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OCR Page 1 of 2NLT (Naval Aide 1166
OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. Guidelines, March 9-4-85 6, 1982
12065, Sec. 3-402
State By Dept. DEB NLT, Date
February 2, 1951
TOP SEC
SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS
EASTERN EUROPE
The chiefs of our eastern European missions
meeting at Paris agree on the basis of their
observations that evidence does not suggest the imminence of hostilities
in their areas. Although the Soviet Union and its satellites are steadily
developing their military capabilities, present signs suggest this is a
long-term effort rather than one designed to support hostilities in the
immediate future. The chiefs agree, however, that a change can occur
in the situation at any time and may not be immediately detected because
of the increasing limitations on facilities for the observation of such
change. They believe that the Soviet Union will not move on its own
volition in the immediate future but that the action of the western powers
directed toward reducing the gap between Communist military strength
and that of the West could alter this estimated Soviet attitude. The
extent and manner of the rearmament of West Germany may therefore
be of paramount importance. Reaction to rearmament appears more
violent in the satellites than in the USSR. The chiefs are unable to
determine whether the Soviet-bloc admonitions are a part of a war of
nerves or forecast direct action if rearmament gets under way. The
comment is made that the USSR undoubtedly realizes that the western
powers are aware of the magnitude of military developments in East
Germany and would probably not be provoked by a comparable effort in
West Germany.
GERMANY
We have informed our High Commissioner that
it is our view that the High Commission should
not be the determining body on the acceptability of German proposals
from the NATO viewpoint. While we believe that the Germans are
entitled to full information on internal German administrative problems
and on overall troop strengths, we do not believe that matters of higher
command organization can be decided at this time nor can tentative
answers to German questions on this subject be attempted by the High
Commission. We point out that the initial purpose of the present dis -
cussions is to obtain the German viewpoint. It is our view that the
OP