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OCR Page 1 of 3NET(NAVAL AIDE) 439
OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
V
DECL
State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982
E.O. 12065, Set 3-102
WASHINGTON
DEB NLT, Date 9-11-85
December 8, 1952
By
TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION
SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS
INDOCHINA
A French Foreign Office official has informed
Embassy Paris that uncertain military situations
as now prevailing in Na San always cause public and parliamentary
heart-searching in France on the Indochina problem and that this
is particularly acute now. There is an unusual amount of ques- -
tioning as to what, if anything, could be done to bring about an ultimate
satisfactory solution, whether France should continue the struggle
and if so, where. There was universal agreement in France, he
said, on only one point: namely, that if France were to continue the
struggle, she could not do it "alone.' He stated that he recognized
that the US could not make any basic decisions on such questions
at the present time, but he felt it important that the US, UK, and
French Governments begin intensive and realistic political and
military studies now with a view to reaching decisions at the next
tripartite meeting, presumably in March or April. Indicative of
the type of questions to be considered, he mentioned: 1) whether
Indochina was in fact essential either militarily or politically to
preventing Communist domination of Southeast Asia; 2) could western
strategic interests be adequately met by holding offshore island
chain; 3) effect of French withdrawal from north and center to con-
centrate on holding only the south; 4) would it be possible to make
a major short-term military effort to wipe out the Viet-Minh pocket
between the northern and central strong points and establish a
single front between them, and 5) would there be any possibility
of "borrowing" US and UK planes, carriers and naval vessels
from Korea or elsewhere in connection with that or similar operations.
Embassy Paris states that there was no element
of blackmail whatever in this discussion but it was simply an ex-
pression of conviction that the three governments would have to do
some very serious thinking individually and collectively and face
up to difficult decisions within a few months. The French spokes-
man also expressed the hope that a tripartite staff organization
could be established as soon as possible.
TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION