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Korea (6)
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Korea (6)
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National Security Council East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff Files (Ford Administration)
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The original documents are located in Box 5, folder "Korea (6)" of the NSC East Asian
and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, 1969-1977 at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald R. Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
la
1738
MEMORANDUM
Rok
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
J
ACTION
May 3, 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR:
GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM:
W. R. SMYSER
SUBJECT:
Call on the Vice President by
Korean Chief Justice Min
The State Department has proposed a meeting between the Vice
President and Korean Chief Justice Min Bok Ki (Tab B).
State's purpose in requesting this meeting is to underline our support
of Korean "regular and traditional judicial institutions" at a time of
'increasing authoritarian rule and government" in Korea.
I see no reason why we should involve the Vice President in political
maneuvers designed to influence Korean internal affairs.
Mrs. Davis concurs.
Recommendation:
That you authorize Jeanne Davis to sign the memorandum to
Mr. Springsteen at Tab A.
Approve
Disapprove
FORD
Digitized from Box 5 of NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, 1969-1977 at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
MEMORANDUM FOR
Mr. George S. Springsteen
Executive Secretary
Department of State
SUBJECT:
Call on the Vice President by
Korean Chief Justice Min
The Vice President is unable to receive Chief Justice Min Bok
Ki of the Korean Supreme Court.
We recommend that alternate arrangements be made for the
Korean Chief Justice to meet with members of the U.S.
Judicial Branch.
Jeanne W. Davis
Staff Secretary
FOOD
1C
7408574
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
7401738
Washington, D.C. 20520
April 30, 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE
Subject: Call on the Vice President by Korean
Chief Justice Min
Chief Justice Min Bok Ki of the Korean Supreme
Court will visit the United States during May under
A.I.D. auspices.
Chief Justice Min is a highly respected Korean
jurist. At a time when Korea is experiencing in-
creasingly authoritarian rule and government by Presi-
dential decree we are interested in strengthening the
regular and traditional judicial institutions in the
ROK and in giving support to those who have a similar
view. We believe that Chief Justice Min is in this
category. It would be useful if the Vice President
could see him during his stay in Washington. A bio-
graphic report on Chief Justice Min is enclosed.
He will be available on May 14 and the Department
of State recommends that the Vice President receive a
courtesy call from Chief Justice Min on that date.
You George (S. Springsten
Executive Secretary
Attachment:
Biographic sketch
FORD
10
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 032794
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
ÇNational security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
ÇBiography
DESCRIPTION
Re Republic of Korea Official
CREATION DATE
05/1974
VOLUME
1 page
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
033700247
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES
BOX NUMBER
5
FOLDER TITLE
Korea (6)
DATE WITHDRAWN
03/03/2011
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
TMH
2a
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
CONFIDENTIAL
INFORMATION
May 10, 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR:
RICHARD T. KENNEDY
FROM:
DAVID M. RANS
SUBJECT:
Korea
In the course of a meeting today of the Interagency Steering Group for
the Korean Modernization Program (see attachment), Dick Sneider made
it clear he thought major changes were going to be necessary in both how
and what we funded in this program. He disclaimed a desire to recast
the Presidential commitment; he merely wanted to make it achievable.
-- How we fund: Sneider wants to program much more FMS
relative to MAP. (DOD and OMB agree.) He pointed to the
growing shortfall in the Mod program, which is now in its
fourth year. Instead of a billion dollars, by the end of FY 74
we will have provided something over $600 million in MAP.
Congressional sympathy for MAP was continuing to decline,
and it was unlikely we could end the Mod program before FY 78
at the earliest. Sneider said NSSM 227 in effect, locked in the
USG not only to low FMS levels but also to low MAP levels. If
7
we gave up the quest for high MAP levels, Sneider believes,
there is a good change that we could get much higher FMS
(
credit levels from Congress. Sneider specifically recommended
asking for a line-item, three year program of credits for Korea
to supplement what we already have in the FY 75 budget for
Korea.
What we fund: Sneider wants to rethink the equipment mix,
in line with what he says are changing Korean interests. We
are wed, he feels, to a package of equipment may be growing
obsolete, in Korean eyes. He pointed out the Koreans want to
expand this package with purchases of aircraft perhaps
from third countries. (DOD again agreed.)
I said there was little flexibility I could see in the aims the President is
pursuing in offering Korea a modernization program. However, there
FORD
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
CONFIDENTIAL
NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines
By
In
NARA, Date 12/6/10
CONFIDENTIAL
- 2 -
was flexibility where the means were concerned, as evident in the willing-
ness to make the program open-ended. I added I questioned whether it
was wise, when we were trying to renegotiate security arrangements on
the Peninsula, to tell the Koreans that we were no longer seeking grant
funds as agreed --better to let Congress fail to provide the funds we seek.
Sneider said our failure to provide funds was jeopardizing the credibility
of the President's commitments, which could have its own consequences
for the negotiations we were trying to carry out. He preferred a closed
end package that we (1) could deliver and (2) use to get full Korean
understanding of our position, starting in September when the UNC out-
come might be in sight. Talking to the Koreans candidly would reduce
another danger he foresaw: Korean purchases prompted by less and
less faith in our ability to deliver MAP. Sneider alluded to numerous re-
ports of equipment that Park reportedly wanted --- none on the USG
priority list and some from third countries. (I question the latter point,
but the observations about funding strike me as accurate and important.)
Sneider said the Koreans F-4 request (which the Country Team had recom-
mended) put us on the spot. They want credits. This is likely to be the
first of a series of FMS credit proposals, including perhaps A-7's from co-
production facilities. These items are not on our priority list.
I said we had made the move last year to change the priority from ground to
air defense. DOD reps said the study had just arrived from CINCPAC and
Korea. I went on that the priority list could therefore change if both sides
agreed. DOD said a new priority list, negotiated with the Koreans, was
also in the wings. At this point it was agreed to defer further discussion
?
of the equipment issue until the two studies were in hand.
One more issue was discussed: how much money (and what equipment)
would be added to Korea before the end of this fiscal year. The DOD rep
agreed to draw up illustrative programs assuming different levels of
increase (up to $40 million).
Comment: We are just where we were last summer: everyone but NSC
thinks the program is "a mess" because of the high MAP requirements.
They insist the "mess" is getting worse although there is $52 million in
FMS credits in FY 75 (vice $25 million in FY 74). I discouraged them from
seeking an end to our commitment to seek MAP but as a practical matter I
strongly agree we must come up with more credits in FY 75 to cover some
of our MAP shortfall.
The equipment mix and the final funding level this year are also questions
we must (and can) solve. The more serious question, however, is how do
we serve the President's wishes if the MAP shortfall continues to accumu-
late without offsetting credit increases?
cc:
Smyser
Froebe
CONFIDENTIAL
2
IASG Meeting on ROK Forces Modernization Program
Friday, May 10 at 10:30, Room 6210
STATE
EA - Richard L. Sneider
EA/K - Donald L. Ranard
EA/K - Howard F. Newsom
PM - Jonathan F. Ladd (Fred)
RA/PMU - Richard Finch
ACDA - Jan Kalicki
DOD
Gen. Arthur Hanket
David L. Evans
Robert Vandegrift
Col. Samuel Adams
Cdr. James Moore
Paul Flint
OMB
Paul Baltay
NSC
David Ransom
ORD
2 2c C
IASG Agenda
Background
MAP Funding for FY 1974 (as of March 29, 1974)
Grant MAP Shortfall
F-4E Aircraft
A-7 Aircraft
F-5B Aircraft
FMS
Annual Review
2d
General
MAP Funding for FY 1974 (as of March 29, 1974)
Total Grant Allocation:
$134.3 million
New Equipment
$110.1
Training
2.2
Supply Op
22.0
Funded MAP Grant FY 1974
$ 62.75
Unfunded
49.55
Unfunded Items ($ thousand)
F-5B Aircraft
15,880
F-5B AGE
1,323
Landing Vehicle, Amphib.
420
Trucks
1,017
AA Guns
2,484
Aircraft Support Equip.
1,024
Ship Overhaul (in-country)
737
Other Weapon and Ordnance Equip.
20
Ammunition
3,161
Missle Support Equip.
3,561
Communications Equip.
3,923
Other Support Equip.
1,268
Spare Parts
Aircraft
3,410
Ship
380
Weapons
1,173
Commo
1,470
Missle
2,288
Automotive
952
TA and Spec Sves
539
Repair and Rehab.
3,595
Sale of Excess
39
Training
886
$49,550
If MAP grant should be reduced by $19 million, F-5B aircraft
and AGE would be excluded plus an unidentified $800,000. A
larger reduction would cause deferment until FY 75 of other
items.
2e
29 March 1974
FY 74 KOREA MAP
($ Thousands)
TOTAL PROGRAM
FUNDED PROGRAM
ITEM DESCRIPTION
QTY
COST
QTY
COST
Aircraft Fighter F-5B
8
15,880
F-5B AGE, Engines & CSP
2,323
1,000
Aircraft Fighter F-5E
24
38,400
24
38,400
57.7
F-5E AGE, Engines & CSP
19,303
19,303
Landing Vehicle Amphib
3
420
Miscellaneous Boats & Craft
1
No cost
1
No cost
Trailers (Excess)
69
22
52
22
Trucks (Excess)
1,370
121
157
121
Trucks (Non-Excess)
82
1,017
Ambulances (Excess)
4
2
3
2
Anti aircraft Guns
8
2,484
Cranes (Excess)
2
No cost
Tractors (Excess)
10
5
7
5
Major Construct Eqp Items
5
6
4
6
Aircraft Support Eqp
1,024
Ship Overhaul (In-country)
737
Other weapons & Ordnance Eqp
20
Ammunition
3,161
Missile Support Eqp
4,286
725
Communications Eqp
3,923
Other Support Eqp
1,435
167
Spare Parts:
Aircraft
3,518
108
Ship
405
25
Weapons
1,173
Commo
2,264
794
Missile
2,495
207
Automotive
963
11
Tech Assistance & Spec Svcs
712
173
Repair and Rehabilitation
3,595
UN Forces support In Korea
300
300
Sale of Excess in Korea
100
61
Training
2,206
1,320
Total MAP
112,300
62,750
DECLARCIFIED
E.O.
SEC 3.3
NSC Memo,
Dept, Guidelines:
Dirative
5200.30
By
has
NARA, Date 12/6/10
)
CONFIDENTIAL
2f
Cumulative Funding Data
Grant MAP Shortfall
Funding of the entire allocation in FY 74 will still
leave the MAP Modernization Program $311 million behind
the initially planned five year schedule. (Following table
in $ million)
Grant
FY 71
FY 72
FY 73
FY 74
Total
Plan
295
280
250
215
1040
Funding
292
152.5
149.5
134.8
728.8
Difference
-3
-127.5
-100.5
-80.2
-311.2
FMS
15.0
17.0
24.2
25.0
EDA
Plan
158.9
24.9
19.7
11.5
215.0
Actual
46.9
75.6
9.3
n.a.
131.8 (add na
Difference
-112.0
+50.7
-10.4
n.a.
-71.7 (add na
Recapitulation
Funded FY 71-73
594.0
Allocated FY 74
134.8
FMS charged to Modernization Program FY 73
1.2
FMS charged to Modernization Program FY 74
14.8
Total through FY 74
744.8
FMS approved by NSDM 227 FY 75*
45
FMS approved by NSDM 227 FY 76
65
FMS approved by NSDM 227 FY 77
90
200.0
MAP Grant Required FY 75-77
305.2
1250.0
*$12 million FMS for FY 75 is for items not included in the
ORO
MOD Plan, namely PG ships: $5 million; M-16: $3 million;
Animo plant: $4 million. The CPD for FY 75 provides for
$52 million FMS.
ROK Investment Priorities FY 7: and FY 75
2g
FY 74
Category ^- - Highest Priority -- $127.0 million
Conversion I bn basic Hawk to Improved Hawk
Chapparel batteries and missiles
Vulcan guns
Hardening of POL facilities and aircraft shelters
F-5E (24)
Gap filler radar
Harden radar sites
/
F-4D
PG Co-Production (FMS)*
M-16 Co-Production (FMS)*
PRC-77 Co-Production (FMS)*
Category B - Middle Priority - -- $52.0 million
Improved command and control for ADA
F-5B (4)
CPIC
C-123K (repair and rehab)
Forward area radar
Hawk TOE and terminal equipment
Commo and radar (ROKAF)
Category C - Lowest Priority -- $13.0 million
Repair and Modernize 3 NIKE-HERC batteries
PLL/ASL (Army)
Weapons (LAW)
Commo equip (llavy and MC)
Shipyard MOD
Vehicles
UH-1H Helicopters
OEH support
Attrition Equip.
FY 75
Category A - Hinhest Priority -- $111.0 million
GSBALO FORD LIBRARY
Conversion 1 In basic that to Improved Howk
1
Chapperal batteries and missiles
SEVARE
Aircraft shelter and harden POL storage
Harden radar sites
PG Co-Production*
M-16 Co-Production*
PRC-77 Co-Production*
Category B - Middle Priority -- $102.0 million
Commo Equip (Army)
Forward area rada:
/
CPIC
F-5E (24) **
F-5B (12) **
Commo and radar (ROKAF)
ASL/PLL, tools
Category C - Lowest Priority -- $26.0 million
Attrition equip
08M support
Vehicles
Navy spt and shipyard MOD
UH-1H
* Prior-year FMS commitments
** Highest priority within Category 8. Could be split with a portion of these
aircraft bought in FY 75, remainder 76 or 77. F-5E in category A complete i;
squadrons in MOD Plan.
NOTE: Items within categories are not listed in priority sequence.
FORD
HERALD
LIBRARY
3a
RECEIVED
NSC
MILLS CHARLES N
74 SEOUL 3015
CONFIDENTIAL
JUL 2 7 32 PM '74
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 01 SEOUL 03015 130452Z
20
ACTION EA-14
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 PM-07 NSC-07 SP-03 SS-20 RSC-01 CIAE-00
INR-10 NSAE-00 AEC-11 COME-00 EB-11 TRSE-00 ACDA-19
PA-04 PRS-01 USIA-15 DRC-01 OMB-01 SCI-06 SAJ-01 L-03
H-03 IO-14 /153 w
127240
R 130316Z MAY 74
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3745
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO
CINCPAC
ONFIDENTIALSEOUL 3015
JOINT EMBASSY/COMUSK MESSAGE
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS KS
SUBJECT: LOCKHEED AIRCRAFT ASSISTANCE TO ROK DEFENSE INDUSTRY
1. ROKG AGENCY FOR DEFENSE DEVELOPMENT (ADD) HAS
ASKED LOCKHEED AIRCRAFT TO SUBMIT PROPOSALS FOR THREE
SEPARATE JOINT VENTURES WITH KOREAN COMMERCIAL FIRMS
AND FIVE PROPOSALS FOR ASSISTANCE TO ADD ITSELF IN
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT.
2. IN CONVERSATIONS WITH CHIEF JUSMAG AND AT EMBASSY
LOCKHEED VICE PRESIDENT FOR ASIA, WILLIAM R. TUCK,
SAYS ADD HAS REQUESTED PROPOSALS FOR: A) PROPELLENT
PILOT PLANT AND RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT FACILITIES
FOR PROPELLENTS BOTH TO BE OPERATED BY ADD; B) TRAINING
PROGRAM FOR ADD PERSONNEL IN PROPELLENT R AND D,
DESIGN, ENGINEERING, AND PRODUCTION; C) CONSTRUCTION
OF A 4 x 4' WIND TUNNEL TO BE OPERATED BY ADD;
D) TRAINING PROGRAM FOR ADD PERSONNEL IN FIRE
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 SEOUL 03015 130452Z
CONTROL SYSTEMS DESIGN, ENGINEERING, SYSTEMS
INTEGRATION AND PRODUCTION; E) AN ADD/LOCKHEED
PARTNERSHIP OR JOINT VENTURE TO RESEARCH, DESIGN,
ENGINEER, BUILD AND TEST MISSILE PROTOTYPES. IN
ADDITION TO DIRECT SUPPORT FOR ADD, BLUE HOUSE
OFFICIALS AND ADD HAVE ALSO ASKED LOCKHEED TO
FORD
EXAMINE POSSIBILITIES OF JOINT VENTURES WITH
KOREAN COMMERCIAL FIRMS TO PRODUCE: A) A SMALL
SERALD
MISSILE; B) FIRE CONTROL SYSTEMS; c) COMBAT VEHICLES
LIBRARY
OBJECT OF THESE LATTER JONT VENTURESSVOULD BDMTO
DEVELOP ROK CAPABILITY TO DESIGN, ENGINEER, TEST
AND PRODUCE THESE TYPES OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT.
ACCORDING TUCK, REQUEST FOR JOINT VENTURE PROPOSALS
STILL RATHER VAGUE. HE BELIEVES ROKS THINKING ABOUT
ANTI-TANK ROCKETS, AIR TO GROUND MISSILES, SOMETHING
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE
1
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
State Dept Guidelines
By
NARA, Date 12/6/10
MILLS CHARLES N
74 SEOUL 3015
CONFIDENTIAL
TO COUNTER RUSSIAN MADE STIX MISSILE AND FIRE CONTROL
SYSTEMS FOR VULCAN B. JUSMAG CHIEF HAS BEEN TOLD
BY MND THAT ROKG IS INTERESTED INITIALLY IN
ESTABLISHING MISSILE MAINTENANCE CAPABILITY AS ITS
FIRST PRIORITY IN MISSILE FIELD.
3. WHILE TUCK HAS MADE CLEAR THAT HIS DISCUSS FNS WITH
KOREANS ARE STILL IN PRELIMINARY STAGE HE INDICATES
KOREAN ANXIOUS TO MOVE AHEAD QUICKLY. PROPELLENT
PILOT PLANT DISCUSSIONS ARE APPARENTLY ALREADY
PROCEEDING AT LOCKHEED HEADQUARTERS AND ADD IS NOW
PREPARING DETAILED EXPLANATION OF TRAINING PROGRAM
IT WISHES FOR ITS PERSONNEL IN PROPELLENT RESEARCH
AND PRODUCTION. TUCK HAS HIMSELF GIVEN US PAPER
OUTLINING YEAR LONG TRAINING PROGRAM FOR FOUR TO
FIVE ADD ENGINEERS IN RESEARCH, DESIGN, DEVELOPMENT
AND PRODUCTION FIRE CONTROL SYSTEM. TUCK HAS ALSO
SUGGESTED TO ADD THAT AGENCY AND LOCKHEED FORM A
JOINT STUDY TEAM TO WORK OUT THE ORGANIZATION OF
THE JOINT COMPANY TO CONDUCT RESEARCH ON AND TO DEVELOPE
A KOREAN MISSILE CAPABALITY.
4. WHILE EXPRESSING APPRECIATION TO UCK FOR KEEPING
CONF ID ENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 SEOUL 03015 130452Z
US INFORMED, EMBASSY AND JUSMAG HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT
DETAILED REVIEW IN WASHINGTON WILL BE REQUIRED BEFORE
NECESSARY APPROVALS, LICENSES AND SECURITY CLEARANCES
INVOLVED IN THESE EXTENSIVE PROPOSALS CAN BE
DECIDED ON. TUCK HAS INDICATED FULL APPRECIATION
OF THIS FACT. HE EVINCES HIMSELF SOME SURPRISE
AND DOUBTFULNESS ABOUT THE EXTENSIVE NATUE OF THE
PROPOSALS LOCKHEED IS BEING REQUESTED TO SUBMIT
AND THE COMPLEXITY OF SOME OF THE PROJECTS BEING
PROPOSED.
5. COMMENT: SOME OF VAGUENESS TUCK HAS FELT ON ROK
SIDE UNDOUBTEDLY DUE FACT KOREANS ALSO BEGINNING TO
TALK ABOUT THESE AND OTHER PROJECTS TO A NUMBER OF
OTHER US AIRCRAFT COMPANIES, INCLUDING BOEING,
NORTHRUP, LTV, SIKORSKY, AND MCDONNELL DOUGLAS.
ROKG CLEARLY SHOPPING AT THIS STAGE AND WISHES TO SEE
WHAT PROPOSALS VARIOUS CAMPANIES WILL COME UP WITH
FORD
WHILE NOT COMITTING THEMSELVES.
6. IN GENERAL, ROKS EXEHLORATION OF DEFENSE INDUSTRY
RERALD
POSSIBILITIES IS HEALTHY SIGN THAT THEY MOVING
LIBRARY
REAPIDLY IN THIS AREA TOWARD GREATER SELF-RELIANCE
AND IN KEEPING WITH SECRETARY CLEMENT'S DISCUSSIONS
WITH MND YU AT SECURITY CONSULTATION MEETING SEPT 1973,
DUIRNG WHICH SECRETARY ENCOURAGED ROK JOINT VENTURES
WITH US INDUSTRY. WE ARE SKITTISH ABOUT
COMPLEXITY AND ECONOMIC WISDOM OF SOME OF PROJECTS
CONTEMPLATED HOWEVER, PARTICULARLY IN HIGHLY
SOPHISTICATED ELECTRONICS AND MISSILE BUILDING
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE
2
MILLS CHARLES N
74 SEOUL 3015
CONFIDENTIAL
AREAS, WHERE THEY APPEAR TO BE BITING OFF MORE THAN
THEY WILL BE ABLE TO DIGEST. ROKG MAY REACH THIS
CONCULSION ON ITS OWN.
7. WE ALSO RECOGNIZE THAT SOME OF PROJECTS BEING
CONSIDERED BY ROKG, PARTICULARLY IN MISSILE FIELD,
MAY POSE SIGNIFICANT POLICY QUESTIONS. THEREFORE FOR
THE PRESENT RECOMMEND WASHINGTON AGENCIES ADOPT CAUTIOUS,
NON-COMMITTAL APPROACH TO ANY US COMPANY
PROPOSLAS IN MORE SENSITIVE, OVERLY SOPHISTICATED
FIELDS UNTIL ROKG HAS MORE CLEARLY DEFINED ITS
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 04 SEOUL 03015 130452Z
REQUESTS.
HABIB
CONF IDENTIAL
NNN
FORD
RERALD
LIBRARY
PAGE
3
3b
MILLS CHARLES N
74 SEOUL 3134
SECRET
SECRET
PAGE 01 SEOUL 03134 01 OF 02 170444Z
12/67
ACTION EA-14
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00
NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20 USIA-15 ACDA-19
MC-02 AID-20 IGA-02 OMB-01 EB-11 COME-00 TRSE-00
SAJ-01 IO-14 DRC-01 /160 w
054136
R 160908z MAY 74
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3819
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO CINCPAC
SECRETSECTION 1 OF 2 SEOUL 3134/1
NOFORN
CORRECTEDCOPY (CORRECT GARBLED TEXT THROUGHOUT)
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS KS
SUBJECT: ROK DEFENSE PROCUREMENT: IMPLICATIONS FOR US POLICY
REF: A. SEOUL 3053 B. SEOUL 3015
JOINT EMBASSY/COMUSK MESSAGE
BEGIN SUMMARY: THE ROKG IS MOVING IN THE DIRECTION
OF SIGNIFICANT DEFENSE PROCUREMENT ESSENTIALLY THROUGH
ITS OWN RESOURCES. IN THIS SITUATION THE ROKG DOES
AND WILL CONTINUE TO SEEK OUR BEST ADVICE ON MILITARY
PROCUREMENT MATTERS BUT WILL ALSO SET ITS OWN PRIORITIES
AND ACT ON THEM. END SUMMARY.
1. REF A. GIVES THE BACKGROUND ON RECENT ROKG ACTIONS
TO BEGIN SIGNIFICANT DEFENSE PROCUREMENT ESSENTIALLY
THROUGH ITS OWN RESOURCES. REF B. REPORTS CURRENT ROKG
SECRET
SECRET
PAGE 02 SEOUL 03134 01 OF 02 170444Z
THINKING ON R&D AREA.
2. ROKG MOVEMENT IN THIS DIRECTION IS NOT UNEXPECTED AND
IS ESSENTIALLY A HEALTHY DEVELOPMENT. THE ROKG
CLEARLY HAS COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT ANY LIKELY
FUTURE MAP GRANT ASSISTANCE LEVELS WILL BE TOO LOW
TO MEET ROK DEFENSE NEEDS. AND ROKG VIEWS GRANT
ASSISTANCE AS INCREASINGLY PROBLEMATICAL GIVEN
CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDES. CONSEQUENTLY, UNDER THE
PERSONAL DIRECTION OF PRESIDENT PARK, GOVERNMENT HAS
BEGUN THE PROCESS OF PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING FOR
BEBALD FORD VIBRARY
ITS PROCUREMENT NEEDS IN THE MID-70S.
3. THESE ROKG ACTIONS DO NOT MEAN THAT ROKG HAS
FORMALLY ABANDONED ITS EXPECTATIONS RE MOD PLAN
OBJECTIVES. AND IT HOPES FOR SOME LEVEL OF US GRANT
ASSISTANCE IN NEAR TERM. ROKG WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS
US ON QUESTION OF UNFULFILLED MOD PLAN LEVELS IN HOPE
OF EXACTING AS MUCH GRANT ASSISTANCE AS POSSIBLE.
HOWEVER, ROKG HAS NO SERIOUS EXPECTATIONS THAT GRANT
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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
We
State Dept Guidelines,
By
NARA, Date 12/6/10
MILLS CHARLES N
74 SEOUL 3134
SECRET
ASSISTANCE WOULD CONTINUE BEYOND MOD PLAN IN ANY
EVENT. FURTHER, MND FULLY AWARE OF, AND HAS ACCEPTED,
IMPLICATIONS OF SECDEF CLEMENT'S STATEMENT AT LAST
SCM THAT FMS AS WELL AS GRANT ASSISTANCE
WILL BE USED IN COMPLETING MOD PLAN. IN THIS SITUATION
ROKG APPEARS TO BE MOVING REALISTICALLY AND QUICKLY
TO TAKE UP POST-MOD PLAN PROCUREMENT BURDEN AS WELL
AS TO MEET WHAT IT VIEWS AS ITS OWN HIGH PRIORITY
DEFENSE NEEDS WHETHER THEY ARE IN MOD PLAN OR NOT.
4. FOR OUR PART, WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS INCUMBENT
ON USG ALSO TO REALISTICALLY ASSESS FUTURE DIRECTION
OF OUR MAP. IN OUR PARA CONTRIBUTION (SEOQNR JEAUELN
COUNTRY TEAM POINTED OUT THAT: ROKG IS ICREASINGLY
ABLE TO BEAR COSTS OF ITS OWN DEFENSE; ROKG IS
COMPLITCH AWARE OF DOWNWARD DIRECTION OF US GRANT
ASSISTANCE; AND IT HAS ACCEPTED THAT PROCUREMENT OF
MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND MATERIAL WILL BE ITS OWN
RESPONSIBILITY. WE ALSO POINTED OUT THAT WE MUST
ACCEPT THAT FORMER DOMINANT US ROLE IN DETERMINING
ROK MILITARY REQUIREMENTS WILL INEVITABLY CHANGE, AND
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PAGE 03 SEOUL 03134 01 OF 02 170444Z
THAT ROKG WILL INCREASINGLY EXPECT TO MAKE ITS OWN
FINAL DETERMINATIONS.
5. GIVEN CURRENT ROKG ACTIONS, WE BELIEVE PROPOSED
COURSE OF ACTIONS OUTLINED IN OUR PARA SUBMISSION
CONTINUE TO REMAIN A VALID STATEMENT. AS OUTLINED
IN THAT PAPER, WE BELIEVE THAT THE USG SHOULD:
A. CONTINUE TO MEET OUR MOD PLAN OBJECTIVES
BY A COMBINATION OF GRANT ASSISTANCE AND FMS WITH A
TARGET COMPLETION DATE OF FY 77.
B. CONTINUE TO TRANSFER DEFENSE COSTS TO THE
ROK BY USING INCREASED FMS CASH AND CREDIT FACILITIES.
C. PROJECT ADEQUATE FMS LEVELS TO MEET MAJOR
AGREED ROK PROCUREMENT REQUIREMENTS.
D. WORK TOWARD A SITUATION IN WHICH THE ROK
IS ABLE TO USE NORMAL COMMERCIAL CHANNELS FOR PRO-
CUREMENT AND, AS THE ROK MOVES TOWARDS COMMERCIAL
CREDIT PROCUREMENT, WORK TO ASSURE THAT US EQUIPMENT
AND MATERIAL RETAIN A MOST-FAVORED POSITION.
6. WITHIN THE POLICY FRAMEWORK OUTLINED ABOVE,
ESSENTIAL PROBLEM NOW FACING US IN MILITARY ASSISTANCE
FORD
FIELD IS NOT A BOOKKEEPING APPROACH TO MOD PLAN FUL-
FILLMENT. ROKG HAS INTERPRETED OUR PAST COMMENTS RE
DERALD
MOD PALN STRETHC-OUT, AND INCREASING USE OF FMS TO
LIBRASY
MEET MOD PLAN AS SIGNS THAT ORIGINAL MOD PLAN CONCEPT
IS IN EFFECT WITHERING AWAY. ROKG WOULD NOT WISH TO
PUBLICLY ABANDON MOD PLAN BUT, IT HAS NO SERIOUS
EXPECTATIONS THAT REQUISITE GRANT ASSISTANCE LEVELS
WILL BE FORTHCOMING. RATHER IT SEES ESSENTIAL PROBLEM
AS BEING THE AVAILABILITY OF A HIGH LEVEL OF FMS CREDIT IN THE
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FY 75-80 PERIOD.
FROM ROKG POINT OF VIEW, ITS
CONCESSIONAL CREDIT NEEDS ARE BEYOND MOD PLAN LEVELS
AND INVOLVE MANY ITEMS NOT IN MOD PLAN.
7. CONSEQUENTLY, WE BELIEVE THAT IN THE MONTHS BEFORE
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PAGE 04 SEOUL 03134 01 OF 02 170444Z
THE NEXT SCM IN SEPT, WASHINGTON AGENCIES MUST SERIOUSLY
CONSIDER PRESENTING ROKG WITH REALISTIC PICTURE OF
GRANT ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FUTURE. FURTHER, AND MORE
IMPORTANTLY, WE SHOULD FOCUS ON QUESTION OF FMS CREDIT
LEVELS OVER NEXT FEW YEARS TO ALLOW A NEEDED TRANSI-
TION FROM THE LARGE SCALE GRANT ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
OF THE PAST TO A SITUATION IN WHICH ROK IS ABLE TO USE
NORMAL COMMERCIAL CHANNELS FOR PROCUREMENT.
8. THE FMS CREDIT LEVELS WHICH WE WOULD SEE IN THE
FY 75-78 PERIOD WOULD BE SIGNIFICANTLY ABOVE THE PRESENT
POM LEVELS. IF USG WERE IN A POSITION TO BE FORTH-
COMING ON THE FMS CREDIT USSUE, BELIEVE THAT KOREANS
WOULD IMPLICITLY ACCEPT SITUATION IN WHICH MOD PLAN
REQUIREMENTS WOULD GRADUALLY BE ABSORBED IN COURSE OF
TIME IN AN EXPANDED FMS CREDIT PROGRAM WE WOULD IN
EFFECT HAVE A SMOOTH TRANSITION IN WHICH GRANT ASSISTANCE
ELEMENTS WOULD DISAPPEAR AND AT SOME POINT IN PROCESS
WE WOULD BE IN POSITION TO STATE THAT MOD PLAN
HAD BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLETED.
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FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3820
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO CINCPAC
FORD
S-E CRET SECTION 2 OF 2 SEOUL 3134/2
9. SPECIFICALLY WE RECOMMEND FOLLOWING APPROACH
ON KEY POLICY QUESTIONS:
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LIBRARY
A. MOD PLAN FUTURE: WITH REGARD TO MOD PLAN
FUTURE, BELIEVE WE SHOULD DEAL REALISTICALLY AND
HONESTLY WITH ROKG ON PROSPECTS. USG SHOULD USE FORTH-
COMING SCM TO POINT OUT TO KOREAN SIDE THAT WE WILL
CONTINUE TO DO BEST WE CAN TO MEET REMAINING MOD PLAN
OBJECTIVES. HOWEVER, GIVEN CONGRESSIONAL REALITIES,
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MILLS CHARLES N
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WE CANNOT BE HOPEFUL ABOUT GRANT ASSISTANCE COMPONENT
AND THEREFORE WE AND ROKG WILL HAVE TO GIVE PRIMARY
EMPHASIS TO FMS CREDIT AND CASH PURCHASES FOR REMAINING
MOD PLAN HIGH PRIORITY ITEMS.
B. O&M QUESTION: WE ARE SCHEDULED TO BE OUT OF
GRANT ASSISTANCE FOR O&M BY FY 76. IN LIKELY EVENT
FY 74 GRANT ASSISTANCE IS SUBSTANTIALLY BELOW $112
MILLION, WE MAY WELL ALREADY BE OUT OF O&M BUSINESS IN
FY 74. GIVEN ROKG WILLINGNESS AND ABILITY TO CONSIDER
MAJOR DEFENSE PROCUREMENT ITEMS OUT OF ITS OWN FUNDS,
THERE IS NO JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUING GRANT O&M.
THEREFORE, WE BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD TELL ROKG NOW
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PAGE 02 SEOUL 03134 02 OF 02 162256Z
THAT THERE WILL BE NO SIGNIFICANT O&M GRANT ASSISTANCE
IN FY 75 AND WHATEVER OUR EVENTUAL FY 74 GRANT ASSISTANCE
LEVEL WE WOULD BE BETTER ADVISED TO USE IT FOR
PROCUREMENT OF INVESTMENT ITEMS, NOT O&M. THIS WILL
ALLOW MND TO REALISTICALLY PLAN ITS FUTURE O&M
REQUIREMENTS. (IN VIEW OF LEAD TIME REQUIRED TO
EFFECTIVELY ARRANGE AND IMPLEMENT SSA &FMS CASH CASES
FOR CRITICAL SUPPORT OF ESSENTIAL HIGH PRIORITY,
WEAPONS SYSTEMS, SOME GRANT AID O&M SUPPORT MAY BE
REQUIRED).
C. FMS CREDIT LEVELS: USG SHOULD ON PRIORITY
BASIS ADDRESS QUESTION OF LIKELY FMS LEVELS AVAILABLE
TO ROK IN COMING YEARS. IN OUR VIEW, IT IS IN OUR
INTEREST TO PROVIDE EXPANDED FMS LEVELS NOT ONLY FOR
SECURITY REASONS BUT ALSO TO ASSURE THAT, AS ROKG
INCREASINGLY BEARS ITS OWN DEFENSE COSTS, US EQUIPMENT
AND MATERIAL RETAIN A MOST-FAVORED POSITION IN KOREAN
PROCUREMENT.
D. ROK THIRD-COUTNRY PROCUREMENT: AT PRESENT
ROKG STILL ESSENTIALLY ORIENTED TO PROCUREMENT OF US
EQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS. HOWEVER, AS ROKG INCREASINGLY
MAKES ITS OWN DECISION IT IS ALREADY BEGINNING TO SHOP AROUND.
THIRD-COUNTRY REPS ARE ALREADY QUIETLY BUT ACTIVELY
TRYING TO MOVE IN ON WHAT THEY SEE AS A NEW MARKET.
IN OUR VIEW, WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO TAKE A FIRM LINE
THAT AS LONG AS THERE IS MAJOR USG CONCESSIONAL MAP
PROGRAM HERE, ROKG MUST GIVE US EQUIPMENT HIGHEST
PRIORITY. ROKG WILL UNDERSTAND THIS. AT SAME TIME
FORD
WE DO EXPECT ROKG TO PRESS US FOR UNDERSTANDING AND
APPROVAL OF LIMITED PROCUREMENT OF THIRD-COUNTRY ITEMS
BERALD
WHICH THEY BELIEVE ARE ESSENTIAL TO THEIR NEEDS AND
LIBRARY
WHICH ARE EITHER UNAVAILABLE IN US INVENTORIES OR IN
THE ROK VIEW INADEQUATE. WE WILL HAVE TO DEAL WITH
THESE ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS AS THEY ARISE (E.G.
SWISS OERLIKON AA GUNS). HOWEVER, AS STATED ABOVE
WE NO NOT BELEIVE USG SHOULD COUNTENANCE MAJOR ROK
ARMS PURCHASES FROM THIRD-COUNTRIES WHILE WE ARE IN
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MILLS CHARLES N
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EFFECT STILL UNDERWRITING SIGNIFICANT PART OF THE
ROK DEFENSE COSTS.
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PAGE 03 SEOUL 03134 02 OF 02 162256Z
10. BEYOND THE SPECIFIC CONSIDERATIONS NOTED
ABOVE, WE BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT TO RECOGNIZE THAT OUR
MILITARY ASSISTANCE RELATIONSHIP WITH KOREA IS ALREADY
IN A PERIOD OF TRANSITION. THE ROKG IN ITS OWN WAY
IS ATTEMPTING TO REACT REALISTICALLY TO WHAT IT SEES
AS THE PHASE DOWN OF THE USG'S MASSIVE MILITARY
ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS OF THE PAST. THIS REALIZA-
TION
HAS NOT LED THE ROKG TO PANIC OR TO UNDUE RECRIMINA-
TIONS DIRECTED AGAINST US. IT HAS BEEN UNHAPPY WITH
OUR PERFORMANCE IN PAST YEAR ON MANY MILITARY
ASSISTANCE MATTERS AND HAS SAID so. IN THE SCM WE
CAN EXPECT SOME COMMENT ON ON-FULFILLMENT OF OUR
PROMISES. AT SAME TIME, ROKG HAS NOT IGNORED THE
TRENDS OF EVENTS AND IS NOT TRYING TO TURN CLOCK BACK.
11. FOR OUR PART THIS MEANS THAT WE MUST ACCEPT THAT
THE ROKG INCREASINGLY WILL TELL US WHAT IT WANTS IN
THE MILITARY PROCUREMENT FIELD. THE ROKG
WILL CONTINUE TO ASK OUR ADVICE ON MILITARY
PROCUREMENT MATTERS BUT IT WILL SET ITS OWN
PRIORITIES AND ACT ON THEM. HOWEVER, THE ROKG IS
IN THE PROCESS OF MOVING FROM A PAST DEPENDENT STATUS
IN WHICH, IN EFFECT, IT ACCEPTED OUR DETERMINATIONS
SINCE WE WERE PAYING THE FREIGHT TO A SITUATION IN
WHICH IT SEES ITSELF AS BEARING ESSENTIALLY THE MAJOR
COSTS OF ITS DEFENSE BY THE MID-70S.
12. AMBASSADOR HABIB HAS CLEARED THIS MESSAGE.
ERICSON
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MILLS CHARLES N
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P R 241000Z MAY 74
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3968
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO CINCPAC
SECR E T SECTION 1 OF 2 SEOUL 3335
JOINT EMBASSY/COMUSK MESSAGE
EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, KS
SUBJECT: OUTSTANDING MILITARY ASSISTANCE/MILITARY PROCUREMENT
ISSUES
REF: A SEOUL 3134 B. SEOUL 3053 C. SEOUL 2684
SUMMARY: MND HAS BEEN PRESSING FOR USG RESPONSE TO
SEVERAL MAJOR MAP MILITARY PROCUREMENT MATTERS. EMBASSY/COMUSK
BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD RESPOND TO ROKG REQUESTS ALONG LINES
RECOMMENDATIONS CONTAINED THIS MESSAGE.
1. IN PAST WEEKS MND HAS BEEN PRESSING STRONGLY FOR
USG RESPONSE ON SEVERAL MAJOR MAP MILITARY PROCUREMENT
MATTERS.
2. LATEST DISCUSSION WAS MAY 21 MEETING BETWEEN MND
ASST. MINISTER PAIK SEOK CHU AND JUSMAG CHIEF. DISCUSSION
COVERED FY 74 MAP LEVELL, O&M QUESTION, AND
MAJOR ROK MILITARY PROCUREMENT REQUESTS. THESE
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INCLUDE F4E PROCUREMENT, TOW FOREIGN MILITARY SALES
CREDIT CASE, STANDARD MISSILE PROCUREMENT AND AIM-9E
PROBLEM. PAIK ALSO BROUGHT UP QUESTION OF ROK PRO-
CUREMENT OF OERLIKON 35 MM AA GUNS WHICH BEING
REPORTED SEPARATELY.
3. ON QUESTION OF FY 74 GRANT LEVEL, APIK WAS
FORD
TOLD THAT PROSPECT LOOKED BLEAK AND THAT THERE WILL
BE FURTHER REDUCTION IN LEVEL BELOW THAT ALREADY
CONVEYED TO ROKG. ON QUESTION OF FY 74 O&M, PAIK
LIBRABU
TOKD BY JUSMAG CHIEF THAT IT WOULD BE PRUDENT TO
EXPECT LITTLE OR NO O&M FOR FY 74. PAIK DID NOT
REACT STRONGLY, INDICATING THAT MAJOR MND CONCERN
NOW IS TO GET FIRM FIX ON HOW MUCH GRANT ASSISTANCE
WILL BE AVAILABLE so THAT MND CAN TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTIONS
TO COMPENSATE. PAID INDICATED MND WILL BE REQUESTING FUNDS
TO COMPENSATE FOR O&M SHORTFALL IN SUPPLEMENTAL BUDGETARY
REQUEST LATER IN YEAR.
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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
State Dept Guidelines
By
NARA, Date 12/6/10
MILLS CHARLES N
74 SEOUL 3335
SECRET
4. HOWEVER, PAIK WAS EMOTIONAL AND ADAMANT IN
CONVEYING SENSE OF URGENCY WHICH EXISTED WITHIN MND,
JCS, AND BLUE HOUSE REGARDING MAJOR PROCUREMENT
ITEMS WHICH KOREANS HAVE ALREADY REQUESTED FROM
US AND NEED FOR INCREASED OUTYEAR FMS CREDITS.
PAID SAID BLUE HOUSE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND MND'S
INABILITY TO SECURE REQUISITE INFORMATION ON COST
AND AVAILABILITY AND TO BEGIN PROCUREMENT PROCESS.
5. FOLLOWING IS SUBSTANCE OF PAIK'S COMMENTS RE
SPECIFIC MAJOR PROCUREMENT PROBLEMS:
A. F4ES: PAIK STRESSED THAT ROKG ANXIOUSLY
WAITING FOR LETTER OF OFFER ON F4ES. HE REQUESTED
THAT LETTER BE EXPEDITED AND PRESENTED TO ROKG NO
LATER THAN THE END OF MAY. PAIK STATED THAT FIRM
DECISION HAS BEEN MADE TO PURCHASE ONE F4E SQUADRON
PRODUCED IN U.S. AND TO REQUEST FMS CREDIT FUNDING FOR
THEIR PURCHASE. REQUIRED ADDITIONAL AIRCRAFT WILL
BE ASSEMBLED IN ROK UNDER JOINT VENTURE ARRANGEMENT WITH
MCDONNELL-DOUGLAS. PAID INDICATED ROKG FULLY AWARE THAT FUNDING
FOR JOINT VENTURE F4E ASSEMBLY WOULD HAVE TO BE DIRECT
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COMMERCIAL FINANCING. (DISCUSSION RE JOINT VENTURE
IS ALREADY UNDERWAY BETWEEN ROKG AND MCDONNELL-
DOUGLAS. COMPANY REPS HAVE INDICATED TO US INFORMALLY
THEIR WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT.)
B. TOW FMS CASE: PAIK SAID THAT IN-DEPTH
ANALYSIS OF TOW REQUIREMENTS HAS LED MND TO CONCLUSION
ONLY SIX COMPANIES ARE REQUIRED. THEREFORE, IN
ADDITION TO THE TWO COMPANIES INCLUDED IN FY 74
PHASE II FMS CREDIT PROGRAM, ROKG WISHES TO
PURCHASE FOUR ADDITIONAL COMPANIES (18 PER COMPANY).
PAIK STRESSED MND MUST RECEIVE IN TIMELY FASHION
INFORMATION EARLIER REQUESTED CONCERNING PRICE,
AVAILABILITY AND FUNDING ARRANGEMENTS FOR TOW
PURCHASE. SAID THIS INFORMATION ESSENTIAL
so THAT MND CAN MAKE PROPER BUDGETARY ARRANGEMENTS.
C. STANDARD MISSILES: PAIK INDICATED THAT
FURD
ROKG'S DESIRE TO PURCHASE 40 STANDARD MISSILES
REMAINS FIRM. MND HOPES THAT THESE CAN BE
PURCHASED FROM U.S. NAVY THROUGH FMS CREDIT. MND
SERALD
WORKING DIRECTLY WITH GENERAL DYNAMICS CORP. TO
LIBRARY
PURCHASE EIGHT LAUNCHERS. JUSMAG CHIEF POINTED OUT
FY 74 CREDIT LEVEL COULD NOT ACCOMMODATE
PURCHASE OF MISSILES. PAIK EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING,
BUT SAID HE HOPED WE WOULD BE ABLE TO OBTAIN
ADDITIONAL FMS FUNDS FOR THIS. IF FMS CREDIT NOT
POSSIBLE, PAIK SAID ROKG PREPARED MAKE CASH PAYMENT.
HOWEVER, WOULD HAVE TO KNOW HOW MUCH THE 40 MISSILES
WOULD COST AND WHAT TERMS OF PAYMENT WOULD BE. PAIK
ALSO REQUESTED THIS INFORMATION ON PRIORITY BASIS.
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D. AID 9E PROJECT: MND REQUESTS EARLIEST POSSIBLE USG
ACTION ON AID-9E PROJECT. AS WASHINGTON AWARE,
PHILCO FORD CORPORATION HAS INFORMED ROKG OF THEIR INTENT
TO STOP ACTIONS ON CURRENT CONTRACT EFFECTIVE 1 JUNE
74 UNLESS PAYMENT OF $3.3 MILLION MADE PRIOR. IN VIEW
OF FACT WE ENCOURAGED ROKG TO GO FMS ROUTE ON THIS
PROJECT, THEY SIGNED CONTRACT IN AUGUST 1973 AND HAVE
BEEN PAYING $12,000 MONTHLY INTEREST SINCE THAT DATE
FAILURE TO PROMPTLY APPROVE FMS CREDIT PREVIOUSLY
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PAGE 04 SEOUL 03335 01 OF 02 241102Z
REQUESTED AND IN CURRENT FY 74 PROGRAM, WOULD BE
EXTREMELY EMBARASSING AND IMPOSSIBLE TO EXPLAIN
ADEQUATELY TO ROKS (PHILCO FORD CORPORATION HAS
ALREADY STOPPED SHIPMENT OF EQUIPMENT AND PARTS
AGREED TO IN INITIAL CONTRACT).
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P R 241000z MAY 74
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3969
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO CINCPAC
SECR E T SECTION 2 OF 2 SEOUL 3335
6. COMMENT: PAIK CLEARLY UNDER HEAVIEST PRESSURE FROM
BLUE HOUSE AND MND TO GET SOME MOVEMENT FROM US ON
ROKG PROCUREMENT REQUESTS. ROKG DOES NOT UNDERSTAND
CONTINUING DELAY ON OUR PART IN EVEN PROVIDING COST AND
AVAILABILITY INFORMATION REQUESTED BY MND. THIS IS CREATING
SERIOUS IRRITATION AT HIGHEST LEVELS OF ROKG. RECOGNIZE THAT
SOME OF ROKG REQUESTS REQUIRE MAJOR DECISIONS ON OUR PART
AND CANNOT BE ACTED UPON INSTANTLY AS ROKG OBVIOUSLY WISHES.
HOWEVER, BELIEVE IT ESSENTIAL THAT WE RESPOND SOONEST
TO AT LEAST SOME OF THE ROKG REQUESTS LISTED ABOVE.
FORD
7. TO MEET OUR NEEDS HERE, EMBASSY/USFK WOULD
RECOMMEND THE FOLLOWING APPROACH:
SERALD
A. WASHINGTON AGENCIES PROVIDE SOONEST
LIBRARY
PROCUREMENT INFORMATION REQUESTED BY MND
ON TOW FMS CASE AND ON THE STANDARD MISSILES AND
AT SAME TIME, INFORM MND OF RELEASE PHASE II FMS
CREDIT FUNDS FOR AID-9E MISSILES. (IF WE COULD ALSO
INFORM MND OF RELEASE ALL OF PHASE II FY 74 FMS CREDIT
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MILLS CHARLES N
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FUNDS THIS WOULD DO MUCH TO MEET OUR MOST PRESSING
PROBLEMS IN DEALING WITH MND.)
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B. EXPEDITE CONSIDERATION OF ROKG REQUEST
FOR F4E LETTER OF OFFER. AS WE SEE IT, THERE ARE TWO
QUESTIONS INVOLVED: FIRST IS POLICY DETERMINATION
THAT WE WILL ALLOW SALE OF F4ES TO ROKG; SECOND IS
QUESTION OF FMS FUNDING. WITH REGARD TO POLICY CONSIDERATION,
EMBASSY/USFK BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD INFORM ROKG NOW THAT WE
HAVE NO OBJECTION TO SALE OF F4ES. WE HAVE ALREADY EXPLAINED
BACKGROUND ROKG DECISION ON THIS. QUESTION OF HOW MANY
F4ES ROKG WILL PROCURE STILL UNDER DEBATE WITHIN
GOVERNMENT. BUT AT MINIMUM KOREANS WANT TO PURCHASE
ONE SQUADRON NOW AND TO EVENTUALLY CO-PRODUCE ONE
OR TWO ADDITIONAL SQUADRONS IF JOINT VENTURE
ARRANGEMENT WORKS OUT. ON QUESTION OF FMS FINANCING,
BELIEVE THAT ROKG WILL RELUCTANTLY ACCEPT AN INITIAL
USG RESPONSE INDICATING THAT EARLY ANSWER NOT
POSSIBLE SINCE WE MUST STUDY ROKG REQUEST AND WEIGH
IT IN TERMS OF OTHER COMPETING PRIORITIES.
8. ACTION REQUESTED:
A. REQUEST THAT WASHINGTON AGENCIES ACT
IMMEDIATELY ALONG LINES RECOMMENDED IN PARA 7A ABOVE.
B. WITH REGARD TO RECOMMENDATION RE F4ES,
REQUEST WASHINGTON GIVE PRIORITY ATTENTION THIS
PROBLEM AS REQUESTED IN PARA 7B ABOVE AS WELL AS
AUTHORIZE US NOW TO INFORM MND THAT EARLY REPLY WILL
BE FORTHCOMING.
ERICSON
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GERALD FORD VIBRIES
Blake UPS
5/5/74
called
1738
May 8,
MEMORANDUM FOR
Mr. John Marsh
1974 weater say his irom.
Assistant to the Vice President
for Defense Affairs
SUBJECT:
Call on the Vice President by Korean
Chief Justice
The State Department has recommended that the Vice President
receive Korean Supreme Court Chief Justice Min Bok Ki for a
courtesy call on May 14 (Tab A). The Chief Justice, who is
visiting the U.S. under the auspices of AID, has not requested
an appointment with the Vice President but he would, of course,
be pleased if an appointment were arranged.
State's purpose in requesting the meeting is to underline our
support of Korean "regular and traditional judicial institutions"
at a time of "increasing authoritarian rule and government" in
Korea.
The NSC staff recommends against the appointment. We believe
it is inappropriate to involve the Vice President in political
maneuvers designed to influence Korean internal affairs. Nor
do we believe it necessary to offer a meeting with such a high
official of the Executive Branch and would plan to recommend to
State that they arrange appointments with appropriate ranking
members of the U.S. Judiciary.
Will you please let me know the Vice President's wishes in this
regard so that we may take the necessary steps with the State
Department.
SERALD FORD LIBRATO
Jeanne W. Davis
Staff Secretary
CC: Mr. Smyser
1738
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION
May 3, 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR:
GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM:
W. R. SMYSER
SUBJECT:
Call on the Vice President by
Korean Chief Justice Min
The State Department has proposed a meeting between the Vice
President and Korean Chief Justice Min Bok Ki (Tab B).
State's purpose in requesting this meeting is to underline our support
of Korean "regular and traditional judicial institutions" at a time of
'increasing authoritarian rule and government" in Korea.
I see no reason why we should involve the Vice President in political
maneuvers designed to influence Korean internal affairs.
Mrs. Davis concurs.
Recommendation:
That you authorize Jeanne Davis to sign the memorandum to
Mr. Springsteen at Tab A.
Approve BD
Disapprove
FORD
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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 State (es Dept amended) Guidelines SEC 3.3 statement state 9/17/03
By like NARA, Date 12/6/10
WHITE JOYCE A
74 SEOUL 3134
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R 160908Z MAY 74
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3819
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO CINCPAC
SECRE T SECTION 1 OF 2 SEOUL 3134/1
NOFORN
CORRECTEDCOP Y (CORRECT GARBLED TEXT THROUGHOUT)
<-
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS KS
SUBJECT: ROK DEFENSE PROCUREMENT: IMPLICATIONS FOR US POLICY
REF: A. SEOUL 3053 B. SEOUL 3015
JOINT EMBASSY/COMUSK MESSAGE
BEGIN SUMMARY: THE ROKG IS MOVING IN THE DIRECTION
OF SIGNIFICANT DEFENSE PROCUREMENT ESSENTIALLY THROUGH
ITS OWN RESOURCES. IN THIS SITUATION THE ROKG DOES
AND WILL CONTINUE TO SEEK OUR BEST ADVICE ON MILITARY
PROCUREMENT MATTERS BUT WILL ALSO SET ITS OWN PRIORITIES
BOOK
AND ACT ON THEM. END SUMMARY.
1. REF A. GIVES THE BACKGROUND ON RECENT ROKG ACTIONS
TO BEGIN SIGNIFICANT DEFENSE PROCUREMENT ESSENTIALLY
THROUGH ITS OWN RESOURCES. REF B. REPORTS CURRENT ROKG
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PAGE 02 SEOUL 03134 01 OF 02 170444Z
THINKING ON R&D AREA.
2. ROKG MOVEMENT IN THIS DIRECTION IS NOT UNEXPECTED AND
a. FORD
IS ESSENTIALLY A HEALTHY DEVELOPMENT. THE ROKG
CLEARLY HAS COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT ANY LIKELY
FUTURE MAP GRANT ASSISTANCE LEVELS WILL BE TOO LOW
TO MEET ROK DEFENSE NEEDS. AND ROKG VIEWS GRANT
ASSISTANCE AS INCREASINGLY PROBLEMATICAL GIVEN
CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDES. CONSEQUENTLY, UNDER THE
PERSONAL DIRECTION OF PRESIDENT PARK, GOVERNMENT HAS
BEGUN THE PROCESS OF PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING FOR
ITS PROCUREMENT NEEDS IN THE MID-70S.
3. THESE ROKG ACTIONS DO NOT MEAN THAT ROKG HAS
FORMALLY ABANDONED ITS EXPECTATIONS RE MOD PLAN
OBJECTIVES. AND IT HOPES FOR SOME LEVEL OF US GRANT
ASSISTANCE IN NEAR TERM. ROKG WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS
US ON QUESTION OF UNFULFILLED MOD PLAN LEVELS IN HOPE
OF EXACTING AS MUCH GRANT ASSISTANCE AS POSSIBLE.
HOWEVER, ROKG HAS NO SERIOUS EXPECTATIONS THAT GRANT
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WHITE JOYCE A
74 SEOUL 3134
SECRET
ASSISTANCE WOULD CONTINUE BEYOND MOD PLAN IN ANY
EVENT. FURTHER, MND FULLY AWARE OF, AND HAS ACCEPTED,
IMPLICATIONS OF SECDEF CLEMENT'S STATEMENT AT LAST
SCM THAT FMS AS WELL AS GRANT ASSISTANCE
WILL BE USED IN COMPLETING MOD PLAN. IN THIS SITUATION
ROKG APPEARS TO BE MOVING REALISTICALLY AND QUICKLY
TO TAKE UP POST-MOD PLAN PROCUREMENT BURDEN AS WELL
AS TO MEET WHAT IT VIEWS AS ITS OWN HIGH PRIORITY
DEFENSE NEEDS WHETHER THEY ARE IN MOD PLAN OR NOT.
4. FOR OUR PART, WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS INCUMBENT
ON USG ALSO TO REALISTICALLY ASSESS FUTURE DIRECTION
OF OUR MAP. IN OUR PARA CONTRIBUTION (SEOONR JEAUELN
COUNTRY TEAM POINTED OUT THAT: ROKG IS ICREASINGLY
ABLE TO BEAR COSTS OF ITS OWN DEFENSE; ROKG IS
COMPLUTCH AWARE OF DOWNWARD DIRECTION OF US GRANT
ASSISTANCE; AND IT HAS ACCEPTED THAT PROCUREMENT OF
MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND MATERIAL WILL BE ITS OWN
RESPONSIBILITY. WE ALSO POINTED OUT THAT WE MUST
ACCEPT THAT FORMER DOMINANT US ROLE IN DETERMINING
ROK MILITARY REQUIREMENTS WILL INEVITABLY CHANGE, AND
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PAGE 03 SEOUL 03134 01 OF 02 170444Z
THAT ROKG WILL INCREASINGLY EXPECT TO MAKE ITS OWN
FINAL DETERMINATIONS,
5. GIVEN CURRENT ROKG ACTIONS, WE BELIEVE PROPOSED
COURSE OF ACTIONS OUTLINED IN OUR PARA SUBMISSION
0000
CONTINUE TO REMAIN A VALID STATEMENT. AS OUTLINED
UNIT
IN THAT PAPER, WE BELIEVE THAT THE USG SHOULD:
A. CONTINUE TO MEET OUR MOD PLAN OBJECTIVES
BY A COMBINATION OF GRANT ASSISTANCE AND FMS WITH A
TARGET COMPLETION DATE OF FY 77.
B. CONTINUE TO TRANSFER DEFENSE COSTS TO THE
ROK BY USING INCREASED FMS CASH AND CREDIT FACILITIES.
C. PROJECT ADEQUATE FMS LEVELS TO MEET MAJOR
AGREED ROK PROCUREMENT REQUIREMENTS.
D. WORK TOWARD A SITUATION IN WHICH THE ROK
1022
IS ABLE TO USE NORMAL COMMERCIAL CHANNELS FOR PRO-
CUREMENT AND, AS THE ROK MOVES TOWARDS COMMERCIAL
CREDIT PROCUREMENT, WORK TO ASSURE THAT US EQUIPMENT
AND MATERIAL RETAIN A MOST-FAVORED POSITION.
6. WITHIN THE POLICY FRAMEWORK OUTLINED ABOVE,
ESSENTIAL PROBLEM NOW FACING US IN MILITARY ASSISTANCE
FIELD IS NOT A BOOKKEEPING APPROACH TO MOD PLAN FUL-
FILLMENT. ROKG HAS INTERPRETED OUR PAST COMMENTS RE
MOD PALN STRETHC-OUT, AND INCREASING USE OF FMS TO
MEET MOD PLAN AS SIGNS THAT ORIGINAL MOD PLAN CONCEPT
IS IN EFFECT WITHERING AWAY. ROKG WOULD NOT WISH TO
P**ONTHS BEFORE
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PAGE 04 SEOUL 03134 01 OF 02 1704442
THE NEXT SCM IN SEPT, WASHINGTON AGENCIES MUST SERIOUSLY
CONSIDER PRESENTING ROKG WITH REALISTIC PICTURE OF
GRANT ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FUTURE. FURTHER, AND MORE
IMPORTANTLY, WE SHOULD FOCUS ON QUESTION OF FMS CREDIT
LEVELS OVER NEXT FEW YEARS TO ALLOW A NEEDED TRANSI-
TION FROM THE LARGE SCALE GRANT ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
OF THE PAST TO A SITUATION IN WHICH ROK IS ABLE TO USE
NORMAL COMMERCIAL CHANNELS FOR PROCUREMENT.
8. THE FMS CREDIT LEVELS WHICH WE WOULD SEE IN THE
FY 75-78 PERIOD WOULD BE SIGNIFICANTLY ABOVE THE PRESENT
POM LEVELS. IF USG WERE IN A POSITION TO BE FORTH-
COMING ON THE FMS CREDIT USSUE, BELIEVE THAT KOREANS
WOULD IMPLICITLY ACCEPT SITUATION IN WHICH MOD PLAN
REQUIREMENTS WOULD GRADUALLY BE ABSORBED IN COURSE OF
TIME IN AN EXPANDED FMS CREDIT PROGRAM WE WOULD IN
EFFECT HAVE A SMOOTH TRANSITION IN WHICH GRANT ASSISTANCE
ELEMENTS WOULD DISAPPEAR AND AT SOME POINT IN PROCESS
WE WOULD BE IN POSITION TO STATE THAT MOD PLAN
HAD BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLETED,
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PAGE 01 SEOUL 03134 02 OF 02 162256Z
67
ACTION EA-14
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00
NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20 USIA-15 ACDA-19
MC-02 AID-20 IGA-02 OMB-01 EB-11 COME-00 TRSE-00
SAJ-01 IO-14 DRC-01 /160 W
049950
R 160908Z MAY 74
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3820
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO CINCPAC
S-E C R B T SECTION 2 OF 2 SEOUL 3134/2
9. SPECIFICALLY WE RECOMMEND FOLLOWING APPROACH
ON KEY POLICY QUESTIONS:
A. MOD PLAN FUTURE: WITH REGARD TO MOD PLAN
FUTURE, BELIEVE WE SHOULD DEAL REALISTICALLY AND
HONESTLY WITH ROKG ON PROSPECTS. USG SHOULD USE FORTH-
COMING SCM TO POINT OUT TO KOREAN SIDE THAT WE WILL
CONTINUE TO DO BEST WE CAN TO MEET REMAINING MOD PLAN
OBJECTIVES. HOWEVER, GIVEN CONGRESSIONAL REALITIES,
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FORD is GREATO LIBRARY
WHITE JOYCE A
74 SEOUL 3134
SECRET
WE CANNOT BE HOPEFUL ABOUT GRANT ASSISTANCE COMPONENT
AND THEREFORE WE AND ROKG WILL HAVE TO GIVE PRIMARY
EMPHASIS TO FMS CREDIT AND CASH PURCHASES FOR REMAINING
MOD PLAN HIGH PRIORITY ITEMS.
B. O&M QUESTION: WE ARE SCHEDULED TO BE OUT OF
GRANT ASSISTANCE FOR O&M BY FY 76. IN LIKELY EVENT
FY 74 GRANT ASSISTANCE IS SUBSTANTIALLY BELOW $112
MILLION, WE MAY WELL ALREADY BE OUT OF O&M BUSINESS IN
FY 74, GIVEN ROKG WILLINGNESS AND ABILITY TO CONSIDER
MAJOR DEFENSE PROCUREMENT ITEMS OUT OF ITS OWN FUNDS,
THERE IS NO JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUING GRANT O&M.
THEREFORE, WE BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD TELL ROKG NOW
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PAGE 02 SEOUL 03134 02 OF 02 162256Z
THAT THERE WILL BE NO SIGNIFICANT O&M GRANT ASSISTANCE
IN FY 75 AND WHATEVER OUR EVENTUAL FY 74 GRANT ASSISTANCE
LEVEL WE WOULD BE BETTER ADVISED TO USE IT FOR
PROCUREMENT OF INVESTMENT ITEMS, NOT O&M. THIS WILL
ALLOW MND TO REALISTICALLY PLAN ITS FUTURE O&M
REQUIREMENTS. (IN VIEW OF LEAD TIME REQUIRED TO
EFFECTIVELY ARRANGE AND IMPLEMENT SSA &FMS CASH CASES
FOR CRITICAL SUPPORT OF ESSENTIAL HIGH PRIORITY,
WEAPONS SYSTEMS, SOME GRANT AID O&M SUPPORT MAY BE
REQUIRED).
c. FMS CREDIT LEVELS: USG SHOULD ON PRIORITY
BASIS ADDRESS QUESTION OF LIKELY FMS LEVELS AVAILABLE
TO ROK IN COMING YEARS. IN OUR VIEW, IT IS IN OUR
INTEREST TO PROVIDE EXPANDED FMS LEVELS NOT ONLY FOR
SECURITY REASONS BUT ALSO TO ASSURE THAT, AS ROKG
INCREASINGLY BEARS ITS OWN DEFENSE COSTS, US EQUIPMENT
AND MATERIAL RETAIN A MOST-FAVORED POSITION IN KOREAN
PROCUREMENT.
D. ROK THIRD-COUTNRY PROCUREMENT: AT PRESENT
ROKG STILL ESSENTIALLY ORIENTED TO PROCUREMENT OF US
EQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS. HOWEVER, AS ROKG INCREASINGLY
MAKES ITS OWN DECISION IT IS ALREADY BEGINNING TO SHOP AROUND.
THIRD-COUNTRY REPS ARE ALREADY QUIETLY BUT ACTIVELY
TRYING TO MOVE IN ON WHAT THEY SEE AS A NEW MARKET.
IN OUR VIEW, WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO TAKE A FIRM LINE
THAT AS LONG AS THERE IS MAJOR USG CONCESSIONAL MAP
PROGRAM HERE, ROKG MUST GIVE US EQUIPMENT HIGHEST
PRIORITY. ROKG WILL UNDERSTAND THIS. AT SAME TIME
LIBRARY HORALD FORD
WE DO EXPECT ROKG TO PRESS US FOR UNDERSTANDING AND
APPROVAL OF LIMITED PROCUREMENT OF THIRD-COUNTRY ITEMS
WHICH THEY BELIEVE ARE ESSENTIAL TO THEIR NEEDS AND
WHICH ARE EITHER UNAVAILABLE IN US INVENTORIES OR IN
THE ROK VIEW INADEQUATE. WE WILL HAVE TO DEAL WITH
THESE ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS AS THEY ARISE (E.G.
SWISS OERLIKON AA GUNS). HOWEVER, AS STATED ABOVE
WE NO NOT BELEIVE USG SHOULD COUNTENANCE MAJOR ROK
ARMS PURCHASES FROM THIRD-COUNTRIES WHILE WE ARE IN
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WHITE JOYCE A
74 SEOUL 3134
SECRET
EFFECT STILL UNDERWRITING SIGNIFICANT PART OF THE
ROK DEFENSE COSTS.
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PAGE 03 SEOUL 03134 02 OF 02 162256Z
10. BEYOND THE SPECIFIC CONSIDERATIONS NOTED
ABOVE, WE BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT TO RECOGNIZE THAT OUR
MILITARY ASSISTANCE RELATIONSHIP WITH KOREA IS ALREADY
IN A PERIOD OF TRANSITION. THE ROKG IN ITS OWN WAY
IS ATTEMPTING TO REACT REALISTICALLY TO WHAT IT SEES
AS THE PHASE DOWN OF THE USG'S MASSIVE MILITARY
ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS OF THE PAST. THIS REALIZA-
TION
HAS NOT LED THE ROKG TO PANIC OR TO UNDUE RECRIMINA-
TIONS DIRECTED AGAINST US. IT HAS BEEN UNHAPPY WITH
OUR PERFORMANCE IN PAST YEAR ON MANY MILITARY
ASSISTANCE MATTERS AND HAS SAID so, IN THE SCM WE
CAN EXPECT SOME COMMENT ON ON-FULFILLMENT OF OUR
PROMISES. AT SAME TIME, ROKG HAS NOT IGNORED THE
TRENDS OF EVENTS AND IS NOT TRYING TO TURN CLOCK BACK.
11. FOR OUR PART THIS MEANS THAT WE MUST ACCEPT THAT
THE ROKG INCREASINGLY WILL TELL US WHAT IT WANTS IN
THE MILITARY PROCUREMENT FIELD. THE ROKG
WILL CONTINUE TO ASK OUR ADVICE ON MILITARY
PROCUREMENT MATTERS BUT IT WILL SET ITS OWN
PRIORITIES AND ACT ON THEM. HOWEVER, THE ROKG IS
IN THE PROCESS OF MOVING FROM A PAST DEPENDENT STATUS
IN WHICH, IN EFFECT, IT ACCEPTED OUR DETERMINATIONS
SINCE WE WERE PAYING THE FREIGHT TO A SITUATION IN
WHICH IT SEES ITSELF AS BEARING ESSENTIALLY THE MAJOR
COSTS OF ITS DEFENSE BY THE MID-70S.
12. AMBASSADOR HABIB HAS CLEARED THIS MESSAGE.
ERICSON
SECRET
NNN
FORD
BERALD
2291
6a
FROEBE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
FYI Rok
June 13, 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR:
S
Mr. George S. Springsteen
Executive Secretary
Department of State
SUBJECT:
Reply to Letter for Korean National
Assemblyman (S/S 7410736)
P
I enclose a slightly revised version of the reply to Mr. Row
and suggest it be signed by a State Department officer.
Jeanne Davis
Staff Secretary
Attachment
Dispatched 6/13/1974 (adc)
FORDO LIBRARY 077336
SUGGESTED LETTER
Honorable Chin Hwan Row
National Assembly of the
Republic of Korea
Seoul, Korea
Dear Mr. Row:
I have been asked to respond to your letter to the President,
in which you express your appreciation for the visit of Mr. John
Nidecker, Special Assistant to the President, to Korea.
We are indeed pleased that you found Mr. Nidecker's visit
helpful. For his part, Mr. Nidecker benefited considerably
from his visit and has provided us with a valuable report of
developments in Korea and of his visit. We are grateful that
he was so well received.
Sincerely yours,
FBIS 63
DPRK DEPUTY PREMIER ATTACKS ROK-U.S. OBSTRUCTION OF REUNIFICATION
B231011 PYONGYANG KCNA IN ENGLISH 0800 GMT 23 JUN 74 B
R
(TEXT) PYONGYANG JUNE 23 (KCNA) -- A GRAND PYONGYANG REPORT
MEETING WAS HELD AT THE PEOPLE'S PALACE OF CULTURE SATURDAY EVENING
TO MARK THE FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF THE PUBLICATION OF "LET US PREVENT A
NATIONAL SPLIT AND REUNIFY THE COUNTRY", HE HISTORIC SPEECH MADE BY
THE RESPECTED AND BELOVED LEADER COMRADE KIM IL-SONG.
PUT WITH DUE RESPECT ON THE PLATFORM AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF A
HUGE DEEP BLUE AND RED FLAG OF THE REPUBLIC WAS A PORTRAIT OF THE
RESPECTED AND BELOVED LEADER COMRADE KIM IL-SONG, THE GENIUS OF
REVOLUTION AND THE SUN AND SAVIOUR OF OUR NATION.
PRESENT AT THE REPORT MEETING WERE FUNCTIONARIES OF PARTY AND
POWER ORGANS, WORKING PEOPLE'S S ORGANIZATIONS AND ECONOMIC BODIES AND
MEN OF SCIENCE, EDUCATION, CULTURE AND ART AND THE PRESS AS WELL AS
WORKING PEOPLE IN THE CITY AND SERVICEMEN OF THE PEOPLE'S ARMY.
THE PLATFORM WAS TAKEN BY COMRADES SO CHOL AND CHONG CHUN-KI:
HO CHONG-SUK, DIRECTOR OF THE SECRETARIAT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
OF THE FATHERLAND FRONT: KANG CHANG-SU, CHAIRMAN OF THE CENTRAL
COMMITTEE OF THE CHONDOIST CHONGU PARTY: KIM SONG-YUL, VICE-CHAIRMAN
OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE KOREAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY: HONG KI-
MUN, CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE FOR THE PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION OF THE
FATHERLAND; MEMBERS OF THE PRESIDIUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE
FATHERLAND FRONT: KANG HUI-WON, CHAIRMAN OF THE PYONGYANG MUNICIPAL
ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE: AND RESPONSIBILE FUNCTIONARIES OF PUBLIC
ORGANIZATIONS.
DeputyPremer
COMRADE CHONG CHUN-KI DELIVERED A REPORT AT THE MEETING.
THE REPORTER SAID: THE FIVE-POINT PROPOSITION OF NATIONAL
REUNIFICATION ADVANCED BY THE RESPECTED AND BELOVED LEADER COMRADE KIM
IL-SONG IS A MOST PATRIOTIC PROPOSITION FOR REUNIFICATION CORRECTLY
REFLECTING THE URGENT DEMAND OF THE PREVAILING SITUATION AND THE
ARDENT DESIRE OF THE ENTIRE KOREAN PEOPLE TO ACHIEVE NATIONAL
REUNIFICATION AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE, AND A FAIR AND
REALISTIC NATIONAL SALVATION PROPOSITION IN FULL ACCORD WITH THE
THREE PRINCIPLES OF NATIONAL REUNIFICATION AGREED UPON BETWEEN THE
NORTH AND SOUTH.
HE CONTINUED: THE FIVE-POINT PROPOSITION OF NATIONAL
REUNIFICATION IS THE CHUCHE-ORIENTED, GREAT PROPOSITION FOR PEACEFUL
REUNIFICATION WHERE THE GREAT CHUCHE IDEA THAT PEOPLE ARE THE MASTER
OF THEIR OWN DESTINY AND THEY HAVE ALSO THE CAPACITY TO HEW OUT
THEIR OWN DESTINY HAS FOUND A BRILLIANT EMBODIMENT IN THE QUESTION
OF REUNIFICATION AND AN INSPIRING BANNER OF ACTIVELY SEEKING A
SHORTCUT TO NATIONAL REUNIFICATION BY THE EFFORTS OF OUR PEOPLE
THEMSELVES THROUGH THE MOBILIZATION OF ALL THE PATRIOTIC FORCES OF
THE NORTH AND SOUTH.
THE FIVE-POINT PROPOSITION OF NATIONAL REUNIFICATION NEWLY
CLARIFIED BY THE GREAT LEADER IS ALSO A PROPOSITION OF INDEPENDENT
AND PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION IN FULLIACCORD WITH THE UNANIMOUS
DESIRE OF THE WORLD PROGRESSIVE PEOPLES TO SEE PEACE IN KOREA AND THE
PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE KOREAN QUESTION AND WITH THAT HE TREND OF THE
PRESENT
TIMETWHEN
ROAD OF INDEPENDENCE,
THE FIVE-POINT PROPOSITION OF NATIONAL REUNIFICATION CLARIFIED BY
THE RESPECTED AND BELOVED LEADER COMRADE KIM IL-SONG IS A HISTORICAL
NATIONAL SALVATION PROPOSITION POINTING TO THE ONLY WAY TO SHAPE THE
DESTINY OF THE COUNTRY AND THE NATION BY THE EFFORTS OF THE KOREAN
PEOPLE THEMSELVES AT THE GRAVE HISTORIC JUNCTURE WHEN THEY ARE AT THE
CROSSROADS OF REUNIFICATION OR PERMANENT SPLIT, A REUNIFICATION
DECLARATION BRINGING DOWN A SLEDGE UPON THE HEADS OF A TINY HANDFUL
OF NATIONAL SPLITTISTS WHO CAME OUT WITH THE "SPLITTING DECLARATION"
AND (WORD INDISTINCT) REFLECTING THE ASPIRATION OF THE NATION FOR
REUNIFICATION AND A GREAT MILITANT PROPOSITION POWERFULLY ROUSING THE
ENTIRE KOREAN PEOPLE TO THE SACRED STRUGGLE AGAINST THE DIVISION AND
TREACHERY AND FOR REUNIFICATION AND PATRIOTISM.
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23 JUN 1808Z BG/MC
FBIS 65
FIRST ADD 63 (DPRK DEPUTY PREMIER)
Harler
$5078
XXX REUNIFICATION AND PATRIOTISM.
6068
(TEXT) ONE'S APPROACH TOWARDS THE FIVE-POINT PROPOSITION
OF NATIONAL REUNIFICATION IS THE TOUCHSTONE TESTING WHETHER HE
WANTS REUNIFICATION OR NOT, WHETHER HE RESPECTS OR NOT THE THREE
P
PRINCIPLES OF NATIONAL REUNIFICATION WHICH THE NORTH AND SOUTH
PLEDGED TO FULFIL BEFORE THE NATION, THE REPORTER SAID, AND CONTINUED:
IN THE FIVE-POINT PROPOSITION OF NATIONAL REUNIFICATION THE
GREAT LEADER COMRADE KIM IL-SONG ADVANCED IT AS A NATIONAL SALVATION
MEASURE OF GREATEST URGENCY TO REMOVE MILITARY CONFRONTATION
AND EASE TENSION BETWEEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH, TO BEBIN WITH.
THE GREAT LEADER COMRADE KIM IL-SONG HAS TAUGHT:
"TO IMPROVE THE PRESENT RELATIONS BETWEEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH
OF KOREA AND ACCELERATE THE PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION OF THE COUNTRY,
IT IS NECESSARY, FIRST OF ALL, TO ELIMINATE MILITARY CONFRONTATION
AND EASE TENSION BETWEEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH".
THIS PROPOSAL ADVANCED BY THE LEADER IS A MOST REASONABLE
AND FAIR ONE FOR ELIMINATING THE SOURCE OF MISUNDERSTANDING AND
MISTRUST BETWEEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH, IMPROVING THE NORTH-SOUTH
RELATIONS IN CONFORMITY WITH THE INTERESTS OF THE NATION AND
CREATING PRECONDITIONS FOR THE INDEPENDENT AND PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION
OF THE COUNTRY.
THE PAK CHONG-HUI CLIQUE AGREED IN THE JOINT STATEMENT
TO ACHIEVE REUNIFICATION IN A PEACEFUL WAY. BUT WHEN WE PRACTICALLY
PUT FORWARD A CONCRETE PROPOSAL TO ELIMINATE
MILITARY CONFRONTATION AND EAST TENSION, THEY CAME OUT WITH
THE STEREOTYPED SOPHISM THAT "IT IS STILL PREMATURE" AND "NOW
IS NOT THE STAGE TO SETTLE THIS MATTER" AND WENT THE
LENGTH OF REFUSING TO DISCUSS THIS MATTER.
AND THEY TOOK THE ROAD OF SPEEDING UP WAR PREPARATIONS
AND FURTHER KEYING UP TENSION, WHILE REINFORCING THE ARMED
FORCES, EXPANDING ARMAMENTS, BEGGING FOR THE PERMAMENT
STATIONING OF THE U.S. IMPERIALIST AGGRESSOR TROOPS AND
INTRODUCING LARGE QUANTITIES OF NEW TYPE WEAPONS AND MILITARY
EQUIPMENT.
THE DARK DESIGN PURSUED BY THE PAK CHONG-HUI CLIQUE
BEHIND THE SINGBOARD OF "PEACE" AND "CO-EXISTENCE" HAS
BEEN MORE FULLY REVEALED IN THE "NON-AGGRESSION PACT"
BROUGHT FORWARD BY THEM.
THE *NON-AGGRESSION PACT" BRAZEN-FACEDLY PUT FORWARD BY
THE PAK CHONG-HUICLIQUE IS NOTHING BUT A SMOKESCREEN TO COVER
UP THEIR CRIMINAL WAR POLICY AND TURN DOWN OUR PROPOSAL FOR PEACE
AGREEMENT. IT AIMS ONLY AT MAINTAINING THE PRESENT SITUATION
FRAUGHT WITH THE DANGER OF WAR AS IT IS.
AS LONG AS THE U.S. IMPERIALIST AGGRESSOR TROOPS, THE SOURCE
OF WAR IN OUR COUNTRY, STAY ON, PEACESIN OUR COUNTRY CANNOT BE
GUARANTEED NOR CAN THE DANGER OF WAR BE REMOVED THERE NO
MATTER WHAT SIGNBOARD MAY BE PUT UP TO "JUSTIFY" THEIR OCCUPATION
OF SOUTH KOREA AND NO MATTER WHAT EMPTY "DECLARATION" BE MADE.
A
IN THE FIVE-POINT PROPOSITION OF NATIONAL REUNIFICATION
THE GREAT LEADER COMPADE KIM IL-SONG ALSO CLARIFIED A NATIONAL
SALVATION PROPOSAL TO REALISE MANY-SIDED COLLABORATION AND
INTERCHANGE BETWEEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH.
THE GREAT LEADER COMRADE KIM IL-SONG HAS TAUGHT AS FOLLOWS:
"TO IMPROVE THE NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS AND EXPEDITE THE COUNTRY'S
REUNIFICATION, IT IS NECESSARY TO MATERIALIZE MANY-SIDED
COLLABORATION AND INTERCHANGE BETWEEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH IN THE
POLITICAL, MILITARY, DIPLOMATIC, ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL FIELDS".
TO IMPROVE THE NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS AND SETTLE THE
REUNIFICATION QUESTION IN A PEACEFUL WAY, MANY-SIDED
COLLABORATION AND INTERCHANGE MUST BE REALISED BETWEEN THE
NORTH AND SOUTH FOR CREATING AN ATMOSPHERE OF MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING
AND TRUST, RESOIRING THE SEVERED NATIONAL LINKS IN AN ALL-ROUND
WAY AND PROMOTING THE INDEPENDENT AND UNIFORM DEVELOPMENT OF THE
COUNTRY. THERE IS NO OTHER WAY.
BUT THE PAK CHONG-HUI PUPPET CLIQUE WHO HAD BEEN TRYING TO USE
THE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE AS AN IMPLEMENT FOR PERMANENT DIVISION
OBSTINATELY OPPOSED TO GIVING A CONCRETE SHAPE TO AND TRANSLATING
INTO PRACTICE NORTH-SOUTH COLLABORATION THOUGH THEY AGREED ON IT
AND PERSISTENTLY PURSUED THE LINE OF 'CONFRONTATION" AND
"COMPETITION".
(MORE)
R.
FORD
23 JUN 18152 BG/GS
SERALD
:
FBIS 66
7507
6068
SECOND ADD 63 (DPRK DEPUTY PREMIER)
XXX "CONFRONTATION" AND "COMPETITION".
d
T (TEXT) THE CRIMINAL MOVES THE PAK CHONG-HUI CLIQUE ARE
STEPPING UP IN PURSUANCE OF "CONFRONTATION" AND COMPETITION"
BETWEEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH, TURNING AWAY THEIR FACE FROM COLLABORATION
AND INTERCHANGE BETWEEN THE TWO PARTS, ARE TREACHEROUS ONES TO
PROLONG THE DIVISION, NOT REUNIFICATION, AND INCITE ANTAGONISM, NOT
UNITY.
IN HIS HISTORIC JUNE 23 SPEECH THE GREAT LEADER COMRADE KIM
IL-SONG PROPOSED IN THE FIVE-POINT PROPOSITION OF NATIONAL
REUNIFICATION TO CONVENE A GREAT NATIONAL CONGRESS COMPOSED
OF REPRESENTATIVES OF PEOPLE OF ALL STRATA AND POLITICAL PARTIES
AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE NORTH AND SOUTH.
THE GREAT LEADER COMRADE KIM IL-SONG HAS TAUGHT:
"IN ORDER TO SETTLE THE QUESTION OF THE COUNTRY'S REUNIFICATION
IN' CONFORMITY WITH THE WILL AND DEMAND OF OUR PEOPLE, IT IS NECESSARY
TO ENABLE THE MASSES OF PEOPLE OF ALL STRATA IN THE NORTH AND SOUTH
l
>>
TO PARTICIPATE IN THE NATIONWIDE PATRIOTIC WORK FOR NATIONAL
REUNIFICATION".
IN VIEW OF ITS NATURE THE QUESTION OF NATIONAL REUNIFICATION
IS NOT A MATTER PERTAINING TO THE INTERESTS OF ANY ONE CIRCLE
OR POLITICAL GROUPING BUT AN ALL-PEOPLE, NATIONWIDE WORK IN WHICH ALL
CLASSES AND CIRCLES, ALL PARTIES AND GROUPINGS OF OUR COUNTRY
DESIROUS OF REUNIFICATION ARE VITALLY INTERESTED.
FROM THE FIRST DAYS OF THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH
THE WORKERS PARTY OF KOREA, THE KOREAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY, THE
CHONDOIST CHONGU PARTY AND SOCIAL ORGANISATIONS IN THE NORTHERN
HALF PROPOSED THAT BILATERAL OR MULTILATERAL CONTACTS BE REALISED
AMONG ALL THE POLITICAL PARTIES AND SOCIAL ORGANISATIONS IN THE NORTH
AND SOUTH AND A NORTH-SOUTH POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE CONFERENCE BE
CONVENED TO DISCUSS THE QUESTION OF NATIONAL REUNIFICATION, AND
THE REVOLUTIONARY PARTY FOR REUNFICATION, THE NEW DEMOCRATIC PARTY,
THE DEMOCRATIC UNIFICATION PARTY AND ALL OTHER POLITICAL PARTIES
AND PERSONAGES OF ALL STRATA IN SOUTH KOREA ALSO CEASELESSLY
DEMANDED MANY-SIDED CONTACTS AND POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN
THE NORTH AND SOUTH.
BUT THE PAK CHONG-HUI PUPPET CLIQUE MONOPOLIZED A DISCOURSE
ON THE REUNIFICATION QUESTION IN SOUTH KOREA AS IF IT WERE THEIR
EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY, DOGGEDLY OPPOSED OUR PROPOSAL ON HOLDING
POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS AND HARSHLY SUPPRESSED EVEN THE DEMAND
OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES, ORGANISATIONS AND INDIVIDUAL PERSONAGES
OF SOUTH KOREA FOR CONTACTS WITH US FOR THE REUNIFICATION OF THE
COUNTRY.
THIS SHOWS HOW MUCH THE PAK CHONG-HUI PUPPET CLIQUE ARE
AFRAID OF THE SOLUTION OF THE QUESTION OF NATIONAL REUNIFICATION
BY THE EFFORTS OF OUR PEOPLE THEMSELVES AND WHAT A BASE TRICK
THEY ARE RESORTING TO TO PERPETUATE THE DIVISION OF THE COUNTRY.
A
THE GREAT LEADER COMRADE KIM IL-SONG NEW YOUROSED IN THE
FIVE-POINT PROPOSITION OF NATIONAL REUNIFICATION TO INSTITUTE
A NORTH-SOUTH CONFEDERATION UNDER THE SINGLE NAME OF THE CONFEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF KORYO.
THE GREAT LEADER COMRADE KIM IL-SONG HAS TAUGHT:
"WHAT IS OF GREAT SIGNIFICANCE TODAY IN SPEEDING UP THE COUNTRY'S
REUNIFICATION IS TO INSTITUTE A NORTH-SOUTH CONFEDERATION UNDER
THE NAME OF A SINGLE COUNTRY".
ORIGINALLY, THE QUESTION OF NATIONAL REUNIFICATION IS ONE TO
BE SETTLED PEACEFULLY ON AN INDEPENDENT AND DEMOCRATIC
PRINCIPLE. THE BASIC WAY OF ITS SOLUTION IS TO ESTABLISH A UNITED
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT THROUGH NORTH-SOUTH GENERAL ELECTIONS. THIS
PROPOSAL FOR NATIONAL REUNIFICATION HAS BEEN INVARIABLY MAINTAINED
BY OUR PARTY AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC FROM THE FIRST
DAYS OF THE DIVISION OF THE COUNTRY.
AS THIS FAIR AND AGOVEBOARD PROPOSAL FOR REUNIFICATION HAS NOT
BEEN ACCEPTED BY THE SOUTH KOREAN AUTHORITIES, THE NORTH-SOUTH
CONFEDERATION WAS PROPOSED AS A TRANSITIONAL STEP FOR ACHIEVING
REUNIFICATION. THIS IS A MOST CORRECT PROPOSAL FOR REUNIFICATION
TAKING INTO FULL ACCOUNT THE OBJECTIVE REALITIES IN THE NORTH
AND THE SOUTH WHERE THERE EXIST THE TWO DIFFERING SYSTEMS.
(MORE)
23 JUN 1831Z BG/GS
RESALO FORD LIBRAS
FBIS 67
THIRD ADD 63 (DPRK DEPUTY PREMIER)
XXX TWO DIFFERING SYSTEMS.
(TEXT) IT CANNOT BUT BE A MOST REASONABLE MATTER OF
R
URGENCY TO INSTITUTE THE NORTH-SOUTH CONFEDERATION AFTER
CONVENING A GREAT NATIONAL CONGRESS AND ACHIEVING
GREAT NATIONAL UNITY, UNDER THE CONDITION IN WHICH
THE U.S. IMPERIALISTS HAVE BECOME EVER MORE UNDISGUISED
M
IN THEIR "TWO KOREAS" PLOTS.
BUT, THE PAK CHONG-HUI CLIQUE TURNED DOWN EVEN THIS
JUST PROPOSAL OF OURS TO INSTITUTE THE NORTH-SOUTH
CONFEDERATION UNDER A SINGLE NATIONAL TITLE, CRYING
THAT THE CONFEDERATION IS "POSSIBLE ONLY BETWEEN THE
MULTI-NATIONAL STATES WITH ONE AND THE SAME SYSTEM"
AND IT IS AN "UNREALISTIC" PROPOSAL WHICH IS
"INFEASIBLE" BETWEEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH WHERE THERE ARE TWO
DIFFERING SYSTEMS.
THE SOUTH KOREAN AUTHORITIES' REFUSAL TO INSTITUTE THE NORTH-
SOUTH CONFEDERATION UNDER A SINGLE NATIONAL TITLE ON THE PRETEXT THAT
THERE IS THE DIFFERENCE OF SYSTEMS PATENTLY SHOWS THAT THEY ARE A
PACK OF TRAITORS TO THE NATION, SEEKING THE SPLIT, GOING AGAINST THE
ARDENT DESIRE OF THE NATION FOR NATIONAL REUNIFICATION.
IT IS ALSO CLARIFIED IN THE FIVE-POINT PROPOSITION OF NATIONAL
REUNIFICATION OF THE GREAT LEADER COMRADE KIM IL-SONG THAT THE NORTH
AND SOUTH SHOULD WORK TOGETHER IN THE FIELD OF EXTERNAL ACTIVITY.
THE GREAT LEADER COMRADE KIM IL-SONG HAS TAUGHT:
"WE CONSIDER THAT OUR COUNTRY SHOULD BE PREVENTED FROM BEING SPLIT
INTO TWO KOREAS PERMANENTLY AS A RESULT OF THE FREEZING OF NATIONAL
DIVISION AND THAT THE NORTH AND SOUTH SHOULD ALSO WORK TOGETHER IN
THE FIELD OF EXTERNAL ACTIVITY".
ONLY WHEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH WORK TOGETHER IN THE FIELD OF
EXTERNAL ACTIVITY IS IT POSSIBLE TO PREVENT OUR NATION FROM BEING
SPLIT INTO TWO AND PROVIDE A FIRM INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEE FOR
RESOLVING ALL PROBLEMS CONCERNING THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE COUNTRY'S
REUNIFICATION.
IN SPITE OF OUR JUST PROPOSAL THAT THE NORTH AND SOUTH WORK
TOGETHER IN THE FIELD OF EXTERNAL ACTIVITY, THE PAK CHONG-HUI CLIQUE
COMMITTED SUCH UNPARDONABLE SPLITTING ACTS AS DECLARING THE "TWO
KOREAS" PLOT AS THEIR POLICY" AND BRINGING THE MOTION CALLING FOR
SEPARATE UN MEMBERSHIP FOR TWO KOREAS" BEFORE THE UNITED NATIONS.
THE "TWO KOREAS" PLOT. OF THE U.S. IMPERIALISTS AND THEIR
STOOGES, HOWEVER, TOTALLY MISCARRIED AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY LAST
YEAR.
THE PAK CHONG-HUI PUPPET CLIQUE DO NOT HESITATE TO MAKE EYES AT
SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, ADVOCATING THE "OPEN-DOOR POLICY" IN AN ATTEMPT
TO CREATE "TWO KOREAS" AT ANY COST. BUT, IT IS CLEAR TO EVERYONE
THAT THIS TRICK CAN NEVER SUCCEED.
WHOLE COURSE OF THE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE AND ALL THE EFFORTS
MADE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GREAT FIVE-POINT PROPOSITION OF
NATIONAL REUNIFICATION CLEARLY SHOW WHO TRULY WANTS PEACE IN OUR
COUNTRY AND HAS STRIVEN FOR THE PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION AND WHO HAS
ACTUALLY SOUGHT A WAR AND PERMANENT DIVISION OF THE COUNTRY, WHO HAS
BEEN TRULY FAITHFUL TO THE PRINCIPLES OF NATIONAL REUNIFICATION LAID
DOWN IN THE NORTH-SOUTH JOINT STATEMENT AND WHO HAS VIOLATED THESE
PRINCIPLES AND CLEARLY TELL WHO IS TO BLAME FOR THE PRESENT
DEADLOCK OF THE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE, THE REPORTER NOTED, AND
CONTINUED:
PAK CHONG-HUI MADE PUBLIC ON THE 22ND A "STATEMENT" IN WHICH HE DID
NOT GIVE UP THE "TWO KOREAS" POLICY THAT HAD BEEN OPENLY. DECLARED IN
THE "SPECIAL STATEMENT" ONE YEAR AGO AND "PLEDGED HIMSELF" TO CARRY
ON HIS MANOEUVRES TO PERPETUATE THE DIVISION, DEFYING THE DENUNCIATION
OF THE WHOLE NATION.
THE PAK CHONG-HUI CLIQUE ARE ONLY SEEKING THE CONFRONTATION
BETWEEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH, PERMANENT NATIONAL SPLIT AND FRATRICIDAL
WAR, WITH THE BACKING OF OUTSIDE FORCES, VIOLATING THE THREE
PRINCIPLES OF NATIONAL REUNIFICATION AGREED UPON BETWEEN THE TWO
SIDES AND TURNING DOWN THE FIVE-POINT PROPOSITION OF NATIONAL
REUNIFICATION, A GREAT PROPOSITION OF THE NATION TO EMBODY THE THREE
PRINCIPLES. THEY ARE THE VICIOUS SPLITTISTS UPSETTING THE
ASPIRATION OF THE WHOLE NATION FOR PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION, A PACK OF
DESPICABLE TRAITORS SELLING OUT THE INTERESTS OF THE COUNTRY AND THE
NATION AND WICKED BELLICOSE ELEMENTS DISTURBING PEACE IN THE COUNTRY.
(MORE)
FORD
23 JUN 18412 BG/MC
GERALD
ML
FBIS 68
FOURTH AND LAST ADD 63 (DPRK DEPUTY PREMIER)
XXX IN THE COUNTRY.
(TEXT) THE SOUTH KOREAN FASCIST CLIQUE ARRESTED AND IMPRISONED
THOUSANDS OF PATRIOTIC STUDENTS AND DEMOCRATIC FIGURES WHO FOUGHT FOR
DEMOCRACY AND PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION ON CHARGES OF INVOLVEMENT IN THE
FAKED-UP "CASE OF THE NATIONAL FEDERATION OF YOUTH AND STUDENTS FOR
DEMOCRACY" AND SENT OVER 250 OF THEM TO THE "EXTRAORDINARY MILITARY
TRIBUNAL" ON CHARGES OF VIOLATION OF THE "ANTI-COMMUNIST LAW" AND
"EMERGENCY MEASURES" AND ARE STAGING EVERY DAY A TRIAL OF 34 OF
THEM, TO BEGIN WITH, IN AN ATTEMPT TO PUNISH AND MURDER THEM
RUTHLESSLY.
ALL THE TREACHEROUS MANOEUVRES STEPPED UP BY THE PAK CHONG-HUI
PUPPET CLIQUE UNDER THE SLOGAN OF "ANTI-COMMUNISM" HAVE ORIGINATED
FROM THE AGGRESSIVE POLICY AND "TWO KOREAS" PLOT OF THE U.X. AND
JAPANESE IMPERIALISTS AND ARE ZEALOUSLY BACKED BY THEM.
THE U.S. IMPERIALISTS HAVE OBSTRUCTED FROM ITS VERY START THE
NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE, DESPERATELY HAMPERED THE REUNIFICATION OF
KOREA, SUPPLIED WEAPONS FOR AGGRESSION TO THE SOUTH KOREAN BELLICOSE
ELEMENTS AND CEASELESSLY KEYED UP THE TENSION IN KOREA WITH AN EYE TO
KEEP A HOLD ON SOUTH KOREA AS THEIR PERMANENT COLONY AND MILITARY
BASE.
THE 3RD SESSION OF THE 5TH SUPREME PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY, DIRECTING
DEEP ATTENTION TO THE U.S. IMPERIALISTS' POLICY OF AGGRESSION ON KOREA,
PROPOSED TO CONCLUDE A PEACE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE DEMOCRATIC
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND THE UNITED STATES IN ORDER TO CREATE
PREREQUISITES TO THE ACCELERATION OF THE INDEPENDENT AND PEACEFUL
REUNIFICATION OF THE COUNTRY.
BUT THE U.S. IMPERIALISTS HAVE NOT MADE ANY PROPER RESPONSE OR
GIVEN ANY REPLY TO OUR PEACE-LOVING PROPOSAL. ON THE CONTRARY, THEY
ARE TAKING THE ROAD OF FURTHER INTENSIFYING THEIR AGGRESSIVE AND
SPLITTIST MANOEUVRES AGAINST OUR COUNTRY.
THE JAPANESE MILITARISTS, TOO ARE NOW PURSHING THE POLICY OF
AGGRESSION ON KOREA AND ZEALOUSLY EGGING THE PAK CHONG- HUI PUPPET
CLIQUE ONTO THE "Two KOREAS" PLOT. THEY ARE ZEALOUSLY PLAYING IN
THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA THE ROLE OF "DETACHED FORCE" TO KEEP KOREA
SPLIT INDEFINITELY.
THE ONLY WAY OF SAVING THE COUNTRY AND NATION FROM THE DANGER OF
PERMANENT SPLIT AND PROMOTING THE CAUSE OF NATIONAL REUNIFICATION IS
TO BRING TO REALISATION THE FIVE-POINT PROPOSITION OF NATIONAL
REUNIFICATION ADVANCED BY COMRADE KIM IL-SONG, THE RESPECTED AND
BELOVED LEADER AND THE GREAT SUN OF THE NATION, THE REPORTER DECLARED.
HE WENT ON:
WE, AVAILING OURSELVES OF THIS OPPORTUNITY, EXTEND POWERFUL SUPPORT
AND ENCOURAGEMENT TO THE JUST AND PATRIOTIC STRUGGLE OF THE SOUTH
KOREAN PEOPLE AND SOLEMNLY DECLARE THAT WE WILL ACTIVELY SUPPORT THEIR
STRUGGLE WITH ALL OUR EFFORTS FROM THE STAND OF SHARING ALWAYS WITH
THEM THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR STRUGGLE.
THE ENTIRE SOUTH KOREAN PEOPLE SHOULD VIGOROUSLY STRUGGLE TO
PUT AN END TO THE U.S. IMPERIALISTS' OCCUPATION OF SOUTH KOREA AND
THEIR COLONIAL RULE AND DRIVE THEM OUT OF OUR COUNTRY.
THE SOUTH KOREAN PEOPLE SHOULD WAGE A POWERFUL STRUGGLE TO
FRUSTRATE THE JAPANESE MILITARISTS' REINVASION, HOLDING HIGHER THE
BANNER OF THE STRUGGLE AGAINST JAPANESE MILITARISM AND FOR NATIONAL
SALVATION.
TO HASTEN NATIONAL REUNIFICATION A STRUGGLE SHOULD BE WAGED ALSO
AGAINST THE NATION-SPLITTISTS OF SOUTH KOREA, FAITHFUL STOOGES OF
THE U.S. AND JAPANESE AGGRESSORS.
NO ONE SHOULD SEEK THE PERMANENT DIVISION OF KOREA OR UPSET THE
UNANIMOUS DESIRE OF OUR NATION FOR THE INDEPENDENT AND PEACEFUL
REUNIFICATION OF THE COUNTRY. THERE IS NO GROUND OR PRETEXT
WHATSOEVER FOR THE U.S. IMPERIALISTS TO REMAIN IN SOUTH KOREA.
m
THE U.S. IMPERIALISTS MUST GIVE UP AT ONCE THEIR POLICY OF
AGGRESSION AGAINST OUR COUNTRY AND "TWO KOREAS" PLOT, WITHDRAW
FORTHWITH FROM SOUTH KOREA TAKING ALONG ALL THE LETHAL WEAPONS, AND
ACCEPT WITHOUT DELAY THE DPRK GOVERNMENT S PROPOSAL FOR THE CONCLUSION
OF A PEACE AGREEMENT AIMED AT CREATING PREREQUISITES TO PEACE IN
KOREA AND HER PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION.
THE UNITED NATIONS SHOULD STRIP THE U.S. IMPERIALISTS AGGRESSOR
FORCES IN SOUTH KOREA OF THE "UN FORCES" BERETS AND TAKE STEPS FOR
A
THEIR WITHDRAWAL. THE JAPANESE MILITARISTS MUST STOP THEIR REINVASION
OF SOUTH KOREA, GIVE UP THE HOSTILE POLICY AGAINST THE DPRK AND CEASE
INTERFERING WITH THE CAUSE OF THE REUNIFICATION OF OUR COUNTRY.
THE SOUTH KOREAN AUTHORITIES MUST RENOUNCE THE ANACHRONISTIC WAY
OF THINKING TO LIVE BY RELYING ON THE OUTSIDE FORCES, DISCONTINUE
THE TREACHERIES OF SELLING OUT THE COUNTRY AND THE NATION AND THE
FASCIST REPRESSION OF PEOPLE, STOP SEEKING THE PERMANENT NATIONAL
SPLIT, ACCEPT OUR FIVE-POINT PROPOSITION OF NATIONAL REUMIFICATION
AND TAKE HONEST APPROACHES TOWARD THE DIALOGUE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF
THE NORTH-SOUTH JOINT STATEMENT. IF THE U.S. AND JAPANESE
AGGRESSORS AND THE PAK CHONG-HUI PUPPET CLIQUE PERSIST IN THE
AGGRESSIVE MANOEUVRES AND TREACHERIES AND KEEP FOLLOWING THE ROAD
OF NATIONAL SPLIT, GOING AGAINST THE TREND OF THE TIMES, THEY WILL
CERTAINLY SUFFER A SHAMEFUL DESTRUCTION BEFORE HISTORY AND THE NATION,
THE REPORTER WARNED.
(ENDALL)
HOMO
23 JUN 18572 BG/MC
80
MEMORANDUM
2784
pok
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
July 5, 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR:
GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM:
W. R. SMYSER
RICHARD T. KENNEDY
SUBJECT:
Proposed Sale of F-4 Squadron to
Republic of Korea
The Republic of Korea has asked us to sell it 57 F-4Es, or three
squadrons, as an FMS cash purchase. State and Defense have in
principle approved the sale of one squadron of F-4Es, and they
recommend that the question of selling two more squadrons be
considered as part of the current annual review of the Korean Force
Modernization Plan. A cable to Embassy Seoul (Tab A) would give
effect to their recommendations.
We agree with this basic State/Defense recommendation, though we
have some reservations. You should be aware that this action would
in a sense go beyond the President's decision a year ago on the
Korean Force Modernization Plan (Tab B). His decision in effect
approved the State/Defense recommendation that the Plan include
another three squadrons of F-5Es rather than a second squadron of
F-4s. The President had, however, in 1971 approved a second F-4
squadron which was found not to be available. So the second squadron
is not in absolute contravention of his wishes.
For us to put a second squadron of F-4s back into the plan now, in
addition to the three additional squadrons of F-5Es, would add
somewhat to Republic of Korea air defense capabilities. We believe
this addition is acceptable because it would not be enough to destabilize
the basic political-security balance on the Korean Peninsula postulated
by last year's review of the Modernization Plan. Moreover, the
squadron would not physically be turned over to the Republic of
Korea until well after the F-4 squadron now on bailment to the
Republic of Korea is withdrawn next spring. (It is not, however,
accurate to speak of the second F-4 squadron as replacing the bailed
squadron, as the State/Defense draft cable does. The F-5As on loan
to Vietnam will replace the bailed squadron under the Enhance Plus
Agreement when they are returned to the Republic of Korea. We have,
therefore, deleted that sentence from the draft cable.)
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 1230
SEC 3.3
TOP.SECRET/SENSITIVE
XGDS
NSCjMemo,
Guidelines
By an
NARA Date 12/6/10
1/17/06
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
2
A final consideration is the timing of any publicity given to our
agreement to sell a second F-4 squadron to the Republic of Korea.
We do not want such publicity to undercut our approach to the PRC
on the termination of the U.N. Command. We have amended the draft
cable to make this clear.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you approve the draft State/Defense cable at Tab A as amended.
Approve
Disapprove
FORD
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE
SECRET
sb
Material which has been lined
through is that which we
PRIORITY
recommend be deleted.
Material in square brackets
is that which we recommend
TO: CINCPAC HONOLULU HAWAI
be added.
COMUSKOREA SEOUL KOREA
INFO: AMEMB SEOUL KOREA
CJUSMAG SEOUL KOREA
CSAF WASH DC
JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE
SUBJECT: F-4E Aircraft for ROK
REF: STATE 109114, dtd 232357Z May 74
1. Ref advised that the F-4 matter is extremely involved and too
many issues are at hand for the USG to move on short notice. The Inter-
Agency Steering Group (IASG) has met twice and is continuing to
review all issues associated with ROK's decision to purchase 57 F-4Es.
2. At this time, it is considered prudent to withhold a letter of offer
on the entire 57 F-4 aircraft for ROK until the LASG has finished its
review and made its recommendations. However, to be forthcoming
with the ROK's, a letter of offer is approved for nineteen F-4E aircraft
(one squadron, one attrition aircraft), provided the purchase is on a
dependable undertaking cash basis. At this time, no commitment
can be made on the use of FY 75/76 FMS credit for the F-4E program.
These-aircraft,ineffect-would replacethe-bailed-sguadron-oP-4Ds.
Monies as expended repeat expended will be counted against the MOD
plan balance.
DECLASSIFIED
E.O.
SEC 3.3 DND Directive 5211.30
SECRET
GDS
NGC
Guidelines; state 9/17/03
By
NARA, Dato 12/6/10
SECRET
2
3. The- P&A data-is being formulated-and -will be forwarded- seenest.
[Until you receive further instructions, no repeat no publicity whatsoever
should be given to the contemplated transfer. We would strongly
reque'st R OK cooperation in this request. ] You will be advised of
the results and recommendations of the IASG.
TORD
SECRET
8c
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
SECRET
July 27, 1973
National Security Decision Memorandum
227
TO:
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
SUBJECT:
Korean Force Modernization Plan
The President has reviewed the Under Secretaries' memorandum on
Re-examination of the Korean Force Modernization Plan and has
decided:
-- Air defense should be emphasized in modernizing ROK
forces in order to assist the ROK in moving toward combat self-
sufficiency for defense against the North Korean threat.
-- Modernization of ROK divisions beyond the 16 active and
three ready reserve divisions recommended in the military study should
receive low priority but the ROK should not be told the U. S. will not
support modernization of additional divisions.
- - NSDM 129 continues in effect but no termination date should
be established for grant MAP assistance.
-- Planning for grant MAP and requests to Congress should
not be precipitously reduced nor should assistance be switched rapidly
to FMS (Option Two of the Steering Group's Report is approved).
- - Before high performance aircraft beyond replacement
aircraft in the original modernization plan are funded, a complete
review of the threat and air defense requirement should be undertaken
and recommendations submitted to the President.
SECRET
GDS
DECLASSIFIED
Classified by Henry A. Kissinger
AUTI
ASC 1/30/09
BY
12/6/10
SECRET
2
Subject to the foregoing the recommendations of the Under Secretaries'
Committee are approved and the Korean Force Requirements Study
should be the general basis for military assistance planning.
H A. Kim
Henry A. Kissinger
cc: The Director, Office of Management and Budget
The Acting Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
FUND
LIBRARY
SECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
9 in
SEGRET
WASHINGTON
July 18, 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
SUBJECT:
U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula
The President has approved the following as interim guidance on our
basic policy toward the Korean Peninsula:
-- We shall continue to reassure the ROK of U.S. support for its
timely and constructive foreign policy initiative announced in President
Park's speech of June 23.
--
The U.S. will make no further adjustments in its present force
levels in the ROK except in the context of the overall security situation
on the Peninsula. We will consult with the ROK well in advance of any
further force reductions.
-- The U.S. will continue military assistance to the ROK, and in
particular will complete the Five Year Modernization Plan, although
Congressional funding limitations will require that U.S. assistance on
this plan be stretched out through FY 1977. We also believe that the
emphasis in the plan should be shifted from ground forces to air defense.
The other recommendations of the Under Secretaries Committee on the
plan are presently under consideration; pending decision we should avoid
further detailed discussion of U.S. military assistance.
-- We are keenly aware of President Park's desire that we discuss the
Korean question with the PRC and the Soviet Union, and can assure the
ROK that we have that desire very much in mind. We will do nothing that
will harm South Korean vital interests, and will consult with the ROK to
the maximum extent possible.
We should avoid attempting to force the pace of the South-North
talks either by suggesting a reduction of our support for the ROK,
FUND
by pressing on the ROK a series of initiatives that it might take up with BERA
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 (no amended) SEC 3.3
LIBRARY
By
hh Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines
SEGRET
NARA, Date 12/6/10
9/17/03
SECRET
2
Pyongyang. Beyond lending every encouragement to the ROK to persist
in the talks, and assuring the ROK of continued support, U.S. direct
intervention with Seoul should be limited to averting any threatened
break-down in the talks.
-- We accept the proposition that the termination of UNCURK would
be a very useful step in helping avoid a confrontation at next fall's UNGA.
Any termination of UNCURK, however, should be without prejudice to its
past activities. We should seek to persuade the members of UNCURK
to recommend termination in their annual report. A decision on whether
to seek a UNGA resolution formally accepting the report, however, will
not be made until we have more certain indication of the intentions of the
other side.
-- We are reviewing the status of the UNC and will consider the possibil-
ity of terminating this body, provided that the related aspects of existing
security arrangements can be adjusted in a way that will not diminish the
security of the ROK. Since this is a delicate and complex undertaking,
we should proceed with caution and are confident that we can defend the
UNC against a possible hostile resolution in the next UNGA.
-- As to U. N. membership for the two Koreas, we support the position
taken by President Park in his June 23 speech. We will continue to consult
closely with the ROK and other friendly nations on the tactics we will adopt
on the Korean question in next fall's UNGA.
The President has asked that you use the above interim guidance in your
contacts with ROK officials and others, and that you not go beyond this
position pending further guidance from him.
Henry A. Kissinger
FORD
arease
sibnaul
SECRET
10
UNPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATE STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
was
P
CONFIDENTIAL 9696
PAGE 01 MOSCOW 11563 261600Z
61
ACTION EUR-25
INFO OCT-01 EA-11 IO-14 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03
INR-11 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03
SS-20 USIA-15 DRC-01 NIC-01 /128 W
002150
R 261450Z JUL 74
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1160
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
C N I D E N I A L MOSCOW 11563
E.O. 11652 GDS
TAGS: PFOR, KN. KS, AS, UR
SUBJI SOVIET VIEWS ON KOREA
1. IN RECENT CONVERSATION WITH KAPITSA, DEPARTMENT
HEAD IN MFA, AUSTRALIAN AMBASSADOR SOLICITED SOVIET
VIEWS ON KOREA. KAPITSA STRESSED THAT NORTH KOREA
IS "FRIEND AND ALLY" OF SOVIET UNION AND THIS IS
MAJOR CONSIDERATION FOR LATTER. AT SAME TIME,
KAPITSA COMMENTED THAT SOVIETS REALIZE THAT NORTH
KOREAN OBJECTION TO ENTRY OF BOTH KOREAS INTO UN
IS INCONSISTNET WITH MEMBERSHIP OF BOTH IN UN
SPECIALIZED ORGANIZATIONS. KAPITSA SAID THAT
SOVIET UNION HAD GIVEN SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO
RECOGNIZING SOUTH KOREA AND ESTABLISHING DIPLOMATIC
RELATIONS WITH HER BUT HAD DECIDED AGAINST THIS
AFTER BALANCING BENEFITS AND LOOSES. SOVIETS FELT
THAT GAINS FROM RECOGNIZING SOUTH KOREA WOULD BE
LESS THAN THE LOSSES IT WOULD SUFFER IN INFLUENCE IN
AND SUPPORT FROM NOTH KOREA, KAPITSA SAD THAT,
EVEN NOW. SOVIETS ARE HAVING DIFFICULTIES WITH NORTH
KOREA BECAUSE SOVIET UNION PERMITS ENTRY OF SOUTH
KOREANS FOR PARTICIPATION IN SPORTS EVENTS AND
E.O.
SEC 3.3 sthreview 9/17/03
Da
States
CONF IDENTIA
NARA, Date 12/6/10
An
By
FORM DS.1652
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED and STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 MOSCOW 11563 261600Z
CONFERENCES.
2. WHEN AUSTRALIAN AMBASSADOR SUGGESTED THAT ONE
ADVANTAGE OF HAVING BOTH KOREAS IN UN WOULD BE
RECOGNITION OF TWO INTERNATIONAL ENTITIES, WHICH
WOULD MEAN THAT ATTACK BY ONE AGAINST THE OTHER WOULD
BE CONSIDERED AS AGGRESSION, KAPITSA SAID THAT HE
WAS SURE THAT THERE WOULD BE NO ATTACK BY SOUTH KOREA
AGAINST NORTH KOREA IF U.S. DID NOT WANT IT. LIKEWISE
THERE WOULD BE NO ATTACK BY NORTH KOREA AGAINST SOUTH
KOREA IF CHINESE AND SOVIET UNION DID NOT WANT IT.
AMBASSADOR ASKED WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF CHINESE AND
SOVIET UNION DID NOT AGREE, AND KAPITSA SAID CHINA
WOULD NOT WANT TO CAUSE DIFFICULTIES WITH THE SOVIET
UNION OR THE U.S. AT PRESENT.
3. AUSTRALIAN AMBASSADOR ALSO TOLD ME THAT HE THOUGHT
AUSTRALIAN RECOGNITION OF NORTH KOREA WOULD TAKE PLACE
IN NEAR FUTURE. DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WILL BE
ESTABLISHED, BUT AN AUSTRALIAN AMBASSADOR WILL NOT
BE RESIDENT IN PYONGYANG. STOESSEL
717853
e
CONFIDENTIAL
FORM 1652
FRoebe
mpr."
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
July 29, 1974
National Security Decision Memorandum 262
TO:
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
SUBJECT:
Use of U.S. Bases in Japan in the Event of
Aggression Against South Korea
The President has reviewed the memorandum of the Deputy Secretary
of State of April 27, 1974 which proposed a modification in the
guidance contained in NSDM 251 concerning extension of the 1961 Kishi
Minute on the Use of U.S. Bases in Japan in the Event of Aggression
Against South Korea.
The President has approved the recommendation in Option 3 of the
memorandum, i.e., with the purpose of retaining at least the effect of
the Korean Minute without seeking an explicit, formal extension of the
Minute, we should:
--
Not raise the question of the Korean Minute itself directly
with the Japanese Government.
-- Rather, during discussion with the Japanese Government on
the future of the U.N. Command, take the position that we are confident
termination of the U.N. Command will not adversely affect our ability
to deter a North Korean attack, even though the U.N. cover and the U.N.
SOFA for Japan are terminated, and that no further formal U.S. - -Japanese
actions are required.
Accordingly, the guidance contained in NSDM 251 is amended in this
respect.
A.
Henry A. Kissinger
cc: Director of Central Intelligence
DECLARATIVE
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
AUT
ASC 1/30/29
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
BY
In
12/6/10
12A
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 032795
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
ÇNational security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
ÇMemorandum
CREATOR'S NAME
John E. Nidecker
RECEIVER'S NAME
General A. M. Haig, Jr
DESCRIPTION
Re US-Republic of Korea Relations
CREATION DATE
07/29/1974
VOLUME
2 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
033700247
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES
BOX NUMBER
5
FOLDER TITLE
Korea (6)
DATE WITHDRAWN
03/03/2011
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
TMH
12B
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 032796
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
ÇNational security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
ÇLetter
CREATOR'S NAME
Philip C. Habib
RECEIVER'S NAME
Mr. John E. Nidecker
RECEIVER'S TITLE
Special Assistant to the President
DESCRIPTION
Re US-Republic of Korea Relations
CREATION DATE
07/15/1974
VOLUME
2 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
033700247
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES
BOX NUMBER
5
FOLDER TITLE
Korea (6)
DATE WITHDRAWN
03/03/2011
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
TMH
12 C
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 032797
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
ÇNational security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
ÇLetter
CREATOR'S NAME
John E. Nidecker
CREATOR'S TITLE
Special Assistant to the President
RECEIVER'S NAME
The Honorable Philip C. Habib
RECEIVER'S TITLE
Ambassador
DESCRIPTION
Re US-Republic of Korea Relations
CREATION DATE
07/03/1974
VOLUME
2 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
033700247
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES
BOX NUMBER
5
FOLDER TITLE
Korea (6)
DATE WITHDRAWN
03/03/2011.
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
TMH
12D
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 032798
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
ÇNational security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
ÇLetter
CREATOR'S NAME
John E. Nidecker
CREATOR'S TITLE
Special Assistant to the President
DESCRIPTION
Re US-Republic of Korea Relations
CREATION DATE
07/03/1974
VOLUME
2 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
033700247
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES
BOX NUMBER
5
FOLDER TITLE
Korea (6)
DATE WITHDRAWN
03/03/2011
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
TMH
Ba
MEMORANDUM
3245
subj
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ECRET
ACTION
August 2, 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR:
GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM:
JOHN A. FROEBE, JR
CAR
SUBJECT:
South Korean Ambassador Requests to
Call on the Vice President
The Vice President's office has informed me that they have been
informally approached by the Korean Embassy for a call on the
Vice President for their Ambassador.
I recommend against the Vice President's receiving Ambassador Hahm
at this juncture. Ambassador Hahm undoubtedly wants to seek the
Vice President's understanding and sympathy for President Park's
handling of his currently sensitive political situation. Ambassador Hahm
since his return from Seoul recently has been mounting a campaign
around town to counter Congressional interest in reducing our military
assistance to South Korea as a means of inducing Park to relax his
authoritarian controls. It is true that the Vice President could merely
hear Hahm out and could refuse to make substantive comment on the
question. However, Ambassador Hahm might misconstrue any comments
the Vice President would make, and the mere fact of the Vice President's
seeing Hahm in the present context might be misinterpreted. On
balance, I believe that we have little to gain and something to risk by
the Vice President's receiving Ambassador Hahm at this time.
Attached at Tab A is a draft memorandum from Mrs. Davis to
Mr. Marsh recommending against the Vice President's receiving
Ambassador Hahm.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you approve Mrs. Davis' sending the draft memorandum at
Tab A to Mr. Marsh.
Approve
Disapprove
E.O.
SEC 3.3
SECRET
GDS
NSC Memo,
Guidalines
By
MARA,
Date
01/9/01
13b
MEMORANDUM
3245
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET
ACTION
August 2, 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR:
MR. MARSH
FROM:
JEANNE W. DAVIS
SUBJECT:
South Korean Ambassador's Request
to Call on the Vice President
Colonel Walker has informally informed Mr. Froebe that the South
Korean Embassy informally sought a call on the Vice President for
Ambassador Hahm. Although we understand the purpose of the call
was not specified, Ambassador Hahm's intention in all probability is
to seek the Vice President's understanding and sympathy for President
Park's handling of his current sensitive domestic political situation.
The Park Government recently has been particularly concerned about
mounting Congressional criticism, and about the proposal being
discussed in committee to reduce U.S. military assistance to South
Korea as a means of trying to induce the Park Government to relax
these controls.
We would recommend against the Vice President's receiving Ambassador
Hahm. The mere fact of Ambassador Hahm's calling on the Vice
President could be misinterpreted in this context. In addition, any
comments that the Vice President might make in response to
Ambassador Hahm's presentation would be subject to misinterpretation.
SECRET GDS
SECC.S
E.O.
MSC
By
We NARA, Date 12/6/10
14
4009-X
MEMORANDUM
Rok
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION
EGRET/SENSITIVE
September 11, 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR:
GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM:
JOHN A. FROEBE, JR.
SUBJECT:
Your Meeting with Ambassador Sneider
on September 12, 1974 at 2:30 p.m.
You have agreed to meet with Ambassador Richard L. Sneider on
September 12, 1974 at 2:30 p.m. As you know, Mr. Sneider is departing
shortly to take up his new post in Seoul.
Current Crisis in South Korean - Japanese Relations. The two sides
within the past day or so now seem to have broken the Gordian knot.
Guidelines 9/02
The Japanese have agreed to the basic South Korean demand that Prime
Minister Tanaka's letter be carried by a ranking Japanese emissary
and that it be addressed to President Park. Final language of the letter
is now being worked out as regards the issues of Japanese acknowledg-
ment of responsibility of the assassination attempt against President Park
and the killing of Mrs. Park, the Japanese investigation of the assassina-
tion plot, and the question of Chosen Soren's (the organization representing
North Korea in Japan) involvement.
NARA, Date 12/16/10
We have played a key role in the resolution of this crsis -- we have effec-
tively set limits on the lengths to which both parties could go, and we have
acted as a traditional Asian go-between in conveying the substantive pro-
posals to each of the parties. (We played a similar role in the resolution
of the Kim Dae-jung case earlier this year.) The outcome has thus
avoided serious adverse consequences for the South Koreans, the Japanese,
and ourselves -- which could have only benefited such as North Korea.
U.S. Continued Strong Support of South Korea. As the State EA Deputy
Assistant Secretary concerned with Korea, Dick Sneider has at times in
By
the past year floated the idea of U.S. troop reductions in South Korea and
pressed for a reduction of our military assistance to South Korea. Defense
has now picked up the cudgel again on this latter issue -- in preparation
for the U.S.- ROK annual security consultative meeting later this month,
Deputy Secretary Clements has sent Secretary Kissinger a memo pro-
posing an end to U.S. grant MAP to the ROK after FY 76. The memo was
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
SECRET/SENSITIVE
2
not coordinated with State -- we have asked DOD to do so -- and seemed
somehow to have been picked up in its substance in a New York Times
piece earlier this week.
Presidential Visit to South Korea. As you know, the President has not
yet decided finally whether he will visit South Korea immediately follow-
ing his visit to Japan in mid-November. Secretary Kissinger believes
he should, primarily because of commitments to this effect that he
(Secretary Kissinger) and former President Nixon have made to the South
Koreans.
I will not plan to sit in on the meeting.
Recommended Talking Points
We are relieved that the most recent crisis in South Korean-
Japan relations now seems well on the way to solution. We believe State's
EA Bureau and our Embassies in Seoul and Tokyo played a highly skillful
role in resolving this imbroglio, which could have played into North
Korea's hands at a most unpropitious time.
We believe that we must maintain strong support for the ROK
through the completion of the UNC termination negotiations, until the
post-UNC termination arrangements are solidly in place, and until the
North Koreans decide to pull back from their military option. In this last
regard, we will be particularly interested in the North Korean reaction to
Secretary Kissinger's recent proposal to the Romanian intermediary --
that we will consent to direct contacts with the North Koreans as long as
they do not attempt to exploit this politically against Seoul and if Moscow
and Peking are willing to undertake similar contacts with Seoul.
-- Although the President has not yet made a final decision, he
probably will visit Korea immediately after his visit to Japan. This will
carry obvious dividends for our relations with South Korea particularly
at this juncture, but will inevitably detract to some extent from the
President's visit to Japan. What suggestions do you have as to how we
might minimize the adverse effect of the Seoul visit after the President's
visit to Japan?
-- As regards South Korea's internal political problems, we believe
we should carefully stick to the neutral middle ground Ambassador Habib
has staked out -- maintaining an equal distance between President Park and
SECRET/SENSITIVE
SECRET/SENSITIVE
3
his domestic critics. At the same time, we must when necessary call
to the Park Government's attention whatever substantial adverse impact
his handling of internal politics may be having on our Congress in so far
as this threatens our military assistance and other support for the ROK.
Concurrence: Mr. Smyser wes/tric
SECRE T/SENSITIVE
Fraele 15a
MEMORANDUM
3915 Rok R
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION
September 18, 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR:
MR. ELLIOTT
FROM:
JEANNE W. DAV
SUBJECT:
Proposed Reply to Mr. Darrell C.
Schroeder Responding to Your Letter
on South Korea
Attached at Tab A is a draft reply from you on behalf of the President
to Mr. Darrell C. Schroeder, who wrote the President recently asking
him to express gratitude to the South Korean Government for their
help in reuniting his adopted Korean daughter with her brother and
sister. The reply has been coordinated with the State Department.
FOR
UNCLASSIFIED
Dear Mr. Schroeder,
I have been asked to respond to your letter of August 15, 1974, to the
President in which you describe the extensive assistance that General
Kim, Colonel Park, Mr. Woon and others gave in helping you reunite
your adopted daughter with her brother and sister in the Republic of
Korea. I can well understand your deep feelings of gratitude to these
people for the strenuous efforts they made in your behalf.
It would not, however, be appropriate for the President to express
gratitude on your behalf and to the Government of the Republic of
Korea. I believe that it would be appropriate, and much appreciated,
if you yourself wished to call the attention of the Korean Government
to the manifold efforts which these individuals have made. You could
do so by writing to the Embassy of the Republic of Korea, 2320
Massachusetts Avenue, N. W., Washington, D.C. 20008.
Sincerely,
Roland L. Elliott
Special Assistant to the President
Mr. Darrell C. Schroeder
Evans-Mills-Gardner
108 W. Monroe
Bloomington, Illinois 61701
16
Froebe
4009-X
MEMORANDUM
ROK
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION
SECRET/SENSITIVE
September 11, 1974
R
MEMORANDUM FOR:
GENERAL SCOWCROFT
Thanks
BS
FROM:
JOHN A. FROEBE, JR.
SUBJECT:
Your Meeting with Ambassador Sneider
on September 12, 1974 at 2:30 p.m.
You have agreed to meet with Ambassador Richard L. Sneider on
September 12, 1974 at 2:30 p.m. As you know, Mr. Sneider is departing
shortly to take up his new post in Seoul.
Current Crisis in South Korean - Japanese Relations. The two sides
within the past day or so now seem to have broken the Gordian knot.
The Japanese have agreed to the basic South Korean demand that Prime
Minister Tanaka's letter be carried by a ranking Japanese emissary
and that it be addressed to President Park. Final language of the letter
is now being worked out as regards the issues of Japanese acknowledg-
ment of responsibility of the assassination attempt against President Park
and the killing of Mrs. Park, the Japanese investigation of the assassina-
tion plot, and the question of Chosen Soren's (the organization representing
12/6/10 Guidelines
North Korea in Japan) involvement.
ONS
We have played a key role in the resolution of this crsis -- we have effec-
tively set limits on the lengths to which both parties could go, and we have
acted as a traditional Asian go-between in conveying the substantive pro-
NARA, Date
posals to each of the parties. (We played a similar role in the resolution
of the Kim Dae-jung case earlier this year.) The outcome has thus
avoided serious adverse consequences for the South Koreans, the Japanese,
and ourselves which could have only benefited such as North Korea.
NSC Me
U.S. Continued Strong Support of South Korea. As the State EA Deputy
Assistant Secretary concerned with Korea, Dick Sneider has at times in
By
the past year floated the idea of U.S. troop reductions in South Korea and
pressed for a reduction of our military assistance to South Korea. Defense
has now picked up the cudgel again on this latter issue -- in preparation
for the U.S.- ROK annual security consultative meeting later this month,
Deputy Secretary Clements has sent Secretary Kissinger a memo pro-
posing an end to U.S. grant MAP to the ROK after FY 76. The mento was
SECRET/SENSITIVE
SECRET/SENSITIVE
2
not coordinated with State -- we have asked DOD to do so -- and seemed
somehow to have been picked up in its substance in a New York Times
piece earlier this week.
Presidential Visit to South Korea. As you know, the President has not
yet decided finally whether he will visit South Korea immediately follow-
ing his visit to Japan in mid-November. Secretary Kissinger believes
he should, primarily because of commitments to this effect that he
(Secretary Kissinger) and former President Nixon have made to the South
Koreans.
I will not plan to sit in on the meeting.
Recommended Talking Points
-- We are relieved that the most recent crisis in South Korean-
Japan relations now seems well on the way to solution. We believe State's
EA Bureau and our Embassies in Seoul and Tokyo played a highly skillful
role in resolving this imbroglio, which could have played into North
Korea's hands at a most unpropitious time.
-- We believe that we must maintain strong support for the ROK
through the completion of the UNC termination negotiations, until the
post-UNC termination arrangements are solidly in place, and until the
North Koreans decide to pull back from their military option. In this last
regard, we will be particularly interested in the North Korean reaction to
Secretary Kissinger's recent proposal to the Romanian intermediary --
that we will consent to direct contacts with the North Koreans as long as
they do not attempt to exploit this politically against Seoul and if Moscow
and Peking are willing to undertake similar contacts with Seoul.
-- Although the President has not yet made a final decision, he
probably will visit Korea immediately after his visit to Japan. This will
carry obvious dividends for our relations with South Korea particularly
at this juncture, but will inevitably detract to some extent from the
President's visit to Japan. What suggestions do you have as to how we
might minimize the adverse effect of the Seoul visit after the President's
visit to Japan?
-- As regards South Korea's internal political problems, we believe
we should carefully stick to the neutral middle ground Ambassador Habib
has staked out -- maintaining an equal distance between President Park and
SECRET/SENSITIVE
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
3
his domestic critics. At the same time, we must when necessary call
to the Park Government's attention whatever substantial adverse impact
his handling of internal politics may be having on our Congress in so far
as this threatens our military assistance and other support for the ROK.
Concurrence:
Mr. Smyser
wes/tric
SECRET/SENSITIVE
17a
MEMORANDUM
4163
ROK
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
CONFIDENTIAL
ACTION
September 25 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR:
SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM:
W. R. SMYSER B
SUBJECT:
Proposed Reply From the President to
South Korean President Park Chung Hee
Accepting His Invitation for the President
To Visit South Korea Following His
Japan Visit
At Tab I is a draft memorandum from you to the President attaching a
proposed reply from the President to President Park Chung Hee
responding to President Park Chung Hee's letter of September 10, 1974,
inviting the President and Mrs. Ford to visit South Korea following
their visit to Japan. The President's draft reply simply conveys the
President's formal acceptance of President Park's invitation which has
already been relayed to Park through normal diplomatic channels.
The President's draft reply has been coordinated with Paul Theis'
office.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you sign the draft memorandum to the President at Tab I.
NSC Mar
FORD
CONF IDENTIAL
GDS
NARA, Date
By
12/6/10
4163
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
CONFIDENTIAL
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
HENRY A. KISSINGER
SUBJECT:
Proposed Reply From You to the South
Korean President Park Chung Hee
Accepting His Invitation To Visit Korea
Following the Japan Visit
At Tab A is a draft letter from you to President Park Chung Hee of
Korea. In that letter you formally accept his invitation (Tab B) for
you and Mrs. Ford to visit Korea.
The draft reply has been coordinated with Paul Theis' office.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you sign the draft reply to President Park at Tab A.
NSC
By
NARA, Date 12/6/10
CONF IDENTIAL GDS
Froebe FYI
4163
por
170
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
R
October 1, 1974
Dear Mr. President:
Thank you for your letter of September 10,
1974, and your most gracious invitation to
Mrs. Ford and me to visit the Republic of
Korea. We are delighted to accept and
look forward to seeing you at that time and
to discussing issues of common concern.
Sincerely,
Heald R. 3rd
His Excellency
Park Chung Hee
President of the
Republic of Korea
Seoul
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President of the Republic of Horsa
(Translation)
September 10, 1974
Excellency:
I have the honor to extend my cordial invitation
to Your Excellency and Mrs. Ford to visit my country
in late November or early December this year at Your
Excellency's convenience.
I am confident that Your Excellency's visit to
Korea will greatly contribute to further strengthening
the friendly relations between our two countries.
I look forward to the pleasure of welcoming Your
Excellency and Mrs. Ford in Seoul.
Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my
highest consideration.
Sincerely,
/s/ Park Chung Hee
His Excellency
Gerald R. Ford
President of the
United States of America
Washington, D. C.
4438-X
18
MEMORANDUM
kok
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION
TOP SECRET/NODIS
September 27, 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR:
SECRETARY KISSINGER
n
FROM:
W. R. Smyser 5
SUBJECT:
Memorandum of your Conversation with
Foreign Minister Kim Dong-jo,
September 27, 1974
At Tab A is a memorandum of your conversation with Korean Foreign
Minister Kim Dong-jo on September 27, 1974.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you approve the memorandum of conversation at Tab A.
Approve
Disapprove
4080
E.O.,11
5083
LIBRAR
By NSC
Guidalines
NARA,
Date
12/6/10
TOP SEGRET/NODIS - XGDS
18b
MEMORANDUM
4438-X
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
TOP SECRET/NODIS
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
Kim Dong-jo, Foreign Minister of the
Republic of Korea
Lee Sang-ock, Director of the American
Affairs Bureau in the Korean Foreign
Ministry
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Philip C. Habib, Assistant Secretary of
State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
W. R. Smyser, Senior Staff Member, NSC
Donald L. Ranard, Dir, Korean Desk
DATE, TIME
September 27, 1974; 5:00 p.m.
PLACE:
The Secretary's Office, State Department
SUBJECT:
U.S. -Korean Relations
Kim: I have talked today to Messrs. Sisco and Buffum to see if we can
get the Arabs to help us at the United Nations.
Kissinger: We will do what we can to help you with them. I am not sure
if it will work. The North Koreans give pilots to the Arabs. Whenever
I fly around the Middle East they meet me.
Kim: President Park asked me to convey his appreciation for your assistance
in settling the dispute between us and Japan. The President looks forward to
seeing you. I will be the Chairman of the Welcoming Committee.
Kissinger: Please express my condolences to the President for the tragedy
of the loss of his wife. Also, please tell him that I am glad I shall see
him soon. We had good talks the last time I was in Seoul.
Kim: How are things going in your talks with the Chinese?
Kissinger: We gave our proposal to them, which you know. They rejected
a non-aggression treaty. We have discussed the United Nations Command
and keeping the armistice arrangements. They have not replied so far.
ISSIFIED
E.O.
EBC 3.3
TOP SECRET/NODIS - XGDS
NSC
Guidelines
By
NARA, Date 12/6/10
9/17/03
TOP SECRET/NODIS
2
I will see Chiao in New York next Wednesday and I expect to get an
answer then.
Kim: We think that in New York our resolution is acceptable to many
countries. We have gained 21 co-sponsors.
I have already spoken to Mr. Habib about the admission of South Korea
to the United Nations. We would like to ask your good offices in your
talks with the PRC to help us get us in the UN, together or separately.
Kissinger: You mean North Korea first?
Habib: No. South Korea. North Korea can join with South Korea or it
can stay out.
Kissinger: Then not North Korea first.
Habib: No. It is North Korea that says it does not want to go into the
United Nations.
The resolutions now before the UN are designed to let the other side know
we will deal on the UNC. If we do not get anywhere with our private
proposal, we can still use it and surface it if necessary. We are talking
from a strong position.
Kissinger: I always talk from a strong position.
Kim: President Park has already talked to Ambassador Habib in Korea
about the next subject I want to raise. What is the situation with regard
to military aid? What are your long-range plans?
Kissinger: We are not ready to answer you on that right now. We will
be able to do-so:by the President's visit to Korea. We will study the
matter. We will study it sympathetically. I belong to the minority who
believe our allies should come first.
Kim: I appreciate that.
On another matter, President Park has decided that he would like to
meet with foreign newsmen. He would welcome them. If you have any
suggestions, please let us know. We had troubles with Elizabeth Pond,
but we have now decided we will let her return to Korea.
Kissinger: That seems good.
TOP SECRET/NODIS - XGDS
TOP SECRET/NODIS
3
I wantyou to know that we will support you strongly in the United Nations.
We will study aid sympathetically. (Turning to Mr. Smyser) Let's get a
NSSM out on that question.
Habib: Our planning is, of course, dependent on the Congress.
Kim: Next week I shall return to Washington and I shall see a number of
Congressmen.
Kissinger: I will let you know what the PRC says.
Habib: We are fully in agreement. We can go ahead.
Kissinger: We are getting feelers all over the world for North Korea to
talk to us. We are not accepting. We have nothing we want from them.
We want to keep them quiet, of course. But we will talk to you before we
do anything.
Kim: Good.
Kissinger: You are our ally and we back you. We only tell you this because
we do not know what they are saying and what is reaching you,
Kim: How are things going with the Soviet Union on our proposal?
Kissinger: I spoke to Gromyko a few days ago and told him of the proposal.
They want to get the PRC out of Panmunjon. He asked me who was there
under our proposal. I told him four countries. Then he asked me why.
But he did not reject it.
I said we would work it out with the PRC.
Kim: If the PRC worked out something with you, would the Soviet Union
accept it?
Kissinger: No. But the PRC is more important.
I think things look good in New York. And, even if we lose there, it is
not a disaster. We will still keep what we have.
TOP SECRET/NODIS - XGDS
MEMORANDUM
1412
941
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
TOP SECRET
GDS
(9/11) kokDamis
ACTION
Than
September 30, 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR:
MRS. DAVIS
FROM:
JOHN A. FROEBE, JR.
my
SUBJECT:
Declassification of 1949-50 Korean Papers
I agree to the release of all of the attached 1949-50 Korean papers,
with the exception of the following:
1) NSC 8/1 and 8/2. I most strongly recommend against the release
of these two documents at this time. Their release would carry a
considerable risk that North Korea would misinterpret U.S. intentions
on the Korean problem at the present time, and that South Korea might
see the release as presaging a decline in U.S. support. This risk would
be produced by the fact that these two NSC studies, the conclusions of
which were adopted as basic U.S. policy toward Korea, recommended
the removal of the remaining 7, 500 U.S. troops in Korea, even though
the study recognized that the withdrawal involved a substantial risk that
North Korea, supported by the Soviets or the Chinese, would thereby
be encouraged to attack South Korea. Specifically,
The Joint Chiefs took the position that the U.S. had little
strategic interest in maintaining its troops and bases in South Korea.
The study recognized that the removal of U.S. troops might
be followed by a North Korean attack on South Korea.
The study held that the
extension of Soviet-backed
Communist control throughout all of Korea would enhance the political
and strategic position of the USSR with respect to both China and
Japan and adversely affect the position of the U.S. in those areas and
throughout the Far East. 11
The study took note of the fact that the U.S. had decided less
sons
than six months earlier to postpone the withdrawal of the remaining
U.S. forces in part because of the dangers just cited.
LIDRAN
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E.O.
EC3.3
GDS
NSC
Guidelines
State 9/17/03
By
like
NARA, Date 12/6/10
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2
These two documents should be withheld in their entirety, since the
objectionable passages constitute the essence of the study and of the
subsequent policy decision.
2) 1950 Documents, Document No. 4, Memorandum of July 10, 1950
from the Joint Chiefs to the Secretary of Defense: This document should
be withheld in its entirety, since the essence of it is, as stated in
paragraph 3, that the Korean Peninsula is of "slight strategic importance"
to the United States. If released at this time, this document would risk
seriously misleading North Korea and others as to the basic importance
the U.S. attaches to the Korean Peninsula.
3) 1950 Documents, Document No. 6, Memorandum of July 25, 1950
from the NSC Executive Secretary: I recommend the deletion of the
first two sentences of paragraph 3. These sentences repeat and comment
on the argument made by the Joint Chiefs in their memorandum of
July 10, 1950, to the effect that Korea is of slight strategic importance
to the United States.
4) 1950 Documents. Document No. 24. Memorandum of November 9,
1950 from the Joint Chiefs to the Secretary of Defense: I recommend
the deletion of paragraph 5 (c) and of paragraphs (d) and (e). In these
paragraphs the Joint Chiefs make the same argument as in their memorandum
of July 10, 1950, an argument that would entail the risk to the United States'
interests described above.
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