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C. Suggested Defense Position
1. Must closely watch balance, so control does not
injure capability, nor hair-trigger be set too
fine.
2. Support Acheson on parallel though modest nuclear
preparations.
V. Airlifts
A. Acheson
1. Garrison airlift should be first response to blocked
Allied access.
2. Full airlift should be response to blocked civilian
access.
3. Allies would insist on these before ground conflict.
B. JCS
1. Airlifts are last resort measures.
2. Evidence of airlift preparations weakens deterrent
credibility.
3. Some hal-deployment of airlift can result.
4.
Soviet interference capability much greater than
in 1948.
C. Suggested Defense Position
1. Reserve.
VI. Substance of Negotiations
A. Acheson
1. "Optical changes" in Berlin status are quite
acceptable.
2. US should concede a self-imposed limitation on
garrison strength.
3. US should concede on permanence of Oder-Neisse.
B. JCS - Not known.
C. Suggested Defense Position
1. The concessions to be granted the USSR are not all
acceptable. At the general level, the concept that "an optical
change" in the Berlin situation in favor of the Soviets is not
hurtful to the US could hardly be more wrong. Besides the real
4
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Document data
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Context sent to Scholar
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"ocrText": "TOP SECRET\nC. Suggested Defense Position\n1. Must closely watch balance, so control does not\ninjure capability, nor hair-trigger be set too\nfine.\n2. Support Acheson on parallel though modest nuclear\npreparations.\nV. Airlifts\nA. Acheson\n1. Garrison airlift should be first response to blocked\nAllied access.\n2. Full airlift should be response to blocked civilian\naccess.\n3. Allies would insist on these before ground conflict.\nB. JCS\n1. Airlifts are last resort measures.\n2. Evidence of airlift preparations weakens deterrent\ncredibility.\n3. Some hal-deployment of airlift can result.\n4.\nSoviet interference capability much greater than\nin 1948.\nC. Suggested Defense Position\n1. Reserve.\nVI. Substance of Negotiations\nA. Acheson\n1. \"Optical changes\" in Berlin status are quite\nacceptable.\n2. US should concede a self-imposed limitation on\ngarrison strength.\n3. US should concede on permanence of Oder-Neisse.\nB. JCS - Not known.\nC. Suggested Defense Position\n1. The concessions to be granted the USSR are not all\nacceptable. At the general level, the concept that \"an optical\nchange\" in the Berlin situation in favor of the Soviets is not\nhurtful to the US could hardly be more wrong. Besides the real\n4\nTOP SEGRET"
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