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1976/05/07 S2662 International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act (vetoed) (3)
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1976/05/07 S2662 International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act (vetoed) (3)
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The original documents are located in Box 44, folder "1976/05/07 S2662 International
Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act (vetoed) (3)" of the White House
Records Office: Legislation Case Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald R. Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Exact duplicates within this folder were not digitized.
Digitized from Box 44 of the White House Records Office Legislation Case Files
at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
attached material
was superseded !
(per C.Finley of
R Lundera office)
FORD s LIBRARY GERALD
TO THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES:
I am returning, without my approval, S. 2662, a bill
that would unwisely and improperly obstruct the exercise of
the President's constitutional responsibilities for the con-
duct of foreign affairs and do serious harm to the long-term
foreign policy interests of the United States.
This legislation authorizes appropriations for security
assistance programs for fiscal year 1976. These programs
are of great importance to our efforts to promote a more
stable and secure world in which constructive international
cooperation can flourish. However, the numerous restrictions
and cumbersome procedures contained in the bill would seriously
impair the ability of the Executive Branch to perform its
proper functions.
Constitutional Objections
S. 2662 contains an array of constitutionally objectionable
requirements whereby virtually all significant arms transfer
decisions would be subjected on a case-by-case basis to a
period of delay for Congressional review and possible dis-
approval by concurrent resolution of the Congress. These
provisions are incompatible with the express provision in
the Constitution that a resolution having the force and effect
of law must be presented to the President and, if disapproved,
repassed by a two-thirds majority in the Senate and the House
of Representatives. They extend to the Congress the power to
prohibit specific transactions authorized by law without
changing the law -- and without following the constitutional
process such a change would require. Moreover, they would
involve the Congress directly in the performance of Executive
functions in disregard of the fundamental principle of sepa-
ration of powers. Congress can, by duly adopted legislation,
authorize or prohibit such actions as the execution of
contracts or the issuance of export licenses; but Congress
FORD
2
cannot itself participate in the Executive functions of
deciding whether to enter into a lawful contract or issue
a lawful license, either directly or through the disapproval
procedures contemplated in this bill.
The erosion of the basic distinction between legislative
and Executive functions which would result from the enactment
of S. 2662, displays itself in an increasing volume of similar
legislation which this Congress has passed or is considering.
Such legislation would pose a serious threat to our system of
government, and would forge impermissible shackles on the
President's ability to carry out the laws and conduct the
foreign relations of the United States. The President cannot
function effectively in domestic matters, and speak for the
nation authoritatively in foreign affairs, if his decisions
under authority previously conferred can be reversed by a
bare majority of the Congress. Also, the attempt of Congress
to become a virtual co-administrator in operational decisions
would seriously distract it from its proper legislative role.
Inefficiency, delay, and uncertainty in the management of our
nation's foreign affairs would eventually follow.
Apart from these basic constitutional deficiencies
which appear in six sections of the bill, S. 2662 is faulty
legislation, containing numerous unwise restrictions.
Trade with Vietnam
The bill would suspend for 180 days the President's
authority to control certain trade with North and South
Vietnam, thereby removing a vital bargaining instrument
for the settlement of a number of differences between the
United States and these countries. I have the deepest
sympathy for the intent of this provision, which is to
obtain an accounting for Americans missing in action in
Vietnam. However, the enactment of this legislation would
not provide any real assurances that the Vietnamese would
now fulfill their long-standing obligation to provide such
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
3
an accounting. Indeed, the establishment of a direct
linkage between trade and accounting for those missing in
action might well only perpetuate Vietnamese demands for
greater and greater concessions.
This Administration is prepared to be responsive to
Vietnamese action on the question of Americans missing in
action. Nevertheless, the delicate process of negotiations
with the Vietnamese cannot be replaced by a legislative
mandate that would open up trade for a specified number of
days and then terminate that trade as a way to achieve our
diplomatic objectives. This mandate represents an unacceptable
attempt by Congress to manage the diplomatic relations of the
United States.
Annual Ceiling on Arms Sales
A further objectionable feature of S. 2662 is an annual
ceiling of $9.0 billion on the total of government sales and
commercial exports of military equipment and services. In
our search to negotiate mutual restraints in the prolifera-
tion of conventional weapons, this self-imposed ceiling would
be an impediment to our efforts to obtain the cooperation of
other arms-supplying nations. Such an arbitrary ceiling
would also require individual transactions to be evaluated,
not on their own merits, but on the basis of their relation-
ship to the volume of other, unrelated transactions. This
provision would establish an arbitrary, overall limitation
as a substitute for case-by-case analyses and decisions based
on foreign policy priorities and the legitimate security
needs of our allies and friends.
Discrimination and Human Rights
This bill also contains well-intended but misguided
provisions to require the termination of military coopera-
tion with countries which engage in practices that dis-
criminate against United States citizens or practices
constituting a consistent pattern of gross human rights
FORD
4
violations. This Administration is fully committed to a
policy of actively opposing and seeking the elimination of
discrimination by foreign governments against United States
citizens on the basis of their race, religion, national
origin or sex, just as the Administration is fully supportive
of internationally recognized human rights as a standard for
all nations to respect. The use of the proposed sanctions
against sovereign nations is, however, an awkward and in-
effective device for the promotion of those policies. These
provisions of the bill represent further attempts to ignore
important and complex policy considerations by requiring
simple legalistic tests to measure the conduct of sovereign
foreign governments. If Congress finds such conduct deficient,
specific actions by the United States to terminate or limit
our cooperation with the government concerned would be man-
dated. By making any single factor the effective determinant
of relationships which must take into account other considera-
tions, such provisions would add a new element of uncertainty
to our security assistance programs and would cast doubt upon
the reliability of the United States in its dealings with
other countries. Moreover, such restrictions would most
likely be counterproductive as a means for eliminating
discriminatory practices and promoting human rights. The
likely result would be a selective disassociation of the
United States from governments unpopular with the Congress,
thereby diminishing our ability to advance the cause of
human rights through diplomatic means.
Termination of Grant Military Assistance and
Advisory Groups
The legislation would terminate grant military assis-
tance and military assistance advisory groups after fiscal
year 1977 except where specifically authorized by Congress,
thus creating a presumption against such programs and
missions. Such a step would have a severe impact on our
relations with other nations whose security and well-being
5
are important to our own national interests. In the case of
grant assistance, it would limit our flexibility to assist
countries whose national security is important to us but which
are not themselves able to bear the full cost of their own
defense. In the case of advisory groups, termination of
missions by legislative fiat would impair close and long-
standing military relationships with important allies.
Moreover, such termination is inconsistent with increasing
Congressional demands for the kind of information about and
control over arms sales which these groups now provide.
Such provisions would insert Congress deeply into the
details of specific country programs, a role which Congress
has neither the information nor the organizational structure
to play.
*****
I particularly regret that, notwithstanding the spirit
of genuine cooperation between the Legislative and Executive
Branches that has characterized the deliberations on this
legislation, we have been unable to overcome the major
policy differences that exist.
In disapproving this bill, I act as any President would,
and must, to retain the ability to function as the foreign
policy leader and spokesman of the Nation. In world affairs
today, America can have only one foreign policy. Moreover,
that foreign policy must be certain, clear and consistent.
Foreign governments must know that they can treat with the
President on foreign policy matters, and that when he speaks
within his authority, they can rely upon his words.
Accordingly, I must veto the bill.
THE WHITE HOUSE,
TO THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
I am returning, without my approval, S. 2662, a bill that
would make unacceptable encroachments upon the constitutional
responsibilities of the President for the conduct of foreign
affairs and do serious harm to the long-term foreign policy
interests of the United States.
This legislation authorizes appropriations for security
assistance programs for fiscal year 1976. These programs
are of great importance to our efforts to promote a more stable
and secure world in which constructive international coopera-
tion can flourish. However, the numerous restrictions and
cumbersome procedures contained in the bill would seriously
impair the ability of the Executive Branch to perform its
proper functions.
Constitutional Objections
S. 2662 contains an array of constitutionally objectionable
requirements whereby virtually all significant arms transfer
decisions would be subjected on a case-by-case basis to a
period of delay for Congressional review and possible dis-
approval by concurrent resolution of the Congress. These pro-
visions are incompatible with the express provision in the
Constitution that a resolution having the force and effect
of law must be presented to the President and, if disapproved,
repassed by a two-thirds majority in the Senate and the House
of Representatives. They extend to the Congress the power to
prohibit specific transactions authorized by law without
changing the law -- and without following the constitutional
process such a change would require. Moreover, they would
involve the Congress directly in the performance of Executive
functions in disregard of the fundamental principle of sepa-
ration of powers. Congress can, by duly adopted legislation,
authorize or prohibit such actions as the execution of con-
tracts or the issuance of export licenses; but Congress
cannot itself participate in the Executive functions of
deciding whether to enter into a lawful contract or issue
a lawful license, either directly or through the disapproval
procedures contemplated in this bill.
The erosion of the basic distinction between legisla-
tive and Executive functions that would result from the
enactment of .2662, and that displays itself in an in-
creasing volume of similar legislation which this Congress
has passed or is considering, would pose a serious threat
to our system of government, and would forge impermissible
shackles on the President's ability to carry out the laws
and conduct the foreign relations of the United States.
The President cannot function effectively in domestic matters,
and speak for the nation authoritatively in foreign affairs,
if his lawful operational decisions under authority previ-
ously conferred can be reversed by a bare majority of the
Congress. Also, the attempt of Congress to become a virtual
co-administrator in operational decisions would seriously
distract it from its proper legislative role. Inefficiency,
delay, and uncertainty in the management of our nation's
foreign affairs would eventually follow.
Apart from these basic constitutional deficiencies
which appear in six sections of the bill, S. 2662 is faulty
legislation, containing numerous unwise restrictions.
Trade with Vietnam
The bill would suspend for 180 days the President's
authority to control certain trade with North and South
Vietnam, thereby removing a vital bargaining instrument for
the settlement of a number of differences between the United
States and these countries. I have the deepest sympathy for
the intent of this provision, which is to obtain an accounting
3
for Americans missing in action in Vietnam. However, the
enactment of this legislation would not provide any real
assurances that the Vietnamese would now fulfill their long
standing obligation to provide such an accounting. Indeed,
the establishment of a direct linkage between trade and
accounting for those missing in action might well only
perpetuate Vietnamese demands for greater and greater con-
cessions.
This Administration is prepared to be responsive to
Vietnamese action on the question of Americans missing in
action. Nevertheless, the delicate process of negotiations
with the Vietnamese cannot be replaced by a legislative
mandate that would open up trade for a specified number of
days and then terminate that trade as a way to achieve our
diplomatic objectives. This mandate represents an unac-
ceptable attempt by Congress to manage the diplomatic rela-
tions of the United States.
Annual Ceiling on Arms Sales
A further objectionable feature of S. 2662 is an annual
ceiling of $9.0 billion on the total of government sales and
commercial exports of military equipment and services. In
our search to negotiate mutual restraints in the prolifera-
tion of conventional weapons, this self-imposed ceiling would
be an impediment to our efforts to obtain the cooperation of
other arms-supplying nations. Such an arbitrary ceiling
would also require individual transactions to be evaluated,
not on their own merits, but on the basis of their relation-
ship to the volume of other, unrelated transactions. This
provision would establish an arbitrary, overall limitation
as a substitute for case-by-case analyses and decisions based
on foreign policy priorities.
Discrimination and Human Rights
This bill also contains well intended but misguided
provisions to require the termination of military coopera-
tion with countries which engage in practices that dis-
criminate against United States citizens or practices
constituting a consistent pattern of gross human rights
violations. This Administration is fully committed to a
policy of actively opposing and seeking the elimination of
discrimination by foreign governments against United States
citizens on the basis of their race, religion, national
origin or sex, just as the Administration is fully sup-
portive of internationally recognized human rights as a
standard for all nations to respect. The use of the pro-
posed sanctions against sovereign nations is, however, an
awkward and ineffective device for the promotion of those
policies. These provisions of the bill represent further
attempts to ignore important and complex policy considera-
tions by requiring simple legalistic tests to measure the
conduct of sovereign foreign governments. If Congress finds
such conduct deficient, specific actions by the United States
to terminate or limit our cooperation with the government
concerned would be mandated. By making any single factor
the effective determinant of relationships which must take
into account other considerations, such provisions would
add a new element of uncertainty to our security assist-
ance programs and would cast doubt upon the reliability of
the United States in its dealings with other countries.
Moreover, such restrictions would most likely be counter-
productive as a means for eliminating discriminatory
practices and promoting human rights. The likely result
would be a selective disassociation of the United States
from governments unpopular with the Congress, thereby
diminishing our ability to advance the cause of human rights
through diplomatic means:
Termination of Grant Military Assistance and
Advisory Groups
The legislation would terminate grant military assist-
ance and military assistance advisory groups after fiscal
year 1977 except where specifically authorized by Congress,
thus creating a presumption against such programs and
missions. In the case of grant assistance, this would
limit our flexibility to assist countries whose national
security is important to us but which are not themselves
able to bear the full cost of their own defense. In the
case of advisory groups, termination of missions by legis-
lative fiat would impair close and long standing military
relationships with important allies. Moreover, such
termination is inconsistent with increasing Congressional
demands for the kind of information about and control over
arms sales which these groups now provide. Such provisions
would insert Congress deeply into the details of specific
country programs, a role which Congress has neither the in-
formation nor the organizational structure to play.
I particularly regret that, notwithstanding the spirit
of genuine cooperation between the Legislative and Executive
Branches that has characterized the deliberations on this
legislation, we have been unable to overcome the major policy
differences that exist.
In disapproving this bill, I act as any President would,
and must, to retain the ability to function as the foreign
policy leader and spokesman of the Nation. In world affairs
today, America can have only one foreign policy. Moreover,
that foreign policy must be certain, clear and consistent.
Foreign governments must know that they can treat with the
President on foreign policy matters, and that when he speaks
within his authority, they can rely upon his words.
Accordingly, I must veto the bill.
THE WHITE. HOUSE
May
, 1976
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503
7.30p.m.
APR 30 1376
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Subject: Enrolled Bill S. 2662 - International Security
Assistance and Arms Export Control Act
Sponsor - Senator Humphrey (D) Minnesota
Last Day for Action
May 11, 1976 - Tuesday
Purpose
(a) Authorizes appropriations of $3,958.7 million for
security assistance and certain other programs for fis-
cal year 1976 and the transition quarter and places
individual country limitations on the use of certain
funds; (b) provides authority to stockpile defense
articles for foreign military forces and drawdown
Defense stocks to meet emergency requests; (c) ter-
minates the general authority for grant military
assistance and military assistance advisory groups
after fiscal year 1977; (d) establishes a separate
foreign military training program; (e) expands the
congressional role in the foreign military sales
program; and (f) contains a number of other sig-
nificant policy revisions as noted below.
Agency Recommendations
Office of Management and
Disapproval (Veto Message
Budget
attached)
National Security Council
Disapproval (Informally)
Arms Control and Disarmament
Disapproval
Agency
Department of Defense
Approval
Agency for International
Approval
Development
Department of State
Foresees potentially
serious consequences
of a veto
Department of Justice
Objects on constitu-
tional grounds but
defers to other
agencies on foreign
policy and other
considerations
FORD
Department of Commerce
Defers to other agencies
Department of the Treasury
Would not recommend veto
2
Discussion
Amounts Authorized to be Appropriated
The tables attached to this memorandum summarize
the amounts authorized for fiscal year 1976 and
the transition quarter. For the transition
quarter, the bill provides for "appropriation of
one-fourth of any amount authorized for fiscal
year 1976
in accordance with the authorization
applicable to operation and activities authorized
under this act
"
Authorizations of appropriations for the 15-month
period for all accounts exceed the Administration's
request by $368 million. Foreign military sales
(FMS) credit funds are increased by $203.8 million
and security supporting assistance by $301.3
million primarily for aid to Israel during the
transition quarter. For fiscal year 1976, aid for
Israel is authorized substantially as requested includ-
ing an FMS credit program of $1.5 billion with
repayments on one-half of this amount to be for-
given.
The grant military assistance program (MAP) is
reduced by $135.8 million. This reduction is not
as severe as it appears because $63 million of the
cut was taken from Greece and Turkey for which
separate authorization is to be sought when
Congress approves base agreements with these
countries. Thus, only Jordan suffers a severe
cut from the $100 million in grant MAP requested to
the $67.5 million authorized under this bill. The
bill also contains a number of individual country
limitations on the use of grant MAP, FMS credit
and security supporting assistance funds.
Special Authorities
The bill contains permanent authority for the
President to determine that there is an emergency
requirement for military assistance and to order
the use of Department of Defense stocks or services
of value up to $67.5 million in any fiscal year
to meet such an emergency. Obligations incurred
are authorized to be liquidated by future grant
MAP appropriations, but the entire authority is
FORD
LIBRARY
3
contingent on the inclusion of language in annual
appropriation acts making the authority effective
in the same amount.
The bill permits reinstitution of the stockpiling
program, suspended in December of 1974 by Congress,
under which defense articles are held in U.S.
inventories as war reserves for foreign nations.
Limits of $75 million and $18.8 million are set
on the value of additions to such stockpiles in
1976 and the transition quarter, respectively.
Termination of Grant MAP and MAAGs
Beginning with fiscal year 1978, the general
authority for grant MAP is terminated. Each
country program thereafter must be authorized
separately. Authority is provided until the end
of fiscal 1980 for wind up costs of programs
existing before September 30, 1977.
During fiscal year 1977, the number of military
assistance advisory groups (MAAGs) and similar
military groups is limited to 34, a reduction of
10 from current levels. In fiscal year 1978, no
MAAG or similar mission may continue unless
specifically authorized by Congress. However, the
President would be permitted to assign no more than
three military personnel to the chief of a
diplomatic mission to perform MAAG functions.
Military attachés are specifically prohibited from
performing such functions.
International Military Education and Training
As requested by the Administration, the bill
establishes the military training program as a
program separate from grant MAP. No termination
date is established for this program.
Expanded Congressional Role in Foreign Military Sales
A. Restriction on commercial sales. The bill
R. FORD
4
requires that all sales of major defense equipment
of $25 million or more must be on a government-to-
government (FMS) basis except for sales to NATO
countries which can continue through commercial
channels. Major defense equipment is defined as any
item of significant combat equipment having a non-
recurring research and development cost of more than
$50 million or a total estimated production cost of
more than $200 million.
B. Congressional review and veto by concurrent
resolution. Under current law, all proposed
government-to-government (FMS) sales of defense
articles and services valued over $25 million must
be submitted to the Congress and the Congress may
forbid such sales by passage of a concurrent
resolution within 20 days. There is no similar
existing provision affecting export licenses for
commercial sales. This bill extends the existing
reporting requirement and Congressional veto to
cover all proposed sales of "major defense equip-
ment" of $7 million or more, whether FMS or
commercial, and also extends the waiting period for
Congressional action to 30 calendar days. The
President can exempt a sale from Congressional
veto by certifying to Congress that an "emergency
exists which requires such sale in the national
security interests of the United States."
C. $9.0 billion arms sales ceiling. The bill
incorporates a worldwide $9 billion (in 1975
constant dollars) annual ceiling on all arms sales
(FMS and commercial) beginning in fiscal year 1977.
The ceiling would be computed according to
contract price of equipment actually delivered in
any fiscal year. Thus, the full value of long-term
contracts signed in fiscal year 1977 will not be
counted against the ceiling in that year, but
incrementally as deliveries are made. The
President may waive the ceiling if he determines
a particular sale to be in the national security
interest and so certifies to Congress.
is
FORD
LIBRARY
5
D. Reporting. The bill requires the President
to submit an annual report to Congress which includes
an arms control impact statement prepared by the
Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
for each purchasing country. This statement is
required to address the impact of sales on our
arms control efforts with that country and on the
stability of the region in which the country is
located.
E. Arms sales policy. The bill requires the
President to conduct a comprehensive study of arms
sales policy "in order to determine whether such
policies and practices should be changed." A report
to Congress is due in one year.
F. Sales affecting U.S. combat readiness. The
President is required to report to the Congress any
sale if in his judgment such sale "could have a
significant adverse effect on combat readiness of
the Armed Forces of the United States." The
report would have to contain a "certification that
such sale is important to the security of the United
States.
"
G. Repayment period. The maximum repayment
period for foreign military credit sales is extended
from 10 years to 12 years except in the case of
Israel where a repayment period of "not less than
twenty years following a grace period of ten years
on repayment of principal" is mandated for fiscal
year 1976.
H. Deferred payment on cash sales from stock.
Current law permits the President to defer payment
on cash sales from Department of Defense stocks by
up to 120 days after delivery without interest
charge. This bill requires that interest be
charged on any net amount due on such sales not
paid within 60 days of delivery unless the President
determines that "the emergency requirements of the
purchaser exceed the ready availability to the
FORD
6
purchaser of funds," in which case he may defer
payment for a total of 120 days.
I. Agent Fees. The bill mandates reports
to the Congress by the Secretary of State on
political contributions, gifts, commissions, and
fees in connection with foreign military sales or
commercial sales licensed or approved under the
Act. It also requires the Secretary of State
to establish recordkeeping and reporting
requirements for such fees, authorizes the President
to establish regulations prohibiting or limiting
fees, and provides criminal penalties for private
individuals not complying with these regulations.
Other Policy Provisions
A. Congressional power to terminate military
assistance. The bill establishes the right of
Congress to terminate assistance and deliveries of
assistance (grants or credits) whenever it finds
by concurrent resolution that a recipient country is
in substantial violation of the eligibility criteria
for foreign assistance or the international
agreements under which assistance is provided.
Assistance would remain terminated until the
President determined that the violation had ceased.
and the country had given assurances that the
violation would not recur.
B. Congressional power to prevent third-
country transfers. The bill prevents the President
from giving his consent to the transfer of defense
articles and services from aid recipients to third
countries without first certifying certain infor-
mation to Congress concerning the intended transfer.
Congress may prevent the proposed transfer by
concurrent resolution within 30 calendar days unless
the President certifies that an emergency exists which
requires such transfer in the national security
interest.
C. Human rights. The bill establishes a yearly
reporting procedure on the human rights situation
7
in all countries receiving security assistance and
allows Congress to ask for more detailed reports on
particular countries. It also creates the
position of Coordinator for Human Rights within
the Department of State as a Presidential appointment
requiring Senate confirmation. The legislation
allows Congress, within 90 days of receiving a report
on a particular country from the Coordinator for
Human Rights, to terminate or restrict assistance
to that country by concurrent resolution. No waiver
authority is provided.
D. Prohibition against discrimination. The bill
mandates the cut-off of any FMS project if a U.S.
citizen is prevented by a foreign government from
participating in that project by reason of race,
religion, sex, or national origin. However, it
does provide prior opportunity for the President to
make private efforts to reverse an instance of
discrimination before any action to terminate must
be taken. The President can waive the cut-off if he
determines it would have "a significant adverse
impact on the. security of the United States."
E. Angola. The bill contains a provision
expressing the concern of the Congress with respect
to Soviet and Cuban intervention in Angola.
F. Chile. All security assistance is prohibited;
thus, only cash sales of defense articles and
services are possible after enactment.
G. Military forces in the Indian Ocean. The
bill expresses the sense of Congress that the
President should initiate negotiations with the
Soviet Union regarding control of military forces
in the Indian Ocean and report to the Congress not
later than December 1, 1976.
H. Turkey. The bill authorizes $31 million in
grant MAP for Turkey (as compared with the budget
request of $75 million), but continues the
R. FORD
8
prohibitions of existing law with respect to such
assistance. Thus, grant assistance cannot be
provided unless the President certifies as to
substantial progress toward a Cyprus agreement and
Turkish compliance with U.S. law and implementing
agreements. On the other hand, the legislation
permits the sale of $125 million in defense articles
and services to Turkey during the balance of fiscal
year 1976 and the transition quarter, a softening
of the present total prohibition on grants or
sales.
I. Trade with Vietnam. The bill suspends
certain restrictions on trade with Vietnam for 180
days. The suspension would automatically expire
unless the President certifies to the Congress
that the Vietnamese have been forthcoming in
accounting for MIAs.
J. International narcotics control. The
bill prohibits U.S. personnel from engaging or
participating in direct police arrest actions in
any foreign country in connection with narcotics
control efforts.
K. Report on Korea. The bill requires the
President to report 90 days after enactment and
annually for the next 5 years on (1) progress made
by the Republic of Korea in modernizing its
armed forces so as to achieve military self-
sufficiency, (2) the role of the United States in
mutual security efforts in Korea, and (3) prospects
for phased reduction of United States armed
forces assigned to Korea, in coordination with the
timetable of the Republic of Korea for military
self-sufficiency.
L. U.S. citizens imprisoned in Mexico. The
bill declares the intent of Congress "that
efforts to secure stringent international law
enforcement measures with respect to dangerous
drugs shall be combined with efforts to secure
fair and humane treatment for, citizens of foreign
9
countries who are imprisoned." The provision requests
the President to communicate directly to the President
of Mexico the continuing concern of the United
States over the treatment of United States citizens
arrested in Mexico. The Secretary of State is required
to submit quarterly reports to Congress on progress
achieved toward full respect of the human and legal
rights of all United States citizens detained in
Mexico.
M. Strife in Lebanon. The bill expresses the
sense of the Congress that the situation in Lebanon
poses a serious danger to Middle East peace, and
that the Congress views with grave concern outside
efforts to exploit the current strife for the purpose
of transforming Lebanon into a radical state in
confrontation with Israel. This provision also
contains a request that the President use his good
offices to bring about peace.
N. Portugal. There is a sense of Congress
statement that the President should take action to
alleviate food shortages in Portugal using existing
statutes.
O. Middle East policy. The bill declares the
sense of Congress that the United States will
continue to determine Middle East policy as
circumstances may require. It further declares the
authority contained in the joint resolution
approving the early warning system in Sinai and
the authorizations contained in this bill shall
not be construed "to constitute congressional
approval, acceptance, or endorsement (1) of any
oral or written commitment, understanding, assurance,
promise, or agreement, whether expressed or
implied, or any other expression, oral or written
(other than the 'United States Proposal for
the Early Warning System in Sinai'), made by any
official of the United States which Israel, Egypt, or
any other nation or organization might construe
or interpret as a basis on which it could rely or
act, or (2). of any characterization of any such
10
commitment, understanding, assurance, promise, or
agreement, or other expression, as constituting a
'codification' of existing, congressionally
approved United States policy.
"
P. International terrorism. The bill
requires the President to terminate all assistance
to any government which aids or abets international
terrorism by granting sanctuary to terrorists. A
Presidential waiver on national security grounds
is possible, but Congress within 30 days of such
action could adopt a concurrent resolution
reversing the waiver action.
The Department of Justice informally advises that
the bill is objectionable on constitutional grounds
due to the inclusion of the several provisions for
congressional override of Presidential actions by
concurrent resolution. Justice defers to the views
of other agencies, however, as to whether foreign
policy and other considerations outweigh these
constitutional objections.
In its enrolled bill letter, Defense states:
"Apart from the concurrent resolution
veto aspect of S. 2662, the Department
of Defense is of the view that its
provisions can be implemented without
significant detriment to the foreign
policy and national security of the
United States. In general, the Depart-
ment of Defense believes that the
final text of these other provisions
represents a genuine effort by the
Congress to accommodate objections
raised by the Executive Branch during
markup by the International Relations
and Foreign Relations Committees and
by the Conference Committee. For
example, adequate provision has been
made for a waiver of limitations by
the President. Accordingly, the
Department of Defense does not
believe that a veto of S. 2662 is warranted
because of those provisions."
11
Defense also believes that a veto of the enrolled
bill based on the concurrent resolution override
provisions it contains also would be inappropriate
because the fiscal year 1975 foreign aid authoriza-
tion bill and numerous other bills presented to the
President over the past 30 years containing similar
provisions have been approved. The Department
recommends approval and a strong signing statement
citing the constitutional objections to the bill
and welcoming a speedy and decisive judicial
test of the concurrent resolution provisions.
Its enrolled bill letter includes language that
could be used in such a signing statement.
Alternatively, Defense recommends that, should
you decide to signify your dissatisfaction with
the bill in a stronger fashion, you announce
your intention to permit the bill to become law
without your signature and issue a statement
similar to that recommended above.
State advises us informally that, while it
understands you intend to disapprove S. 2662, it
foresees some potentially serious consequences
arising from a veto, if sustained. Principally,
the Department is concerned about the ability
to carry out security supporting assistance and
foreign military sales, credit and guarantee
programs during the remainder of fiscal year
1976 and the transition quarter and believes it
could be difficult to obtain an amendment to the
existing continuing resolution that would provide
adequate funds for these programs. Furthermore,
State believes a veto, if sustained, could impair
efforts to obtain congressional approval of
agreements with Turkey, Spain, Greece and the
Philippines.
In addition to the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, the National Security Council and the
Office of Management and Budget recommend dis-
approval for the reasons set forth in the attached
12
proposed veto message. The message has been con-
curred in by Mr. Buchen, Mr. Scalia, Mr. Scowcroft
and Mr. Lynn.
James m. Trey
James M. Frey
Assistant Director for
Legislative Reference
Enclosure
FOR
FISCAL YEAR 1976
(appropriations in millions of dollars)
Authorization
Enrolled
Request
Bill
Difference
Grant Military Assistance
394.5
228.7
165.8
Foreign Military Training
30.0
27.0
-3.0
Foreign Military Credit Sales
1,065.0
1,039.0
-26.0
(Program)
(2,374.7)
(2,374.7)
(---)
(Authority to forgive
Israeli repayments)
(750.0)
(750.0)
(---)
Security Supporting Assistance
1,873.31/
1,766.2
-107.1
Middle East Special Requirement
Fund
50.0
50.0
---
Narcotics Control
42.5
40.0
-2.5
Contingency Fund
10.0
5.0
-5.0
Aid to Cypriot Refugees
---
10.02/
+10.0
International Atomic Energy
Agency
---
1.03/
+1.0
Total
3,465.3
3,166.9
-298.4
1/ Of the total request, $25.0 million was for Cyprus relief. This amount
has been authorized as a separate account, Aid to Cypriot Refugees.
2/ In addition to $30.0 million authorized in the development assistance
bill.
3/ In addition to a voluntary contribution of $3.5 million authorized in
the development assistance bill; earmarked for safeguards activities.
TRANSITION QUARTER (JULY 1, 1976 - SEPTEMBER 30, 1976)
(appropriations in millions of dollars)
Authorization
Enrolled
Request
Bill
Difference
Grant Military Assistance
27.2
57.2
+30.0
Foreign Military Training
7.0
6.8
-.2
Foreign Military Credit Sales
30.0
259.8
+229.8
(Program)
(55.5)
(593.7)
(+538.2)
(Authority to forgive
Israeli repayments)
(---)
(187.5)
(+187.5)
Security Supporting Assistance
33.21/
441.6
+408.4
Middle East Special Requirement
-
Fund
10.0
12.5
+2.5
Narcotics Control
13.0
10.0
-3.0
Contingency Fund
5.0
1.2
-3.8
Aid to Cypriot Refugees
---
2.52/
+2.5
International Atomic Energy
Agency
---
.2
+.2
Total
125.4
791.8
+666.4
1/ Of the total request, $5.0 million was for Cyprus relief.
This amount
has been authorized in a separate account, Aid to Cypriot Refugees.
2/ In addition to $5.0 million authorized in the development assistance
bill.
NSC changes
TO THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
I am returning, without my approval, S. 2662, a bill that
would make unacceptable encroachments upon the constitutional
responsibilities of the President for the conduct of foreign
affairs and do serious harm to the long-term foreign policy
interests of the United States.
This legislation authorizes appropriations for security
assistance programs for fiscal year 1976. These programs
are of great importance to our efforts to promote a more stable
and secure world in which constructive international coopera-
tion can flourish. However, the numerous restrictions and
cumbersome procedures contained in the bill would seriously
impair the ability of the Executive Branch to perform its
proper functions.
Constitutional Objections
S. 2662 contains an array of constitutionally objectionable
requirements whereby virtually all significant arms transfer
decisions would be subjected on a case-by-case basis to a
period of delay for Congressional review and possible dis-
approval by concurrent resolution of the Congress. These pro-
visions are incompatible with the express provision in the
Constitution that a resolution having the force and effect
of law must be presented to the President and, if disapproved,
repassed by a two-thirds majority in the Senate and the House
of Representatives. They extend to the Congress the power to
prohibit specific transactions authorized by law without
changing the law -- and without following the constitutional
process such a change would require. Moreover, they would
GERALD FORD VIBRARY
involve the Congress directly in the performance of Executi
functions in disregard of the fundamental principle of sepa-
ration of powers. Congress can, by duly adopted legislation,
CREATE UNWISE IMPROPERTANT STRUCT
THE EXERCISE or THE PRESIDENTS CONSITUTIONAL
RESPONSIBILITIES
authorize or prohibit such actions as the execution of con-
tracts or the issuance of export licenses; but Congress
cannot itself participate in the Executive functions of
deciding whether to enter into a lawful contract or issue
a lawful license, either directly or through the disapproval
procedures contemplated in this bill.
The erosion of the basic distinction between legisla-
tive and Executive functions that which would result from the
enactment of S.2662, and what that displays itself in an in-
creasing volume of similar legislation which this Congress
such ligisation
has passed or is considering. would pose a serious threat
CONGRESS AS ABODY SIMPLY DOES NOT HAVE
THE INFORMATION AND EXPERTISE CAN IT DEVOTE THE
to our system of government, and would forge impermissible
CONSTANT ATTENTION WHICH SUCH OPERATIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE THEMANAGYMENT ON ASSISTANCE
PROGRAMS REQUIRES.COULD not properly be given by
shackles on the President's ability to carry out the laws
and conduct the foreign relations of the United States.
The President cannot function effectively in domestic matters,
and speak for the nation authoritatively in foreign affairs,
if his lawful operational decisions under authority previ-
ously conferred can be reversed by a bare majority of the
Congress. Also, the attempt of Congress to become a virtual
co-administrator in operational decisions would seriously
distract it from its proper legislative role. Inefficiency,
delay, and uncertainty in the management of our nation's
the Congress.
foreign affairs would eventually follow.
M
Apart from these basic constitutional deficiencies
which appear in six sections of the bill, S. 2662 is faulty
legislation, containing numerous unwise restrictions.
Trade with Vietnam
The bill would suspend for 180 days the President's
authority to control certain trade with North and South
FORD & LIBRAR GERALD
Vietnam, thereby removing a vital bargaining instrument for
the settlement of a number of differences between the United
States and these countries. I have the deepest sympathy for
the intent of this provision, which is to obtain an accounting
for Americans missing in action in Victnam. However, the
enactment of this legislation would not provide any real
assurances that the Victnamese would now fulfill their long
standing obligation to provide such/an accounting. Indeed,
the establishment of a direct linkage between trade and
accounting for those missing in action might well only
perpetuate Vietnamese demands for greater and greater con-
cessions.
This Administration is prepared to be responsive to
Vietnamese action on the question of Americans missing in
action. Nevertheless, the delicate process of negotiations
with the Vietnamese cannot be replaced by a legislative
mandate that would open up trade for a specified number of
days and then terminate that trade as a way to achieve our
diplomatic objectives. This mandate represents an unac-
ceptable attempt by Congress to manage the diplomatic rela-
tions of the United States.
Annual Ceiling on Arms Sales
A further objectionable feature of S. 2662 is an annual
ceiling of $9.0 billion on the total of government sales and
no
commercial exports of military equipment and services. In
our search to negotiate mutual restraints in the prolifera-
ag
tion of conventional weapons, this self-imposed ceiling would
be an impediment to our efforts to obtain the cooperation of
other arms-supplying nations. Such an arbitrary ceiling
would also require individual transactions to be evaluated,
not on their own merits, but on the basis of their relation-
ship to the volume of other, unrelated transactions. This
provision would establish an arbitrary, overall limitation
as a substitute for case-by-case analyses and decisions based
on foreign policy priorities and the legitimate security
needs of our allies and friends
IT is THIS ADMINISTRATIONS POLICY TO EXERCISE AND work FOR
no
RESTRAINT IN CONVENTIONAL ARMS SALES, WHILE AT THE
SAME TIME RECOGNIZING ,HAT NE mvst REMAIN
RESPONSIVE TO THE LEG.TIMATE SECURITY NEEDS OF OUR
ALLIES AND FRIENDS.
Discrimination and Human Rights
This bill also contains well intended but misguided
provisions to require the termination of military coopera-
tion with countries which engage in practices that dis-
criminate against United States citizens or practices
constituting a consistent pattern of gross human rights
oviolations. This Administration is fully committed to a
policy of actively opposing and seeking the elimination of
discrimination by foreign governments against United States
citizens on the basis of their race, religion, national
origin or sex, just as the Administration is fully sup-
portive of internationally recognized human rights as a
standard for all nations to respect. The use of the pro-
posed sanctions against sovereign nations is, however, an
awkward and ineffective device for the promotion of those
policies. These provisions of the bill represent further
attempts to ignore important and complex policy considera-
tions by requiring simple legalistic tests to measure the
conduct of sovereign foreign governments. If Congress finds
such conduct deficient, specific actions by the United States
to terminate or limit our cooperation with the government
concerned would be mandated. By making any single factor
the effective determinant of relationships which must take
into account other considerations, such provisions would
add a new element of uncertainty to our security assist-
ance programs and would cast doubt upon the reliability of
the United States in its dealings with other countries.
Moreover, such restrictions would most likely be counter-
FORD
productive as a means for eliminating discriminatory
practices and promoting human rights. The likely result
would be a selective disassociation of the United States
from governments unpopular with the Congress, thereby
diminishing our ability to advance the cause of human rights
through diplomatic means:
Termination of Grant Military Assistance and
Advisory Groups
The legislation would terminate grant military assist-
ance and military assistance advisory groups after fiscal
year 1977 except where specifically authorized by Congress,
thus creating a presumption against such programs and
it
missions In the case of grant assistance, this would
limit our flexibility to assist countries whose national
security is important to us but which are not themselves
able to bear the full cost of their own defense. In the
case of advisory groups, termination of missions by legis-
lative fiat would impair close and long standing military
relationships with important allies. Moreover, such
termination is inconsistent with increasing Congressional
demands for the kind of information about and control over
arms sales which these groups now provide. Such provisions
would insert Congress deeply into the details of specific
country programs, a role which Congress has neither the in-
formation nor the organizational structure to play.
I particularly regret that, notwithstanding the spirit
of genuine cooperation between the Legislative and Executive
Branches that has characterized the deliberations on this
legislation, we have been unable to overcome the major policy
differences that cxist.
SUCH A STEP would HAVE A SEUERE IMPACT
XA
ON OUR RECATIONS W.TH OTHER NATIONS WHOSE
SECURITY AND WELL BEING ARE IMPORTANT TO
OUR OWN NATIONAL INTERESTS.
In disapproving this bill, I act as any President would,
and must, to retain the ability to function as the forcign
policy leader and spokesman of the Nation. In world affairs
today, America can have only one foreign policy. Moreover,
that foreign policy must be certain, clear and consistent.
Foreign governments must know that they can treat with the
President on foreign policy matters, and that when he speaks
within his authority, they can rely upon his words.
Accordingly, I must veto the bill.
THE WHITE. HOUSE
May
, 1976
FORD )