatime we must carefully examine each Soviet proposal, taking care not to appear routinely dismissive of Soviet initiatives. We remain ready for opportunities arising from iincreasedctensians within the Kabul regime which stem from Moscow's recent politic 1 moves. Soviet courting of Pakistan, although intermätten has greatly enhanced nervousness within the PDPA. (S) -SECRET DECLASSIFY ON: OADR -SECRET