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NLT (Naval Aide 1166 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON DECLASSIFIED E.O. Guidelines, March 9-4-85 6, 1982 12065, Sec. 3-402 State By Dept. DEB NLT, Date February 2, 1951 TOP SEC SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS EASTERN EUROPE The chiefs of our eastern European missions meeting at Paris agree on the basis of their observations that evidence does not suggest the imminence of hostilities in their areas. Although the Soviet Union and its satellites are steadily developing their military capabilities, present signs suggest this is a long-term effort rather than one designed to support hostilities in the immediate future. The chiefs agree, however, that a change can occur in the situation at any time and may not be immediately detected because of the increasing limitations on facilities for the observation of such change. They believe that the Soviet Union will not move on its own volition in the immediate future but that the action of the western powers directed toward reducing the gap between Communist military strength and that of the West could alter this estimated Soviet attitude. The extent and manner of the rearmament of West Germany may therefore be of paramount importance. Reaction to rearmament appears more violent in the satellites than in the USSR. The chiefs are unable to determine whether the Soviet-bloc admonitions are a part of a war of nerves or forecast direct action if rearmament gets under way. The comment is made that the USSR undoubtedly realizes that the western powers are aware of the magnitude of military developments in East Germany and would probably not be provoked by a comparable effort in West Germany. GERMANY We have informed our High Commissioner that it is our view that the High Commission should not be the determining body on the acceptability of German proposals from the NATO viewpoint. While we believe that the Germans are entitled to full information on internal German administrative problems and on overall troop strengths, we do not believe that matters of higher command organization can be decided at this time nor can tentative answers to German questions on this subject be attempted by the High Commission. We point out that the initial purpose of the present dis - cussions is to obtain the German viewpoint. It is our view that the OP