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President's Secretary's File (Franklin D. Roosevelt Administration)
Diplomatic Correspondence
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PSF
Italy
1933-38
Italy-1933
COPY
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 14th, 1933.
My dear Mr. Prime Minister:-
I am asking Ambassador
Long, who is a very old personal friend of mine,
to give you this note when he presents his
credentials. I only wish that I might have
the opportunity to see you myself, to give you
my greetings and to talk over many things in
which you and I have a common interest.
May I tell you how much
I appreciated my talks with Signor Jung? His
frankness, his complete understanding of our
mutual problems, and his delightful personality
gave me great pleasure and great confidence.
Thank you for sending him.
Those two very wonderful
volumes have thrilled me, not only because of
their great artistic merit, but also because
Vergil and Horace were my favorites in my student
days - and I shall keep them among my treasures.
When I am gone they will repose in the Library
of Congress.
And in the meantime they
will be symbols of the greatness of the spirit
and understanding of the Italian people - and
of you their leader whom I hope some day to meet.
I am, my dear Mr. Mussolini,
Very sincerely yours,
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
His Excellency
Signor Benito Mussolini,
Head of the Government,
Prime Minister of the
Kingdom of Italy,
Rome.
PsF Italy
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
December Return 4, 1933.
Dear Mr. President:
I beg to call to your attention a
very interesting and confidential telegram
from Ambassador Long, under yesterday's date,
in which he reports the substance of recent
conversations between Hitler and the French
representative in Berlin. The telegram is
excellently prepared and is a real contribu-
tion.
Wellam Faithfully yours, Phease
The President
The White House.
Returned 12/5/33
IL CAPO DEL GOVERNO
My oen m₂ Fresident.
in response to your request to have
m exchange of views concerning the wald economic
and publitive problems in Wich the Unites states
and They me mutually interested J have sker
the Miniffer to of Finance Hm. Suide jury to
come Washington as my uprentative.
Kinoeft personal requids and greetings. He will
M₂ July i) bringing you my
Hell you with how great an intact J an
following the Wnk of the United states Sormement,
fn the intention of the wals present officulties
with only can be solves by the muture
cooperation and grodwill of the nating.
m young with the reprimation of the manuferipts
It is with great pleasure that entrugt
of Viigil ans HANCE which are kept at Her
hibrary in therence imy
representative will have the hma of conveying them
to you M a mark of my milt unrial feelings.
J chook thole two anthos not only
because their prictice wnks represent the greatelt
legacy of Rom in the fils of letters but also
because they stand as exemples of that greateness
of spirit ans human mostaning wich J
believe are the two central qualities
of the American Character.
With best withes and fentiments
of expeem behere me
very tinerly your
Mumui
Roma 24 ymile 1933 - XI XI
Italy - 1933
4-24-33
Hm hanklin X. Rooserelt
Frankent of the United States
Washington. C.C.
PSF
will
file mal
Italy 67
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
February 21, 1935
My dear Mr. President:
With respect to the letter from Ambassador Long
at Rome dated February 3, I wish to state that I re-
ceived from Mr. Long on February 1 a cable, in which
he stated that he had taken up the matter of the pos-
sibility of cotton trade with Suvich. The cable con-
tained no information as to what he had in mind. The
State Department had no information about Mr. Long's
conversation, before leaving the United States, with
Oscar Johnston, Morgenthau, Wallace, and others on
the matter of cotton trade.
On February 3, the same day that he wrote his
letter to you, Mr. Long sent a cable stating that he
had talked with Signor Mussolini and that Signor
Mussolini had asked if there were a chance that we
could have some agreement on some few articles so as
to make some immediate advance in the volume of trade,
and
The President,
The White House.
-2-
and that he hoped that some such arrangement might
be arrived at in advance of the more general arrange-
ments to follow. Mr. Long said that he had replied
that he thought this was possible.
In reply to his cable, I wired that it was not
clear what he had specifically in mind. There had
been some earlier proposal with respect to raw silk.
I pointed out that raw silk was already on the free
list, and that if any arrangement carried a definite
obligation to purchase raw silk, some agency of the
Government would have to buy this silk and distribute
it, an arrangement which would obviously present diffi-
culties. I pointed out that a preliminary trade agree-
ment containing a few items could not be made until
after public hearings had been held, and that the
announcement for such hearings had already been made
for March 11, 1935, and that if preliminary arrange-
ments were entered into in advance of such hearings,
American protected interests could charge that they
had not been heard. I asked Mr. Long to give us an
expression of his views as to what might be done under
these circumstances, and stated that it would be most
helpful if he could secure from Signor Mussolini and
his officials any suggestions that they might have.
Mr.
-3-
Mr. Long replied the next day, February 6, 1934,
expressing his gratitude for my exposition of the
situation. He stated that he had made it clear in his
conversations that the American Government was not able
to purchase commodities of any kind, and that the pur-
chase of silk was therefore out of the question. He
had suggested that they find some other items of Italian
origin which might be considered in an arrangement which
would protect the market in Italy for American cotton.
He stated further that he would now wait until they
approached him and then report to us.
I think the foregoing exchange of views between the
Ambassador and the Department since his letter of
February 3, 1934, to you, has brought us all abreast of
the situation and that we are now in a position to give
careful consideration to any suggestions which the
Italian officials might make. I am enclosing copies of
all the telegrams relating to this matter. As these
telegrams were transmitted in one of the Department's
confidential codes, it would be appreciated 1f they could
be returned to the Department at the President's con-
venience for appropriate disposition.
Faithfully yours,
Enclosures:
As above
[1935] star
ETHIOPIAN MOBILIZATION ORDER.
This is a perfect example of a streamlined operations order.
If they didn't win it wasn't the fault of their order!
"When this order is received all men and all
boys able to carry a spear will go to Addis Ababa.
Every married man will bring his wife to cook and
wash for him. Every unmarried man will bring any
unmarried woman he can find to cook and wash for him.
Women with babies, the blind, and those too aged or
infirm to carry a spear are excused. Anyone found at
home after receiving this order will be hanged."
Petiman PSF Italy
COPY
No. 74
AMERICAN CONSULATE
Nairobi, Colony of Kenya, Africa.
June 25, 1935.
SUBJECT:
Italian Activities in Italian Somaliland.
THE HONORABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON.
SIR:
I have the honor to submit the following in-
formation regarding the activities of the Italian
Army in Italian Somaliland which was related to me
by one Mr. Petersen, a traveling representative of
the Caterpillar Tractor Company who visited that
area during the latter part of May. In submitting
this information it is not my intention to encroach
upon the political reporting activities of other
Consulates, but it is believed that some of the in-
formation may help to augment that already submit-
ted to the Department.
At the time of Mr. Petersen's visit to Italian
Somaliland there were some 38,000 Italian troops
stationed in and about Mogadiscio. Most of these
are understood to be from the south of Italy and
are inclined to be sour and unruly. Consequently,
one unit of Black Shirts has been brought in for po-
lice duty. In addition to the Italian troops there
are some 30,000 Somali troops under arms. Captain
Vivian
-2-
Vivian Ward, a retired British army officer resid-
in in Nairobi, who has had considerable experi-
ence with Somali troops, ventures the opinion that
the Italian Government will be very foolish if it
places much dependence upon the Somali troops since
they are known to be extremely unreliable.
It is understood that 32,000 additional Ital-
ian troops are expected to arrive in Mogadiscio dur-
ing June and that 800 more Black Shirts will also
arrive to augment the unit now on duty there.
On May 24th a parade of all the troops and
equipment in the area was held at Mogadiscio. In
addition to the troops mentioned above the follow-
ing equipment was observed:- 39 planes, about equal-
ly divided between fighters and bombers; 40 small
tanks; and 36 - 75 millimeter field pieces. It was
not known what equipment in the way of artillery,
et cetera, would accompany the troops expected to
arrive during June.
No barracks have a.8 yet been provided, and all
the troops are quartered under canvas, among the
sand dunes surrounding Mogadiscio. All of the wells
in the vicinity are brackish, and all water used for
the troops must be distilled from sea water. Ap-
paratus for distillation appears to be limited and
water is rationed, the allowance for all purposes
being two litres per day per person. About once a
week the troops are marched to the beach for a bath,
but by the time they have marched back to the camp
in a temperature of 100 to 120° F., the salutary
effects
-3-
effects of the bath have been dissipated.
The region produces no foodstuffs except ba-
nanas, and all meats and vegetables must be import-
ed. To date the importations have not kept pace
with needs and the troops are all on short rations.
As a result of flies and the bad water available,
a goodly number of the troops are suffering from
dysentery.
The harbor of Mogadiscio will accommodate a
maximum of 16 vessels, but due to the lack of equip-
ment and labor only two vessels can be unloaded at
one time. Vessels are forced to anchor about one
mile out and are unloaded into Arab dhows. Conse-
quently, in rough weather all loading or unloading
operations must cease. After being off-loaded into
dhows the cargo is taken to the dooks. The port fa-
cilities comprise one dook about 120' long, on which
there 18 one ten ton orane which will not handle ten
tons and one three ton crane. As a result of the
limited facilities the shortest time taken to un-
load one ship is three days, while some vessels
have remained as long as thirty-three days before
unloading was completed. Mogadiscio has a normal
population of only 800 and, although every able-
bodied man in town 18 employed, the labor shortage
18 most acute and the Italians are now attempting
to recruit additional labor elsewhere.
There are no warehouses or other facilities for
storing supplies and to date no material has been
imported either for the construction of warehouses
or of
4-
or of barracks. Several large shipments of flour
and cement were imported just prior to the advent
of the rainy season and were stored in large stacks
on the shore with not even any sort of waterproof-
ing covering to protect them from the rain. As a
result the greater portion has been ruined.
In order to facilitate troop movements the
Italians are constructing three roads from the
coast to the Abyssinian border. The main road
will run from Mogadiscio in a north-westerly di-
rection. The other two roads will start at points
north and south of Mogadiscio and will tend to con-
verge with the Mogadiscio road as they approach the
Abyssinian border. To date little progress has been
made except on the main road from Mogadiscio, for
which the Italians have imported six 40 H.P. Cater-
pillar Diesel Tractors.
Although Mogadiscio is approximately 250 miles
from the Abyssinian border, the Italian forces have
constructed a complete system of entrenchments and
barbed wire entanglements in a semi-circle nine
miles from Mogadiscio. Whether these entrenchments
will be used for training purposes only or whether
the Italians expect to make a last stand there
should they be driven that far from the Abyssinian
border is not known.
It is recognized in Mogadiscio that the Ital-
ian Government can not expect to commence any seri-
ous war-fare until after the monsoon period, which
lasts during May, June and July. During this per-
iod
-5-
1od the sea is almost invariably rough which ham-
pers the loading and unloading of ships, and the
rain which accompanies the monsoon will effectually
prevent any operations on a large scale inland.
Well informed persons in Mogadiscio make no hesita-
tion about saying that active hostilities will com-
mence about September lst and that when the Ital-
ians consider themselves sufficiently prepared, a
series of incidences or border clashes will be cre-
ated which will be used as an excuse for sending
troops into Abyssinia. It would appear, however,
that unless the Italian Government goes about its
war preparations in a much more businesslike manner
than it has to date, they may find themselves seri-
ously embarrassed by lack of equipment and supplies
and by sickness among her troops.
An amusing incident in connection with the pur-
chasing of supplies in Kenya for the Italian Govern-
ment has occurred. The local firm of Mitchell Cotts
& Company has obtained the authority for the purchase
of all foodstuffs and other supplies needed for the
Italian troops which may be obtained in East Africa.
About two weeks ago a large order for various things
was received and the first item on the list read:-
"500 ladies of easy virtue". Although Kenya has a
reputation abroad for a singular lack of morals a-
mong its white settlers, people in Nairobi felt that
this was going a little too far. It is understood
that this portion of the order was passed on to con-
nections
-6-
nections in Bombay who are in a better position to
fill the order than is the local firm.
Respectfully yours,
(Signed) Robert B. Streeper
Robert B. Streeper
American Consul.
The
PSF Italy
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
July 15, 1935.
Dear Mr. President:
I enclose two interesting tele-
grams from Paris, dated July 13th and 14th,
respectively.
They indicate clearly the
way the wind is blowing between Italy and
Ethiopia.
Faithfully
Milhau
The President
The White House.
PSF
JS
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone (B)
PARIS
Dated July 13, 1935
Rec'd 3:05 p.m.
Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.
RUSH, 591, July 13, 5 p.m.
URGENT AND
I
FOR THE SECRETARY
I saw Laval this afternoon accompanied by Tuck
and communicated to him the sense of your 270, July
11, 1 p.m. and 275, July 11, 8 p.m. He replied that he
is equally anxious to avoid war that he believes that
it might be avoided by Italian mandate over Abyssinia
which would give Italy territorial concessions, econ-
omic advantages and a form of administrative control
but he does not know whether that would be acceptable
to the Emperor. Laval expressed himself as willing to
cooperate with United Stated and England to settle the
dispute if that could be arranged. I told him of your
expressed ignorance of details of controversy to which
he replied that he had no knowledge of Mussolini's
reply to Eden in Rome except published reports
He feels that Italy is bent on war if war is
necessary to accomplish her purpose. In regard to my
question
-2-
From Paris July 13, #541
question as to the effect on Europe of sending four
hundred thousand Italian troops to Abyssinia he said
"that is Mussolini's business - not mine."
STRAUS
CIB
REP
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
PARIS
fore being communicated
to anyone. (B)
Dated July 14, 1935
Rec'd 1:05 p. m.
Secretary of State,
Washington.
RUSH
592, July 14, 3 p. m.
FOR THE SECRETARY.
Saw Italian Ambassador to France it anniversary
review this morning. In answer to my question he said
that in his opinion war in Abyssinia is inevitable;
that British Ambassador here had suggested to Laval
a meeting between Mussolini, Laval and Hoare in an
endeavor to find a solution that might avoid an armed
conflict; that Laval had telephoned to Mussolini, and
that Mussolini had replied that discussion would not
alter his determination to maintain his position.
STRAUS
RR
physical
PSF
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
Italy
WASHINGTON
August 9, 1935
Dear Mr. President:
Referring again to your desire to be kept
informed in regard to the health of Italian troops
now in East Africa, I beg to enclose for your in-
formation a memorandum on the subject which has
been prepared for me by our Division of Near
Eastern Affairs. It is true that most of the
information contained in our despatches is based
on rumors and reports, but read together they
present a rather definite picture.
I also bring to your attention a elegram
just received from our Embassy at Rome, with
regard to the same subject. We have yet to hear
from our new effort to obtain information from
Port Said.
Faithfully yours,
The President,
The White House.
PSF Italy
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
August 8, 1935.
In connection with the interest recently ex-
pressed by the President in obtaining information
regarding the number and health of troops now being
invalided home to Italy from East Africa, I have had
a search made of all despatches from Rome on the
subject of the Italo-Ethiopian dispute and think
the following excerpts may be of some value, al-
though it will be noted that most of the information
is based on rumors and reports:
"It is
....
rumored that the morale of the
troops in Somalia is not good and that they are
suffering gréatly from the excessive heat, lack of
an adequate water supply and from unsatisfactory
sanitary conditions". (Despatch #1077 from Rome,
May 3, 1935).
"It is reported that some 50% of the crews on
the transports used in the East African service are
demanding a transfer to some other service on account
of impaired health and overwork incidental to tropical
conditions". (Despatch #1108 from Rome, May 23, 1935).
"Rumors concerning serious outbreaks of illness
among the Italian troops and workmen in East Africa
continue to be heard. A report, attributed to the
American Consul at Port Said, has reached the Embassy
that a large Italian ship returning from Eritrea to
Italy had recently passed through the Suez Canal under
strict quarantine with many sick on board, and that it
is believed that, in addition to malaria, cholera has
broken out among the troops in Eritrea". (Despatch
#1135 from Rome, June 6, 1935).
2
"Rumors of bad health conditions among the men
sent to East Africa continue to circulate. The Consulate
General at Naples reports that some 340 laborers in-
valided home from Eritrea were disembarked at that port
from June 2nd to June 6th Despite official announce-
ments to the contrary, it is generally believed that
most of these men were in a very serious condition. It
is understood that the strictest silence concerning
living conditions in the East African Colonies has been
enjoined upon the men invalided home, but rumors of
extremely unsatisfactory health and sanitary conditions
continue to emanate from the families and friends of
men there. It is unofficially but fairly reliably re-
ported that an alarming number of cases of dysentery
and sunstroke are occurring in Somalia and that it is
very difficult to get the Italians to understand the
necessity for protecting themselves adequately from the
tropical sun". (Despatch #1146 from Rome, June 13, 1935).
"Rumors and reports
belie the newspaper state-
ments concerning the excellent health conditions prevail-
ing in the East African colonies. The American Consul
in Palermo reports in this connection that there are
some 300 men hospitalized in Palermo and between 700
and 800 in Messina who have been invalided home from
Eritrea and Somalia. THE LONDON MORNING POST is said
to have published an interview on June 18th with Pro-
fessor Aldo Castellani, an Italian authority on tropical
diseases whose work is well known in London, and who has
recently returned from a tour of inspection in Eritrea,
to the effect that, in spite of reports to the contrary,
the sanitary situation is 'absolutely satisfactory'. A
report has reached the Embassy, however, attributed to
one who is close to Castellani, that he found an alarm-
ing number of cases of malaria in Eritrea and a wholly
inadequate supply of quinine and other medicines to com-
bat it". (Despatch #1166 from Rome, June 20, 1935).
"With regard to the health of the troops in East
Africa the Embassy continues to hear unofficial reports
and rumors concerning the increasing number of men being
returned to Italy for hospital treatment". (Despatch
#1180 from Rome, June 27, 1935).
"The English Consul at Messina reports that, on
June 10th, 800 sick soldiers, returning from Eritrea,
were
3
were debarked at that port". (Report #14533 from the
Military Attache at Rome, June 28, 1935).
According to the account of a militiaman returned
to Naples in February of this year from Eritrea on account
of illness, which was transmitted to the Embassy by the
Consul General at Naples, laborers in East Africa are
discontented but are placated by their high wages.
"With regard to the health conditions of the troops
in Eritrea this militiaman reports that out of the 340
men sent there with him in November 1934, one half have
since been returned to Italy on account of illness. He
himself suffered from malaria. He also reported a water
shortage at Asmara, but in view of the time that has
elapsed since his departure from Eritrea, this informa-
tion is not thought to be of value". (Despatch #1227
from Rome, July 25, 1935".
cib
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
ROME
fore being communicated
to anyone. (B)
Dated August 8, 1935.
Received 4:18 p.m.
Secretary of State
Washington.
456, August 8, 7 p.m.
My 446, August 6, 4 p.m.
Rumors regarding unfavorable health conditions among
the Italian troops in East Africa were not generally circu-
lated in Italy until the month of April but from that date
reports of cases of sunstroke, malaria, dysentery, typhoid,
and cholera among those troops were current as well as
threatened water shortage and inadequate sanitary facilities
at Massaua and elsewhere. The circulation of these reports
was apparently finally taken into consideration by the
central authorities and statements have been published in
the press announcing that since January 1st, 624 troops
have been invalided from the colonies and 37 have died of
which 7 were officers and that during the same period
2,000 laborers have been ropatriated and 113 have died.
American consular officers, particularly those at Naples
and Palormo, have submitted reports of hospital casos at
those ports as well as at Messina but owing to the difficulty
of obtaining details as to the nature of those cases no
satisfactory
-2- No. 456, August 8, 1935,
from Rome.
satisfactory check with the official figuros has boon
possible.
The publishod accounts and statistics rolating to
the health of the troops sent to East Africa have boen
invariably accompanied by commont intended to show that
the proportion of illnesses and deaths is negligible and
a rocont statement outlines the progress of sanitation in
the East Africa colonies and the difficulties which are
being overcome in the fight against disease thore. According
to this statomont the hospital facilitios which consisted
originally of eight hundrod bods has been increased to
20,000 bods of which 3,000 aro dostined for Somaliland and
the romaindor for Eritrea. In this connection, according
to information supplied by an Italian officer in the army
medical corps who has recontly returned from Eritroa, it
would appoar the policy is being adopted of reducing the
numbor of ropatriation casos by sonding tho sick to the
high platoau regions of Eritroa where an extonsivo hospital
commiserating systom is boing installed for which supplies
and equipment are now being purchased. This system is
intended to care for the sick as well as for eventual
casualties.
KIRK
CIB HSS
PSF PSF Italy Italy
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
August 20, 1935.
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
In regard to Kirk's meeting
with Mussolini, and the latter's remarks:
It would be well in any sub-
sequent note or message by us, either
to Italy or to other Nations, to point
out that it is never too late to avoid
an armed conflict. The mere fact that
Italy has mobilized a million men and
spent two billion lire does not mean
"destruction of her prestige in in-
curring the disdain of other countries
who would be ready to accuse her of
having attempted to bluff or of having
engaged in an undertaking which she
found she was unable to carry out."
On the contrary, we could well point
out that after all these preparations
Italian prestige would be enhanced and
not harmed if Italy could take the
magnificent position that rather than
resort to war, she would cancel the
military preparations and submit the
whole question to peaceful settlement
by arbitration.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
-2-
In other words, a very strong
document can be based on Mussolini's
statement by making an appeal to the
higher and not the lower ideal.
F. D. R.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Print
THE SECRETARY
August 19, 1935.
Memorandum for The President.
I attach a part of telegram
No. 500, from K1rk in Rome, which I
think you will find interesting.
The balance of the telegram 18 badly
garbled and difficulty is being
experienced in decoding.
I also enclose a copy of tele-
gram No. 708, from Marriner in Paris,
and call your attention to the
marked paragraph.
C.Huee
C.H.
PSF
gill
Italy (s)ch
MED
This message must be
ROME
closely paraphrased
before being communi-
Dated August 19, 1935
cated to anyone (c)
Received 2:20 p.m.
Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.
RUSH, 500, August 19, 1 p.m.
Strictly confidential. My 499, August 19, 11 a.m.
Mussolini received me shortly before 11:30 this
morning and I left his office at noon. I presented him
with a copy of the message contained in your 136, August
18, 1 p.m., and explained to him that it was a personal
and confidential message sent to him by the Secretary of
State at the direction of the President which the Depart-
ment would not give out to the press.
Mussolini read the message carefully. He then
asked me to convey to the President and the Secretary his
appreciation of the expression of friendliness and of
the character of the message. As to the subject matter,
however, it was now too late to avoid an armed conflict.
Italy, he continued, had mobilized a million men and
had spent two billion lire. Two hundred thousand men
had already been sent to East Africa and one hundred
fifty thousand more were ready to go at any time. Two
Black
MED - 2 - #500, August 19, 1 p.m., from Rome
Black Shirt divisions were being sent out this week and
others were to follow. In the face of this preparation
and the sacrifices which it implied, any alteration
in purpose now would be absolutely disastrous to Italy
and would entail consequences from which she would not
recover for a century. No nation; and he specifically
referred to the United States, could expect that Italy
could draw back now and destroy her prestige in incurring
the disdain of other countries who would be ready to
accuse her of having attempted to bluff or of having
engaged in an undertaking which she found she was un-
able to carry out. Six months ago perhaps some solution
might have been found but the opposition of other countries
and England in particular, although it had brought the
Italian people unanimously to the support of the govern-
ment, had strengthened the position of the Negus so that
now only a military defeat at the hands of Italy could
accomplish the ends which Italy had a right to obtain.
Mussolini went on to say that for years Italy had
made every effort to cooperate with the Abyssinians
to the mutual advantage of both countries. Practically
everything that had been done to improve the condition
of the Abyssinians and advance their progress along
modern lines had been due to the Italians. The treaty
of 1928
MED
- 3 - #500, August 19, 1 p.m., from Rome
of 1928 was intended to declare this policy of amity and
and to render this collaboration effective. This
Treaty, however, had remained entirely ineffective
owing to the attitude of the Abyssinians and all efforts
to give effect to the purposes of the Treaty were of no
avail. Even prior to the construction of the (?)
of the road to Assab as an outlet to the sea, for the
past few days had met with the opposition of the
Abyssinian Government and no progress could be made.
It is true, he added, that during that time the influence
of the French which during those years was unfriendly
towards Italy, was a factor in negativing Italy's efforts
at cooperation in Abyssinia but the main difficulty lay
in Abyssinia's attitude toward Italy herself. Italy
in 1896 had lost the battle of Adowa. That was forty
years ago and the circumstances were such that Italy
herself need not harbor a necessity for revenge. The
Abyssinians, however, regarded Adowa as the triumph of their
force over a powerful white nation and this spirit, which
had been encouraged by the friendly attitude and support
of other European nations, had created a situation in
Abyssinia which absolutely precluded the possibility
on the part of Italy of safeguarding or developing her
legitimate
MED
- 4 - #500, August 19, 1 p.m. from Rome
legitimate interests, This situation could only be
met by a display of force and could only be remedied
by inflicting a defent on the Abyssinians.
The Abyssinians, Mussolini continued, were
known to have 450,000 men under arms. (End section one).
KIRK
HPD:CSB
MED
This telegram must be
ROME
closely paraphrased
before being communi-
Dated August 19, 1935
cated to anyone (C)
Received 2:15 p.m.
Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.
RUSH, 500, August 19, 1 p.m. (Section two).
their military plan was to retreat before the Italian
advance and then when the Italian lives were extended
to launch attacks against those lives in the form of
guerilla warfare. The Abyssinians were not taking
sufficiently into account the Italian air force which
would eliminate the chance of success of these tactics.
Mussolini expressed complete confidence in the outcomo
of this military set up and he intimated that he believed
it would be brief. Ho indicated that following this
phaso nogotiations for a final adjustment would be simple
and in this connection ho pointed out the success of
Italian administration in Eritroa where great progress
along modorn linos had boon made and where no opposition
on the part of the natives had ever been encountered.
In giving the foregoing account Mussolini took pains to
omphasize general attitude so far as onvisaging the
matter sololy from the point of view that the conflict
would be confined exclusively to Italy and Abyssinia
and had
MED - 2 - #500, August 19, 1 p.m. from Rome
and had been alluding to the part played by other govern-
ments only insofar as they affected the relations between
those two countries. If the conflict could be so limited
he said no anxiety need be felt
as to the con-
sequences. He went on to say, however, that the attitude
of England had brought to the fore the possibility that
it might not be 80 confined and in that event he fore-
saw the gravest consequences to the peace of the world.
The conversations at Paris which onded yesterday
showed an attitude which gave littlo indication that
there was an unwillingness to admit the Italian view-
point. The proposals which had boon put forward
involving concessions in Abyssinia though vague were
clear enough to show that they were entiroly un-
acceptable to Italy. England, he said, might profess
not to know what Italy really wanted in Abyssinia but
she know very well (End of two).
KIRK
RR:CSB
MJD
Paris
This telegram must be
Dated August 19, 1935.
closely paraphrased
before being communi-
Rec'd. 11:45 a. m.
cated to anyone. (B)
Secretary of State,
Washington.
708, August 19, 4 p. M.
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
Dopartment's 332, August 18, lp. m.
I saw Leger and Eden this morning and com-
municated orally and in the strictest confidence
the nature of the message which Kirk has been in-
structed to deliver to Mussolini. I informed them
that it was not being given to the press and they
both agreed that in the present position of affairs
this was the wisest means of bringing to Mussolini's
attention the solidarity of the world in the inter-
est of poace.
Both Leger and Eden expressed themselves as
boing extromely gratoful for the prompt and effec-
tive action of the American Government in this
matter and felt that even though the negotiations
in Paris had broken down it was not too late for
its offects to be felt in Italy.
It was Leger's opinion that with the return
of
-2- No. 708, August 19, from Paris
of Aloisi to Rome, Mussolini would gain a more
accurate impression of the solidarity against
him which oxisted hore and what he would have
to faco in Geneva, where, in accordance with the
information which the French have received from
Rome, Mussolini still intends to send his
represontatives on September 4. (End of section
onc.)
MARRINER
RR
CSB
MJD
Paris
This telegram must be
Dated August 19, 1935.
closely paraphrased
before being communi-
Rec'd. 1:00 p. m.
cated to anyone. (B)
Secretary of State,
Washington.
708, August 19, 2 p. m. (Section two)
Neither Leger nor Eden felt that the failure of
conversations here was necessarily the final chapter
and that there was still time for Rome to alter its
program.
Apparently Mussolini refused even to consider
the Anglo-French offer as a basis of discussion.
Eden's analysis of the Italian reply was that
Mussolini would only be willing to accept through
the medium of the League what he would take by
force of arms if it were not granted.
Eden said that in his conversation with Laval
this morning they both considered that in searching
their consciences no offorts had been spared and
no means neglected to find a poaceful settlement
of the question. In this connection Leger told
me that the only benefit that he folt had been de-
rived from the negotiation was a much closor
rapprochement
-2- NO. 708 (Section two) August 19, from Paris
rapprochement and understanding botwoon Great
Britain and Francc. Eden leaves late this after-
noon for London and Vansittart for Aix-les-Bains
whore he will see Baldwin. It is possible that
a Cabinot meeting will be called in London for
August 22. (End message.)
MARRINER
RR
CSB
file
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
file
OFFICE OF THE ECONOMIC ADVISER
November 7, 1935.
Mr. Secretary:
I attach on the basis of the best available material
we have been able to secure up to the present, the follow-
ing:
(1) Table 1. A record of our total exports to Italy
during October, 1935, divided into the main classes of
exports and compared with the record for October, 1934.
Included in the same table is a record of our total
exports to Italy by the same main classes during the first
ten months of 1935, as compared with the same period of
1934.
(2) Table 2. A comparison of the trade of American
exports of numerous important specific items to Italy
comparing that trade for October, 1935, with the trade in
the same items for October, 1934, with increases and de-
oreases.
(3) Table 3. A comparison of the American export
trade to Italy of the same group of specific items as in
Table 2 comparing the monthly average of our exports dur-
ing the first ten months of 1935 with the monthly average
for 1934, with increases and decreases.
This
-2-
This material covers trade with Italy alone and we
are still waiting to receive from Commerce the information
which will make possible a comparable record for Italian
Africa and Ethiopia.
In the meanwhile, I attach tables 4 and 5 which give
the record of export shipments to these countries for
October, 1935, by main classes.
Attached to these tables is a short memorandum which
is really a footnote pointing out the defects and neces-
sary corrections to this statistical record.
Our trade records are being kept on a weekly basis
and by the end of the afternoon there will be available
a record for October, 1935, divided into a weekly basis.
Because of the delays in forwarding of the necessary docu-
ments by the Customs Houses, this weekly record is still
not complete enough to be wholly reliable. However, the
tables will show a falling-off in total shipments subse-
quent to the President's proclamation.
EA:HF:DJW
Table(1)
Total Exports to Italy With Division by Classes.
First ten months
October
1934
1935
1934
1935
Total Exports
$50,865,070
$54,105,361
$6,184,491
$5,840,781
Textile fibers and manufactures
25,422,675
24,465,433
3,956,452
2,678,293
(Unmanufactured cotton)
(24,456,254)
(23,511,579)
( 3,740,755)
(2,602,443)
Nonmetallic minerals
5,830,942
6,594,203
382,821
969,816
Machinery and vehicles
4,757,371
7,085,201
390,426
626,003
Metals and manufactures, except
machinery and vehicles
6,081,287
9,301,790
502,030
1,085,322
Wood and paper
2,705,768
2,297,133
329,583
142,398
Animals and animal products
2,130,065
1,102,656
198,686
31,575
Chemicals and related products
1,422,972
1,646,427
138,103
142,805
Vegetable food products and
beverages
961,889
354,504
138,032
29,397
Vegetable products, inedible,
except fiber and wood
922,849
772,468
80,801
95,397
Miscellaneous
685,252
478,386
67,557
39,775
*
Sulstantialshipments to Italian africa VN addition to this
Table No. 2
Comparison of American Exports to Italy October 1934 and
October 1935 in Some Important Items of Trade
Increase
Commodity
October 1934
October 1935
or Decrease
Cotton
$3,740,755
$2,602,443
-1,038,312
Petroleum products.
626,068
1,363,767
+ 737,699
Refined copper
188,237
534,094
+ 345,857
Iron and steel scrap
179,458
463,817
+ 284,359
Aircraft and engines
4,081
179,540
+ 175,459
Steel plates, sheets,
etc
46,822
6,368
-
40,454
Rubber and manufac-
tures
20,808
275
-
20,533
Automobiles, parts,
and accessories.
48,108
8,125
-
39,983
Other ferro-alloys.
11,306
450
-
10,856
External cylindrical
grinding machines
9,304
33,843
+ 24,539
Nickel
16,564
11,132
-
5,432
Gear-cutting machines
8,460
10,623
+
2,163
Engine lathes
I
44,134
+ 44,134
Internal grinding
machines.
4,183
65,147
+ 60,964
Coal
4,650
I
-
4,650
Tin and manufactures
I
-
-
Ferro-tungsten
544
--
-
544
Tin plate scrap
I
-
-
Lead
--
--
I
Table No. 3
Comparison of Monthly Average of American Exports to Italy,
fifst ten months of 1935 as compared with Monthly Average
for Whole Year 1934
Monthly Averages
12 Mos.
10 mos.
Increase
Commodity
1934
1935
or Decrease
Cotton
$2,698,662
$2,351,158
- $347,304
Petroleum products
312,318
433,995
+ 121,677
Refined copper...
267,649
471,391
+ 203,742
Iron and steel
scrap
185,517
335,284
+ 149,767
Aircraft and en-
gines
8,941
65,305
+ 56,364
Steel plates,
sheets, etc....
25,710
15,043
- 10,767
Rubber and manu-
factures
28,650
13,372
- 15,278
Automobiles, parts,
and accessories
60,099
61,307
+
1,208
External cylindri-
cal grinding
machines
4,765
29,003
+ 24,238
Nickel
3,855
7,832
+
3,977
Gear-cutting
machines
3,003
18,005
+ 15,002
Engine lathes
2,233
19,090
+ 16,857
Internal grinding
machines
1,550
19,517
+ 17,967
Coal
20,500
9,284
- 11,216
Tin and manufac-
tures
376
617
+
241
Ferro-tungsten...
270
924
+
654
Tin plate scrap..
I
3,644
+
3,644
Lead
204
108
I
96
PSF Italy
Table 4
U. 8. EXPORTS TO ITALIAN AFRICA,
OCTOBER 1935, SHOWN BY MAIN CLASSI-
FICATIONS
Animals and animal products.
$
--
Vegetable food products and beverages
--
Vegetable products, inedible, except
fiber and wood
1,247
Textile fibers and manufactures
--
Wood and paper
-
Nonmetallic minerals
118,126
Metals and manufactures, except machin-
ery and vehicles.
1,381
Machinery and vehicles
206,511
Motor trucks, busses, and chassis,
36,116
Automobile parts and accessories,
12,115
Trailers
118,980
Chemicals and related products
25,868
Benzol
25,868
Miscellaneous
1,475
Total exports
354,608
Table 5
U. S. EXPORTS TO ETHIOPIA
OCTOBER 1935,
SHOWN BY MAIN CLASSIFICATIONS
Animals and animal products
$ --
Vegetable food products and beverages
--
Vegetable products, inedible, except fiber
and wood
-
Textile fibers and manufactures
-
Wood and paper
--
Nonmetallic minerals,
--
Metals and manufactures, except machinery
and vehicles
--
Machinery and vehicles
361
Chemicals and related products
500
Miscellaneous
-
Total exports
861
FOOTNOTE TO TABLES 1, 2 AND 3, AND 4 & 5
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF THE ECONOMIC ADVISER
November 8, 1935.
The monthly statistics of American foreign trade are
not strictly on a calendar month basis. The figures al-
ways include a certain amount of trade which actually
took place in a previous time period. The figures for
any one month usually include some shipments which were
actually made in the previous month, and do not include
some shipments made towards the end of the month dealt
with (these appear under the heading of a later month).
Therefore, in order to have the October statistics of
our import and export trade more closely comparable with
previous periods the figures in the preceding tables
were left uncorrected. Figures are available, however,
showing what part of the trade recorded in the preceding
table as being October trade actually was shipped
earlier than October. These figures are as follows:
Animals and animal products
$ 3,636
Vegetable food products and bev-
erages
944
Textile fibers and manufactures
184,810
Wood and paper
44,956
Non-metallic minerals
39,006
Metals and manufactures, except
machinery and vehicles
263,499
Machinery and vehicles
208,819
Chemicals and related products
31,039
Miscellaneous
540
TOTAL
$777,249
Arrangements
- 2 -
What actual shipments in October still remain to be
reported cannot be estimated with sufficient reliability
at this moment; they would be an offset to the figures
of earlier trade included in the October figures.
Arrangements have been worked out whereby future
records of monthly trade with the belligerents will be
more closely adjusted to the actual trade of each month.
EA:HF:LWW
PSF
Pulice
Italy
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE UNDER SECRETARY
November 14, 1935
Mr. Secretary:
In view of the information brought us by Mr. Hack-
worth this morning as a result of the discussions in
New York last night, my feelings are as follows:
1. The argument of the representatives of the
ten big oil companies that while they would abide by
the wishes of the Federal Government and would, there-
fore, be willing to refrain from exporting oil to the
belligerents, the 120 odd American companies certainly
would not do 80. These are small companies purely
out for gain and would undoubtedly take advantage of
the situation created by the failure of the big
companies to export.
2. We do not yet know precisely what sanctions
are going into effect nor how far-reaching they will
be. We know enough to presume that there will be a
flow of materials into Italy from Germany, Rumania,
Hungary, Austria, Brazil and the Argentine to make it
exceedingly doubtful whether there will be any severity
in the sanctions as prescribed. The question is
whether the United States should undertake to penalize
American
-2-
American trade before we have any knowledge as to the
real situation resulting from the action of the League
on the 18th instant. It does not seem to me quite
fair to American trade to put in "on the spot" in this
way. Therefore, I recommend that we wait until after
the League has acted before making the appeal.
With especial reference to oils, I do not like the
idea of putting the President in the position of making
an appeal to the oil industries of the country, which 1s
not respected by the smaller companies and therefore
not effective, nor do I like the idea, at this moment,
before the League action for the President to "black
list" the exporting companies by announcing their
names.
In brief I believe that it will be wiser to await
the result of the League action in this case rather than
to act somewhat precipitously now. It may even be
wiser to await action by our Congress in order that the
Gov ernment may be in a position to exercise real
restraint upon the export of raw materials - a restraint
which will be equally effective upon all companies
exporting raw materials.
ur
William Phillips.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY
Confidential
for the President
from Secretary Hull.
Nov. 23, 1935.
PSF
Italy
At Warm Springs, Ga.,
November 27, 1935.
Dear Cordell:-
That memorandum of your conversation
with the Italian Ambassador on November twenty-
second is a classic. You did a splendid job in
making our position clear and, at the same time,
pointing out the very untenable position in which
Italy has deliberately placed herself.
In regard to the 1871 treaty, there
is, of course, the undoubted fact that Italy, by
a deliberate violation of the Kellogg-Briand Pact,
made strict compliance with the old treaty 1m-
possible. Furthermore, I very much doubt whether
the language in the 1871 treaty was ever intended
to apply to a situation in which one nation was
engaged in a war in which that nation was the
aggressor.
As ever yours,
The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. 0.
PSF F Italy
November 22, 1935.
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY HULL AND
THE ROYAL ITALIAN AMBASSADOR, SIGNOR AUGUSTO ROSSO
The Italian Ambassador called by his own request
and after some preliminary exchanges of the usual
nature he said that he called upon instruction of his
Government to lay before me two views which his Govern-
ment supports; that he was not handing me & note or
any other formal instrument of writing; that he had re-
duced to writing the oral conversation that he is pro-
posing to conduct. The Ambassador thereupon proceeded
to read to me the typewritten copy of his proposed
oral conversation:
"1 - The various official declarations and public
statements issued from the Federal Govern-
ment during the last two months with regard
to the Italo-Ethiopian conflict, and par-
ticularly the statement of the Secretary of
State of November 15, cannot be interpreted
otherwise than an extension and aggravation,
to the principal detriment of Italy, of the
meaning of the Neutrality Act of August 31,
1935.
"Although these declarations and state-
ments apply, formally and theoretically, to
both the contending parties, it 1s well
known that their practical result would be
actually to impair the freedom of trade only
with respect to Italy.
"Such
-2-
"Such an assumption has been confirmed
by the fact that the statement made by the
Secretary of State on November 15 specifically
mentions certain commodities which Italy has
been used to buy in the United States and which,
being largely employed for non military purposes,
are essential to the needs of the economic and
social life of any civilized country.
"We maintain that any measure or policy
aiming at, or resulting in, imposing restric-
tions which actually are detrimental to only
one of the contending parties, goes against
the spirit of neutrality.
"2 - We maintain also that the above mentioned
statement of the Secretary of State 1s contrary
to the letter and the spirit of the Treaty
signed between the United States and Italy in
1871 - and still in force - which reciprocally
guarantees each contracting party a 'complete
freedom of commerce and navigation'.
"No justification whatsoever for the 11mi-
tation of the freedom guaranteed by the Treaty
can be found in any international Act dealing
with the status of neutrals. Reference is
made in this respect to the Hague Convention
of 1907.
"Such a limitation, if and when applied,
is bound to assume the meaning of a 'sanction'
and therefore the positive character of an
unfriendly act.
November 22, 1935."
The Ambassador paused briefly here and there in the
course of the reading to elaborate with one or two sen-
tences, but they did not change the purport of the in-
strument of writing. He then indicated his desire to
answer any question or listen to any comment I might
see fit to offer in case I desired to do so. I addressed
the
-3-
the Ambassador and said that, of course, he and his
Government should keep in mind all of the essential
phases of the situation as it relates to this country;
that in all of the past the most cordial and friendly
relations have existed between the people of this coun-
try and those of Italy; that the people of this country
today do not feel personally unfriendly towards the
people of Italy, but that they are vigorously and almost
wildly against war and are at all hazards in favor of
keeping out of the present war; that, if those partici-
pating in the war were double cousins and twin brothers
of the American people, the people of this country
would be just as violently and eternally against the
war and in favor of peace and, above all considerations,
as far
in favor of keeping A away from and out of the war B.B
would be possible. I said that it was in these circum-
stances and in this highly wrought up state of the public
mind of this country that the Neutrality Act of last
August vas enacted and the Executive Department was
directed to pursue the policy of neutrality which it
provided; that this mandate of Congress was promptly
put into effect when the President declared a state of
war to exist between Ethiopia and Italy and declared
an embargo on the shipment of arms, ammition and
implements of war to either of the belligerents; that
at
- 4 -
at the time heavy pressure was brought to bear upon
the State Department also to include a number of
prime and essential war materials out of which finished
arms, ammunition and implements of war might be made
in large quantities over night; that since that time
insistent demands representing large groups of senti-
ment in this country have been made upon the Executive
Department to include these war materials in the embargo
issued under the Neutrality Act against arms, ammuni-
tion and implements of war. I added, in this connection,
that I hoped that the Ambassador and his Government
would recall the experience of the people of this coun-
try in ways that will shed much light upon the state
of mind and the viewpoint of the people and of this
Government in accordance with it, and that is that our
country sent 2,000,000 men to Europe to fight for Italy
and other countries at an enormous cost to this Govern-
ment and this country; that we likewise loaned Italy
much money at the time and afterwards; that we later
made almost a nominal settlement with the Italian Gov-
ernment at twenty-five cents on the dollar, all of which,
with interest, is due and unpaid, to say nothing of other
vast indebtedness in Europe; that I have been besought dur-
ing past months to demand aggressively, if necessary,
payment
-5-
payment by the Italian Government of this indebtedness in-
stead of its spending hundreds of millions in this Ethiopian
conquest. I said that I had not done 80 thus far, but
until this time I had been willing, on a suitable occasion,
to sit down with the Ambassador and seek a satisfactory
adjustment of the indebtedness. I then said that with
the extremely disastrous and unsatisfactory experience
of the American people in going to Europe and aiding
Italy and other countries to the extent they did, they
are almost wild in their demand that we not only avoid
being drawn into the war but that we stay entirely away
from the same; that the people of this country are in
no state of mind to engage in any activities or steps
except those primarily looking towards keeping out of
the war and in a secondary or subordinate sense mani-
festing proper interest in peace and the shortening of
the duration of the war in the light of our obligations
under the Kellogg Pact; that it is in this highly wrought
up state of mind of the American people that the Govern-
ment of Italy now arraigns this Government upon both a
charge of unneutrality and of violating the provisions
of the treaty between the United States and Italy of
1871 pledging complete freedom of commerce and naviga-
tion. I said that these are surprising as well as
serious
MUDIT
coudges
besta
beAmout
-6-
serious complaints in the circumstances. I said I
might remark here that from the outset this Government
has pursued its own separate, independent course and
initiative with respect to all phases of the controversy
between Ethiopia and Italy; that we have had no agree-
ments whatsoever, directly or indirectly, with Geneva
or London or Paris; that they did not know of any of
the steps this Government had taken until they read
about the same in the press; that this Government be-
lieves that it has been consistent in its course and
policies and naturally feels constrained to adhere to
them; that the Government, as stated, placed in opera-
tion its embargoes and at the same time the President
warned all Americans against any business or economic
contacts with any of the belligerents, except at their
own risk. The President and myself in public statements
during the weeks that followed made it clear that this
warning statement of the President was intended, generally,
to discourage any business or economic relationships
between our nationals and the belligerents; that nothing
further was said by the President, myself or the Govern-
ment officials relative to business dealings with the
belligerents until some days ago when the official
statistics showed that some five essential war materials
were
I/Ve
#1831
-7-
were being exported from this country to belligerents
in abnormal quantities compared with similar shipments
during any recent period, and that I thereupon made a
further official statement, in which I said that this
class of business was directly contrary to the policy
of the Government in opposition to selling war materials
to belligerents, which policy was held and believed to
be strictly within the spirit of the Neutrality Act;
that nothing further has been said by the President or
myself with respect to trade relations between this
country and the belligerents. I then said that the
Ambassador must realize that just as soon R.S the Ameri-
can people discovered that abnormal quantities of essen-
tial war materials were being shipped on an increasing
scale to belligerents without protest but with the
silent acquiescence of the proper Government officials,
there would probably be & storm of criticism and 8. loud
demand for the immediate convening of Congress to take
adequate steps in the premises, and that the result
scarcely beyond any question would be a swift passage
of a drastic not dissolving every possible relationship
with the belligerents pending the war. I repeatedly
expressed surprise that the Italian Government would
make a complaint against this Government in all the
circumstances in the severe language that it does. I
inquired
VIII
2
ASI
-8-
inquired whether and what the Italian Government had
said to Germany in the light of st more sweeping and
inflexible prohibition of business relations with the
belligerents than this Government has taken. The Ambas-
eador replied that he did not know whether his Govern-
ment had made any representations to Germany. I com-
mented rather emphatically and stated that I had seen
no published account of any complaint whatsoever, and
that it was therefore all the more strange to me to
read this rather harsh complaint against this Govern-
ment; that it seemed all the more surprising when both
the Ambassador and I know that the bitterest critics
of the Executive branch of the Government and the most
extreme isolationists who are demanding that all Ameri-
cans stay entirely away from the war zone do not in the
slightest question the integrity of the neutrality poli-
cies of this Government 8.8 they are being carried out
in accordance with the letter or the spirit, or both,
of the Neutrality Act. I said that it was really
astonishing to find that a government cannot be neutral
without being attacked and a demand made to supply war
materials to 1. belligerent under penalty of being charged
with an unfriendly act. The Ambassador emphasized the
view that the manner in which this Government is con-
ducting
-9-
ducting its policy of neutrality operates as a dis-
crimination against Italy. I replied that under the
law of neutrality in the past any belligerent controlling
the high seas was usually at an advantage over its enemy
with respect to obtaining goods from neutral countries,
that a poor belligerent without means of purchasing
and paying for supplies from neutrals was at a disad-
vantage under the operation of neutrality laws, and
likewise where one country has or can produce its mill-
tary supplies and another is without such facilities or
equipment, the latter suffers under the operation of
the neutrality law. I then pointed out that, in fact,
under the policy this Government 1s now pursuing neither
Italy nor Ethiopia should be securing war materials
with the result that both countries are 88 nearly on a
parity in this respect as it is possible for them to be.
The charge of discrimination, therefore, does not apply.
I repeatedly inquired of the Ambassador why his Govern-
ment does not sit down with others and work out this
difficulty in a peaceful manner. He made very slight
and casual comment in reply. The Ambassador sought to
emphasize the idea that the attitude of his Government
was not fully understood in this country and that it
had been misrepresented to a considerable extent. I
commented
- 10 -
commented that his Government might well have thought
of all of these and other unsatisfactory phases before
getting into the war. I stated as emphatically as
possible that these trading incidents to which the
Italian Government refers and about which it complains
are entirely trivial compared with the real problems
and deep concern which the Ethiopian-Italian war causes
this Government; that the Ambassador must realize the
awful repercussions that make their immediate appearance
in far and remote parts of the world, but which are
calculated to give this nation and perhaps others, in-
cluding Italy, unimaginable troubles for a generation.
The Ambassador immediately indicated that he knew the Far
East was in mind. I added that the second condition which
is giving this Government immense concern relates to
the possible spread of the war to any number of other
countries at almost any time with unimaginable troubles
and injuries and consequences to this country as well
as others; that it is, therefore, all the more deplorable
to see the Italian nation moving forward with the war,
which it must realize threatens to create these terrific
problems and conditions so far-reaching that the imagina-
tion cannot grasp their possibilities. I inquired why
these considerations were not in the mind of the Italian
Government
-11-
Government before it went into the war and again re-
iterated my surprise that the Italian Government, on
the contrary, is upbraiding this Government virtually
because it is thus 80 deeply concerned and is striving
in every possible way to keep entirely away from and
out of the var. I remarked then that the Ambassador
well recalls that the President and I pleaded with and
almost prayed with Mr. Mussolini to keep out of the
war but that he ignored our plea and now seems to ex-
pect us to furnish him with war supplies while he
prosecutes the war ad libitum. I added that regardless
of anything or anybody this nation proposed to stay
out of and as far away from the war as possible, and
that we feel most deeply the indifference with which
the world is subjected to the threat of of general war
and with the frightful repercussions in the Far East;
that this Government is keeping its attitude flexible
under the Neutrality Act and the spirit of that Act
which is being carried out in connection with the policy
of opposition to the supplying of certain war materials
to the belligerents; that if the war should spread,
for example, this Government will be in an attitude to
take further steps relative to both miscellaneous trade
and the five war materials which I recently referred to
in 8. statement opposing their shipment to the belligerents;
that
- 12 -
that this Government cannot think of any course or
any precautionary plans short of these, in view of the
fact that aeroplane bases, naval bases and submarine
bases dot the entire Mediterranean section with the
result that almost at any time a conflagration might
be touched off; that it is in the light of these
dangerous possibilities, which to the American people
seem to be probabilities, that this country is almost
madly opposed to our Government taking the slightest
risk of being drawn into the war by permitting its
nationals to trade promiscuously with belligerents in
and about this dangerous war zone, especially in essen-
tial war materials. I stated that during the past
three years I had almost worn myself out physically
in an effort to aid in world economic rehabilitation
so that Italy and other countries would have an adequate
amount of international trade to afford contentment
to their respective populations, and that the Ambas-
sador could not begin to imagine the deep disappoint-
ment I feel at the effort to renew the practice which
all nations have recently undertaken to abandon, relating
to that of military aggression by any and all coun-
tries at any and all times, and that, of course,
if one country is to be allowed to violate this new
policy of the pacific settlement of disputes, then
every
Lean
press
Joet
THE
from
-13-
every country may do 80 with consequences that one
shudders to contemplate. I pointed out to the Ambas-
sador the fact that the League of Nations organization
at Geneva solemnly adjudged an aggressor in this war,
while the United States did not; that the Geneva agency
seeks to aid Ethiopia, which the United States does
not; that the Geneva agency seeks to embargo all imports
from Italy, which this Government does not; that this
Government, as stated, is pursuing its own separate
course without understanding or collaboration with
other governments or peace agencies, and that in these
circumstances it is not only difficult to understand
the Italian complaint but I repeat that it is surpris-
ing to contemplate it; that the mere fact that there
are some concurring nots on the part of the League of
Nations in pursuing sanctions and of the United States
in frankly carrying out its policy of neutrality is,
in the circumstances, no basis whatever for a charge
against the United States of unneutrality and of un-
friendliness. This makes 8. mere coincidence or its
absence determine the question of whether the United
States is or 16 not neutral, in the eyes of the Italian
Government. In other words, if there were no attempted
sanotions at Geneva the United States would be entirely
neutral
are
-14-
neutral in carrying out its present policies of oppos-
ing the sale of war materials to belligerents. I added
that when I issued my statement on the 15th of November,
about which complaint is now made, I did not know and,
in my opinion, no one here knows yet what the League of
Nations may or may not do regarding concerted action
to curb exports to Italy of oil and other prime war
materials, and yet here is a charge that this Govern-
ment is engaged in an unfriendly act as stated. The
Ambassador said that this step, in his opinion, would
be taken on the 38th of this month at Geneva. I 0011->
mented that, of course, that remains to be seen. I
inquired of the Ambassador why his Government had not
taken $100,000,000 to Ethiopia and brought back a key
D.
to the entire Empire instead of expending several hundred
million dollars in its military conquest with all of
the worry and threat of danger to the balance of the
world. He replied that Italy had been attempting for
forty years to effect colonizations in Ethiopia, but
without success. I repeated that the people of this
country are LS yet entirely friendly to the Italian
people but added that if his note should be made public
in the United States, an inflamed public that nobody
could control or curb would be almost instantly aroused
end that, of course, the pressure of 8. surprising charge
such
TM
eyes
FUR
woner
-15-
such 19 he is bringing against this Government will
in due time make the American people personally hostile
to the people of Italy, and naturally it would endure
long in their minds. I took up the complaint of viola-
tion by this Government of the treaty of freedom of
commerce and navigation of 1871 with Italy and at once
stated that I was satisfied that international and all
other law makes it possible for either country a party
to this commercial treaty to remain neutral in the event
the other country becomes involved in war; that it is
inconceivable that either Italy or the United States
in an ordinary commercial treaty signed away its right
to remain neutral in case of war on the part of the
other and that that is the precise reason this Govern-
ment is undertaking to pursue and has no other 1dea
than to pursue it; that, furthermore, with both Italy
and America signatories of the Paris Peace Pact with
the solemn obligations it imposes upon each, it is not
possible to understand how Italy can go to war and
announce to the United States Government that despite
the Paris Paot it must supply Italy with materials of
war under penalty of being guilty of an unfriendly act,
as stated. I remarked further, without discussing the
merits, that the American people cannot be convinced
that
-16-
that the Italian Government is not under most solemn
obligations to keep the peace under three or four
treaties, and it is incomprehensible to them to find
Italy demanding of this Government that to be neutral
it must furnish war supplies and that if it fails to
do 80 it is guilty of an unfriendly not. I repeatedly
emphasized my great surprise and incomprehension and
repeatedly inquired why his Government had not thought
of these phases before it went into the war. I finally
said that, while entirely satisfied as to the lack of
interference of the treaty of 1871 with the present
course of this Government, I would, 28 a. matter of
courtesy to the Ambassador, again give some further
attention to the authorities, although I have no doubt
that I have examined them fully and accurately. The
Ambassador did not attempt any aggressive utterances
and I endeavored throughout the conversation to make
the impression upon him that our nation and most other
peace loving nations were greatly pained and hurt to
find their traditional friends, the Italian people,
involved in this war despite the minerous treaties of
peace to which the Government 10 a party, and despite
the awful menage to the peace of the world which this
war creates.
8 CH:MK
PSF
department OF STATE
paula Italy - 4935
ASSISTANT SECRETARY
(5)(2) (5)
December 11, 1935.
My dear Miss LeHand:
I am again referring to the matter of the shipment of
oil to the Italian Government on the tanker ULYSSES. Since
our telephone conversation yesterday afternoon, I have ascer-
tained definitely that as early as September, 1935, the owner
of the vessel was expecting to arrange for such a transaction,
and he placed the tanker in dry dock, where it was recondition-
ed at an expense of certainly not less than $25,000 and per-
haps as much as $40,000; that on October 25 the vessel was
chartered to the Reed Company for a voyage to Italy, and that
on the same date the Italian interests entered into an agree-
ment with the Reed Company for the vessel to carry a cargo of
oil to the Italian Government. If the carriage of the oil is
forbidden, the Reed Company will be liable to a suit for dam-
ages; the owner of the vessel will almost certainly look to
our Government for the payment of damages; and the prospect of
the vessel being kept in business so as to afford its owner some
opportunity of paying the Government's mortgage will be gone.
It is thought by the Department of Commerce and the Department
of State that we should not stand in the way of the transaction
being completed. You will bear in mind that October 25 was
prior to the announcement being made with reference to the
shipment to the belligerents of five specified articles, one
of
- 2 -
of which is oil.
The only reason I am writing you is that I wish the
President to have all the facts, and if he desires to do
so, confirm the understanding you gave me yesterday that
he leaves the matter to the determination of the two de-
partments mentioned. I hope on receipt of this you may
be able to see the President within at least an hour or so,
and telephone me.
Yours very sincerely,
A-M RWM:HM
P.F
girly Drawd
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
February 6, 1936
My dear Mr. President:
With reference to inquiries which you have made
previously concerning conditions in Italian East Africa
I believe that you may be interested in reading the
attached report from our Military Attache at Rome, re-
counting a conversation which he had with Mr. W. B.
Courtney, a representative of COLLIER'S WEEKLY, who
has just returned from a three weeks' visit to Eritrea.
Faithfully yours,
Enclosure:
Report from Military
Attaché at Rome.
The President,
The White House.
Department of State
NE
BUREAU
DIVISION
ENCLOSURE
TO
Letter drafted
ADDRESSED TO
The President,
The White House.
# * - - number - -
1-195
PSF Italy
Enclosure No. 1 (Report No. 2) to despatch No. 1471
of Jan. 3, 1936, from the Embassy at Rome.
G-2 Report.
6920.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.
ITALY (COMBAT).
Subject: Minor Field Operations.
Visit to Theater of Operations by American
Correspondent.
Mr. W. B. Courtney, representing Collier's has just return-
ed to Rome after being three weeks in Eritrea and Tigre. The
following notes were made during a conversation with him concern-
ing his trip. They represent of course Mr. Courtney's impressions
but are perhaps worthwhile as indicating an objective view of
some of the details in East Africa as he saw them. Mr. Courtney
left Naples on November 18th, 1935, on the S. S. "SANNIO" of
9,900 tons, carrying Marshal Badoglio and 2,500 workmen. Marshal
Badoglie took this boat rather than one of the Italian liners
with better accommodations as an example to the Black Shirt
elements of his command. Conditions aboard the "SANNIO" were
far from ideal. The 2,500 workmen were crowded below decks.
During a storm in the Red Sea just before reaching Massaua it
was necessary to station Carabinieri at each of the hatches to
prevent the workmen from coming on deck. Toilet facilities and
water supply were inadequate and the living accommodations for
these workmen were described by Mr. Courtney as nothing short of
filthy.
At Massaua two old tankers were tied up at wharfs and drums
were being filled from these ships and stacked in a dump adjoin-
ing the docks. Every ounce of gasoline was concentrated in this
one dump. It is estimated that the supply is sufficient for about
3 months. The Italian supply service in estimating its require-
ments failed to take into consideration the fact that the trucks
would have to operate almost continually in low gear, and conse-
quently what was expected to be a year's supply will probably
not last beyond the present dry season.
Sanitary condition in Massaua leave much to be desired. The
port is crowded with men and supplies. There is only one public
toilet in the town and no sewage system. The streets are used
indiscriminately as latrines. No warehousing facilities exist.
Supplies are stacked in open dumps and when rains occur prior to
removal of supplies to the plateau, large quantities are spoiled.
There are no hotels or other sleeping accommodations excepting one
or two freighters anchored in the harbor and used to accommodate
casualties awaiting shipment to Italy. These freighters are so
infested with vermin and bugs as to be almost uninhabitable. Press
correspondents and others who were acquainted with the situation
preferred to stay ashore until they could get aboard a transport.
Even here it is next to impossible to sit down anywhere because of
the accumulated filth. Many have found it more agreeable to seek
accommodations in the native brothels rather than go aboard the
freighters.
Communication
From: M.A. Rome, Italy.
Report No. 14,986.
January 3, 1936.
- 2 -
Communication between Massaua and Adowa depends on one road
and this road has been very badly cut up by the heavy travel.
The stretch between Nefasit and Asmara is especially bad. It is
out out of the side of the mountain with straight drops of over
1000 feet. It is narrow and passing is only done with great
difficulty. For a while traffic was controlled on this road -
one way during certain hours - but so many exceptions were made
that the control has now broken down completely and traffic moves
both ways, passing on such turnouts as could be built. Heavy
traffic has ground the road surfacing to powder and the shoulders
give way under the weight of the trucks. Accidents are frequent.
Often several trucks, their drivers blinded by the dust, have
followed each other over the bank. The same is true of the newly
constructed roads from Asmara to the front. Casualties due to
road accidents have exceeded those due to battle. In one 31 mile
stretch of road (a section of the Senafe-Adigrat road) there are
1700 hair-pin turns. On another section of the road between
Asmara and Adowa Mr. Courtney counted 27 trucks down the embank-
ment. He came to one truck fully loaded and bound for the front
which had broken down and after some delay this truck was rolled
over the bank with its entire cargo. He stated that the casualties
among trucks due to accidents and breakdown ran as high as 5%
per day, many of these of course being repaired and returned to
service.
While en-route from Asmara to Adowa Mr. Courtney passed
many 75 m. guns and 105 mm. howitzers returning from Adowa. It
is not possible to use anything except pack artillery in this zone.
There is a fertile plateau around Axum and between Adowa and
Axum. Other than that the country that he saw is not even suit-
able for grazing. Mr. Courtney got as far forward as the Dam-
beguina Pass. He left before the fighting which took place in
this vicinity the middle of December. He subsequently learned
that the Italian advanced elements which were driven back from
Mai Timchet were blocked in this pass and suffered severe casual-
ties.
The Italians were similarly ambushed during the advance from
Adigrat to Macalle in a canyon north of Azbi. The Danakil column
(Mariotti group of natives) which consisted of two battalions of
Askaris and about 1000 Danakils marched into a gorge without
sufficient reconnaissance and were trapped in the gorge, suffer-
ing heavy casualties. Attempts to communicate by radio with the
Corps Commander, General Santini, failed because the radio sets
were not functioning. The column remained in the gorge through-
out the day and night but the Abyssinians withdrew without
attempting to annihilate it. The attack was such a surprise
that the supply units (combat trains) had to abandon their sup-
plies and close up in order to avoid being cut off. The column
continued on to the village of Azbi without food or water. The
radio equipment was repaired and a message gotten through to the
Corps Commander who managed to transport supplies by air but the
supplies were dropped at the wrong place and were taken by the
natives before the troops could get to them. This column had to
rejoin the corps by its own efforts before it could receive any
assistance.
The Askaris are good soldiers. As one Italian officer put
it: "They are a lot better than the Black Shirts". The Black
Shirts have made lots of noise in East Africa but have not been
effective as combat troops. The regular soldiers are much better.
Morale
- 3 -
Morale among the Italian troops is not high. There is a great
deal of the usual grumbling, but also a lot of real dissatis-
faction with the existing conditions. If it was hoped that many
of the troops now in East Africa would want to settle there, the
hope will not be realized, for almost to & man the Italian soldiers
would like nothing better than a transport home.
The Askaris have borne the brunt of the fighting to date and
in consequence have adopted a rather superior attitude toward the
Italians.
Mr. Courtney was 111 for a time in the hospital at Aksum.
He describes this hospital as without any sanitary arrangements
at all. The only latrines are open straddle-trenches, and bathing
facilities do not exist. A moat around the city contains some
fresh water and is used indiscriminately for drinking purposes,
sewage disposal, watering animals and washing pigs and goats. The
natives seem to have attained an immunity to typhoid but there is
lots of syphilis and African ulcers. The white troops have suf-
fered somewhat from pneumonia, but on the whole their health has
been surprisingly good considering the conditions.
As soon as Marshal Badoglio assumed command, all war corres-
pondents have been ordered back to Asmara. There they get very
little information. Frequently the official communiques are not
delivered to them until several days after they have been publish-
ed in Rome.
Mr. Courtney feels that the Italians are now definitely
stopped in their present positions and will not be able to ad-
vance again this season. He feels that Marshal Badoglio will
be fortunate if he can hold on to territory now occupied. The
aviation has been of little real value. The country is so vast
and there are so many opportunities to hide in the brush and
among the rocks that air observers find it impossible to pick
up even large bodies of native troops. The natives are becoming
accustomed to the Italian aircraft and know how to avoid being
seen. They have even gone 80 far as to prepare traps for the
Italian aviation by setting up a camp in a valley, then abandon-
ing the camp and taking positions on the steep sides of the
mountains from which they can fire from above on any aircraft
attempting a low altitude attack on the camp. As a result
Italian air attacks now are being made from an altitude of
10,000 feet.
The tanks have been of somewhat more value, especially in
advancing against villages, but the country has been too rough
for their extended use.
NOTE: This picture drawn by Mr. Courtney may be very much
overdrawn. It is reported for what it may be worth as the im-
pression of an American journalist gained from a three weeks'
visit to the soene of operations in East Africa.
NORMAN E. FISKE
Major, Cavalry, U.S.A.,
Asst. Military Attache.
file
PSF Italy
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
State
June 30, 1936.
Dear Mr. President:
It appears that the United Press gave out
yesterday a somewhat misleading report, which has
found its way into the Italian press. The Embassy
has this morning sent us the item, as it appears
in this morning's papers in Rome, and I attach a
copy of the despatch.
Inasmuch as it was announced from St. Louis
yesterday that Long had resigned, it occurs to me
that possibly you may care, in your press conference,
to confirm the fact of his resignation and at the
same time say something to the effect that, in due
course, you would make an announcement of a new
American Ambassador to Rome, whose appointment would
be in the ordinary routine.
The United Press statement that a "special
ambassador" is to be sent from this country to Italy
for
The President
The White House.
2
for certain special purposes, perhaps might
well be disposed of as soon as possible before
it gains headway.
I am expecting a reply from Rome at any
moment for the requested agrement for the new
Ambassador, but meanwhile, as is 80 often the
case, the United Press is giving out another
statement mentioning my name in this connection.
Needless to say, I have said nothing to the
press whatsoever.
Faithfully yours,
WCNS79
THE GOVERNMENT HAS DECIDED TO SEND UNDERSECRETARY PHILLIPS
TO ROME, THE UNITED PRESS SAYS UNDER A COPYRIGHT.
PHILLIPS WILL ATTEMPT TO WORK OUT AMERICA'S RELATIONS WITH THE NEW
ITALIAN EMPIRE WITHOUT COMPROMISING THE ADMINISTRATION'S PRINCIPLE
OF NOT RECOGNIZING TERRITORIAL GAINS MADE BY FORCE.
THE IMPORTANCE WITH WHICH BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND ITALY REGARD
THE ETHIOPIAN PROBLEM IS SHOWN BY THE FACT THAT THEY ARE EXCHANGING
UNDERSECRETARIES OF STATE AS ENVOYS. ITALY HAS JUST APPOINTED
FULVIO SUVICH, PHILLIP'S ITALIAN COUNTERPART, AS AMBASSADOR TO THIS
COUNTRY. HE WILL REPLACE AUGUSTO ROSSO.
6/30.-RB134P
PSF Italy
JS
Gray
ROME
Dated June 30, 1936
Rec'd 7:00 a.m.
Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.
241, June 30, 10 a.m.
Following United Press. report under Washington date line
of June 29th published in this morning's papers:
"From a most reliable source it is learned that a
high official of the Federal Government will go to Rome
in the near future to discuss and settle with the Italian
Government questions of direct interest to the United
States which have arisen as a consequence of the Italian
annexation of Ethiopia.
At the State Department there is neither confirm-
ation nor denial of the rumor that the American Ambass-
ador to Rome Breckinridge Long is being at least tem-
porarily replaced by special ambassador. Long, it will
be recalled, is still in & hospital at Rochester, Minn-
esota, and has asked to be replaced in his mission to
Rome."
KIRK
JS
IL CAPO DEL GOVERNO
My ocar Mr Trendent,
years J have often wmembered our
In the left three
exchange of letters of 1433 , and regrettes that
the course of events hy not allowes the first
contacts then extablisher bet ween ourselves
in our intention.
to be purpres with the entirentry wich was
It if therefore with the repent
interfaction that J avoil myself of the
occasion presentes by your triumphae
relection to the Residency ito comvery
to you my Warmat ungrotulating for
this expression of missue
that your great wnk has met with
I all, oerive to express to you
my very time withes fn the ere-greater
proprity , with - I - J am /me- - the Uniler 11ty
will achieve under your enlightenent guidance.
Hoping that our relating how
re-e/tablisher, may not undergo any further
interingation ,J dm my Demth Tressment
very hundy
yours
Munnhii
Roma 19 novembre 1y36- XV
IL CAPO DEL GOVERNO
STANDARD FORM No. 14A
APPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT
MARCH 10, 1925
FROM
The White
PSF: staly
Mashington
TELEGRAM
OFFICIAL BUSINESS-GOVERNMENT RATES
files
friend
CABLEGRAM
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 72082
January 27, 1937.
H. E. AUGUSTO ROSSO
HOTEL PRINCE DE GALLES
PARIS
MY WARM GREETINGS AND GOOD WISHES TO YOU BOTH
ROOSEVELT
Obticive
ATSCH IF DIE
LOB
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
January 25, 1937.
The Secretary of State encloses for the informa-
tion of the President copies of the telegrams indicated
below.
Since some of these telegrams were transmitted in
one of the Department's confidential codes, it would be
appreciated if the enclosures could be returned to the
Department at the President's convenience for appropri-
ate disposition.
Enclosures:
Telegram No. -, Paris. (dated January 25, 12:15 p.m.)
U
GRAY
Paris
Dated January 25, 1937
Rec'd 12:15 p.m.
Secretary of State
Washington
PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT:
Rosso, former Italian Ambassador to Washington,
is to be married in Paris on the morning of January 28
to an American lady, Mrs. Bunker. I am to be witness at
the marriage.
From a conversation I had with Rosso I know that he
would be deeply moved if you should send him a personal
telegram of good wishes. His address is Hotel Prince
de Galles.
BULLITT
CSB:HPD
FAST
DIRECT
RCA
RADIOGRAM
R.C.A. COMMUNICATIONS. INC.
A RADIO CORPORATION OF AMERICA SUBSIDIARY
TO ALL THE WORLD - BETWEEN IMPORTANT U.S. CITIES - TO SHIPS AT SEA
WN15CL RFK604 PARIS 32 28 NFT
RECEIVED AT
1112 CONNECTICUT RCA AVENUE
Ps= ITaly
LC PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT
file
WASHINGTON, D. C.
WHITE HOUSE
1937 JAN 28 AM 8 51
AT
WASHINGTON
STANDARD TIME
DEEPLY TOUCHED BY YOUR KIND MESSAGE WE BEG YOU TO ACCEPT OUR MOST
HEARTFELT THANKS AND THE EXPRESSION OF OUR SINCERE DEVOTION FRANCES
AND AUGUSTO ROSSO
TELEPHONE: NATIONAL 2600
To secure prompt action on inquiries, this original RADIOGRAM should be presented at the office of
R. C. A. COMMUNICATIONS, Inc. In telephone inquiries quote the number preceding the place of origin.
FORM 112WN-W
PSF.Staly
Rasso
Paris, February 2, 1937.
Dear Miss Le Hand:
I am enclosing herewith, for transmittal
to the President, a letter from His Excellency
Augusto Rosso, former Italian Ambassador in
Washington and now Italian Ambassador in Moscow.
With all good wishes and kindest regards,
I remain,
Hastily and sincerely yours,
Offie
Carmel Offie.
P. S. -- All is quiet on the Seine!
But l know
Enclosure.
somebody who feels
Miss Marguerite Le Hand,
like braining you
Private Secretary to the President,
for not writting
The White House,
Washington, D. C.
Paris, January 29th, 1937
Dear Mr. President,
Having asked the advice of my friend Bullitt
as to the way a former Ambassador to Washington should
follow in sending his wedding announcement to the
President of the United States, the answer was : "Just
write a personal letter. The President does not mind
an occasional breach of the Rules of Protocol !".
Following Mr. Bullitt's advice, I take the
liberty of addressing to you this informal communication
of my marriage with Mrs. Frances Wilkinson Bunker of
Washington, formerly an American citizen, and since
yesterday the Italian Ambassadress in Moscow.
I wonder, Mr. President, if you happen to
remember that two years ago, at the diplomatic reception
His Excellency
Franklin D. Roosevelt
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C.
at the White House, you teased me for my delay in obeying
the Duce's ukase to his diplomats : "Marry or quit!". !".
This is one of the reasons why I thought I should
let you know that I have actually complied with the order
of my Boss !
But I have been prompted to do so also by the
memory of the great kindness and friendliness you have
always shown me during my mission in Washington, which
makesme feel doubly happy to-day for the new tie binding
me to a country and a people I have learnt to know and
love.
May I respectfully ask you, also in the name
of my wife, to convey to Mrs. Roosevelt our deepest
regards, and to accept yourself on this occasion, the
assurance of our sincere devotion.
Believe me, dear Mr. President,
most sincerely yours
Ross
P.S. This Petter was already within when
I had the pleasure of receiving your not
grawary cable, fn wish we mush to thank
you again
R.
PsF
department OF STATE
THE SECRETARY
July 6, 1937.
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY HULL
AND THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR, SIGNOR FULVIO DE SUVICH
Trade Agreements Program.
The Ambassador of Italy called at his own request.
He had just returned from a three weeks' trip to the
Pacific Coast. For several minutes we discussed what
he saw and heard on this trip. He spoke of Hollywood
and the different stars he met there and ended with the
statement that there was a great deal of rare genius
among them. I took this lead to state that unless Italy
was well represented among the foremost of these geniuses
it would be the first time that that great country had
not been well represented among the best minds of the
world in one or more lines of thought; that this re-
minded me that many more of Italy's statesmen should
visit this country, just as American statesmen visit
Italy and other countries of Europe and other European
statesmen visit this country. I then added that one
of the valuable policies which contributed very much
to the enthusiasm of the conference of American nations,
both at Montevideo and Buenos Aires, was that each
proposed
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY
-3-
proposed a. full and constant interchange between all of
the American nations of the educational, cultural, ar-
tistic and other valuable attainments of each country
to the end that each would have the benefit of the best
that all could produce. I then launched into the
strongest possible discussion of nationalism in its
extreme form, carefully distinguishing between sane,
practical nationalism within reasonable limits and the
extreme type which during the post-war period has con-
stituted the worst disease that could overtake the human
family. I repeated my illustration of a. community of
families, 8.8 set forth in a radio address of mine during
Foreign Trade Week, in which I pointed out what happened
to a family that undertook to live 8. hermit existence
without a single friend emong the families of the same
community, how it stagnated and steadily became hope-
lessly decadent. I said, "This is the great curse of
the world today and threatens civilized nations with
still more disastrous effects, unless the nations 1m-
mediately begin at least to move in R. different direc-
tion with 8. definite and sound program. I remarked
that our entire program promulgated at Buenos Aires
contains
department OF STATE
THE SECRETARY
- 3 -
contains a reasonable, practical and most urgent set of
principles and policies as the single alternative to
the present disastrous course of affairs in Europe, --
that 18, a peaceful settlement and adjustment and re-
habilitation of all worthwhile and indispensable inter-
national relationships. I said that it is nobody's
fault in particular that after eighteen years the only
foundation which Europe presents for a restored inter-
national order is the narrowest, cutthroat, trouble-
breeding method of trading and 8. wild, runaway race in
armaments; but that this is in striking contrast with
the program of the 21 American nations, and of several
European countries which have approved it in the main,
which does provide 8. solid and permanent foundation for
a stable structure of business, of peace, and of govern-
ment; that the single question is whether the civi-
lized nations will wait until it is too late before
proclaiming and pursuing this practical and constructive
course. I elaborated further with my usual arguments
in support of this program and especially emphasized
the extreme necessity for its support by European
countries generally, before too late.
The
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY
-4-
The Ambassador interjected, for illustration and
without criticism, the view that the British are engaged
in an armament program which will require two years for
completion, and that, considering altogether conditions
in Europe, the time is not ripe just now for 8. movement
in support of the program to which I was referring in
some detail; that within another year or two the time
would be ripe.
I replied that we were talking now as citizens of
the world, rather than 8.8 officials representing our
two governments and that I desired his permission to
discuss the other side of the view he was expressing.
I then said that I had been reared in an undeveloped
mountainous region, where on Saturday afternoons the
neighbors gathered in and about the country store; that
when I would see several of the younger element, who
were still engaged in sowing their wild oats, come in
armed with pistols, I knew there was most likely to be
8. cigar stub or a cigarette stub dropped accidentally
during the afternoon and somebody would get hurt; that
these same persons would get hurt even though none of
them intended or desired 8. pistol fight; on the other
hand,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY
-5-
hand, that when these young men would come in of 8.
Saturday afternoon with no sign of firearms at all,
everyone breathed 8. sigh of relief because of the
assurance there would be no violence undertaken during
the day. I said, "Human nature among statesmen and
among nations is very much the same. Furthermore,
all of the nations never get fully armed under a
policy of rearmament races; one or more always desires
longer time to get more fully armed and equipped; and,
in the end, en explosion inevitably occurs." I con-
tinued, "This is the situation in Europe today. It
is to avoid just such 8. cataclysm that the 21 American
nations have offered a program and are pleading to all
other civilized nations to embrace it and give it sup-
port without a day's delay." I referred to the recent
statements on economic and military peace made by
Mussolini and said that these gave hope and gratifica-
tion to all -- the only trouble was that the masses of
the people everywhere, within almost 24 hours, forget
and that, therefore, it is necessary that the program
for business restoration and peace must be preached
each week by the important statesmen of each country;
that
department OF STATE
THE SECRETARY
- 6 -
that I desired to request the Ambassador again to tell
Mussolini how much we appreciated these statements of
his but that we profoundly hope he or his statesmen will
deliver 8. speech along these lines each week. I said
that there was never before such an opportunity for some
important country in Europe to furnish leadership with
just this sort of a program as I had outlined; that 8
few addresses proclaiming it and supporting it would
result in an amazing awakening of peace and good
neighbor sentiment and that a wave of grateful public
sentiment would sweep over Europe and over the entire
Western world. I said, "This government is keeping
entirely away from the political difficulties in Europe.
It is preserving neutrality with respect to both politi-
cal and military activities and complications. We are
hoping and praying we may be able to keep 3,000 miles
away from any undesirable experiences in Europe. We
have 8. rather definite neutrality act which 18 very
inflexible in certain respects, and we are assuming that
no governments - - such as the British, the Russian, the
German, the French, the Italian, or any other -- will
say or do enough officially to require the carrying into
operation of the neutrality act."
The Ambassador
department OF STATE
THE SECRETARY
- 7 -
The Ambassador was not very vocal in reply to this
and did not take issue or offer definite comment except,
by inference, to the effect that nothing of this nature
was contemplated so far 8.8 he knew. He again came back
to the question of the time not being propitious for 8.
movement in support of an alternative program for econ-
omic and peace restoration. I replied that if each
nation waits until the time is exactly right from its
standpoint, then I must again repeat that the time never
would become propitious; that the experience of recent
years in Europe clearly demonstrates this view; that it
has not been possible for the nations of Europe to settle
any one or two of the 7 or 8 point program involved, or,
in other words, the situation is merely drifting amidst
increasing turbulence and uproar in Europe, 8.8 well as
in certain other parts of the world; that the develop-
ment of a. broader background and a more favorable
psychology is probably vital to a broad and successful
attack upon the numerous problems presented; that our
method of approach and our championship in the Western
hemisphere of the Buenos Aires program should be a
splendid example; that I could offer no better illustra-
tion of what I had in mind than to say that if Italy
and other important countries of Europe were preaching
our
department OF STATE
THE SECRETARY
- 8 -
our Buenos Aires program today, they and the 26 other
governments, parties to the non-intervention pact, would
meet in London on next Friday with a softened state of
mind, with a friendlier spirit and one of mutual conces-
sion, and with a strong disposition to find ways for
the complete settlement of the matters of difference
before they ceased their efforts or adjourned their
meeting; that this is in wide contrast to a. meeting
next Friday where there may be just a little aloofness
from each other, a little too much suspicion of each
other's motives and purposes and a lack of that confidence
and neighborly spirit which is 80 necessary on the occa-
sion of great crises; that, in brief, the preachment and
the championship of a program such as pointed out by me
was probably indispensable to the development of the
necessary psychology among statesmen and nations to deal
adequately and promptly with present emergency problems;
that statesmen must develop an interest and 8. disposition
and a will to cooperate in a broad and flexible manner
in support of a basic program of peace and business
restoration -- otherwise that it will not be possible to
induce nations to halt their present armament races and
to suppress their present suspicions and lack of trust
in
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY
- 9 -
in each other to an extent sufficient to enable them
to cooperate in support of a desirable program. The
Ambassador took no issue with this view but seemed to
be much interested.
I elaborated here on the general situation in
Europe, referring to it as serious and what many would
call dangerous. I remarked that either another war or
a deep-seated economic panic would be utterly destructive
of all that is worthwhile in the affairs of the western
world, and yet absolutely nothing in Europe is being
done in the way of permanent planning in the direction
of peace and general stability. I said that today there
are probably 4 million wage-earners in Germany engaged
in armament production, who, with their families, com-
prise 15 to 20 million of the entire German population
of 70 million; that relative numbers in the United States,
Great Britain, Italy, France, and other countries, are
likewise engaged; that within another eighteen months,
when the resources of most countries necessary for
further increased armaments are exhausted, it would not
be humanly possible to find other gainful and productive
employment for all the millions and millions and millions
of wage-earners now engaged in military production; and
that
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY
- 10 -
that yet, with the roar of the economic and the military
Niagara below, now within distinct hearing, and with
the certain knowledge that the happening of either
catastrophe would be fatal, nations are drifting and
drifting and drifting with no broad or permanent or
peaceful planning.
The Ambassador again came back to the idea that
the armament workers could a year or two hence be
gradually transferred to productive industry. I said
that I must distinctly differ on this point; that noth-
ing in the future could be more clear than that the
races in armaments by industrial nations, as happens to
be the case, and continued delay in adopting a coopera-
tive program for general rehabilitation, would within
another two years have compelled all of the surplus-
producing food and surplus-producing raw material
countries to establish their own manufacturing and other
industrial plants, thus leaving surplus-producing
industrial countries, like Italy and others in Europe,
not to mention the United States, high and dry 80 far
as anything resembling a real and profitable international
trade in the future would be concerned. I. further stated
that there
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY
- 11 -
that there could beyond question be restored 30 billion
dollars of mutually desirable and mutually profitable
international trade above the present depleted volume;
that there are many things Italy and other industrial
countries produce, differing materially in value or
quality or use, which it would be highly profitable
for the United States and other countries to purchase,
thus giving employment to capital and labor in both
countries; that another two years of armament races
and failure to adopt 8. program of peace and economic
rehabilitation would inevitably fasten upon the world
permanent conditions of the most extreme economic
nationalism and all of its unthinkable consequences
and deep privations. I said that it is in these cir-
cumstances that this country, as stated before, while
taking every precaution to keep aloof from political
and military involvements abroad, strongly feels that
each civilized country right now has the unshirkable
responsibility of making a real contribution to promote
peace and normal international relationships; that
therefore it and the other American nations are behind
the broad economic program and its kindred provisions
to which I had referred, and that naturally we are
looking
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY
- 12 -
looking longingly to leading countries in Europe to
offer a similar contribution to peace and economic
well-being; that unless they do awaken and give support
to such a program and movement, an economic collapse
in Europe within 18 to 24 months is inevitable.
The Ambassador made very little further comment,
except to agree in principle on all that I was saying
about the economic situation and the desire for peace.
He then said that his government requested him
to say to this government that Italy has no purpose
whatever to occupy Spanish territory in any event and
is only concerned in that respect to see that a Com-
munist government does not prevail in Spain. He then
added that his government strongly favored recognition
of belligerent rights of General Franco's organization,
not recognition of the Franco organization as a govern-
ment as Italy and Germany had recognized it. His
theory seemed to be that recognition of belligerency
by all the nations would clarify and serve to solve
the present important differences relative to the
Spanish situation. He emphasized the point 8.8 stated
that Italy continues to adhere to the non-intervention
pact
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY
- 13 -
pact along with the other 26 governments signatory to it.
I thanked him for the information and expressed the hope
that the interested nations in Europe would find ways
to compose every difference; that, as indicated, this
country has 8. rather definite and inflexible neutrality
act, and that, of course, with our variety of popula-
tion some people at all times are urging us to take
steps; that naturally we have been assuming that none
of the many governments interested will be disposed to
indulge in such official utterances or acts 8.8 would
raise the question of placing it in operation. The
Ambassador said, "I observe that you are not operating
the embargo provisions", to which I replied that this
is upon the assumption, as just stated, that no other
government will engage in such official acts 8.8 would
aggravate or complicate the situation any further in
80 far as it would relate to our neutrality law.
The Ambassador made no further comment on this
particular phase. He then proceeded to say that his
government would be flexible in its attitude in con-
ference with other governments, and that it was the
purpose of his government, while going as far in
dealing
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY
- 14 -
dealing with 8. given phase as was deemed necessary or
advisable, to stop short of action which might be
calculated to provoke violence or hostility with another
country or countries.
C.H.
S CH:HR
PSF
File
Italy
Personal
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
July 7, 1937
My dear Mr. President:
I received this morning a personal letter from
Bill Phillips dated June 22 in which he says that he is
considerably worried because of the long delay which
has elapsed in your sending a reply to Mussolini's
letter to you of November 19, 1936. He says that "This
long delay is really unfortunate", and expresses the
belief that it would be very helpful if you saw fit to
send a reply in the near future.
I remember that you spoke to me some weeks ago
about this matter and indicated that you were then pre-
paring to draft a reply.
It may be that because of recent developments you
have thought it better to wait a while longer before
sending your answer, but in view of the concern which
Bill Phillips expressed, I thought I had better bring
his request personally to your attention.
Believe me
The President,
Faithfully yours, halls
A
The White House.
Published in
Foreign Relations of the U. S.
1937
Vol. I General
PP. 662-664
musiline
(s)
to
Condroll
/
Is Then ik. ?
the
Summer and I heartity
approve
dure
see Foreign Dignitaries file
Signar
for longhen litten from
PSF Italy 1937
July 29, 1937.
My dear Signor Mussolini:-
I have waited for many months
to thank you for your gracious and much appreciated
letter to me, which I found on my return from South
America last December. I have delayed writing you
because through all these months I have been hoping
that the world situation would clarify sufficiently
for me to discuss with you neasures looking toward
the stabilisation of peace among nations.
But, unfortunately the situation
today seems no clearer than before, and, indeed, in
some aspects the drift of events has been toward
and not away from an ultimate crisis.
I have been gratified in read-
ing of your statements in favor of the principles
of reduction of armament. AD you know, the Secretary
of State has had my full support in his effective
efforts toward the increase of international trade
and the lowering of barriers against trade.
Nevertheless, all of these
efforts, even if they are joined by additional
nations, and even if a greater total of world trade
results in the coming years, will not prove a
pletely effective guarantee of international peace
if world areament among the nations continues on
its present scale.
+
The two things must go hand in hand. It
seems clear to me that if the nations cannagree on
armazent reduction, even if it be in the form of a
progressive reduction over a period of years, they
can far more effectively discuss practical instruments
for reduction of trade barriers, thus building up
employment in industry to take the place of employ-
ment in armament. and I recognise that as a part
of the discussion of increasing trade, every con-
sideration should be given to a more ready access
to raw materials' markets for those nations which in
themselves do not produce the raw materials necessary
to industry.
I am confident, my dear Duce, that you
share with me the fear that the trend of the present
international situation is ominous to peace. And I
am confident that you share with me the desire to
turn the course of the world toward stabilising
peace. I have often wished that I might talk with
you frankly and in person because from such a meet-
ing great good night come. But we both realise the
great difficulties that stand in the way - inter-
national difficulties as well as the distances of
the Atlantic Goean and the Nediterranean Sea.
I was very happy to learn that my youngest
son, John, had the privilege of meeting you last week.
I had charged him with conveying to you my very warm
regards. Some day you and I must and shall meet in
person.
Believe me, with every good wish,
Faithfully yours,
His Excellency
Signor Benito Mussolini,
Chief of the Government,
Rome, Italy.
P.S. This is your birthday and I send you wishes
for many happy returns of the day.
ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C.
mills
PSF Italy
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
In reply refer to
February 9, 1938
NE 865D.01/378
My dear Mr. McIntyre:
In accordance with the President's memorandum of
January 31, 1938, I am returning the letter of Janu-
ary 15 addressed to the President by Dr. W. C. Martin
on behalf of Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia.
The Department has instructed the Embassy at
London to make appropriate acknowledgment of Dr.
Martin's communication.
Sincerely A yours, Mills
Enclosure:
From Dr. Martin,
January 15, 1938.
The Honorable
Marvin H. McIntyre,
Secretary to the President,
The White House.
Department of State
BUREAU
NE
DIVISION
ENCLOSURE
TO
Letter drafted
ADDRESSED TO
The Honorable
Marvin H. McIntyre.
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
1-1088
TEL. KENSINGTON 7433.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FDR
5, PRINCE'S GATE,
S.W.7.
1938 JAN 30 PM 2 28
IMPERIAL ETHIOPIAN LEGATION
January 15th938.
LONDON
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS
President Franklin D. Roosevelt,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
Sir,
I have the honour to thank you heartily in the name of
His Majesty The Emperor of Ethiopia and the Ethiopian People for
your right and noble act in refusing to recognize the unjust and
precarious occupation and pretended sovereignty of the King of
Italy over the Ethiopian Empire.
Such a firm stand for international right and justice
on the part of the Head of the great American People is a great
encouragement for us and for all weak peoples and at noble example
to the world, and we have no doubt that perseverance in these vital
moral principles by the great democracies will in the end overcome
all difficulties and bring peace and security to the peoples of the
world.
I have the honour to be,
With the highest consideration,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
Wartin
d-1-30 WHITE HOUSE
PSF Italy
WASHINGTON
August 31, 1938.
C
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:
The following comes from a person who
actually has & somewhat intimate access to
Mussolini:
"On May 29th, Mussolini received
a telegram from Hitler saying that on
May 24th he had informed Henlein and also
Esterhazy (of Hungary) that they should lay
low for the moment to give Hitler the necessary
time of ten weeks to complete his defense line --
at which time Hitler would be ready to present
an ultimatum to Prague. At that time the "ring"
of Germany, Austria and Hungary would be ready
to act 8.8 a concerted unit. One item of the
ultimatum under consideration would be the
discharge of Benes by Czechoslovakia.
I merely pass this on to you. The informa-
tion was sent me early in July but only just
reached me. It is worth noting that ten weeks
from the end of May brings us approximately to
the early part of September.
F.D.R.
FDR/dj
Swayon
5. 1/11. 38.
confidented
her Dear - Before leav.
my Haly I wa asked tarry
you a Henage about a cer tain
matter Which undoubtedy has
abread Came Don attention
in Leveral ways So Dam Send-
the if along Ron as heing abso.
lately autherities - (so I wa
asker to tell Jan )- in case
any ane is landering has Much
truth there is in the suman
that on may the 29th more olini
in for had Hen lein & also 5
Say inj that on may I 24th
received a telep am from he Hi had then
(Wes is, I he lieve, the Hungariag
par lia mentary Spatter mar Jam
Slorakia in the Progue partichent),
& to Jether with them Har thy- to
Rielow for the mo ment, wing him
the recessary time of tea Treek
to Caup lete his defence line at
which time he lower he ready to
present an ulli atam Thogue
to act as a Can carted unit.
& which time the ning he heady
It Seems also in theair that
the of the / tem under Casi-
Deration hi this ultimation
Could he the Dihissia of Bene
(an they fay "Benes"S head
It Lae write at Lay ing, doesn't
ih?- that Benes power and fres
tige hifidet outfide his Country
Could he reg under as an obvide
handi cap to the lazy -realization
the Subcute program.
Haven in add tia to this alltoo.
loident of act- there has been of
fored a definite explanation
toward Bene which I have her
of the mitrolini antag Thisa
Toed is has being in ver tigated.
7 Caurse the in tes Jeetia
/perhaps one could say
A the British at that point hat ex-
ih Difficult Day nod & that-
actly part of the program. ) makes
each free plan # Her may
if will in flude ee or have amend been
formulating spaking until You, then I loor re-
quester to Keep in Kind that Those
who as Red the to do this there es-
pecially can eerned hat Loudon
auther tieits A this Hitler telegram
also he informed as to the undombled
to hurnolini- & here them Jelse Ch-
Deavoring to fet a reliable hers enger
through & Poud an - and although )
Said at the time I feet none of
this would he her lither Doe
or to Lowon - I was of cause
willing to pass the mess age along.
as for Rua the Centlal Suropean
moblect is, as ih always has been, Com-
pley & haffling I am foory the Cannot fit
then for it loneshe in tere, this the & loss cauforting Hen
Denelop meals there, X the background ofor
offer a cup of tea speaking of these later
in a way that
word cannot manage.
Butlan are, happil, At to a Der tinatia,
which promise to he nu eli wore fun.
program is hebical - that the holi-
Thope of the the trans Crutin ental
dog will he refres ling in every toog-
Always fairs Affectiaale
Dance C Gave
)
[Frances Crane ]
PSF Italy
THE COUNSELOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
file
WASHINGTON
September 22, 1938.
Dear Mr. President:
A question has been raised as to whether the
request should be met of those who are interested
to exempt from the payment of customs duties a
number of household furnishings that are being
brought in. from Italy to be used in a house that
is being provided in Washington by or under the
direction of the Vatican State. Assistant Secretary
Gibbons of the Treasury tells me that he will feel
justified in granting the request should the State
Department indicate to him that it will be glad to
see it granted as an act of international courtesy.
So far as I know, none of us here who have consider-
ed the matter perceive any objection to a note being
written to Mr. Gibbons on which he may base an order
exempting the articles, which I do not understand to
be of any considerable value, from the payment of
customs duties. When the matter was casually men-
tioned in a conversation with the Secretary yester-
day, he thought it would be well for me to bring it
to your attention, and therefore I am now doing this
in the hope that you can find time to have someone
telephone me as to whether or not you see any ob-
jection. Mr. Gibbons would like to know as soon as
possible what to do.
The suggested action would not imply any recog-
nation by our Government of the Vatican State.
Yours very sincerely,
The President,
The White House.
PSF. staly
President Roosevelt to the Chief of the Italian Government
(Mussolini), Washington, December 7, 1938.
(re: political refugees)
Published in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1938,
Volume I, General, pages 858-859.
RLJ 5/24/57