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    "label": "Briefing Paper for NSC Discussion on Berlin, 29 June 1961",
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    "title": "Briefing Paper for NSC Discussion on Berlin, 29 June 1961",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/6037281",
    "collections": [
        "Robert S. McNamara Papers",
        "Records Relating to the Defense Program and Operations"
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    "subjects": [
        "Berlin Wall, Berlin, Germany, 1961-1989"
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    "url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/81/372/6037281/content/arcmedia/research/1961-berlin-crisis/932006-3-4-15/Briefing-Paper-29-June-1961.pdf",
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    "ocrText": "Item 2\nTOP SEGRET\nJune 28, 1961\nBRIEFING PAPER FOR NSC DISCUSSION ON BERLIN\n29 June 1961\nA paper prepared by Mr. Acheson analyzing the Berlin situation\nand recommending main lines of US action is expected to be the focus\nof discussion.\nThe Acheson paper has been rapidly produced, with little\nopportunity for revision. NSC participants will have had the benefit\nof only brief study and relatively little staffing. The JCS will\nnot have time to establish a formal position. Much of the subject\nmatter has had close examination, however, and there are JCS positions\non many features of the problem. Set out in outline form below for\nsome key issues are elements of Mr. Acheson's approach, of the JCS\napproach, and of a suggested Defense position.\nI. Nuclear Weapons and the Berlin Problem\nA. Acheson\n1. Credibility of our nuclear deterrent must be\nrestored, by actions.\n2. Use of SAC transcends and cannot solve the\nBerlin problem.\n3. General nuclear war might grow from initially\nnon-nuclear conflict.\n4. US must face this risk, and make it convincing\nto Soviets.\n5. US must be prepared to use whatever force is\nnecessary.\n6. US should raise nuclear threshold.\n7. Tighter policy control over warhead use is\nnow essential.\nB. JCS\n1. US determination is the main issue.\n2. Clear political decision to \"go all the way\"\nneeded beforehand.\n3. Past pattern of manifesting nuclear threat is\nsound and should be intensified.\n4. Visible intent to use large non-nuclear force\nmay cast doubt on our determination.\n5. Viable alternatives to general nuclear war\nbeing desirable, initial nuclear use should\nperhaps be restricted to a handful of purely\nmilitary targets.\nDOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR\nTOP SECRET\nINTERVALS: NOT AUTOMANICALLY\nDECLASSIFIED. DOD DIR 5200.10\nTOP SECRET\nC. Suggested Defense Position\n1. Support Acheson approach.\nII. Size of Non-Nuclear Force to be Used\nA. Acheson\n1. Start modestly, with a division or two, prepared\nto expand.\n2. Larger force gains more time for deterrent to\noperate.\n3. Larger force more convincing evidence of both\ndetermination and possibility of escalation to\ngeneral nuclear war.\n4. Must preclude any possibility of US looking\nludicrous, as by GDR alone stopping a ground\noperation.\n5. Strong troop reinforcement beforehand is necessary,\nUS and Allied.\n6. No upper limit of force should be set beyond which\nUS goes nuclear.\nB. JCS\n1. Allies cannot \"win\" in non-nuclear ground conflict\n(implicit assumption that any Bloc resistance means\ntotal Soviet resistance).\n2. Any conflict with Soviets in Europe almost inevitably\nbecomes general nuclear war.\n3. Allied divisions used toward Berlin would be chewed\nup.\n4. Mal-deployment for general war results from use of\nmuch force.\nC. Suggested Defense Position\n1. Object of ground operation is to change Soviet\ndecision, not destroy forces.\n2. Prior reinforcement based on still earlier mobiliza-\ntion can raise capability and avoid ill-effects of\nchanged deployment.\n3. Using stronger ground forces improves chances of\nsuccess short of general nuclear war.\nIII. Military Preparations\nA. Acheson\n1. Twofold object: forestall crisis, and prepare to\nmeet it.\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SEGRET\n2. Measures should be businesslike, realistic, and\nnot ballyhooed.\n3. From a moderate start, tempo should rise.\n4. US should avoid scaring Allies and blocking Soviet\nway out.\n5. Main preparations for non-nuclear ground action in\nEurope.\n6. Phased parallel preparations: nuclear, civil\ndefense, world-wide.\n7. No MRBM development, nuclear aid to France, Cuba,\nor Laos.\nB. JCS\n1. Preparations should emphasize strategic nuclear\nstrength.\n2. Early partial mobilization needed.\n3. Allies probably unwilling to make non-nuclear\npreparations.\n4. US should develop land-based MRBM, give France\nnuclear aid, and intervene in Cuba and Laos.\nC. Suggested Defense Position\n1. Time is required to mobilize and deploy; risky\nto be too gradual.\n2. To use non-nuclear ground force in Europe, we\nmust begin mobilizing some months beforehand.\n3. Allies apt to follow US lead.\n4. Support Acheson.\nIV. Nuclear Aspects of Preparations\nA. Acheson\n1. Some strengthening and readying of nuclear forces\nshould accompany conventional force improvement.\n2. By creating crisis Khrushchev shows existing pattern\nof nuclear deterrence not convincing; more of same\nhelps little.\n3. Absence of nuclear measures could increase Khrushchev\ndoubts and US vulnerability.\n4. Whatever its size, danger of Soviet pre-emption grows,\nso some SAC air alert is in order\n5. Political control of US nukes needs tightening.\nB. JCS\n1. US preparations should emphasize nuclear measures.\n2. US should improve nuclear readiness of Allies.\nTOP 3SEGRET\nTOP SECRET\nC. Suggested Defense Position\n1. Must closely watch balance, so control does not\ninjure capability, nor hair-trigger be set too\nfine.\n2. Support Acheson on parallel though modest nuclear\npreparations.\nV. Airlifts\nA. Acheson\n1. Garrison airlift should be first response to blocked\nAllied access.\n2. Full airlift should be response to blocked civilian\naccess.\n3. Allies would insist on these before ground conflict.\nB. JCS\n1. Airlifts are last resort measures.\n2. Evidence of airlift preparations weakens deterrent\ncredibility.\n3. Some mal-deployment of airlift can result.\n4. Soviet interference capability much greater than\nin 1948.\nC. Suggested Defense Position\n1. Reserve.\nVI. Substance of Negotiations\nA. Acheson\n1. \"Optical changes\" in Berlin status are quite\nacceptable.\n2. US should concede a self-imposed limitation on\ngarrison strength.\n3. US should concede on permanence of Oder-Neisse.\nB. JCS - Not known.\nC. Suggested Defense Position\n1. The concessions to be granted the USSR are not all\nacceptable. At the general level, the concept that \"an optical\nchange\" in the Berlin situation in favor of the Soviets is not\nhurtful to the US could hardly be more wrong. Besides the real\n4\nTOP SEGRET\nTOP SECRET\naspects of Berlin, the symbolic aspects are profoundly important,\nas the early portions of the paper so powerfully affirm. The\nworld's eyes are on Berlin; governments and publics alike are\nwatching, in allied, and neutral, and unfriendly states. Not\nonly sophisticated statesmen watch, who can perceive the reality\nbehind the appearance of a Soviet gain. There are others, too,\nwhose illusions come easier. To them the appearance of Soviet\ngain is the reality of US loss in a place where we have said we\nwill not lose. The consequence, in terms of our national influence\nabroad vis-a-vis the Soviets', is no different whether our loss\nbe real or only apparent.\n2. More specifically, we must for psychological as well as\nmilitary reasons be most cautious about arrangements touching on\nAllied garrisons and intelligence activities in Berlin. To\naccept limitations on garrison strength is to imply a tacit\nceiling on the protection offered the West Berliners. It is\nto suggest some Soviet control over the degree of US and NATO\ncommitment to defend them. Psychologically it would disturb those\ntwo and a third million people whose whole pattern of confident\nindustriousness stems from implicit, unexamined faith in the un-\nlimited nature of Allied protection. Militarily a strength limita-\ntion could inhibit somewhat our ability to deal with the possibility\nof disorders and violence by infiltrated goon-squads, and it could\nmake matters awkward as the periodic improvements in organization\nand equipment necessitate unit reorganization.\n3. The impact of US acquiescence in the permanence of the\nOder-Neisse is dealt with rather lightly. West Germany, which\nnow furnishes half NATO's Shield strength and much of its momentum,\nfinds that quite offensive. What would be the cost to NATO and\nour security of this major stride toward formalizing the Soviet\nconsolidation of Eastern Europe, including a pair of Germanies?\nTOP SECRET"
}