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The original documents are located in Box 7, folder "Science and Technology Adviser: May
1-21, 1975" of the White House Special Files Unit Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential
Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 7 of the White House Special Files Unit Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
MEMORANDUM
OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON
May 1, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
FROM: Roger W. Hooker, Jr.
Rust
Because of the apparent failure on the
part of the White House to come forth with a
plan to provide ongoing science and technology
advice to the President, Senator Kennedy intends
to schedule hearings in early June on S.32,
his bill to:
1. Establish a Council of Science Advisors
(similar to the Council of Economic Ad-
visors) in the White House.
CERALO FORD LIBRARY
2. Require the Council to recommend annual
levels of federal investment in R & D
and to indicate how such funds should be
allocated within broad categories.
3. Provide some money and technical assistance
to assure greater imput at the state and
local level from the science and technology
community.
According to Ellis Mottur, his principal
staff person in this area, Senator Kennedy:
1. Is not wedded to the S.32 approach.
2. Was encouraged and impressed by his
discussion with you on this subject some
weeks back,
3. but is concerned that nothing has emerged
from the White House.
THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEETING ON SCIENCE ADVISER
Tuesday, May 13, 1975
12:15 p.m. (30 mins.)
The Oval Office
From:
Jim Cannon Jane
I.
PURPOSE:
To resolve organizational issue on the
Science Adviser question.
II.
BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS AND PRESS PLAN
A. Background: In December, you asked the
Vice President to study this issue and report
to you. Since that time various options have
been recommended by the Vice President and
others. A paper identifying these options
is at Tab A.
B. Participants:
The Vice President
Don Rumsfeld
Jim Lynn
Jim Cannon
C. Press Plan:
Not to be announced.
A
4
4
THE WHITE
ACTION
WASHINGTON
April 24, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
JIM CANNON
June
SUBJECT:
Science and Technology
Adviser to the President
BACKGROUND:
Some time ago you requested a recommendation from the Vice Presi-
dent on a Science and Technology Adviser to the Administration.
The Vice President submitted a proposal, then conducted additional
research and submitted another proposal on March 3, 1975 (Tab I)
You then indicated an interest in having a study made of what pre-
vious Presidential science advisers had actually accomplished for
the Presidents they served. One outside analysis is at Tab II. An
evaluation by Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., who was the first adviser
to President Eisenhower and one of the best of all science advisers,
is at Tab III.
The 15-year record of the office indicates, in sum, that when a
Presidential science adviser had a clear and specific objective with-
in the President's broader goals, provided a wider range of solu-
tions for the President, and kept his own ambitions and ego in check,
he made great contributions to government and was a major political
asset.
The best example of the effectiveness of the Presidential scientific
apparatus came in the late Fifties, under President Eisenhower. It
met a visible need to catch up with the Russian space and missile
technological advances, gave a sense of confidence to the American
people, and thereby became a political plus for the President.
Today's need for scientific and technological advances to meet energy
needs appears to be somewhat analogous.
-2-
Any proposal for a Scientific Adviser would be a new spending pro-
gram, but it seems to me that it could be justified if it were related
closely to energy.
CONGRESSIONAL SITUATION
1.
Congress is likely to pass some kind of Science and Tech-
nology bill at this session. The House Committee on Science
and Technology is committed to passage of a bill creating
a Council of Advisers on Science and Technology in the Ex-
ecutive Office. On March 6, 1975 Representatives Teague
and Mosher introduced a comprehensive bill that would--
a)
write into law a national science policy,
b)
create a five-member Council of Advisers, with
a Chairman to be Science Adviser to the President,
c)
establish a Cabinet level Secretary of Research
and Technology Operations, and,
TOHD LIBRARY
d)
form a government corporation to promote public
use of research and development.
2.
Informal discussions with House Science and Technology Com-
mittee members and staff indicates that the House Committee
is flexible and wants to work with your staff on passage of a
bill that is acceptable to you. But it appears that Chairman
Teague's Committee does want the President and his Admin-
istration to have a strong, effective and visible scientific ad-
visory group.
3.
The Senate is likely to pass a Science and Technology bill
at least as extensive as the proposed House bill.
OPTIONS
Following are three options offered by the Vice President and a fourth
recommendation by Phil Buchen which have been staffed to your
senior staff for comments and recommendations. Their responses have
been summarized and are included with each option for your consid-
eration on the following pages.
OPTION #1
Description:
A three-member Council of Technology and Science Advisers with
up to 20 assistants.
Cost:
$2.5 - $5 million annually.
Arguments for:
Such an approach would be a substantial commitment that would
enable initiatives in a full range of subject areas. It would be well
received by the scientific and academic community and would prob-
ably satisfy Congress.
Arguments against:
It would be a large and costly operation and difficult to integrate
into the present White House Staff.
Recommend:
None
Agree
MR7
Disagree
OPTION #2
Description:
A single Director of Technology and Science with up to 17 assistants
as needed.
Cost:
Initial cost would be $1 - $1.5 million annually.
Arguments for:
A single director would provide a better reactive capacity and a
clearer identity. This option would probably be acceptable to Con-
gress, and would be less costly than what Congress is likely to
come up with. The staff would be easier to organize and integrate
than Option 1.
Arguments against:
Expenditures and staff additions are still large and the organization
could not be set up quickly.
Recommend:
Jim Cannon
"Since previous Presidential science advisers were
most effective in solving specific problems subject
to scientific and technological resolution, I would
recommend this option, with the Director speci-
fically directed to work with your energy group
toward reaching your energy independence goals.
But I think the spending could be scaled down. If
Russ Train
"An organization comparable to the former office of
Science and Technology, if established, could have
strong positive reactions throughout the scientific
and academic community. "
Ted Marrs
"With a larger budget this office would be a poten-
tially, highly productive function which can pay
its way - if properly managed - by savings through
selectivity and coordination of scientific activities. "
Russ Peterson
"Important for President to have a separate and
direct input from a scientific adviser; thus, a single
person rather- than a Council."
987
Agree
Disagree
With
OPTION #3
Description:
A Science and Technology adviser with up to three assistants.
Cost:
$100,00 - $200,00 annually.
Arguments for:
Extremely simple approach whose cost would be relatively minor and
such an effort could be in place quickly. Only administrative action
would be required.
Arguments against:
BLEGRO
This approach would have limited capability in terms of issues it could
deal with on its own and thus would have to rely almost exclusively on
outside resources. It probably would not preclude further action by
Congress.
Recommend:
Jack Marsh
"This group could get cracking quickly and instead
of trying to become the big problem solvers them-
selves, could draw on the manifold sources already
in place in a dozen existing agencies. II
Bob Goldwin
"Should avoid establishing one more operative group
within the White House. There is already a vast sci-
entific enterprise in America but the President does
need to be advised and informed by an S & T Adviser.
However, three assistants are too low, just as sev-
enteen would be too many II
Frank Zarb
"Appointment of a Science Adviser, but with a small
staff, would draw favorable response from the sci-
ence community, the Congress and the public at
large. "
Alan Greenspan
"Recommends this option but holds out for the pos-
sibility of a more elaborate apparatus at some future
time pending further evaluation and review. "
Paul O'Neill
Supports this option, with comments (Tab IV).
Max Friedersdorf Supports this option.
Agree
MR7
Disagree
RECOMMENDED BY PHIL BUCHEN
Description:
The appointment of a Scientific and Technology Liaison Adviser to
the President who would serve simply as a point of contact between
the Administration and the Scientific community.
Cost:
Minimal (no dollar estimate)
Arguments for:
A simple step which could be taken immediately at little cost. It would
be understood as having no substantive responsibility other than
liaison and as a point of contact and therefore would not create false
expectations.
Arguments against:
Would probably not satisfy Congress and might be viewed in the sci-
entific community as no more than a token effort.
Recommend:
Phil Buchen
"The subject matter of science and technology is
much too diverse to make feasible a substantive
advisory role with anything less than the kind of
staff indicated by Option 1. Since substantive
advice is normally provided through the expertise
of the departments and agencies who, if there is
need on occasion for an additional viewpoint, can
bring an appropriate outside adviser to the Pres-
ident -- not to formulate any in-house White House
position on the subject. "
Bill Seidman
"The S & T proposal falls under the umbrella of
no new spending programs, and every effort
should be made to hold the line against unneces-
sary expenditures as well as the appearance of
a new spending program. A White House staff
member designated to undertake liaison with the
already existing National Science Foundation
seems adequate. Another layer of bureaucracy
is not needed.'
Agree
1223
Disagree
a
THE VICE PRESIDENT
"
WASHINGTON
"
March 3, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
The Vice President
har
SUBJECT:
Re-establishing a Science and Technology
Advisory Apparatus in the Executive Office
of the President
This is in response to your request for a memorandum concerning
the re-establishment of a science and technology advisory apparatus
in the Executive Office of the President.
INDEX
Tab A - Problem
Tab B - Background
Tab C - Functions
Tab D - Structure
Option 1 - Creation of a Council of Technology
and Science Advisers
Option 2 - Creation of an Office of Technology
and Science
Option 3 - Appointment of a Science and Technology
Adviser to the President
TAB A.
PROBLEM
The dissolution of the science advisory structure in
the White House in 1973 was greeted with great dismay
by the scientific community. Pressure is growing
steadily from scientific community leaders for action
to restore some science presence in the White House.
A June 1974 report by a special committee of the
National Academy of Sciences, recommending the crea-
tion of a Council on Science and Technology in the
Executive Office of the President, has heightened this
pressure and has made likely Congressional action to
re-establish some kind of scientific and technical
policy organization in the Executive Office of the
President.
TAB B.
BACKGROUND
President Truman
The concept of providing scientific and technical advice
directly to the President in a formal way was initiated
by President Truman in 1951. The Scientific Advisory
Committee in the Office of Defense Mobilization met
occasionally with the President and, in spite of its
location in the Department of Defense, had direct access
to the President. President Truman, himself, recognized
this function of the group and dealt with them as
personal advisers.
President Eisenhower
The "Sputnik" crisis of 1957 created a political situa-
tion that made it advisable to locate a scientific
advisory structure in the White House itself. Accordingly,
the scientific advisory function which was located in
the Office of Defense Mobilization was moved to the
White House and greatly expanded. An official with
the title of Science Adviser to the President was
appointed and a President's Science Advisory Committee
was established.
The President's Science Adviser also served as Chairman
of the new interagency Federal Council on Science and
Technology, which took over the function of coordinating
all of the scientific research and technical develop-
ment going on with the Federal Government.
President Kennedy
In 1962, under a reorganization measure of the Executive
Branch, President Kennedy created a large staff office
in the White House under the Science Adviser to assist
in advising the President and in overseeing the
burgeoning Federal responsibility for science and
technology. This office, called the Office of Science
and Technology, also served as the staff arm of the
President's Science Advisory Committee.
The Office of Science and Technology and the President's
Science Advisory Committee were remarkably successful
in heightening the overall interest in scientific and
technical developments among the various Departments
of the Federal government. In fact, their creation
sparked the establishment of line offices in charge of
scientific research and development in all of the
operating Departments of the Federal government.
Through the early and middle 1960s, the Office of
Science and Technology enjoyed a fairly prominent
position in the White House, as the space and defense
programs dominated the national scene. As the
national focus shifted to the economic and social
problems of the late Sixties, however, the role of
the Office of Science and Technology in national policy
formulation became less clear and its influence in
the White House less substantial.
President Nixon
During the late Sixties and the early Seventies, the
Office of Science and Technology became more and more
of a "special pleader" for its science constituency --
advocating positions and ideologies not always
consistent with Administration policy. Instead of
serving to advise the President, the Office of Science
and Technology often became his critic.
Finally, in July 1973, President Nixon abolished the
position of Science Adviser, the Office of Science and
Technology and the President's Science Advisory Committee.
The functions of the Science Adviser were given to the
Director of the National Science Foundation and those
of the Office of Science and Technology and the
President's Science Advisory Committee transferred to
the National Science Foundation in civilian areas and
the National Security Council in military areas.
Although many scientists viewed the dissolution of
the science advisory structure in the White House as
purely politically motivated, there were several good
reasons for making some kind of change.
1. By the early 1970s, virtually all Federal
Departments had developed their own scientific
and technical arms. This significantly
lessened the need for a large scientific and
technical staff in the White House (which,
after all, had no line functions).
2. The failure of the Office of Science and
Technology's staff to relate to the White
House policy formulating procedure made it
difficult to integrate that Office's
recommendations with those of other advisory
functions in the White House. Therefore, as
emerging national problems began to include
components other than "hard" technology,
the Office of Science and Technology became
less effective and useful in contributing
to Presidential-level decision-making.
3. As the Office of Science and Technology's
allegiance to its constituency grew, its
effectiveness in serving the President
diminished.
FORD & LIBRARY 938839
TAB C.
FUNCTIONS
The scientific community is now generally united in the belief
that the President should have available to him an independent
source of scientific and technological judgment on a wide range
of areas, including:
-- social and behavioral sciences;
-- physical and life sciences;
-- medicine;
-- engineering;
-- international aspects of science and technology;
-- science and technology in the private sector;
-- education and training of scientific manpower.
They have pointed out that a White House science and technology
advisory apparatus could perform the following vital functions:
1. Advising the President in the formulation and review
of national policies in areas involving science and
technology development. Energy, transportation,
environmental planning, health care delivery and food
supply are examples of these.
2. Providing technical advice for the President and his
staff, including the Domestic Council, the Council of
Economic Advisers, and the Office of Management
and Budget, on specific issues and questions dealing
with science and technology.
3. Working with the Federal Council on Science and
Technology in coordinating the large existing in-house
capability of the Federal government in scientific
and technological research and development. There
are approximately 100,000 people employed in Federal
research and development establishments, and it is
important to see that this large and sophisticated
work force is properly and effectively employed.
4. Identifying and reporting on gaps in scientific
research and technological developments in the
public and private sector and initiating studies
where appropriate.
5. Providing the President with "early warning" of
problems, opportunities or developments that have
a scientific or technological component, including
some longer-range forecasting of such problems,
opportunities and developments.
6. Consulting with the President on the appointments
of various scientific and technical officials in the
Federal agencies.
FORD & LIBRARY GERATE
Moreover, the scientific community is now in full agreement
that the proper function of such an advisory apparatus is to
advise and service the President -- not to be public advocates.
TAB D.
STRUCTURE
OPTION 1. CREATION OF A COUNCIL OF TECHNOLOGY
AND SCIENCE ADVISERS
The President could propose legislation creating a 3-member
Council of Technology and Science Advisers in the Executive
Office of the President. The Council would be similar in
function to the Council of Economic Advisers. The members
of the Council would be appointed by the President from among
the different disciplines in the science and technology fields.
The Chairman of the Council would also serve as the President's
Technology and Science Adviser.
(VARIATION: Some have proposed creation of a 7-member
Council, composed of four Presidential appointees and the
Presidents of the National Academy of Science, the National
GERALE
Academy of Engineering and the Institute of Medicine serving
ex officio. )
STAFFING: The Council's staff would consist of an Executive
Assistant to the Chairman and a number of professional assist-
ants (15-20) and supporting clerical staff. The Council would
also be authorized to establish ad hoc committees composed of
governmental and/or non-governmental experts to do in-depth
analyses of selected problems and issues.
FISCAL IMPLICATIONS: $2. 5 - $5 million annually.
ARGUMENTS FOR:
In essence, this is the approach embodied in the
"Kennedy bill" passed by the Senate last year. It
incorporates the recommendation of the National
Academy of Science's special committee, and is
fully responsive to the scientific community's
demands.
-2-
This assures greater depth in the science and
technology advisory apparatus and greater repre-
sentation and input from the various disciplines in
the science and technology field.
This would ensure an ongoing structure in the
Executive Office of the President fully capable of
rendering scientific and technological advice or
performing such other related responsibilities as
the President may assign to it.
The authority to create ad hoc groups permits
tapping of the resources of the scientific community.
ARGUMENTS AGAINST:
LIBRARY seas
This structure might be difficult to integrate into
the existing White House operation.
It is more susceptible to "politization" both as to
its internal operation (with each of the three members
representing the views of his own constituency) and
as to its relationship with the Administration (because
of the structural autonomy of a council).
-- It would result in a visible increase in the size and
budget of the White House.
;
This structure is larger than is necessary to meet
the problem and is also unwieldy.
OPTION 2. CREATION OF AN OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
AND SCIENCE
The President could propose legislation creating an Office of
Technology and Science in the Executive Office of the President.
The Director of the office would be a highly qualified scientist
appointed by the President, who would serve also as the
President's Technology and Science Adviser.
STAFFING: In addition to the Director, the office would have
a Deputy Director (for administration) and, as is required
-- up to five Assistant Directors (for various specialties);
--
up to twelve professional assistants; and
-- supporting clerical staff.
The Director would also be empowered to establish ad hoc
committees composed of governmental and/or nongovernmental
experts to do in-depth analyses of selected problems and issues.
FISCAL IMPLICATIONS: $1 - $1.5 million annually.
ARGUMENTS FOR:
-- This is largely responsive to the legitimate demands
of the scientific community and could, therefore, be
expected to satisfy the Congress.
-- It assures to the President and his staff the avail-
ability of a broad range of scientific and technical
expertise. This would be tremendously useful to
the Domestic Council, the Council of Economic
Advisers, the Office of Management and Budget,
et al.
-2-
-- This structure will help to assure the development
of an ongoing scientific and technological capacity
in the Executive Office of the President.
-- The authority to create ad hoc groups permits tapping
of the resources of the scientific community.
-- This structure is sufficiently flexible to permit
growth of in-house capacity when and as necessary.
ARGUMENTS AGAINST:
-- This would involve Congressional action to implement
(and, of course, to undo).
-- There are those who feel that this would unduly
increase the size of the President's staff.
-- Some contend that the need for a science and
technology capacity in the White House does not
justify the creation of an office.
OPTION 3. APPOINTMENT OF A SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
ADVISER TO THE PRESIDENT
The President could, by administrative action, appoint a full-time
Science and Technology Adviser to the President to serve on the
White House staff.
STAFFING: The Science and Technology Adviser would be author-
ized a few (1-3) professional assistants and supporting clerical
staff, but would otherwise have to rely on National Science Founda-
tion professional staff for support.
FISCAL IMPLICATIONS: $100,000 - $200,000 annually.
LIBRARY
ARGUMENTS FOR:
-- This could be accomplished by administrative act of the
President.
-- It would relieve some of the pressure for Congressional
action on this issue.
-- This would make available to the President and his staff
at least some independent scientific and technological
expertise.
-- This would be relatively inexpensive and would not
significantly increase the size of the President's staff.
ARGUMENTS AGAINST:
-- This approach would satisfy neither the scientific
community nor the Congress and, therefore, it could
not be expected to avert independent Congressional
action on the issue.
-- It is doubtful whether, under this structure, the Science
and Technology Adviser could "cover the waterfront."
Therefore, pressure to increase the size and scope of
this apparatus will continue.
This structure is not suitable for the development of an
on-going scientific and technological capacity in the
White House.
This structure is not suitable for tapping the resources
of the scientific community on an interim basis since
the Science and Technology Adviser would not be
empowered to create ad hoc panels for special research
purposes.
PRESIDENTIAL DECISION
Proceed with further development of:
Option 1
Option 2
Discuss
Option 3 Jm Jan
TT
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 18, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
JIM CANNON Jul
SUBJECT:
Contributions of Science Advisers to
Previous Presidents
SUMMARY:
The Presidential scientific apparatus was a
splendid tool in the early days under President Eisenhower.
It met a visible need to catch up with the Russians, and
was an important political plus for the President.
But in time, the scientists corrected the specific
weaknesses that had at first made them necessary. Then
their proposals became more diffuse, and seemed directed at
preventing ills that had not yet materialized e.g., food
and energy. Thus they lost out to greater demands within
the White House for solutions to problems that were
immediate and pressing. To make matters worse, the
scientific community became politicized during the Vietnam
war, and was perceived as critical and unfriendly.
The 15-year record of the office indicates that
when a Presidential science adviser supported the
President's goals, broadened his range of solutions,
and kept his ego and ambitions in check, he made great
contributions to government and was a major political asset.
EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION
James Killian of MIT became science adviser to
President Eisenhower in 1957 and was later succeeded by
George Kistiakowski, a Harvard chemist. This was
probably the most effective and influential period
for science advisers.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS:
1. Following SPUTNIK, helped assure the
U. S. public that the country's missile
and space program was in good hands and
moving ahead.
2. Prompted creation of National Aeronautics
and Space Administration.
- 2 -
3. Provided the scientific basis for
President Eisenhower's proposal which
ultimately resulted in the 1963 test ban
treaty.
4. Made a major impact on the ICBM program,
including emphasis on solid fuel rockets.
5. Accelerated the development of a ballistic
missile early warning system and anti-
submarine capabilities.
6. Assisted in advancing photo reconnaissance
by satellite.
7. Helped make available scientific and
technical information for dealing with
such problems as food additives and
environmental health.
8.
Helped strengthen programs for the
education of U. S. scientists and
engineers.
9. Through the respect and prestige they
commanded, Killian and George Kistiakowski,
helped reassure a shaken public that the
U. S. ballistic missile and space programs
would close the "technological gap" between
the U. S. and Soviet Union.
PROBLEMS:
No major problems other than some criticism of
their focus. on defense and space-related questions.
KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION
Dr. Jerry Wiesner of MIT was President Kennedy's
science adviser. Some of the successes and most of
the problems of this period were a product of Wiesner's
personal and his assertive attempts to seek a bigger and
bigger role in government decision making.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS:
1. Provided valuable guidance leading to
the rejection of a number of Pentagon
proposals which subsequent research
has shown would have indeed been mistakes.
e.g. the Dynasoar space plane.
П
- 3 -
2. Introduced interests beyond space and
defense and focused on many other areas
of government scientific research such
as health.
PROBLEMS:
1. Bitter public debates with NASA over
techniques to be used in moon landing, which
became a personal struggle between Wiesner
and Wernher von Braun.
2. Alienated the scientific community by high-
handed attitude and suspicion that he was
ambitious to become the "Czar" of American
science.
3. Criticism of the Defense Department. For
example, he boasted that he could make a better
evaluation of defense development projects than
Secretary McNamara.
4. Expanded his authority to the point that
he was attempting simultaneously to be an
unbiased and impartial staff adviser as well
as director of a scientific operations unit
advocating specific programs.
JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION:
President Johnson's adviser was Donald Hornig, a
chemist from Princeton. Hornig has a stormy and unfriendly
relationship with the President and therefore appears to
have had very little influence on policy.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS:
1. Instituted many siginificant long-range
studies, e.g. the potential of the
oceans; the world food problem; restoring
the environment.
2. In 1965 conducted the first major assessment
of the U. S. energy situation.
- 4 -
PROBLEMS:
1. Despite the predictive merit of his
proposals, Hornig had little impact because
he had no access to the President and little
standing within the White House staff.
2. As the Viet Nam war expanded, the scientific
communitie's mounting opposition to the war
made it even more difficult for Hornig to
serve as an adviser.
FORD
NIXON ADMINISTRATION:
LIBRARY
Lee DuBridge was President Nixon's first science
adviser and was succeeded by Ed David of Bell Laboratories
in 1970. The decline of influence which began during the
Johnson Administration accelerated until 1972, when President
Nixon abolished the science adviser.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS:
1. Attempted to develop practical applications
of science research.
PROBLEMS:
1. Presidential Science Advisory Committee
strongly and publicly opposed SST
proposal at a time when the Administration
was actively seeking support for the SST.
2. Acquired a reputation within the White
House for generating proposals to spend
more Federal money.
3. Scientific community regarded Ed David
as lacking credentials because of his
background as an engineer.
JAMES R. KILLIAN, JR.
77 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02139
March 20, 1975
The Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller
Vice President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D. C.
My dear Mr. Vice President:
In response to your request, I have
prepared the attached list of some of the contributions
to Presidential policy-making in the Eisenhower
administration made by the Special Assistant for
Science and Technology and the President's Science
Advisory Committee. At the beginning of this list,
I have summarized the longer statement which
follows. In listing these contributions made during
the period when I was a participant, may I express
some personal views bearing on the study you are
making of proposed science advisory arrangements.
I fully recognize that present circumstances
differ from those of the Eisenhower years both in the
organization of the Presidential staff machinery and in
the diversity and complexity of the issues faced by the
President.
President Eisenhower looked to his science
advisory mechanism for assistance in the national
defense area and for supporting the work of the
National Security Council. I am aware that the
National Security Council now has staff competence
and consultant panels which are providing a tech-
nological dimension to the examination of national
security issues. These did not exist in the Eisenhower
period. This arrangement appears to be working
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effectively and to have the confidence of the Special
Assistant for National Security Affairs. I personally
do not recommend that these arrangements be
supplanted by a new science and technology advisory
mechanism but I do feel that the proposals for the
new mechanism are no less essential because these
NSC panels exist. The existing NSC arrangements
have a national security policy focus on a very limited
number of problems, and J. am convinced that there
are important issues involved in assuring a healthy
scientific and technological foundation for military
research and development, and the preposals of the
National Academy Committee are directed toward
providing this foundation.
I am also convinced that the scientific and
technical feasibility and soundness of major weapons
systems developments evaluated by objective panels
of the proposed advisory mechanism could serve the
needs of the President and the Office of Management
and Budget as well as the National Security Council
as the NSC might request. In my view it would be a
mistake to exclude the Science Adviser from the
national security area and from the deliberations and
studies of the National Security Council because of the
inseparability of policy and program considerations
and the special perspective and judgments that a
science advisory group could contribute to Presidential-
level discussion of national security issues.
In the Domestic Council area there is, of
course, muth greater emphasis on problems in the
civilian sector, where developments in science and
technology in many instances offer the best hope of
long-term solutions. The existence of the
Domestic Council means that there is a focus for
scientific and technological assessments of domestic
problems and an opportunity to couple scientific and
technological considerations with economic, sociological,
institutional, and political factors, all of which must
11
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be brought to bear in developing options for Presi-
dential consideration. The effectiveness of the
Special Assistant for Science and Technology in
the national security area in past years was in no
small measure attributable to the existence of the
National Security Council as a mechanism for
assuring serious consideration of scientific studies.
In the latter days of the Special Assistants
and the President's Science Advisory Committee
many of the excellent, farseeing studies which were
made by the advisory setup were not systematically
considered and followed up because there was no
mechanism such as the Domestic Council and its
staff to receive and assess them. During the
Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations
there were numerous important studies made by
PSAC and its panels which dealt with environmental
matters, energy policy, and the world food problem
which could have been of great value to the adminis-
tration in the formulation of policy and the taking
of initiative in areas that later came to be of great
national concern. There was a national loss in the
fact that these farseeing studies did not receive
the necessary follow-through attention.
In making these observations, I am
mindful of the arguments that by strengthening the
scientific and technical capabilities of the National
Security Council, the Domestic Council, and the
Office of Management and Budget, there may be
less need for a separate White House level science
and technology mechanism and that a separate
mechanism might have difficulty in relating its
scientific and technological analyses to the issues
as they are perceived by those staff agencies.
These arguments were carefully examined by the
National Academy of Sciences Committee on Science
and Technology, which I chaired. The membership
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of that Committee included a former Assistant
Director of the Office of Management and Budget
and a former member of the Council of Economic
Advisers, both of whom were experienced in the
operations of the White House staff. It was the
strongly held view of the Committee that the
scientific and technical capabilities of the National
Security Council, Domestic Council, and OMB
should be strengthened and by so doing there would
be a more effective interaction achieved and a two-
way coupling between those offices and a new
science and technology mechanism. The new
mechanism proposed can look at the totality of the
nation's scientific and technical resources in rela-
tion to national needs and by having this broader
view, can help to offset a fragmented approach
occasioned by the differing missions of the execu-
tive agencies, both at operating and Presidential
staff levels.
The reasons supporting the establish-
ment of a new science and technology mechanism
have been intensively treated in the National
Academy and other excellent reports and articles
in the past year. My interest in making the for-
going observations is to emphasize a few points
arising out of the discussions which were prompted
by the Academy report.
I am in full accord with the comments
made by President Handler of the National Academy
of Sciences when he wrote you recently emphasizing
that the mission of the new science and technology
advisory mechanism which has been proposed shoul d
be to serve the needs of the President. "It should, "
as he wrote, "not be a privileged means to represent
special interests of the scientific and technological
communities. Nor should it be a privileged advocate
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for science and technology per se. To be useful,
its analyses must recognize the essential inter-
dependence of science, technology and fiscal,
economic, social, political, and institutional
factors in developing policy alternatives."
I am grateful for this opportunity to
provide supplemental information and to recall the
many ways in which the scientific mechanism
established by President Eisenhower served him
and successive Presidents and assisted greatly
in the formulation of sound national policies.
Yours respectfully,
Jime J. R. Killian, Jr.
JRK:cp
enclosure
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503
MAR 7 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR: JIM CANNON
FROM:
Paul O'Neill
Ohem
SUBJECT:
Science Advisory Options Memorandum from
the Vice President
I have reviewed the draft memorandum to the President con-
cerning the reestablishment of a science advisory apparatus
in the Executive Office of the President.
I am concerned that the problem statement does not seem to
be related to the arguments presented for the three options.
The only motivation given in the description of the problem
is one of the constituent pressure by the scientific com-
munity. If that is the only problem we are concerned with,
then it seems to me the options should be measured by that
criterion and by that criterion alone. If on the other hand,
we want to assert that there is a substantive problem as
well, we should specify the problem as clearly as possible
(with examples, perhaps) and show how each option would help
to solve the "problem."
Second, I believe the range of options in the draft could be
usefully expanded. Options 1 and 2 are virtually identical
except for the multi-headed nature of the Council described
in option 1 and the difference in funding for contractor and
consultant support (i.e., $1.0-1.5 VS. $2.5-5 million). Be-
yond this, no options are presented which either strengthen
or build upon the present apparatus or which might seek to
integrate a science advisory apparatus into an existing
Executive Office organization (the Domestic Council).
Third, I am concerned about the way some of the arguments
for and against each of the options is presented. For ex-
ample, it seems to me, use of such descriptions as "tremendously
useful" and such judgmental terms as "unduly" belong in a
recommendation section of the paper so that, as nearly as
possible, we separate value judgments from facts.
Furthermore, the arguments are not presented consistently
from one option to another. Specifically, all the arguments
2
cited for and against option 1 are equally valid for option 2.
For example, the need for congressional action for implemen-
tation is cited as an argument against option 2 although it
is also true for option 1. Also, the argument of difficulty
of integration of science advice in broader policy issues
and the susceptibility to "politization," which are cited as
arguments against option 1, are equally valid arguments against
option 2.
In sum, it is my view that the options paper put together
a few weeks ago (see copy attached) was extremely well done
and balanced. I would recommend strongly that you replace
the options section of the present memorandum with something
close to that version. I would be happy to discuss.
Attachment
L
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
February 12, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
JIM CAVANAUGH
SUBJECT:
Science and Technology in the Executive
Office of the President
This memorandum (a) identifies arguments for and against the science
advisory arrangements recommended by the Vice President's staff,
(b) discusses and assesses other alternatives, and (c) recommends an
alternative plan for assuring that adequate scientific and technical advice
is available for you and your advisers.
Background
The Vice President's staff recommendations (Tab A) call for the creation
by law of an Office of Technology and Science (OTS) in the Executive Office
of the President, with the head of the office also designated as the
President's science and technology adviser. In addition to the Director,
there would be a deputy, five assistant directors, up to 12 professional
staff, and additional supporting staff. The Director and office would be
assisted by ad hoc panels of experts from outside the government.
The recommended arrangements are quite comparable to the science
advisory apparatus which was abolished in July 1973 which included the
Office of Science and Technology, with the Director designated as Science
Adviser, and the President's Science Advisory Committee which included
experts from outside the government. In 1973 the civilian functions were
transferred to the National Science Foundation and its Director has
served as Science Adviser.
Except for the single Director rather than a three member Council as the
leadership, the Vice President's staff recommendations are like those
recommended in June 1974 by a National Academy of Sciences Committee
chaired by James Killian and provided for in a bill passed last November
by the Senate (the Kennedy bill). There are a number of advantages and
disadvantages of this proposal, and there are other alternatives that
warrant consideration.
- 2 -
Critical Considerations
Critical considerations that bear upon a decision on science advisory
FORD is 078330 LIBRARY
arrangements include:
1.
Integration of staff advice. There are few problems and issues
requiring Presidential or Executive Office attention that involve only
scientific and technical considerations. A group limited primarily to
scientists and engineers is not well equipped to deal with other perti-
nent considerations -- economic, social, legal, political, intergovern-
mental, etc. Thus, the output of a scientific and technical group, even
if it reports to the President, must be integrated with the work of others
to provide a full analysis of a problem or issue and a full range of
alternatives -- not limited to scientific and technical alternatives.
2. Focus of special purpose offices. Past experience with special
purpose offices in the Executive Office indicates that they tend to
become "special pleaders" or advocates for particular alternatives
or programs, thus making more difficult the job of reaching balanced
decisions among competing interests. For example, they advocate
programs which involve additional funding for their constituancy.
3. Scientific community views. Pressure is growing steadily from
scientific community leaders for action to restore some science
presence in the White House. Arguments are often more emotional
than substantive. (If not resolved this year, the subject could even
be a campaign issue for scientists in 1976.)
4.
Congressional action. There is a good chance that Congress will act
on its own initiative this year to create some new Executive Office
organization.
Alternatives
There are four principal alternatives that have been advanced for
organizing scientific and technical advice.
Alt. #1 Propose legislation to create an Office of Technology and Science
(as recommended in the Vice President's staff report, Tab A)
Arguments for:
Would be fully responsive to the scientific and technical
community.
Would defuse the pressures in Congress to mandate their
solution.
- 3
Having independent scientific and technical advice immediately
available could be useful on occasions.
Arguments against:
As in the case of the arrangements existing prior to July 1973,
there will be problems of integrating the work of this single
purpose group with other elements of the Executive Office.
Reestablishes the special interest problem.
Would add substantially. to the White House staff and would
be costly.
Would be viewed as Administration endorsement of Senator
Kennedy's bill. Establishes a permanent and rigid structure.
Alt. #2 Continue the existing arrangements, wherein the Director of NSF
also serves as Science Adviser. Or strengthen it with a formal
Science Adviser to the President designation and involve him in
more issues, perhaps through Presidential assignment.
Arguments for:
White House scientific oversight is less important now than
in the 1950's and 1960's, because line agencies and NSF are
much better staffed to deal with technical considerations.
The Science Adviser can devote more staff and funding
resources to the function since he can draw upon all NSF
resources.
The Science Adviser has functioned principally as an adviser
to the OMB. His advice is integrated with other inputs --
avoiding the "special pleader" problem.
Arguments against:
The arrangement is not satisfactory to the scientific community
which has complained of three principal weaknesses:
- The Science Adviser is not involved in national defense
issues, thus there is essentially no scientific and technical
review from outside DOD. (In fact, NSC established in 1973
a scientific advisory apparatus consisting of technical staff
and 25 technical consultants. )
- The Science Adviser is too far removed from the President.
- The Science Adviser has a "conflict of interest" in that he
must seek and defend before OMB NSF's request for R&D
funds while also evaluating R&D requests of other agencies.
Elements of the Executive Office other than OMB have received
relatively little help from the Science Adviser.
The selection of this alternative will probably result in
legislation such as the Kennedy bill.
n
- 1 -
Alt. #3 Appoint a Science Adviser to the President on the White House
staff. Provide him with a few (1 to 3) professional assistants
and expect him to draw upon scientific and technical expertise
in agencies and from non-Federal ad hoc committees -- much
the way Bob Goldwin functions with the academic community.
The Science Adviser would continue to draw upon NSF for staff
support. NSC's existing staff and advisory group would be
continued and would work closely with the Science Adviser.
Arguments for:
Provides a "science presence" in the White House.
Provides additional expertise for addressing critical issues
that involve scientific and technical considerations.
Avoids institutionalizing another large special purpose staff.
Arguments against:
This limited arrangement may not be adequate to satisfy the
scientific community (c. g., it might not meet the criticism
that the President needs technical advice independent of NSC
and DOD on defense matters) or head off Congressional
action.
Once created, pressure may still be strong to expand it to a
full-blown office or council.
The Science Adviser may become a special interest advocate.
Alt. #4 Expand significantly and restructure the policy analysis capability
of the Executive Office of the President by creating a more broadly
based analytical or planning group which includes scientific and
engineering experts.
Arguments for:
The policy analysis and long range planning capabilities of the
Executive Office are not adequate and should be expanded.
Scientific and technical expertise should be integrated with
other parts of the policy analysis and decision making structure.
Arguments against:
This would involve rethinking and restructuring the roles of
OMB, NSC and Domestic Council and has not been developed
adequately to permit serious consideration at this time.
Such expanded White House-Executive Office capability probably
would be opposed on the Hill and by line agencies.
Probably would not be acceptable to the scientific community
which tends to view integration of its advice at some level below
the President as de facto subordination of scientific advice.
IT
- 5 -
Recommendation
From the standpoint of substantive contribution to improve decisions, I
do not believe that it is necessary to provide new scientific and technical
capability in the White House or Executive Office. However, the growing
pressures from the scientific community and the Congress are compelling
reasons for some action. I believe Alternative #3 (Science Adviser with
small staff) is the best course of action and recommend that you direct that
further development of this alternative be undertaken. I also recommend
that you meet with leaders of the community before deciding a course of
action.
Brent Scowcroft, Jim Lynn (Paul O'Neill), Phil Areeda and Phil Buchen
also recommend Alternative #3.
Decision
Proceed with the development of a detailed proposal to:
Create an Office of Technology and Science (Alt. #1)
Strengthen existing arrangcments (Alt. #2)
Appoint a Science Adviser with limited staff (Alt. #3)
Explore further the development of a broad policy
analysis capability (Alt. #4)
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND THE
PRESIDENT'S EXECUTIVE OFFICE
Recommendations
February 5, 1975
February 5, 1975
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND
THE PRESIDENT'S EXECUTIVE OFFICE
Recommendations
1.
There should be a scientific and technological
capability directly available to the President
(a) Many issues that come to the President, either
for decision or for initiative, involve science
and technology, sometimes to a very high degree,
in the analytical and judgmental process.
(b) While the federal departments and agencies have,
and should have, scientific and technological
of high quality. the President should
have available to him an independent source of
scientific and technological judgment of the very
highest quality. The organization set up to pro-
vide such a source for the President must not be,
or be perceived as, the representative of the
scientific and technical community in the
President's office.
(c) While the present need for such a capability is
clear, in our complex and technologically varied
society, the need to draw upon science and
technology to meet urgent problems and oppor-
tunities will be even greater in the decades ahead.
11
2.
This caoability should be lodged in
an Office of Technology and Science
(a) fill Office of Technology and Science should be
established by Congressional action and should
be headed by a Director who should also have the
title of Science and Technology Advisor to the
President.
(b) An Office, better than a single Advisor, or a
Council or Committee of: Advisors, can
--- cover the full range of necessary competence
without seeming to subordinate one area to another;
-- interact with (and "translate" the reports of)
ad hoc expert task forces of consultants drawn
from a variety of disciplines in and out of
science and technology;
-- call on and utilize the best scientific,
technological and professional talents in the
country for specific tasks relevant to the
President's responsibilites;
-- resist the pressures to make the President's
Science Advisor the "spokesman for science and
technology" as distinguished from the President's
need for scientific competence in meeting his
national responsibilities.
of Technology and Science should be principally.
Note: Not all of the following activities need
be undertaken at the outset. The func-
tions of the Office should be allowed
to grow as the President may require,
as relationships with the departments
and agencies of government develop,
and as emerging national programs,
policies and issues may make desir-
able and useful. ]
(a) To respond on scientific and technical matters
to requests from the President with respect to
issues that are before him for decision, or
new initiatives.
(b) To help the President resolve conflicting
advice involving scientific matters that come
to the President from departments, agencies
or the Congress.
(c) To organize ad hoc panels of consultants to
assist in the collection and evaluation of
relevant data with respect to particular
technical and scientific issues.
The membership of such panels would be
drawn from the special competence available
in the private and public sectors including
universities, the National Academies, industry,
and government laboratories.
(a) To provide the President with early warning
of either
-- opportunities, or
-- problems
that have a scientific or technological com-
ponent, including some longer range forecasting
of such opportunities, problems or developments.
(e) To identify and report on any gaps in scientific
research and technological development in the
public or private sectors that merit attention.
(f) To consult with the President on the appoint-
ments of various scientific and technical
officials in the federal agencies.
(g) To stay in contact with the professional staffs
of the federal departments and agencies, and of
state and local governments, as well as with
private sector organizations involved in science
and technology.
(h) To be available for participation in reviews
of policies and programs of the departments
and agencies having technical responsibilities
and thus to assist in the formulation of national
policy on technical and scientific matters.
(i) To assist the Domestic Council, the National
Security Council and the OMB in reviewing de-
department and agency programs that have techni-
cal and scientific content.
(j) To have a modest budget to initiate analyses'
and studies in support of: the ad hoc panels
mentioned in subparagraph (c) above. These
analyses and studies would be performed in
universities, private industry or federally
supported institutions.
4.
Organization of the Office
(a)
The full-time Director of the Office should
serve at the pleasure of the President.
(b)
The Director should have a full-time deputy
responsible for the administration of the
Office who need not be a scientist.
(c)
There should be provision for a flexible number
of full-time Assitant Directors (up to five)
so as to cover a decent range of professional
disciplines without trying for "reprosentation"
of every professional discipline or interest.
and to respond to the possible growth in
Presidential needs for special competence.
(d)
Provision should bc made for a flexible number
of full-time professionally qualified staff
(up to a dozen) as well as a clerical staff
to meet the responsibilities of the Office
as they may develop.
(e)
The ad hoc advisory panels (mentioned in para-
graph 3 above) which are central to the effective
functioning of the Office should:
R
(i) be exempt from the Federal Advisory
Committee Act.
Frank and objective advice cannot be
expected to be available if exposed to con-
tinuous and public scrutiny and controversy.
(ii) have their members, in general, appointed
by the President.
(iii) serve on a part-time basis for a limited
term;
(f) The Director would maintain close relationships
with the National Academies of Science and of
Engineering and the Institute of Medicine and,
in establishing ad hoc panels, would make full
use of their membership, as well as of academic
faculties and such organizations as the Social
Science Research Council.
(g) The Office in its initial full year of operation
should have an annual budget in the $1 to $3 mil-
lion range.
(h) Since science and technology are profoundly inter-
related (not only among the scientific disciplines
themselves, but with domestic and foreign social
and political issues and the intellectual activity
of the nation) the area of the Office's con-
corn should be broad and include:
-- social and behavioral sciences
-- physical and life sciences
-- medicine
-- engineering
-- military applications
-- international aspects of science and technology
-- science and technology in the private sector
-- education and training of scientific manpower
5. The Qualifications of the Director
The Director must have, or be the type of
person who can readily gain, the personal confidence
of the President.
He or she should be a scientist, engineer or
medical person of proven scientific or technical
capability, have some experience in public service
or administration, and should preferably be a member
of one of the National Academies of Science or
Technology or the Institute of Medicine.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 14, 1975
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
JIM CANNON
FROM:
JERRY H. JONES
SUBJECT:
Science and Technology
Adviser to the President
Your memorandum to the President of April 24 on the above subject
has been reviewed and the following was noted:
Option #1 -- A three-member Council of
Technology and Science Advisers with up
to 20 assistants. Disagree.
Option #2 -- A single Director of Technology
and Science with up to 17 assistants as needed.
Agree with the following notation:
-- With more limited staff + less
funding.
Option #3 -- A Science and Technology adviser
with up to three assistants. Disagree.
Option #4 -- The appointment of a Scientific and
Technology Liaison Adviser to the President who
would serve simply as a point of contact between
the Administration and the Scientific community.
Disagree.
Please follow-up with the appropriate action.
Thank you.
CC: Don Rumsfeld
Jim Lynn
INFORMATION
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 14, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
JIM CANNON June
SUBJECT: Science Adviser Decision and Action
I.
This is my understanding of your decision and
your direction for action:
1. There will be a Science and Technology Adviser
to the President.
2. The office and staff will be authorized by
legislation.
3. There will be a single director, someone of
the ability and scientific standing of
Dr. Harold Brown, President of Cal Tech.
The Director should know scientists, be able
to attract the best minds, and know how to
include their counsel in the executive
decision-making process.
4. He will have assistants, but not as many as the
17 called for in Option 2 of the April 24, 1975
memorandum. He might begin, for example,
with a staff of five assistants.
5. Extensive use will be made of consultants as
members of scientific and technological task
forces for various projects.
6. Initial costs would be $1 million - $1.5 million
annually.
7. You will invite Representatives Teague and
Mosher, Senators Tunney and Beall, and Senator
Kennedy to the White House next week (perhaps
on Thursday, May 22) to make known your decision,
describe the kind of Science Adviser and staff
you want, and express the hope that they will
follow your proposal for legislation.
- 2 -
8. The Vice President, Jim Lynn, Brent Scowcroft
and I will work together to define the role
of Science Adviser and clarify his relationship
to military and international science meetings.
II.
As the next steps to carry forward your decision
after your meeting with members of the House and Senate,
I propose that the Domestic Council Staff:
-- Draft legislation to carry forward your decision
-- Draft a message to the Congress.
-- Work with Max Friedersdorf and his staff, to
develop with Congressional leaders legislation
that you and the Congress will support.
In broad terms, our objectives are to:
-
assure the development of an ongoing scientific
and technology capacity in the Executive Office
of the President.
- assure the availability of a broad range of
scientific and technical expertise;
-
acknowledge Congressional support for an
effective and visible science advisory group;
- demonstrate unequivocally the Administration's
commitment to using the resources of the nation's
scientific community and technology industry to
meet the overriding needs of our times; and
-
make known to the nation the Administration's
ability to develop and support new and innovative
ideas through the creation of Executive Branch
task forces operating out of the Office of the
Science and Technology Adviser to the President.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 14, 1975
LIURAK
TO:
DONALD RUMSFELD
FROM: JIM CONNOR gu
Jerry Jones asked me to bring to your attention
the discrepancies between the President's decision
on the Science Advisor and the attached information
memorandum being submitted by Jim Cannon to
the President.
Of particular concern are items 4, 5 and 6 on the
first page. It appears that Cannon may be assuming
a staff growing well beyond the 5 to 7 numbers
that were discussed. The decision memorandum
as I read it does not discuss the use of consultants,
extensive or otherwise. The President had decided
on "less funding" than the $1 million to $1. 5 million
annually.
Jerm
Sex we
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 21, 1975
MEETING WITH MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
ON THE SCIENCE ADVISOR ISSUE
Thursday, May 22, 1975
The Cabinet Room
From: Jim Cannon
I.
PURPOSE
9:45 a.m. (30 minutes) June
To discuss your decision on the Science Advisor with
key Senators and Congressmen.
II.
BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS & PRESS PLAN
A. Background: You requested this meeting.
B. Participants: The Vice President; Senators Frank
Moss, Barry Goldwater, J. Glenn Beall and Paul
Laxalt; Congressmen Olin Teague, Charles Mosher,
Ray Thornton, John Conlan and James Symington;
Jim Cannon, Jim Lynn, Jack Marsh, and Max
Friedersdorf.
Regrets: Senators John Tunney and Ted Kennedy.
C. Press Plan: To be announced.
III. TALKING POINTS
1. I have considered the various options for providing
the President science advice and have concluded
that an advisory presence in the White House is
desirable.
2. Dr. Stever, as science advisor, has done an out-
standing job in assisting the Executive Office
and the White House. He has assembled resources
2
devoted to science and technology policy in NSF
which we expect him to retain and to use in support
of the new White House group. I feel that this
new arrangement can be even more effective in
keeping me and my top White House staff advised
on issues involving science and technology.
3. The new science advisory arrangement would consist
of a single science advisor assisted by a small
staff. I believe that through such an arrangement
we can encourage more extensive use of experts from
the scientific community who are knowledgeable on
specific problems and issues that may arise. In
addition, this office will be able to continue to
draw on the resources of the National Science
Foundation.
4. The major responsibilities of the science advisor
and his office would include:
Analyzing the scientific and technological aspects
of major National policy problems or issues and
examining their implications for policy alternatives.
Acting as the President's spokesman on government-
wide matters affecting the government's partici-
pation and conduct in R&D activities.
Keeping me and my top advisors abreast of new
discoveries or breakthroughs in science and
technology that may have impact on National
policies or government programs.
5. I would expect the science advisor to arrange for
me occasional meetings with leaders of the scientific
and technological community from both industry and
academia so that I can gain from them first-hand
information on matters of National importance.
6. I hope you agree with me that this new arrangement
will be an effective vehicle in providing me
scientific advice. I will be forwarding legislation
shortly to establish this new office and I ask your
support in deferring action on pending legislation
in this area until the Congress can consider the
approach I am recommending.
POINTS ON SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGY
ADVISER TO THE PRESIDENT
A) The Vice President will probably bring this
subject up in his 2:30 meeting tomorrow with the President.
B) The Vice President has committments out to his
friends in the scientific community (Baker, Teller, etc.)
Apparently he has promised to secure a major voice inside
the White House for the scientific community.
C) The Cannon paper recommends a single Director of
Science and Technology with up to 17 assistants at a
cost of $1,000,000 to $1,500,000 annually. Basically,
this is a high cost, large organization option. In
choosing this option the paper fails to address the two
key organization problems with such an office.
1) How does it fit with the rest of the White
House Staff, what does it do, and how does it obtain
an effective policy voice on scientific matters in
White House deliberations? The last office was
not able to find a place in the sun for very real
reasons; why will a new office do better?
2) How do we organize it in such a way as to prevent
it from becoming an advocacy office for special
scientific interests. In essence, the paper
recommends a large office without specifying its
mission or how it would fit with all of the rest
of us. In my view, this is a formula for
establishing an unsatisfactory organization which
will come back to haunt us. (Read the O'Neill
paper at Tab 4 and the original Cavanaugh paper
of February 12 at Tab 4).
D) The choice to do nothing is not realistic.
Congress will force some type of organization on us.
E) As far as I can tell, the correct mission for an
office of science and technology would be to perform a
role for the scientific community like the one Bob Goldwin
is presently performing for the intellectual community,
e.g., the role of converging key concepts from the academic,
private, and governmental organizations and individuals
dealing with scientific policy in a way that can be used
in the policy counsels of the White House. Ed David has
suggested a third option (Tab A) ; upon reflection, his
suggestion would surely give birth to an advocacy office.
Unless it can be proven that a large office can work
effectively within the White House, we should not go
that road, but rather stick to the Goldwin format.
There are two keys to making the Goldwin format work:
1) The man selected to perform the role
must be someone the President will work with
and whose expertise the President will be
willing to draw upon. Also, he has to be highly
regarded in the scientific community if they are
to accept such a limited role and office.
2) The President will have to personally sell
this limited option if we are to sustain the
position:
a) The Vice President must be convinced.
b) The Hill committees, and particularly
Tiger Teague, must be convinced.
F) The NSC has not yet been consulted. This is a major
oversight since the NSC assumed most of OST's duties within
the White House when it went out of business. The NSC
is sure to object to the formation of a new competing
organization which will more than likely get into the
business of commenting on weapon's technology (I have
given a copy of the paper to Scowcroft for comment).
HAM A