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NET(NAVAL AIDE) 439 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE V DECL State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982 E.O. 12065, Set 3-102 WASHINGTON DEB NLT, Date 9-11-85 December 8, 1952 By TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS INDOCHINA A French Foreign Office official has informed Embassy Paris that uncertain military situations as now prevailing in Na San always cause public and parliamentary heart-searching in France on the Indochina problem and that this is particularly acute now. There is an unusual amount of ques- - tioning as to what, if anything, could be done to bring about an ultimate satisfactory solution, whether France should continue the struggle and if so, where. There was universal agreement in France, he said, on only one point: namely, that if France were to continue the struggle, she could not do it "alone.' He stated that he recognized that the US could not make any basic decisions on such questions at the present time, but he felt it important that the US, UK, and French Governments begin intensive and realistic political and military studies now with a view to reaching decisions at the next tripartite meeting, presumably in March or April. Indicative of the type of questions to be considered, he mentioned: 1) whether Indochina was in fact essential either militarily or politically to preventing Communist domination of Southeast Asia; 2) could western strategic interests be adequately met by holding offshore island chain; 3) effect of French withdrawal from north and center to con- centrate on holding only the south; 4) would it be possible to make a major short-term military effort to wipe out the Viet-Minh pocket between the northern and central strong points and establish a single front between them, and 5) would there be any possibility of "borrowing" US and UK planes, carriers and naval vessels from Korea or elsewhere in connection with that or similar operations. Embassy Paris states that there was no element of blackmail whatever in this discussion but it was simply an ex- pression of conviction that the three governments would have to do some very serious thinking individually and collectively and face up to difficult decisions within a few months. The French spokes- man also expressed the hope that a tripartite staff organization could be established as soon as possible. TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION