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Memorandum for the President - Preliminary Draft - The Berlin Crisis

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SECRET -30- - time for the Soviets to appreciate the risks of the course on which they were embarked and to seek an acceptable negotiated settlement. After a period of about 1-2 weeks this allied force would need further reinforcement - depending on the Communist strength thrown against it. At some point, either at the end of this 1-2 weeks or later if the seven division force were to be reinforced, a judgment would have to be reached that we had done all that was feasible to convince Khrushchev that the United States would and, indeed, must - in order to preserve its army, its allies and itself - use nuclear weapons. Thus the last stage of deterrence would have been reached, if previous preparations and uses of force had not produced an acceptable settlement of the issue. The SECRET

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Source index
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Size
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Context sent to Scholar

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    "ocrText": "SECRET\n-30- -\ntime for the Soviets to appreciate the risks of the course\non which they were embarked and to seek an acceptable negotiated\nsettlement.\nAfter a period of about 1-2 weeks this allied force would\nneed further reinforcement - depending on the Communist strength\nthrown against it. At some point, either at the end of this\n1-2 weeks or later if the seven division force were to be\nreinforced, a judgment would have to be reached that we had\ndone all that was feasible to convince Khrushchev that the\nUnited States would and, indeed, must - in order to preserve\nits army, its allies and itself - use nuclear weapons. Thus\nthe last stage of deterrence would have been reached, if\nprevious preparations and uses of force had not produced an\nacceptable settlement of the issue.\nThe\nSECRET"
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