Memorandum of Conversation with Secretary of State Dean Acheson and President Harry S. Truman

DECLASSIFIED STATE DEPT.MEMO A-1-Ly 451 TRUNAN and AND Project NLT F2-4 RECORD SERVICO By NLT- We NARS, Date 9.5.dy SUCHEI 295 & coverng Cetober 10. 1951 cotof Memorandum of Secretary's Conversation with the President Following his return from the NSC meeting, the Secretary met with several people in the Department and reported on his conversation with the President following the NSC. Mr. Lovett, Mr. Bohlen and General Smith were also present. The Secretary told the President that we had concluded that the resolution to be submitted to the Security Council was one which we could support. He said that he thought we were obli- gated to go along with the British on it, to vote for it, and to help in getting votes for it. He said that we thought we should let the British "call the shots" as to how they proceed, etc., although we might make suggestions to them. He pointed out that a defeat on the resolution might have serious effects on the British, and that similarly a victory might have serious effects as far as making it difficult for Mossadegh, but that we had decided we should support it and plan to do so. The Presi- dent agreed that this was the proper course. Apparently, information was given at the meeting at the White House to the effect that Mossadegh was most anxious to get a settlement of the oll problem and did not want a Security Coun- cil meeting to take place. The Secretary said that this informa- tion was authentic. He did not indicate the source of this infor- mation. He did say that he was inclined to think that the British should be told this. The Secretary went on to say to the President that the entire Iranian matter was extremely complicated and serious, and that while we did not understand all of it, he thought there were two great points necessary in order to get a settlement: 1. The first question is whether the British have a chance of going back into Iran as an operator. The Sec- retary said he was convinced that Mossadegh would not yield on this point. He said he thought that the British were about reconciled to this, but that we must know from the British that this is true and that they do accept the situation.