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OCR Page 1 of 9Digitized from Box 20 of the NSA. Presidential Country Files: East Asia and the Pacific at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
CONFIDENTIAL
- 6 -
-- We should devise more effective ways of bridging
the gap between the expert level and the decision-making
level of the government. Cogent judgment was often ob-
scured as information and recommendations proceeded upward
through the system, because of the pressures for success.
-- We should insure that the political and military
aspects of our commitments, and the resources we devote to
each, are kept in proper balance. Military considerations
will become dominant in policy If that balance is skewed
and, as in Viet-Nam, we may lose sight of the fundamental
nature of the conflict and our goals in it.
-- We should try to insure that we do not become
locked-in to "firefighting" management techniques, We
must improve our ability to anticipate events in any
situation of major American involvement, rather than
finding ourselves-- as we so often did in Viet-Nam--coping
FORD
with crises after they had arisen.
Domestic Considerations
8. JOAND,
-- We should recognize that no amount of cajolery
can create public support for a foreign undertaking where
none already exists. (Thus, our commitments must be re-
lated to perceived national interests.) An Administration,
by active leadership, can only energize latent support.
-- Having become involved in a difficult foreign
project, we should not attempt to mislead public opinion
or the Congress as to its duration or the level of sacrifice
it will require. We should not profess to see lights at
the end of tunnels. We should not employ short-term ra-
tionales, out of short-term expediency, when in fact much
remains to be done.
-- We should never assume that inconsistencies in our
policies, or foul-ups in their implementation, will go un-
noticed by the fourth estate. We will have to live with
the fact that mistakes will be exposed (as well as, un-
fortunately, the fact that any course of action, right
or wrong, will be second-guessed).
-- We should insure that Congress is on board not
only at the outset of foreign commitments, but at every
CONFIDENTIAL