Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
158701436
label
Management Team Meeting Marina Del Ray, California April 1997 [3]
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
158701436
contentType
document
title
Management Team Meeting Marina Del Ray, California April 1997 [3]
citationUrl
collections
Records of the Domestic Policy Council (Clinton Administration)
Irene Bueno's Files
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
158701436
levelOfDescription
fileUnit
otherTitles
42-t-7367472-20171120S-035-009-2019
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
mediaId
0084dc6b6da87b3d
ocrText
Clinton Presidential Records
Digital Records Marker
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
This marker identifies the place of a tabbed divider. Given our
digitization capabilities, we are sometimes unable to adequately
scan such dividers. The title from the original document is
indicated below.
Divider Title:
4
IMPROVING MANAGEMENT
IV.
Should the Commission make recommendations to improve management
of the federal immigration system?
Although the Commission may recommend that certain structural changes be made
to the current U.S. immigration system, management reforms also must be adopted
if the agencies responsible for immigration matters are to implement policy
effectively. Structural reforms alone will not solve some of the persisitent immigra-
tion agency management problems.
Advantages. The Commission would be recommending managerial im-
provements that could be undertaken relatively soon and within almost any
organizational structure. Most of these would have little, if any, costs.
Disadvantages. This recommendation might be seen by federal agencies as
Commission micromanagement [although it has said repeatedly that it does
not want to micromanage]. These recommendations may detract attention
from a clear and simple focus on any structural changes the Commission
might recommend.
[PLEASE NOTE: The following options are not mutually exclusive and the Com-
mission may wish to recommend all or a combination of them.]
Option A. Set more manageable and fully-funded priorities.
Under this option, the Commission would urge Congress and the Executive to
establish and then appropriately fund a "more manageable" set of immigration-
related priorities, that is with fewer, more integrated priorities, more realistically-
achievable long-term and short-term goals, and greater numerical specificity on
expected annual outcomes to which agencies could be held accountable [see
Option B.].
1
The processes used by both Congress and the Executive Branch to plan and allocate
resources constrain the development of a more manageable set of priorities.
Currently, most immigration priorities result from Legislative-Executive interaction
during the multiyear budget process. Government budgeting cycles are lengthy and
complex. Agencies must work simultaneously with the budgets and reporting cycles
of four fiscal years,¹ while congressional action consists of the doubly bifurcated
processes of authorization and then appropriations occurring separately in both the
House of Representatives and the Senate and then together in conference.
Executive Branch departments seldom identify adequately how much money they
need to accomplish the entirety of a specified goal. Nor do they do a good job of
scaling back or increasing their objectives depending on the resources appropriated.
Within the legislative branch, there is little coordination between congressional
committees to ensure a congruence between any agreed-upon priority expectations
and the resources actually allocated to do the job. As a result, transparency and
accountability are not built into the system. For example, Congress is not held
accountable for adding on new priorities without appropriating resources to
accomplish all of the specified tasks, and federal agencies are not directly nor easily
held accountable for their performance in achieving or not achieving agreed-upon
results.
The general problem of inexact articulation of priorities and resources is compound-
ed by the Executive Branch's identification of implementation priorities. Most
Administration immigration priorities are articulated in broad statements of
purpose and intent that are difficult to monitor (such as those contained in the
February 7, 1995 Presidential Directive on "Deterring Illegal Immigration," [attached]
1 For example, for the second quarter of FY 1997 [i.e., January - March 1997], federal agencies are
performing the following budget-related tasks:
For FY 1996, completing work on 1996 year-end statistics and reports;
For FY 1997, continuing work on implementing FY 1997 goals and priorities;
For FY 1998, putting final touches on the President's February "FY 1998 Budget Submission to
the Congress" and then explaining/defending it at hearings before the appropriate
Congressional committees;
For FY 1999, developing within Executive Branch agencies the FY 1999 budget initiatives,
priorities and strategies to be submitted to OMB under the "Spring Plan" planning
process.
2
that built on the 1994 CIR report). Other agency priorities are so minutely-defined or
objectives so numerous that it is equally impossible to track or assess success (such
as the seven priorities, thirty-six objectives, and eighty-seven tasks of the INS
Commissioner's FY 1997 Priorities [attached]).
Under this option, the Commission would urge that Congress and the Executive
Branch not overpromise. For example, rather than merely defining the removal of
deportable and inadmissible aliens as the priority for removal, a long-term goal that
is not now achievable, the federal government could define annual removal
priorities in terms of specified categories of aliens (e.g., criminal aliens) and specify
the strategy to be used to reach the targeted annual outcome, (e.g., "last in, first out,"
that is, gaining the capacity to remove everyone who newly enters the removal
system before moving on to the backlog of persons whose cases have been pending
for some period). This priority-setting and strategy-developing process, worked well
in reforming the asylum process and could be repeated in other areas.
Setting of priorities and strategies must be accompanied by sufficient resources. In
the removal example, it should include giving resources to Investigations, Trial
Attorneys, Immigration Judges, Detention and Deportation Officers, Department of
State liaisons with host countries, vehicles, equipment, training, support, etc. The
priority should identify the problem completely and clearly and map out which part
of it will be solved in which of several years of priority action. And then Congress
should agree to fund it and the Executive be held accountable.
Advantages. Although this option may appear to be self-evident,
immigration priorities and resources do not now reflect this basic
concept-that agencies should not promise-nor Congress mandate-
more than they can accomplish with reasonable resources and within
reasonable timeframes. This option would permit a reiteration of this
sound management principle and is consistent with the goals of the
Government Performance and Review Act [GPRA].
Disadvantages. While seemingly straightforward, this option is very
difficult to achieve. Reducing the number of priorities to a more
manageable set that can be accomplished means determining that
3
certain important issues will not be addressed immediately. Doing a
small amount on a lot of issues gives the appearance of being more
responsive to legitimate concerns about immigration than doing or
promising more on a limited set of issues.
Option B. Improve systems of accountability.
Under this option, the Commission would recommend improvements designed to
make staff responsible for immigration programs more accountable for the results of
their activities. Systems to reward or sanction staff on the basis of their performance
would require the development of performance measures that relate to expected
outcomes. For example, the Commission earlier recommended rewarding Border
Patrol staff for their effectiveness in deterring illegal migration rather than their
prowess at apprehending illegal aliens. Similarly, managers responsible for
adjudication of benefits should be rewarded if they lessen processing time for the
approval of applications and simultaneously improve their detection of fraudulent
cases. By contrast, managers who fail to meet recognized operating standards should
be held accountable and be sanctioned for their noncompliance. Systems to reward
innovation also need to be developed. Too often, staff who try new approaches are
not only not rewarded for their initiative, they are sanctioned by their colleagues
and supervisors, for example, the reaction the Commission witnessed when
Operation Hold the Line was implemented.
Advantages. Improvements will never be made at INS and the other
agencies responsible for immigration matters until managers are held
accountable for their performance. This option provides an opportuni-
ty for the Commission to reiterate the importance of developing
performance based standards.
Disadvantages. Staff see no disadvantages to this option except,
perhaps, to anticipate adverse reaction from staff unions to numerical
or other defined performance indicators.
4
Option C. Recruit and train managers.
Under this option, the Commission would recommend enhancements in the
recruitment and training of managers. As immigration-related agencies grow and
mandated responsibilities increase or evolve, closer attention should be paid to
improving the skills and managerial capacity of immigration staff at all levels to
ensure more efficient and effective use of allocated resources.
Since 1993, the immigration system has been undergoing a tremendous infusion of
new resources and, since 1996, significantly augmented statutory mandates. Either
would seriously burden even the best-run agencies; both at once may stretch the
absorptive capacity of several immigration agencies beyond their current limits.
Since 1993, the funding allocated to the INS alone has more than doubled. Such
infusions of new resources to INS and to several other agencies-including funding
for large augmentations for additional, mostly-entry level staff-burden agency
administrative and management systems. As one of the consultation participants
observed, INS has added much needed policy expertise to its top personnel but has
not added a sufficient number of good managers to help the agency address the
many challenges it faces.
Agencies must be able to rapidly recruit, select, train, deploy, and then support new
staff-and they must sustain this expansionist capacity over several fiscal years.
Most of the new staff added are entry-level, necessitating on-the-job training,
mentoring, and close supervision before they can be considered fully-functional.
As new staff are added, new supervisors are needed-and they too need supervisory
and management training to be successful. Supervisors usually are drawn from the
ranks of the operational staff-and with increased operational responsibilities, they
often are unable to be freed soon enough or long enough to attend supervisory
training in a timely fashion.
In addition, major changes in immigration statute passed in 1996 necessitated the
redrafting and repromulgation of hundreds of sections of law and regulations,
5
hundreds of new or old forms, and training and retraining of staff just to imple-
ment these profound changes.
Serious attention needs to be paid to the capacity of several agencies to successfully
absorb both the additional staff authorized by the Congress and the revised and
increased mandates passed last year. INS repeatedly has warned that it is skeptical
about reaching some of its Congressionally-imposed hiring mandates, and internal-
ly increasingly is expressing concern about the effective supervision and manage-
ment of these new staff. The service warns that having so many new staff members
requires augmentation of supervisory ranks from operational officers who are not
yet ready for such responsibility.
Such changes in the law and infusion of additional resources and staff may require
some immigration agencies to make major changes in the way new staff are trained:
training in management by objectives, in accountability, in managerial and supervi-
sory skills, etc. For some agencies, the skill levels and agency cultures are not yet
adequate to fulfill present and future expected increased managerial and supervisory
responsibilities successfully. Both additional supervisors and new skills are
urgently needed.
The infusion of new skills and culture can come from two sources: (1) in-house
training and retraining of existing staff; (2) the addition-from outside the agencies
-of new middle- and upper-level management staff possessing those skills and
capable of quickly applying them to the immigration setting. These two sources
need not be mutually exclusive; some of both may be required.
One promising recent development is the INS new "competency-based" assessment
process for Border Patrol officer promotions to supervisor. The Border Patrol is the
single immigration agency receiving the greatest number of new staff over the
coming next several years. The objective of this system is to test Border Patrol
officers to predict more accurately their potential for success as future supervisors.
According to INS, the main focus of the system is on assessment of "thinking skills
and on the way supervisors and managers must think and react on a daily
6
basis."2 So far, more than 1,000 Border Patrol officers have been tested, another
1,000 will be tested by the end of summer 1997, and testing of all remaining eligible
Border Patrol Officers will be completed by the end of CY 1997.
Advantages. This option emphasizes that the immigration system has
become sufficiently complex to require the recruitment and training of
a cadre of good managers, a recommendation that should help im-
prove performance.
Disadvantages. There are cost implications to this recommendation.
For example, INS may require supervisor-staff ratios lower than the
1:13 recommended by the Vice-President's National Performance
Review [NPR] because of the challenges presented by its rapid growth
and management problems.
Option D. Strengthen customer service orientation.
This option emphasizes that increased attention should be paid to instilling a
customer-service ethic in staff, particularly those responsible for adjudication of
applications for benefits.
Repeatedly, but most often at INS, people complain of a lack of service from both
their dollar and from the people charged with serving them. [See attached example,
dated March 7, 1997, from Jette Rasmussen to Acting District Director Ouellette.]
The horror stories are too common. Most people coming into contact with INS
have paid a fee-whether indirectly (e.g., airport fees or inspections users fees tacked
onto ticket prices) or directly (e.g., fees submitted with applications for a benefit)
2 The system is based on four assessments:
Decisionmaking Situational Assessment: that measures thinking skills, such as reasoning,
decisionmaking, and problemsolving;
In-basket Job Simulation: that measures administrative skills, such as planning/organizing and
managing/organizing information;
Managerial Writing Skills Exercise: that measures written communications skills; and,
Past Achievement Record: that measures personal qualities, such as leadership and
flexibility.
7
-and they expect service that is user-friendly and timely. People should be treated
courteously, records should be located with ease, and information should be
provided in a professional manner.
According to one recent INS-official, the problem of INS service "is not a problem of
an enforcement mind set in the minds of service people." Rather, it is "simply an
inadequate service culture among Service people.
Most of the people in the
service side of the agency didn't come from the enforcement side. They came up
through examiners' ranks.
The problem of service in the INS offices seems
a
problem of not training people to perform service adequately."
The absence of a separate career track for benefits adjudicators nevertheless hampers
efforts to attract and retain the best federal employees to perform these tasks.
Currently, many of those promoted into management positions within INS moved
along the enforcement career track, whose higher grade designations made them
eligible for such promotions before those whose careers were spent in the benefits
adjudication function. Benefits adjudication personnel should have a career track
that promotes the best performers into positions of management and leadership and
provides all employees both with appropriate incentives and models worth
emulating.
The primary currency of service is information-correct and timely. Information
should be readily available to immigration customers without having to stand
hours in a line. Immigration processes should be reengineered, when necessary, to
ensure that information is easily available at several locations and through several
electronic means and, when given, is accurate. INS currently is experimenting in
various cities with Information Kiosks that dispense INS forms. The INS Internet
website is being augmented with informational resources and forms and soon will
also include major immigration reports, including annual statistics.
Customer-service personnel should be both initially well-trained and periodically
tested to ensure they remain current with latest changes and interpretations. In
addition, there should be a formal quality assurance program in place for each
immigration function, including oversight of detention facilities, investigations
work, and deportation arrests. For customer service representatives working on the
8
lines at district field offices or answering questions on the telephone, quality
assurance should include the possibility for supervisors to monitor the correctness
and manner of delivery of the service given.
Advantages. This option addresses a major problem impeding the
delivery of services and, hence, fulfillment of a principal mission of
the immigration system.
Disadvantages. Staff see no disadvantages to this option.
Option E. Use fees for immigration services more effectively.
Under this option, the Commission would support the imposition of users fees, but
emphasize that (1) fees should reflect true costs; (2) agencies collecting the fees
should retain them; (3) those paying fees should expect timely and courteous
service; and (4) agencies should have maximum flexibility to expand or contract
expeditiously as fees increase or decrease.
The current system has a number of weaknesses. First, some programs are now
undercharging (or not charging) fees, while others reportedly are overcharging. INS
is now engaged in a review of its fees to determine where adjustments should be
made. Second, some fees go into the general Treasury while others are held by the
agencies collecting them. Third, when the demand for services increases, there is a
significant lag time before an agency is able to use the increased fee revenue to
expand its service capacity. For example, it took several months to obtain permis-
sion for a reprogramming of funds when naturalization and 245i adjustment
applications increased significantly, resulting in a growing backlog of persons
awaiting the service for which they already had paid. Providing more flexibility
would require agreement from the appropriations committees that they need not
approve the reprogramming of fees when changes occur in the volume of applica-
tions.
Advantages. This option would help ensure that resources are
available to perform effectively the various functions needed in
9
adjudicating benefits and that systems are in place to provide the
actual services in a timely and efficient manner.
Disadvantages. This option reduces congressional oversight of the use
of resources.
Option F.
Complete efforts to improve information resource coordination.
Under this option, the Commission would encourage completion of the efforts
underway throughout immigration agencies to improve the reliability of agency
databases that facilitate both an applicant's immigration processing and an agency's
ability to track and assess management efficiencies and results.
Until recently, many of the information resources and databases concerning
immigration processes were uncoordinated within agencies and unconnected
between agencies. An alien's official and legal immigration processing can begin
either with a relative's or prospective employer's petition or with a request for a
visa. Once a visa has been obtained, an alien departs his home country, travels to
the U.S., is inspected at a U.S. port-of-entry, stays for a while and then leaves, tries to
adjust, or requests asylum. For those who entered illegally, overstayed their visas,
or otherwise ran afoul of immigration or criminal law, removal proceedings are
conducted and concluded, and if found deportable, the alien is removed.
Under the 1996 Act, aliens who remain in an illegal status and are eventually
removed, and those who are removed through normal immigration procedures,
cannot return to the U.S. for a certain number of years. Such people are put on
official government "lookouts" used during overseas visa processing and U.S. ports-
of-entry inspections. While information databases exist for each of these immigra-
tion-related processes, they are not connected in a way that enables the government
to monitor an alien's physical whereabouts and immigration status.
Once removed from the U.S., an alien might try to obtain another visa from the
U.S., under his/her own name or another name with false identification papers. It
is vital to implementation of U.S. immigration laws and the safety of U.S. commu-
10
nities that government databases be accurate and up-to-date. In July 1993, President
Clinton announced a new multiyear program to improve the accuracy and timeli-
ness of government databases and to improve links between existing databases.
Since then, some progress has been made. In particular, the recently completed
Department of State and INS DataShare project resulted in the creation of one data
system for use from the issuance of a visa through the issuance of a green card by
INS and ultimately to issuing a passport once the person has been naturalized.
According to INS, this is "one linear function, no separate files, no separate process-
es." Another recently completed linkage insures that INS deportation information
is readily and accurately available to all U.S. consulates overseas so that if a deported
alien comes in for a visa, s/he can be sent away without one.
Advantages. This option is consistent with prior Commission recom-
mendations to improve data collection and information systems.
Disadvantages. Large-scale data projects of this type easily can fall prey
to mismanagement. Any recommendation supporting data integra-
tion should acknowledge the need for careful monitoring.
11
72 INTERPRETER RELEASES
248
February 13, 1995
Appendix I
7885
Federal Register
Presidential Documents
Vol. 60. No. 28
Friday. February 10. 1995
Title 3-
Memorandum of February 7, 1995
The President
Deterring Illegal Immigration
Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies
It is a fundamental right and duty for a nation to protect the integrity
of its borders and its laws. This Administration shall stand firm against
illegal immigration and the continued abuse of our immigration laws. By
closing the back door to illegal immigration. we will continue to open
the front door to legal immigrants.
My Administration has moved swiftly to reverse the course of a decade
of failed immigration policies. Our initiatives have included increasing over-
all Border personnel by over 50 percent since 1993. We also are strengthening
worksite enforcement and work authorization verification to deter employ-
ment of illegal aliens. Asylum rules have been reformed to end abuse by
those falsely claiming asylum. while offering protection to those in genuine
fear of persecution. We are cracking down on smugglers of illegal aliens
and reforming criminal alien deportation for quicker removal. And we are
the first Administration to obtain funding to reimburse States for a share
of the costs of incarcerating criminal illegal aliens.
While we already are doing more to stem the flow of illegal immigration
than has any previous Administration, more remains to be done. In conjunc-
tion with the Administration's unprecedented budget proposal to support
immigration initiatives, this directive provides a blueprint of policies and
priorities for this Administration's continuing work to curtail illegal immigra-
tion. With its focus on strong border deterrence backed up by effective
worksite enforcement. removal of criminal and other deportable aliens and
assistance to states. this program protects the security of our borders. our
jobs and our communities for all Americans-citizens and legal immigrants
alike.
COMPREHENSIVE BORDER CONTROL STRATEGY
A. Deterring Illegal Immigration At Our Borders
I have directed the Attorney General to move expeditiously toward full
implementation of our comprehensive border control strategy. including ef-
forts at the southwest border. To support sustained long-term strengthening
of our deterrence capacity. the Administration shall seek funding to add
new Border Patrol agents to reach the goal of at least 7,000 agents protecting
our borders by the year 2000.
Flexible Border Response Capacity
To further this strategy. the Department of Justice shall implement the capac-
ity to respond to emerging situations anywhere along our national borders
to deter buildups of illegal border crossers. smuggling operations. or other
developing problems.
Strategic Use of High Technology
Through the strategic use of sensors. night scopes. helicopters. light planes.
all-terrain vehicles, fingerprinting and automated recordkeeping. we have
freed many Border Patrol agents from long hours of bureaucratic tasks and
increased the effectiveness of these highly-trained personnel. Because these
tools are essential for the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
to do its job, I direct the Attorney General to accelerate to the greatest
72 INTERPRETER RELEASES
249
February
Appendix I, continued
7886
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 28 / Friday, February 10, 1995 / Presidential Documents
extent possible their utilization and enhancement to support implementation
of our deterrence strategy.
Strong Enforcement Against Repeat Illegal Crossers
The Department of Justice shall assess the effectiveness of efforts underway
to deter repeat illegal crossers, such as fingerprinting and dedicating prosecu-
tion resources to enforce the new prosecution authority provided by the
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.
The Department of Justice shall determine whether accelerated expansion
of these techniques to additional border sectors is warranted.
B. Deterring Alien Smuggling
This Administration has had success deterring large ship-based smuggling
directly to United States shores. In response, smugglers are testing new
routes and tactics. Our goal: similar success in choking off these attempts
by adjusting our anti-smuggling initiatives to anticipate shifting smuggling
patterns.
To meet new and continuing challenges posed along transport routes and
in foreign locations by smuggling organizations, we will augment diplomatic
and enforcement resources at overseas locations to work with host govern-
ments, and increase related intelligence gathering efforts.
The Departments of State and Justice, in cooperation with other relevant
agencies, will report to the National Security Council within 30 days on
the structure of interagency coordination to achieve these objectives.
Congressional action will be important to provide U.S. law enforcement
agencies with needed authority to deal with international smuggling oper-
ations. I will propose that the Congress pass legislation providing wiretap
authority for investigation of alien smuggling cases and providing authoriza-
tion to seize the assets of groups engaged in trafficking in human cargo.
In addition, I will propose legislation to give the Attorney General authority
to implement procedures for expedited exclusion to deal with large flows
of undocumented migrants, smuggling operations. and other extraordinary
migration situations.
C. Visa Overstay Deterrence
Nearly half of this country's illegal immigrants come into the country legally
and then stay after they are required by law to depart. often using fraudulent
documentation. No Administration has ever made a serious effort to identify
and deport these individuals. This Administration is.committed: to curtailing
this form of illegal immigration.
Therefore, relevant departments and agencies are directed to review their
policies and practices to identify necessary reforms to curtail visa overstayers
and to enhance investigations and prosecution of those who fraudulently
produce or misuse passports, visas, and other travel related documents.
Recommendations for administrative initiatives and legislative reform shall
be presented to the White House Interagency Working Group on Immigration
by June 30, 1995.
REDUCING THE MAGNET OF WORK OPPORTUNITIES, WORKSITE ENFORCEMENT, AND
DETERRENCE
Border deterrence cannot succeed if the lure of jobs in the United States
remains. Therefore. a second major component of the Administration's deter-
rence strategy is to toughen worksite enforcement and employer sanctions.
Employers who hire illegal immigrants not only obtain unfair competitive
advantage over law-abiding employers, their unlawful- use of illegal immi-
grants suppresses wages and working conditions for our country's legal
workers. Our strategy, which targets enforcement efforts at employers and
industries that historically have relied upon employment of illegal immi-
grants. will not only strengthen deterrence of illegal immigration, but better
protect American workers and businesses that do not hire illegal immigrants.
72 INTERPRETER RELEASES
250
February 13, 1995
Appendix I, continued
Federal Register 1 Vol. 60, No. 28 1 Friday, February 10, 1995 1 Presidential Documents
7887
Central to this effort is an effective, nondiscriminatory means of verifying
the employment authorization of all new employees. The Administration
fully supports the recommendation of the Commission on Legal Immigration
Reform to create pilot projects to test various techniques for improving
workplace verification, including a computer database test to validate a
new worker's social security number for work authorization purposes. The
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and Social Security Administra-
tion are directed to establish, implement, monitor, and review the pilots
and provide me with an interim report on the progress of this program
by March 1, 1996.
In addition, the INS is directed to finalize the Administration's reduction
of the number of authorized documents to support work verification for
noncitizens. Concurrently, the Administration will seek further reduction
legislatively in the number of documents that are acceptable for proving
identity and work authorization. The Administration will improve the secu-
rity of existing documents to be used for work authorization and seek
increased penalties for immigration fraud, including fraudulent production
and use of documents.
The Department of Labor shall intensify its investigations in industries with
patterns of labor law violations that promote illegal immigration.
I also direct the Department of Labor, INS, and other relevant Federal agencies
to expand their collaboration in cracking down on those who subvert fair
competition by hiring illegal aliens. This may include increased Federal
authority to confiscate assets that are the fruits of that unfair competition.
The White House Interagency Working Group on Immigration shall further
examine the link between immigration and employment. including illegal
immigration. and recommend to me other appropriate measures.
DETENTION AND REMOVAL OF DEPORTABLE ILLEGAL ALIENS
The Administration's deterrence strategy includes strengthening the country's
detention and deportation capability. No longer will criminals and other
high risk deportable aliens be released back into communities because of
a shortage of detention space and ineffective deportation procedures.
A. Comprehensive Deportation Process Reform
The Department of Justice, in consultation with other relevant agencies,
shall develop a streamlined, fair, and effective procedure to expedite removal
of deportable aliens. As necessary, additional-legislative-authority will be
sought in this area. In addition, the Department of Justice shall increase
its capacity to staff deportation and exclusion hearings to support these
objectives.
B. National Detention and Removal Plan
To address the shortage of local detention space for illegal aliens. the Admin-
istration shall devise a National Detention, Transportation, and Removal
Policy that will permit use of detention space across the United States
and improve the ability to remove individuals with orders of deportation.
The Department of Justice, in consultation with other agencies as appropriate
and working under the auspices of the White House Interagency Working
Group on Immigration, shall finalize this plan by April 30, 1995.
The Administration will seek support and funding from the Congress for
this plan and for our efforts to double the removal of illegal aliens with
final orders of deportation.
C. Identification and Removal of Criminal Aliens
The Institutional Hearing Program is successfully expediting deportation
of incarcerated criminal aliens after they serve their sentences.
To further expedite removal of criminal aliens from this country and reduce
costs to Federal and State governments, the Department of Justice is directed
to develop an expanded program of verification of the immigration status
Appendix I, continued
7888
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 28 / Friday. February 10. 1995 / Presidential Documents
of criminal aliens within our country's prisons. In developing this program.
the viability of expanding the work of the Law Enforcement Support Center
should be assessed and all necessary steps taken to increase coordination
and cooperative efforts with State, and local law enforcement officers in
identification of criminal aliens.
TARGETED DETERRENCE AREAS
Many of the Administration's illegal immigration enforcement initiatives
are mutually reinforcing. For example, strong interior enforcement supports
border control. While there have been efforts over the years at piecemeal
cooperation, this Administration will examine, develop, and test a more
comprehensive coordinated package of deterrence strategies in selected met-
ropolitan areas by multiple Federal, State, and local agencies.
The White House Interagency Working Group on Immigration shall coordi-
nate the development of this interagency and intergovernmental operation.
VERIFICATION OF ELIGIBILITY FOR BENEFITS
The law denies most government benefits to illegal aliens. The government
has a duty to assure that taxpayer-supported public assistance programs
are not abused. As with work authorization, enforcement of eligibility require-
ments relies upon a credible system of verification. The INS. working with
the White House Interagency Working Group on Immigration as appropriate.
shall review means of improving the existing benefits verification program.
In addition, we will seek new mechanisms-including increased penalties
for false information used to qualify for benefits-to protect the integrity
of public programs.
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION
Our efforts to combat illegal immigration must not violate the privacy and
civil rights of legal immigrants and U.S. citizens. Therefore, I direct the
Attorney General, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Chair
of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and other relevant Ad-
ministration officials to vigorously protect our citizens and legal immigrants
from immigration-related instances of discrimination and harassment. All
illegal immigration enforcement measures shall be taken with due regard
for the basic human rights of individuals and in accordance with our obliga-
tions under applicable international agreements.
ASSISTANCE TO STATES
States today face significant costs for services provided to illegal immigrants
as a result of failed policies of the past. Deterring illegal immigration is
the best long-term solution to protect States from growing. costs for Lillegal
immigration. This is the first Administration to address this primary respon-
sibility squarely. We are targeting most of our Federal dollars to those
initiatives that address the root causes that lead to increased burdens on
States.
The Federal Government provides States with billions of dollars to provide
for health care, education, and other services and benefits for immigrants.
This Administration is proposing increases for immigration and immigration-
related spending of 25 percent in 1996 compared to 1993 levels. In addition,
this Administration is the first to obtain funding from the Congress to
reimburse States for a share of the costs of incarcerated illegal aliens.
This Administration will continue to work with States to obtain more Federal
help for certain State costs and will oppose inappropriate cost-shifting to
the States.
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
This Administration will continue to emphasize international cooperative
efforts to address illegal immigration.
Pursuant to a Presidential Review Directive (PRD). the Department of State
is now coordinating a study on United States policy toward international
72 INTERPRETER RELEASES
252
February 13, 1995
Appendix I, continued
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 28 / Friday, February 10, 1995 / Presidential Documents
7889
refugee and migration affairs. I hereby direct that, as part of that PRD
process, this report to the National Security Council include the relationship
of economic development and migration in the Western Hemisphere and,
in particular, provide recommendations for further foreign economic policy
measures to address causes of illegal immigration.
The Department of State shall coordinate an interagency effort to consider
expanded arrangements with foreign governments for return of criminal
and deportable aliens.
The Department of State also shall seek to negotiate readmission agreements
for persons who could have sought asylum in the last country from which
they arrived. Such agreements will take due regard of U.S. obligations under
the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.
The Department of State further shall implement cooperative efforts with
other nations receiving smuggled aliens or those used as transhipment points
by smugglers. In particular, we will look to countries in our hemisphere
to join us by denying their territory as bases for smuggling operations.
The Department of State shall initiate negotiations with foreign countries
to secure authority for the United States Coast Guard to board source country
vessels suspected of transporting smuggled aliens.
This directive shall be published in the Federal Register.
williams Tennton
THE WHITE HOUSE.
Washington, February 7, 1995.
IFR Doc. 95-3554
Filed 2-8-95: 2:36 pmi
Billing code 3195-01-P
Appendix II
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 26 / Wednesday, February 8. 1995 / Rules and Regulations 7443
AGENCY: Bureau of Consular Affairs.
the three fiscal years of the Transitional
Department of State.
Diversity Program but not used during
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
that period. The amendments became
ACTION: Interim rule. with request for
effective upon signature and the
Bureau of Consular Affairs
comments.
available visas are to be issued during
22 CFR Part 43
SUMMARY: Pub. L. 103-416, the Act of
the Fiscal Year now in progress.
October 25, 1994, the Immigration and
Accordingly. the Department is
[Public Notice 2163]
Nationality Technical Corrections Act of
promulgating an interim rule in order to
1994. further amends section 132 of
create a basis for initiating the necessary
Visas: Documentation of Immigrants
Public Law 101-649 to authorize the
processing and inviting comments.
Under Section 132 of Public Law 101-
649, as Amended
issuance during Fiscal Year 1995 of
DATES: This rule is effective February 8.
those immigrant visas authorized during
1995. Interested persons are invited to
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
FY 1997
PRIORITIES
RECEIVED
DEC 2 1996
ROPAE
FY 97 PRIORITIES
OVERVIEW
PRIORITIES, OBJECTIVES AND TASKS
11/15/96
FY 1997 PRIORITIES
Overview of Objectives & Tasks
STRENGTHEN BORDER FACILITATION AND CONTROL
INS Utility conn
do
Objective 1: Implement Attorney General Initiatives
Task 1: Implement El Paso Crime Initiative
foor
Task 2: Implement McAllen Anti-Crime Initiative
Objective 2: Control Between the Ports of Entry
Task 1: Fully Deploy and Use IDENT
Task 2: Maintain the Table of Organization
these not specific set goals, results
Printing
Task 3: Implement East County Initiative
Objective 3: Strengthen Facilitation and Enforcement Efforts at Ports-of-Entry
Task 1: Demonstrate Results Of Business Process Reengineering Efforts
Task 2: Implement Performance Indicator Management System (PIMS)
Task 3: Expand the Datashare Program
Objective 4: Intelligence Program Reengineering
Task 1: Complete a Strategic Plan for the Intelligence Program
Task 2: Fully Implement the SOPs for Border Patrol Sectors
Task 3: Develop SOPs for Districts (both domestic and international)
Task 4: Develop and institutionalize academy intelligence training for district and
Sector personnel
Objective 5: Improve Data Consistency, Timeliness, and Applicability
Task 1: Address Consistency, Verification Methods, and
Redundancies within Current Data Collection.
Task 2: Develop Future Measurements of Success for Border Facilitation and Enforcement (at
and Between POEs).
Objective 6: Implement '96 Act
Task 1: Implement Expedited Exclusion
Task 2: Develop an Automated Departure Control System
Task 3: Develop Plan for Incorporation of Biometrics into the Border Crossing Card (BCC)
STRENGTHEN ANTI-SMUGGLING, ANTI-TERRORISM AND OVERSEAS
DETERRENCE
Objective 1: Implement Attorney General Initiatives
Task 1: Implement Puerto Rico Anti-Crime Initiative
Task 2: Implement South Florida Anti-Smuggling Initiative
Task 3: Implement Nigerian Anti-Crime Initiative
Task 4: Implement Anti-Methamphetamine Initiatives in the Midwest
Task 5: Implement Anti-Russian Organized Crime Initiatives
Task 6: Implement Anti-Southeast Asian Organized Crime Initiatives
I
11/15/96
Objective 2: Strengthen Anti-Smuggling Efforts
Task 1: Increase Investigative Efforts Directed Towards the "TOP TEN" or Other Identified
Major Smuggling Organizations
Task 2: Finalize National Anti-Smuggling Strategy and Operational Guidance
Objective 3: Strengthen Anti-Terrorism Efforts
Task 1: Establish Infrastructure and Procedures for Removal Court and "Special Interest"
Cases
Task 2: Enhance INS participation in JTTF's at appropriate field locations.
Task 3: Finalize National Counter-Terrorism Strategy and Operational Guidance.
Objective 4: Overseas Enforcement/Deterrence Functions
Task 1: Enhance INS Overseas Activity
Task 2: Increase Interagency and International Cooperation on Migrant Trafficking and
Other Enforcement Issues.
Task 3: Enhance Training of Foreign Law Enforcement and Immigration Officials.
Objective 5: Data Integrity
Task 1: Review Anti-Smuggling Reporting and Implement Required Changes
Task 2: Develop a Reporting and Data Collection System for Terrorist-related Cases.
Task 3: Review and Redesign, as required, Overseas Enforcement Activity Reporting
Task 4: Ensure Accuracy, Consistency and Timeliness of Data Reporting for Current
Operational Tasks
Objective 6: Implement '96 Act
Task 1: Develop Plan to Establish New Preinspection Stations
INCREASE THE REMOVALS OF DEPORTABLE AND INADMISSIBLE ALIENS
Objective 1: Ensure Data Integrity
Task 1: Improve DACS Entry and Reporting
Task 2: Track Voluntary Returns
Objective 2: Increase Criminal Alien Removals
Task 1: Strengthen the Institutional Hearing Program
Task 2: Expand County Jail Programs
Task 3: Strengthen Administrative Deportation
Objective 3: Increase the Apprehension and Removal of Absconders
Objective 4: Strengthen the Deportation Process
Task 1: Improve Detention Resource Management
Task 2: Assure Full Implementation of the National Transportation System and Develop the
Detention and Deportation Optimization System
Task 3: Speed the Availability of Travel Documents and Address the Problem of Unremovable
Aliens
Objective 5: Implement the 1996 Act
Task 1: Implement the Redesign of the Removal Process
Task 2: Provide Congressionally Required Statistical Reports
2
11/15/96
REDUCE UNAUTHORIZED EMPLOYMENT AND INCREASE THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF WORKSITE ENFORCEMENT
Objective 1: Increase Employer Enforcement Activity and Illegal Worker Removals
Task 1: Target Major Employer Violators
Task 2: Complete Cases Required for Compliance Rate Determinations (GAP)
Objective 2: Assist Employers to Comply
Task 1: Increase Employer Information/Outreach Support
Task 2: Facilitate the Hiring of Legal Replacement Workers
Objective 2: Refine Systems, Procedures, Policies and Documentation
Task 1: Resolve "Evidentiary" and Fines Settlement Standards
Task 2: Revise and Implement "Fines Tracking and Collection" Process
Task 3: Increase "Timeliness" of Case Processing
Objective 3: Data Integrity
Task 1: Ensure Reporting Through LYNX and PAS
Task 2: Remove LYNX-PAS Duplications and Inconsistencies
Task 3: Distribute Automated LYNX Capability to District Offices
Objective 4: Implement '96 Act
Task 1: Complete Required Document Reduction Activities
IMPROVE ADJUDICATIVE SERVICES
Objective 1: Implement Phase 2 of Citizenship USA (CUSA) Initiative
Task 1: Ensure Satisfactory Quality of Naturalization Adjudications
Task 2: Develop and Adopt Strategic Plan for Naturalization Re-engineering
Task 3: Maintain Case Processing Time Standard
Objective 2: Improve Adjudications Processes, Services and Integrity
Task 1: Establish a National Customer Service Center
Task 2: Implement Joint (INV/BEN) Application Fraud Initiative
Task 3: Improve Clearance Procedures (FBI, etc.)
Objective 3: Data Integrity
Task 1: Appropriate Use of NACS, PAS, and CLAIMS
Task 2: Revise PAS, G-22 reporting
Task 3: Ensure Support of Interim Systems in Districts
Objective 4: Implement '96 Act
Task 1: Implement Exclusion, Parole and Waiver Provision Changes
Task 2: Complete Foreign Student Control Pilots
3
11/15/96
CONTINUE BUILDING INS' INFRASTRUCTURE AND STRENGTHENING
PROFESSIONALISM
Objective 1: Sustainment
Task 1: Develop and Implement an INS Retention Plan
Task 2: Provide Advanced Training for Officer Corps
Task 3: Develop and Implement a Revised Multi-Year Vehicle Replacement Plan
Task 4: Implement a Revised Helicopter Replacement and Maintenance Plan
Task 5: Implement a Revised Plan for Buildings Management to Enhance Facilities Standards
Task 6: Enhance the Environmental, Occupational Safety and Health Program (EOSH)
Task 7: Enhance ADP Staff Support and Servicewide Training
Objective 2: Modernization
Task 1: Implement Competency-Based Assessments for Promotion to Managerial Positions in the
Border Patrol
Task 2: Develop and Enhanced Financial Management Information System (FMIS)
Objective 3: Improve Data Integrity
Task 1: Establish a Competency-Based Assessment Database
Objective 4: Implement '96 Act
Task 1: Coordinate Development and Delivery of Immigration Act 1996 Training
ENHANCE INS COOPERATION AND PARTICIPATION WITH LOCAL
ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, AND
COMMUNITIES
Objective 1: Expand INS Cooperation with Local Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) and Communities
Task 1: Examine and Test Applicability of Community Policing to INS Operations
Task 2: Expand Capacity of Field Offices to Plan Activities that Benefit LEAs and Other
Agencies
Task 3: Identify Unintended Impacts of INS Activities (e.g., at day labor sites, within public
housing complexes, and other community settings) and Explore Community Oriented
Approaches/Resolutions
Objective 2: Expand INS Cooperation and Interaction with Other Law Enforcement, State and Local
Governments, and the Media
Task 1: Expand Two-Way Communication with Associations Representing State and Local
Officials
Task 2: Increase the Knowledge Base of the Media re: Immigration and Immigrants
Objective 3: Ensure Data integrity
Task 1: Identify and Develop Appropriate Indicators for Long-term Measurement and
Reporting of the Impacts of Immigration-related Policies and Practices on Local
Communities
Objective 4: Implement '96 Act
Task 1: Implement Verification Requirements (including Pilot tests and Welfare Reform)
Task 2: Develop a National Educational Initiative
1
11/15/96
3-11-1997 11:19AM
FROM JAMES E SWAINE 2036034423
P.2
Jette and Robert Resumusion
52 Farmington Ave. Longmendow MA-01106
Phone: (413) 567-4009
Acting District Director Jean Ouellette
U.S. Department of Justice
Immigration and Naturalization Service
J.F. Kennedy Federal Building
Government Center
Boston
MA - 02203
CoRt
March 7, 1997
GOD BLESS AMERICA - AND ESPECIALLY THE I.N.S. (you really need it !)
This is a letter of "Complaint" - or a letter "Of good advice". The decision is all yours.
I hope you will take your time to read it - like a few other people will have the oppertunity.
My name is: Jette D. Rasmussen. 1 am from Denmark in Europe and moved to the United States per August
1st, 1995.
The reason for the move was NOT that 1 was unhappy in my home country- but simply due to the fact that
my husband : Robert K. Rasmussen - was asked by his company : LEGO (which by the way is a Danish
company) to move to the States to be closer to the market : Robert does product developement for the
American school market.
The reason for this letter is that a few hours ago my family and I got back from yet another "exiting"
trip to the LN.S. - WITHOUT having obtained our Green Card - even though WE (read: we II) did
ALL what it takes - and brought every bit of documentation etc. - in originals - as well in copies.
Sameone in the JFK-building made "a few mistakes" - my husbands file was only a copy - the original was
either in Vermont at the ServiceCenter . or in Minnesota (because of his one year at an american high school
in 1964. - My form I guess the 1-181 - was NOT sent yet - instead they had send 2 for our son Peter - "so
you will have 10 walt another 60 days III Just like that 1
Isn't that wonderful - being scheduled for an interview for 3 1/2 months making all the necessary work -
getting up at 5.am. drive to Boston - but - "someone was sleeping up there" . and WE have to wait another
(at least) 60 days . and we also had to write another check for USD 210,00 to get new Travel Documents.
Robert's work demands some travelling to the headquarters in Denmark - and my parents are right now both
being hospitalized I
3-11-1997 11:20AM FROM JAMES E SWAINE 2036034423
P.3
2)
USD 210,- is quite a lot of money to pay - for someone else's mistake, Not to talk about all the time you
spend on this thing. - Isn't SERVICE & "big thing" in America ? Well certainly NOT at the I.N.S.
When we came to the United States in August 1995 one of the first things we did was to go to New York to
"visit" the Statue of Liberty. Even though we are "the lucky ones" living in the 1990'es and moving to
America because of LEGO- we felt we had to go and see this very interesting and for many people so
exciting place. A LOT of different thoughts go through one's head - standing here - at Ellis Island - looking
at all the photos of many many different people - coming here. to make a new start. You see the dispair - the
fear - the joy - the expectations - you see a lot - in all these eyes. - A little scared - but America WELCOMES
people - or TT??
Well - this is not 1895 - but 1995 so things are probably different - and better and easier - or 7779
Within the first 6-7 months of our stay we realize that we can not file for a Green Card - because of a certain
rule. It says that the company you work for has to be at least one year old - and "Robert's" LEGO-company
in the States is not - so we have to wait. So in the fall of 1996 we start the procedure: "Applying for a
Green Card"- among other reasons because we want our son - Peter - to be able to get himself a job
Through LEGO we have a great lawyer - helping us to fill out all the forms- It surely takes "& lot of paper"-
and telling us where to go for: doctors examinations, photos and fingerprints. We go to Immigrations in
Hartford, Connecticut to have the photos and fingerprints !!!!
Finally we are ready to file - and on November 18, 1996 all 3 of us go to Boston.
Well - sometimes in life it's good that you do not know "what's expecting you" ! The I.N.S. is NO nice
place. Common KINDNESS is a very unknown thing- and we cannot help thinking of the fact that most of
the employees in this crowded room would be absolutely without their jobs- if they had been working in
Europe - in official offices ! - In Europe you learn from childhood: "If you want to be treated in a nice way-
be nice yourself Well
new country - new rules I Obviously I
The man at the Information desk - and later a person at one of the booths - reminds us of the movie:
"Crumpier old men". Is it really THAT bad - working at the I.N.S. ? If it wasn't that SAD- it would
almost be funny I You have a LOT of time- to think- look around - wait- and wait - look around and
wait
S
It is very interesting to see the posters at the wall "The gate to America" I think it says Well at least at
photos they can smile !
1 get kind of SAD sitting here. I am thinking of Ellis Island - seeing all these people - of different colors -
with different languages. It certainly does not seem to be easy for them - even though it is 1996 ! Why is
nobody SMILING to each other - would If not help- just a little I Why is it that you can not call this place -
per phone - and get a little information. A lot of these people have 6-7 maybe more questions - and it seems
as though they only get the chance of 1 maybe 2. Why are these employees (most of them look like they
came to "The gate of America" at one time themselves from somewhere around the world) - of all places -
working here if they do not enjoy It at least a little bit- to "do something for their fellow people" ??
Well - we file our application - and 4 hours after our arrival we are walking the streets of Boston before our 3
hours drive. My husband also got a Travel Document - because of his job related travelling. AND we all got
the date for our interviews: FRIDAY, MACH 7TH 1997. We look forward to this. Very much !
3-11-1997 11:21AM
FROM JAMES E SWAINE 2036034423
P.4
3)
Mid January 1997 I go back to the JFK-bullding. My old parents in Denmark are both sick and are going to
the hospital. 1 need a Travel Document for my son and myself. I have prepared everything - with the lawyers
help: application - letter from the doctors in Denmark etc. I can get a ride with my husband and a colleague
who are going to Boston for a meeting. At 12.10 p.m. I arrive reach the Information Desk: SMILE (it must
be a crime up here?) and say: hello - I would like to apply for a Travel Document - and the man says of
course without even looking at me: "you cannot and OF COURSE. NO further explanation
Y get tears in my eyes - say: Excuse me could you tell me: why not ? Answer: you have to be here in the
morning / By the way. HOW was 1 supposed to know I Well - after asking - almost begging - he gives me
& number. I want very much - to talk to somebody who can tell me WHAT to bring - and WHAT to ex-
: when I get back- next time - BEFORE 12.00 II I wait 1/2 hours - and talk to a woman. She is nice
no smile of course (maybe it is a "Government thing" "no smiling"?? and she tells me WHEN to come
K that the office might be closed on the 2/13 maybe and I ask if 1 have to bring my son Peter (I am
applying for him as well) and she says I do not need to take him out of school as long as I have the proof
that 1 am his mother !! Well I go back my 3 hours drive I
A week later 1 make a new "attempt". Reach the Information Desk: "Hello I am here to apply for a Travel
Document for my son and me !" - Guess - the answer: "You cannot
BUT- this time I am NOT ready to give up EXCUSE ME 7???? "Well you need 10 bring your son and I
don't see him
low I almost get mad BUT- I have seen quite & lot of people up here getting "mad" and seeing them "get
ck" so I say PLEASE listen to me please please I was here 10 days ago a woman told me that I
could apply for Peter without bringing him". "Which woman
OH BOY thanks for the poster on the wall she is right there Well
finally the man gives me a
number - I wait- I wait and THEN tra-lass
but NO I!
"Where is the number ??" Excuse me 7777 "The other mumber??" Excuse me could you explain to me
WHICH number - PLEASE And . yes she wants TWO numbers and I only got ONE from the man at
the Information Desk
"How do you want me 10 do this without another number" she asks ME and I really do not mean to be
rude- but HOW am I to know what she means ???
Well - sometimes you have to "get a little angry" - I got the Travel Documents for my son Peter and myself.
We went to Denmark and saw my parents and we came back as planned on February the 28th because we
have an INTERVIEW scheduled - that we look very much forward to on Friday, March 7th at 8.30 a.m. !!
AND. today's the day.
At 8.15 a.m. we arrive at Room 170. A VERY NICE AND SMILING YOUNG MAN at the desk says:
"hello - how are you this morning and shows us to the next desk". Our son says: wauh- he is nice this
is a good sign. At 8,35 a.m. we are called to the office of Jeanine N. Clapp-Simon, District Adjudications
Officer. She is - obviously - very correct and "official". Says: I will interview you Robert- and then your
son and you Mrs. Rasmussen In a while because your papers were not filled out !
We do not understand but "it will be O.K. in a little while". Well Robert is interviewed - Peter is in-
serviewed and finally I am interviewed.
anine Clapp-Simon even commends us "you are very organized".
verything is fine we think. Suddenly she gives Robert our passports back- Robert looks at me- and
both of us say: "Excuse us - but are we not supposed to have a stamp in our passport ?????"
3-11-1997 11:22AM FROM JAMES E SWAINE 2036034423
P.5
4)
And now it's getting very interesting:
1) Looking at PETER she says: your fingerprints have not been cleared ! - We all wonder - a great deal.
2) Looking at ROBERT: your file is a "copy-file" - you see: it is YELLOW - the others are brown
Again . WE are not the guys working at this office WE do NOT know WHY Peter's fingerprints have
not been cleared - we do NOT know WHAT it means that a file is YELLOW instead of brown II - BUT
Unfortunately all 3 of us SENSE that "something is wrong" - VERY wrong. - We ask: "does this mean
that we do NOT get the approval ??? - and could you please tell WHY 7??"
This is NOT easy for Jeanine - she has to tell us that "someone in this office made a few mistakes" - and
after Robert getting a little upset thinking of NEW applications for Travel Documents etc. - we do WANT
to KNOW - WHAT exactly has happened. She rushes to her "supervisor" - Robert calls our lawyer from
our mobil phone. Everything is VERY confusing. It is also SAD - and much much too bad 1 . And WE are
very very CONFUSED. . We "worked so hard for this" - we don't have a lot of time to spend on the high
ways - we are in the States because of Robert's WORK 111 - How come ??
Jeanine N. Clapp-Simon is a "good soldier". We had to "push her - real hard" to hear
WHAT really has happened - as far as she can see: - New version
1) "Peter's paper came out of the computer (777?) twice - so they sent it twice but they did NOT send mine
RESULT: we will have to wait (at least) another 60 days I - If 60 days is what it takes !!
2) "Someone forgot 10 ask for Robert's file". So - the file that a little before was at "the Servicecenter in
Vermont" is probably in Minnesota (because Robert was a high school student here for 1 year in 1964 ??)
and "Someone forgot to ask for it now it will take time to get it" I - Oh yeah of course I
3) By the way: the photos - the ones we had made at the Immigrations in Connecticut are not good enough
: too big III - Yes of course of course they are I
Closure:
How come that when we do our part of "the deal" - that the I.N.S. "treat you this way". - One thing is that
you are being treated as a criminal every time you show up - that people are so unkind - and the "air" so un-
comfortable that you are very happy back on the street but WHY do you not inform people 7777
Would it not have been much much easier for all of us - if YOU had made a phone call a month ago - and
said: "hello guys we are sorry we made a mistake and have to postpone the Interview already scheduled" -
or something like that. Or AT LEAST to have admitted the mistake first thing in the morning - so that
WC had been prepared that "this would not work - after all" ! And I cannot help thinking: WE are here
because Robert's company wants US to - and they are helping us. HOW on earth is it - for all the others
"out there" ?
Certainly 1 will have a lot more sad thoughts on my mind the next time I am standing at my
beloved photos at Ellis Island - knowing how "The Gates to America" REALLY are - and
how they work - here in 1997.
Regards,
Jette Duus Rasmussen
Clinton Presidential Records
Digital Records Marker
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
This marker identifies the place of a tabbed divider. Given our
digitization capabilities, we are sometimes unable to adequately
scan such dividers. The title from the original document is
indicated below.
Divider Title:
5
STRUCTURING, ORGANIZING, AND MANAGING AN EFFECTIVE
IMMIGRATION SYSTEM CONSULTATION:
WHAT REFORMS ARE NEEDED?
Staff Summary
April 3, 1997, Washington, DC
Commissioners Present: Lawrence Fuchs, Chair, Harold Ezell, Robert C. Hill,
Warren R. Leiden, Bruce Morrison
Staff Present: Susan Martin, Andrew Schoenholtz, David Levy, Patricia Dunn, Gregg
Beyer, Brett Endres
Participants:
Alex Aleinikoff, Former Executive Associate Commissioner, INS
Diego Asencio, Former Chair, Commission for the Study of International
Migration & Cooperative Economic Development
James Blume, Assistant Director, Audit Operations Group/Justice, GAO
Roger "Buck" Brandemuehl, Former Chief, U.S. Border Patrol
Barry Kefauver, Former Executive Director, Bureau of Consular Affairs
Albert J. Kliman, Senior Research Associate, National Academy of Public
Administration Panel on INS
Michael Lempres, Former Executive Associate Commissioner, INS
Milton Morris, Senior Vice President, Joint Center for Political and Economic
Studies
Ruth Anne Myers, Former INS District Director, Phoenix, Arizona
Peter K. Nune, Former U.S. Attorney and Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for
Law Enforcement
Joaquin F. Otero, Former Deputy Under Secretary of Labor for International
Labor Affairs
Daniel W. Sutherland, Legal Scholar, Center for Equal Opportunity
The Chair opened the meeting by explaining that the Commission is looking at the
issue of immigration management, organization, and structure in the federal
government. The Commission looks to the participants to provide guidance on
1
optimum structure and/or improvements to the current system. Most participants
are former Executive Branch officials with numerous years of government service;
others have done reports examining the Executive Branch agencies and have made
recommendations of their own.
Former INS General Counsel, Alex Aleinikoff warned the Commission not to
recommend changes in the structure of the immigration system just for the sake of
making changes and/or to make the agencies seem neater and better organized. The
current system looks like an odd structure for a reason; it is actually quite workable.
In terms of the service versus enforcement functions of INS, INS Officers perform
both functions simultaneously and splitting them is hard to conceptualize. The
perception of enforcement dominating service at INS results from the large amount
of resources and attention enforcement receives. Poor service is due to a lack of
culture, training, and resources.
With the recent additional resources allocated to INS and the mounting demands
on the service for accountability and management, he said a mix of management
analysts need to be brought in as part of the INS culture. Although many of the
systems problems relate to management rather than structure, major organization
reform is justified. As there is no high place in the Administration to address
immigration policy development, policies that are formulated tend to be reactive
and crisis driven. Aleinikoff recommended establishment of a Cabinet-Level
Department of Migration to provide needed skills and, most importantly, high level
policy rank.
Policy Leadership
INS is not the proper place to make immigration policy; rather, a high-level central
locus where major issues of immigration policy can be debated, discussed, and
decided is needed. Wherever the final location of immigration policymaking, it
should consider demographic effects as a whole and the effect of certain immigra-
tion situations on the rest of the country. Immigration policy has not received the
attention it needs; for most of the involved agencies outside of INS, policies have
2
been only reactive, not proactive. While many participants agreed that a higher
level locus for policymaking is needed, they differ on where that should be.
Department. One recommendation was for a Cabinet-level Department with a
Secretary rank to direct all the functions of the INS, the Visa Office and the Depart-
ment of State [DOS], and labor certification from the Department of Labor [DOL].
This Department would have both a Secretary and Deputy Secretary thinking about
immigration issues. An Assistant Attorney General for Immigration or an Associ-
ate Attorney General are not high enough ranking to do what needs to be done on
immigration. The present rank of the INS Commissioner is comparable to that of an
Assistant Secretary.
Presidential Advisor. A special advisor or advisory group to the President was also
suggested. An Immigration Czar, much like the Drug Czar, was briefly considered.
The purpose would be to raise immigration as a highly visible issue requiring
presidential attention and to have a seat at the table during important meetings
with the other Cabinet Secretaries. A high level advisor would elevate the issue
and convey leadership (or at least give the appearance of executive concern) within
the White House and to the Congress.
Enhancement of the Domestic Policy Council [DPC] role. The DPC already has
responsibility for interagency coordination on immigration policy. Some partici-
pants expressed concern that placing immigration policy development responsibility
in the White House would make it overly subject to political pressure. Others
responded that the President must make the final decision on immigration policy
issues and that building a capacity within the Executive Office of the President for
analysis of immigration would ensure the receipt of better information on which to
base those decisions.
Service/Enforcement Split
Participants held two differing views on splitting the service and enforcement
functions: (1) they should remain in the same agency, but with a clear split within
that agency; (2) they should be totally split into two different agencies. Though these
3
issues were discussed briefly, no one seemed to have a clear idea or recommenda-
tion on how this should be accomplished.
Border Management Agency
The topic of a border management agency that would combine the enforcement
functions of INS Inspections, the Border Patrol, and U.S. Customs into a single
agency also arose. Although this proposal has been consistently recommended
since the 1930s, it still has not been implemented, perhaps because of the
jurisdictional division of the Congressional Appropriations Committee and
Subcommittees overseeing DOJ and the Department of the Treasury.
Bureau of Immigration and Border Control
A Bureau of Immigration and Border Control also was suggested. Its single mission
would be immigration control and would have three sectors: administration,
services, and enforcement. The Bureau's Director would report directly to the
Attorney General. The directors of administration, services, and enforcement also
would have direct line authority. This differs from the present system in that
service and enforcement would be split within the Bureau and reporting would be
to a higher level in the Department of Justice [DOJ]. As in the FBI, the Director of
the Bureau would be appointed for a fixed term that exceeded four years.
Congressional and Political Will
It was mentioned that many very good recommendations have come from previous
Commissions on immigration, but that Congress "did not have the stomach to do
what was necessary." Participants felt the Commission could go either of two ways:
(1) submit a report that had recommendations for a "perfect world" scenario that
Congress would have no plans to implement and would sit on a shelf with many
other reports; or (2) submit recommendations that would make incremental
changes, not "big picture" reforms.
4
Other Issues
A few other problems or issues were identified and discussed at the meeting.
Mission Overload. Some participants mentioned that INS currently has too many
high priority items on their list and not enough time and resources to accomplish
them all. The participants would prefer to see only three things listed as top
priorities, not the current much-longer list.
Detention. Detention constitutes a large portion of the INS budget and many of
the participants suggested that INS is not set up for long-term detention of aliens.
The Bureau of Prisons [BOP] and the U.S. Marshals have their own systems to deal
with detention within the DOJ. INS has neither the ability nor the knowledge to
implement long-term detention. The BOP and U.S. Marshals detain criminals,
whereas, those that violate the immigration laws, which are fundamentally civil in
nature, are not criminals. There are, however, an increasing number of detained
aliens who have been convicted of a crime. If the INS did not have to concern itself
with running detention facilities, but instead could detain aliens run by another
entity, it could do a better job.
Conclusions
The Chair asked participants to list three management and structural issues they
would like to see changed or implemented. The recommendations fell into three
areas.
Management
Flood INS with managers from the outside who are not immigration
experts but who have the management skills necessary to run an
agency effectively.
5
Give Regional Directors a greater role in developing priorities, goals,
and expectations, and develop a program evaluation capability to
ensure that programs are moving towards and meeting these goals.
Perform quality assurance checks and provide for a system of feedback
into to ensure that what has been done not only has been finished but
that it also has been done properly.
Have managers and policymakers identify and be held accountable for
management goals.
Pilot test privatization at INS, including detention models and more
fee collection for services.
Improve communication between headquarters and the field in terms
of management meetings, training for field officers, budget accountabil-
ity, and ensure that the requested and authorized resources get to the
field in a more timely manner.
Correct overlaps and eliminate redundancies in which two agencies are
performing essentially the same function.
Policy
Separate service and enforcement functions within INS, keeping the
two within the same agency but consolidating the functions of each.
Consolidate enforcement functions of the Border Patrol, Inspections,
and Customs to control illegal migration.
Have detention handled by some other agency and only monitored by
INS rather than having INS detain aliens for the long-term.
6
Streamline and reform the agencies involved in immigration so that
each would have an internal office or person responsible for
policymaking.
Structure
Have policy development made at a higher level to address DOS, DOL,
and DOJ issues.
Continue the priority process (which INS has done successfully in the
last few years) in setting objectives and goals and fulfilling them.
Develop an employee identification system so that the employment
magnet is not pulling people here that our system is trying to keep out.
7
MANAGEMENT TEAM CONSULTATION Staff Summary
April 4, 1997, Washington, DC
Commission Members Present: Lawrence Fuchs (presiding), Harold Ezell, Robert
Hill, Warren Leiden, Bruce Morrison
Staff Present: Susan Martin, Andy Schoenholtz, Gregg Beyer, Pat Dunn, Brett
Endres, David Levy
Participants:
Stephen R. Colgate, Assistant Attorney General for Administration
Donna Hamilton, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Visa Services
Seth Harris, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Labor for Policy
John B. McGowan, Passenger Process Owner, Office of Field Operations, Customs
Service
Doris Meissner, Commissioner of INS
Steve Mertens, Senior Program Examiner, OMB
Anthony C. Moscato, Director, Executive Office for Immigration Review
Phyllis Oakley, Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees, and Migration
Gerri Ratliff, Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General
Mary Ryan, Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs
Steve Warnath, Senior Policy Analyst, Domestic Policy Council
Seth Waxman, Acting Deputy Attorney General
Vice Chair Fuchs convened the consultation, welcomed participants, and outlined
the discussion ground rules.
INS Commissioner Meissner
Policy development has worked quite well in the last several years. Three crucial
arenas demonstrate success within existing structures: the more than doubling of
the INS budget in the last three/four years, with continuing growth; the handling of
8
emergency migrations, such as Cuba and Haiti; and, the overall commitment and
effort that has gone into managing the immigration system.
Separating border enforcement activities from the rest of immigration enforcement
would be difficult because:
INS is now linking its border enforcement efforts internally and
beginning to share intelligence and understanding both of what the
major entry routes are and how they connect to employment and
employers;
Separation would constitute a return to a more fragmented system
when INS and the Customs Service are now at a point where there is
essential parity in resources, resulting in the development of true port
management in the busiest port of entry, San Ysidro;
These functions are mutually reinforcing, for example: an effective
asylum system requires eliminating the abuses in the system, which
means focusing on enforcement; in naturalization, the greatest
weakness is the ability to fingerprint and get criminal records in an
effective and timely manner.
While, at the present time there is no basis for fundamental restructuring, one area
in which improvements are called for is the way in which the international
dimensions of migration management and the domestic dimensions intersect.
Smuggling and law enforcement pressures require global activity to achieve truly
effective border control. There is a need for a substantial overseas law enforcement
presence. Much additional work remains to be done in joint planning and out-
comes and performance effectiveness.
Integration of databases between INS and other agencies shows great promise: it is
becoming acutely important in employer verification and in cooperative efforts
with the Social Security Administration.
9
Assistant Secretary Mary Ryan
The budget and planning process is very complex and there are numerous discon-
nects. Planning is difficult when one doesn't know how much money will be
available from year to year. Immigration needs additional funding (also mentioned
by Commissioner Meissner).
After the World Trade Center bombing, Congress recognized the need for additional
consular services resources and authorized a machine-readable visa fee. Every visa
issuing post now is automated. There is a direct tie-in to the classified lookout
system at each such post.
The Bureau of Consular Affairs is working to develop better strategic plans.
Interagency efforts to deter illegal immigration, identify criminals and terrorists, and
combat fraud figure very prominently in these draft strategic plans. The Govern-
ment Performance and Results Act [GPRA] is driving these efforts and it will also
lead to further integration of the budget and planning processes.
Organizational changes are not necessary; more can be gained by actively supporting
the growing integration of INS and the Department of State [DOS] operations
through increased coordination. DOS is strongly against any transfer from DOS of
the visa function, which involves a lot more than just denying entrance to ineligi-
ble aliens; the manner in which the visa function is performed has a decided effect
on our relations with other nations. The proposed travel of individual aliens to the
U.S. relates to foreign as well as domestic policy, including situations involving
terrorist organizations and drug traffickers. As international movement of peoples
increases in importance in our bilateral and multilateral relations, the impact of
visa operations on our foreign policy will be even greater. DOS has officers trained
and experienced in the operation and policy aspects of immigration as it relates to
foreign policy. Further, transfer of the visa function would eliminate a source of
talent because the officers now doing consular work would not transfer to an agency
that only does immigration.
10
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Labor Seth Harris
The problems with the employment-based immigration systems are problems of
conflicting policy goals, different policy objectives, and different levels of political
influence among interest groups in our political economy. The goals are not
matched by systems intended to meet those goals. In the nonimmigrant system,
which purports to satisfy short-term skill-based shortages, there is no labor market
test to determine whether such shortages exist. Problems in the permanent
employment-based system that were pointed out in the recent Department of Labor
[DOL] Inspector General's report cannot be addressed by moving boxes around
within the government. Creation of an Assistant Secretary of Labor for Immigra-
tion would not cause these problems to go away.
Consolidating worksite enforcement in a single agency would not solve the
problems. While there is a tension between the DOL roles of enforcing worker
protections and of cooperating with INS, there are conflicts between the DOL
enforcement and service functions and whether DOL is serving them to get the
desired outcome. Does DOL serve the customer's goal, depending how the customer
is defined? Does DOL serve its policy goals? The question that should be asked,
both from the perspective of the employer and the immigrant, is: Is this the most
efficient way of having a foreign worker admitted to the U.S.?
Discussion
At the conclusion of the three presentations, one Commissioner observed that there
was an overwhelming disconnect between current and former executive branch
officials' perception of structural problems in the immigration system. The current
incumbents stated that there are essentially no problems; in contrast the previous
day's consultants pointed out numerous problems. Participants replied that there
are problems, but they questioned the extent to which these problems are
structural.
11
Selection of Immigrants and Nonimmigrants
The Commission asked if apparent redundancies in the adjudication of immigra-
tion benefits could be reduced. One Commissioner pointed out that DOL, INS, and
DOS are involved in the selection of temporary and foreign workers and that USIA
has responsibility for temporary exchange visitors who work in the U.S.
A participant noted that the double-check system (DOS and INS) used in issuing
visas is very useful and important; going to a single agency issuance would lose this
safeguard. Another said that the principal employment-based immigration
problems are not management or structural, but are statutory, policy, and political
problems that involve competing policy objectives. Moving boxes or consolidating
functions does not necessarily solve problems. The goal should be how to save the
customer and the government money and still get the same or better policy results.
A Commissioner asked if reform in this area was hampered by DOL declaration that
the nonimmigrant, H-1B, and labor certification process policy level is illegitimate.
He said that DOL should have a role, but that role is difficult to define when the
agency itself doesn't think the program is legitimate. A participant argued that for
four years DOL has been pushing a legislative agenda to reform the permanent
program, but the nonimmigrant program, which is a feeder system into the
permanent program, must also be reformed.
In the meantime, DOL is doing the best job it can with shrinking resources. DOL
relies on the State Employment Security Agencies [SESAs] that took a deep funding
cut. Eliminating the SESA role may not make sense as the SESAs may be better
positioned to do a local labor market test and determine if recruitment has been
done.
Data Sharing
Participants pointed to the greatly improved sharing of data during the past few
years as a way of making the diffused immigration system work efficiently. The
DataShare program in which INS and DOS share information on visa applications
12
and approvals, adjustments of status, entry to the U.S., and other immigration data
involves consular posts, the National Visa Center, INS Regions, and ports of entry.
DataShare provides current immigration information on individuals to those who
need it. As required by the National Performance Review, DataShare helps reduce
redundancies and makes for more effective use of resources. At present, 80 percent
of the immigrant visas issued by DOS are in the DataShare system under which the
information is directly transferred to INS.
Three direct and immediate benefits of data sharing are more accurate data, more
timely data, and lower costs. While it is more expensive initially, it pays off in the
long run.
A system to go directly from the granting of citizenship to the production of a
passport without going through a separate passport application, was described as
another way to bridge agency responsibilities. There is similar potential at the
beginning of the process to link immigrant visas and the issuance of green cards,
which can be connected with the issuance of social security cards.
Policy Development
The Commission asked how to get sustained policy development, particularly on
legal immigration policies, in the absence of a compelling crisis. A participant
reported that in the last few years, policy development on legal immigration did not
occur in the way some people wished because it was determined that the focus
would be on illegal immigration. Another reported that in 1994 and 1995 there were
interagency working groups that addressed issues such as border management, legal
immigration, and benefits. He said that the Administration did not ignore legal
immigration issues but made fighting illegal immigration its priority.
Commissioners asked about the appearance that DOL was advocating fundamental
statutory changes in the employment-based system on its own without the support
of the Administration. Participants stated that DOL was advocating the Administra-
tion's position and outlined all of the steps that occurred in developing a consensus
Administration position, including meetings with the Domestic Policy Council
13
[DPC] and appropriate Cabinet officials. The steps included the development of
recommendations through channels within DOL. There was a meeting involving
Secretary of Labor Reich, Carol Rasco, and Doris Meissner that included a discussion
of the CIR recommendations. There was a principals-level meeting, and those
views were incorporated into letters sent by the Administration to the Congress.
DOL views were arrived at in conjunction with the DPC and INS. The Chief of Staff
was consulted and he met with cabinet secretaries, the head of National Economic
Council [NEC] and the head of DPC. The conclusion was that the DOL never took
any action that did not constitute an Administration consensus.
Internal Reorganization of INS
One participant recommended an internal reorganization of INS to clarify organiza-
tional lines of communications and responsibilities. He said there was a problem
with communications between the field and headquarters. INS has a proposal in
the works to address some changes needed as the result of the reorganization done
two years ago. Additional management and policy analyst staff at INS headquarters
was also recommended.
Domestic Policy Council
Recommendations were made to strengthen the Domestic Policy Council, using the
National Security Council [NSC] as a model. NSC has interagency working groups
with staff to develop the issues being considered. Initial discussions and comments
are then provided to Deputies Committee for its consideration which, in turn
frames the issues and structures options for the Principals Committee consisting of
Cabinet members and the National Security Advisor. This group then recommends
appropriate action to the President. The NSC model has worked well for decision-
making on issues that cut across agency lines.
One participant noted that immigration presents a mixture of domestic and foreign
policy issues, requiring the cooperation between DPC and NSC on cross-cutting
issues. Another said that it would be helpful to increase staff at DPC to enable it to
14
perform the consultative functions performed by the NSC, but that there is a
question of whether additional funds could be available and, if available, whether
they would be assigned to DPC.
Department of Justice
Participants were asked about a proposal for some type of superstructure at DOJ to
serve as coordinator between INS, EOIR, Office of Immigration Litigation, and to
intersect with the FBI and other agencies. A DOJ representative said the Office of the
Deputy Attorney General serves this function. The importance of immigration
requires it to have a place in DOJ very close to the Attorney General. Another
participant said that the current structure at DOJ has improved coordination
significantly. At the Attorney General's biweekly meeting on immigration there is
high level representation from the appropriate parts of DOJ to bring all pertinent
views to the table.
The larger problem is coordination with other agencies. A participant suggested that
core law enforcement criminal justice functions be consolidated within DOJ. This
would include ATF, Customs Service, and others. Another participant pointed out
that the Customs Service also has responsibilities to collect custom duties. This
taxation responsibility is different from law enforcement functions.
Worksite Enforcement
Questions were raised about involvement of both DOJ and DOL in enforcement
of employer sanctions. A Commissioner asked if there wasn't a better way to handle
employer sanctions enforcement than the current system of four agencies, INS,
Office of the Special Counsel, Wage and Hour, and the Office of Federal Contract
Compliance Programs [OFCCP]. DOL has been wary of too great a participation in
immigration-related activities. Most employment law enforcement is complaint-
driven, and if complainants expect to be deported as a result of their complaint,
there is a great disincentive to complain about exploitation.
15
To the extent workers view DOL as immigration enforcers, it will have a detrimen-
tal effect on low wage enforcement. A Commissioner pointed out that without an
effective worksite enforcement system, there is no effective illegal alien prevention
program. Moreover, as employers who hire illegal aliens are more likely to violate
other labor standards, the DOL has a vested interest in reducing illegal migration.
Hence, while employer sanctions can be seen as a U.S. worker protection and a labor
standard, DOL has never accepted employer sanctions as such.
In the absence of consolidation of responsibility, better data sharing would help
reduce duplication of effort. One participant recommended greater information
sharing between INS and DOL on specific employers who violate immigration
and/or wage laws. He said that it is difficult, however, as INS and DOL do not use
the same database.
Border Management
Commissioners asked for comments on two suggestions with respect to the border
patrol: creation of a separate border management agency including Customs; and
consolidation of border enforcement (the border patrol and deputies) within INS.
One participant argued strongly for integration within INS, such as an office of
border management or border enforcement including both the border patrol and
inspections. A Commissioner asked if the division of Border Patrol as a separate
office or agency within INS is still logical or whether INS is moving away from that.
It isn't logical for purposes of an effective border control strategy, but is logical for
historical and other reasons occupationally and personnel-based reasons and
because it is a uniformed activity requiring the carrying of firearms.
The Commission asked if the Border Patrol differed from Investigations in its
responsibilities. The respondent equated the border patrol to police on the beat and
investigators to detectives. A Commissioner observed that the Commission was
trying to get at the integration of the enforcement mission by clarifying distinctive
responsibilities and roles, with everyone striving to reach the same goal, whether it
was border management or removals. Another Commissioner noted that in the
past ports of entry have not had a high priority-except for the last few years when
16
they've gotten a lot more resources. He said they need to be a part of enforcement,
not examinations.
Removals
One of the gaping needs of interior enforcement is the removal of the hundreds of
thousands of aliens under final deportation orders. Removal needs to be made a
priority, an observation that garnered considerable support. One participant said
that it does no good to do enhanced worksite enforcement and apprehensions
without carrying the cases through to the removal stage. She said that it is impor-
tant to get the systems and resources aligned so that those who are picked up in the
first place have a very high probability of ultimately being removed. She said that
the process is getting better, but the removal capacity is not yet where it should be.
Detention
A Commissioner pointed out that the FBI and other law enforcement agencies do
not detain those whom they apprehend. The U.S. Marshals Service has responsibil-
ity for pretrial detention and the Bureau of Prisons for postconviction detention.
According to one respondent, INS is very uncomfortable with long-term detention
that grows out of asylum and the appellate process. INS does not want to be in the
long-term detention business because it involves factors that are not within its area
of expertise. However, with reform of the asylum system and expedited exclusion,
there should be a reduction in long-term detention. Asked why detention couldn't
be performed by the Marshals Service or another agency that deals with detention of
nonconvicted individuals, a DOJ representative stated that in response to a Congres-
sional request in the DOJ 1997 appropriations bill, a detention planning committee,
which includes INS, the U.S. Marshals Service, Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Attorneys,
and EOIR, is undertaking a study. Approximately 20 percent of INS resources now
are devoted to detention.
17