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    "localId": "7367501",
    "label": "State Department Paper Regarding the Lessons of Vietnam",
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    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "State Department Paper Regarding the Lessons of Vietnam",
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    "identifierLocal": "032400090-001",
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        "Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific (Ford Administration)",
        "East Asia and Pacific Country Files"
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            "day": 9,
            "logicalDate": "1975-05-09",
            "month": 5,
            "year": 1975
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    "seq": 1,
    "pageIndex": 0,
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    "url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/1/3675/7367501/content/arcmedia/presidential-libraries/ford/gallery/032400090-001_Page_7.jpg",
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    "ocrText": "Digitized from Box 20 of the NSA. Presidential Country Files: East Asia and the Pacific at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library\nCONFIDENTIAL\n- 6 -\n-- We should devise more effective ways of bridging\nthe gap between the expert level and the decision-making\nlevel of the government. Cogent judgment was often ob-\nscured as information and recommendations proceeded upward\nthrough the system, because of the pressures for success.\n-- We should insure that the political and military\naspects of our commitments, and the resources we devote to\neach, are kept in proper balance. Military considerations\nwill become dominant in policy If that balance is skewed\nand, as in Viet-Nam, we may lose sight of the fundamental\nnature of the conflict and our goals in it.\n-- We should try to insure that we do not become\nlocked-in to \"firefighting\" management techniques, We\nmust improve our ability to anticipate events in any\nsituation of major American involvement, rather than\nfinding ourselves-- as we so often did in Viet-Nam--coping\nFORD\nwith crises after they had arisen.\nDomestic Considerations\n8. JOAND,\n-- We should recognize that no amount of cajolery\ncan create public support for a foreign undertaking where\nnone already exists. (Thus, our commitments must be re-\nlated to perceived national interests.) An Administration,\nby active leadership, can only energize latent support.\n-- Having become involved in a difficult foreign\nproject, we should not attempt to mislead public opinion\nor the Congress as to its duration or the level of sacrifice\nit will require. We should not profess to see lights at\nthe end of tunnels. We should not employ short-term ra-\ntionales, out of short-term expediency, when in fact much\nremains to be done.\n-- We should never assume that inconsistencies in our\npolicies, or foul-ups in their implementation, will go un-\nnoticed by the fourth estate. We will have to live with\nthe fact that mistakes will be exposed (as well as, un-\nfortunately, the fact that any course of action, right\nor wrong, will be second-guessed).\n-- We should insure that Congress is on board not\nonly at the outset of foreign commitments, but at every\nCONFIDENTIAL"
}