Telegram from Ambassador George Kennan to Secretary of State Dean Acheson

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State RE TELEGRAPH BRANCH 23-D-X TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION Action Control: 13490 FE Rec'd: July 29, 1952 FROM: Moscow 2:43 p.m. Info SS TO: Secretary of State G EUR NO: 201, July 29, 7 p.m. UNA DCR PRIORITY DCRM Have given careful thought DEPTEL 92, July 25 re Korean arm- istice. My views on specific questions raised by Dept follow: 1. Do not (rpt not) think it likely approach to Sovs at this time would exert any favorable effect on armistice negots unless we could demonstrate to Sov Govt by actions as well as words that alternative to prompt action by Sov Govt to bring about armis- tice wld be one having serious disadvantages for Kremlin. 2. Do not (rpt not) think any overt approach to Sov authorities would be apt produce much info on Sov attitudes toward contin- uation hostilities in Korea, unless it were one which, as per above, were backed up by some real means of pressure. 3. Not (rpt not) only do I feel such approach wld not be useful for purposes Dept has mentioned, but think it might actually have unfortunate and dangerous effect on general pattern of Sov- West relations unless, again, it were backed up by some real means of pressure. 4. Should it nevertheless be decided to make an approach, I think it should not (rpt not) be addressed to Vyshinski. It would appear as a repetition of Kirk's approach last November and fact that Kirk's warnings of that time had proved as yet unsubstantial would not (rpt not) incline Vyshinski and those who stand behind him to respect any warnings I might utter. 5. While deploring approach to Stalin now for general reasons, thinking it even uncertain whether I wld be received, I would consider this preferable to approaching Vyshinski. In case of approach to Stalin would recommend that instead of confining dis- cussion to Korea and making empty-handed plea for Sov help there an effort be made to discuss entire spectrum of US-Sov relations with him in such manner as to give grounds to hope that Korean question might eventually fall into place as part of general pattern. However, I reiterate I mention this only as something preferable to trying to talk about Korea alone, and do not (rpt not) consider that it wld be wise, on balance, for us to approach 38 REPRODUCTION FROM THIS TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION COPY, IF CLASSIFIED, IS PROHIBITED