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Telegram from Ambassador Warren Austin to Secretary of State Dean Acheson

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  • Part of Korean War Files (Truman Administration), Department of State Files

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Knea 88 INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State DUPLICATE IN W. P. FILE TELEGRAPH BRANCH 28-M-X SECRET Action Control: 7127 Rec'd: January 16, 1951 UNA FROM: New York 8:12 p.m. Info SS TO: Secretary of State G P NO: DELGA 519, January 16, 7:39 p.m. DECLASSIFIED L E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402 EUR State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982 FE PRIORITY. By He DCR NLT, Date 7-14-14 FROM GROSS. Re Korea CTO Conversation with Jebb (UK DEL) I gave Jebb points for condemnation resolution. ARCHI NATIONAL RECORDS TROMAN ES AND informed me British Embassy had been instructed to SERVICE" discuss with Department problems relating to next steps. The British Government appears to have considerable difficulty with suggestion to use collective measures committee. I pointed out that CMC had seemed to us to be most suitable because of its balanced composition, because it did not include any Soviet or satellite states, and because it finessed the China question. All these problems would be presented if attempt were made to com- pose a new committee. Jebb said his government still very much concerned as to nature of collective measures and felt it important to discuss in detail with us on confidential basis (perhaps including French) what measures, if any, would result in perceptible damage to China. UK felt that if discussion these matters were precipitated in CMC without prior con- sultations with us, there would be embarrassing debates and delays which could not help but leak to the public. The UK still doubted desirability of designating action of Chinese as "aggression, feeling same purpose could be served by condemning their acts without fixing a label. He personally felt that there was no particular reason to avoid the label because consequences would probably be the same under either formulation. Essential question in Jebb's mind was what steps would follow, and he indicated same doubts and fears expressed by Younger when latter was here some weeks ago. British hoped that they could obtain from Department greater pre- cision of thinking re steps considered to be practicable and effective. Jebb was inclined to believe numerous other S DELS REPRODUCTION OF THIS SHORET (over) MESSAGE IS PROHIBITED