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- 2 -
S.
e
SECCORDS
so
From political point of view, dangerous
in Germany.
Czechoslovakia and other border questions
considered.
Result -- These ideas discarded.
Possibility still existed of Russian willingness to make
progress regarding Germany.
Importance of linking Austria.
Therefore, first effort should be made to ascertain
Russian purposes.
Importance, in this connection, of insisting that
talk be first directed to substantive matters,
rather than mere organization of four-power controls.
We decided, therefore, to probe Russian ideas on
establishing political freedom in East Germany, which
involved corporations and reparations --
guarantees of continued freedom in the event of
all-German Government;
freedom of trade throughout Germany.
Another eriticaltmatter would be progress of resump-
tion of normal relations between Western Zones and
Berlin.
So far as four-power control was concerned,
the veto could not be re-established.
We should strive for 'Austrian system
of freedom for German Government unless
unanimous disapproval.
It seemed necessary that the progress
already made on Western Germany should
not be jeopardized.
We regarded it as within the range of possibility
to work out a unified administration for Berlin.
Importance of this in maintaining economy
of city.
Best way of summarizing our views at the end of preparation is
to read memorandum of my off-the-record press conference of May 18.
Refer to my going-away statement. (D.S. Bul. 20, 675, pink slip 19)
Refer here to methods of communication both ways between Washington
and Paris which were set up for this meeting
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"ocrText": "- 2 -\nS.\ne\nSECCORDS\nso\nFrom political point of view, dangerous\nin Germany.\nCzechoslovakia and other border questions\nconsidered.\nResult -- These ideas discarded.\nPossibility still existed of Russian willingness to make\nprogress regarding Germany.\nImportance of linking Austria.\nTherefore, first effort should be made to ascertain\nRussian purposes.\nImportance, in this connection, of insisting that\ntalk be first directed to substantive matters,\nrather than mere organization of four-power controls.\nWe decided, therefore, to probe Russian ideas on\nestablishing political freedom in East Germany, which\ninvolved corporations and reparations --\nguarantees of continued freedom in the event of\nall-German Government;\nfreedom of trade throughout Germany.\nAnother eriticaltmatter would be progress of resump-\ntion of normal relations between Western Zones and\nBerlin.\nSo far as four-power control was concerned,\nthe veto could not be re-established.\nWe should strive for 'Austrian system\nof freedom for German Government unless\nunanimous disapproval.\nIt seemed necessary that the progress\nalready made on Western Germany should\nnot be jeopardized.\nWe regarded it as within the range of possibility\nto work out a unified administration for Berlin.\nImportance of this in maintaining economy\nof city.\nBest way of summarizing our views at the end of preparation is\nto read memorandum of my off-the-record press conference of May 18.\nRefer to my going-away statement. (D.S. Bul. 20, 675, pink slip 19)\nRefer here to methods of communication both ways between Washington\nand Paris which were set up for this meeting"
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